World Bank Institute The Importance of Stakeholder Ownership for Capacity Development Results Nicola Smithers World Bank Institute Capacity Development and Results May 2011 THE WORLD BANK Copyright 0 May 2011 The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, USA All rights reserved This paper was prepared under the direction of Samuel Otoo. Valuable comments and contributions were provided by Jenny Gold, Natalia Agapitova, Margherita Castelli, Cristina Ling, Sara Okada, Violaine Le Rouzic, Joy Behrens, Sharon Fisher, Edouard A Dahdah, Audrey Sacks and Nimah Mazaheri. Design: Sharon Fisher, World Bank Institute About the World Bank Institute (WBI) WBI's mission is to be a global facilitator of capacity development for poverty reduction, helping leaders, institutions, and coalitions address their capacity constraints to achieving development results. For more information, visit www.worldbank.org/wbi. About the WBI Capacity Development and Results Practice (WBICR) WBICR provides advisory services, knowledge products, action research and knowledge sharing that inform and support the design and management of results-focused capacity development strategies, policies and programs. For more information, email capacity4change@worldbank.org. Contents Abbreviations ................................................... 5 Executive Summary ...................7........ ...................7 A. Introduction ........................................ .......... 13 WBI's approach to results-focused capacity development Key concepts Purpose and content of the paper B. Strength of Stakeholder Ownership .......................... 15 Stakeholder ownership and its determinants Why stakeholder ownership is key to achieving development goals What stakeholder ownership might look like C. Institutional Characteristics Contributing to Stakeholder Ownership ...... 20 Commitment of social and political leaders ............................... 20 Compatibility of social norms and values ....................... 25 Stakeholder participation in setting priorities .............................. 29 Stakeholder demand for accountability ........................ 32 Transparency of information to stakeholders ................. .......... 37 D. Interaction Among the Institutional Characteristics .................... 41 E. Conclusions and the Way Forward ..................................... 42 References ..................................................... 44  Abbreviations ADB Asian Development Bank CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDD Community Driven Development CDRF Capacity Development and Results Framework CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment CSO Civil Society Organization CV&A Citizens' Voice and Accountability DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development DG Development Goal DPL Development Policy Lending EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative FBO Faith Based Organization HIPC Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative IBP International Budget Project ICT Information and Communication Technology IEG Independent Evaluation Group IMF International Monetary Fund NGO Non-Governmental Organization OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability program PFM Public Financial Management PRS Poverty Reduction Strategy PTF Partnership for Transparency Fund ROSC Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes TI Transparency International UN United Nations UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Program WBI World Bank Institute ABBREVIATIONS [ 5 6 ] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Executive Summary Introduction that guide stakeholder behavior towards the goal, and effectiveness of organizational arrangements Capacity development is widely accepted as established to achieve the goal. For each of these critical to achieving the Millennium Development institutional capacities, the framework identifies a Goals (MDG) and other development outcomes, number of attributes or characteristics that con- but the results from capacity development tribute to the institutional capacity. initiatives have often been disappointing. This challenge signifies the urgent need to advance The focus of this paper is on the strength of capacity development knowledge and practice. stakeholder ownership. Drawing on a review of As a contribution to addressing this challenge, recent studies, literature and relevant examples, the World Bank Institute (WBI) has developed a this paper seeks to deepen understanding of the strategic, country-led and approach to results- importance of stakeholder ownership and its con- focused capacity development, which involves tributing institutional characteristics to achieving collective action across society and an emphasis development goals. The paper identifies future throughout on achieving results. The conceptual collaborative research that would shed light on framework and processes for WBI's approach which change strategies are likely to be most ef- are captured in the Capacity Development and fective in strengthening stakeholder ownership in Results Framework (CDRF) (Otoo, Agapitova and different contexts. Behrens 2009). The CDRF proposes the following operational Strength of stakeholder ownership definitions of capacity and capacity development: The CDRF (WBI 2010b, p.2) provides the following * Capacity is the availability of resources definition: and the efficiency and effectiveness with "Stakeholder ownership comprises formal which societies deploy these resources and informal political, economic and social to identify and pursue their development forces that determine the priority that gov- goals on a sustainable basis. ement, civil society and the private sector give to a development goal." * Capacity development involves the empowerment of societal actors through Stakeholder ownership is therefore concerned learning, knowledge, information with the demand-side of development, involv- and innovation, in order to effect ing the priority and support a society (including transformational and sustainable change government leaders, public officials, legislators, in institutions, which in turn supports the civil society actors, private sector, service users achievement of the development goal. and providers, academia and citizens) gives to a development goal as a consequence of various Capacity development therefore seeks to impact forces. The political, economic and social forces achievement of development outcomes by chang- are mediated though formal and informal institu- ing institutions. Based on extensive practitioner tions, often referred to as the "rules of the game" consultations and learning, the CDRF identifies for society's actors. Institutions shape incentives three broad institutional capacities as the opera- that may influence the stakeholder ownership tional targets of capacity development efforts for a given development goal. Fundamentally, it to advance achievement of any development involves the ability and willingness of beneficiaries goal: strength of stakeholder ownership for the and also other actors inside and outside govern- development goal, efficiency of policy instru- ment to express and facilitate demand, so as to ments, and other formal incentive mechanisms influence achievement of the development goal. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY [7 Country ownership has become probably the Institutional characteristics most prevalent and widely held principle of devel- contributing to stakeholder opment assistance in recent years, reflecting the ownership growing recognition that donor-driven develop- ment assistance and technical solutions imported Drawing on lessons of experience from across the from other countries were often ineffective in development community, the CDRF identifies five bringing about sustained change. The scaling up institutional characteristics that (i) impact the abil- of development assistance to support MDGs (UN ity and willingness of stakeholders to influence the 2000) highlighted the importance of improving achievement of a development goal and (ii) are aid impact. Strengthening country ownership is susceptible to change through deliberate action. central to the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Ef- They can therefore be considered as potential fectiveness, and to the World Bank's approach to levers to contribute to strengthening stakeholder development engagement. To emphasize that the ownership, and are described in Table 1 (in the concern is for ownership by actors across society, main text). and not just government, the term "stakeholder - Commitment of social and political leaders to ownership" is used in the CDRF and this paper. the development goal -Compatibility of social norms and values with Strong stakeholder ownership is essential because the development goal capacity development impacts roles and responsi- - Stakeholder participation in setting priorities bilities that "unsettle vested interests and estab- related to the development goal lished power structures" (UNDP 2008, p.4) and - Stakeholder demand for accountability "the forces for change will only arise out of the regarding the development goal political and social system of the country" (OECD * Transparency of information to stakeholders 2006, p.21). Several major cross-country studies related to the development goal provide evidence supporting the development community consensus that stakeholder owner- A summary of the review regarding each institu- ship is critical to the success of development tional characteristic is shown in Table ES-i. This programs, including the Independent Evaluation includes key dimensions captured within the Group (IEG) evaluation of Public Sector Reform characteristic, and why it is important for achiev- (World Bank 2008), the Capacity, Change and ing development goals. The table presents the Performance 16 country-case study (Baser and evidence available from cross-country studies of Morgan 2008), and the Asian Development Bank each characteristic's importance, and how to rec- (ADB) 2007 Annual Evaluation Review. ognize it. The latter draws on relevant indicators from actual World Bank project results frame- Understanding and assessing ownership is there- works, country examples from the literature that fore a key concern. This is reflected in the 2009 illustrate what the characteristic might look like, DPL Good Practice Note (World Bank 2009c) and and existing data sets where available. a checklist for assessing country ownership of poverty reduction strategies (PRS) (Entwistle and Table ES-i summarizes two general findings from Cavassini 2005) that suggest potential, broad the review. First, for each institutional character- indicators of ownership (Box 1). Ownership can istic, the literature reflects the broadly held view look very different in different types of devel- that the characteristic is important for achieving a opment processes. Examples include political development goal (DG). The cross-country stud- ownership (as in Punjab devolved education ies do not directly test the impact of the charac- where politicians provided backing and space for teristics on achieving a development goal and, reform), ownership across a coalition of different therefore, do not provide conclusive evidence. interests (as in domestically-driven civil service This is in part because the studies were not specifi- reform in Sri Lanka), and grass roots ownership (as cally designed to assess a characteristic's impact in community-led reforms to primary education in (often taking this assumption as the starting point), Chad). These examples illustrate the breadth of and in part because common terms were used for what can constitute stakeholder ownership, but, in somewhat different concepts. However, for each of general, measurable indicators are lacking. the five characteristics, two or more cross-country studies broadly demonstrate the contribution of 8] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Table ES-1. Institutional Characteristics of Stakeholder Ownership Key Why important and Supporting What it looks like dimensions further considerations evidence COMMITMENT OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LEADERS * Commit- Why important Fairly strong sup- Illustrative examples ment of Leaders: porting evidence Different indicators of leaders' commitment and both social Influence the opinions of the positive illustrative examples include: and political and actions of many contribution of lead- Allocation of resources to support achievement leaders others (motivating ers' commitment of the goals-such as Rwanda spending on * Commitment some while overcoming to achieving DGs is Information Communications Technology (ICT) demon- resistance of others) provided by: to support transformation of the economy, and strated May have specific powers o lEG public sector share of secondary education in ministry budget through to enable the program reform evaluation in Burkina Faso. words and (such as creating reform (2008) Concrete actionss-such as prosecution of public deeds space) o lEG Africa officials in Singapore's anti-corruption drive. * Accounta- May be able to provide capacity Assignment of a top politician to lead reforms- bility for resources development such as the Deputy Prime Minister being directly commit- Further considerations evaluation (2005) responsible for the mine action organization in ments made L May involve a few leaders * lEG synthesis Azerbaijan. review on Existing indicator frameworks or ciso many * Motivations and strengthening e Elements of the 2009 DPL Good Practice Note capabilities of leaders are effectiveness and indicators and 2005 PRS country ownership important accountability checklist assess government commitment. * Commitment often needs of public sector e Antecedents and elements predict political to go beyond leaders institutions (2006) commitment in the McCourt 2003 model. COMPATIBILITY OF SOCIAL NORMS AND VALUES * Extent Why important Several studies Illustrative examples the DG is Social norms, values and indicate the WBI's database of project indicators includes survey supported or beliefs and other informal contribution of results regarding women's acceptance of violence undermined institutions often profoundly social norms, (UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) and by social influence the way people values and informal belief of labor in pension system (Living Standards norms behave, institutions Measurement Survey). * Whether They can support, comple- to capacity Helmke and Levitsky (2004) categorize informal solutions ment, substitute or under- development: institutions based on their relationship with formal adopted mine the achievement of a lEG public sector institutions. Illustrative examples in each category: to achieve the formal institutions that reform evaluation *Complementary informal institutions reinforce DG ares(2008) DGae underpin achievement of (20)the impact of formal institutions-such as the supported the DG. a Baser and contribution of shared values among staff and by social Morgan 16 patients of a non-governmental hospital in north- norms Further considerations country case em Uganda to ensure its survival and success. "Involve Social norms and similar in- study (2008) *Substitutive informal institutions fill gaps in state informal formal institutions are often OECD review capacitys-such as faith-based organizations in institutions resistant to change. of capacity Papua New Guinea delivering social services and DGs should not necessarily development facilitating peace-building in communities. be constrained by existing experience (2006) Accommodating informal institutions bend but norms, such as those involv- do not break the formal rules-such as informal ing discrimination. In some power sharing between political parties in the circumstances it is possible Netherlands that limited the power of citizens' that they can be successfully votes but reduced societal conflict. challenged. Competing informal institutions that directly contradict the formal ruless-such as kinship demands conflicting with formal rules for civil servants in post-colonial Ghana. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY [9 Key Why important and Supporting What it looks like dimensions further considerations evidence STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN SETTING PRIORITIES * Participa- Why important Several studies find Illustrative examples tion in Effective participation participation, broadly WBI's database of project indicators includes stake- choices broadens likely ownership defined, contributes holder representation on decision-making bodies, between of the DG choices made, to likely success of a and responsiveness of government spending plans to DGs and enables broadly DG: expressed stakeholder preferences. * Expression dispersed beneficiaries to e ADB annual Processes that facilitate stakeholder participation in set- of opinion create pressure for change evaluation report ting priorities and illustrative examples include: by citizens to achieve the DG. for 2007 * PRS processes-such as the institutionalization and other Further considerations e UNDESA 2010 of stakeholder participation in Mozambique PRS parties * Who is participating report on ("voice") and who is excluded,. otcnlct*poess ("voce" an whois xclded pos-coflit oTargeting marginalized groups-such as Nepalese * Respon- Do marginalized groups reconstruction programs to empower excluded groups to access siveness have a voice? e lEC Africa capacity rights and services. of govern- * Legitimacy of groups development * Local planning and budgeting-such as town ment to claiming to represent (2005) those citizens, and potential e Studies referenced metin counity particip ation in opinions tensions between rep- by Russell-Einhorn Guatemala. resentative democracy (2007) and public participation Ajondooevua Exsignictrfmwrk and ublc prtiipaion A jintdonr ealu- *Managing for Development Results Capacity Scan in policy processes. tion of voice and ac- manual provides criteria for assessing participation * Decentralization and countability interven- in policy, planning and budgeting processes at the CDD as policy instru- tions found unrealistic national level. ments to advance donor expectations * The Bank's CPIA includes measures of community stakeholder participa- contributed to mixed involvement in planning and public consultations in tion, as well as account- results (Rocha Meno- several sectors. ability and transparency. cal and Sharma 2009). STAKEHOLDER DEMAND FOR ACCOUNTABILITY Extent Why important Several studies Illustrative examples to which Effective demand for indicate that demand WBI's database of project indicators includes scrutiny of stakeholders accountability by for accountability public finances by non-state actors, surveyed opinion of take action to stakeholders across contributes to the need for citizens to actively question leaders, and demand: society creates pressure achieving DGs: active representation of stakeholder in governance *Their rights for performance e lEG Africa capacity arrangements related to the DG. *Answers improvement and development Mechanisms and illustrative examples include: for failures achievement of evaluation (2005). * Monitoring of public programs-such as citizen *Their development goals. This e Baser and Morgan watchdog institutions monitoring education improve- opinions to can reinforce government's 16 country case ments at local and community levels in Ethiopia. be heard commitment to DGs. study (2008) * Budget oversight-such as civil society groups under- Focuses on Further considerations e lEG public sector taking analysis and advocacy in respect of the gov- the actions This characteristic is reform evaluation erment. A six-country study found positive impact of non- distinct from government (2008) on allocations and systems. government actions to account for e OECD review * Report cards and surveys-such as citizen report stakeholders performance, though both of capacity cards used to monitor public perceptions of service within the are required. development delivery in Bangalore. accountability It is also distinct from experience (2006) * Challenge to change from clients-such as outspo- relationship. demand for a given ser- Several county exam- ken challenge by the business community for the vice, which may be passive pies also demonstrate Afghanistan Investment Support Agency to improve rather than active demand. impact (see adjacent business entry conditions. cefo Existing indicator frameworks Indicator sets that measure accountability focus on government actions to provide account, rather than demand for accountability from stakeholders. 10] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Key Why important and Supporting What it looks like [dimnension s further consid eration s evidence TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION TO STAKEHOLDERS Supply of Why important Importance of Illustrative examples information by The supply of transparency is WBI's database of project indicators includes public entities, information is critical typically taken as a public disclosure of public finance information, and which is: to enable the demand- given, but several provision of information on benefits and obligations * Timely and side characteristics of studies draw with a public program. high quality participation in priority valuable insights Examples of successful efforts to improve transpar- * In useful setting and demand for readnit and accountability regarding it ency and their contribution include the following: and ccontablit reardig cntriutin: Publication of all judicial deliberations in Timor accessible a development goal. e lEG Africa Leste has contributed to accountability and inde- form Transparency is widely capacity pendence of the judiciary. Enables viewed as a necessary, development o Transparency measures in India, including right to stakeholders though not sufficient, evaluation (2005) information and e-governance in sectors serving to participate condition for good e OECD review business and citizens, have promoted account- in policy, governance and better of capacity ability. oversight, development outcomes. development o Nigeria EITI, involving publication of audits of oil ovrsgh,experience (2006) revenues, has supported recovery of underpay- monitoring Further considerations e lEG public sector ments to government and enabled civil society to and Strengthening reform evaluation challenge public officials. evaluation, transparency has been (2008) o Radio communication provided independent in- the focus of several e UNDESA 2010 formation during elections in the Democratic Re- major international report on initiatives, including: post-conflict * Extractive Industries reconstruction Existing indicator frameworks Transparency Initiative. Various aspects of transparency are included in exist- * Open Budget evealo ing indicator sets, including the following: Initiative. examp as o CPIA includes measures of transparency across * Partnership for idicat ct(se the public sector and several specific sectors. Transparency Fund. a The Global Integrity Index assesses transparency * Transparency arrangements in different parts of the public International sector. t Transparency in PFM is assessed in several existing indices and measures. the characteristic to strengthening stakeholder Interaction among the institutional ownership and to achieving the development goal. characteristics Second, measurement of the institutional The institutional characteristics are interactive characteristics is still at an early stage. Country and dynamic. Commitment of political and social examples provided in Table ES-i illustrate various leaders and social norms will be affected by each ways a characteristic may be manifested and the other, and will influence participation, demand for degree to which this is highly context-specific. accountability and transparency. In addition, the World Bank project results frameworks provide concepts of participation, demand for account- some relevant indicators, as illustrated in WBI's ability and transparency are closely interwoven. institutional capacity indicator database. Existing indicator frameworks include some measures of While, in some circumstances, positive impact transparency of information and, to a lesser extent, on achievement of the development goal may participation in setting priorities and commitment be possible through focused attention on one of of leaders. However, high-quality indicators of the institutional characteristics, action on multiple some aspects of the characteristics have yet to be fronts may be needed to align interests and chal- developed, lenge vested interests. Any approach to designing EXECUTIVE SUMMARY a change strategy therefore needs to be designed porate stakeholder ownership and its contributing locally, to understand these interactions. characteristics in the goal assessment, problem identification, objective setting, design, imple- mentation, monitoring and evaluation of develop- Conclusions and the way forward ment programs. Capacity development initiatives within development programs need to address In summary, the findings of the cross-country this broader institutional environment, in addition studies provide some evidence to support the to the challenge of formal policy instruments and widely-held view that stakeholder ownership and organizational arrangements. the five characteristics are important factors in the achievement of development goals. However, in Second, more learning is required, involving many cases this hypothesis is not directly tested, collaboration among disciplines, to build under- definitions of these concepts often vary between standing about what aspects of stakeholder own- studies and robust measures are typically lacking.. ership really matter in varying contexts and condi- tions, how they can be measured and in what The CDRF's institutional characteristics have been ways they can be influenced. Key steps include: more narrowly and precisely specified than the - Challenging and building consensus on the broad, commonly used terms of commitment, CDRFs precise operational definitions. participation, accountability and so on. This - Piloting applications of the CDRF to support makes the characteristics operationally useful local agents in developing strategies to in targeting capacity development to achieve strengthen stakeholder ownership. desirable institutional change, and allows testing - Developing stakeholder ownership indicators to identify what really matters in creating effec- for adaptation and inspiration of practitioners. tive demand for a development goal and how to * Systematically reviewing and evaluating measure it. practices in strengthening stakeholder ownership. On this foundation, the review proposes two main - Promoting and capturing innovative practices implications for the way forward. First, the review that strengthen stakeholder ownership, and underlines the need to more systematically incor- demand-side institutions more generally. 12] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Introduction WBI's approach to results-focused context, and is concerned with collective capacity capacity development and action by empowered leaders, citizens and coalitions across society. It supports country stake- There is wide acceptance of the importance of holders in a systematic process from problem iden- capacity development to the achievement of tification and design to implementation, monitor- development outcomes. It underpins the MDGs ing and evaluation. At the core of WBI's approach and 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. is a results focus that enables setting objectives The OECD (2006, p.1 1) lays out the nature of the and measuring achievements while facilitating flex- challenge, contrasting this importance with the ibility and innovation in the change process. difficulties experienced in trying to achieve it, noting: "Capacity development has been one of This approach provides the basis for systematic the least responsive targets of donor assistance." learning about what works and why. It also aims to assist in applying the specialized knowledge One of the main stumbling blocks for capacity across the broad spectrum of governance, politi- development has been broad and varied un- cal economy, social accountability and institutional derstanding of what is meant by capacity and development to capacity development initiatives. capacity development, such that consensus on an The conceptual framework and processes for this effective operational set of definitions is lacking. approach are captured in WBI's Capacity Develop- This undermines a strategic, results-focused ment and Results Framework (CDRF) described in approach. Also among the culprits: lack of clear Otoo et al (2009). links between capacity development interven- tions and development goals; externally driven technical solutions; inadequate consideration of Key concepts stakeholder incentives; lack of clarity and rigor in setting objectives and measuring results of inter- A critical step for capacity development initiatives ventions; and poor fit to local institutional context. is the development of widely accepted operational definitions of capacity and capacity development. The constraint placed by inadequate capacity Significant efforts have been underway across the on development and poverty reduction, and the development community in this direction. The disappointing achievements from interventions to CDRF has sought to contribute through develop- date, signify the urgent need to advance capac- ing definitions that are precise so as to make them ity development knowledge and practice. In operationally useful, while being comprehensive. response, in consultation and collaboration with partners, WBI developed a strategic, country- The CDRF defines capacity as the availability of led and results-focused approach to achieving resources and the efficiency and effectiveness with transformative capacity development. The ap- which societies deploy these resources to identify proach recognizes the need to go beyond ability and pursue their development goals on a sustain- and competence of individuals and organizations, able basis. This definition highlights two key points to address the effects of the institutional environ- regarding capacity that are widely accepted. ment on the willingness of stakeholders to act. * The availability of resources (human, financial, technical) is a necessary but not sufficient WBI's approach is strategic in that directs capacity condition for achieving the development goals development initiatives to achievement of sustain- of a society or an administrative entity. able institutional changes required for develop- * Social and economic development is sustainable ment results. It involves local agents of change when results and performance are locally owned designing and implementing their own change and can be replicated and scaled up by local processes that are tailored to their particular actors. INTRODUCTION [ 13 Most definitions of capacity previously focused on state and non-state stakeholders bring together the ability of local agents and define capacity at to achieve a development goal. this entry point (for example, OECD 2006, p.12). However, a more comprehensive understanding For each of these institutional capacities, the CDRF of capacity is arising globally. The effectiveness identifies a number of institutional characteristics, and efficiency with which resources are acquired which contribute to that institutional capacity. Ca- and used by stakeholders to achieve results pacity development interventions can then target depend not only on ability or competence, but these characteristics to improve the institutional also on social, political, economic, policy and environment in support of local development. organizational factors that condition the behavior of actors and their willingness to act. These fac- This paper focuses on the strength of stakeholder tors, rooted in history, power-relations and a host ownership, and five institutional characteristics of other context-specific variables, are collectively that WBI's ongoing learning and consultations with referred to in the literature as the enabling envi- development practitioners globally indicate are key ronment or institutional context. contributors.1 Following from the above, capacity development is defined as the self-empowerment of societal Purpose and content of the paper actors through learning, knowledge, information and innovation to effect transformational and Despite its widely accepted importance in the sustainable changes in local institutions, which in development process, the concept of stakeholder turn enable achievement of their goals. ownership is not clearly defined or understood due to a lack of empirically rooted evidence and analy- As the next step, the CDRF draws on extensive sis (Forsberg 2007). Drawing on a review of recent practitioner consultations and learning to identify literature and relevant examples, this paper seeks three of the overarching institutional factors that to deepen understanding of stakeholder owner- constrain achievement of development goals: ship, its relevance, institutional characteristics that low or divergent priority given by stakeholders contribute to it and how these can be observed. that inhibits effective action; inadequate policy It identifies future collaborative research needed framework to guide stakeholder actions; and to better understand which change strategies are poorly performing organizations. From these, it likely to be most effective in strengthening stake- derives three broad institutional capacities as holder ownership in different contexts. the operational targets of capacity development. The first of these addresses institutional factors Section B explores the meaning of stakeholder that strengthen demand for a given development ownership and its determinants, growing consen- goal, while the second and third are concerned sus of the development community on this issue, with institutional factors that enable the supply: findings of relevant cross-country studies of its impact and illustrations of the forms it may take. * Strength of stakeholder ownership, comprising Section C describes the five institutional charac- formal and informal political, economic and teristics of stakeholder ownership, and for each social forces that determine the priority that considers arguments and evidence regarding government, civil society and the private sector relevance and the contribution made, and how it give to a development goal. might be recognized, providing examples. Section D discusses the interactions among the character- * Efficiency of policy instruments, comprising istics. Section E concludes with remarks about the the administrative rules, laws, regulations, agenda for further experimentation and learning. standards and other formal incentives that a ' This paper focuses on the nation-state or other jurisdiction as the society uses to guide stakeholder actions to contextfor discussion. However, the concept of the three institutional achieve its development goals. capacities and their contributing characteristics is quite general. The constructs and various tools developed for their application can be used flexibly at any level of society and in any social organization. For instance, * Effectiveness of organizational arrangements, tools developed for diagnosis of the effectiveness of organizational comprising the systems, rules of action, arrangements were used to help strengthen a coalition of CSOs in Colombia to improve their participation in the national development processes, personnel, and other resources that planning process, i.e., strengthening national stakeholder ownership. 14] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Strength of Stakeholder Ownership Stakeholder ownership and its relates to the decision processes that determine determinants how countries set priorities about what they actu- ally want to do and, therefore, what they want "Stakeholder ownership comprises formal capacity for." and informal political, economic and social forces that determine the priority that gov- The social, political and economic forces that ernment, civil society and the private sector determine ownership are mediated through give to a development goal." institutions, both informal and formal. The classic definition of institutions provided by North (1991, The CDRF (WBI 2010b, p.2) packs a lot into this p.3) is that they are the "rules of the game in a concise definition of stakeholder ownership. It society," which are the "human devised con- includes: straints that shape human interaction." Helmke * The extent of the priority (and support) that and Levitsky (2004, p.727) present this as "rules is attached to a development goal, including and procedures that structure social interaction by accountability for its achievement. constraining and enabling actors' behavior," and * The priority across different actors in society, go on to define informal institutions as "socially not just the government or public officials shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, involved. communicated, and enforced outside of officially * The determinants that drive the priority given. sanctioned channels." Formal institutions are those included in constitutions, laws and legally- The concern is with ownership of stakeholders based rights (Parlevliet 2007), while informal across society, including government leaders, institutions reflect social norms, traditions, kinship, public officials, legislators, civil society actors, pri- and such, as well as arrangements such as clien- vate sector, service users and providers, academia telism and organized crime, generally with some and citizens. It involves the ability and willingness consequence for breach of the rules. of beneficiaries and also other actors inside and outside government to generate and express Institutions matter because they reduce uncer- demand so as to influence achievement of the tainty in human interaction and lower transac- development goal. This also includes actions tions and production costs (North 1991), which taken, often by public officials, to facilitate effec- facilitates economic activity, collective action and tive demand from other stakeholders (for exam- delivery of public goods (Fritz, Kaiser and Levy ple, by making public relevant information). 