EM ERGI NG L ESSO N S S ER IES N O. 7 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: DEC EM BER 202 1 PREVIOUS REPORTS IN THE EMERGING LESSONS SERIES No. 1: Involuntary Resettlement—April 2016 No. 2: Indigenous Peoples—October 2016 No. 3: Environmental Assessment—April 2017 No. 4: Consultation, Participation & Disclosure of Information—October 2017 No. 5: Insights from the Kalagala Biodiversity Offset Associated with the Bujagali Power Project in Uganda—May 2020 No. 6: Responding to Project Gender-Based Violence Complaints Through an Independent Accountability Mechanism— December 2020 All reports are on the Inspection Panel website: www.inspectionpanel.org/publications E M E RGING L ESSON S SE R IES N O. 7 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: D EC E M B E R 2021 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BHRRC Business and Human Rights Resource Centre CAO Compliance Advisor Ombudsman CSO Civil Society Organization DRC Democratic Republic of Congo ESF Environmental and Social Framework ESS Environmental and Social Standard GBV Gender-Based Violence GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism HRD Human Rights Defender IAM Independent Accountability Mechanism IDB Inter-American Development Bank IFI International Financial Institution NERAMP North Eastern Road-corridor Asset Management Project OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights PAPs Project-Affected Persons PBS III Protection of Basic Services Program Phase II Additional Financing and Promoting Basic Services Phase III Project Pro-Routes Second Additional Financing for the High-Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project TSDP Transport Sector Development Project UN United Nations UNRA Uganda National Roads Authority 2 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Background and Context .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 a) Introduction.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 b) Report Structure.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 c) Increasing Reprisals and Their Impact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 Key Terms and Concepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 Commitments Against Reprisals .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 a) The World Bank’s Commitments Against Reprisals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Case Study I: 2012—Ethiopia: Protection of Basic Services Program Phase II Additional Financing and Promoting Basic Services Phase III Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 b) Safe Access to Complaint Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 How the Rule-of-Law Context Affects Accountability for Reprisals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Case Study II: 2004—Pakistan: National Drainage Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4 Inspection Panel Data on Reprisals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 a) What the Data Shows. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Case Study III: 2018—India: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 b) Types and Sources of Reprisals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Case Study IV: 2017—DRC: Second Additional Financing for the High-Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Case Study V: 2020—Peru: Cusco Transport Improvement Project. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 5 Evolution of the Panel’s Approach to Addressing Reprisals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 a) Incremental Progress. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Case Study VI: 2013—Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project and Additional Financing. . . . 42 b) Outcomes .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Case Study VII: 2001—Chad: Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, Management of the Petroleum Economy Project, and Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 6 Insights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Endnotes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54  3 INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS— WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS The burgeoning global activism of the late 1980s and early 1990s brought with it a degree of criticism of certain World Bank projects. In scattered capitals and remote sites around the world, some dissatisfied members of civil society questioned the Bank’s social and environmental commitments. The Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank took notice and responded in 1993 by creating an independent internal body, the Inspection Panel, to review such questions and complaints impartially. The Inspection Panel investigative approach is designed to: • Help project-affected people and communities share their voices and concerns about Bank-supported activities that impact their lives and shape their futures, • foster redress whenever and wherever it is warranted, and • promote institutional accountability and learning within the Bank. By launching the Panel, the Bank’s Board introduced an instrument of “bottom-up” accountability to supplement the “top-down” system already existing within the Bank’s management structure. For bottom-up accountability to achieve its important goals—and to encourage community members to contact the Bank when necessary—the Panel has been and remains accessible, credible, and impartial. An essential premise of Inspection Panel operations is that access to the Panel must remain free from any coercion or reprisal— a policy that reflects and reinforces the World Bank’s “zero tolerance” of intimidation or retaliation. 4 1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT a) Introduction T he World Bank Inspection Panel (“the Panel”)1 is committed to preventing intimidation or reprisals of any kind against anyone who submits or supports a complaint presented to it. The Panel believes that any form of reprisal threatens the integrity of the World Bank’s accountability process and that a fundamental premise of the Panel’s function is that project-affected persons (PAPs) can access it safely. 2 The World Bank (“the Bank”) more broadly also maintains a strong commitment against reprisals. The Bank states, “We do not tolerate reprisals and retaliation against those who share their views about Bank- financed projects. Any form of intimidation against people who comment on Bank projects, research, activ- ities and their impact, goes against our core values of respecting the people we work for and acting with utmost integrity.”3 In striving to meet the level of zero tolerance of intimidation and reprisals in the context of Panel cases, the Panel and World Bank Management (or “Management”) have promptly and consistently collaborated in responding to instances of reprisal. Both the Panel and Management believe that it is through the World Bank as an institution that allegations of reprisals can best be addressed. The Panel’s case record, described below, demonstrates the valuable benefits of this collaboration and the constraints inherent in rectifying reprisals. In this advisory report (the “report”) the terms intimidation, reprisals and retaliation are used generically and interchangeably to identify any sort of harmful action or conduct used by one party to discourage or prevent another party from voicing opinions or interacting with any non-judicial, quasi-judicial, judicial, or administrative recourse mechanism, or to punish another party for taking such action. This report includes some examples of reprisals allegedly experienced by Requesters4 because they submitted a complaint to the Inspection Panel as well as alleged reprisals that project-affected persons and human rights defenders (HRDs) have experienced when raising issues or expressing opposition to a Bank-financed project that the Panel was reviewing. The reprisals described below also cover parties or persons who claim to have experi- enced retaliation due to their actual or presumed association with a Panel case; such associated persons5 may include interpreters or facilitators. This report cites various allegations of reprisals. These allegations have been presented to the Panel through Requests for Inspections or during the processing of the Requests; in some cases, allegations were presented after the case was closed. In some of the examples described below, the Panel neither investigated nor confirmed a given allegation, but the report presents the victims’ experiences here as they were recounted to the Panel. It is worth noting that the Panel is not required to verify the credibility of such allegations. Background and Context 5 b) Report Structure The case studies and examples presented below were selected to illustrate the different types of This advisory report delves into the Panel’s experi- reprisals reported by Requesters, PAPs, and associ- ence and practice responding to allegations of repri- ated persons, the mitigating actions the Panel and sals since its inception nearly 30 years ago. Bank Management took to address these reprisals, Through its case studies, the Panel offers in-depth and the outcomes of these efforts—both positive insights from the viewpoint of an independent and negative. The studies describe some Panel accountability mechanism (IAM), and disseminates input or actions that brought desired results—and information on handling the subject of reprisals— others that were less successful, thereby illustrat- including good practices, challenges, and limita- ing some of the limitations the Panel and Bank tions faced—from this perspective. This report Management have faced on this issue. Since this aims to raise awareness about the potential risks report focuses on the Panel’s conduct in selected of reprisals and ways to identify and address such situations, the names of individuals involved are risks, and provides suggestions for safeguarding omitted here, whether or not their difficulties were the wellbeing of individuals subjected to reprisals publicized by journalists or others. caused by their involvement in—or relation to— The Panel’s procedures allow affected people and a complaint about a Bank-funded project. communities to submit a Request for Inspection The Panel believes the insights presented here will through local representatives. In many cases, griev- be of use to development practitioners and anyone ances are brought to the Panel by community mem- else with an interest in or need for accountability. bers representing themselves and/or others, or by Hence, the objectives of this report are twofold: local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). First, to share the Panel’s experience, knowledge, A complaint to the Panel can raise the Requesters’ practice, and the practical steps taken to date in profiles, potentially exposing them to unwanted response to reports of reprisals. attention and a host of questions and suspicions Second, this report examines how PAPs can be pre- about their motives and agendas. Even if their emptively protected from the risk of reprisals and request for confidentiality is strictly observed, remain engaged in the development process. This is stakeholders (whether authorities, commercial enti- important, as Requesters raise issues that are often ties, or other community members) may attempt to critical for their own livelihoods and welfare, and the deduce or assume who the Requesters are. When cohesion of their societies and families. This report that occurs, Requesters may be pressed, intimi- also examines the limitations of the Panel and Bank dated, condemned, threatened, attacked, smeared, Management in affording protection. defamed, or retaliated against for complaining to the Panel, an international oversight body external The report is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 to national sovereign mechanisms. For these rea- provides background and context. Chapter 2 intro- sons, Requesters often approach the Panel in des- duces the key terms and concepts used throughout peration and only as a last resort—when they believe the report. Chapter 3 examines retaliation against they have no effective alternative left to them for contract workers such as interpreters and facilita- redress. By submitting such a complaint, they often tors who support the Panel in the field and how wittingly assume a potential risk of retaliation. the rule-of-law context affects accountability for reprisals. Chapter 4 analyzes quantitative and quali- tative data on reprisals gathered from a cross- section of Panel cases. Chapter 5 describes the Panel’s system for dealing with allegations of reprisals. Chapter 6 presents the Panel’s insights. 6 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS B O X 1 : A T Y P I C A L P A N E L C A S E I N V O LV I N G A L L E G AT I O N S O F R E P R I S A L S A few years back,6 Requesters sent the Panel an email raising issues of resettlement and forced eviction. They asked for confidentiality, which was respected. Shortly after their complaint was submitted, they informed the Panel that someone was planning their “removal.” They said “two well-dressed men” had knocked on their door one evening; the next night some suspicious looking, plain-clothes police officers visited their family and busi- ness searching for them, which the Requesters viewed as a threat. Subsequently someone broke into one of their houses and stole equipment containing personal information. The Requesters summed up by saying “they are living in fear and spending their nights in different places.” They asked the Panel for relocation assistance. With their consent, the Panel immediately told Bank Management, withholding their names and any information that could identify the Requesters. Management wrote to the Government, alerting it to the Bank’s zero- tolerance policy of retaliation in the context of its projects. The letter, which Management shared with the Panel, stated the Bank’s categorical commitment to protect Requesters, victims, and witnesses from any form of threat. The letter asked the Government to remind all project implementing entities of the importance of avoiding, and safeguarding Requesters against, retaliation. The Panel informed the Requesters about the letter, but explained that the Panel per se lacked the authority or ability to use Bank resources to relocate them. The elements of this case illustrate the process the Panel follows regarding reports of reprisals against Requesters, what can be achieved, and the Panel’s limitations. The Panel is an independent complaints mecha- nism for people and communities who believe they have been—or are likely to be—adversely affected by a Bank- supported project. The Panel process gives PAPs an opportunity to present their concerns, and provides affected individuals and community members—those who believe their rights and interests may be at risk—a vehicle to bring their fears to the attention of the Bank and, ultimately, to the Board of Executive Directors. The example in Box 1 demonstrates the chain of rights defenders—including 38 women—and 35 events and the key role played by the Bank when countries registered the killing of at least one HRD.8 the Panel alerts it to incidents or allegations of Between 2015 and 2019, OHCHR recorded 1,323 kill- reprisals. In such cases, the Panel closely coordi- ings of HRDs—including 166 women and 22 young nates with senior Bank Management, which leads HRDs.9 the ensuing dialogue with government authorities. This case also indicates the limitations of both the Panel’s and Bank Management’s ability to provide Intimidation and reprisals affect not protection once Requesters start to experience only the individuals and groups directly reprisals. impacted, but are alarming also for the c) Increasing Reprisals and Their Impact message they send to other actors and Increasing Reprisals. Intimidation and reprisals are individuals, whether from government growing concerns worldwide, including in the con- or civil society, who wish to… text of development projects.7 In 2019, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human express their views freely. Rights (OHCHR) recorded the killing of 281 human —UN Secretary-General António Guterres10* Background and Context 7 In 2015, six of the nine Requests for Inspection (67 short notice to accept expropriation of their homes percent) received by the Panel included requests on the questionable justification that the houses for confidentiality, while three (33 percent) reported violated city regulations. They were told if they did fears of reprisal. In comparison, four of the five not consent voluntarily, their houses would be forci- Requests (80 percent) received in 2020 asked bly expropriated anyway. Faced with this ultimatum, for confidentiality and two (40 percent) conveyed the potential Requesters felt “disappointed, help- Requesters’ fear of reprisal.11 The threat of reprisals less, and abandoned.”14 Ultimately, they were given affects not only victims and their families. It also less than a month to leave their residences. These has a serious deterrent effect on other individuals potential Requesters further alleged that the com- or communities raising or contemplating raising pensation they were offered was unfair and insuf- project concerns. ficient. The Panel explained its process to them. A few months later, they explained their reluctance Risks of Filing a Request. In