The Welfare of  Syrian Households after a Decade of  Conflict The Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict ©2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or currency of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the infor- mation, or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. 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Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ّ ‫مل‬. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xii ‫خص تنفيذي‬ Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv 1. The Conflict in Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2. Demographic Impact of the Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3. Labor Market Impact of the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4. Human Capital Impact of the Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5. Welfare of Syrian Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6. Concluding Remarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Annex 1: The Humanitarian Needs Assessment Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Annex 2: Regression Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 List of Figures Figure 1 Areas of control by different parties to the conflict, 2015, 2018, 2020, and 2022. . . . . . . . . . . 2 Figure 2 Conflict-related fatalities in Syria between 2011 and 2021, cumulative distribution . . . . . . . 3 Figure 3 Conflict trends, 2011–2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Figure 4 Total conflict-related events and deaths 2011–2022, by governorate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Figure 5 Conflict-related incidents and deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, by governorate . . . . . . . . . . 6 Figure 6 Internal and international displacement, stocks and flows. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Figure 7 Distribution of population by governorate, 2011 and 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Figure 8 Population estimates for Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Figure 9 Syria population pyramids, 2010 and 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 iii iv THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT Figure 10 Masculinity ratio in 2022, by age group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Figure 11 Trends in under-5 mortality rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Figure 12 Number of absent members for households currently residing in Syria, by reason of absence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Figure 13 Households with male absent members living abroad, 2018–2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Figure 14 Changes in working age population, 2010–2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Figure 15 Trends in labor force participation, employment to population and unemployment rates, by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Figure 16 Relationship between female labor force participation and the masculinity ratio at the governorate level, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Figure 17 Trends in employment composition, by job type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Figure 18 Trends in sectoral distribution of employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Figure 19 Gross enrolment ratios LMICs, 2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Figure 20 Average years of total schooling, population ages 25+, Syria, 2000–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Figure 21 Average years of total schooling, population ages 25+, LMIC, 2010. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Figure 22 Net attendance rates by governorate, 2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Figure 23 Educational attainment, % of population 15+ by governorate, 2006. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Figure 24 Out-of-school children by age group and governorate, 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Figure 25 Out-of-school children by age and displacement status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Figure 26 Probability of being out of school by children age groups, multivariate analysis, 2022. . . 32 Figure 27 Poverty by governorate at US$3.65 poverty line in 2009. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Figure 28 Poverty incidence among LICs and LMICs, circa 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Figure 29 Poverty trends 2009–2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Figure 30 Incidence of poverty in 2022, by governorate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Figure 31 Distribution of poor population in 2022, by governorate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Figure 32 Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Figure 33 Population multidimensionally poor and deprived in each of the indicators (censored headcount), 2021 and 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Figure 34 Percentage contribution of indicators to the MVI, 2021 and 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Figure 35 MVI by governorate, 2021 and 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Figure 36 Incidence and Intensity of multidimensional vulnerability poverty by governorate, 2021 and 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Figure 37 Percentage contribution of each indicator, by governorate, 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 List of Tables Table 1 Internationally displaced Syrians, by host country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Table 2 Internally displaced people, by governorate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Table 3 Poverty at international poverty lines, pre-conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Contents v Table 4 Incidence, intensity and Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI), 2021 and 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Table 5 Incidence, intensity and Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI), by displacement status. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Table A1 HNAP sample-based household surveys. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Table A2 OLS regressions results – probability of being out of school. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Table A3 Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 List of Boxes Box 1 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event (UCDP GED). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Box 2 Wheat production and trade in Syria, 2000–2020.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Box 3 Labor market challenges of Syrian women. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Box 4 International remittances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Box 5 Education system in Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Box 6 Multidimensional Vulnerability Index for Syria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Abbreviations and Acronyms CBS Central Bureau of Statistics GDP Gross Domestic Product GER Gross Enrolment Ratio HIES Household Income and Expenditure Surveys HNAP Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme IDP Internally Displaced Person IDMC International Displacement Monitoring Center ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria LMIC Lower Middle-Income Country MENA Middle East and North Africa MICS Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey MVI Multidimensional Vulnerability Index NSAG Non-State Armed Group OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OHCHR United Nations Human Rights Office PPP Purchasing Power Parity SDF Syrian Democratic Forces SOHR Syrian Observatory for Human Rights TVET Technical and Vocational Education and Training UIS UNESCO Institute for Statistics UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UCDP GED Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene WDI World Development Indicators vi Acknowledgements The “Welfare of Syrian Households after a Decade of Conflict” was co-authored by Silvia Redae- lli (Senior Economist and Task Team Leader) and Michelle Infanzon Guadarrama (Consultant). The team would like to thank the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP) and Modher Alhamadani (International Organization for Migration) for the fruitful collaboration and for making available the household survey data used in this analysis. The findings presented in this report build on the analytical work conducted under the Syria Poverty Measurement and Welfare Monitoring project, which builds on additional contributions by Laura Liliana Moreno Herrera (Senior Data Scientist), Aaron Thegeya (Consultant), David Newhouse (Senior Economist) and Sandra Baquie (Economist). Throughout the project, the team has greatly benefited from valuable comments and inputs by Maria Eugenia Genoni (Senior Economist), Christoph Lakner (Program Manager), Daniel Gerszon Mahler (Senior Economist), Luan Zhao (Senior Economist), Alan Fuchs (Lead Economist), and Minh Cong Nguyen (Senior Economist). The team is grateful for guidance and support from Jean-Christophe Carret (Country Director, Middle East Department), Nadir Mohammed (Regional Director, Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions), and Salman Zaidi (Practice Manager, Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions). vii Executive Summary The consequences of conflict on a country’s development are profound. The direct impact of con- flict in terms of lives lost, populations forced to leave their homes, and the destruction of property and infrastructure is often the most visible manifestation of its wrath. However, the indirect conse- quences of conflict are often even larger, dramatically affecting a country’s economy, people’s live- lihoods, and a wide range of development outcomes. The human toll from the Syrian conflict has been staggering. According to estimates based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the conflict in Syria claimed the lives of 421,000 individu- als between March 2011 and December 2021, corresponding to half of the conflict-related deaths worldwide over the same period. The initial years of the conflict were marked by the highest inci- dence of violence and triggered one of the largest episodes of displacement witnessed since World War II. While the governorates of Aleppo, Hama, and Rural Damascus paid a relatively higher toll in terms of war-related deaths, conflict was widespread throughout the country’s territory, and virtually no region was left unscarred. In more recent years, after 2018, the scale of conflict has sig- nificantly abated, mostly affecting areas in the northern part of the country that remain outside of the Syrian Government’s control. Nonetheless, more than 6 million Syrians remain internationally displaced, mostly in neighboring countries, and an even larger number are displaced within Syr- ia’s borders. The impact of conflict is highly visible in terms of Syria’s population count and demographic struc- ture. The direct and indirect impact of the conflict on Syria’s population might be quantified in a 20 percent contraction, with the population estimates for 2022 being short of 5 million individu- als compared with pre-conflict estimates. In addition, conflict has dramatically affected the gender structure of the population, with a substantial male deficit concentrated in the 20 to 40 age group. In 2022, as many as 30 percent of Syrian households reported having an absent member as a result of the conflict, with the primary cause of absence among prime-age men being international dis- placement, followed by war-related deaths. Between 2018 and 2022, the number of young Syrian males leaving the country and their families behind has increased, reflecting the compounding effect of conflict and the need to cope with conflict-induced economic hardship. The Syrian economy has also been profoundly affected by conflict. Prior to the conflict, Syria was a fast-growing Lower Middle-Income Country (LMIC). Over a decade of conflict has substantially curtailed the country’s industrial and agricultural production capacity and increased its reliance on imports and its exposure to international shocks. After losing half of its GDP between 2010 and 2020, the current economic profile of Syria is that of a low-income country in which households increasingly struggle to make ends meet, leveraging the only asset that remains at their disposal: ix x THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT labor. Compared with the pre-conflict period, labor force participation has increased significantly, particularly among women, who have been increasingly called upon to contribute toward their households’ livelihoods. However, with few job opportunities generated by the country’s strug- gling economy, a larger share of workers is currently employed informally and in the services sector. Not surprisingly, given the challenging labor market conditions in present-day Syria and the sizable share of households with male members displaced abroad, the share of total household income from international remittances has increased fourfold, from a national average of about 3 percent in 2009 to 12 percent in 2022. The impact of conflict on children’s educational outcomes has also been far-reaching. During the decade prior to the conflict’s onset, Syria had made remarkable progress in improving educa- tional outcomes, being one of the best performers among its development peers. Such progress halted in the following decade, with the initial years of conflict marked by a dramatic increase in the share of out-of-school children. In more recent years, the share of out-of-school children