2009). They create incentives and disincentives for the actions of actors in society. In the context of Stakeholder ownership relates to the space cre- stakeholder ownership, institutions are the mecha- ated by stakeholders' interactions, within which nism through which preferences of stakeholders development goals and policy directions are set are exercised. Therefore, institutions contribute to and where accountability for development results the degree and nature of stakeholder ownership. is ultimately determined. Different stakeholders are likely to have varying, and sometimes conflict- Stakeholder ownership is not uniform across a ing interests; the space for development goals to country or a government (OECD 2006), but is spe- be achieved will depend on how those different cific to the context for a particular goal. What is stakeholders interact and the overall balance of possible in one program, and the extent of stake- positive ownership that results. Together these holder ownership required, is likely to vary from constitute the demand-side of development. As those in another. It is for this reason that the CDRF de Nevers, Leautier and Otoo (2005, p.4) point defines and considers stakeholder ownership in out: "The demand-side, which is rooted in gov- terms of a specific development goal. It does not ernance and in political economy considerations, seek to judge whether that development goal is STRENGTH OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [15 desirable, but rather to examine how stakeholder and programmes are supported by international ownership may affect its achievement. development partners." Specific steps to enable strong country owner- Why stakeholder ownership is key to ship are captured in the 2005 Paris Decaration achieving development goals on Aid Effectiveness. Developing countries and development agencies committed to greater Why is the priority and support of governments, country ownership and leadership responsibility citizens and private sector for a development for the development agenda with coordinated goal critical to its achievement? The development and aligned support from the development com- community commonly refers to this as country munity, alongside broad participation and results ownership, though care is required as the term is monitoring (OECD 2005a). In 2008, the Accra sometimes used narrowly as a synonym of govern- Agenda for Action reiterated the importance of ment ownership. The concern is wider than that: strengthening country ownership, identifying it as "partnership is required among these actors to one of the "three main challenges to accelerate solve development problems" (Pradhan 2010, progress on aid effectiveness" (OECD 2008, p.15). p.1). Recent analysis of Country Assistance Strategies Country ownership has become probably the (CASs) and Development Policy Lending (PL most prevalent and widely held principle of de- illustrate the integration of country ownership velopment assistance in recent years. It underpins into Bank programs. The starting point for the the PRS approach, which was introduced as part World Bank's 2009 GAS retrospective is that of the Highly-Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) country ownership is a "necessary condition debt relief initiative and subsequently became the for aid effectiveness" (World Bank 2009a, p.9), central framework for development assistance to while the Good Practice Note on designing DPLs low income countries, especially in Africa. This identifies adequate ownership as a necessary, reflected the growing recognition that donor- though not sufficient, condition for Bank support driven development assistance and technical solu- (World Bank 2009c, p.4). The Good Practice Note tions imported from other countries were often also recognizes the need for ownership to extend ineffective in bringing about sustained change. beyond government to beneficiaries and other The OECD (2006, p.15) notes that for many years, stakeholders. donors "severely overestimated the ability of development cooperation to build capacity in the Stakeholder ownership is important because "the absence of real country commitment." Leaders in forces for change will only arise out of the political Africa formed the New Partnership for Africa's and social system of the country" (OECD 2006, Development, which "centres on African owner- p.21). It is required to align interests in support ship and management" and made the following of change, and overcome resistance to change, call: "The appeal is for a new relationship that as change inevitably involves losers as well as takes the country programmes as a point of winners. Capacity development impacts roles and departure" (NEPAD 2001, pp.10,52). responsibilities that "unsettle vested interests and established power structures" (UNDP 2008, p.4). MDGs, adopted by the United Nations as part of Furthermore, it is typically the case that change the Millennium Declaration (UN 2000), heightened needs to be locally driven if it is to be sustainable. the urgency and world's attention to improving A locally driven program is more likely to fit coun- the impact of the increased levels of aid required try circumstances and generate the engagement to support the achievement of the goals. The cen- and support needed to continue the program tral importance of country ownership to increas- after external assistance has finished. ing aid and development effectiveness underpins the UN Millennium Project (2000) and has been Several major studies have provided evidence of borne out by the MDG progress to date. The UN the impact of stakeholder ownership on the effec- Millennium Development Goals Report (2010, tiveness of capacity development initiatives. Baser p.3) "shows that the Goals are achievable when and Morgan (2008) studied capacity, endogenous nationally owned development strategies, policies change and performance in 16 organizational 16] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS cases covering the public sector, non-govern- failed. A fourth phase was a wholly domestic mental organizations (NGOs), civil society orga- effort. "Making a strengthened Public Service nizations (CSOs) and faith-based organizations Commission ... was an indigenous initiative. As (FBOs), using a standard template developed for such, while still precarious, it was more stable than the study: the donor-sponsored reform phases that preced- ed it. Ironically, it was also deeper and more radi- "An unsurprising conclusion of this report cal." "Sri Lanka's informal coalition of political par- confirms what is already conventional ties, senior civil servants, and staff associations... wisdom: namely, that progress on capacity sustained the reform, because it responded to development depends critically on the level a need that they had identified themselves, the of ownership, commitment and motivation need to curtail patronage" (McCourt 2007, p.34). of country actors, i.e. their ability to com- mit and engage" (Baser and Morgan 2008, p.59). What stakeholder ownership might look like The evaluation of World Bank support for capac- ity building in Africa from 1995 to 2004 examined The central concern with ownership makes assess- more than 30 technical assistance loans, and ing it a key requirement for engagement in devel- undertook six in-depth country case studies. opment programs. Box 1 summarizes two useful Among the main constraints on capacity devel- references that provide some guidance on how opment, it highlights "limited country owner- to identify ownership. The good practice note on ship of the change agenda and the absence of a DPLs (World Bank 2009c) looks to recent actions time-tested approach for adapting international taken as well as inclusion of the DPL-supported practices to the local context" (World Bank 2005, program in national strategy documents and p.28). In the same evaluation, resistance to change building of support. While this necessarily focuses by officials in spending ministries was identified as on government ownership, given the nature of a key cause of problems in implementing budget the instrument, it also recognizes the need for management reforms in Benin and Ghana, two of broader stakeholder engagement. The checklist the country case studies. The Asian Development on assessing country ownership of PRSs considers Bank's (ADB) Annual Evaluation Report (2007, the ownership and interaction among state and p.34), which focused on capacity development, non-state actors (Entwistle and Cavassini 2005). finds that "strong ownership by the government" is one of the key factors "that improve the Stakeholder ownership can look very different in chances of project success." different types of development process, not least because of the breadth of actors involved. The The need for government ownership is a con- case of civil service reform in Sri Lanka outlined sistent theme throughout the report of the IEG above is an example of ownership generated by public sector reform evaluation (World Bank and evident in the creation of a broad coalition 2008), and is highlighted by the Committee of in support of change. This coalition succeeded Development Effectiveness in its discussion of the where formal government "buy-in" had failed. evaluation's findings. An OECD review of capacity Two further examples described below entail development experience identified how donors political ownership in Punjab Province in Pakistan often respond to perceived weak domestic com- and grass roots ownership in Chad. mitment by assuming leadership; this in turn leads to "a sense of disengagement and lack of interest Watson and Khan provide an analysis demon- in performance standards among recipient orga- strating that, despite a challenging environment, nizations and individuals, which results in further Punjab has been successful in improving devolved deterioration in capacity" (OECD 2006, p.24). education delivery. Evidence of strong political ownership of the reforms included explicit per- Civil service reform in Sri Lanka is an illuminat- sonal backing of the Chief Minister that provided ing case. McCourt reports that, between the mid a strong signal to the rest of the provincial gov- 1980s and early 2000s, three phases of reform with ement, the Chief Minister's request for Bank strong donor involvement and support essentially support following rigorous Bank analysis and the STRENGTH OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [17 Box 1. Assessing Country Ownership for DPLs and PRSs Indicators for assessing country ownership for DPL (extract from World Bank 2009c) * The government has recently taken initial steps to implement elements of the reform program to be supported by the operation. * The government has a good track record in implementing related reforms. * The reform is specifically endorsed in the country's formally adopted national development strategy, PRSP, or similar document that has been widely discussed and formally approved. * The government has taken the initiative in formulating the reform agenda and presenting it to the Bank. * Key policymakers articulate their intellectual conviction that the reform is needed. * Top political leaders have publicly stated their support for the reform. * The government has undertaken efforts to build support for the reform among key constituencies. * Relevant interest groups have been engaged in dialogue with the government about the reforms and have indicated general support. Potential beneficiaries have been mobilized, and the concerns of groups that might suffer losses from the reforms have been taken into consideration. * The reform has been openly advocated during the campaign of an elected government. Assessing country ownership of PRSs-checklist of good practices (extract from Entwistle and Cavassini 2005) A. Leadership within and participation across the executive (1) PRS has a clear role vis-a-vis other national development strategies. (2) Finance and planning functions are clearly aligned, and the PRS coordination function is backed by high- level leadership. (3) PRS formulation and implementation are embedded in inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms and linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and national budget processes. (4) Line ministries systematically align sector action plans with PRS priorities. (5) PRS M&E system integrated into existing systems. B. Role and impact of national institutions (6) Parliamentary committees contribute to PRS formulation and monitoring. (7) Local development plans are compatible with PRS priorities. C. Government-stakeholder dialogue (8) Government and stakeholders have a mechanism for systematic consultations, with mutually agreed objectives and timetable. (9) Capacity building supports the development of negotiation skills across government and stakeholders. (10) Communication strategy includes translating PRS, or a simplified version of it, into local languages. (11) M&E system incorporates information exchange between government and stakeholders to inform strategy refinements. D. Role and impact of internal partners (12) Umbrella CSOs and business associations consult with members before engaging the government on the PRS. E. Role and impact of external partners (13) Financing and technical assistance are tailored to country circumstances. (14) Assistance strategies are aligned with PRS priorities and PRS business processes match the country's systems. (15) Consultations for assistance strategies are tied to PRS participatory structures. (16) Consultative meetings are held on a regular basis in the country and chaired/co-chaired by the government. F Political and economic shocks (17) Interruptions due to political and economic events, including electoral cycles, are anticipated and factored in. 18] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS protection provided by the Chief Secretary to management, communities were eventually able allow a high degree of continuity in the manage- to confront public officials, demand accountabil- ment and reform teams (when this is typically very ity, and mount pressure to make them respond." low in the Pakistan public service) (Watson and (Brinkerhoff 2010, p.5). Here it was the commu- Khan, 2009). nity rather than political leaders that owned and implemented reform. In the contrasting case of Chad, "in the mid to late 1990s, because the central government's capac- These examples illustrate the breadth of what is ity to provide primary education was weak, local meant by stakeholder ownership, but in general, communities established parents' associations, measurable indicators of stakeholder ownership which evolved to fulfill an expanded set of educa- are lacking. As a step towards making the con- tion management functions, including hiring and cept of stakeholder ownership more operational, paying teachers, raising local revenues for school the next section unbundles it further by examin- operations, and exercising performance oversight ing key contributing factors or characteristics of (Fass and Desloovere, 2004).... Besides education strong stakeholder ownership. STRENGTH OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [19 Institutional Characteristics Contributing to Stakeholder Ownership Stakeholder ownership for a given development ers beyond political and government leaders. The goal is concerned with the ability and willingness institutional characteristics involve different sets of of beneficiaries and other stakeholders to influ- stakeholders and their interactions. ence the achievement of that goal. The next step is to examine the factors that contribute to the demand for a development goal. Drawing on les- Commitment of social and political sons of experience from across the development leaders community, the CDRF identifies five institutional characteristics that (i) impact this ability and will- What it is and why it matters ingness of stakeholders, and (ii) are susceptible to This institutional characteristic relates to the com- change through deliberate action. They can there- mitment of both social and political leaders to the fore be considered as potential levers to contrib- development goal. It goes beyond simply stat- ute to strengthening of stakeholder ownership. ing support for the goal. It is concerned with the extent to which they demonstrate consistent and To facilitate operational izing and monitoring of public commitment through words and deeds, these characteristics, and testing of what aspects and then deliver on those commitments. The matter most for strengthening stakeholder owner- accountability that leaders demonstrate to con- ship, the CDRF has developed precise descrip- stituents belongs under this characteristic. tions of each institutional characteristic (Table 1). The discussion of each characteristic that follows While the term "commitment" is often used further explains what it is and why it matters, interchangeably with "ownership" in discussion drawing on evidence available from recent of development effectiveness, the CDRF seeks to studies. It also examines how to recognize the distinguish these two concepts. It provides a com- presence or absence of the characteristic and prehensive view of stakeholder ownership, equat- considers the issue of measurement. ing this with overall demand for the goal, while more specifically identifying and defining commit- Substantial work has been undertaken in the last ment of leaders as a key contributor to ownership. decade in developing indicators of institutions It should be borne in mind that different analysts and capacity at different levels and in differ- referenced in this paper use formulations that vary ent sectors, but this remains a key challenge in to some degree. advancing results-focused capacity development. WBI has developed a database of indicators Commitment of social and political leaders is related to the institutional characteristics, draw- important for creating strong and wide owner- ing from several hundred World Bank projects, ship of a development goal since these leaders as a contribution to global work on indicators. It influence the opinions and actions of many others, provides many potentially valuable indicators from may have specific powers to enable the program, which the paper draws illustrative examples. and may be able to provide resources. The UN Millennium Project (2002, p.96) notes: "Success- While carefully defining discrete institutional ful service scale-up to achieve the MDGs cannot characteristics that contribute to stakeholder begin without political leadership and strong ownership, the CDRF seeks at the same time