addition to the to submit the signatures required to initiate the Requests it receives, the Panel commonly com- Panel admissibility process owing to their fear of municates with potential Requesters interested in retaliation.15 filing a complaint but reluctant to do so because of what they believe are existing reprisals against Impact of Reprisals. Several Panel cases—such as them. For example, in the Brazil Paraná Biodiversity the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Second Project case in 2006, the Panel informed the Board Additional Financing for the High Priority Roads of Executive Directors that the Requesters claimed Reopening and Maintenance Project (“Pro-Routes,” to have been intimidated and warned not to file see Case Study IV), the Uganda Transport Sector a Request for Inspection, and then pressured to Development Project (TSDP, see details below), and withdraw it after they nevertheless proceeded.12 the Pakistan National Drainage Project (see Case The Panel noted in its eligibility report that such Study II)—highlight the ways inadequate local griev- practice “threatens the integrity of the Panel pro- ance procedures in many communities, poor consul- cess and may have a chilling effect on local people tation by a project, and the lack of opportunities for who genuinely feel harmed or potentially harmed by engagement serve as major causes of community Bank projects.”13 frustration and distress. These inadequacies insti- gated heightened tensions and opposition to these In another context, the Panel met with two rep- projects which, in turn, eventually led Requesters to resentatives of civil society organizations (CSOs) allege various forms of reprisals and retaliation. who were raising concerns related to an irrigation project. The representatives—acting on behalf of In many Panel cases, opponents of a project found farmers concerned that a project would lead to themselves accused—by national and sub-na- the diversion of irrigation water away from their tional authorities—of being “anti-development” or farms—approached the Panel to inquire about its “anti-progress.” In other cases, Requesters faced process. They later told the Panel that the farmers hostility and/or reprisals from within their own feared retaliation from the authorities because of communities. This can happen when a community is a national law prohibiting individuals from asking divided about a particular project initiative. international organizations for help. Their fear Often Bank Management implicitly acknowledges deterred them from filing a complaint and seeking the risk of retaliation. In the TSDP, Management redress for their concerns. noted that “complaints about the road works [were] In yet another example, some potential Requesters not welcome and may have been seen as jeopar- complained about the likelihood of suffering harm dizing the Project altogether.”16 The Requesters from project-supported involuntary resettlement. said the project lacked a functioning mechanism Several dozen households had received extremely to hear and address their grievances. As a result, 8 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS community members were spending “a lot of funds such retaliation, in turn, often prevents PAPs from and other household resources” to pursue their filing a complaint with the Inspection Panel or grievances. They told the Panel there were no seeking redress through an independent account- “dialogue meetings” in which PAPs could air their ability mechanism. The 2020 Annual Report of views.17 the OHCHR, for example, noted that “repressive or restrictive environments that have led to concrete One of the chilling effects of reprisals is the silenc- acts inhibiting cooperation with the United Nations, ing of individuals—such as HRDs, witnesses, civil including self-censorship, continue to be docu- society representatives, or those who strive to mented and reported. When individuals, groups raise issues and concerns. This can also result from and communities are afraid to be associated with reprisals against third parties—family members, the United Nations, its relevance and impact is colleagues, or other individuals associated with seriously undermined.”18 the HRDs. Awareness in the wider community of Background and Context 9 10 2 KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS D ifferent institutions have their own, discrete vocabularies to define types and attributes of reprisals. This report utilizes the terms and definitions used by OHCHR, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders,19 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Front Line Defenders—an international non-governmental organization specializing in protecting HRDs20—and other IAMs. Herein “victims” of reprisals include PAPs, persons associated with Panel cases, and HRDs.21 Acts of Intimidation and Reprisal or Threats Thereof include warnings or acts relating to physical harm—including death—or hardships, such as loss of employment. Threats of physical harm can be especially effective in contexts characterized by extreme violence. In many countries, threats are leveled against family members to put pressure on HRDs.22 Colleagues or other community members might also be targeted. Death threats are used widely to dis- suade HRDs. These are often anonymous and arrive by telephone, letter, or online.23 Sometimes, however, the threats come from people known to the defenders; but even when identified, perpetrators are usually neither investigated nor charged by the police. The lack of effective police or judicial response to killings and death threats invites further violations.24 The relative impunity that characterizes weak rule-of-law environments can discourage prosecution of criminal acts. “[T]he sub-contractor representative, speaking about the complaining landowners (though not in their presence), stated that he would ‘knock them with his car’ and that he would ‘have them shot’.”25 Arbitrary Detention is depriving an individual of liberty without legal justification, or in response to a legitimate exercise of human rights—such as freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of assembly, and freedom of associ- ation—or confining refugees for exercising their right to seek asylum and/or freedom to leave their own country.26 “The NGOs described Chad’s public consultations as ‘one way’ processes where local villages were told what was going to happen, and where free exchange of views was hampered by the presence of armed security forces, or by government representatives who would retaliate by arresting or intimidating people who spoke out against the Project.”27 Associated Persons (as defined by the Inspection Panel) are individuals involved with the Panel process and may include project-affected persons, interviewees, and those assisting in the field—drivers, interpreters, facilitators, etc.28 Key Terms and Concepts 11 Break-ins and Thefts are usually committed by unknown individu- als. Often equipment and documents are stolen, thereby disrupting HRDs’ work.29 Defamation is the use of slanderous allegations in state-controlled or other media to attack the integrity of complainants or HRDs. Malicious accusations are fabricated to discredit independent non-governmen- tal organizations and journalists seeking to expose human rights abuses. Defenders’ work is publicly misrepresented, and HRDs them- selves are labeled terrorists, rebels, subversives, proxies of opposi- tion parties, etc.30 The resulting notoriety may expose Requesters and their advocates to additional reprisals. “The Requesters claim local authorities have been using social media and television to spread misinformation and defame them as well as their businesses, creating an environment of hostility where the Requesters fear for their safety.”31 Harassment is almost always committed by authorities and can take many forms. These include phone surveillance, seizing or withhold- ing travel and identity documents, disbarring lawyers, levying heavy fines for trivial, administrative transgressions, or ordering targeted individuals to report repeatedly over extended periods to an adminis- trative office for no clear reason.32 Human Rights Defenders are persons or groups who peacefully pro- mote, protect, and address environmental or human rights on behalf of individuals, communities, or other groups.33 HRDs seek to advance civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.34 Interrogation often follows summons to appear before police author- ities or prosecutors. Although questioning is legitimate in many cases, it is also used to deter HRDs from performing their legitimate work by implying or threatening that an investigation may be opened against them.35 (See Chad Case Study.) 12 Invoking Security Measures to Prosecute is a technique employed to restrict the work of HRDs and sometimes target them. Under the pretext of security, HRDs have been prosecuted and convicted under vague laws and condemned to harsh sentences.36 Such pros- ecutions occur when peaceful activities lead to charges of bribery, public disturbance, or hooliganism, and they often result in long-term imprisonment, forcible commitment to psychiatric institutions, or “re-education through labour.”37 Judicial Harassment can include criminal charges, civil lawsuits, or administrative proceedings. Accusations often used against HRDs range from violations of protest laws, NGO laws, or public order to entirely fabricated charges of terrorism, subversion, or crimes against the security of the state. Many HRDs receive long prison terms, which are used to intimidate the broader human rights com- munity. Even when HRDs are acquitted, judicial harassment diverts time, energy, and resources away from their human rights work.38 In several countries the judicial process itself is so lengthy it becomes a form of punishment. Physical Attack is any type of assault carried out by uniformed police, plain-clothes agents, private security agents, hired thugs, or others. In virtually all cases, the attackers go unpunished. Attacks frequently occur when police disperse protesters during demonstrations.39 “The first Requesters allege that when construction works started in 2016, police officers accompanying the workers reacted to a peaceful protest by using force. They claim that community members, including women and children who tried to intervene, were beaten and several members suffered serious injuries and had to go to the hospital.”40 Restriction of the HRD Work/Advocacy Environment occurs when an organization is suppressed or shut down on flimsy pretexts, or its sources of funding are inappropriately cut off or limited, or efforts to register it are deliberately prolonged by cumbersome bureau- cracy. State authorities sometimes delay or block meetings held by HRDs, and prevent them from traveling to investigate human rights concerns. Laws curtailing the legitimate exercise of freedoms of opinion and expression, religious belief, association, and movement— such as regulations governing the registration and activities of non- governmental organizations, or legislation banning or hindering receipt of foreign funds for human rights activities—have all been used to harass and impede the work of HRDs.41 13 “The Requesters further claim that ‘NGOs involved in [the] advocacy campaign with the World Bank have been refused vital information with regard to [the] completion report of [the] Left Bank Outfall Drain Project and [the] feasibility studies of [the] National Drainage Program.’”42 “The Requesters referred to threats and intimidation they faced. They noted one of them was arrested under ‘trumped up charges.’ They state they received a stern warning from local administration against holding their usual residents meeting.”43 Retaliation refers to any harmful act(s) performed to prevent, dis- courage, or punish public comment about, access to, or interaction with a judicial or administrative recourse mechanism. Retaliation can include physical, psychological, and economic mistreatment; it can take place online and in-person, and can be conducted by either state or non-state actors. Economic retaliation can be employment-re- lated—such as demotion, disciplinary action, firing, salary reduction, job or shift reassignment, anti-union discrimination, or blacklisting. Retaliation may target people socially linked to the rights holders— including family members, friends, colleagues, etc.44 “Women from Purani Basti said they are not being issued Gram Panchayat recommendations for aadhar cards—Indian social security cards—because they have been labeled troublemakers. They added Purani Basti is being bypassed for any new government-funded proj- ects as it is now perceived to be an ‘anti-development’ habitation. Community members also claimed they were threatened with legal action if they continued to oppose the Elevated Storage Reservoir.”45 Sexual Violence or Harassment may be committed against a per- son of either gender or any sexual orientation; it most often targets women. In many countries, female HRDs are perceived as defying cul- tural norms, and therefore face greater risks than men. Gender-Based Violence (GBV) is the Bank’s umbrella term for any unwanted action based on gender differences. GBV includes physical, mental, or sex- ual harm, threats of such acts, coercion, and deprivations of liberty, either in public or in private life.46 “They treated us as animals. They forced us to have sexual intercourse with them…touched us on the breast, everywhere. When you refused, they threatened to fire you.”47 14 “One even tried to get me in the house, and I refused. I told [a coworker] and he told me this was the culture here. If I didn’t want to have sex, I could get a job somewhere else. They also deducted from my pay because I refused to have sex.”48 Smear Campaigns are attacks on HRD reputations, credibility, and standing within the community. Calling HRDs “traitors,” “terrorists,” “foreign agents,” or “violent extremists” diminishes public support for their work. (Labels include “anti-state,” “anti-religious,” “agents of Western powers,” “members of armed opposition groups,” “sex workers,” “traffickers,” and “corrupt individuals.”) State-run media are often used to stigmatize HRDs and, in some countries, HRDs are attacked by the highest political authorities. Smear campaigns often precede judicial harassment.49 Surveillance is increasingly performed electronically, but in many countries HRDs continue to report instances of physical surveillance. This may include observing strangers patrolling near their offices or homes, or questioning neighbors about their habits or whereabouts. While some surveillance seeks to learn what HRDs are working on, it may also be used to intimidate and can foreshadow physical targeting, especially when threats have also been made.50 “We are constantly put under surveillance. One evening I received a phone call from [the security apparatus]. The officer asked me why I was planning to meet with the Panel and what I intended to talk about. I was afraid. I don’t know how they found out. The officer insisted that I do not talk about the project.”51 Torture is the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering—phys- ical or mental—upon a person in the custody or under the control of the authorities or others, apart from the pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions.52 Torture of HRDs is used to obtain information or a confession, or to punish, intimidate, or coerce. Acts of torture must be carried out by, at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.53 “Those farmers who opposed the relocation, and government work- ers who refused to implement the program, including the Requesters and/or their relatives, have been targeted with arrest, beating, torture and killing.”54 15 16 3 COMMITMENTS AGAINST REPRISALS a) The World Bank’s Commitments Against Reprisals I n March 2020, the World Bank announced its “commitments against reprisals,”55 which affirm that its environmental and social policies and their supporting guidance include strong commitments against reprisals or retaliation. The Bank acknowledges that listening to people’s voices is critical to its work, adding that it has high standards of stakeholder engagement to ensure that clients achieve the best possible development outcomes. The Bank therefore welcomes views about the projects it supports, and does not tolerate reprisals or retaliation against those who voice them. When allegations of such reprisals come to the Bank’s attention, it works with the appropriate parties to address them. The Bank’s vision goes beyond ‘do no harm’ to maximizing development gains.56 Reprisals Affecting Bank Contract Workers. While it is important to safeguard Requesters and HRDs who file complaints against Bank projects, protecting contract workers directly engaged by the World Bank is also neces- sary. These contract workers—who serve as facilitators, interpreters, negotiators, etc.—can also become the tar- gets of intimidation or retaliation, since they are sometimes perceived as “collaborating” with a “foreign agency.” The Bank has developed a framework for the safety of the individuals it contracts directly. This framework, which deals with threats to Bank personnel, is also applied to those hired by the Panel during the period of their employment. A threat is defined as “the intent and capability of an adversary to initiate an undesirable event.” 