has declined, broadly returning to its pre-conflict levels. The conflict has been further reinforcing pre- existing inequalities in educational outcomes between governorates and creating new vulnerabil- ities among displaced children. On average, households’ economic circumstances, the availability of school facilities, and residence in areas still affected by conflict and outside government control in the northern parts of Syria are among the main determinants of children being out of school. Monetary poverty dynamics and the current welfare profile of Syria’s population provide the most striking evidence of how conflict has dramatically affected the country’s development. Extreme poverty, as measured by the share of the population living below the international poverty line of US$2.15 (2017 PPP) per capita per day, was virtually nonexistent prior to the conflict. As of 2022, it affects more than one in four Syrians (about 5.7 million individuals). When considering the US$3.65 (2017 PPP) international poverty line of LMICs, poverty affects 69 percent of the population—equiv- alent to about 14.5 million Syrians. Extreme poverty in Syria has a strong spatial connotation, with more than 50 percent of the extreme poor living in just three governorates—Aleppo, Hama, and Deir-ez-Zor—with governorates in the northeastern part of the country showing the highest pov- erty incidence. Syrians living in female-headed households and the internally displaced are at higher risk of poverty, while receiving international remittances significantly reduces the risk of poverty. Despite conflict intensity subsiding in more recent years, the incidence of monetary poverty has dramatically increased post-2019, reflecting the compounding impact of international shocks that affected the Syrian economy, starting from the financial crisis in Lebanon in 2019, the COVID-19 pan- demic in 2020 and, most recently, the war on Ukraine. Beyond monetary poverty, the vulnerability of the Syrian population along the livelihoods and living conditions dimensions is pervasive and, based on a multidimensional index, deteriorated between 2021 and 2022. Multidimensional vulnerability is particularly severe due to the lack of Executive Summary xi income opportunities and has been deteriorating with regard to access to water. Similar to the observations made in monetary poverty and educational outcomes, multidimensional vulnerabil- ity has a strong spatial connotation, with the northeastern and southern governorates showing the worst outcomes. The analysis presented in this report shows that the crisis in Syria is far from over and that, lacking drivers of poverty reduction, the welfare challenges facing Syrian households are likely to persist, if not worsen, in the face of shocks. In this context, having reliable data to monitor the evolution of welfare outcomes and to inform actions along the humanitarian-development nexus remains a priority. In the absence of official statistics, continuing the collaboration on the design and analy- sis of data collected by humanitarian agencies could significantly contribute to filling knowledge gaps moving forward. ‫ملخّص تنفيذي‬ ‫أي بلد تداعيات عميقة عىل فرصه اإلمنائية‪ .‬وغالباً ما تكون آثاره املبارشة من حيث الخسائر يف األرواح‪ ،‬ومغادرة‬ ‫ال ّ‬ ‫شك أن للرصاع يف ّ‬ ‫السكان منازلهم بطريقة قرسية‪ ،‬وتدمري املمتلكات والبنية التحتية‪ ،‬أبرز مظاهر احتدامه‪ .‬غري أن العواقب غري املبارشة كثريا ً ما تكون‬ ‫أوسع نطاقاً‪ ،‬وتؤث ّر بشكل كبري عىل اقتصاد البلد‪ ،‬وسبل عيش سكانه كام عىل جوانب واسعة من نواتجه اإلمنائية‪.‬‬ ‫إن الخسائر البرشية الناجمة عن الرصاع يف سوريا صادمة‪ .‬وفقاً للتقديرات املستندة إىل برنامج أوبساال لبيانات الرصاعات ()‪UCDP‬‬ ‫‪ ،Uppsala Conflict Data Program‬أودى الرصاع يف سوريا بحياة ‪ 421‬ألف شخص بني آذار‪/‬مارس ‪ 2011‬وكانون األول‪/‬ديسمرب‬ ‫‪ ،2021‬أي ما يعادل نصف الوفيات املرتبطة بالرصاعات يف جميع أنحاء العامل خالل الفرتة ذاتها‪ .‬اتّسمت السنوات األوىل من الرصاع‬ ‫ببت يف واحدة من أكرب موجات النزوح يف العامل منذ الحرب العاملية الثانية‪ .‬وقد دفعت‬ ‫بأعىل معدل من حوادث العنف وتس ّ‬ ‫محافظات حلب وحامة وريف دمشق حصيلة أعىل نسبياً من حيث الوفيات املرتبطة بالحرب‪ ،‬لكن الرصاع كان منترشا ً عىل نطاق‬ ‫أي منطقة تقريباً من جراحه‪ .‬وبالرغم من تراجع حجم الرصاع بشكل كبري بعد عام ‪،2018‬‬ ‫واسع يف جميع أنحاء البالد‪ ،‬ومل تسلم ّ‬ ‫كانت عواقبه واضحة يف املناطق الشاملية من البالد والتي ال تزال خارج سيطرة الحكومة السورية‪ .‬وهناك حالياً أكرث من ‪ 6‬ماليني‬ ‫سوري من النازحني يف الخارج‪ ،‬معظمهم يف البلدان املجاورة‪ ،‬وما يفوقهم عددا ً يف داخل البالد‪.‬‬ ‫ويربز تأثري الرصاع بشكل واضح من حيث عدد السكان والبنية الدميوغرافية يف سوريا‪ .‬وميكن قياس التأثري املبارش وغري املبارش للرصاع‬ ‫عىل سكان سوريا من حيث تقليص عددهم بنسبة ‪ 20‬يف املائة‪ ،‬فالتقديرات السكانية لعام ‪ 2022‬أقل مبقدار ‪ 5‬ماليني نسمة مقارنة‬ ‫بتقديرات ما قبل الرصاع‪ .‬وباإلضافة إىل ذلك‪ ،‬كان للرصاع أثر كبري عىل البنية الجندرية للسكان‪ ،‬حيث تركّز النقص الكبري يف الذكور يف‬ ‫الفئة العمرية ‪ 20‬إىل ‪ 40‬سنة‪ .‬يف عام ‪ ،2022‬أبلغت نسبة حوايل ‪ 30‬يف املائة من األرس السورية عن غياب أحد أفرادها نتيجة للنزاع‪،‬‬ ‫ن مبكرة‪ ،‬تليه الوفيات املرتبطة بالحرب‪ .‬بني عامي ‪ 2018‬و‪،2022‬‬ ‫وكان النزوح اىل الخارج السبب الرئييس للغياب بني الرجال يف س ٍّ‬ ‫تضاعف عدد الشباب السوريني الذكور الذين غادروا البالد مع أرسهم‪ ،‬مام يعكس التأثري املتفاقم للرصاع والحاجة إىل التعامل مع‬ ‫الصعوبات االقتصادية الناجمة عنه‪.‬‬ ‫دة بالرصاع‪ .‬فقد كانت سوريا ما قبل الرصاع ت ُعترب من الدول ذات الدخل املتوسط املنخفض والرسيعة‬ ‫كام تأث ّر االقتصاد السوري بش ّ‬ ‫دى إىل تقليص قدرة البلد عىل اإلنتاج الصناعي والزراعي بشكل كبري‪ ،‬واىل زيادة‬ ‫النمو‪ .‬غري أن أكرث من عقد من الرصاع املستمر أ ّ‬ ‫رضه للصدمات الدولية‪ .‬وبعد خسارة نصف ناتجها املحيل اإلجاميل بني عامي ‪ 2010‬و‪ ،2020‬يتمثل‬ ‫اعتامده عىل الواردات وتع ّ‬ ‫الوضع االقتصادي الحايل لسوريا كبلد منخفض الدخل تكافح فيه األرس باستمرار لتغطية نفقاتها‪ ،‬معتمدة عىل املصدر الوحيد‬ ‫دل املشاركة يف القوى العاملة بشكل ملحوظ‪ ،‬ال سيام‬ ‫املتبقي لدعمها‪ :‬القوى العاملة‪ .‬وباملقارنة مع فرتة ما قبل الرصاع‪ ،‬ارتفع مع ّ‬ ‫ن‪ .‬ومع ذلك‪ ،‬مع محدودية فرص العمل التي‬ ‫ن بشكل متزايد املساهمة يف تأمني سبل عيش أرسه ّ‬ ‫بني النساء‪ ،‬اللوايت يُطلب منه ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫املتعرّث يف البالد‪ ،‬تعمل حالياً نسبة أكرب من العامل والعامالت بشكل غري رسمي ويف قطاع الخدمات‪ .‬ونظرا ً لظروف‬ ‫يوفّرها االقتصاد‬ ‫سوق العمل الصعبة يف سوريا اليوم والعدد الكبري من األرس التي نزح أفراد ذكور منها اىل الخارج‪ ،‬فمن غري املستغرب أن تكون‬ ‫رات‪ ،‬من متوسط وطني بلغ حوايل ‪ 3‬يف املائة يف عام ‪2009‬‬ ‫حصة إجاميل دخل األرسة من التحويالت الدولية قد تضاعفت أربع م ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫إىل ‪ 12‬يف املائة يف عام ‪.2022‬‬ ‫‪xii‬‬ ‫ملخّص تنفيذي‬ ‫‪xiii‬‬ ‫دماً‬‫وكان تأثري الرصاع عىل النتائج التعليمية لألطفال بعيد املدى أيضاً‪ .‬خالل العقد الذي سبق بداية الرصاع‪ ،‬أحرزت سوريا تق ّ‬ ‫دم توقّف يف العقد التايل‪ ،‬حيث‬ ‫ملحوظاً يف تحسني النتائج التعليمية‪ ،‬باعتبارها واحدة من أفضل البلدان النامية بني أقرانها‪ .‬هذا التق ّ‬ ‫ات ّسمت السنوات األوىل من الرصاع بزيادة كبرية يف نسبة األطفال غري امللتحقني باملدارس‪ .‬هذه النسبة تراجعت يف السنوات األخرية‪،‬‬ ‫وعادت إىل مستواها العام ملا قبل الرصاع‪ ،‬الذي ضاعف أيضاً عدم املساواة املوجودة سابقاً يف النتائج التعليمية بني املحافظات‪ ،‬مام‬ ‫د الظروف االقتصادية لألرس‪ ،‬وتوافر املرافق املدرسية‪ ،‬واإلقامة يف‬ ‫خلق مواطن ضعف جديدة بني األطفال النازحني‪ .‬بشكل عام تع ّ‬ ‫ددات الرئيسية لعدم التحاق‬ ‫املناطق التي ال تزال عرضة للنزاع وخارج سيطرة الحكومة يف األجزاء الشاملية من سوريا‪ ،‬من بني املح ّ‬ ‫األطفال باملدارس‪.‬‬ ‫تشكّل ديناميات الفقر النقدي ومستوى الرفاهية االجتامعية الحالية لسكان سوريا األدلّة األكرث وضوحاً عىل التأثري الدراماتييك‬ ‫دله نسبة اىل السكان الذين يعيشون تحت خط الفقر الدويل‬ ‫للرصاع عىل فرص التنمية يف البالد‪ .‬كان الفقر املدقع‪ ،‬الذي يُقاس مع ّ‬ ‫نه واعتبارا ً من عام‬ ‫والبالغ ‪ 2.15‬دوالر أمرييك للفرد يومياً (ما يعادل الق ّ‬ ‫وة الرشائية لعام ‪ ،)2017‬معدوم الوجود تقريباً قبل النزاع‪ .‬لك ّ‬ ‫كل أربعة سوريني (حوايل ‪ 5.7‬مليون نسمة) يف فقر مدقع‪ .‬وإذا تم األخذ يف االعتبار خط الفقر الدويل يف‬ ‫‪ ،2022‬أصبح واحد من ّ‬ ‫واملتوسطة الدخل والبالغ ‪ 3.65‬دوالر أمرييك (ما يعادل القوة الرشائية لعام ‪ ، )2017‬فإن الفقر يف سوريا يؤث ّر عىل‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫البلدان املنخفضة‬ ‫نسبة ‪ 69‬يف املائة من السكان – أي حوايل ‪ 14.5‬مليون سوري‪.‬‬ ‫وللفقر املدقع يف سوريا داللة مكانية قوية‪ ،‬حيث يعيش أكرث من ‪ 50‬يف املائة من الفقراء املدقعني يف ثالث محافظات فقط هي حلب‬ ‫وحامة ودير الزور‪ ،‬فتعاين املحافظات الواقعة يف الجزء الشاميل الرشقي من البالد أعىل مع ّ‬ ‫دالت الفقر‪ .‬وتعترب األرس التي ترأسها نساء‬ ‫دة‬‫والنازحون داخلياً أكرث عرضة للفقر‪ ،‬يف حني أن تلقي التحويالت الدولية يحد بدرجة كبرية من خطره‪ .‬وعىل الرغم من تراجع ح ّ‬ ‫دل الفقر النقدي بشكل كبري بعد عام ‪ ،2019‬مام يعكس التأثري الرتاكمي للصدمات الدولية عىل‬ ‫الرصاع يف السنوات األخرية‪ ،‬زاد مع ّ‬ ‫ءا من األزمة املالية يف لبنان عام ‪ ،2019‬وجائحة كوفيد‪ -19‬يف عام ‪ ،2020‬ومؤخرا ً الحرب عىل أوكرانيا‪.‬‬ ‫االقتصاد السوري‪ ،‬بد ً‬ ‫اىل جانب الفقر النقدي‪ ،‬فإن وضع السكان السوريني عرضة للضعف والهشاشة بسبب قلّة سبل كسب العيش وتدهور الظروف‬ ‫ددة األبعاد حادة‬ ‫دد األبعاد‪ ،‬تدهور هذا الوضع بني عامي ‪ 2021‬و‪ .2022‬وتعترب الهشاشة املتع ّ‬ ‫املعيشية‪ .‬واستنادا ً إىل ّ‬ ‫املؤرّش املتع ّ‬ ‫دة بسبب شبه انعدام الحصول عىل املياه‪ .‬وعىل غرار املالحظات‬ ‫بشكل خاص بسبب االفتقار اىل فرص الدخل‪ ،‬لكنها ازدادت ح ّ‬ ‫ددة األبعاد لها داللة مكانية قوية‪ ،‬حيث تسجل املحافظات الشاملية‬‫املتعلقة بالفقر النقدي والنتائج التعليمية‪ ،‬فإن الهشاشة املتع ّ‬ ‫الرشقية والجنوبية أسوأ النتائج‪.‬‬ ‫ركات الحد من الفقر‪ ،‬من املرجح أن تستمر‪،‬‬ ‫يبنّي التحليل الوارد يف هذا التقرير أن األزمة يف سوريا مل تنته بعد‪ ،‬وأنه يف غياب مح ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ديات حالة الرفاهية االجتامعية التي تواجه األرس السورية يف محاولتها التصدي للصدمات‪ .‬ويف هذا السياق‪ ،‬من‬ ‫إن مل تتفاقم‪ ،‬تح ّ‬ ‫ور نواتج مستوى الرفاهية االجتامعية واالسرتشاد بها يف اإلجراءات املتّخذة يف سياق‬‫األولويات الحصول عىل بيانات موثوقة لرصد تط ّ‬ ‫العمل اإلنساين والتنمية‪ .‬ويف ظل غياب اإلحصاءات الرسمية‪ ،‬إن االستمرار يف التعاون بني الوكاالت اإلنسانية يف جمع وتحليل البيانات‬ ‫ميكن أن يسهم بشكل كبري يف التقدم باتجاه سد الفجوات املعرفية‪.‬‬ xiv THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT Introduction Over the past decade, violent conflict has dramatically increased globally. By 2030, it is estimated that countries affected by fragility, conflict and violence will be home to up to two-thirds of the world’s extreme poor. The consequences of conflict on a country’s development are profound, affecting a wide range of outcomes both directly and indirectly. Several studies have shown how conflict affects a country’s growth, exacerbates poverty and hunger, and disrupts service delivery, ultimately leading to a deterioration of health and education outcomes. Assessing the impact of conflict is often hindered by data constraints. Information on the profile and welfare of populations in fragile and conflict-affected countries is severely constrained by data availability, as is the under- standing of the immediate and long-term welfare consequences of conflict. The report aims to provide an assessment of some of the welfare consequences of the conflict in Syria. To the extent possible, given existing data limitations, the analysis presented in this report tries to highlight changes in selected welfare outcomes between the pre-conflict period (2000–10), and the summer of 2022, when the latest nationally representative survey was conducted under the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP).1 The analysis presented in this report further highlights the important role that humanitarian agencies play not only in providing vital assistance to populations in emergency situations, but also in collecting data in challenging environments. Beside informing humanitarian operations, data collected by humanitarian actors can effectively be used to generate knowledge public goods along the humanitarian-development nexus. This report is structured as follows: Section 1 provides an overview of the Syrian conflict, aimed at providing the background context for the analysis presented in Sections 2, 3, and 4, which assess the impact of conflict on the demographic profile of the Syrian population, and on its labor market and human capital outcomes. Section 5 provides an assessment and profile of Syrian population welfare, both in terms of monetary poverty and non-monetary (multidimensional) outcomes, while Section 6 builds on the findings of the report to provide concluding remarks. 1 See Annex 1 for details. 1 The Conflict in Syria 1 2 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT The current conflict has ravaged the Arab Republic of Syria and its people for the past 12 years. The conflict in Syria started in March 2011. Protests first erupted in the southern gov- ernorate of Dar'a and soon spread nationwide. As the violence escalated, various opposition groups emerged to challenge the government and eventually achieve control of various parts of Syria’s territory. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which at its time of maximum expansion in 2015 controlled about 43 percent of Syria’s territory (Figure 1), led to the intervention of international powers supporting different parties to the conflict, and to a further escalation of hostilities. Beginning in 2017, political negotiation efforts to establish de-escalation zones and ceasefires, as well as advancement in the fight against ISIS, led to a marked decline in the geographical spread of the conflict, which currently remains mostly concentrated in areas outside of the Syrian Government’s control in the northeastern and northwestern parts of the country. FIGURE 1 Areas of control by different parties to the conflict, 2015, 2018, 2020, and 2022 2015 2018 Al Hasakah Al Hasakah Aleppo Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Idlib Raqqa a Lataki a Lataki Deir ez−Zor Deir ez−Zor Hama Hama Tartus Tartus Homs Homs Damascus SDF Damascus Contested Douma Douma SDF ISIS Quneitra Quneitra ISIS Opposition/NSAG Opposition/NSAG As Sweida Government As Sweida Government Daraa Daraa No data No data Occupied Territories Occupied Territories 2020 2022 Al Hasakah Al Hasakah Aleppo Aleppo Idlib Raqqa Idlib Raqqa a Lataki a Lataki Deir ez−Zor Deir ez−Zor Hama Hama Tartus Tartus Homs Homs Damascus Government and SDF Damascus Government and SDF Douma Contested Douma Contested Quneitra Turkish AF Quneitra Turkish AF SDF SDF ISIS ISIS As Sweida Opposition/NSAG As Sweida Opposition/NSAG Daraa Daraa Government Government Occupied Territories Occupied Territories Source: World Bank staff calculations based on the data by the Carter Center. THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA 3 The human toll of the Syrian conflict has been devastating. Estimates of the total death toll of the Syrian war vary depending on the methodology and reporting agency. In 2021, the United Nations’ Human Rights Office (OHCHR) released a tally during the first 10 years of the conflict of 350,200 deaths, including both civilians and combatants. 2 The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) estimates an overall death toll of 610,000 people over 11 years of conflict, of which 160,681 are represented by civilians (120,158 men, 15,237 women, and 25,286 children).3 According to geo- referenced conflict-related data compiled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Georeferenced Events Dataset (UCDP GED, Box 1), the estimated death toll between March 2011 and December 2021 was 407,000 people, with civilians accounting for around one-quarter of the total fatalities in the conflict (Figure 2). Putting these somber statistics into perspective, it is worth noting that, worldwide, close to one in two conflict-related deaths that occurred over the period were due to the conflict in Syria. FIGURE 2 Conflict-related fatalities in Syria between 2011 and 2021, cumulative distribution 500 400 407 300 Thousand 200 100 122 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Low estimate High estimate Best estimate Civilians Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data. 2 The count is based on a strict methodology requiring the deceased full name, date of death and location of the body and should therefore be interpreted as an under-estimation of the actual number of was related deaths. See OHCHR. 3 See SOHR. 4 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT BOX 1 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Event (UCDP GED) The UCDP GED is a comprehensive geo-referenced dataset that documents violent events and conflicts worldwide. It is the oldest ongoing data-collection project on conflict, with a temporal span of almost 40 years. The UCDP provides detailed information on the locations, dates, types of violent incidents, and the number of casualties involved. The dataset covers various conflict-related events, including battles, bombings, and other forms of violence. The unit of analysis in the UCDP GED is the “event,” which refers to a specific instance of fatal orga- nized violence. An event is defined as the use of armed force by an organized actor against another organized actor or civilians, resulting in at least one direct death, occurring at a specific location and within a specific time frame. Each instance meeting these criteria is recorded as a single observation in the dataset and serves as the unit of analysis. The data-collection process involves utilizing search strings through the Dow Jones Factiva aggregator to retrieve news reports containing information about individuals killed or injured due to conflict. The search encompasses global sources, and addi- tional local, specialized news sources, and social media outlets are incorporated to enhance coverage. Non-media sources, such as reports from NGOs, international organizations, historical archives, and case studies also contribute to the data collection process. The intensity of conflict in Syria is marked by significant temporal and spatial dynam- ics. The initial three years of conflict were characterized by widespread violence, as indicated by the number of conflict-related events and the incidence of conflict-related casualties, including among the civilian population (Figure 3). Since peaking in 2014, the incidence of conflict-related deaths has progressively declined, reflecting the change in the military profile of the conflict (from state-based events to non-state-based events), and the progressive reduction of its geographical spread, possibly due to the large-scale population displacement from the areas most affected by the conflict. In absolute terms, the concentration of violence has been particularly pronounced in the densely populated areas of Aleppo and Rural Damascus (Figure 4). These regions collectively account for 40 percent of all recorded violent events during the conflict. Similarly, in terms of casu- alties, Aleppo and Rural Damascus are responsible for a significant portion of the recorded deaths, making up 40 percent of the overall toll. However, the province of Hama stands out, with only 9 percent of recorded violent events but a substantial 30 percent share of all conflict-related deaths. As expected, given that densely populated urban areas have consistently been among the most fiercely contested sites throughout the war, and combined with the indiscriminate use of heavy weaponry, the conflict’s civilian death toll is also concentrated around Aleppo and Rural Damascus (41 percent of all civilian deaths). THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA 5 FIGURE 3 Conflict trends, 2011–2022 Con ict-related incidents (Thousands) 20 17 12 11 10 8 4 2 1 1 1 1 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Con ict-related deaths (Thousands) 81 84 63 53 55 39 20 22 22 14 14 14 12 11 4 6 6 3 3 1 2 2 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Best estimate Civilians Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data. FIGURE 4 Total conflict-related events and deaths 2011–2022, by governorate 20 140 120 15 100 Events (thousand) Deaths (thousand) 80 10 60 40 5 20 0 0 Rural Damascus Aleppo Idleb Dar'a Homs Hama Deir-ez-Zor Damascus Ar-Raqqa Al-Hasakeh Lattakia Quneitra As-Sweida Tartous Events Deaths Civilian deaths Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data. 6 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT While major population centers account for the largest share of conflict-related deaths, virtually no region was left unscarred by violence. Regions with lower population density have witnessed a disproportionately high level of violence relative to their resident numbers. As shown in Figure 5, when normalizing conflict statistics to pre-conflict population estimates by gov- ernorate, the southern governorates of Quneitra and Dar'a gain prominence, registering 1,104 and 825 fatal incidents per 100,000 individuals, respectively, way surpassing the national average of 424 incidents per 100,000 people. Similarly, when analyzing the death toll, Hama stands out once again for its exceptionally high level of conflict-related deaths, at 7,900 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. The Syrian conflict set into motion one of the largest episodes of international displace- ment since World War II. As of October 31, 2023, 5.2 million Syrian refugees are currently hosted in neighboring countries (UNHCR, 2023), with an additional 1 million residing in Europe, mostly in Germany and Sweden (Table 1). While staggering, these figures represent less than half of the cur- rent toll of Syria’s forcibly displaced population. As of August 2022, as many as 6.6 million people were living in displacement within Syria’s borders, meaning that one in three people living in Syria were internally displaced. As shown in Table 2, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are mostly concen- trated in the governorates of Idleb, Aleppo and Rural Damascus. The majority of IDPs (52 percent of FIGURE 5 Conflict-related incidents and deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, by governorate 1,200 9,000 8,000 1,000 7,000 800 6,000 Events/100k 5,000 Deaths/100k 600 4,000 400 3,000 2,000 200 1,000 0 0 Quneitra Dar'a Rural Damascus Deir-ez-Zor Hama Homs Ar-Raqqa Aleppo Damascus Lattakia Al-Hasakeh As-Sweida Tartous Syria Idleb Events/100 Deaths/100 Civilian deaths/100 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UCDP data. Note: Population figures refer to 2011 (pre-conflict). THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA 7 the total), as well as the totality of those accommodated in camps, live in areas outside of govern- ment control and are still affected by conflict in the northwestern and northeastern governorates.4 TABLE 1 Internationally displaced Syrians, by host country Location name Population of concern Türkiye 3,274,059 Lebanon 789,842 Jordan 652,842 Iraq 270,479 Egypt 151,721 Other (North Africa) 45,003 Total 5,183,946 Germany 692,734 Sweden 105,617 Other (Europe) 394,028 Total 1,192,379 Source: UNHCR (as of October 31, 2023). TABLE 2 Internally displaced people, by governorate Location name IDPs Share of IDPs in the total population Idleb 1,801,804 0.64 Aleppo 1,261,700 0.30 Rural Damascus 1,089,978 0.36 Damascus 597,979 0.33 Lattakia 447,447 0.35 Al-Hasakeh 305,178 0.26 Homs 298,800 0.20 Hama 211,882 0.16 Tartous 180,365 0.19 Deir-ez-Zor 152,701 0.20 Ar-Raqqa 144,919 0.20 As-Sweida 71,251 0.19 Dar’a 68,742 0.07 Quneitra 3,418 0.03 Total 6,636,164 0.32 Source: HNAP – Monthly Mobility and Needs Monitoring (MNM) August 2022. 4 IDP camps are present in Al-Hasakeh, Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Idleb. 8 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT The temporal pattern of displacement closely overlaps with the temporal evolution of conflict intensity. As shown in Figure 6, internal displacement movements were particularly severe during the initial years of conflict in 2012 and 2013, when widespread violence erupted, and then again in 2016 and 2017, when international players entered the conflict arena in the fight against ISIS and other non-state actors. On the other hand, international displacement and the arrival of refu- gees in neighboring countries were mostly concentrated between 2014 and 2016, possibly sug- gesting a continuum in displacement trajectories, with IDPs eventually deciding to leave Syria when unable to find safety or availed of the opportunity.5 According to a recent assessment conducted by the International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDCM) on displaced populations in Afghani- stan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Niger, South Sudan, and Yemen, more than half of the refugees and returning refugees surveyed were internally displaced before leaving their country of origin. Conflict and conflict-induced displacement have determined a substantial change in the distribution of the Syrian population across governorates. Comparing the subnational dis- tribution of the Syrian population between 2011, on the eve of the conflict, and 2022, Aleppo, Deir- ez-Zor, Homs and Hama emerge as the governorates with the largest population loss (Figure 7). On the other hand, the population of the northwestern governorate of Idleb, which currently remains outside of the Syrian Government’s control, almost doubled over the period, with 60 percent of its population as of 2022 being constituted by displaced Syrians. 5 In Lebanon, at the Government of Syria’s request, UNHCR stopped registering refugees in 2015. Similarly, Jordan and Türkiye enforced stricter border controls to limit population movements after 2016. THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA 9 FIGURE 6 Internal and international displacement, stocks and flows 8 Million 7 Million 6 Million 5 Million 4 Million 3 Million 2 Million 1 Million 0 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 IDPs Refugees IDPs stock (dx) Refugees stock Source: UNHCR, OCHA. FIGURE 7 Distribution of population by governorate, 2011 and 2022 5 100% 4 80% 3 60% Million 2 40% 1 20% 0 0% Damascus Aleppo Rural Damascus Homs Hama Lattakia Idleb Al-Hasakeh Deir-ez-Zor Tartous Ar-Raqqa Dar'a As-Sweida Quneitra Total population 2011 Total population 2022 Share of population displaced (2022) Source: HNAP – Monthly Mobility and Needs Monitoring (MNM) August 2022. 