to government commitment. This is an absolutely bring a holistic approach, which recognizes the necessary (though far from sufficient) condition." interaction and interdependence of these charac- Commitment of leaders to a development pro- teristics. Further, it seeks to ensure that ownership gram can be critical in: is understood to involve a wider set of stakehold- 20] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Table 1. Institutional Characteristics Institutional Characteristics Areas Covered Commitment of social and Social and political leaders consistently and regularly support the development political leaders goal through public statements, decisions, votes, and other actions demonstrating their commitment and accountability for achievement of the goal. Leaders demonstrate sound ethics and integrity related to the goal, faithfully honoring their pledges of support and not engaging in activities or missions that would undermine progress toward the goal. Compatibility of social norms The social norms and widespread beliefs that shape the behavior of local and values stakeholders are compatible with the development goal. Stakeholder participation in Priority-setting processes related to the development goal include opportunities setting priorities for all stakeholders to express opinions freely and without fear of repression, and these opportunities are communicated with adequate time for stakeholder engagement and response. Stakeholders actively participate through these established mechanisms, and government and other public service entities are responsive to the expressed views of civil society and other relevant parties. Stakeholder demand for Stakeholders know their rights related to the development goal, claim those accountability rights, and communicate their grievances and proposals for change to the government and legislature. If public officials and other public service providers fail to meet expectations about the achievement of the goal or are using allocated resources for unintended purposes, stakeholders freely hold them accountable for their conduct and performance. Stakeholders organize and collectively appeal unfavorable decisions concerning the goal. Stakeholders demand and use instruments of accountability that are available to the public, such as government scorecard information. Transparency of information Government and other public service entities provide accurate, relevant, to stakeholders verifiable, and timely information about the development goal to all stakeholders. They also explain actions concerning the goal in terms that stakeholders can use to participate in setting priorities, monitoring progress, and evaluating actions of public officials responsible for the goal. Any information influencing decisions related to the goal is fully disclosed to stakeholders. Motivating stakeholders, while overcoming Coalitions are important to give voice and resistance. Leaders can inspire and motivate influence to an often large and dispersed group others to engage and support a development of beneficiaries of a development policy, to goal. At the same time, leaders supporting overcome narrow vested interests. change may be able to persuade, compensate Creating reform space. Political leaders in or negate the influence of those who resist particular may be able to create protected change. In their discussion of the turnaround space for public sector reform implementers. of Uganda's National Water and Sewerage Social leaders may be able to do the same Corporation, Matta, Otoo and Agapitova for civil society actors. The example of Punjab (2009) highlight the power of commitment from devolved education provides an illustration: inspired leaders in launching and sustaining "Senior politicians saw the importance of rapid results initiatives. improving education service delivery. This * Building coalitions in support of change. ownership was manifested, among other Fritz et al (2009, p.xiii) identify the building ways, in buffering of managerial and technical of coalitions as one of the "main avenues for staff from lower-level political interference, building traction for change" and point to which had obstructed previous efforts to the role of leaders in that coalition building. enhance delivery capacity" (Watson and Khan, INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [21 2010, p.21). Furthermore, Andrews argues the review determines, "Large-scale technocratic that it is reform space, rather than technical reform programs have yielded better results when design, that "determines how much can be they have built on strong country leadership and achieved," (Andrews 2008, p.100), with reform broad based political support." For instance, "a space defined as the area where acceptance, substantial share of the success of the Bulgarian authority and ability overlap. reforms has been the product of broad-based Allocating resources. Leaders may, directly or political support elicited by the prospect of EU indirectly, assist in ensuring that resources are accession." allocated to support the achievement of the development goal. Resources can take the Further, while Bank assistance to public finan- form of people, funds, materials and services. cial management reform has had mixed results, "areas that received political support, such as tax Evidence from studies administration ... have made steady progress." In Three reports by the World Bank's IEG provide contrast: "When political support has been less strong evidence of the positive contribution of forthcoming, the effectiveness of Bank-supported commitment of leaders and leadership to the administrative reforms has been undermined." achievement of development results. First of The review also notes that political opposition to these is the 2005 evaluation of capacity develop- reforms in Honduras contributed to achievement ment in Africa, which includes an examination of of only limited results (World Bank 2006, pp.34-36). the impact of country leadership and commit- ment on public sector reform achievements in six Similarly, commitment is identified as a key country cases. The evaluation places the countries determinant of the success or otherwise of into three clusters. Country leadership and com- reforms throughout the report of the 2008 IEG mitment are identified as key determinants of the evaluation of public sector reform (World Bank cluster into which a country falls. In Ethiopia and 2008). For example, "financial management Mozambique, strong leadership is identified as information technology systems have been suc- contributing to substantial public sector reform cessfully adopted in some cases when there are and capacity building actions. In the second clus- sufticient commitment, capacity, and resources" ter, Benin, Ghana and Mali weak country leader- (p.47). The report also points to the impact of a ship is associated with slow paced reform. In the lack of political commitment, or a change in politi- third cluster, failure to meet program objectives cal leadership, which can derail seemingly promis- in Malawi is attributed to overestimation of the ing public sector reforms: "This issue of political government's commitment to reform (World Bank commitment can affect even the most uncontro- 2005, pp.21-23). versial measures, such as introduction of new data systems, by reallocating resources or simply delay- These conclusions are reinforced by the 2006 ing projects because of staff turnover. Changes synthesis review of IEG findings regarding support in political leadership can also result in decisions for strengthening effectiveness and accountabil- to terminate, reverse, or dilute more controversial ity of public sector institutions, presented in the reforms such as downsizing" (p.54). Commitment IEG Review of Development Effectiveness of that needs to be long term to address complex areas year. The review draws on four years of IEG CAS such as public sector reforms. reviews, and also thematic evaluations on com- munity development, extractive industries and The importance of leaders to development fiduciary assessments. In examining the impact of achievements is supported by the Baser and Mor- improved government processes on the percep- gan study of 16 cases of capacity development, tions of governance (as measured by WBI's World- though they focus on organizational leaders. They wide Governance Indicators) it finds that, while in conclude (p.64): "What was evident was that lead- most countries there was little change, "in at least ers could act to increase the likelihood of success two countries, Bulgaria and Lithuania, perceived even in complex situations," citing the cases of governance indicators have improved. This dem- the Rwandan Revenue Authority, the World Con- onstrates that it is possible to make rapid prog- servation Union (IUCN) in Asia, and the Environ- ress when there is strong country commitment ment and Sustainable Development Unit in the to do so"(World Bank 2006, p.34). In addition, Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. 22] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Further considerations be poor at coalition building, which can limit their While the summary findings outlined above allow effectiveness." (Fritz et al 2009, pxiii). broad conclusions to be drawn, these studies recognize that commitment of leaders is multi- Third is the issue of commitment extending faceted and a far-from-simple concept. What beyond the leaders. The commitment of social constitutes effective commitment is context- and political leaders alone is often not enough; specific and nuanced. Here we discuss just three commitment of a broad coalition is often aspects that require consideration. The first is that required. "Only a broad coalition., will have the while in some cases there may be one or a few power and momentum capable of dislodging leaders, in others there may be a larger group of powerful elites and institutions with vested leaders. WBI's approach to results-focused capac- interest in the status quo" (Kpundeh 2004, p.279). ity development points to the requirement for This also points to the requirement for effective connective leadership that goes beyond leaders' institutional arrangements for mediation (OECD individual commitment (Pradhan 2010). In the case 2006). Another example is provided by Mengesha of the Brazil Observatorio a network of academ- and Common's study of business license process ics, analysts and practitioners advocated for re-engineering in Ethiopia, where the responsible improved public health, while in cases of the non- minister and other senior officials provided access governmental Lacor Hospital in northern Uganda to policy makers and generated confidence in and public sector reform program in Tanzania, an the ministry to propose and tackle reforms. In evolution occurred over time from one dominant addition, the study emphasized the need for staff individual to a group of leaders bound by shared to embrace the changes: "Senior management values (Baser and Morgan 2008). tends to be more mobile, and so it is the front-line that has seen through this change" (Mengesha Second, the Bank's Problem-Oriented Gover- and Common 2007 p.378). nance and Political Economy Analysis Good Practice Framework points to the important role Recognizing commitment of reform champions in promoting change, but Recognizing commitment of leaders to a devel- argues that their motivations and capabilities opment goal is not straightforward. The OECD need to be understood: "individual champions (2006, p.25) notes that the "mere existence of a often have multiple agendas and issues that they capacity development strategy or policy docu- need to take into account, such as maintaining ment to which senior officials have put the gov- their own position and/or power bases, possibly ement's name is not necessarily an indication of addressing a range of challenges that may require real commitment." From the existing literature, horse-trading and compromising with others, two potentially useful sources are mentioned having important personal interests or obliga- here though it should be noted that they focus on tions, and so on. Also, some reform champions government commitment. The DPL Good Practice may be strong individual supporters of reform but Note suggests indicators of ownership many of Political capacity Voluntary-Reform driven domestically, rather than a Strong political base by donors. Reform c Leadership Explicit-Specific goals set. implemented " Consensus among 011 policyrakers Challenging-Challenging but attainable goals set. Results Administrative capacity Public-Politicians publicly state their support for delivered p United and strong specified goals and results. reform team Irrevocable-Insulated from policy reversal, with no 2 Overall capacity easy line of retreat by government. Adapted from McCourt (2003) INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [23 which are, more specifically, measures of govern- commitment, and then tested on (unsuccess- ment commitment (Box 1, p.18). ful) civil service reform experience in Swaziland. With a few revisions, McCourt concludes that "it A model to predict political commitment to a is possible to use our model to predict whether a policy, proposed by McCourt (2003), may provide government will in fact implement a given policy useful insights. It hypothesizes that when posi- proposal" (McCourt 2003, p.1 027). The study sug- tive "antecedents" to the policy are sufficiently gests that the existence of these antecedents and present (i.e., the enabling environment is strong elements increase the likelihood that the govern- enough), commitment will emerge and will be ment will implement and sustain the policy reform. demonstrated by the "elements" of commit- The revised model is shown in Diagram 1. ment. The model was derived from psychological literature and several development studies that Examples from WBI's database of relevant project identified factors associated with government indicators that capture the commitment of leaders Box 2. Examples of demonstrated commitment identified in UNDP program reviews Allocation of resources * Rwanda Information and Communication Technology. "...the government is aiming for middle-income status by the year 2020, transforming from an agricultural to an information economy, driven by a focus on ICT. Rwanda has set a goal to become the 'Silicon Valley' of East Africa. National spending on information and communication technology is on par with Western figures, well above the African average." * Panama Human Development Institute. "The Human Development Institute was created in 2004 to facilitate the generation of employment opportunities through the human capital, economic development and poverty reduction joint initiatives.... The Government commitment to the project is clear by its political leadership and its growing financial investment in the institution. In 2007, 81 million dollars were assigned to this initiative. That amount increased to 91 million dollars for 2009." * Namibia Public Private Partnerships. "The sustainability of the PPP initiative was supported by strong, visible commitment to pro-poor PPPs by political leaders at the national and municipal levels. In addition, PPP units and yearly budget provisions were established at the national (Ministry of Local Government) and municipal levels." Concrete actions * Singapore Anti-Corruption. "The government has exhibited strong political will to combat corruption through the introduction of stringent administrative and legal measures to support the anticorruption law, empowering the independent Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) to prosecute corrupt officials, and promote ethical leadership by example. Importantly, successful prosecution of cases against public officials, whose cases are also displayed publicly in the CPIB website, have also bolstered public support for the government's anticorruption drive." Top politician leading the program * Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action. "The government demonstrated its commitment to making ANAMA a strong institution and provided strong political support to its leadership. Its funding was also bolstered. In 1998, the ratio of donors' resources to the government's in support of ANAMA was 80 to 20 percent. Today, this ratio is reversed, with the government contributing 80 percent of ANAMA's resource needs. By placing ANAMA under the direct responsibility of the Deputy Prime Minister, the government has empowered the institution to fulfill its mandate and to perform effectively." * China Climate Change. "The establishment, in June 2007, of the "Leading Group for Energy Conservation and Pollution Abatement," led directly by Premier Wen Jiabao, and the launch of China's first ever National Climate Change Programme, attest to the commitment of the Government of China to strengthen its institutional capacity in the area of climate change, as well as its ownership over the capacity development agenda." Sources: UNDP (2009, 2010) 24] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS are often related to the funding of the develop- ness-the third of the framework's institutional ment goal, such as: capacities. This detailing of the elements also pro- * Percentage of revenues from excises tax on fuel vides clues as to how to measure it. Further work channeled into road maintenance (Moldova is required to apply, measure, test and evolve the Second Poverty Reduction Support Credit) definition of this factor, in order to strengthen its * Share of secondary education in the budget inclusion in the diagnosis, design, implementa- of the Ministry of Secondary and Tertiary tion, monitoring and evaluation of capacity devel- Education and Scientific Research (Burkina Faso opment programs. Post-Primary Education Project) * Percentage increase in public investment in the agriculture sector (Kenya Agricultural Compatibility of social norms and Productivity and Agribusiness Project). values ADB (2007, p.32) also notes that "the provision What is it and why it matters of adequate recurrent cost financing during The second institutional characteristic is con- implementation is a good proxy indicator of the cerned with the extent to which the development continued strong commitment and ownership of goal is supported or undermined by the prevail- the government." Further hints that might help in ing social norms, values and beliefs, and related recognizing commitment of leaders to change are informal institutions such as family, kinship and provided by UNDPts review of capacity develop- traditional authorities. This is not to suggest that ment programs it supports. In addition to the the goal should necessarily be constrained by allocation of resources, these include completion existing norms, such as gender discrimination, but of concrete actions, and appointment of a top that it is important to be cognizant of the help or politician to head the reforms. hindrance that those norms are likely to contrib- ute to the achievement of the goal. This concerns