57 According to this framework, the duty of care is the obligation of the Bank is to do all that is rea- sonably practicable to ensure the operational security and safety of individuals in the conduct of their duties. Bank standards and practices must match or exceed those of comparable international organizations.58 The Bank’s legal department, human resources department, and others play primary roles in providing necessary safeguards. The operational security duty of care provided under this framework does not extend to employ- ees of third parties contracted to provide services for—or on behalf of—the Bank;59 the duty of care to such individuals rests with their employer(s). In the Protection of Basic Services Program Phase II Additional Financing and Promoting Basic Services Phase III Project (PBS III) in Ethiopia, an individual contracted by the Panel for a short time in February 2014 was arrested in March 2015, after the contract term had ended. This individual was accused of terrorist activ- ities; a few years later, all charges were dropped. Under the Bank’s framework, the World Bank no longer had a duty of care towards the individual, who was no longer employed by the Panel when arrested. The process followed is described in Case Study I. Commitments Against Reprisals 17 CASE STUDY I 2012—ETHIOPIA: PROTECTION OF BASIC SERVICES PROGRAM PHASE II ADDITIONAL FINANCING AND PROMOTING BASIC SERVICES PHASE III PROJECT TYPES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS FACED—PROSECUTION, ARREST WITHOUT CAUSE, UNLAWFUL DETENTION, AND SILENCING Context. In May 2006, the World Bank started sup- authorities charged the person with terrorism, porting the Protection of Basic Services program conviction of which could result in a sentence of through several operations. 60 The third of these— 20 years to life in prison. In April 2018, just over PBS III—sought to expand access to and improve three years after the arrest, all charges were the quality of basic services. The program provided dropped and the facilitator was released.62 block grants to ensure adequate staffing and oper- Actions and Outcomes. Although the facilita- ations and to strengthen the capacity, transpar- tor was no longer employed by the Panel, once ency, accountability, and financial management of it learned of the arrest, it immediately informed government offices at regional and local levels. Bank Management. The regional team, the Bank In September 2012, two local representatives act- President, and relevant Executive Directors ing on behalf of 26 Anuak Indigenous Peoples from then reached out to government authorities. the Gambella region of Ethiopia submitted Management informed the Panel that the Bank’s a complaint to the Panel. They asked that their formal response included a letter from the Country identities remain confidential “due to grave con- Director based in Addis Ababa requesting release of cerns about [their] personal security and that of the individual. This appeal was unsuccessful. [their] relatives.”61 In September 2015, shortly after learning about During its investigation, the Panel hired a facilitator the charges filed against the facilitator, the Panel for case-related field work that lasted several days. issued a press release expressing its concern. In At the time, the facilitator was a known indigenous, the release, the Panel announced its concern for land rights defender from the Gambella region. In this individual—who had assisted its field work on March 2015, more than a year after the facilitator PBS III—and that since the arrest, senior staff at the finished working for the Panel, the person was Bank checked frequently with the Government of arrested while traveling to attend a food security Ethiopia regarding the individual’s safety. The Panel workshop supported by two well-known interna- also called on the Government to ensure that due tional organizations. The facilitator was detained process and other protections under the rule-of-law without charges for six months. Several months were respected. 63 During a six-month period the after the arrest, on September 7, 2015, Ethiopian Panel issued two press releases expressing its 18 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS concern. Two-and-a-half years later the charges between citizens and their government agencies, were dropped. nor question government actions towards its cit- izens when these occur outside agreed arrange- Key Takeaways. This case study raises two points. ments with the Bank. First, it shows the different categories of reprisal victims. In this case, the victim was an individual Furthermore, the Bank’s framework of accountabil- previously employed by the Panel for its field work. ity for its security management system64 only pro- It highlights the vulnerability. People such as trans- tects direct employees during their employment. lators, facilitators, mediators, or HRDs enjoy little The arrest in this case occurred more than a year or no Bank protection from reprisals. As was true after the Panel contract had ended. By then, the of the facilitator here, HRDs who experience repri- individual had lost the protection and duty of care sals often engaged in multiple activities. After they afforded by the framework discussed above. assist on a Panel case, it can be difficult to deter- For the Panel, the matter is particularly important. mine whether subsequent reprisals stem from their What due diligence and filters should the Panel general history of activism or their specific involve- apply when hiring translators or facilitators? What ment with the Panel. Regardless, it is important assurances of safety can the Panel offer such indi- that the Panel apply its guidelines and commitment viduals, especially if their ongoing activities as against reprisals when anyone involved in a Panel HRDs or community leaders are already under the case suffers reprisals. Second, the high visibility scrutiny of the authorities? of this case and the prosecutorial and judicial pro- cesses used against one individual can intimidate Several lessons from this example have been others who assist Panel investigations, and possibly applied to subsequent cases. The Panel now exer- imperil accountability for development overall. cises greater due diligence and takes more preemp- tive steps before individuals are hired, especially in This case is also an example of the Panel’s and high-risk contexts. The Panel asks potential contract Bank Management’s inability to gain the facilita- workers whether they are active HRDs or are being tor’s immediate freedom. Bank Management was targeted by authorities. In deciding whether to hire told that the facilitator was involved in terrorist someone, the Panel weighs the risks to the individ- activities—charges which complicated the facilita- ual against the Panel’s ability to offer protection. tor’s release. Once those charges were dropped, This does not preclude highly exposed individuals with hindsight the wider message of the person’s from being hired, but rather ensures that this deci- incarceration—i.e., as a warning to others—became sion is made with an informed understanding by more apparent. The case is a reminder that preven- both parties of the risks and protections available tion is a far better safeguard than later corrective should reprisals occur. action, and it prompted the Panel to reinforce its precautionary procedures (see following para- graphs). This case study raises questions for Bank Management and the Panel about how best to guarantee that contract workers can engage freely and safely in assigned tasks without facing retalia- tion for that work. It is particularly challenging to Bank Management, since the Bank cannot intervene Commitments Against Reprisals 19 b) Safe Access to Complaint Mechanisms From the Bank’s perspective, people who feel they have been negatively affected by a project are entitled to seek redress free of reprisals;65 a safe complaint system is essential for development. Third parties—not necessarily the Requesters themselves—can bring concerns to Management’s attention. Under the Panel process, in-country Management should have the first opportunity to respond to such claims. If Requesters remain dis- satisfied after this initial effort, they can escalate their concerns to the Panel. How the Rule-of-Law Context Affects Accountability for Reprisals Requesters’ access to potential redress or remedies through the Panel ultimately falls under the protection of national laws and, therefore, is affected by the broader, rule-of-law environments in project countries. This is particularly important in countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence, where the discrimination, inequality, and human rights violations may be pervasive. Weak rule-of-law generally brings high risk of reprisals. There is well-documented impunity from prosecution for perpetrators of reprisals in many countries, owing to poor law enforcement. In the Uganda TSDP case, the Panel noted that the “community is largely dependent on subsistence agriculture and suffers from under-resourced government institutions, weak law enforcement, tolerance of violence against women and girls, lack Requesters were in countries with low ranks on the of access to appropriate sexual and reproductive Index. This has important ramifications for PAPs health knowledge and services for adolescents, and wishing access to the Inspection Panel or other high prevalence of HIV/AIDS.”69 In the DRC Pro- national or international grievance redress mech- Routes Investigation Report, the Panel observed anisms, since filing a complaint—even when con- that, “despite such legal protections, law enforce- fidentiality is requested and possible—raises their ment remains weak.”70 vulnerability. The Panel has, for example, known for Many Bank borrower countries rank quite low on two years of an emerging complaint held by potential the World Justice Project’s Rule-of-Law Index, and Requesters who have a well-founded fear of persecu- relatively few rank medium or high.71 A significant tion; they began the filing process, only to withdraw majority of the Panel cases alleging reprisals against at the last minute owing to their dread of reprisals. 20 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS CASE STUDY II 2 0 0 4 — PA K I S TA N : N AT I O N A L D R A I N A G E P R O J E C T TYPE OF ALLEGED REPRISAL FACED—DETENTION Context. In September 2004, seven individuals sub- this information to Management. The Bank then mitted a complaint to the Panel on behalf of them- immediately sent a letter to the Government, result- selves and “2,000 others who live in the area known ing in the leader’s release. as district Badin, Sindh, Pakistan” in the Indus River Key Takeaways. This case demonstrates the effec- Basin.66 The Requesters raised concerns related to tiveness of individual initiatives—even the poorest the Bank-supported construction of drainage infra- and most vulnerable citizens could nevertheless structure and related saline effluent disposal.67 They organize themselves to be heard—and the personal claimed the project adversely affected the down- cost of such actions. stream wetlands and interconnected lakes—known as Dhands—in southern Sindh at the tail end of the Unlike most other cases, here there was no ambi- Indus River system. These Dhands were the source guity regarding the link between the reprisal and of livelihood for 40 fishing villages with a combined the victim’s involvement in the Panel process; this population of 12,000-15,000. The traditional and arrest was directly connected to a planned meeting. small fishermen of Badin and Thatta protested the But this case again exposes the limitations of the loss of their traditional fishing grounds; an NGO Panel, which had to rely on Bank colleagues. In this they established played a leading role in these case, as in all cases, the Panel had no direct role or protests. Shortly before the Panel’s visit, the NGO ability to seek the victim’s release. leader scheduled to meet with the Panel was tem- porarily detained by local authorities until after the It also highlights the importance of creating and Panel’s visit.68 protecting civil society space to enable affected parties to organize themselves to articulate their Actions and Outcomes. The NGO informed the concerns. This is critical to ensuring that affected Panel of this detention, and the Panel passed on people’s voices are heard at the Bank. Commitments Against Reprisals 21 22 4 INSPECTION PANEL DATA ON REPRISALS I n this chapter, the Panel uses quantitative and qualitative data to present trends observed throughout its nearly three decades of existence. However, because so many cases of reprisal go unreported, the Panel’s record does not fully reflect the extent to which such acts occur, or measure their total impact on victims or potential Requesters. a) What the Data Shows Increased Requests for Confidentiality and Reports of Retaliation. Through June 2021, the Panel had received 150 Requests for Inspection.72 In some instances, the Panel received multiple Requests regarding a given project. For this publication’s purpose, when these Requests were received within the same year or when they concerned the same Requesters or circumstances of alleged reprisal, they have been considered a single case.73 As such, the 150 Requests are considered here as 128 Panel cases. Of those 128 cases, 40 percent (50 cases) included allegations of reprisal, 47 percent (60 cases) contained requests for confi- dentiality, and 29 percent (37 cases) had both.74 Fifty-seven percent of the 128 cases (73 cases) had either an allegation of reprisal or a request for confidentiality. In some of the projects, reprisals recurred. During its 28-year history, the Panel has learned of several reprisal incidents, including reports of harass- ment and threats. As seen in Figure 1, over time the Panel has observed a general rise in the number of Requesters asking the Panel to ensure confidentiality. Allegations of Requests for Both Reprisals Confidentiality 29% 40% 47% Inspection Panel Data on Reprisals 23 F I G U R E 1 : T R E N D S I N I N S P EC T I O N PA N E L CA S E S Allegation of Reprisals and Requests for Confidentiality, Fiscal Years (July 1–June 30) 1995–202175 10 8 6 4 2 0 08 04 02 05 20 06 09 03 07 00 20 1 10 18 12 14 15 21 16 19 8 17 5 6 9 7 13 11 0 199 199 199 199 199 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 Fiscal Year Panel Cases Requests for Confidentiality Allegations of Reprisals More Prevalent Reprisals in Land Projects. Of the A useful example of a Panel case concerning land 50 out of 128 cases mentioned above that had alle- tenure is a complaint submitted in September 2009 gations of reprisals, 86 percent (43 cases) related by communities alleging adverse effects from the to land concerns. Most of these—60 percent (26 Land Management and Administration Project in cases)—involved land-taking for infrastructure pur- Cambodia. The Requesters asked the Panel to keep poses; 16 percent (seven cases) involved taking land the names of affected people and villages confiden- for natural resource management, 14 percent (six tial. They claimed 4,250 families would be evicted cases) for extractives, and nine percent (four cases) as a result of the project and that residents began for land management and zoning projects. Requests facing pressure and intimidation to leave the area involving 15 of these cases were brought by indig- when the developer commenced its work in 2008. enous or disadvantaged communities. Land-taking The following year, many households received for- disproportionately affects indigenous communities mal eviction notices with a one-week deadline to as they have stronger attachments to their land; accept one of three compensation options. The this often fuels their greater resistance or oppo- Requesters emphasized that hundreds of families sition to projects. According to a 2020 Front Line had already been evicted from their land and pres- Defenders’ report, 69 percent of all HRDs killed in sured into accepting “inadequate compensation 2020 addressed land, indigenous peoples, or envi- under conditions of duress.”78 ronmental rights issues, and 26 percent worked spe- Upon receipt of the complaint, the Panel informed cifically on indigenous peoples’ rights.76 From 2015 Bank Management of the seriousness of the claims. to 2020, two-thirds of all attacks on HRDs were Management acknowledged the issues and encour- directed at land and environmental defenders.77 aged the Government to see that no evictions would be carried out. In assessing Bank Management’s 24 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS compliance, the Panel found that the evictions vio- More Prevalent Allegations in Africa, South Asia. lated the Bank Policy on Involuntary Resettlement The Panel’s case record shows that Africa is the and resulted in “grave harm to the affected families continent that has the most allegations of retali- and community.” During the Board discussion, World ation (20), followed by South Asia (10), and Latin Bank President Robert Zoellick said the Bank was America and the Caribbean (eight). Of the nine deeply troubled and frustrated that people were Panel cases in East Asia and the Pacific, 89 percent being forced from their homes. He added that the (eight) involved requests for confidentiality, and Bank had repeatedly asked the Government to end 44 percent (four) involved