2 Demographic Impact of the Conflict 11 12 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT The demographic profile of a country affected by war can be a good indicator of the scale of human losses brought about by conflict. Epidemiologists distinguish between direct and indirect effects of conflict. Direct effects include higher mortality associated with war- related casualties and international displacement leading to substantial losses in population. Indi- rect effects can be even larger. Massive destruction brought about by conflict over time involves services, infrastructure, and productive systems that are critical for people’s survival, leading to increases in malnutrition, morbidity and, ultimately, higher mortality. The destruction of health facilities, the collapse of health systems, and damage to agricultural production and food systems, as well as the destruction of houses, and water and sanitation infrastructure, are among the most harmful indirect effects of conflicts, with implications often enduring well beyond the termina- tion of hostilities. The interplay of conflict and international displacement has severely affected the size of Syria’s population. The last population Census conducted in 2004 estimated Syria’s population at 17.9 million. Since then, population estimates for Syria have been revised multiple times (Figure 8). Pre-conflict estimates based on medium fertility scenarios projected Syria’s population to be 27.2 million in 2022, about 5 million higher compared with the most recent estimates reported in the 2022 World Population Prospects, which were informed by data-collection efforts on the ground FIGURE 8 Population estimates for Syria 30 Million 25 Million 20 Million CBS HNAP 15 Million CONFLICT STARTS 10 Million 5 Million 0 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 CBS – HNAP Prospects 2010 Prospects 2015 Prospects 2019 Prospects 2022 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on World Population Prospects (UNDESA), HNAP and CBS. Note: Population projections based on medium fertility scenario. DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 13 under HNAP. According to these estimates, if using pre-conflict projections as a counterfactual, it might be possible to say that, as of 2022, the country’s population has suffered a 20 percent con- traction as a direct and indirect consequence of the conflict. Not only has conflict affected Syria’s population size, but it has also affected its demo- graphic profile. As shown in Figure 9, Syria’s population structure in 2022—as estimated using the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP) household survey data collected in May– June 20226 —is significantly different from the one observed in 2010, before the onset of conflict. In 2010, the gender composition of Syria’s population was relatively balanced across age groups and children in the 0–4 age category, in line with the profile of a growing population, were the largest demographic group. These features have not persisted after more than a decade of conflict. The demographic structure of Syria in 2022 is the one typical of a conflict-stricken country. Similar to other countries affected by conflict,7 the current shape of Syria’s population pyramid clearly shows FIGURE 9 Syria population pyramids, 2010 and 2022 2010 2022 80+ 80+ 75–79 75–79 70–74 70–74 65–69 65–69 60–64 60–64 55–59 55–59 50–54 50–54 Age group Age group 45–49 45–49 40–44 40–44 35–39 35–39 30–34 30–34 25–29 25–29 20–24 20–24 15–19 15–19 10–14 10–14 5–9 5–9 0–4 0–4 10 5 0 5 10 10 5 0 5 10 Female Male Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospect 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). 6 From mid-May to mid-June 2022, HNAP conducted a nationwide demographic household survey across all 14 gover- norates of Syria. The survey, with a total sample of 26,171 households, collected data on key demographic and socio- economic indicators, and it is representative at the country, governorate and sub-district level. 7 A demographic deficit of prime-age men has been for example documented in Rwanda, Cambodia and Darfur (Guha-Sapir and D’Aoust, 2010). 14 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT a substantial male deficit concentrated in people aged 20 to 40 (Figure 10). Moreover, compared with its pre-conflict level, estimates indicate a decline in the share of children in the 0–4 age cate- gory, consistent with evidence indicating an increase in the under-5 mortality rate related to con- flict (Figure 11). A compounding driver for this change might be a decline in fertility, spurred by the progressive deterioration of living conditions and high levels of maternal mortality. 8 Overall, despite these changes, the demographic dependency rate has remained stable at its pre-conflict level. International displacement and war-related deaths have been the two main driving forces behind observed gender imbalances in Syria’s prime-age adult population. Accord- ing to HNAP 2022 data, about 30 percent of households currently living in Syria report at least one household member who is absent because of conflict. As shown in Figure 12, “absent” household members in 2022 are predominantly male who have either left Syria or have died as a result of con- flict: about 988,000 individuals, 93 percent of whom are men, have fled Syria leaving their house- holds behind, while another 344,000 individuals, 89 percent of whom are men, have died as a direct FIGURE 10 Masculinity ratio in 2022, by age group 140 120 100 No. of males per 100 females 80 60 40 20 0 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65+ Age group Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). 8 In low-income countries, conflict has been found to associate with increases in maternal mortality due to the decline access to reproductive health services, decline in female education and social insecurity (Urdal and Che, 2013). DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 15 FIGURE 11 Trends in under-5 mortality rate 47 45.3 41.6 39.5 37 Number of deaths per 1,000 live births 23.5 23.4 22.2 22.4 19.7 19.3 18.9 18.8 18.9 19.1 20.1 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Source: UNICEF – https://data.unicef.org/country/syr/. FIGURE 12 Number of absent members for households currently residing in Syria, by reason of absence Jailed/Missing Movement outside Syria Reason for absence Movement within Syria War-related death 0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 Female Male Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). 16 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT consequence of the war.9 International displacement of prime-age men could have been jointly driven by efforts to escape mandatory conscription, as well as to support families in Syria through international remittances.10 Not surprisingly, the gendered impact of war-related deaths and inter- national displacement have contributed to the increase in the share of female-headed households in the Syrian population, from 4.4 percent in 2009 to 9.6 percent in 2022. In recent years, the number of young male Syrians leaving the country has increased, reflecting the compounding effect of conflict and the need to cope with conflict-induced economic hardship. As shown in Figure 13, the share of households with an absent male household member living abroad and the absolute numbers of male Syrians leaving the country increased sub- stantially between 2018 and 2022. Looking at the most recent data from 2022, two in three males who have left the country, leaving their households behind, are 20 to 29 years old. The majority of them live in Türkiye (40 percent), followed by Germany (17 percent), other European countries (12 percent), and Lebanon (10.6 percent). As further discussed in the next section, challenging labor market condi- tions in present day Syria may have pushed an increasing number of young males to flee the country, not only to escape conscription and conflict, but also to try to support their households economically. FIGURE 13 Households with male absent members living abroad, 2018–2022 5 1,000 922,127 796,987 788,970 4 800 4.3 699,626 No of males (thousand) 640,701 % of households 3.8 3 600 3.2 2 400 2.4 1.9 1 200 0 0 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). 9 These estimates are based on reports of households currently living in Syria and should therefore not be interpreted as indicative of the total displacement or death toll of the Syrian conflict. In fact, international displacement often entails all household members moving together across borders; some of these internationally displaced households might have suffered casualties among their members, and entire households might have lost their lives due to conflict. 10 See Box 4: International remittances. 3 Labor Market Impact of the Conflict 17 18 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT Large-scale destruction brought about by more than a decade of conflict has profoundly affected Syria’s economy and its labor market. In addition to the immensurable suffering associated with displacement and war-related deaths, the conflict has inflicted significant dam- age on the country’s capital stock and economic activities. It is estimated that Syria’s GDP halved between 2010 and 2020 (World Bank, 2023). Conflict has led to a collapse in domestic industrial out- put and agricultural production, increasing Syria’s reliance on imported goods, including food sta- ples (see Box 2). Syria’s exports saw a tenfold decline from US$18.4 billion in 2010 to US$1.8 billion in 2021, primarily driven by the collapse in oil and tourism receipts. While still sizable, the decline in imports was less pronounced, contracting from US$22.7 billion in 2010 to US$6.5 billion in 2021. The collapse in domestic production and domestic demand brought about by the conflict can be fully appreciated looking at dynamics on the labor market. BOX 2 Wheat production and trade in Syria, 2000–2020 Agriculture has historically been a major contributor to the Syrian economy. In the 2000s, agriculture production contributed on average 22 percent of Syria’s GDP, and accounted for almost one-quarter of total employment (WDI Database, 2022). The importance of agriculture in rural areas was even greater, with 80 percent of rural dwellers sustained by income from agricultural work as of 2010 (FAO, 2021). During this period, wheat production contributed 17.3 percent of total agricultural production, and accounted for 85 percent of all cereals produced by the country. Of Syria’s total cultivable land, about 62 percent is located in the three northeastern governorates of Aleppo, Ar-Raqqa, and Al-Hasakeh, with the latter being the largest wheat-producing governorate. Between 2001 and 2007, Syrian domestic wheat production averaged about 4 million tonnes, prior to declining precipitously to 2.1 million tonnes in 2008, due to severe drought conditions. Prior to the drought, Syria was a net exporter of wheat. The country turned into a net wheat importer in 2009, when 1.7 million tonnes were imported. Between 2012 and 2020, wheat production declined to an average of 2.5 million tonnes annually, with production dropping to below 2 million tonnes between 2016 and 2018, due to the intertwined impact of drought conditions and conflict. During the same period, wheat imports averaged 415,000 tonnes, although there was wide annual variation, with imports as high as 1.5 million tonnes in 2013, and as low as 50,000 tonnes in 2018. Trends in wheat Trends in wheat production production and and official official imports, ’000 metric imports, ’000 metric tonnes tonnes 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Production Imports Source: World Bank staff calculations based on FAOSTAT. LABOR MARKET IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 19 Syrian households have coped with the impact of conflict by leveraging their only asset: labor. The increase in labor force participation has compensated for the demographic shock induced by conflict . Compared with its pre-conflict levels, Syria’s working age popula- tion has shrunk significantly, particularly in its male component (Figure 14). However, the impact of this demographic shock has been compensated by an increase in labor force participation, leaving the  overall number of employed Syrians almost unchanged, at around 6.3  million.11 The increase in the level of economic activity has been particularly dramatic for Syrian women, with female labor force participation more than doubling from 13 percent in 2010 to 31 percent in 2022, against a more modest increase in male participation from 72 to 79 percent over the same period (Figure 15). With deteriorating economic conditions in the country, more Syrian women have been pushed to enter the labor market to support their households to make ends meet and, possibly, to compensate for the absence of male adult household members. In fact, as shown in Figure 16, the increase in female labor force participation has been particularly strong in governorates more affected by the conflict-induced male demographic deficits, possibly suggesting the substituting role that women are playing in the Syrian labor market.12 FIGURE 14 Changes in working age population, 2010–2022 7.0 6.5 6.4 Million 6.2 2010 2022 2010 2022 Male Female Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospect 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). 11 Between 2010 and 2022, labor force participation in Syria increased from 43 to 51 percent. 12 Similar positive relation between conflict and female labor force participation, often times referred to as “additional worker effect”, has been found in other conflict episodes, such those in Peru, Nepal and Vietnam (see Gallegos [2012], Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers [2015] and Kreibaum and Klasen [2015]). 