Implications not only the compatibility of the social norms with In general terms, the literature and examples sup- the development goal, but also the compatibility port the widely held view, and a proposition of the with the solutions adopted to achieve the goal. CDRF, that commitment of leaders is an important factor in the achievement of development goals. Social norms, values and beliefs are important be- Commitment is a broad concept, however, and cause of the often profound influence they have a number of different terms are used in different on the way people behave, not least because studies, sometimes interchangeably; other terms enforcement can "range from adherence to inter- include leadership, country commitment and nalized norms and expectations of reciprocity, to political support. In addition, leaders may refer to social shunning and ostracism, to threats and use those directly responsible for a program as well as of violence" (Fritz et al 2009, p.45). Many analysts the political leaders. At the same time, the capac- argue that this influence has not been adequately ity development studies tend to focus on politi- understood in the design of development pro- cal and government leaders, and often do not grams. For example, the OECD (2006) notes the directly consider the influence of social leaders. potentially negative impact of social influences on the behavior of officials that, if not addressed, This suggests that, in order to operationalize this undermines outcomes from learning interventions characteristic, to monitor it, to identify how it is (pp.22-23). developed and to assess its impact, it is neces- sary to develop and test more specific definitions An important consideration is the terms in of commitment. The CDRF aims to contribute which development programs are discussed through proposing a precise description of com- with and communicated to stakeholders. The mitment of leaders. This distinguishes it from non-governmental PRAXIS program supporting the quality of leadership, is more concrete than capacity development concludes, "The failure of simply referring to political support, and explicitly so many development interventions over the past focuses on both political and social leaders. At half-century can be partly attributed to their lack the same time it excludes program leaders, which of rootedness in the society they were designed are considered as part of organizational effective- to change. For development interventions to INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [25 catalyze fundamental change, they have to Benefits from institutions work "best when formal engage with people's identity and values"(James and informal institutions are complementary and and Wrigley 2007, p.17). PRAXIS points to use of worst when formal and informal institutions are local proverbs and metaphors as ways to connect competing and mutually subversive" (Fritz et al to stakeholders. 2009, p.45). Social norms and similar informal institutions may reinforce the impact of formal North seeks to chart a long link running from institutions on people's behavior, for example beliefs (imperfect perceptions that people have negative societal views on drunk-driving can con- of the consequences of their actions) and institu- tribute to enforcement of laws (termed "comple- tions, via incentives, to organizations, policies and mentary" informal institutions by Helmke and ultimately to economic outcomes (North 2005, Levitsky 2009, p.728) or when congregations col- pp.1 55-165). He argues that this link explains lect voluntary donations to deliver public goods many cases throughout history of economic when the state lacks the capacity to do so (termed progress and improved well-being, and the "substitutive"). They may also undermine formal many more cases of economic failure. He argues institutions. that cultural heritage of a society provides the beliefs, institutions, tools and technology, and The informal institutions may encourage behaviors that these together have immense impact on that "contradict the spirit, but not the letter, of the the level of certainty individuals have over their formal rules," (termed "accommodating" informal environment and their interactions. He contrasts institutions), in which formal rules are bent but not the relative ease of decision-making in low risk broken. They may go further than that, particularly cases in countries such as the United States, with when formal institutions are weak, such that they the challenges of day-to-day decision-making for directly contradict the formal institutions meaning citizens of underdeveloped societies (North 2005, that to follow the informal rule, actors must violate pp.36-37), with ultimate consequences for growth the formal rule. These are termed "competing" and development. informal institutions, and include examples such as clientelism and kinship demands that over-ride The IEG Africa capacity building evaluation takes governance and public service rules (Helmke and as one of its starting points that "the state has Levitsky 2009, p.729). yet to integrate formal rules with informal rules in ways that ensure good governance" that contrib- Evidence from the studies utes to continued weakness of the public sec- The lEG evaluation of public sector reform points tor in many countries in the region (World Bank out that cultural sensitivity helps to explain the 2005, p.2). It also points out that cultural norms, greater successes in PFM and tax administration together with the political economy, are factors programs compared to civil service and anti- that underpin the demand-side of the process to corruption reforms. "The thematic differences in strengthen public sector performance. outcomes result in part from financial manage- ment and tax administration being less politically The UN World Public Sector Report for 2010 and culturally sensitive than issues surrounding identifies the particular importance that beliefs public employment and corruption" (World Bank and traditional systems can have in post-conflict 2008, p.43). OECD also supports this point (2006). countries when state capacity is often very weak. One of the main lessons it draws from internation- It notes that "some traditional practices might al experience is that informal institutions such as be worthy of retaining or creatively adapting. clientelism and patrimonialism undermine formal Uganda, for example, reintroduced kingdoms and organizations. The examples that are outlined in traditional leadership institutions but conferred on Box 3 provide further demonstration of the impact them missions related to economic development of social norms and similar informal institutions on and cultural development. Rwanda introduced the achievement of development goals. the gacaca court system, based on traditional communal law-enforcement practices, to meet From their study of 16 cases of successful capacity the challenges brought about by the genocide of development, Baser and Morgan (2008, pp.56- 1994" (UNDESA 2010, p.xi). 57) identify the contribution of accepted values, meaning and purpose to success, above and 26] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Box 3. Recognizing categories of compatibility Complementary * The non-governmental Lacor Hospital in northern Uganda is identified by Baser and Morgan (2008, p.57) as an example where values were critical to its sustained success." Many staff and patients saw the hospital a symbol of Acholi tribal identity, but it was also a standard bearer of the values of catholic humanism and its concern for the poor and dispossessed." * Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p.728) note that "scholars have linked the effectiveness of the U.S. Constitution to a complementary set of shared beliefs and expectations among citizens." Substitutive * In Papua New Guinea, faith-based organizations have "widespread legitimacy and support" which has enabled them to step in to fill state capacity gaps not only in public service delivery, but also in governance. "FBOs contribute to better governance and improved performance through: mobilizing their members to participate in politics and public affairs, sharing information and pushing for transparency, serving as advocates and watchdogs for social justice and rule of law, and facilitating reconciliation and peacebuilding ....Churches have unique convening authority to bring stakeholders together to address societal issues, which is especially important for improving governance" (Brinkerhoff 2010, p.7). Accommodating * "Informal power sharing "cartel-like" arrangements between political parties in post-1917 Netherlands, including "extensive consultation in policy making (and) mutual veto powers....violated the democratic spirit of the Dutch constitution (by limiting the power of the vote)." However "they reduced class and religious conflict, thereby enhancing democratic stability" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p. 729). Competing * Tanzania has had one of the more successful public sector reform programs in Africa, but one component that ran into difficulties was the Selected Accelerated Salary Enhancement scheme for key service, reform and strategic staff, designed to replace individual donor top-ups. One of the main problems identified was that "it engendered political opposition to a selective scheme in a society with strong egalitarian values" (SIDA source quoted in OECD 2006, p.27). * Post-colonial Ghana provides an example in which kinship demands were in conflict with formal rules for civil servants, such that "most believed they would pay a significant social cost (such as loss of standing in the community) if they ignored kinship group norms that obliged them to provide jobs and other favors to their families and villages" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p.729). beyond what could be achieved through formal loyalty, greater coherence across units and politi- structural, functional and technical changes. "The cal protection. This did not just apply to formal power of values and meaning was apparent in organizations, but also to other groupings, such many of the cases." "In some cases, organisations as the Brazil network promoting public health could acquire legitimacy and an identity based on that "derived much of its power from its efforts to their contribution to some sort of higher purpose promote social justice, citizenship and democratic or ideal. In the process, such an achievement values that had come to prominence after the end could unleash the allegiance, loyalty and motiva- of military dictatorship in 1983." tion of the participants in ways not possible with restructuring, incentivising or strategizing.... We Further considerations stress here the potential capacity benefits of a The nature of social norms and similar informal in- genuine allegiance to a set of accepted values. stitutions mean that they are likely to be resistant The (6) case actors that achieved this.. .appear to change. Baser and Morgan (2008) report on the to have put in place an informal psychologi- case of Papua New Guinea in which they found cal contract with their staff and supporters that the "underlying social and ethnic structures were yielded benefits in the form of recruitment and more cohesive and resilient than formal organiza- INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [27 tions based on western models" (p.49). However, The examples in Box 3 illustrate the different Helmke and Levitsky (2004) argue that not all so- ways in which compatibility (or incompatibility) cial norms are slow to change, citing the relatively of social norms and similar informal institutions rapid disappearance of Chinese foot-binding with the development goal may be manifest. (p.732), though this is from the perspective of a These examples are organized using Helmke and generation rather than the short time periods of Levitsky's categories outlined above. typical reform programs. Implications This resilience does not mean that the devel- There is broad acceptance in the development opment goals should be fully consistent with literature that social norms influence the success existing social norms. Baser and Morgan (2004) of development programs. More specifically, the argue some degree of "misfit" with social norms studies and examples provide some evidence is often needed to "energize capacity develop- supporting the importance of compatibility of ment" (p.50). They point to the cases in their social norms with the development goal. How- study that deliberately involved "practices to do ever, the capacity development studies generally with gender, human rights and the rule of law and lack a consistent cross-country examination of this professional standards that did not reflect local characteristic. By its nature, compatibility of social norms" (p.50). Jutting et al (2007) reference the norms and values with a development goal is dif- work of Gita Sen, which examines cases in which ficult to define precisely, as social norms, values formal institutions can overcome traditions such and related informal institutions can take many as gender discrimination, if support is generated forms. Understanding this institutional character- within local groups. However, it does mean that istic also requires measurement of the extent of this must be considered carefully and deliberately compatibility. Rocha Menocal and Sharma (2008, p.45) point to the example of Benin, from their study of voice Among the institutional characteristics contribut- and accountability interventions in seven counties, ing to stakeholder ownership proposed by the noting that "the implementation of the new family CDRF, this may be the least amenable to deliber- law coding some rights of married women is con- ate action. When the social norms support the sidered challenging because the power relations goal, this contributes to ownership; the opposite that have served to deny women those very rights is also true. Development programs can be in the first place are not being addressed." designed to fit as far as possible the prevailing social norms, but the goal can justifiably challenge Recognizing compatible (and the norms. While social norms and attitudes are incompatible) social norms often deeply engrained, experience shows that By their nature, social norms and their compat- cultural attitudes can and have changed over ibility or otherwise with a development goal can time, with respect to issues such as religion; race; be very difficult to observe. Mechanisms such as ethnicity; gender; disease; sexual orientation; appropriately facilitated focus group discussions hygiene; dietary and sexual practices; tobacco, with stakeholders may be one way to bring to and drug and alcohol use. Change can be precipi- light potential conflicts between cultural practices tated through awareness raising and the inspira- and the development program. WBI's project tion of influential figures. Being aware of the com- indicators database includes measures of changes patibility, or incompatibility, is a critical first step. in attitudes drawn from surveys; for example: * Women's acceptance of domestic violence Strong collaboration between social development (UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey) and capacity development disciplines will enable * Acceptance among community members further development of this important institu- of corrupt behavior by government officials tional characteristic, and consideration of how to (Sierra Leone Institutional Reform and Capacity effectively operationalize it, drawing lessons from Building Project). changes that have taken place. Such a collabora- * Belief among active labor in the value of tion could also tackle the issue of measuring and contributing to the pension system (Living monitoring compatibility. Standards Measurement Survey). 28] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Stakeholder participation in setting going to jail but the state is still not listening" priorities (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008, pp.27-28). What it is and why it matters The World Development Report 2004 "Making This CDRF institutional characteristic focuses Services Work for Poor People" establishes the on stakeholder participation in making choices framework of relationships among politicians, between development goals, and the relative citizens and public service providers as a key priority attached to each. This is largely concerned determinant of the access, quantity and quality with ex ante decisions during strategic planning of public services to poor people. The voice that and resource allocation, where participation might citizens can express to politician policy makers occur through PRS consultations, participatory regarding priorities and their responsiveness to budget processes, participatory local planning that voice is one of the relationships in that frame- discussions and similar mechanisms. work (World Bank 2004, p.49-51). Participation is one of the defining characteristics of Community This characteristic incorporates two critical sides Driven Development (CDD) programs. "CDD of stakeholder participation: programs operate on the principles of local em- * The expression of opinions by citizens and powerment, participatory governance, demand- other relevant parties (often termed "voice"). responsiveness, administrative autonomy, greater It is concerned with broad participation across downward accountability, and enhanced local society, rather than small powerful groups. capacity"(World Bank 201Oc). * The responsiveness of government and other public entities to those opinions. The CDRF is concerned with broad participation in decision-making, which offers the opportunity Looking first at voice, O'Neil, Foresti and Hudson for coalitions that bring together widely dispersed (2007) draw on the literature to provide the follow- actors, who otherwise would be unable to counter ing definition: "Voice refers to both the capacity the interests of the powerful few. OECD (2006, of people to express their views and the ways in p.21) draws on a United Kingdom Department for which they do so through a variety of formal and International Development (DFID) program review informal channels and mechanisms." (O'Neil et in Nigeria to conclude: "Change tends to happen al 2007, p.3). The CDRF specifies active involve- when broad alliances across civil society, often ment of stakeholders and utilization of estab- supported by media attention and the private lished mechanisms as desirable features of this sector, and linked into reform elements within characteristic, which strengthen its contribution to government, coalesce around an issue of politi- stakeholder ownership. cal importance and exert pressure for effective change." OECD (2006, p.1 7) identifies the lack of Turning to the government side of the relation- voice as one of the factors constraining change ship, O'Neil et al (2007, p.8) identify the concepts and capacity development in the public sector. of receptivity and responsiveness. "Receptivity