allegations of reprisals.83 the evictions.79 This does not necessarily mean intimidation and reprisal threats are higher in these regions than in After the Bank suggested suspension of the project others. Rather, it could indicate strong and active pending discussions on the application of its safe- civil society in these countries, or that reporting is guard policies for handling resettlement issues, the better there than in countries with unreported or Government canceled the project’s financing. The underreported reprisals. Bank then suspended new lending to Cambodia,80 the suspension lasted for five years. Requests from the Community. Figure 3 shows that Requests for Inspection received from the According to UN records, between 2015 and 2020 community tend to have more allegations of threats the region that consistently recorded the highest of retaliation and more frequent requests for con- number of human rights defenders killed—933 of fidentiality than Requests filed by local civil society the 1,323 total killings reported during those years— organizations. was Latin America and the Caribbean.81 In 2020, of the 331 HRDs killed, 79 percent (264) were in the Americas and 16 percent (54) were in Asia and the Pacific.82 TA B L E 1 : A L L E G AT I O N S O F R E P R I S A L S I N PA N E L C A S E S I N V O LV I N G L A N D P R O J E C T S S I N C E 1 9 9 5 # Cases % Cases # Cases % Cases with Alleged with Alleged Affecting Indigenous Affecting Indigenous Type of Land Project Reprisals Reprisals Communities Communities Infrastructure 26 60.5% 5 33.3% Extractives 6 14.0% 2 13.3% Natural Resource Management 7 16.3% 5 33.3% Land Management and Zoning 4 9.3% 3 20.0% Total 43 15 Inspection Panel Data on Reprisals 25 TA B L E 2 : P R E VA L E N C E O F A L L E G AT I O N S O F R E P R I S A L S AND REQUESTS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY BY R EG I O N S I N C E 1 9 95 % # % Requests # Requests Alleged Alleged Total # for for Total # World Bank Region Reprisals Reprisals of Cases World Bank Region Confidentiality Confidentiality of Cases Africa 54% 20 37 East Asia & Pacific 89% 8 9 East Asia & Pacific 44% 4 9 Middle East & 50% 3 6 North Africa South Asia 37% 10 27 Africa 49% 18 37 Middle East & 33% 2 6 South Asia 48% 13 27 North Africa Europe & 32% 6 19 Europe & 47% 9 19 Central Asia Central Asia Latin America & 28% 8 29 Latin America & 31% 9 29 Caribbean Caribbean Europe & Central 0 1 Europe & Central 0 1 Asia, South Asia Asia, South Asia FIGURE 2: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF R E Q U E S T S F O R C O N F I D E N T I A L I T Y A N D A L L E G AT I O N S OF REPRISALS SINCE 1995 40 37 30 29 27 20 19 10 9 6 0 South Asia Africa Latin America East Asia Europe and Middle East Europe and and and Pacific Central Asia and North Central Asia, Carribean Africa South Asia Panel Cases Requests for Confidentiality Allegations of Reprisals In terms of gender, most Requests were brought HRDs are vulnerable to additional danger since the to the Panel by males in the affected communities. threats and attacks they suffer are often accom- According the Front Line Defenders’ 2020 report, panied by gender-based violence, torture, and 13 percent of the HRDs killed were women.84 Female harassment.85 26 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS F I G U R E 3 : A L L E G AT I O N S BY T Y P E O F R E Q U E S T E R S 80 60 40 20 0 Community Community, Local CSO Local CSO International CSO Allegations of Reprisals Requests for Confidentiality Panel Cases Correlation Between Incidences and/or the community for the project’s potential social risks Allegations of Reprisal and Lack of Meaningful contributed to the adverse effects on the commu- Consultation. The data reveal that as community nity. The Panel also noted that continuous consulta- members voice their concerns about a project tions throughout project implementation could have their likelihood of being victimized is greater when helped identify warning signs and prevented some meaningful consultation in project implementation of the harm that occurred.88 It observed that, once is lacking and there are no safe spaces in which to harm is perceived, affected individuals have to take raise these concerns. According to the Business a strong position to draw attention to their situation, and Human Rights Resource Centre’s (BHRRC’s) which heightens their visibility, making them more 2020 Annual Report,86 there were 604 documented vulnerable to retaliation. attacks on defenders working on business-related In this same case, the Requesters told the Panel human rights issues—up from 572 attacks in 2019. they were unaware of any grievance redress mech- The report also states that “at least one third of all anism (GRM) prior to submitting their Request. attacks stemmed from lack of meaningful participa- Community members also said that when they tried tion, access to information and consultation, or the to voice grievances related to damaged drinking failure to secure free, prior and informed consent of water systems and the excessive use of force the local and indigenous communities.” In Panel cases, contractor’s military personnel barred them from Requesters reported inadequate consultation in 24 the contractor’s basecamp. This left the local popu- (48 percent) of the 50 cases where allegations of lation with no way to voice their concerns about the reprisals were made. project and, in the absence of a functioning GRM, In the DRC Pro-Routes case,87 the Panel’s the project implementing agency and Management Investigation Report noted that a weak consul- missed important warnings of problems.89 tation process deprived the project’s risk assess- The case study below on the India Rural Water ment of important information about concerns of Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income the affected communities. As a result, potentially States demonstrates the importance of meaning- adverse impacts and related mitigation measures ful consultation and the continuous presence and were overlooked in project design. The Panel’s inves- engagement of all stakeholders—especially PAPs—in tigation determined that weak community partici- project design and implementation. pation and lack of sensitization and preparation of Inspection Panel Data on Reprisals 27 CASE STUDY III 2 0 1 8 — I N D I A : R U R A L W A T E R S U P P LY A N D S A N I T A T I O N P R O J E C T F O R L O W I N C O M E S TAT E S TYPES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS FACED—INTIMIDATION, REFUSAL TO PROVIDE WORK PERMITS AND CERTIFICATES, AND JUDICIAL HARASSMENT Context. This case concerns two Requests related the construction of the elevated storage reservoir to the India Rural Water Supply and Sanitation on their land.93 Project for Low Income States. The Requests were During the Panel’s eligibility visit, community mem- submitted by 104 Santhal tribal community mem- bers voiced fears about intimidation and reprisals. bers from Giddhi Jhopri and by 130 Santhal and Ho They told the Panel that women and children from tribal community members from Purani Basti in the Giddhi Jhopri had experienced retaliation during State of Jharkhand, India. The Requesters asked for construction of the Bagbera water treatment plant. confidentiality.90 In July 2016, several individuals—including women, The Requesters expressed concern about the con- who are particularly vulnerable—were allegedly struction of an elevated storage reservoir that they hospitalized due to police violence at a peaceful claimed was built on their communal land without community protest.94 The Panel also read a news adequate consultation or disclosure. They stated clipping with pictures of the incident that reported that the construction sullied the historical and cul- that 88 police personnel stood guard at the con- tural significance of their land, disrupted their tradi- struction site.95 Community members told the Panel tional agriculture, and would ultimately impoverish that police were present at some of the community them. The Requesters also alleged lack of consulta- meetings in their villages, creating an atmosphere tion and disclosure of information; they repeatedly of intimidation.96 complained that community members were not They alleged that the police presence in the meet- consulted prior to key project-related decisions and ings was intimidating to the community. Allegedly, that they could not access project documents. as per Requesters’ statements, it hindered meaning- In the second Request, the Requesters also ful consultation and it did not allow for meaningful expressed fear of retaliation.91 The second participation of the community in the design and Requesters stated they “fear there may be repri- implementation of the project. According to the sals […] for complaining.”92 They contended that Request, “There cannot be a free and open consul- community members were threatened with “dire tation in such a coercive environment with the pres- consequences” when they tried to protest against ence of police.”97 28 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS Community members also told the Panel the also acknowledged that considering these events, a Government opened police investigations against more proactive follow-up with the project authorities 39 people in 2016 but had yet to charge them should have taken place to appropriately understand formally.98 In their view, the authorities had not and address what appeared to be significant resis- formally charged them or closed the police files to tance to project implementation.103 instill in the community a continuous fear of prose- Key Takeaways. The allegations of reprisals in this cution.99 The Panel heard from Requesters that they case study highlight how active retaliation can be had difficulty obtaining “character certificates.”100 orchestrated against entire communities, and not They explained these certificates are required for just an individual, an NGO, or close associates and employment and, therefore, their absence has a family. It also flags the importance of adequate due direct negative impact on individuals being able to diligence by project staff to create appropriate safe- secure jobs and maintain livelihoods.101 guards against the risks of reprisal for community Two aspects of this case demonstrate the gender members opposing the project. It begs the ques- impact of retaliation: Women and children suffered tions: Did the police presence in the area constitute physical violence, and women were deprived of doc- an intimidation factor pressuring the community umentation needed to obtain or continue employ- to accept the project? Could meaningful consulta- ment (character certificates). The Requesters also tions have contributed to an environment free of alleged that the exclusion of women from consul- intimation and coercion? How could meaningful tations made the retaliation against them more consultation be guaranteed in such a context? What apparent. measures could have been put in place to prevent the intimidation and retaliation from occurring? These aspects highlight the vulnerability of female Requesters in regard to gender-related struc- This case shows the challenges of applying Bank tural violence and to economic retaliation, which policy requirements. It underscores the need to con- increases the gender gap.102 sider how adequate and meaningful consultation can be achieved where the extremely poor and vul- Actions and Outcomes. Management was aware nerable are pitted against those with overwhelming of community opposition to the project. As noted authority, influence, or control over police. in the Management Response to the first Request, in May 2016 Management carried out a compliance This case emphasizes the importance of designing review of social safeguards and social development a stakeholder engagement plan to increase the issues. This review flagged the “constant opposi- safe space for communities to express their views. tion” from the local tribal community and noted that If strong consultation and participation processes— there were gaps in consultations during the planning including functioning grievance mechanisms—are of the alternative site. Despite this, Management built into project design and implementation, com- acknowledged that no formal communication from munities are less likely to oppose the project. This, the Bank to suspend works pending resolution of in turn, reduces the risks of reprisals. these issues was sent. In its response, Management Inspection Panel Data on Reprisals 29 b) Types and Sources of Reprisals and in two others people were forcefully evicted from their homes. In more recent cases, Requesters According to a Front Line Defenders’ report, 85 allegedly faced death threats, and in the Cusco percent of HRDs killed in 2019 were previously Transport Improvement Project (see Case Study V, threatened individually or as part of the commu- below) opponents of the road project alleged that nity or group in which they worked.104 In the Panel’s they were subjected to an online smear campaign experience, acts of reprisals are not only conducted and attacks from community members who labeled against the Requesters. In some instances, they them “anti-development.”107 specifically target prominent community figures with histories of challenging authority. For these According to the BHRRC’s 2020 Annual Report, individuals, a Panel case can become an excuse or a in more than half of all cases defenders experi- catalyst for authorities to act against them. enced judicial harassment (including prosecutions based on trumped-up charges and arbitrary deten- The Panel cases involving the facilitator in Ethiopia tions). Front Line Defenders’ 2020 Annual Report (see Case Study I) and the opposition leader of the cites arrest and detention as the most commonly legislature in Chad (see Case Study VII, below) pro- reported violations used by states to undermine or vide two examples of this. 105 These individuals—each stop the work of HRDs.108 Fear of reprisal was pres- of whom had a history of contesting national poli- ent in 35 of the 50 cases where allegations of repri- cies—faced severe retaliation. The alleged reprisals sals were made, while intimidation was reported in ranged from intimidating comments on an anony- 28, and arrests or detention in 13. mous phone call to solitary confinement and acts of torture. In nine Panel cases, Requesters faced pros- Of the same 50 cases, 45 allegedly involved ecutions that resulted in detention or arrest. In one the central government and 12 allegedly involved case, a Requester was tortured.106 The facilitator local authorities. Figures 4 and 5 and the case mentioned above was held in solitary confinement studies below demonstrate the types of alleged and tortured before the charges were dropped. In reprisals and the scope and variety of alleged four cases, individuals were denied public services per­petrators involved. FIGURE 4: TYPES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS AND NUMBER O F O CC U R R E N C E S T H RO U G H O U T PA N E L CA S E S Surveillance Eviction Death Threat Break-ins and Theft Relocation Torture Defamation Refusal to of Fear of Refusal to Issue Certification Judicial Harassment Physical Attack Harassment Arrest or Detention Intimidation 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 30 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS FIGURE 5: DIFFERENT SOURCES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS I N PA N E L CA S E S Central Government (45) Local Authorities (12) Security Forces (11) Private Sector (9) Non-state Actors (3) Bank Staff (2) Unknown (1) 31 CASE STUDY IV 2 0 1 7— D E M O C R AT I C R E P U B L I C O F C O N G O : SECOND ADDITIONAL FINANCING FOR THE HIGH-PRIORITY ROADS REOPENING AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT TYPES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS FACED—ACTS OF VIOLENCE AND THREATS OF INTIMIDATION Context. In August 2017, the Panel received a com- works financed under the project. The alleged harm plaint concerning the Pro-Routes Project in the consisted mainly of lost property but included lost DRC. It was submitted by two community members livelihoods, gender-based and physical violence who alleged harm from the Bukavu-Goma road against members of the community, labor issues, 32 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS and impact on indigenous peoples. The Requesters The Panel also received reports that a Requester asked for confidentiality. The Bank partially sus- was being harassed by multiple sources—including pended the project in November 2017. local authorities, security forces, the contractor, and some community members. The precise reasons The Panel’s investigation revealed repeated cases and details were difficult to ascertain due to the of GBV ranging from sexual harassment to sexual many issues surrounding the allegations. However, exploitation, abuse, and rape; harm to livelihoods— of relevance here is that the individual received a particularly the removal of building materials protection grant from Front Line Defenders and from quarries by force and without compensa- was moved to a neighboring country. Sadly, despite tion—and poor community and occupational health relocation the individual and the individual’s family and safety measures that led to injuries among remained fearful and threatened. community members and workers. The Panel’s