20 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT FIGURE 15 Trends in labor force participation, employment to population and unemployment rates, by gender 79 76 72 68 54 48 43 39 31 22 24 24 13 10 10 6 9 5 2010 2022 2010 2022 2010 2022 Participation rate (%) Unemployment rate (%) Employment to WAP ratio (%) Male Female Both sexes Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNDESA World Population Prospect 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). FIGURE 16 Relationship between female labor force participation and the masculinity ratio at the governorate level, 2022 60 50 Tartous Lattakia Female participation rate (%) Homs 40 Hama Deir-ez-Zor Damascus As-Sweida Ar-Raqqa 30 Dar'a Al-Hasakeh Rural Damascus 20 Idleb 10 Quneitra 0 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 Male per 100 female in working age population Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). Note: Population figures refer to 2011 (pre-conflict). LABOR MARKET IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 21 Poor labor market opportunities are reflected in a high level of unemployment and by an increased reliance on remittances from abroad. According to the most recent HNAP sur- veys, the current level of unemployment in Syria’s labor market is as high as its pre-conflict base. The unemployment challenge is particularly severe for Syrian women. In 2022, the female unem- ployment rate stood as high as 24 percent, 15 percentage points higher than the male unemploy- ment rate (see Box 3). Not surprisingly, given the challenging labor market conditions in present day Syria and the sizable share of households with male members displaced abroad, the share of total household income from international remittances has substantially increased, from a national aver- age of about 3 percent in 2009 to 12 percent in 2022 (see Box 4). Compared with the pre-conflict period, the employment profile of Syrians has dramati- cally changed, with a growing number of workers employed informally and in the services sector. The destruction of Syria’s socio-economic infrastructure due to more than 10 years of conflict has resulted in a dramatic change in the job profile of Syrian workers. Prior to the conflict, Syrian households, through family businesses, employed less than 10 percent of workers. Ten years later, the share had more than quadrupled, possibly reflecting the lack of labor demand and a progressive informalization of the Syrian labor market (Figure 17).13 Consistent trends also emerge when looking at changes in the sectoral composition of employment. As shown in Figure 18, the share of industry in total employment roughly halved between 2010 and 2022, and there was a corresponding increase in the share of employment in the services sector, which in 2022 accounted for 64 percent of male employment (48 percent in 2010) and 86 percent of female employment (68 percent in 2010). 13 Unfortunately, lacking access to the microdata of the Labor Force Surveys conducted prior to the conflict, the analysis of trends is constrained to the indicators tabulated on the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS) website that are common to those available through the HNAP demographic and WASH surveys conducted between 2018 and 2022. Due to these data limita- tions, it is not possible to construct a precise measure of informality encompassing both self-employment and casual labor. 22 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT BOX 3 Labor market challenges of Syrian women Despite the observed increase in labor force participation, other factors associated to the conflict have been limiting women’s opportunities for socio-economic inclusion. Similar to other countries in the region, gender norms and legal barriers limit Syrian women’s engagement in the public sphere. Conflict has further exacerbated these constraints. Lack of access to government-issued civil docu- mentation, particularly in areas more affected by conflict, represents a major challenge for women, particularly for widowed and divorced women, as it limits their ability to inherit property, their assets’ tenure security, and it possibly exposes them to the risk of violence. Moreover, safety and security concerns have heightened because of conflict, further limiting physi- cal mobility and employment opportunities of Syrian women, and adding additional risks for those entering the labor market by force of necessity. According to most recent reports, the prevalence of gender-based violence (GBV) remains a prominent concern, with one in five households indicating that women and girls feel unsafe in their respective locations, mainly when crossing checkpoints, at markets, and on public transportation. Source: OCHA “2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic.” February 2022. BOX 4 International remittances International evidence has documented the critical role played by remittance flows to home countries and how they can contribute toward smoothing consumption of receiving households following economic shocks, including those originating from conflict (Vargas-Silva, 2016). According to estimates based on the HNAP survey data, 37 percent of Syrian households (1.54 million households) received remittances in 2022. Among recipient households, remittances average about US$57 per month and account for more than one-third of their total income. Based on these estimates, in 2022, the total value of remittances received by Syrian households reached about US$1.05 billion, up by 39 percent compared with 2021. The share of households receiving remittances varies by governorate (Figure B4.1). Damascus, Deir-ez-Zor and Homs are the governorates where the share of households receiving remittances is the highest. Overall, receiving remittances is relatively more common among households residing in areas that are under the Syrian Government’s control (40 percent) and among formerly displaced households (60 percent). Share of households receiving remittances in 2022, by governorate 67% 53% 50% 44% 44% 42% 39% 37% 33% 32% 32% 18% 18% 16% 13% Damascus Deir-ez-Zor Homs Dar'a Rural Damascus Hama Ar-Raqqa Al-Hasakeh Lattakia Aleppo Idleb Quneitra Tartous As-Sweida Syria Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). LABOR MARKET IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 23 FIGURE 17 Trends in employment composition, by job type 100 6 5 75 4 Percent Million 50 3 2 25 1 0 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2019 2020 2021 2022 Family business employment % Employed outside home % Family business employment Employed outside home Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Labor Force Surveys and HNAP household survey data. FIGURE 18 Trends in sectoral distribution of employment 3.5 60 3.0 40 Number employed (million) 2.5 20 % change 2.0 0 1.5 1.0 –20 0.5 –40 0 –60 Agriculture Industry Construction Services 2010 2022 % change Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Labor Force Survey 2010 and HNAP household survey data (Summer 2022). 4 Human Capital Impact of the Conflict 25 26 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT In the decade leading up to the conflict onset, Syria made remarkable strides in improving educational outcomes. Between 2000 and 2010, the country witnessed a noteworthy surge in gross enrolment ratios (GERs) across all educational levels for both boys and girls (Box 5). Progress was nota- ble at the lower and upper secondary levels, with the former increasing from 66 percent in 2000 to 92 percent in 2010, while the latter rose from 23 to 35 percent in the same period. Compared with other countries at similar levels of development, by 2010, Syria was the best performer in terms of primary and lower secondary education, and among the best performers on tertiary education (Figure 19). Progress in enrolment translated into a marked increase in the educational attainment of the adult population, particularly of younger cohorts. Notably, data on school attainment reveal that the average Syrian citizen aged 25 or above had about 1.7 more years of schooling in 2010 than he or she did in 2000. This increase was particularly pronounced among the younger age cohorts, with individuals aged 25–29 and 30–34 gaining an average of 2.3 and 2.0 additional years of schooling, respectively (Figure 20). Once again, this trend positioned Syria in 2010 among the top-performing nations in terms of educational attainment, when compared with countries at sim- ilar income levels (Figure 21). BOX 5 Education system in Syria In 2010, Syria’s education system was structured as follows: Voluntary pre-primary education was available for children aged 4 to 5, followed by compulsory basic education consisting of primary school for chil- dren aged 6 to 11 (grades 1–6) and preparatory school or lower secondary for those aged 12–15 (grades 7–9). Upon successful completion of a nationally standardized written examination, a three-year upper secondary education program (grades 10–12) was undertaken by youths aged 15 to 18 years, with upper secondary consisting of two types of schools offering different curricular orientations—general-oriented tracks and vocational-oriented tracks (technical and vocational education and training, or TVET). Simi- larly, tertiary education followed a binary structure, including vocational-oriented institutes of one- or two-year duration and more academically oriented universities lasting four to five years. Structure of the Syrian national education system Level name Entry age Duration (years) ISCED level Pre-primary 3 3 0-Pre-primary education Primary: 1st stage of basic education 6 4 1-Primary education Preparatory: 2nd stage of basic 12 3 2-Lower secondary education education General secondary education 15 3 3-Upper secondary education Technical secondary education 15 3 Vocational training 15 3 Technical institutes programs 18 2 4-Post-secondary non-tertiary education Bachelor programs 18 4 5-First stage of tertiary education Master programs 22 2 Doctorate programs 24 2–4 6-Second stage of tertiary education Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS). HUMAN CAPITAL IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 27 FIGURE 19 Gross enrolment ratios LMICs, 2010 140 120 Syria 100 Gross enrolment rate 80 Syria 60 40 Syria 20 0 0 2000 4000 6000 GDP per capita (2015 $US constant) Primary Secondary Tertiary Source: World Bank staff calculations based on UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) and WDI. FIGURE 20 Average years of total schooling, population ages 25+, Syria, 2000–2010 7.3 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.2 6.3 6.1 6.1 6.2 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.0 5.1 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.2 Years 3.0 2.7 2.7 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 25+ Age group 2000 2005 2010 Source: Barro and Lee, 2013. 28 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT FIGURE 21 Average years of total schooling, population ages 25+, LMIC, 2010 11 ARM MDA TON 10 ALB LKA Average years of schooling 25+ population MNG JOR 9 GUY PHL IRN 8 BOL SLV THA ECU IDN 7 CHN PRY SYR EGY TUN CMR IRQ 6 NIC LSO COG IND HND 5 PAK CIV MAR GTM 4 PNG SWZ SDN 3 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 GDP per capita (2015 $US constant) Source: Barro and Lee, 2013 and WDI. The impact of the conflict in Syria on educational outcomes has been far reaching, as evidenced by the dramatic increase in the population of out-of-school children. Accord- ing to data from the Institute for Statistics (UIS) of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), about 1.6 million individuals between the ages of 6 and 17 were not attending school in the 2013 school year. This amounted to 28 percent of primary school-age children, 38 percent of lower secondary-aged adolescents, and a staggering 66 percent of upper secondary-aged youth out of school. These figures represented a significant rise from their respec- tive values in 2010, which were only 1, 12, and 59 percent, respectively. In more recent years, data from HNAP program indicate a progressive reduction in the share of school-age children across all age groups, broadly returning to pre-conflict levels. While this could be an encouraging sign, a decade was lost and no information is available to analyze trends in net enrolment nor to assess the current quality of education and learning outcomes.14 14 Evidence from other conflict-affected countries indicates that the most long-lasting impact of conflict on the educa- tion system is on quality rather than access. The impact of conflict on education quality materializes from the disper- sion of qualified teachers, the lack of learning materials, and, often time, the reduction in the length of school days to accommodate multiple shifts per day. In many conflict and post-conflict settings, the legacy of dropout and rep- etition, disrupted attendance, and overage students greatly outlasts the frequent rapid recovery of enrollment rates (World Bank, 2005). HUMAN CAPITAL IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 29 The conflict in Syria has reinforced pre-existing inequalities in educational outcomes between governorates, with areas outside of government control showing the highest incidence of out-of-school children. Data from the Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted by UNICEF in 2006 indicate that governorates of the northeastern part of the coun- try had significantly lower attendance rates for both primary and secondary education, as well as significantly lower levels of attainment among the population aged 15 and above (Figure 22 and Figure 23). In 2022, Northeastern governorates show the highest incidence of out-of-school chil- dren, reflecting both their relative disadvantage prior to the conflict, as well as the heightened and still ongoing incidence of violence in these areas. The share of out-of-school children is particularly high in Ar-Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zor, including among children of primary school age, 40 percent of which were out of school as of 2022 (Figure 24). Overall, areas and governorates that are outside Syrian Government control, including parts of Aleppo, Idleb, Al-Hasakeh and Quneitra, have the highest incidence of out-of-school children. FIGURE 22 Net attendance rates by governorate, 2006 99.1 98.8 97.6 98.3 98.4 97.9 99 97.9 96.7 97 95.1 96.2 94.2 90.7 89.9 83.3 77.2 72.6 65.7 61.3 60.5 60 59.4 56.2 55 54.2 52.5 Percent 48.4 44.4 39.9 Al-Hasakeh As-Sweida Lattakia Hama Quneitra Dar'a Ar-Raqqa Syria Tartous Damascus Homs Rural Damascus Idleb Aleppo Deir-ez-Zor Primary Secondary Source: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2005/06. 