Stakeholder participation in priority setting has refers to the extent to which the state hears the the potential to help to "articulate and aggregate voices of those expressing their opinions and societal demands, build consensus for broad- preferences. Responsiveness-a form of behav- based political and economic reforms, and refine ior-refers to the extent to which the state, having or improve public policy proposals" (Russell- heard the voice of its citizens, responds to their Einhorn 2007, p.85). demands and concerns" (p.8 referencing Gloppen et al 2003; Moore and Teskey 2006). "Responsive- As a consequence, increasing participation ness is what citizens want when they exercise their of stakeholders in decision-making is a major voice". The need for both sides of this relation- concern of the development community. In their ship to be working effectively is noted in a case briefing paper on the findings of the joint donor study of the Democratic Republic of Congo, part evaluation of citizens' voice and accountability of the joint donor evaluation of citizen's voice and interventions, Rocha Menocal and Sharma (2009) accountability interventions: "As one key infor- note that "the core principles underpinning citi- mant to the DRC country case study summarized zens' voice and accountability, including participa- it, "citizens are allowed to say anything without tion, inclusion and transparency have emerged INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [29 as priority issues in international development" factors that "improve the chances of project suc- (pp.1-2). Participation can contribute to aid ef- cess" is the "strong sense of beneficiary owner- fectiveness by directly tackling a dimension of ship fostered through extensive participation" poverty, strengthening governance and orienting (Asian Development Bank 2007, p.34). The impor- development agendas and aid to the needs and tance of broad voice mechanisms through which priorities of poor people (O'Neil et al 2007, p.14). citizens can participate is supported by the IEG Africa capacity development evaluation, which Accordingly, the World Bank has recognized the finds that "governments, generally, are inclined to importance of stakeholder participation since improve services demanded by powerful interests 2000 (World Bank 2008, p.17), and stakeholder (e.g., trunk roads) more readily than those sought participation is increasingly being mainstreamed by weaker or more diffuse interests (e.g., primary in Bank operations, with particular impetus from education)" (World Bank 2005, p.44). the PRS approach (Barbone and Sharkey 2005) and implementation of the Governance and The study by McNeil and Malena (2010) of social Anti-Corruption Strategy (World Bank 2009b). accountability initiatives in Africa provides This change is further reflected in the proposed examples from Tanzania, Senegal and Zimbabwe update to the Bank's DPL policy, which "draws of how citizen participation in policy and budget attention to the need for borrowing countries to setting impacted the pro-poor orientation of the consult with and engage the participation of key allocations. stakeholders in the process of formulating the country's development strategies" (World Bank The importance of participation in post-conflict 201 Ob). environments is a key lesson identified by UNDESA (2010) in its examination of reconstruct- Evidence from the studies ing public administration after conflict. "Experi- Two evaluations find evidence in support of the ences from around the world clearly point to the importance of participation. The ADB Annual critical importance of engaging civil society, in all Evaluation Report for 2007 focuses on capacity its diversity, to ensure that actions are responsive development and draws on a number of evalu- to the actual needs of the population. This can be ations and studies. It concludes that one of the of enormous help in achieving governmental and Box 4. Examples of impact of voice Examples from Russell-Einhorn (2007, p.227) "There is evidence suggesting that certain forms of "voice" (such as transparency and participation- enhancing mechanisms) have a greater impact on government accountability than do the quality of internal administrative rules, meritocratic personnel standards, or higher public sector wages (see, for example, Kaufmann, Mehrez, and Gurgur 2002)." Examples include: * "Research based on the participatory budget experience in Brazil suggests that such practices have targeted poorer residents and needier areas better than ordinary budget practices. Participatory budget reforms across Brazil between 1997 and 2000 were associated with increased municipal spending on health services, improved fiscal status, and certain improvements in service delivery (such as drinking water) and some human development outcomes, including poverty and educational enrollment rates (Baiocchi 2006)." * "A World Bank study of 121 rural water supply projects in 49 developing countries finds a strong correlation between project success and beneficiary participation: only 8 percent of the 49 projects with low levels of participation were successful, while 42 percent of the 64 projects with high levels of participation were deemed successful (Narayan 1995)." * "In Bolivia there appears to be some correlation between increasing levels of decentralized public participation and higher investment in human capital and social services, including in the poorest municipalities (Faguet 2004)." 30] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS societal transformation after conflict and bringing projects, Mansuri and Rao (2004) point to countries forward on a path of long-lasting peace the dangers of elite capture of participatory and development" (p.xv). In addition, a review of mechanisms: "Most such projects are dominated relevant research by Russell-Einhorn (2007) pro- by elites, and both targeting and project quality vides valuable examples of the impact of voice, tend to be markedly worse in more unequal including participatory budgeting, project partici- communities" (p.1). Humphreys. Masters and pation and decentralized participation (Box 4). Sandbu (2006) find that discussion leaders influenced group decisions from a study of a At the same time, the joint donor evaluation of sample of democratic deliberations in Sao Tome citizen's voice and accountability (CV&A), covering and Principe. At the same time, transactions costs approximately 50 interventions across seven coun- of participation and engagement in respect of a tries, has found mixed results, in part due to unre- particular development program may contribute alistic donor expectations. Its findings include: to excluding some stakeholders, which could have * "Some examples of positive impact of unforeseen consequences for the relative power CV&A interventions have emerged from the of different groups. interventions analysed for this study. This is mostly at the level of positive changes in Following this theme, Schiavo-Campo and behaviour and practice, especially in terms of Sundaram (2001, pp.540-541, 552) discuss social raising citizen awareness, empowering certain groupings and their participation. They highlight marginalised groups, and encouraging state the value that such groups can bring in terms officials. of social capital. At the same time, they argue * However, within the sample analysed, such that governments "need to assess carefully impact/effects have remained limited and the legitimacy of groups claiming rights of isolated, and have so far proven difficult to participation," to ensure that they genuinely scale up. represent the interests of who they say they * A critical factor leading to the observed limited represent. They also caution that tension can nature of results is related to high donor arise between representative democracy, in which expectations as to what such work can achieve, the government is elected to make decisions on based on misguided assumptions around the behalf of citizens, and public participation in the nature of voice and accountability and the links policy process. Particular groups should not be between the two. (Rocha Menocal and Sharma allowed to dictate at the expense of opinions 2009, p.v). expressed through the ballot box. A further consideration is the benefits from strong links This does not negate the potential contribution of among social groups, rather than groups that are the effective participation in policy setting. Rather, founded on the basis of strong exclusion or even it points to the complexities involved and the hostility to other groups. For example, Portes need to take this into account in the development and Landolt (2000, pp 532-533) argue that "the of interventions to strengthen participation. same strong ties that enable group members to obtain privileged access to resources, bar others Further considerations from securing the same assets," and that such One of those complexities relates to the groups can also create "excess claims on group question of who, among the many stakeholders members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and in a country, are in fact participating. As Rocha downward levelling norms". Menocal and Sharma (2009) point out. "not all voices are equal or equally heard"(p.xii). There is particularly strong interconnection among Therefore, a key issue is who is excluded, and stakeholder participation and two of the other in- whether participation mechanisms are giving stitutional characteristics in the CDRF, stakeholder voice to marginalized stakeholders such as demand for accountability and transparency of women, the disabled and the poor. Consequently, information. A powerful development policy the voices of widely dispersed beneficiaries of a instrument that has often sought to advance these development policy or program may be drowned three institutional characteristics in recent years is out by other stakeholders. Following a review that of decentralization. Decentralization of pow- of community-based and -driven development erg, responsibilities and resources from central to INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [31 sub-national governments has become a highly surveyed priorities of citizens, from the Ethiopia topical reform around the world. Bringing gov- Urban Local Government Development ernment and services closer to citizens to enable Project). greater stakeholder participation, accountability of public officials and transparency are central In addition, Box 5 provides country examples from features and among the key objectives of most the literature, which together with those in Box 4 decentralization programs, with the expectation illustrate the wide variation in arrangements and that improved services will result. approaches to participation in priority setting. While the cross-country evidence of the impact of Implications decentralization on service delivery is not con- The broadly held view that stakeholder participa- clusive (World Bank 2009d, p.1), a recent country tion in strategic priority setting is important for study finds evidence of some improvement in ensuring wide stakeholder ownership and pro- the case of Sierra Leone (Zhou eds. 2009), which poor policy choices is reflected in the literature has undertaken a rapid program of decentraliza- and illustrated in the examples noted above. tion since 2004. Based on national public service surveys of the education, health, birth/deaths reg- While several studies draw conclusions about the istration, agriculture, transport, markets and water contribution of participation in decision-making, sectors, it finds that the majority of services have in general they do not directly test its impact on "improved between 2005 and 2007, with many achieving the development goal. The studies seeing dramatic improvements" (p.76). In general, were not specifically designed to assess participa- the report concludes that, in the short period tion and participation is a term that is applied to of implementation, "at the very least, decentral- many different arrangements. These can be at ization has been compatible with consistent different levels (national strategy, sector program, improvements in public service delivery" (Foster project), at different points in the development and Glennester 2009, p.83). process (before, during or after implementa- tion), and in different ways (contributing to policy Recognizing stakeholder participation choices, participating in project implementation In seeking to ascertain ways to identify and moni- etc). tor stakeholder participation in priority setting, two existing tools may be valuable sources for For example, the ADB Annual Evaluation Report developing and adapting measures that could be for 2007 considers participation in project plan- applied to a particular development goal. One ning. This suggests the need for greater clarity tool is the Managing for Development Results regarding the different elements that fall under Capacity Scan manual, which provides criteria for the broad heading of participation and greater assessing participation in policy, planning and precision in their definitions. In this context, the budgeting processes at the national level (avail- CDRF has proposed that participation, specifically able at mfdr.org). Another is the World Bank's in priority setting at the policy level, is of particu- Country Policy and Institutional Assessment lar importance to stakeholder ownership. This is (CPIA), which includes sub-dimensions which intended to enable research to identify what really measure community involvement in planning and matters in creating effective demand and how to public consultations in several sectors. In addition, measure it. measures of stakeholder participation in prior- ity setting identified by WBI's review of project indicators include: Stakeholder demand for * Stakeholder representation on decision- accountability making bodies (e.g., the number of federations with executive committees with at least two What it is and why it matters representatives of vulnerable groups, from the This institutional characteristic focuses on the Orissa Rural Livelihoods Project). actions of stakeholders (citizens, CSOs, private * The responsiveness of government to sector actors and other non-government actors) expressed stakeholder opinions (e.g., within the accountability relationship that ex- alignment of capital investment plans with ists between stakeholders on the one hand and 32] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Box 5. Examples of participation Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) * Mozambique. "In Mozambique, evidence suggests that efforts to institutionalize stakeholder participation have also taken root. The Second Poverty Observatory in April 2004... including representatives from the private sector, civil society, and a broad spectrum of public entities, assessed PRS implementation progress in key sectors. Civil society also participated actively in the preparation of a second PRS. As part of the consultation process, Government involved the private sector in consultations on procurement reform and, ensured the participation of the private sector and trade unions in revisions to labor laws." (Barbone and Sharkey 2005, p.24) * Peru. "The National Dialogue on Poverty Reduction (MCLCP) was founded in January 18th, 2001 as a coordination platform for private and public sector actors (government and civic society)....Past efforts to support social care and related policies in regions and municipalities failed to register the expected results... .the MCLCP was created through a Supreme Decree and a number of ancillary laws have since been adopted to promote consensus-building and ensure an inclusive decentralization process. This also culminated in the passing of the Comprehensive Law of Municipalities (stipulates mechanism for grassroots consultations and private/public inclusiveness mandatory) and the Framework Legislation for Participatory Budgeting... .The MCLCP had a tangible impact throughout the country. It advocated for and demonstrated the feasibility of inclusive and participatory approaches to poverty reduction as well as led to increased investments in poverty reduction initiatives." (UNDP 2010, pp.37-38) Marginalized groups (from Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008, p.28) * Nepal. "The Nepalese country case study examined two interventions specifically aimed at empowering excluded groups (dalit and janajati) using the mechanism of village or citizens' committees to create awareness on rights and, critically, assisting people to exercise such rights. One of the most notable results in this regard was increased access by the dalit communities to citizenship, natural resources and basic services, as well as promotion of accountability of public officials." * Mozambique. "...the case study shows that donor supported mechanisms like Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation at the local level, as well as training of parliamentarians at the national level, give women room for active participation, and enable them to voice their opinions and priorities." Local planning and budgeting * Guatemala. "Guatemala's experience is informative because of the extraordinary degree to which decentralization opened doors for civil society-particularly long-marginalized indigenous populations- to take part in the decision making processes of government.... As part of the peace agreement, the Government agreed to reform the municipal code to ensure local input into local decisions through the cabildo abierto-the Guatemalan equivalent of the town meeting. The Government also committed to restoring local development councils to ensure that community groups-associations of indigenous people, campesino organizations, women's groups, etc.