Investigation Report acknowledged the Key Takeaways. This case demonstrates that substantial and serious efforts undertaken by the diverse perpetrators of reprisals can operate Bank to address the GBV and other issues related simultaneously. In this instance, the Requester felt to the project.109 threatened from different sources: local authori- ties, security forces, the contractor, and community Actions and Outcomes. The Requesters were members. The intra-community tension resulted convinced they had experienced retaliation for from a perception among some community mem- raising their concerns. The Panel and Management bers that the Requester—who had become increas- consistently pressed the Government of the DRC ingly outspoken against specific, project-related about the issues raised, particularly those pertain- issues—opposed development. ing to the threat of physical violence. Management cited the importance of protecting affected indi- The case also underscores the important assis- viduals from retaliation. However, the Panel con- tance specialized organizations can give victims. tinued to receive reports of allegations of violence Front Line Defenders provided resources to against dissenting community members. The relocate the victim to a safer environment. Such Panel met with Bank Management several times to support affords victims at least temporary relief, explore ways to alleviate the pressure felt by the so they can continue their work. In certain circum- Requesters. The Bank took several steps to address stances, the Panel can play a role by informing a this issue, including offering to meet one of the victim about specialized organizations that could Requesters in another country, repeatedly remind- provide direct assistance. ing the Government of the Bank’s zero tolerance The victim here continued to alert the Panel about toward reprisals, and discussing the predicament recurring intimidation even after the construction of the human rights defenders and the Requesters’ was completed and the project was closed. The specific situation with Front Line Defenders and the Bank’s staff regularly responded to the victim. UN Special Rapporteur. However, Bank influence—always limited—was greatly diminished once the project ended. Inspection Panel Data on Reprisals 33 CASE STUDY V 2020—PERU: CUSCO TRANSPORT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT TYPES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS FACED—THREAT OF INTIMIDATION, SOCIAL MEDIA SMEAR CAMPAIGN, AND DEFAMATION USING SOCIAL MEDIA AND OTHER MEDIA CHANNELS In 2020, three individuals submitted a complaint and influencing public opinion against them. The about the Cusco Transport Improvement Project Requesters cited the re-postings of social media in Peru110 that aims to improve mobility in the east- articles featuring their photographs, and alleged the west corridor of the Cusco Provincial Municipality. use of televised campaigns influencing the general The Requesters said their land was being taken public to take sides and join an alleged smear cam- without compensation to make way for the Via paign against them by posting offensive comments. Expresa Avenue. They alleged a lack of consulta- They said these actions negatively raised their pro- tion and disclosure of information, raised concerns files and caused them to fear for their safety.111 about retaliation, and asked the Panel to keep their Actions and Outcomes. After obtaining the identities confidential. Requesters’ permission to take action, the Panel Throughout the Panel process, these Requesters broached these concerns with Management, and did repeatedly reported suffering significant retaliation so every subsequent time it learned of an alleged for voicing their views. They claimed they were incident. As part of its tracking system, the Panel publicly intimidated by local authorities verbally compiled a chronology of all reported threats, intim- and through online threats to scare and discourage idation, physical attacks, defamation, and the social them from complaining about the project. They media smear campaign, as well as the sources of believed a social media smear campaign was being such alleged retaliation. waged against them and their businesses, intent on defaming them as obstacles to the avenue 34 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS In response, Management took several actions, how difficult it is to control inflammatory postings including reviewing the recordings of public con- and their negative effects. sultations and examining video footage of a code The Peru Cusco case is another example of how the enforcement action in the project area. Through Panel could raise concerns of alleged retaliation letters and meetings, Management asked the Cusco with Management. Due to its working relationship Regional Government at the highest levels to with the authorities, Management was able to remind all implementing agency staff of the Bank’s emphasize at the highest levels of the Government zero tolerance for retaliation against the Requesters the seriousness with which the Bank took any alle- and other project stakeholders, and gave notice it gation of retaliation or intimidation, and to reiterate was monitoring the situation and would involve cen- the institution’s zero-tolerance position. tral government authorities if need be. While the Bank could actually observe—by review- The Bank checked and determined that no project ing video footage—whether public authorities com- staff had posted defamatory or threatening com- mitted some of the alleged violence and hostility ments about the Requesters on social media. The against the Requesters, it was far more challenging Bank clearly stated in the Management Response to to determine if social media was a tool of reprisal. the Request that it condemned the use of threats The Requesters were convinced the authorities and defamatory comments by social media users were behind the smear campaign that targeted against any project stakeholders.112 them, and were using it to foment local sentiment Key Takeaways. The harassment and retaliation against them. The Bank found no evidence of direct alleged in this case were largely based around involvement of project staff in posting defama- the use of social media, not only to discredit the tory comments.113 Nevertheless, since social media Requesters’ reputations, but also to mobilize pub- can be used indirectly by proxies or anonymous lic opinion to pressure them, and make them fear contributors, the Bank could make no conclusive attack—not just from the authorities, but also from finding of either culpability or exoneration, and members of their own communities. The online therefore reemphasized its commitment against campaign demonstrates the ease with which social reprisals and retaliation. media can provoke and sharpen public opinion, and Inspection Panel Data on Reprisals 35 36 5 EVOLUTION OF THE PANEL’S APPROACH TO ADDRESSING REPRISALS F rom the time of its establishment, the Panel has been aware of the potential for reprisals against—and the victimization of—those who use its process to raise complaints. Historically, the Panel addressed the reports of reprisals on a case-by-case basis. However, with the increase in reported incidents of reprisals and the issuance of its 2016 Retaliation Guidelines, the Panel has taken a more systematic approach to addressing allegations. The incremental progress made by this approach is expected to continue in the coming years. Similar transitions are occurring at different paces at other IAMs. a) Incremental Progress From the Panel’s inception, its legal framework has had stringent requirements regarding confidentiality, which have been conscientiously applied. The diagram below illustrates how the Panel evolved from a case- by-case to a systematic approach to addressing reprisal issues. (This report constitutes yet another step in the Panel’s work on retaliation.) F I G U R E 6 : PA N E L T I M E L I N E E S TA B L I S H I N G A SYST E M TO A D D R ESS R E P R I SA L S Case-by-Case Public System-Based Retaliation Tracking Confidentiality Approach Reporting Approach Guidelines System 1993 1994 1994 2015 2016 2018 Confidentiality. Shortly after the Panel was established in 1993, it developed strict procedures to pro- tect Requester confidentiality—if asked to do so—to prevent any intimidation or reprisals. The Panel’s 2014 Operating Procedures provide that Requesters need not approach the Bank themselves,114 but could instead rely on trusted intermediaries. Other IAMs also allow complaints to be submitted on the basis of confidentiality. When Requesters ask for confidentiality, the Panel takes many measures to protect their identities, such as redacting Requesters’ names, locations, and other identifying information from the Request for Inspection before it is used. The Panel gives Requesters a detailed explanation of how it will do this.115 Since its first case—the Nepal Arun III Proposed Hydroelectric Project in 1994—the Panel has provided con- fidentiality. In that case, Requesters, fearing retaliation from the authorities, asked for confidentiality. The Evolution of the Panel’s Approach to Addressing Reprisals 37 Panel realized early on that preserving Requester precautions during a given investigation. The confidentiality was essential to a successful process, Panel’s specific methodology—whether based on the and if ignored or handled perfunctorily could dis- Bank’s advice, external stakeholders’ suggestions, courage many communities from seeking redress for or even the Requesters’ wishes—is always tailored to harm resulting from Bank-supported projects. the unique context and challenges at hand, thereby requiring a case-by-case approach. Panel procedures allow affected people to submit a Request through a local or national represen- IAMs in general are still developing their systems tative—such as an NGO. An example of this is the to prevent and address instances of reprisals. Uganda TSDP case, where Requesters asked Joy Mechanisms that conduct dispute resolution have for Children Uganda to represent them before the the parties commit not to pressure or intimidate Panel. one another. The Complaints Mechanism of the European Investment Bank requires that participa- In exceptional cases—where the Bank’s Executive tion in mediation be voluntary, based on trust and Directors agree that the initiator of a complaint confidence, and that parties engaged in it “refrain lacks access to appropriate local representation— from exerting any pressure on any of the partic- an international NGO can bring it to the attention ipants in order to prevent them from expressing of the Panel.116 Moreover, a World Bank Executive themselves.” It also requires that parties agree “not Director may—on his or her own initiative and with to act in any way that could be considered as retal- the concurrence of the entire Board—require the iation against any of the individuals participating in Panel to conduct an investigation on an issue that is the mediation, before, during and after the media- of concern to the Board. This has occurred once in tion sessions.”117 the Panel’s history when, in 1999, a complaint was submitted by the International Campaign for Tibet Public Reporting. The Panel was the first IAM to (ICT) concerning the Western Poverty Reduction report on reprisals in case-related documents. This Project in China. Since ICT was not a local NGO, the practice commenced early in its operations and Board considered whether appropriate local repre- continues to this day. (In its Retaliation Guidelines sentation was available. During that discussion and the Panel commits to “mention[ing] all instances of following China’s withdrawal of the loan application, threats, intimidation or other retaliation in its eligi- an Executive Director requested an investigation bility and investigation reports, while respecting the into the project. confidentiality of complainants and interviewees, unless those affected request the Panel not to do Case-by-Case Approach. Beginning with its first so.”) In the first such report (April 2000), the Panel case, the Panel has utilized carefully selected noted that a field visit “yielded some disturbing and techniques to meet with individuals who felt under dramatic examples of what can only be described pressure without revealing who they are. For exam- as a climate of fear, through which some individuals ple, to help minimize risk of exposure, the Panel nevertheless managed, at great perceived risk, to compartmentalizes the information it receives express their opposition to this Project.”118 by employing different interpreters for different meetings. Similar steps are taken when arranging In 2002, the Panel informed the Board that during transportation. In the field, Panel teams sometimes its field visit a Requester “told how she was sum- use satellite phones—or other means of communi- moned by the Chef de Canton after visiting Nigeria’s cation that are difficult to trace—to verify facts on oil region in Ogoniland. She stated that she was the ground. not arrested or harmed but questioned.”119 The Panel added that several leaders and organizations In many cases, Bank staff or the Bank’s security with whom it met said they felt harassed at times, team has explicitly advised the Panel to take 38 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS though “they have expressed their opinions about of NGOs—such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty the Project without incurring physical violence.”120 International, Front Line Defenders, CIVICUS, The Panel also reported that one NGO “has been etc.—that track human rights violations, and ana- prohibited by the government to operate.”121 lyzing information provided by the World Bank Country Office staff, the Bank’s security person- The Panel again felt the need to alert the Board to nel, Requesters, and civil society. a case in Liberia in 2011. The Panel reported that members of the affected community “have been put In 2019, the Independent Consultation and under pressure and intimidation since bringing their Investigation Mechanism of the Inter-American complaint to the Panel.” This was “of great concern Development Bank Group released a “Guide to the Panel, firstly in terms of the implications for for Independent Accountability Mechanisms on the affected people themselves, and secondly for its Measures to Address the Risk of Reprisals in potentially deterring effect on the ability of people Complaint Management.”124 This comprehensive to bring their concerns to the Inspection Panel with- guide includes specific tools and tips for assessing out fear of reprisal, thus undermining the integrity the level of risk to complainants and others asso- of the Inspection Panel process and ultimately the ciated with IAM activities; developing strategies to Bank’s accountability.”122 The Panel noted the impor- reduce such risk; responding to alleged threats and tance of stopping such actions, citing Management’s reprisals; ensuring safer communication and con- commitment to address the issue with Liberia’s fidentiality; building internal capacity, and working highest authorities. with parent institutions to increase awareness and responsiveness.125 In 2018, the Office of the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO)—the IAM of the International Guidelines. In March 2016, the Panel was the Finance Corporation—started reporting annually on first among IFIs and IAMs to issue guidelines that incidents of reprisal. In its 2019 Annual Report, the included specific, preventive and precautionary CAO wrote that complainants in 36 percent of cases measures126 for addressing retaliation.127 These mentioned reprisal risks, up from 23 percent in the guidelines stress that any form of retaliation threat- 2018 fiscal year.123 According to that report, the accu- ens the integrity of the Bank’s accountability pro- sations were most prevalent in East Asia and the cess, and may have long-term effects on a project’s Pacific, where complainants in half the cases raised quality and the willingness of affected people to reprisal concerns. This was followed by Sub-Saharan voice their concerns about it. Africa, and Europe and Central Asia (both at 42 The guidelines were developed after the Panel percent). Threats were also alleged in Latin America learned of alleged reprisals against Requesters and and North Africa. CAO indicated that in more than others associated with Panel cases—such as the 55 percent of such mentions, complainants claimed serious incidents linked to the Ethiopia PBS III (Case the threats came from government authorities, in Study I), the Chad Cameroon Pipeline (Case Study 44 percent of cases from client companies, and in a VII), and the Uzbekistan Second Rural Enterprise few instances the sources remained unknown. Support (Case Study VI) projects. These guidelines System-Based Approach. In 2015, the Panel firmly established the Panel’s commitment against started incorporating a section on reprisals in any forms of reprisal, and aimed to reduce the risk its admissibility analysis regardless of whether of intimidation and reprisals against Requesters, Requesters asked for confidentiality or claimed their family members and representatives, and any fear of reprisals. Since March 2012, the Panel has other person associated with the Panel process. systematically assessed reprisals and recorded its The Panel’s Retaliation