30 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT FIGURE 23 Educational attainment, % of population 15+ by governorate, 2006 100 6 12 12 10 10 10 13 13 15 17 16 30 28 25 75 37 32 35 39 44 51 48 47 51 52 55 Percent 50 42 46 50 42 38 49 37 35 25 32 31 27 29 24 22 23 20 18 15 15 13 12 7 8 8 8 6 7 6 6 6 9 0 Al-Hasakeh Quneitra Lattakia As-Sweida Dar'a Hama Ar-Raqqa Syria Damascus Homs Rural Damascus Aleppo Idleb Deir-ez-Zor Tertiary Secondary Primary No education Source: Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2005/06. FIGURE 24 Out-of-school children by age group and governorate, 2022 89 76 70 68 67 65 65 58 Percent 46 45 43 42 41 39 39 38 37 37 35 32 31 27 27 26 24 23 21 20 20 20 19 16 16 15 13 11 12 10 9 9 8 7 6 6 5 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 Al-Hasakeh Ar-Raqqa Quneitra Hama Dar'a As-Sweida Lattakia Rural Damascus Homs Tartous Damascus Aleppo Idleb Deir-ez-Zor Ages 6–11 Ages 12–14 Ages 15–17 Ages 18–24 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP Demographic and WASH survey (Summer 2022). Conflict-induced displacement has further negatively impacted educational outcomes. Displacement significantly impacts children’s access to education, often leading to interruptions in schooling that can span extended periods of time, possibly leading to permanent dropouts. Data from the 2022 HNAP evidence that children currently displaced, or who have recently returned to HUMAN CAPITAL IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT 31 their community of origin after a period of internal or international displacement, are at higher risk of being out of school (Figure 25). Particularly concerning are the statistics for adolescents in higher secondary school age (age 15–17), possibly reflecting dropouts at earlier ages during the height- ened phases of conflict, as well as harsher economic conditions of their households.15 Among this age group, 39 percent of IDP youths and 29 percent of returnee youths are out of school, compared with 21 percent among youths from resident (“host”) households. Households’ economic circumstances, the availability of school facilities, and differ- ences between territories controlled by different parties to the conflict are among the main determinants of children being out of school. Multivariate regression analysis was con- ducted to better understand factors affecting the probability of being out of school in 2022.16 As shown in Figure 26, factors associated to the welfare of the household, such as whether children are working, education of the household head, and whether the household reports having sufficient income to satisfy needs are important correlates of the probability of children being out of school.17 Residing in areas outside of Syrian Government control is associated with a higher likelihood of children being out of school, even after controlling for individual and household characteristics (including displacement status), accessibility of schools in the community of residence, and the cur- rent level of conflict, as well as governorate of residence. FIGURE 25 Out-of-school children by age and displacement status 56 46 47 39 Percent 29 21 13 9 9 9 4 6 6–11 12–14 15–17 18–24 Host Returnee (2022) IDP Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP Demographic and WASH survey (Summer 2022). Note: Returnees refer to individuals in formerly internally or internationally displaced households, who have returned to their community of ori- gin in the 6 months preceding the survey. 15 See the next section for a welfare profile of the displaced population. 16 See Table A1 for a full detail of regression analysis results. 17 Ceteris paribus, primary school-age children who need to work to support the livelihood of their households are 33 percentage points more likely to be out of school compared with a non-working peer, a probability that increases to 66 and 48 percentage points for lower and upper secondary school-aged children, respectively. 32 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT FIGURE 26 Probability of being out of school by children age groups, multivariate analysis, 2022 Male Age Disability Working Male HH head HH head education(None) Primary Secondary Tertiary HH type (host) Returnee (2022) IDP Income su ces School access log(1+deaths/100k) Area of control(GoS) Opposition/NSAG SDF Turkish AF Governorate (Damascus) Aleppo Rural Damascus Homs Hama Lattakia Idleb Al-Hasakeh Deir-ez-Zor Tartous Ar-Raqqa Dar’a As-Sweida Quneitra –0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 Primary Lower secondary Upper secondary Source: World Bank staff calculations based on HNAP Demographic and WASH survey (Summer 2022). 5 Welfare of Syrian Households 33 34 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT Before the conflict started, Syria was a fast-growing, lower middle-income country (LMIC), and extreme poverty was virtually nonexistent . The Syrian economy had expanded since the turn of the century, albeit starting from a low base. The transition of power, which occurred when Bashar al-Assad took over the reins of government upon his father’s death in July 2000, accel- erated the process of economic liberalization initiated since the late 1980s. From 2000 to 2010, Syr- ia’s real gross domestic product (GDP) rose at an average annual rate of 4.3 percent, mostly driven by non-oil sectors, and inflation averaged at a reasonable annual 4.9 percent (World Bank, 2017). Despite several international crises,18 the value of Syrian trade (imports and exports) reached 76.5 percent of GDP just before the global financial crisis, about 6 percentage points above the aver- age for the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).19 Before the conflict, extreme poverty in Syria—as measured by the US$2.15 daily per capita international poverty line (2017 PPP)—was virtually non- existent. In 2009, when the Central Bureau of Statistics conducted the last Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 16.25 percent of Syria’s population was living below US$3.65 per capita per day, the international poverty line for LMICs in 2017 PPP. Despite economic growth, poverty reduction remained elusive during the decade prior to the conflict and regional welfare differences widened. The decade leading to the erup- tion of conflict was lost in the progress toward poverty reduction. The poorest segments of the population benefited the least from the economic growth that characterized the period, with pov- erty increasing between 2003 and 2006, and then remaining substantially stable between 2006 and 2009 (Table 3). The severe drought that affected Syria between 2007 and 2009 accentuated the decline of the agrarian sector, already weakened by the dismantling of former socialist structures and the reform of agrarian work relations, and possibly contributed to widening welfare differences across governorates. 20 The northeastern governorates of Ar-Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh, which together accounted for 80 percent of the country’s total irrigated wheat acreage, were the most affected and, together with Idleb, ranked among the poorest in 2009 (Figure 27). TABLE 3 Poverty at international poverty lines, pre-conflict International poverty line (2017 PPP) 2003–04 2006–07 2009–10 US$2.15 0.93 2.83 2.44 US$3.65 10.89 16.36 16.02 Source: World Bank staff estimates. 18 These include Syria’s international isolation after the Iraq war, Syria’s expulsion from Lebanon and Israeli wars against Syrian allies Hezbollah and Hamas. 19 MENA average excludes oil-exporting high-income countries in the region. 20 Promulgated on December 29, 2004, Law 56 allowed landowners to terminate, after three years, all tenancy contract and to replace them with temporary contracts. This law, applied in December 2007, resulted in the expulsion of hun- dreds of tenants and workers (Ababsa, 2015). WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS 35 FIGURE 27 Poverty by governorate at US$3.65 poverty line in 2009 AL-HASAKAH ALEPPO AL-RAQQAH IDLEB LATTAKIA HAMA DEIR EZ ZOR TARTUS HOMS POVERTY RATE (%) > 30 DAMASCUS 25–30 RURAL DAMASCUS 20–25 QUNEITRA 15–20 10–15 DAR'A AS SWEIDA < 10 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on CBS. More than a decade of conflict has led to a dramatic deterioration in the welfare of Syrian households, as captured by the incidence of extreme poverty. According to estimates based on the HNAP 2022 household survey, 27 percent of Syrians—about 5.7 million individuals—live in extreme poverty, i.e., consume below the LIC international poverty line set at US$2.15 (2017 PPP) per capita per day. While this measure of monetary poverty is not strictly comparable to pre-con- flict monetary poverty estimates due to differences in questionnaire design, it is worth noting that extreme monetary poverty was virtually nonexistent in Syria before the conflict whereas, as of the summer of 2022, it affects more than one in four of its inhabitants. 21 When considering the US$3.65 (2017 PPP) international poverty line of LMICs, poverty affects 69 percent of the population, or about 14.5 million Syrians. 22 Compared with other countries at similar per capita GDP levels, poverty in Syria is aligned with that of best-performing LICs and the worst-performing LMICs (Figure 28). 21 See Redaelli et al. (2023) for a description of the methodology for poverty measurement using HNAP 2022 data. 22 Prior to conflict, Syria was classified as a LMIC and the (lower) national poverty line was aligned with LMIC interna- tional poverty set at US$3.65 (2017 PPP) per capita per day. Syria was reclassified as a LIC in 2018. 36 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT FIGURE 28 Poverty incidence among LICs and LMICs, circa 2022 $2.15,2017 PPP 100 90 MDG 80 MOZ 70 COD SSD BDI MWI Poverty rate (%) 60 CAF NER RWA 50 TZA 40 COG BFA KEN AGO SWZ LSO 30 TCD NGA HTI SLE LBR ETH CMR TLS SLBGHA 20 GNB SYR TGO BEN DJI GMB COM MLI SDN STP FSM GIN IND CIV HND WSM MNG 10 NPL SEN BGD MRT TJK PAK LAO BOL TUN NIC CPV LKA SLV KGZMMR KIR PHL IDN EGY IRN 0 BTN MAR DZA 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 GDP per capita, 2020 (constant 2015 US$) $3.65,2017 PPP 100 MDG 90 MWI MOZ COD BDI CAF SSD 80 NER RWA SYR TZA 70 TCD SLE KEN TLS BFAETH NGA Poverty rate (%) 60 LBR SLB TGO HTI COG SWZ GNB LSO BEN AGO 50 MLI SDN GHA GMB GIN CMR IND STP DJI BGD 40 NPL COM PAK CIV FSM SEN LAO 30 TJK MRT HND 20 MMR KIR CPV IDN KGZ PHL EGY NIC 10 MAR WSM LKA SLV MNG BOL DZA IRN 0 BTN TUN 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 GDP per capita, 2020 (constant 2015 US$) Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022 and WDI. Note: Yellow dots correspond to LICs while blue dots to LMICs. WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS 37 Despite conflict intensity subsiding in more recent years, the incidence of monetary pov- erty has dramatically increased post-2019, reflecting the impact of economic shocks. The analysis of monetary poverty trends since the start of the conflict is limited by the lack of suitable household surveys prior to the 2022 and by the lack of comparability between poverty estimates based on the 2009 HIES and the 2022 HNAP survey. Still, while imperfect, trends analysis based on the interpolation of distribution neutral growth estimates can provide some important insights. 23 In particular, estimates indicate that the pace of poverty increase post-2019 might have been as severe as the one observed during the initial years of the conflict, when incidence of deaths, dis- placement and destruction was at its peak (Figure 29). This finding underscores the likely severe impact on household welfare brought about by the compounding impact of international shocks that affected the Syrian economy starting from the financial crisis in Lebanon in 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. Extreme poverty in Syria has a strong spatial connotation, with more than 50 percent of the extreme poor living in just three governorates. Poverty varies significantly across governor- ates (Figure 30). Against a national average of 27 percent, extreme poverty is dramatically higher in Deir-ez-Zor (72 percent), Hama and Ar-Raqqa (61 percent), Al-Hasakeh (49 percent), Dar’a (48 percent), Quneitra (43 percent) and Aleppo (34 percent). In all remaining governorates, extreme poverty inci- FIGURE 29 Poverty trends 2009–2022 US$2.15,2017 PPP 80 70 60 Poverty rate (%) 50 40 30 20 10 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Nowcasting, base 2009 Backcasting, base 2022 Interpolation 2009-2022 US$3.65,2017 PPP (continued on next page) 80 23 Poverty 70 trends over the period 2009–2022 are reconstructed by interpolating poverty estimates obtained by back- casting poverty estimates based on the HNAP 2022 survey and those obtained by nowcasting 2009 poverty esti- 60 with both projections based on the growth rate of per capita GDP in current prices, deflated by CPI and a mates, passthrough of 0.7 (see (Redaelli, Infanzon Guadarrama, & Moreno Herrera, 2024)). overty rate (%) 50 40 30 50 Poverty rate ( 40 38 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT 30 20 10 FIGURE 0 29 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Poverty trends 2009–2022 (continued) Nowcasting, base 2009 Backcasting, base 2022 Interpolation 2009-2022 US$3.65,2017 PPP 80 70 60 Poverty rate (%) 50 40 30 20 10 0 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Nowcasting, base 2009 Backcasting, base 2022 Interpolation 2009-2022 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on CBS and HNAP 2022. dence is well below the national average. Substantial spatial inequalities also emerge when looking at the incidence of poverty at the LMIC poverty line. At this higher welfare threshold, however, poverty incidence is above 90 percent in seven out of the 14 governorates of Syria, and below 50 percent only in Damascus (44 percent) and As-Sweida (23 percent). Looking at the geographical distribution of the extreme poor, Aleppo, Hama and Deir-ez-Zor are home to 51 percent of the population living below the