-help formulate local investment priorities." (UNDESA 201, p.xiv) * Burkina Faso. A Bank supported health and nutrition project successfully developed "a participatory planning and budgeting process that involved communities and other stakeholders in setting priorities and providing oversight" (World Bank 2005, p.26). INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [33 public officials and public service providers on the demands articulated by their population" (p.1). other. In respect of a given development goal, it More specifically, Baser and Morgan (2008) argue captures the extent to which stakeholders de- that organizations "'will inexorably end up focus- mand their rights, answers for failures and for their ing on protecting their own self interest and ex- opinions to be heard. It is concerned with the istence. Only pressure or 'demand'from outside demand-side of development. groups such as clients, funders, citizens, auditors, regulators, politicians, watchdog groups and the Accountability involves a relationship between media will 'pull'capacity and performance out of two parties or groups. Accountability has two the system. Lack of citizen control over the institu- dimensions: answerability and enforcement. Sta- tions that supposedly serve them is seen as a key penhurst and O'Brien (p.1) provide the following barrier to capacity development. Accountability is definitions: "Answerability refers to the obliga- seen as the key to capacity development"(p.68). tion of the government, its agencies and public officials to provide information about their deci- Rocha Menocal and Sharma make a similar argu- sions and actions and to justify them to the public ment: "Governments that can be held account- and those institutions of accountability tasked able for their actions, for their part, are more likely with providing oversight. Enforcement suggests to respond to the needs and demands articulated that the public or the institution responsible for bytheir population" (p.1). Accordingly, de Nev- accountability can sanction the offending party or ers et al (2005) identify capacity development as remedy the contravening behavior." a "along term process requiring attention jointly to both the supply and demand sides of the Accountability also has different types. The capacity challenge-the supply of well-structured relationship between citizens and governments and efficient public and private organizations is variously referred to as "vertical" or "down- and institutions, and the civil society demand for ward" accountability, in contrast to "horizontal" government accountability and improved public or "public" accountability, which involves checks sector performance" (p.4). among different public agencies and branches of government. Social accountability is "an expan- In addition to performance of government, Rocha sion of downward accountability... that relies on Menocal and Sharma (2008) summarize the view civic engagement" and can be formal or informal of the donors contributing to the citizens' voice (World Bank 2009d). and accountability evaluation that strengthening accountability (together with voice) is also directly This institutional characteristic focuses on the tackling a dimension of poverty by empowering citizens and other non-government stakeholders poor people, and furthermore promotes democ- in the accountability relationship with government racy and human rights (pp.17-18). and public agencies, specifically in the actions taken by stakeholders in demanding that effective There is a widespread acceptance that account- accountability exists and in applying sanctions ability is a critical factor in governance, service available to them. This focus arises because of the delivery and poverty reduction. The World historical weakness of demand in development Development Report "Making Services Work for programs, and the essential role stakeholders can Poor People" (2004) identifies the accountability play in creating demand and placing pressure relationships among policymakers, citizens and for performance improvement and achievement service providers as central to effective service of objectives. Governments are less likely to delivery, and weaknesses in these relationships "supply" accountability if stakeholders do not have been a major reason for inadequate supply demand it. of services to poor people. A key requirement for these relationships to work better is for citizens Rocha Menocal and Sharma (2009) take the fol- to play an active role in exercising oversight and lowing as a core assumption to the joint donor holding to account the policymakers and service evaluation of citizens' voice and accountability providers to improve services. interventions: "Governments that can be held ac- countable for their actions, for their part, are more Similarly, the evaluation of capacity development likely to respond to the needs and in Africa draws the following from its review of 34] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS recent developments. "The capacity building systematic efforts to increase the citizens' capabil- approach emphasized that a root cause of pov- ity to monitor and challenge abuses of the system erty, illiteracy, and ill-health was lack of capacity: and to inform the citizens about their rights and in government, to design and implement proper entitlements. Breaking the culture of secrecy that development strategies, and, in society, to hold pervades the government functioning and em- government accountable for its actions" (World powering people to demand public accountabil- Bank 2005, p.7). As a consequence, the "Bank has ity are important components in such an effort" broadened the scope of its support to deal with (World Banks 2008, p.63). Finally, the OECD (2006) demand as well as supply constraints to improved review of international experience concludes that public sector performance" (p.43). The OECD strong demand-side pressures are among condi- (2006, p.25) argues that "perceived lack of com- tions that enable capacity development. mitment on the government side" for a given development goal would be better addressed by In addition to these cross-country studies, Box 6 enhancing the domestic demand-side pressures, provides several country examples in which rather than donors succumbing to the temptation demand for accountability and pressure for to drive the program from the outside. change has impacted performance and achieve- ment of development goals. Evidence from the studies Several of the cross-country studies provide sup- Further considerations porting evidence. First, the IEG Africa capacity The demand for accountability focuses on the development evaluation provides supporting evi- extent to which beneficiaries and other stake- dence from a comparison of varying experience in holders take action to hold public agencies and the roads, health, education and public financial other service providers to account regarding their management sectors. It concludes: "Support for performance related to a development goal. As capacity building in the roads sector has been discussed earlier, this is a partner to, but distinct more effective than support to the other three from, government's actions to provide account sectors reviewed." One of the reasons for this and submit to sanctions. It can also be distinct outcome is that the roads sector is characterized from the underlying demand for a given service. by private sector "stakeholders with a direct inter- For example, in the case of primary education, est in change," who exert "strong stakeholder demand may be viewed as a function of the popu- pressure", while the health and education sectors lation of children of relevant age requiring school- are characterized by "more diffuse and weaker ing, which may be passive and not involve stake- pressures for change"(World Bank 2005, pp.xv, 24- holders in taking action to require its provision. 25). This illustrates that where a set of beneficiary Demand for accountability in respect of a goal stakeholders, such as the private sector in the or service indicates a willingness of stakehold- roads sector, are able to exercise strong demand ers to act in order to create active demand and over the government to deliver on the capacity hold government to account for delivery. Clarity development program, this is more likely to have of what is meant by demand for accountability is an effect on capacity development programs than important. It also requires precisely defined mea- in sectors where the beneficiaries cannot. It does sures to support its operationalization. not, however, mean that the roads sector is less corrupt or more responsive to local communities. Both sides of the relationship are required to Second, Baser and Morgan (2008, p.68) draw on establish effective accountability and promote the cases in their study to support their argu- stakeholder ownership. It also requires the ment of the need to "pull performance out of the government to respond, to be answerable for system" and conclude: "There is a good deal of successes and failures in performance, and for evidence in the cases for the power of demand." there to be mechanisms of enforcement by the stakeholders to exert influence. The answerability Third, the IEG evaluation of public sector reform of government in respect of a given development draws a strong conclusion in respect of anti- goal are addressed in other parts of the CDRF. corruption reforms. "Evidence suggests that The action of government leaders to provide corruption can be substantially reduced only when accountability for achievement of the goal is a the supply-side reforms are complemented by critical component of the commitment of leaders. INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [35 In addition, participation in priority setting in respect of a given development goal is includes responsiveness of government to citizen's challenging. The CPIA Criteria 16 assesses voice. Furthermore, the institutional capacity public accountability arrangements, while regarding the efficiency of policy instruments those relating specifically to PFM are captured includes formal arrangements for compliance in such tools as the Public Expenditure and and enforcement. This illustrates the interaction Financial Accountability (PEFA) PFM Performance among different institutional characteristics and Measurement Framework. However, these capacities within the CDRF. generally do not assess the demand from stakeholders but rather the performance of Recognizing demand for accountability government. Measures of active stakeholder As with the other institutional characteristics, demand for accountability in WBI's project recognizing effective demand for accountability indicators database include: Box 6. Demand for accountability Monitoring programs i "In the Philippines, the Local Government Support Programme showed the power of demand-side pressures from civil society organisations and citizens who worked to monitor the municipal councils. In Ethiopia, the Education Sector Development Programme provided for 'watchdog' institutions at the woreda and even kebele levels to monitor progress. The traditional gemgema system was also used for accountability purposes to carry out assessments of teachers and other public officials." (Baser and Morgan 2008, p.68). g The Philippines Text Book Count has involved active civic monitoring of the entire textbook distribution process from printers to district offices to schools, in a number of districts. An independent evaluation reports that the 4th round of the program monitored 70% of deliveries and verified that all those books were delivered. This represents a very substantial improvement. Prior to the first round of the program, 40% of text books did not reach the district offices. (Van Der Linden 2007). Budget oversight From a review of six cases studies of civil society budget analysis and advocacy, d e Renzio and Krafchik (2007) found this "can have a direct impact in terms of improved budget systems and on pro-poor budget allocations and results" (p.3). Report cards and surveys Russell-inhorn (2007) notes the use of citizen report cards as a means of holding services providers to account. "A study of the use of citizen report cards in Bangalore, India, also finds some impact on service delivery outcomes (Ravindra 2004)" (p.227). * The Punjab devolved education case provides the example of Faislabad in which citizen perception survey analysis highlighted how allocations had historically been skewed away from the poorest areas.aiin Faisalabad, councillors responded to evidence from a citizen perceptions survey that revealed negative feedback on education facilities, especially in areas where PESRP had not delivered to the poorest unions, due to provincial assembly members' influence over resource allocations. The survey findings resulted in amended development allocations in 2007/2008" (Watson and Khan 2010, p.22). Challenge to change from clients *The OECD (2006) highlights the case of the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (supported by GTZ), in which demand from a key stakeholder, the private sector, has impacted effectiveness of the AISA and thereby achievement of the development goal to improve business entry conditions. "Regarding the scope, quality and speed of its own services, but also in its advocacy for private sector concerns, AISA is motivated and challenged by outspoken representatives of the business community. It is on account of this demand that AISA is now also active in analysing and marketing business opportunities at home and abroad." (p.23). 36] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS * The extent of active scrutiny over public policy priorities, judge how well public resources finances by non-state actors (e.g., Sierra Leone have been used, monitor the performance of Integrated Public Financial Management their local service providers, or demand sanctions. Reform Project). Information is required to support both answer- * Surveyed opinion regarding the need for ability and enforceability in the accountability citizens to actively question leaders (e.g., relationship between government and citizens. Sierra Leone Institutional Reform and Capacity Furthermore, when actions are hidden from view, building Project). more subtle pressures such as those that arise * Active representation of stakeholders in from society's values can also be avoided. In such governance arrangements (e.g., Indonesia an environment, corrupt practices are easier and National Project for Community Empowerment less risky. De Nevers et al (2005) identify trans- in Urban Areas Ill). parency as a priority demand-side institution for good governance and civil society awareness. In addition, Box 6 provides a number of country "This means enhancing the flow of information examples of demand for accountability from the through the development and dissemination of literature to illustrate different forms taken. individual country and cross-country compara- tive performance indicators, promoting multi- Implications stakeholder dialogue, expanding communities of The studies provide some supporting evidence of awareness and fostering a stronger commitment the impact of demand for accountability. However, to transparency in government and increased a clear gap exists among the current assessment attention to results" (p.5). frameworks and indicator sets regarding the mea- surement of the demand-side of accountability. A Transparency also contributes to the development prerequisite for measurement is a precise defini- of trust between citizens and governments. It is tion that identifies its elements and clearly distin- hard to trust someone if you have no way of con- guishes it from government accountability actions firming what they say is borne out by their actions. and demand for the service. The detailed CDRF "Information is the lifeblood of efficient economic description proposes the elements; these could activity as well as a good relationship between a feed into a process of discussion, testing and people and their government"(Schiavo-Campo learning to establish a common definition, aid de- and Sundaram 2001, p.579). sign of capacity development programs and test the impact of strengthened demand for account- In both developed and developing countries the ability on stakeholder ownership and achievement tradition has often tended to be one of govern- of development goals. ment secrecy. It is only recently that countries have shifted away from a stand-point that infor- mation is assumed confidential unless there is Transparency of information to a good reason to release it and it is specifically stakeholders sanctioned, toward one in which the default is for all information to be public unless there is a clear What it is and why it matters and justified reason for it not to be. This change is This CDRF institutional characteristic includes evidenced in the increasing adoption and applica- the provision of timely, high-quality information tion of right-to-information legislation. by public entities, in useful and accessible form, to enable stakeholders to participate in policy, The interest of the development community in oversight, monitoring and evaluation related to issues of transparency has grown rapidly, reflect- the development goal. This characteristic is con- ing the broad recognition that transparency cerned with the supply of information that is nec- contributes to good governance. Development essary for the CDRF demand-side characteristics assistance concerns also spurred this perspective. of participation and demand for accountability. The fungibility of aid, particularly debt-forgiveness grants provided through the Highly Indebted If information is not available about policy Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and budget sup- options, decisions made, performance and ser- port meant that "the governance agenda, espe- vices delivered, citizens cannot develop a view on cially accountability and transparency, became INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [37 both a way to improve development performance corruption in some PFM and tax administration and a necessary condition for the continuation of programs (p.60). IDA replenishments and of aid in general" (World Bank 2008, p.16). The UN's World Public Sector Report for 2010 fo- cuses on the lessons from post-conflict restructur- Evidence from the studies ing of governance and public administration. "The In most of the studies, the importance of transpar- Report shows that no progress can be made in ency to good governance is taken as a given, and promoting peace, development and protection of they assess how effective programs have been to human rights unless appropriate governance and strengthen transparency. However, several studies public administration institutions are established" draw valuable insights regarding the contribution (UNDESA 2010, p.iii). The report concludes how of transparency. The study of social accountability important information is to restructuring and ser- initiatives in Africa by McNeil and Malena (2010) vice delivery. "Information dissemination should provides examples from Senegal and Tanzania be treated as a basic service in post-conflict in which municipal tax receipts increased when societies. In the short term, information about se- citizens could see how their funds were being curity, emergency relief and services for displaced used and were able to hold the local government persons and refugees may literally mean the dif- to account. The IEG Africa capacity development ference between life and death. In the long run, evaluation found capacity development programs information on various development initiatives, in the roads sector were more effective than the such as public health and education programmes, other three sectors. One of the major achieve- can contribute to effective service delivery, nation ments in the roads sector has been to enhance building and sustainable development" (p.xvii). the transparency of funding for the sector. This, together with strengthened organizational and Further considerations technical capacities of public and private actors in Strengthening transparency has been the focus the sector and more stable funding, has contrib- of several major international initiatives. This uted to the following rating: "the overall effective- supports the view that transparency is a neces- ness was found to be satisfactory in all six case sary, though not sufficient, condition for good study countries"(World Bank 2005, p.24). governance and better development outcomes, and how it is also a factor in governance and From the OECD's review of capacity develop- anti-corruption that is amenable to deliberate and ment experience it concludes that "low levels of concrete actions. It is a lever that is relatively easy transparency" are among the "conditions that to pull. The following are examples of interna- have made public sector difficult to develop" tional initiatives that seek to strengthen transpar- (OECD 2006, p.1 7). Thus, lack of transparency ency, as a means to fight corruption and improve is identified as a key constraint on public sector accountability: development. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. EITI involves the introduction of transparency The IEG public sector reform evaluation includes and participation into the management and transparency interventions among those that it oversight of revenues arising from oil and examines. This reflects the increase in operations other extractive industries. It aims to reduce that has take place since the late 1990s that in- corruption, improve the efficiency of revenue dude explicit components to increase transparen- collection and transfer and strengthen the cy, often with the objective of reducing corruption. business environment in these industries. An The evaluation's findings of impact on corruption international body based in Oslo assesses the are not conclusive: "Some government-wide extent to which the principles of the initiative transparency efforts, such as access to informa- are being observed by the participating tion laws and implementing agencies and the countries. There are currently five compliant Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, also countries, and a further 27 active candidate show promise as tools against state capture, but countries undertaking measures aimed at it is too soon to see results"(World Bank, p.xvi). achieving full compliance.(eiti.org) However, the evaluation does point to improve- Open Budget Initiative. This initiative of ments in transparency and reduced bureaucratic the International Budget Partnership (IBP) is 38] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS concerned with the degree of transparency of timing, particularly regarding changes in tax that exists across elements of the budget policy-to avoid undesirable anticipatory reac- cycle of a government. It undertakes a survey tions of some agents at the expense of the public of budget transparency every two years and good, "the process cannot be transparent in real ranks countries on its Open Budget Index. time, though it can be transparent in retrospect" The IBP also provides tools for CSOs to (p.731). exercise budget oversight and support to governments to improve budget transparency. A further concern is the reliability of fiscal data; (international budget.org) Heald draws on UK practices to examine issues of * Partnership for Transparency Fund. The manipulation, repeated redefinition and mislead- PTF is an international organization that ing presentation. In addition, complexity of fiscal provides small grants to CSOs in developing information, such as what is excluded due to countries to strengthen transparency and off-budget transactions and oft-balance sheet accountability and fight corruption. It involves financing, and data overload can make it very dif- direct interaction between the CSO and ficultto interpret. How much of the enhancement public agencies. It therefore relates to both to transparency is real, and how much is trans- the transparency of information and demand parency illusion? This points to the need "to be for accountability characteristics in the CDRF. realistic about context and process"(Heald 2003, (partnershipfortransparency.info) p.739). * Transparency International. TI is a leading international CSO fighting corruption, involving Recognizing improvements in a global network of national chapters. The transparency chapters seek to partner with government, A number of indicator sets, indices and assess- business and media to promote transparency ment tools assess various aspects of transparency in the public and private sectors, as well arrangements in the public sector. These could be as to advocate for anti-corruption reforms. valuable sources of measures for adaptation when (transparency.org) considering this institutional capacity regarding a particular development goal. Transparency fea- Transparency is a complex issue. While seeking to tures in several of the criteria in the Bank's CPIA, increase transparency regarding a given devel- including transparency across the public sector opment goal, it may be necessary to consider and within several specific sectors. The Global whether any unintended consequences arise. For Integrity Index includes questions regarding the example, Gavazza and Lizzeri (2007) point to the existence and implementation of transparency possibility of negative incentives for high service arrangements across different parts of the public delivery performers from publicizing league tables sector. A number of tools exist to assess the level due to increased workload resulting; league of transparency in the area of PFM. These include tables may also demoralize low performers or en- the IMF Fiscal Transparency Report on Obser- courage falsification of records (Heald 2003, p745). vance of Standards and Code (ROSQ, the Open Prat (2005) indentifies detrimental incentives aris- Budget Index and elements of the Public Expen- ing from excessive monitoring by a principal of an diture and Financial Accountability (PEFA) PFM agent's actions, rather than results. Performance Measurement Framework. Heald (2003, p.739) examines the arguments for Examples of indicators drawn from WBI's data- and against fiscal transparency: "Doubt is not base of project results include: being cast on the potential usefulness of efforts Public disclosure of documents and information to improve transparency, especially those starting related to public finances (often benchmarking from very low bases." However, he discusses an international indicator sets noted above) and optimal level of fiscal transparency beyond which extractives industry revenues (e.g., Papua New effectiveness falls rather than continues to rise Guinea Second Mining Sector Institutional due to "over exposure," related to high transac- Strengthening Technical Assistance Project). tions costs, excessive politicization (referencing Transparency of benefits and obligations Tanzi 1998) and uncertainty about output-process- associated with a public program (e.g., outcome linkages. Heald also raises the issue provision of information to health insurance INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS CONTRIBUTING TO STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP [39 Box 7. Examples of transparency initiaives * Transparency in the judiciary in Timor Leste. "Institutional strengthening of the Statute of Judicial Magistrates has led to the Superior Council of Judicial Magistrates (SCJM) publishing quality statistics and information for the public. The practice of publishing all deliberations has strengthened accountability and independence in the judiciary." (UNDP 2010). * Transparency measures in India. "The creation of citizen charters in important public services, legislation to facilitate the public's right to information, and experiments in e-governance in sectors and departments serving business and citizens in general were among the initiatives taken by India to promote public accountability." (UNDP 2009, p.15). * Nigeria EITI. "Its periodic audits have opened up, widely, a hitherto opaque industry to public scrutiny. The NEITI audit reports have placed immensely rich data and information in the public domain thereby strongly empowering civil society to hold government to account. The reports have facilitated the process of recovery of significant amounts of underpaid revenue for the state and helped to improve the domestic climate for foreign direct investment. By placing embarrassing facts and figures about the bulk of Nigeria's public revenue in the public domain, NEITI has become both an instigator of civic interrogation of public officers and a social safety valve, redirecting youthful energies from resorting to violent conflicts to engagement in civil debate on sensitive issues" (EITI 2010, p.7). * Transparency through communication technology. "The ICT tools available for communicating information include radio, television, mobile phones and the Internet. For example, during the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Nations and other donors set up Radio Okapi to help keep peace by disseminating reliable and credible information from an independent source. The free flow of information can also empower public institutions, societal groups and citizens to produce and share knowledge-between and within service delivery sectors-to bring a greater degree of cohesion, transparency and accountability." (UNDESA 2010, p. xvii). participants, drawn from the Mexico Social recent years on promoting transparency through Protection System in Health Project). international initiatives as well as individual proj- ects and programs. In addition, Box 7 provides several examples of country transparency initiatives to illustrate differ- To build on this progress and exploit the power ent forms taken. of transparency, further research could focus on identifying which specific dimensions of transpar- Implications ency have most impact on leadership commit- Broadly speaking, the literature and development ment, participation, accountability and results, consensus are clear on the need for transparency and in what circumstances. This could be done to underpin good governance, enable wide soci- by drawing lessons about design and imple- etal engagement and facilitate effective develop- mentation of capacity development programs to ment programs in the public interest. As noted strengthen transparency. above, significant advances have been made in 40] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Interaction Among the Institutional Characteristics This paper examined the five institutional charac- institutional characteristics; for example commit- teristics that contribute to stakeholder ownership ment of leaders may be sufficient for a relatively individually, almost as if they were stand-alone. In straightforward systems reform. However, the addition, the description of each has often been interaction discussed above suggests that the static in nature. In reality, the CDRF is a dynamic impact of change in any one institutional charac- framework that concerns processes of change. teristic alone may often be constrained. Action on The interactive and dynamic nature of the charac- multiple fronts may be needed to align interests, teristics is illustrated by considering the relation- challenge vested interests and allocate space and ship among them. resources. This calls for ownership across a wide range of stakeholders, requiring mechanisms There is a good deal of interaction among the of engagement such as those described in the institutional characteristics. Commitment of participation, accountability and transparency political and social leaders and social norms will characteristics. At the same time, civil society be affected by each other, and will influence groups and other non-state actors are less likely participation, demand for accountability to succeed if they are not supported by powerful and transparency. In addition, the concepts social and political leaders. of participation, demand for accountability and transparency are closely interwoven. The Furthermore, while transparent information is criti- participation characteristic defined in the CDRF cal for the other characteristics, in turn its value is concerns upstream engagement in strategic largely determined by how it is used. A conclusion decisions, which complements the demand for of a report of the impact of EITI in Africa illustrates accountability that is focused on the downstream this point, that "while the EITI in itself is not suf- of implementation. Both are required to provide ficient to eradicate corruption in the extractive engagement throughout the process for citizens sectors, it is an essential part of the solution"(EITI to influence development results. Transparency 2010, p.3). The clarity and precision about the underpins both participation in strategic decisions characteristics advocated by the CDRF are critical and demand for accountability. to understanding what changes really matter, and the sequence in which they need to occur. Looking beyond stakeholder ownership, there is also likely to be significant interconnection with the other institutional capacities, efficiency of policy instruments and effectiveness of organiza- tional arrangements. In many cases the different institutional characteristics and capacities are not aligned to provide mutual reinforcement. Hence, the recommendation under the CDRF to review all three institutional capacities and their character- istics together related to a specific development goal (WBI 2010c). Any approach to designing a change strategy needs to be undertaken locally to understand these interactions. In some circumstances, positive impact on achievement of the development goal may be possible through focused attention on one of the INTERACTION AMONG THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS [41 Conclusions and the Way Forward As demonstrated in the literature reviewed for this of stakeholder ownership and the institutional paper, the development experience of previous characteristics matter in varying contexts and con- decades has led to a widespread acceptance of ditions, how they can be observed and measured the need for strong stakeholder ownership: lead- and in what ways they can be influenced. This ers' commitment and accountability for results, should involve different disciplines in the develop- participation by different segments of society, ment community (e.g., social development, and society's demand for accountability, transparency governance) as well as other relevant literatures on the part of duty bearers, and consideration of (e.g., psychological, sociological, and political). impact of social norms in development programs. The CDRF provides a sound platform for taking this forward. Key steps include the following: The findings of the cross-country studies provide some concrete evidence to support this "common Definitions. Challenging and building wisdom." However, the proposition that owner- consensus on the CDRFs precise operational ship, commitment and strong mechanisms for definitions of the institutional characteristics effective stakeholder engagement are necessary that support demand for development goals. is generally taken as a starting point in these stud- Modifying the definitions as knowledge grows ies, and the hypothesis of their importance is not about what matters. directly tested. In addition, definitions of these concepts vary between studies and are often Pilot applications. Supporting local agents broad and impressionistic. The CDRF's institution- of change to undertake pilot applications of al characteristics have been more narrowly and the CDRF in which assessing and developing precisely specified. This makes the characteristics strategies to strengthen demand for the operationally useful in targeting capacity develop- development goal are judged to be of major ment to achieve desirable institutional change. importance. Drawing lessons from these pilots It allows testing to identify what really matters in about the development of change strategies. creating effective demand for a development goal Providing strong demonstration of how the and how to measure it. CDRF approach supports a strategic process for strengthening stakeholder ownership. These findings present two broad implications. First, there is a need to more systematically incor- Results measurement. Developing a pool of porate stakeholder ownership and its contributing relevant indicators from which practitioners characteristics in the goal assessment, problem can draw and adapt to their particular context, identification, objective setting, design, imple- to target and monitor improvements in the mentation, monitoring and evaluation of develop- institutional characteristics contributing to ment programs. Capacity development initiatives stakeholder ownership. Providing tools to within development programs must address this support local agents to adapt, use and learn broader institutional environment, in addition to from results measurement. Using the results the challenge of formal policy instruments and data to support research of what works. organizations. These processes are core elements of the WBI approach to capacity development Systematic review. Systematically drawing captured in the CDRF, which reflects the growing from experience through rigorous reviews emphasis on viewing capacity development as and evaluations of practice in strengthening a results-focused transformational process that stakeholder ownership, going beyond one- engages all of society's stakeholders. off story sharing and unchallenged practice. Identifying what has worked and in what Second, more collaboration and learning are context. required to build understanding of which aspects 42] THE IMPORTANCE OF STAKEHOLDER OWNERSHIP FOR CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT RESULTS Box 8. Key questions * In cases where ownership was successfully developed, was there a deliberate strategy? What was the dominant form that the ownership took? How effective were deliberate actions to enhance participation, demand for accountability and transparency? Were they top-down or bottom up? Who were the key actors? * How did a given innovation arise? Was it an endogenous adaptation, an evolution? * Can sufficient stakeholder ownership be generated by addressing just one or two of the institutional characteristics, and in what circumstances? * What are the main drivers for commitment of leaders? * Is participation in priority setting at the outset critical for strong stakeholder ownership during implementation? Is participation in other processes as important? * In cases where social attitudes changed, what were the key enabling factors? * In cases where demand for accountability for a development goal was high, what were the main precipitating factors and challenges? * Have increases in transparency prompted greater participation or accountability? Innovations. Promoting and capturing Each step will contribute knowledge and learn- innovative practices that have yielded ing to the overall puzzle of how to strengthen strengthened stakeholder ownership, and stakeholder ownership. 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