Guidelines are disclosed on findings internally. This is accomplished by per- its website. It includes the three-step process for forming desktop review, assembling the research addressing reprisals described below. Evolution of the Panel’s Approach to Addressing Reprisals 39 F I G U R E 7: R E TA L I AT I O N G U I D E L I N E S — T H R E E-ST E P P RO C E S S FO R A D D R E S S I N G R E P R I SA L S Responding Assessing the Implementing to Retaliation: Risk of Preventive Escalation to and Retaliation Measures by Management I. Assessing the Risk of Retaliation. The Panel secure the release of a Requester from gov- assesses the likelihood of retaliation upon ernment custody. receiving any complaint-related communica- II. Implementing Preventive Measures. The tion that mentions or implies such risk exists. tactics used to preempt retaliation are spe- As described above, this is done by collect- cific to each case, informed by the risk assess- ing data and information from a variety of ment, and developed in consultation with the sources. Findings are recorded in the Panel’s Requesters where applicable. They consider internal key issues note. issues such as country context, gender, race, The Panel continually reviews and updates ethnicity, age, disability, the sexual orientation these risk assessments throughout its process or gender identity of the Requesters, or other in consultation with the Requesters and their status. Measures can include special means representatives. The Panel often prompts and scheduling of communication, the loca- Requesters and associated persons to con- tion and timing of meetings, means of trans- sider their security and always encourages portation, the use of trusted intermediaries, them to report any threat or occurrence of selection and use of interpreters, facilitators, retaliation. If the Panel deems retaliation is and other consultants, and the involvement imminent, it alerts Management, which will of expert intermediaries for people with spe- consider steps to increase the security of the cial needs. The Uzbekistan case study below potential victims. This often includes formal illustrates how the Panel put such preventive correspondence from Management to the measures into practice. Government urging it to remind all project As noted above, if Requesters ask for confi- proponents that the Bank does not tolerate dentiality, the Panel sees that all identifying reprisals, that retaliation against anyone information in its possession is closely held expressing any views about projects it sup- and protected. To help maintain confidential- ports must be prevented and, if discovered, ity, the Panel carefully plans field visits and must be stopped immediately. This was the communicates continuously with Requesters case for projects in Pakistan (2006), Uganda about logistical matters (transportation, (2014), the DRC (2017), Kenya (2019), and methods of communication, times and places Peru (2020). In a 2001 case in Chad, the to meet, etc.) to ensure they are neither President of the World Bank went beyond exposed nor identified. sending a formal letter and telephoned the President of Chad directly, urging him to 40 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS As required by its legal framework, the Panel of its risk assessment and gives them the keeps a low profile during its site visits to opportunity to decline the assignment. The avoid attracting media or public attention. Panel keeps the personal and contact details During such visits, the Panel typically records of interpreters and facilitators confidential. information but omits the identities of inter- Where the Panel’s own security may be at viewees. The Panel and its consultants at all risk, the final decision on whether and how times keep their notebooks and electronic to visit an area lies with the Panel members devices in their personal possession or in in close coordination with the Bank’s security secure locations. Where the security situation services. may be volatile, sensitive electronic informa- Throughout its process, the Panel actively tion is encrypted. monitors potential retaliation. This includes Consultants, interpreters, and facilitators asking each Requester if anyone closely hired by the Panel are informed of the need associated with him or her had any security and reasons for protecting information and concerns or faced any problems, particularly must sign confidentiality agreements as following site visits. The Panel provides all part of their contracts. Following the lesson interviewees with its contact details, and learned in the Ethiopia case discussed above, urges them to reach out to the Panel, either when the Panel process may put interpreters directly or indirectly, should any security or facilitators at risk, the Panel informs them issue develop. Evolution of the Panel’s Approach to Addressing Reprisals 41 CASE STUDY VI 2 0 1 3 — R E P U B L I C O F U Z B E K I S TA N : SECOND RURAL ENTERPRISE SUPPORT PROJECT AND ADDITIONAL FINANCING TYPES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS FACED— FEAR OF REPRISAL, BEATING, THREATS, AND SURVEILLANCE Context. Since declaring its independence from education of their children.130 They claimed children the former Soviet Union in August 1991, Uzbekistan were picked up by buses at schools at the begin- has followed a strategy of gradual transition from a ning of the harvest season and sent to cottonfields, planned economy to a market economy. In the cot- where they lived in dormitories or similar quar- ton and wheat sectors—referred to as “centralized ters from September to November annually while crops”—the Government imposes a state procure- they picked cotton. They said the authorities also ment quota system, which for many years was asso- ordered adults to work the fields to meet quotas.131 ciated with the use of forced adult and child labor, After receiving the complaint, the Bank engaged especially in cotton harvesting.128 with the Government of Uzbekistan. The In September 2013, the Panel received a Request for Government thereupon committed to enforcing Inspection of the Second Rural Enterprise Support contractual arrangements with the financial inter- Project and its Additional Financing. The project mediaries and the laws prohibiting child and forced aimed at providing sub-loans through selected labor, and to implement third-party monitoring of financial intermediaries to increase productivity, both practices, while continuing to discuss these key strengthen the financial and environmental sustain- issues with the International Labour Organization.132 ability of agriculture, and boost the profitability of Actions and Outcomes. In this case, the NGO rep- agribusinesses in the project area. resentatives and other signatories of the Request Three Uzbek NGOs submitted the complaint on feared for their safety. Two of the representatives behalf of themselves and the signatories, who lived abroad in exile, while the third had endured requested confidentiality. The complaint said the reported reprisals in Tashkent. The Panel noted that signatories were “farmers, children, university stu- the Requesters were deeply concerned about facing dents, public-sector workers, private-sector workers retaliation for raising their complaints. During its and parents.”129 The Requesters alleged they had two field visits, the Panel team learned an activist been forced to provide labor during the cotton had been beaten and saw pictures of the injuries. harvesting season, and that this had impaired The team also heard that the offices of a human their health, safety, economic wellbeing, and the rights NGO were raided, and electronics seized.133 42 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS Two journalists told the Panel team they were under Key Takeaways. This case illustrates the different surveillance and faced reprisals and intimidation for precautionary measures exercised by the Panel in a reporting on labor practices. The team was asked challenging, post-Soviet environment. In Uzbekistan, to meet an activist in a forest, away from prying the alleged risk of reprisals was both high and eyes; as precautions against shadowing, the team potentially severe, given the context of the project switched cars and drivers to attend this meeting. and the country’s inherent conditions. When con- ducting its work, the Panel paid foremost attention The Bank learned of the general risk of reprisal to Requester and stakeholder safety. It endeavored against HRDs monitoring the cotton sector. In a to protect confidentiality. In consultation with its preparatory meeting with the Bank, the Panel team stakeholders, the Panel identified preventive mea- was briefed on the context of a post-Soviet Union sures—specific to this case—to deal with communica- nation and the structural changes Uzbekistan was tions, meetings, transportation, intermediaries, and undertaking. In such a difficult national and project interpreters. During its visits, the Panel asserted its context—where surveillance was historically com- prerogative to implement any additional measures monplace and therefore highly plausible—the Panel it deemed necessary. Panel members constantly team was advised on how to exercise caution in revisited, discussed, and adapted these measures all forms of its communications, when holding dis- while in the field. cussions in public and when using translators and drivers, and the risk of exposing individuals.134 The This case demonstrates that even in difficult Panel followed the advice of the Bank and the stake- national and project contexts—and while taking holders on the ground—including representatives of robust precautions—the Panel could successfully international organizations. appeal to senior government authorities to respect its independence while conducting fieldwork. By When mid-level officials insisted on accompany- clearly explaining the purpose and objectives of ing it throughout its visit, the Panel appealed to its work to the authorities, the Panel was able to the highest levels of the Government, explaining remove encumbrances and protect the safety of that privacy was necessary to conduct credible individuals, albeit temporarily. (The Panel later was work focused solely on the issues raised in the made aware of continued alleged reprisals against complaint. The Government of Uzbekistan agreed HRDs.) to the Panel’s request and instructed its officials to stop accompanying it to meetings outside the The Panel’s experience and the precautionary Government. The Panel used two translators, one practices exercised during this case served as key assigned to meetings with officials and the other for inputs and provided solid, empirical data when discussions with affected people. With these precau- the Retaliation Guidelines were developed in 2016. tions taken, the Panel noted it received no reports Clearly, even in authoritarian contexts additional of reprisal during its visit or shortly thereafter. logistical preparation and coordination with the Bank can help achieve some level of protection. Evolution of the Panel’s Approach to Addressing Reprisals 43 III. Responding to Retaliation. The Panel largely action by senior Bank Management and the Board relies on the Bank’s relations with national of Executive Directors. authorities to seek the cessation of threats The Bank has greater influence over a project entity and improve safety. Unlike the Panel, the should it be the source of reprisals—especially during Bank has a portfolio that spans multiple the term of the project—than it has over a commu- operations, an in-country presence in the nity or a non-state actor.136 For example, in the case majority of countries in which it operates, of the India Amaravati project,137 Requesters alleged and a longer timeframe for the project than several incidents of intimidation and coercion— a typical Panel case. This makes it easier for including suppression of farmers’ protests against the Bank to approach the authorities and a land-pooling scheme. In response, Management assert its commitment against any form of hired an NGO to monitor the use of the GRM and reprisals—whether perpetrated by an offi- identify instances of intimidation, coercion, and cial, a company, a contractor, a community retaliation. Management also monitored media member, or local thugs. For example, in the outlets in Andhra Pradesh daily for reports of pos- TSDP case and another case involving a road sible pressure. An independent expert contracted project in Uganda—the North Eastern Road- by Management to evaluate the land acquisition corridor Asset Management Project—the process assessed concerns related to coercion.138 Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) Similarly, in the Cusco Transport Improvement placed a public notice in local newspapers Project case in Peru—as mentioned above— expressing its opposition to retaliation and Management reviewed all social media posts to see intimidation.135 if project staff were posting defamatory or threaten- Tracking System. As a further step to avert repri- ing content.139 sals, the Panel developed a confidential, internal tracking system in December 2018. All claims of b) Outcomes intimidation and reprisals are entered into this data Where serious allegations of reprisal are made management tool that monitors the evolving risk of and a person is sequestered, pursued, or legally each specific complaint and the Bank response(s) to harassed, it is relatively easy to measure the it. This tracking mechanism helps measure trends effectiveness of a response—especially when the and efficiency in handling these claims. The tool source of the reprisal is known and is a government also documents and creates formal, institutional authority. The cessation of such acts is the bench- memory on all types of intimidation and reprisals mark of success. and how they have been addressed. However, in cases of low-level reports of intimida- The Panel’s reliance on—and the importance of— tion—which often go unreported and can either be seeking Bank assistance to address incidents and one-off or recurring—it is harder to measure success. allegations of reprisals cannot be overemphasized. Although not a protocol, current Bank practice upon The Uganda TSDP investigation is a positive exam- receiving Panel notice of a threat is to issue a for- ple of how the Bank, the Government, and the mal letter to authorities requesting action to cease project implementing entity—UNRA—successfully intimidation or reprisals immediately, regardless collaborated to manage fear of reprisals. In this of their source. If Requesters continue to suffer case, the Requesters raised concerns about retal- reprisals, the Bank can escalate its reaction. This iation, “political interference,” and “antagonism may even include direct intervention by the Bank [towards] those reporting” concerns. In response, President—as with the Chad-Cameroon pipeline the Bank acted directly and through UNRA. UNRA project (see Case Study VII, below)—or collective agreed to monitor the project for any occurrence of retaliation. Following an August 2015 mission, the 44 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS Bank engaged with community members, including As stated earlier, the Panel relies on the Bank’s by establishing a dedicated communication chan- influence, goodwill, and relations with national nel to allow Requesters to alert the Bank directly authorities to stop threats and protect Requesters if they experienced retaliation.140 Management against reprisals. In many ways, the Panel and informed the Panel that the Government of Bank operations, while independent of each other, Uganda ordered law enforcement agencies to must work in partnership to protect Requesters pursue allegations of retaliation promptly. The against reprisals. Panel Investigation Report noted “the situation has changed over the past 12 months. At the time of the Panel’s Investigation visit, there was more openness and willingness to speak about issues that were formerly considered too damaging or dis- comforting to air publicly. Nevertheless, the Panel believes it is prudent to remain cautious and vigi- lant, even though as of the drafting of this report, the risk of retaliation seems to have decreased.” 