US$2.15 poverty line, against only 30 percent of the country’s population (Figure 31). FIGURE 30 Incidence of poverty in 2022, by governorate US$2.15 extreme poverty line (2017 PPP) US$3.65 LMIC poverty line (2017 PPP) AL-HASAKAH AL HASAKAH ALEPPO ALEPPO AR RAQQA AR RAQQA IDLEB IDLEB LATTAKIA LATTAKIA HAMA DEIR EZ ZOR HAMA DEIR EZ ZOR TARTUS TARTUS HOMS POVERTY RATE (%) HOMS POVERTY RATE (%) > 88 > 88 75–88 75–88 DAMASCUS 62–75 DAMASCUS 62–75 RURAL DAMASCUS 50–62 RURAL DAMASCUS 50–62 38–50 38–50 QUNEITRA 25–38 QUNEITRA 25–38 DAR'A AS SWEIDA DAR'A AS SWEIDA 12–25 12–25 <12 <12 Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022. WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS 39 FIGURE 31 Distribution of poor population in 2022, by governorate 100 Damascus As-Sweida Tartous Quneitra Lattakia 75 Idleb Homs Rural Damascus Percent 50 Al-Hasakeh Ar-Raqqa Dar'a Deir-ez-Zor 25 Hama Aleppo 0 $2.15 Poverty line $3.65 Poverty line Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022. Female-headed and displaced households are at higher risk of poverty, while receiving international remittances sizably reduces the risk of poverty. Figure 32 shows the results of a multivariate analysis of poverty correlates at the US$2.15 and US$3.65 (2017 PPP) per capita per day international poverty lines. In addition to the governorate of residence, controls in the regres- sion include the gender of the household head, his/her age and level of education, the size and the income/livelihood potential of the household (number of working-age males, number of house- hold members employed, remittances and assistance receipt), as well as a dichotomous indicator for current IDPs, or recent past displacement. The strong spatial connotation of poverty in Syria is confirmed by regression results, even when controlling for household level characteristics. Among the latter, female-headed and displaced households face a significantly higher risk of poverty, while receiving remittances from abroad is the single most important factor contributing to reducing the risk of poverty, both when considering extreme poverty (a 12-percentage-point reduction) and poverty at the LMIC international poverty line (an 8-percentage-point reduction). Compared with assistance, the contribution of international remittances to reducing the risk of extreme poverty is almost six times as large, while twice as large when considering the risk of falling below the LMIC 40 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT FIGURE 32 Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression Female household head Age HH head education (none) Primary Secondary Graduate Household size HH members employed No of working-age males Displaced Remittances Assistance Governorate (Damascus) Aleppo Rural Damascus Homs Hama Lattakia Idleb Al-Hasakeh Deir-ez-Zor Tartous Ar-Raqqa Dar’a As-Sweida Quneitra –0,2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 2.15 PL 3.65 PL Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022. international poverty line. As discussed in Section 3, Syrian households mobilized extra labor to make ends meet in response to the challenges brought about by the conflict and economic shocks. Regression results provide further evidence of these labor market challenges. In fact, having more household members working—once controlling for household size and the number of working- age male members—connotes a higher likelihood of poverty, as poorer households mobilize extra labor among marginal workers (women and children). More than a decade of conflict has had a serious impact on the welfare of Syrian house- holds well beyond purely monetary poverty. Following the literature on multidimensional poverty measurement, a Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) was developed to corrobo- rate the profile emerging from the monetary poverty analysis and explore the welfare of Syrian WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS 41 households beyond a purely monetary metric. The index combines six household level indicators equally split to capture vulnerabilities along the dimension of livelihoods and living conditions (see Box 6). The results of this analysis indicate the pervasiveness of deprivation in the Syrian pop- ulation (Table 4). In 2022, more than nine in ten Syrians were multidimensionally vulnerable (H) in more than half of the weighted sum of indicators (A). The overall MVI, calculated as the product of the percentage of the vulnerable population, and the average share of deprivations experienced by the vulnerable population is 0.53, up from 0.50 in the previous year. BOX 6 Multidimensional Vulnerability Index for Syria The Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI) developed for Syria, while differing in the choice of indicators, builds on the Alkire-Foster methodology used to compute the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The MVI is built on data from the 2022 and 2021 summer rounds of the HNAP Demographic and WASH survey. The MVI combines six indicators measured at the household level. Three indicators capture depriva- tions along the livelihood dimension and can be broadly interpreted as proxying for the risk of monetary deprivation. The remaining three indicators capture deprivations along the living conditions dimension which, as with livelihoods, has been severely affected by conflict and might not be fully encompassed when considering a monetary welfare metric. Each indicator is given an equal weight in the composi- tion of the index. The Table below provides the list of the indicators considered in the MVI. Dimensions, indicators and weights in the MVI Dimension Indicator Definition Weight Livelihoods Unemployment Any member aged 15 or older is unemployed 1/6 Precarious Household reports income insufficient to satisfy needs AND engages 1/6 income in at least one extreme negative coping strategy (e.g., taking up socially degrading jobs, high-risk/exploitative jobs, child labor, child marriage, reduction of expenditure on essential items) Remittances Household does not receive international remittances 1/6 Living Electricity access Household has no access to electricity (in any form) 1/6 conditions Water access Household has no regular access to any source of water 1/6 Housing access Household lives in unfinished house/apt, OR moderately/severely 1/6 damaged house/apt OR tent, OR makeshift shelter, OR container The MVI is calculated as a product of the percentage of the population that is multidimensionally vulnerable (the incidence, H) and the average share of deprivations that vulnerable people experience (the intensity, A). A household and all its members are identified as multidimensionally vulnerable if they are deprived in more than one-third of the weighted dimensions (vulnerability cut-off or k = 33 percent). 42 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT TABLE 4 Incidence (H), intensity (A) and Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI), 2021 and 2022 2021 2022 Confidence interval Confidence interval Value (95%) Value (95%) MVI 0.503 [0.494–0.511] 0.527 [0.518–0.536] Incidence (H, %) 91.5% [0.902–0.929] 93.7% [0.927–0.947] Intensity (A, %) 54.9% [0.543–0.555] 56.2% [0.554–0.571] Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022. Analysis of multidimensional vulnerability underscores the severity of welfare deprivation associated to the lack of income opportunities and growing vulnerability in terms of water access. Figure 33 shows the indicators in which the vulnerable population faces the highest level of deprivation (censored headcount ratios).24 Results indicate that an overwhelmingly high share of the population is multidimensionally vulnerable and deprived along the indicators in the livelihood dimen- sion, particularly regarding unemployment. Compared with 2021, the increase in the share of the multi- dimensionally vulnerable population with precarious incomes and lacking access to water is noteworthy, as also evidenced by the analysis of the relative contribution of each indicator to the MVI (Figure 34). FIGURE 33 Population multidimensionally poor and deprived in each of the indicators (censored headcount), 2021 and 2022 84.6 87.4 82.9 73.0 66.3 57.3 52.4 Percent 46.1 40.1 42.5 18.4 15.7 Unemployment Precarious No No electricity No water No housing income remittances access access access Livelihood Living conditions 2021 2022 Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022. 24 The censored headcount ratios measure the percentage of the population who is both multidimensionally vulnera- ble and also deprived in each of the indicators. WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS 43 FIGURE 34 Percentage contribution of indicators to the MVI, 2021 and 2022 100 6 5 14 16 75 12 13 20 25 Percent 50 22 17 25 26 26 0 2021 2022 Unemployment Precarious income No remittances No electricity access No water access No housing access Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022. IDPs living in camps and recently returned displaced Syrians have higher levels of multidimensional vulnerability. In 2022, 30 percent of the Syrian population was either inter- nally displaced or had recently returned to their places of origin after being displaced. Contrary to expectations, the displaced population, when considered as a whole, has a similar incidence and intensity of multidimensional vulnerability compared with hosts. This finding underscores once again the pervasiveness of vulnerability within the Syrian population. Nonetheless, impor- tant differences emerge between different displacement types. As shown in Table 5, IDPs liv- ing in camps emerge as the most vulnerable segment of the Syrian population, both in terms of the incidence of multidimensional vulnerability and the intensity of overlapping deprivations. Syrians who have recently returned, either from international or internal displacement, have heightened intensity of overlapping deprivations compared with the resident (host) population, reflecting the challenges of reintegration, given the country’s current challenging economic circumstances. Both IDPs living in camps and returnees have heightened levels of vulnerabil- ity along the living conditions dimension, with returnees facing particular challenges in term of access to water and electricity. 44 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT TABLE 5 Incidence (H), intensity (A) and Multidimensional Vulnerability Index (MVI), by displacement status Household type Displaced IDP residential Host population Returnee areas IDP camps MVI 53% 52% 56% 50% 63% Incidence (H, %) 94% 93% 91% 93% 97% Intensity (A, %) 57% 56% 61% 54% 65% Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022. The analysis of multidimensional vulnerability further underscores the existence of sub- stantial inequalities across Syria’s governorates. In 2022, MVI is the highest in Al-Hasakeh (0.76) but sizably above the national average in Dar'a (0.68), As-Sweida (0.63), Rural Damascus (0.62), Tar- tous (0.60) and Ar-Raqqa (0.57). Compared with the previous year, governorates that saw the largest increase in MVI are Damascus, Ar-Raqqa and Tartous (Figure 35). As shown in Figure 36, the inci- dence of multidimensional vulnerability is pervasively high across all governorates and, with the sole exception of Deir-ez-Zor, it increased between 2021 and 2022. Compared with 2021, the higher inci- dence of multidimensional vulnerability in 2022 was accompanied by a deterioration in the inten- sity of vulnerability, particularly in the governorates of Ar-Raqqa and Tartous. As shown in Figure 37, deprivations across the livelihood dimensions contribute the most to multidimensional vulnerabil- ity in Hama and Homs (more than 80 percent), while deprivations along the living conditions dimen- sions are more determinant in Al-Hasakeh and Dar'a. FIGURE 35 MVI by governorate, 2021 and 2022 2021 2022 AL-HASAKAH AL-HASAKAH ALEPPO ALEPPO AR RAQQA AR RAQQA IDLEB IDLEB LATTAKIA LATTAKIA HAMA DEIR EZ ZOR HAMA DEIR EZ ZOR TARTUS TARTUS HOMS MVI HOMS MVI > 0.71 > 0.71 0.66–0.71 0.66–0.71 DAMASCUS 0.61–0.66 DAMASCUS 0.61–0.66 RURAL DAMASCUS 0.56–0.61 RURAL DAMASCUS 0.56–0.61 0.51–0.56 0.51–0.56 QUNEITRA 0.46–0.51 QUNEITRA 0.46–0.51 DAR'A AS SWEIDA 0.41–0.46 DAR'A AS SWEIDA 0.41–0.46 <0.41 <0.41 Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022. WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS 45 FIGURE 36 Incidence (H) and intensity (A) of Multidimensional Vulnerability Poverty, by governorate, 2021 and 2022 2021 80 75 70 Al-Hasakeh 65 Rural Damascus Intensity (A, %) Dar'a 60 Quneitra Deir-ez-Zor 55 Idleb As-Sweida Damascus Ar-Raqqa Tartous 50 Aleppo Lattakia Homs 45 Hama 40 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Incidence (H, %) 2022 80 75 Al-Hasakeh 70 Dar'a 65 As-Sweida Intensity (A, %) Rural Damascus Deir-ez-Zor 60 Ar-Raqqa Tartous 55 Lattakia Idleb Quneitra 50 Damascus Aleppo Homs 45 Hama 40 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 Incidence (H, %) Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2021 and 2022. 46 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT FIGURE 37 Percentage contribution of each indicator, by governorate, 2022 Rural 24 19 15 14 24 4 Damascus Tartous 21 28 23 4 24 Quneitra 24 19 25 30 Lattakia 24 28 23 6 19 Idleb 26 19 27 11 10 8 Homs 31 29 19 9 8 Hama 35 31 23 6 6 Deir-ez-Zor 25 21 14 19 15 6 Dar'a 19 21 14 18 22 6 Damascus 28 19 12 19 19 As-Sweida 21 22 23 5 26 Ar-Raqqa 23 23 17 13 13 11 Aleppo 32 19 26 11 6 7 Al-Hasakah 19 21 15 21 21 4 0 25 50 75 100 Percent Unemployment Precarious income No remittances No electricity access No water access No housing access Source: World Bank staff estimates based on HNAP 2022. 