141 In November 2015, UNRA prepared its plan for pre- venting and mitigating retaliation. In short, the scale and extent of Bank responses are proportional to the risk and nature of repri- sals. The Bank has many points of leverage and influence—starting with the in-country team, the Country Director, the Vice President of the region, and ultimately the Bank President and the Board of Executive Directors. As seen in the TSDP case, the Bank can work together with a government and a project implementing entity to manage fear of reprisals successfully. When the Bank’s influence fails to achieve its intended goal—i.e., the safety of an individual—the victim can seek assistance from specialized organi- zations, such as the European Union consortium for HRDs.142 For instance, as described above in the DRC Pro-Routes example (Case Study IV), the Requester who claimed to have experienced threats received support from Front Line Defenders and, as a result, was able to move to a secure location. Providing such support is not easy—it requires resources, the willingness of another country to receive the HRD, and the permission of the originating country for the HRD to leave. Evolution of the Panel’s Approach to Addressing Reprisals 45 CASE STUDY VII 2001—CHAD: PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINE P R O J E C T, M A N A G E M E N T O F T H E P E T R O L E U M E C O N O M Y P R O J E C T, A N D P E T R O L E U M S E C T O R M A N A G E M E N T CA PAC I T Y B U I L D I N G P RO J EC T TYPES OF ALLEGED REPRISALS FACED— ARBITRARY DETENTION, TORTURE, AND ARREST WITHOUT CAUSE Context. The Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline project other contusions that supported the leader’s tes- was the largest energy infrastructure development timony of the alleged torture while incarcerated. on the African continent in 2001.143 It involved the The Requester told the team a main reason for construction of a 1,100-kilometer-long export pipe- the arrest was the submission of the Request to line from Chad to the coast of Cameroon. the Panel. The Requester said the interrogators wanted to know every detail of the complaint—how An opposition leader—a former parliamentarian who it came about, how the Requester learned about represented more than 100 PAPs—submitted a com- the Panel, who the leader was representing, etc. plaint to the Panel in March 2001. The Requesters The Requester felt the arrest and torture were claimed the pipeline construction threatened their motivated by the Government’s eagerness to retal- local communities, their cultural property, and iate against the people involved in this complaint, the environment due to the inadequacy of the and its desire to send a clear message to anyone project’s environmental assessment and compen- contemplating other complaints about the project, sation. They said local communities were neither which would have a chilling effect on the commu- informed about nor consulted on project decisions nity. The Requester thanked the Bank President and relevant to them. In late 1999, prior to the submis- the Panel for what the Requester considered their sion of the Request for Inspection, the opposition life-saving intervention.144 leader had been arrested and—following the Bank’s intervention—released. Key Takeaways. This case demonstrates the influ- ence exercised by the Panel through the Bank Actions and Outcomes. In May 2001—two months President. While such high-level involvement can after the Request was submitted—the opposition be effective, the decision to use it requires careful leader was again arrested along with five other deliberation, as it can only be used sparingly and in opposition members of parliament. Upon news of severe circumstances.145 this arrest, the Panel’s Chairperson contacted the Bank President, who then called the President of This case bears out the Panel’s lack of direct influ- Chad to secure the Requester’s release. A few hours ence or ability to offer protection once a Requester later the leader was discharged and flown to Paris faces threats or acts of alleged reprisals—including for medical treatment. arbitrary detention and torture. It also raises the question of how a Bank escalation process can be Shortly after the Requester’s release, a Panel employed most effectively. team visited the Requester at the hospital, where the opposition leader revealed scars, bruises, and 46 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS In exceptional circumstances, the influence and For example, in 2010 and 2011 the Panel received role of third parties—including the OHCHR and two Requests from Kazakhstan regarding the same the UN Special Procedures of the Human Rights project.146 The first set of Requesters asked for Council—might ensure the safety of individuals confidentiality, but the second did not. During its facing retaliation. In other instances, the Inter- fieldwork for the first complaint, the Panel met with American Commission on Human Rights and the government officials and inquired about civil soci- African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ety’s inclusion in project activities and the fear of can ask national authorities to adopt certain pre- reprisal shared with the Panel by the Requesters. cautionary measures. Despite their inherent limits, By the time the Panel received the second com- such requests remain important tools. They inform plaint, a forum for dialogue among the Requesters, the public, alert authorities, and put them on notice the project, and government authorities had been to protect the safety of individuals. Specialized civil established. The Panel attributes this positive devel- society organizations also report on, support, advo- opment to its earlier dialogue with the Government cate for, and may provide protection to HRDs who and the creation of a safe space for affected people face reprisals. to express their concerns. All stakeholders in this case—the borrower, the Bank, civil society, and the Requesters often raise project-related decisions communities—were willing to engage further on the deemed unjust, or that violate people’s rights—by areas of concern. The improvement between the taking land or forcing resettlement, for example, first and the second complaints is an intangible ben- where there has been failure to recognize customs efit of the Panel process. of an indigenous population. In these situations, the Requesters’ intent is to correct real or perceived Creating a safe space for stakeholders to partici- wrongdoing. A key objective, therefore, is to keep pate, voice concerns, and debate differences often the complaint or concern from escalating to where serves as a starting point for prevention. When safe it is viewed as a threat by the authorities, those space diminishes or vanishes altogether, issues contracted to build a project, or even by certain can escalate and cause friction—within communi- members of their own communities. ties, between communities and authorities, or with those who stand to benefit from the project. This As mentioned above, in many of its cases the friction is often the cause of retaliatory measures. Panel found that complaints reached a higher pitch Dialogue—direct or indirect—between the parties is when GRMs were neither considered nor used by essential for views to be well understood, even if a project. Or when a consultation process failed to it does not ultimately yield agreement. This often hear and weigh fully the views of affected groups helps dispel concerns of intimidation or reprisal. and local NGOs in project design and implementa- tion, particularly in the preparation of safeguard documents. Evolution of the Panel’s Approach to Addressing Reprisals 47 48 6 INSIGHTS    I. INCREASING INCIDENTS AND REPORTS OF INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS T he continuing, upward trend of reported and alleged attacks, acts of intimidation, and reprisals against opponents of actual or potential project impact has led the Panel to develop incremental steps to assess risk, prevent the escalation of tensions, and protect Requesters against reprisals. This advisory report is not intended to provide an exhaustive range of solutions. Rather, it aims to bring together a body of work with the objective of creating incremental progress towards establishing a compre- hensive system that responds to the increasing trend of reports of reprisals in development projects, and to encourage further improvements. The Panel views this report as a building block on which others may build as the thinking and practice in this area evolves. By aggregating quantitative data and qualitative information through its various cases, the Panel hopes to contribute to the overall knowledge of this subject and increase awareness of reprisals among potential victims and HRDs, decisionmakers in development institutions, and development practitioners working in the field.    II. CO-DEPENDENCY BETWEEN ZERO TOLERANCE AND SAFE SPACES Individuals and groups complain to IAMs as a last resort. Hence, Requests often reach the Panel after a breakdown of trust, heightened tensions, simmering conflict, or worse. Fostering an open dialogue and a safe space to discuss issues with stakeholders is one of the best ways to prevent an escalation which might further expose Requesters to risks of reprisals. The responsibility of businesses to respect human rights not only entails a negative duty to refrain from violating the rights of others, but also a positive obligation to support a safe and enabling environment for human rights defenders in the countries in which they are operating. Discharging this duty requires consultation with defenders in order to understand the issues at stake and the shortcomings that impede their work. —Michel Forst, former UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders147 Insights 49 Once reprisals commence, protecting Requesters can be complicated and difficult. Therefore, creating an environment where communities can safely raise and resolve their concerns is a key preventive measure. Continuous stakeholder engagement throughout the project cycle is also key to prevention. Zero tolerance is a commitment. However, “zero” reprisals against affected communities is only attainable if all actors fulfill their duties and obligations towards this commitment, including by enforcing national laws against acts of intimidation aimed at Requesters. It should be noted that at a national level there are varied approaches against reprisals. The Vision for Sustainable Development in the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework sets out the Bank’s objectives on this issue in its relationship with client countries. The Bank commits that its “activities support the realization of human rights expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through the projects it finances, and in a manner consistent with its Articles of Agreement, the World Bank seeks to avoid adverse impacts and will continue to support its member coun- tries as they strive to progressively achieve their human rights commitments.”148 The Bank adds that it “uses its convening ability, financial instruments, and intellectual resources to embed this commitment to environ- mental and social sustainability across all its activities.”149    III. INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS: A SIGNIFICANT DETERRENT TO ACCESSING JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY As this report observes, analysis of international publications and the Panel’s data reveals that, in almost every region in the world, reprisals are on the rise. CSOs report that during the last year150 dozens of pieces of legislation further narrowing civil society space were passed by lawmakers around the world, often attrib- uting the need for these legal constraints to the COVID-19 pandemic.151 Front Line Defenders, in its 2020 Annual Report, observes that arrest and detention remained the most commonly reported tactic used by states to undermine or stop the work of HRDs.152 Reprisals have the effect of undermining the process of justice and weakening accountability, and can become a huge deterrent to those wanting to raise a complaint. Submitting a Request for Inspection to the Panel takes enormous courage. Even when confidentiality is requested, the Requesters, their families, and those closely connected to them risk acts of reprisal by state and non-state actors. Publicly questioning the credibility of the Requesters or attempting to defame them can serve to silence the voices of people wanting to raise concerns about the development projects intended to help them. Such acts defeat the very purpose for which the Executive Directors of the World Bank created the Inspection Panel.    IV. CONTEXT-SPECIFIC APPROACH The cases elaborated in this report show how every incident is framed by its particular context and why, therefore, no “one-size-fits-all” approach is appropriate or possible. In some cases, the World Bank President’s involvement leads to results, in others a high-level intervention may be counterproductive and exacerbate matters. The response in each instance must weigh contextual factors such as intimidation trends, the source of intimidation, national context, project footprint and life, the Bank’s influence, etc. This information is not always available and, therefore, designing an approach requires the involvement of Requesters. This could include connecting Requesters with specialized organizations. 50 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS    V. LIMITATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN RESPONDING TO INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS Raising complaints to—and seeking intervention by—IAMs carries an inherent risk of reprisals. While both the Panel and Bank have publicly committed to zero tolerance of any form of reprisal, their ability to act and directly intervene in such cases is limited to their projects and general influence with a client country’s authorities. Once reprisal occurs and the Panel alerts the Bank, a successful outcome depends on how the Bank exercises its influence to emphasize its zero-tolerance position. The Bank, in turn, relies on the com- mitment of the project implementing agency and national and regional authorities to address the risks. Bank influence is greatest when the sources of reprisals are known and can be targeted precisely. As noted above, the Bank cannot intervene between a citizen and his or her government agencies, or question government actions towards its citizens outside the agreed arrangements with the Bank. The situation becomes increasingly complicated when those who submit Requests or are otherwise involved in the Panel process are already advocating for human rights in their countries and may therefore face risks for work unrelated to their contact with the Panel. In such cases, the causes for reprisals overlap and can become easily blurred between these two objectives. In some cases, authorities acted against such individu- als once the Panel’s work was completed, citing previous or other incidents unconnected to the Panel or the Bank. In other cases, the Panel and Bank ensured protection during a project’s duration but not beyond it. In this regard, protecting Requesters and others associated with them remains a challenge and must be a shared responsibility of the financiers, donors, borrowers, and implementing agencies. Insights 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY At Your Own Risk: Reprisals against Critics of World Bank Group Projects. Human Rights Watch. June 2015. https://www. hrw.org/report/2015/06/22/your-own-risk/reprisals-against-critics-world-bank-group-projects. Checklist to accompany the Guidance Note for ESS10: Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure. The World Bank. June 2018. http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/354161530209334228/ESF-Checklist-ESS10-GRM-June-2018.pdf. Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights – Report of the Secretary-General—Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 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The Inspection Panel issued these Guidelines in 2016. It was the first International Accountability Mechanism to develop a set of retaliation guidelines (see Chapter 6 for more information and Chapter 4 for sourc- es of reprisal). 3 World Bank, 2020. World Bank Commitments Against Reprisals. Report of the Secretary-General, 2018. Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights. 4 The term “Requester(s)” refers to a signatory (or signatories) to a Request for Inspection (a formal document also referred to as a “Request” or a “complaint”); a Request is submitted to the Inspection Panel raising issues of harm resulting from a Bank project’s alleged non-compliance with World Bank operational policies and procedures. 5 “Associated Persons” are defined as those associated with the Panel process and may include project-affected per- sons, interviewees, and persons providing assistance to the Panel in the field (drivers, interpreters, facilitators, etc.). IPN Guidelines. 6 Exact dates are omitted to protect the anonymity of Requesters. 7 Several factors influence what is and what is not reported as a reprisal. In most cases, the claims and incidences of reprisal are underreported. 8 United Nations General Assembly, 2021. Human Rights Council: Final warning: death threats and killings of human rights defenders—Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor, p. 9, para 40. 9 Ibid., p. 9, para 41. 10 (A/HRC/39/41, para.79) 11 Between 2015 and 2020, the Panel received requests regarding 37 cases, 78 percent (29 cases) contained requests for confidentiality and 54 percent (20 cases) contained allegations of reprisals. See Chapter 4 for more analyses of the Panel’s data on Reprisals. 12 Inspection Panel, 2006. Brazil-Paraná Biodiversity Project, Eligibility Report, p. 13, para 43. The Requesters were concerned that changes in project design would focus on the recovery of degraded parts of the sole, remaining, preserved natural areas in the State of Paraná, such as the Araucária Forest, instead of on conserving the biomass. 13 Ibid., p. 13, para 43. 14 Requester’s correspondence with the Inspection Panel. 15 Requester’s correspondence with the Inspection Panel. 16 World Bank, 2015. Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Uganda Transport Sector Development Project—Additional Financing, p. 16, para 56. 17 The Inspection Panel, 2016. Republic of Uganda, Transport Sector Development Project—Additional Financing Investigation Report, p. 58, paras 234-236. 