6 Concluding Remarks 47 48 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT The availability of data on population welfare is of paramount importance, particularly in highly volatile and conflict-affected countries. While not exhaustive, the analysis presented in this report, which is largely based on survey data collected by humanitarian actors, provides important insights into the impact of more than a decade of conflict on the welfare of Syrian households and the chal- lenges moving forward. Conflict can be characterized as “development in reverse”, and Syria is no exception. In the summer of 2022, extreme poverty affected more than one in four Syrians, while it had been virtually nonexistent in 2009. The incidence of extreme poverty is even higher in many of the areas that remain outside of the Syrian Government’s control and continue to be affected by conflict. In February 2023, these same areas also bore the brunt of the impact of the devastating Türkiye-Syria earthquakes, further exacerbating the precarious welfare conditions of their inhabitants. Despite conflict intensity subsiding in recent years, the welfare of Syrian households remains on a steep declining path, reflecting the vulnerability of the country’s economy to international shocks and the inability of Syrian people to make ends meet due to the lack of good quality jobs. Not surprisingly, the progressive deterioration of economic conditions within Syria has gone hand in hand with an increase in the share of households “sending” prime-age male labor abroad as a cop- ing strategy. International remittances are proving to be a critical lifeline to Syrian households, significantly contributing to reducing the risk of poverty. Despite this, however, the proliferation of global and regional crises limits the sustainability of coping strategies based on international mobility moving forward, even more so when neighboring countries face heightened pressures for Syrian refugees to return to their country of origin. As complex emergencies and conflicts dramatically increase in the Middle East and worldwide, the analysis presented in this report shows that the crisis in Syria is far from over and that, lacking driv- ers of poverty reduction, the welfare challenges of Syrian households are likely to persist, if not worsen, in the face of shocks. In this context, having reliable data to monitor the evolution of wel- fare outcomes and to inform actions along the humanitarian-development nexus remains a prior- ity. In the absence of official statistics, continuing the collaboration on the design and analysis of data collected by humanitarian agencies could significantly contribute to filling knowledge gaps moving forward. Bibliography Ababsa, M. 2015. The End of a World. Drought and Agrarian Transformation in Northeast Syria. In R. Hinnebusch, & T. Zintl (Eds.), Syria from reform to revolt. Political economy and international relations (Vol. 1). New York: Syracuse University Press. Barro, R. 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Journal of Conflict Resolution 59(1): 51–73. Redaelli, S., Infanzon Guadarrama, M., & Moreno Herrera, L. 2024. Assessing the extent of monetary poverty in Syria after a decade of conflict. Policy Research working paper. No. 10736; Washington, D.C. World Bank Group. Urdal, H., & Primus, C. 2013. War and Gender Inequalities in Health: The Impact of Armed Conflict on Fertility and Maternal Mortality, International Interactions. Taylor & Francis Journals 39(4): 489–510. Vargas-Silva, C. 2017. Remittances sent to and from the forcibly displaced. Journal of Development Stud- ies 1835–1848. World Bank. 2005. Reshaping the Future. Education and Postconflict Reconstruction. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2017. The toll of war: the economic and social consequences of the conflict in Syria. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2023. Syria Economic Monitor: Syria’s Economy in Ruins after a Decade-long War. Washington, DC: World Bank. 49 Annex 1: The Humanitarian Needs Assessment Program The scale of Syria’s humanitarian crisis and the necessity to inform operations on the ground have prompted UN agencies to develop an articulated system of welfare monitoring: the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP). The HNAP is joint UN program established in April 2018 with the objective of tracking displacement and return movements, conduct multi-sectoral assessments, and monitor humanitarian needs inside the country. 25 In addition to collecting data at the commu- nity level through key informant interviews, the HNAP also implemented sample-based household surveys whose frame relies on community level population data (Table A1). 26 The HNAP Demographic and WASH survey is a large-scale survey aimed at providing national and subnational-level estimates of demographic and basic socio-economic conditions of the popula- tion living inside Syria (resident, IDPs and returnees). The survey is primarily used to inform the pro- gramming of assistance of various UN agencies and humanitarian actors. The questionnaires of this survey have evolved over time. 27 In 2021, in order to assess the monetary deprivation of Syr- ian households, a module on household income and household expenditures was included in the survey. In the summer of 2022 survey round, the module on income and expenditure was further revised in collaboration with the World Bank team in order to improve the monetary aggregates for welfare measurement. 28 25 The HNAP network presently consists of more than 30,000 community focal points and 475 full time staff on the ground in Syria. HNAP is implemented through local Syrian NGOs, with technical support from UN agencies. Infor- mation is collected across all regions inside Syria through face-to-face consultations and direct field observations. 26 Stratified random sampling is used to draw a 95% confidence/10% margin of error sample at the subdistrict level and the number of household interviews per community (p-coded location) within a subdistrict was obtained by ran- domly sampling locations proportionate to population size, with replacement. 27 The main survey modules include questions on demographic characteristics of current household members and of members who have left the household, individual level basic information on labor market engagement (adult popu- lation) and school attendance (children below age 18); household level information on shelter, WASH, access to assis- tance, sources of income, coping strategies and priority needs. 28 In particular, changes aimed at collecting information on in-kind assistance and own-production (particularly for food); using an annual recall period for items consumed infrequently, and expanding (to the extent possible) the list of non-food items. See Redaelli, Infanzon-Guadarrama (2023). 50 Annex 1: The Humanitarian Needs Assessment Program 51 TABLE A1 HNAP sample-based household surveys Representative 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Demographic and Syria population / May May January, January, January, WASH survey (about subdistrict level May June June 25,000 obs.) IDP demographic IDP population/ August October October October October and Intentions subdistrict level (about 18,000 obs.) Returnee Returnee population ­— January, ­— January, ­— demographic and previous 12 months** / September December socio-economic district level survey (about 5,000– 8,000 obs.) Annex 2: Regression Results TABLE A2 OLS regressions results – probability of being out of school Model 1: Only 2022 Model 2: 2018–2022 Variables | Age group 6–11 12–14 15–17 6–11 12–14 15–17 Individual is male 0.014*** –0.015*** –0.053*** 0.006*** –0.029*** –0.054*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Individual’s age in years –0.008*** 0.017*** –0.002*** –0.018*** 0.037*** 0.014*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Individual has a disability 0.048*** 0.025*** 0.032*** 0.154*** 0.166*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) Individual is working 0.334*** 0.665*** 0.487*** 0.559*** 0.602*** 0.632*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) Household head is male 0.019*** 0.018*** –0.002* –0.033*** 0.008*** –0.005*** (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Household head’s education (base: no education) Primary education –0.004*** –0.075*** –0.081*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Secondary education –0.053*** –0.129*** –0.134*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Tertiary education –0.052*** –0.130*** –0.149*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Household type (base: host) Returnee –0.002 0.005*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.086*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) IDP 0.035*** 0.004*** 0.026*** 0.085*** 0.050*** 0.064*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Household income is sufficient –0.006*** –0.021*** –0.017*** (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) School access –0.054*** –0.038*** –0.134*** (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Log(1+Deaths/100 k in Subdistrict) 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.004*** 0.011*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Governorate (base: Damascus) Aleppo –0.022*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.068*** 0.092*** 0.245*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Rural Damascus –0.033*** 0.009*** 0.002* 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.067*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Homs –0.020*** 0.030*** 0.046*** –0.005*** –0.027*** 0.051*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Hama 0.006*** 0.053*** 0.170*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.077*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (continued on next page) 52 Annex 2: Regression Results 53 TABLE A2 OLS regressions results – probability of being out of school (continued) Model 1: Only 2022 Model 2: 2018–2022 Variables | Age group 6–11 12–14 15–17 6–11 12–14 15–17 Lattakia –0.049*** –0.016*** 0.024*** –0.030*** 0.009*** 0.045*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Idleb –0.030*** –0.004** –0.088*** 0.065*** 0.091*** 0.302*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Al-Hasakeh 0.003*** 0.036*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.105*** 0.231*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Deir-ez-Zor 0.029*** 0.093*** 0.210*** 0.093*** 0.168*** 0.277*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Tartous –0.050*** –0.009*** –0.013*** –0.018*** –0.017*** 0.054*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Ar-Raqqa 0.006*** 0.056*** 0.182*** 0.169*** 0.194*** 0.445*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) Dar’a –0.030*** 0.044*** 0.110*** –0.024*** 0.020*** 0.063*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) As-Sweida 0.009*** 0.045*** 0.024*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.096*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Quneitra –0.053*** 0.021*** 0.089*** 0.008*** 0.100*** 0.253*** (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) Area of control (base GoS) NSAG 0.048*** 0.106*** 0.270*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) SDF 0.058*** 0.076*** 0.219*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) TGF 0.001 0.096*** 0.260*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) Year (base 2022) 2021 0.053*** 0.119*** 0.062*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 2020 0.025*** 0.038*** 0.064*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 2019 0.044*** 0.168*** 0.152*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 2018 0.096*** 0.121*** 0.133*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) Constant 0.125*** –0.105*** 0.199*** 0.148*** –0.570*** –0.328*** (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) Observations 20,617 8,420 5,971 100,635 41,550 38,520 Weighted observation 3,279,160 1,447,762 928,971 15,331,246 6,600,660 6,063,964 R-squared 0.082 0.361 0.432 0.095 0.237 0.395 54 THE WELFARE OF SYRIAN HOUSEHOLDS AFTER A DECADE OF CONFLICT TABLE A3 Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression (1) (2) Variable $2.15 LIC $3.65 LMIC Female household head 0.064*** 0.062*** (0.009) (0.010) Household head age 0.000 –0.005*** (0.000) (0.000) Household head’s education (base: none) Primary 0.041*** 0.042*** (0.013) (0.014) Secondary 0.025** 0.051*** (0.012) (0.013) Graduate –0.004 –0.006 (0.013) (0.014) Household size 0.049*** 0.061*** (0.002) (0.002) No. of household members employed 0.008** 0.003 (0.004) (0.004) No. of working age males –0.029*** 0.020*** (0.004) (0.004) Household is displaced 0.037*** 0.059*** (0.005) (0.006) Received remittances over the past year –0.120*** –0.077*** (0.005) (0.006) Received assistance and/or free services over the past year –0.023*** –0.042*** (0.006) (0.007) Governorate (base: Damascus) Aleppo 0.265*** 0.213*** (0.010) (0.011) Rural Damascus 0.097*** 0.123*** (0.010) (0.011) Homs 0.118*** 0.329*** (0.012) (0.013) Hama 0.566*** 0.546*** (0.012) (0.013) Lattakia 0.042*** 0.354*** (0.013) (0.014) Idleb –0.029*** 0.027** (0.011) (0.011) Al-Hasakeh 0.444*** 0.524*** (0.013) (0.014) Deir-ez-Zor 0.629*** 0.454*** (0.014) (0.015) Tartous 0.046*** 0.560*** (0.014) (0.015) Ar-Raqqa 0.515*** 0.473*** (0.014) (0.015) (continued on next page) Annex 2: Regression Results 55 TABLE A3 Correlates of poverty, results of multivariate linear regression (continued) (1) (2) Variable $2.15 LIC $3.65 LMIC Dar’a 0.442*** 0.506*** (0.014) (0.015) As-Sweida –0.024 –0.184*** (0.021) (0.022) Quneitra 0.377*** 0.535*** (0.035) (0.037) Constant –0.150*** 0.333*** (0.022) (0.023) Observations 26,059 26,059 Weighted observation 19,630,924 19,630,924 R-squared 0.262 0.262 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433