18 Human Rights Council, 2020. Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General, p. 18. 19 The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders is an independent expert appointed by the 47-member UN Human Rights Council, a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly. 20 See Front Line Defenders. 21 Not only PAPs but also their family members, colleagues, and other members of their community. 22 Front Line Defenders. 23 Threats can also occur online through social media as seen in the Peru Case Study in Chapter 4, p. 34. 24 OHCHR Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights. 25 The Inspection Panel, 2021. Report and Recommendation on a Request for Inspection: Uganda North Eastern Road-Corridor Asset Management Project (NERAMP), p. 9, footnote 7. 26 OHCHR Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. 27 The Inspection Panel, 2002. Investigation Report of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, p. 40, para 129. 54 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS 28 The Inspection Panel, 2016. Guidelines to Reduce Retaliation Risks and Respond to Retaliation During the Panel Process. 29 Front Line Defenders. 30 Ibid. 31 The Inspection Panel, 2020. Report and Recommendation on a Request for Inspection Peru Cusco Transport Improvement Project, p. 12, para 38. 32 OHCHR Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights. 33 See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/144 adopting the Declaration on human rights defenders. 34 OHCHR. About human rights defenders. 35 Front Line Defenders. 36 OHCHR Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights. 37 Ibid. 38 Front Line Defenders. 39 Ibid. 40 The Inspection Panel, 2019. Report and Recommendation on Requests for Inspection India Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States, p. 5, para 21. 41 OHCHR Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right to Defend Human Rights. 42 The Inspection Panel, 2006. Investigation Report Pakistan—National Drainage Program Project, p. 117, para 498. 43 The Inspection Panel, 2019. Report and Recommendation on a Request for Inspection-Kenya Nairobi Metropolitan Services Improvement, p. 6, para 30. 44 OHCHR Improving accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse through non-State-based grievance mechanisms. From Explanatory Notes: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/GEN/G20/125/60/PDF/G2012560.pdf?OpenElement, p. 5. 45 Community testimony given to the Panel. 46 Front Line Defenders and WB Task Force. 47 The Inspection Panel, 2020. Insights of the World Bank Inspection Panel: Responding to Project Gender-Based Violence Complaints Through an Independent Accountability Mechanism, p. 6. 48 Ibid., p.10. 49 Front Line Defenders and Front Line Defenders, 2011. Workbook on Security: Practical Steps for Human Rights Defenders at Risk. 50 Front Line Defenders. #Surveillance. 51 Personal communication between a Panel member and a community member. 52 Rome Statute. 53 Front Line Defenders. 54 See Chapter 4, page 28. India Rural Water Supply Case Study. 55 World Bank, 2020. World Bank Commitments Against Reprisals. 56 Ibid. 57 A threat is defined as “the intent and capability of an adversary to initiate an undesirable event.” World Bank, 2017. Directive, Framework of Accountability for the WBG Security Management System, p. 6 para 53. 58 Ibid., p. 7, para 3. 59 Ibid., p. 7. 60 World Bank, 2013. Ethiopia Promoting Basic Services Program Phase III Project. 61 Request for Inspection submitted to the Inspection Panel by Requesters in 2012. 62 Coalition for Human Rights in Development, 2019. Uncalculated Risks Threats and Attacks Against Human Rights Defenders and the Role of Development Financiers, p. 73; Oakland Institute, 2018. Free at Last: Charges Against Indigenous Land Rights Defender & Former World Bank Inspection Panel Translator Dropped. 63 Inspection Panel, 2015. Press Release Regarding Charges Filed Against Pastor in Ethiopia. 64 World Bank, 2017. Directive, Framework of Accountability for the WBG Security Management System. Endnotes 55 65 Among these mechanisms and instruments, the Bank lists: i) the Directive on Addressing Risks and Impacts on Disadvantaged or Vulnerable Individuals or Groups; ii) the Good Practice Note on Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse and Sexual Harassment (SEA/SH) in Investment Project Financing Involving Major Civil Works; iii) the Bank’s Standard Procurement Documents that fully reflect the ESF and specific requirements that contractors pre- vent reprisals as part of each contractor’s grievance redress mechanism, in provisions related to health and safe- ty, and in the Code of Conduct’s mandatory template; iv) the requirement for a new project to have one grievance mechanism for workers, and another for the public; and v) the World Bank’s Grievance Redress Service, which closes the gap between project-level grievance mechanisms and the Inspection Panel, and which contributes to the Bank’s overall efforts to manage project environmental and social risks, improve stakeholder engagement and feedback, and support more sustainable project outcomes. 66 The Inspection Panel, 2004. Pakistan: National Drainage Program Project—Request for Inspection. 67 The World Bank, 1998. National Drainage Program Project. 68 Interview with previous Panel Executive Secretary. 69 The Inspection Panel, 2016. Transport Sector Development Project – Additional Financing Investigation Report, p.83, para 330. 70 The Inspection Panel, 2018. Democratic Republic of Congo Second Additional Financing for the High-Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project Investigation Report, p.76, para 271. 71 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index is the leading global source for original, independent data on rule-of- law. Covering 128 countries and jurisdictions, the Index relies on national surveys of more than 130,000 households and 4,000 legal practitioners and experts to measure how rule-of-law is experienced and perceived worldwide. 72 The data presented in this chapter refers to Panel cases from fiscal years (July 1-June 30) 1995-2021, when this advisory report was finalized. 73 From 1994 to June 2021, the Panel received 150 Requests for Inspection. In some cases, the Panel received multiple Requests regarding a given project. For this publication’s purpose, when these Requests were received within the same year or when they concerned the same Requesters or circumstances of reprisal, they have been considered a single case for data collection purposes. 74 See Figure 1: Trends in Inspection Panel Cases. 75 The timing is based on when these allegations were first reported. 76 Front Line Defenders, 2020. Global Analysis 2020, p. 4. 77 Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, 2021. Land & Environmental Defenders. 78 The Inspection Panel, 2010. Investigation Report- Cambodia: Land Management and Administration Project, p. 2, para 4. 79 World Bank, 2011. Press Release- World Bank Board of Executive Directors Considers Inspection Panel Report on Cambodia Land Management and Administration Project. 80 The Guardian, 2011. The World Bank Suspends Cambodia Lending. 81 Killings of human rights defenders were observed in Colombia (397), Brazil (174), Mexico (151), Honduras (73), Guatemala (65), and Peru (24). United Nations Digital Library, 2020. Final Warning: death threats and killings of human rights defenders: report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, Mary Lawlor. 82 Front Line Defenders, 2020. Global Analysis 2020. 83 See Table 2: Prevalence of Allegations of Reprisals and Requests for Confidentiality by Regions since 1995, p. 26. 84 Front Line Defenders, 2020. Global Analysis 2020. 85 OHCHR, 2019. Michel Forst—Women human rights defenders face worsening violence. 86 Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2021. Annual Report—Human Right Defenders, 2020 Snapshot. 87 The World Bank, 2011. DRC—Pro-Routes Project (Additional Financing). 88 The Inspection Panel, 2018. Democratic Republic of Congo Second Additional Financing for the High-Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project Investigation Report, p. 26, para 92. 89 Ibid., p.29, para 105. 90 The Inspection Panel, 2019. Report and Recommendation on Requests for Inspection India Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States, p. 1, para 1. 91 Ibid., p. 1, para 2. 92 Inspection Panel, 2018. India: Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States (P132173)- Second Request, p.1. 56 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS 93 Ibid., p. 2. 94 The Inspection Panel, 2019. Report and Recommendation on Requests for Inspection India Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States, p. 5, para 21. 95 Hindustan Times Newspaper, 2016. Water War; The Inspection Panel, 2019. Report and Recommendation on Requests for Inspection India Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States, p. 11, footnotes 48 and 49. 96 The Inspection Panel, 2019. Report and Recommendation on Requests for Inspection India Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States, p. 22, para 99. 97 Ibid., p. 15, claim 8. 98 Ibid., p. 19, para 83. 99 Ibid., p. 19, para 83. 100 Ibid., p. 5, para 21. 101 Ibid., p. 19, para 83. 102 The Diplomat, 2020. Women Left Behind: India’s Falling Female Labor Participation; World Bank, 2019. Working for Women in India. 103 The Inspection Panel, 2019. Report and Recommendation on Requests for Inspection India Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project for Low Income States, p. 23, para 103. 104 Front Line Defenders, 2019. Global Analysis 2019. 105 See Ethiopia Case Study, Chapter 3, p. 18 and Chad Case Study, Chapter 5, p. 46. 106 See Ethiopia Case Study, Chapter 3, p. 18 and Chad Case Study, Chapter 5, p. 46. 107 See Peru Case Study, Chapter 4, p. 34. 108 Front Line Defenders, 2020. Global Analysis 2020, p. 8. 109 Investigation Report - Democratic Republic of Congo Second Additional Financing for the High-Priority Roads Reopening and Maintenance Project, p. ix – xvii. 110 World Bank, 2014. Cusco Transport Improvement Project. 111 The Inspection Panel, 2020. Report and Recommendation on a Request for Inspection, Peru, Cusco Transport Improvement Project, p. 12, para 38. 112 Ibid., p. 12, para 39. 113 World Bank, 2020. Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Peru: Cusco Transport Improvement Project, p. 12, para 34. 114 The Inspection Panel, 2014. Operating Procedures, para 39 criteria (c). 115 The Inspection Panel, 2018. Guidelines to Reduce Retaliation Risks and Respond to Retaliation During the Panel Process—Step Two: Implementation of Preventive Measures. 116 Inspection Panel Resolution, 2020. Resolution No. IBRD 2020-0004 and IDA 2020-0003, para 13. 117 Interview with Complaints Mechanism staff, February 23, 2021. 118 The Inspection Panel, 2000. Investigation Report—The Qinghai Project A Component of the China: Western Poverty Reduction Project, p. 52, para 119. 119 The Inspection Panel, 2002. Investigation Report of the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project, p. 63, para 216. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid., p. 63, para 216, footnote 205. 122 The Inspection Panel, 2011. Liberia—Development Forestry Sector Management Project, Eligibility Report, pp. 26–27, para 116. 123 The Office of the Compliance, Advisor/Ombudsman, 2019. CAO Annual Report 2019. 124 Inter-American Development Bank, 2019. Guide for Independent Accountability Mechanisms on Measures to Address the Risk of Reprisals in Complaint Management: A Practical Toolkit. 125 Ibid. 126 Many IAMs have also developed guidelines that address the potential for retaliation. In 2018, the ADB’s Accountability Mechanism, the IFC’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, and AIIB’s Project Affected People’s Mechanism followed suit. Guidelines for the Protection of Key Stakeholders during the Accountability Mechanism Process, ADB, May 9, 2018; CAO Approach to Responding to Threats and Incidents of Reprisals in CAO Operations, CAO, 2018; AIIB Policy on the Project-affected People’s Mechanism, Asian Infrastructure Endnotes 57 Investment Bank, December 7, 2018; Annex to Directive on the Project-Affected People’s Mechanism: Draft Rules of Procedure of the Project-Affected People’s Mechanism, Complaints-resolution, Evaluation and Integrity Unit (CEIU) AIIB, December 21, 2018. 127 The Inspection Panel, 2018. Guidelines to Reduce Retaliation Risks and Respond to Retaliation During the Panel Process. 128 World Bank, 2013. Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Rural Enterprise Support Project, p. iii, paras iv and v. 129 The Inspection Panel, 2013. Request for Inspection: Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project, p. 1, para 3. 130 The Inspection Panel, 2013. Notice of Registration—Request for Inspection of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project, pp. 3 and 4. 131 The Inspection Panel, 2013. Eligibility Report and Recommendation of the Republic of Uzbekistan: Second Rural Enterprise Support Project, p. 15, para 65. 132 Ibid., p. 23, paras 102-103. 133 Interviews with Inspection Panel team members; Human Rights Watch, 2015. At Your Own Risk—Reprisals against Critics of World Bank Group Projects, footnotes 101 and 102: Inspection Panel, 2015. “Response to Human Rights Watch Research into Reprisals Linked to World Bank Projects,” on file with Human Rights Watch, p. 5. 134 Meeting with Bank Management on the logistical preparations for the field visit. 135 World Bank, 2015. Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Uganda Transport Sector Development Project—Additional Financing (P121097), p. 179, para 6; World Bank, 2020. Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Uganda: North Eastern Road-Corridor Asset Management Project (P125590), p. 9, para 43 and Annex 2, p. 23. 136 Oxford Public International Law defines Non-State Actors as a “concept that encompasses all those actors in inter- national relations that are not State[s]. It comprises individuals (Individuals in International Law) as well as enti- ties, the latter spanning a large range of organizations and institutions on the global, regional, sub-regional as well as the local levels. These entities cannot be identified by common sociological features as they include, inter alia, international organizations (International Organizations or Institutions, General Aspects), corporations….” See Oxford Public International Law, 2013. Non-State Actors. 137 For more on this Project: World Bank, 2017. Amaravati Sustainable Infrastructure and Institutional Development Project; Inspection Panel, 2017. Request for Inspection: Amaravati Sustainable Infrastructure and Institutional Development Project. 138 The Inspection Panel, 2019. Third Report and Recommendation on a Request for Inspection India Amaravati Sustainable Infrastructure and Institutional Development Project, para. 3 and 5. 139 World Bank, 2020. Management Response to Request for Inspection Panel Review of the Peru: Cusco Transport Improvement Project, p. 12, para 34. 140 The Inspection Panel, 2016. Republic of Uganda, Transport Sector Development Project—Additional Financing Investigation Report, p. 59, para 242. 141 Ibid., pp. 58 and 59. 142 ProtectDefenders.eu delivers a fast and specific EU response to support Human Rights Defenders at risk. Its emer- gency grants programme ensures that Human Rights Defenders can access and implement urgent security mea- sures to protect themselves, their families, and their work. Freedom House’s Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund offers emergency funds to organizations and individuals around the world who are under threat due to their human rights work. 143 World Bank, 2000. Chad and Cameroon—Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, Project Appraisal Document. 144 Interview with a previous Panel Executive Secretary. 145 In its 10-year book, p. 92, the Inspection Panel noted that “[t]he public debate also shed light on Chad’s human rights situation. Amnesty International released information about an opposition leader in Chad’s parliament…who was jailed and reportedly tortured after he spoke out against the pipeline project in May 2001.” The Panel reported that the World Bank President telephoned the President of Chad and the individual was released from prison imme- diately thereafter. 146 The World Bank, 2009. Kazakhstan: South-West Roads: Western Europe-Western China International Transit Corridor—CAREC-1b & 6b. 147 Human Rights Defenders & Civic Freedoms 58 RIGHT TO BE HEARD: INTIMIDATION AND REPRISALS IN WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL COMPLAINTS 148 World Bank, 2017. Environmental & Social Framework—A Vision for Sustainable Development, para 3. 149 Ibid., para 4. 150 This includes Front Line Defenders, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, and Oxfam International. 151 International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law—Top Trends: COVID-19 and Civic Space. 152 Front Line Defenders, 2020. Global Analysis 2020. Endnotes 59 RIGHTS AND PERMISSIONS © 2021 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000; Internet: www.worldbank.org\ Some rights reserved 1 2 3 4 19 18 17 16 This work is a product of the World Bank Inspection Panel with external contributions. 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