79958 Nigeria: Bauchi SABER Country Report TEACHERS 2012 Policy Goals Status 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers In Bauchi, there are clear expectations for what teachers and students are supposed to do, but teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their duties. 2. Attracting the best into teaching While compensation and requirements may attract quality candidates, many may not choose the occupation to avoid working in poor working conditions in schools. 3. Preparing teachers with useful training and experience Minimum education requirements may provide some preparation, and required practical professional experience helps teachers hone their skills. 4. Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs There are no incentives to work in hard-to-staff schools or encourage teachers to study subjects with teacher shortages. As a result, there may be a lack of quality teachers in some areas and subjects. 5. Leading teachers with strong principals Principals are required to have both administrative and teaching experience, and policies require them to help teachers improve their work. 6. Monitoring teaching and learning Teacher performance is monitored, but student performance is not used to help teachers improve their practice or improve administrators support to them. 7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction Teachers may receive support as a result of performance evaluations, but professional development is not integrated into the teaching career. 8. Motivating teachers to perform There are some performance-related incentives in place and sanctions for low- performance, but mechanisms to hold teachers accountable could be strengthened. THE WORLD BANK NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 The Importance of Teacher Policies Overview of SABER-Teachers Research suggests that teacher quality is the main SABER-Teachers collects data on 10 core teacher policy school-based predictor of student achievement and that areas in order to offer a comprehensive overview of several consecutive years of outstanding teaching can teacher policies in each education system. These policy offset the learning deficits of disadvantaged students areas are listed in Box 1. It is important to highlight that (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Nye et al, 2004; Park and SABER-Teachers’ main focus is on the policies formally Hannum, 2001; Rivkin et al, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; adopted by education systems. While in some cases the Sanders, 1998; Sanders and Rivers 1996; and Vignoles et data collected also address how the teacher policy goals al, 2000). However, it is not yet clear exactly which are achieved in practice, the nature of our data teacher policies can raise teacher effectiveness collection approach (based on interviews with key (Goldhaber, 2002 and Rivkin et al, 2005). Thus, devising informants and official document review) do not allow effective policies to improve teaching quality remains a for a thorough assessment of policy implementation. challenge. Therefore, complementary research will be useful in most settings. There is increasing interest across the globe to attract, retain, develop and motivate great teachers. While the Box 1: Key Teacher Policy Areas World Bank has ample experience in supporting teacher policy reforms in developing countries, until recently Teacher Policy Dimensions there was no systematic effort to offer data and analysis • Requirements to enter and remain in that can provide policy guidance on teacher policies. teaching • Initial teacher preparation A new tool, Systems Approach for Better Education • Recruitment and employment Results (SABER)–Teachers, fills this gap by collecting, • Teachers’ workload and autonomy analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating • Professional development comprehensive information on teacher policies in • Compensation (salary and non-salary primary and secondary education across a range of benefits) different education systems. 1 In this report, we discuss • Retirement rules and benefits how SABER-Teachers has been applied in Anambra, • Monitoring and evaluation of teacher quality Nigeria. Our goal is to enable policymakers to learn • Teacher representation and voice about how other countries address the same policy • School leadership challenges related to teacher management and thus how to make well-informed policy choices that will lead to improved learning outcomes. 2 To analyze these data and offer informed policy guidance, SABER-Teachers analyzes progress on eight teacher policy goals. SABER-Teachers used three criteria to select these teacher policy goals. They are: (i) 1 In order to offer guidance to policy makers in client linked to performance through evidence provided by countries on how to raise education quality, the Education research and studies; (ii) a high priority for resource Unit at the World Bank’s Human Development Department allocation; and (iii) actionable. The 8 teacher policy has launched System Assessment and Benchmarking for goals are presented in Figure 1. Education Results (SABER), an initiative that seeks to collect information about different education systems’ policy domains, analyze it to identify common challenges and promising solutions, and make it widely available to inform countries’ decisions on where and how to invest in order to improve education quality. SABER - Teachers is one such policy domain. 2 The focus of the initiative is the design of teacher policies as opposed to their implementation on the ground. A number of complementary activities will be looking at implementation in a sample of countries as this will involve a different methodological approach and will require more financial and human resources. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 2 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 Findings in Nigeria Figure 1: Teacher Policy Goals SABER-Teachers collected policy data for Nigeria’s Anambra, Bauchi, and Ekiti states. Table 1 presents the extent to which each education system has progressed in the eight SABER-Teachers policy goals. Our analysis indicates that each teacher policy system has relative strengths and weaknesses. However, across the three systems, we observed some general patterns, which are the focus of this report. Table 1: Levels of Development of Teacher Policies in Nigeria Anambra Bauchi Ekiti 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers 2. Attracting the best into teaching 3. Preparing teachers with The eight teacher policy goals exclude other objectives useful training that countries might want to pursue to increase the and experience effectiveness of teachers. These were excluded because 4. Matching there is to date insufficient empirical basis on which to teachers' skills with students' make specific policy recommendations, either because needs evidence on policy interventions in that area remains 5. Leading unclear or because the top-performing education teachers with systems take very different approaches to reach these strong principals objectives. 3 For a more detailed report on the eight 6. Monitoring teaching and teacher policy goals and the evidence supporting this learning selection, please see Vegas et al (2010). 7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction 3 For example, SABER-Teachers collects information on 8. Motivating teacher organizations (as part of the policy area of “teacher teachers to representation and voice�) and will make it publicly available. perform Yet no clear trend has emerged regarding whether (and if so, Setting clear expectations for teachers: All education how) governments should engage with these organizations in systems in these states are Established in this policy policy formulation or consultation. To be sure, many studies goal, which means they have developed: (i) explicitly have looked at the impact of unionization on schools’ productivity (Argys and Reese, 1995; Eberts and Stone, 1986; defined standards for what students should know and and Hoxby 1996), student learning (Kingdon and Teal, 2008; be able to do, as well as curricula to guide teaching and Kleiner and Petree, 1988; Kurth, 1987; Register and Grimes, learning; (ii) officially stipulated tasks for teachers; and 1991; and Steelman et al, 2000), teachers’ wages (Ballou and (iii) delineated official time allocations that enable Podgursky, 2002; Baugh and Stone, 1982; Bee and Dolton, teachers to fulfill their duties. 1995; and Dolton and Robson, 1996), working conditions Attracting the best into teaching: With the exception of (Eberts, 1984; Murillo et al, 2002; and Zegarra and Ravina, 2003) and education policy (Goldschmidt and Stuart, 1986 Bauchi, the other states are Established in this policy and Woodbury, 1985). But even top-performing countries goal, which means they have: (i) entry requirements differ widely in how much they engage, to what extent they that allow screening of talented individuals; (ii) regulate, and how they organize teachers’ unions. Data attractive pay and benefits; (iii) appealing working collected by SABER-Teachers will offer guidance on how to conditions; and (iv) attractive career opportunities approach these issues in the future. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 3 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 within the teaching profession. In Bauchi, there is an Findings in Bauchi, Nigeria opportunity to strengthen its policies in this domain. Preparing teachers with useful training and 1. Setting clear expectations for teachers experience: In this policy goal, all systems are Established, which means they have developed: (i) minimum standards for pre-service training programs; Setting clear expectations for teachers is important for (ii) requirements for classroom experience for all several reasons. First, expectations for student and teachers; and (iii) induction or mentoring programs to teacher performance influence how potential entrants help smooth the transition from training into teaching. perceive the profession. The clearer these expectations, Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs: This the more likely an education system is to get the type of policy goal remains a challenge in all states. Anambra is teacher it seeks. Second, expectations guide teachers’ Emerging in this policy goal, while Bauchi and Ekiti are work. The more specific they are, the better teachers lagging behind. Top-performing education systems have can organize their time and resources to meet them. established incentives to attract teachers to work in Finally, expectations can help align the goals of different hard-to-staff schools and/or to teach certain subjects key aspects of the profession (e.g., pre-service training, such as math and science. professional development and teacher appraisals). The more institutionalized these expectations are, the more Leading teachers with strong principals: All education likely all of these aspects will be working towards a systems in these states are Established in this policy common purpose and thus the more likely it will be goal, which means they have developed: (i) achieved. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers requirements to become a principal and attract education systems can use to reach this goal: talented candidates; (ii) established incentives for • Are there clear expectations for what students principals to perform well; (iii) provide autonomy to should know and be able to do? principals to make decisions related to instruction or • Are there clear expectations for what teachers are personnel management for their schools. supposed to do? Monitoring teaching and learning: In this policy goal, all • Do teachers have enough time to fulfill their duties? states are Emerging, which indicates an opportunity to In Bauchi, there are clear expectations for what strengthen its policies in this domain. High-performing teachers and students are supposed to do, but education systems have established student learning teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their assessment systems and teacher performance appraisal duties. Expectations for what students should know mechanisms—factors that have been shown to enhance and be able to do are clear. Nigeria has a national student learning outcomes. curriculum, which sets the contents in detail, informing Supporting teachers to improve instruction: With the teachers of required subject content that should be exception of Ekiti, the other states are Established in taught to students at different grades. In addition, this policy goal, which means teachers are provided expectations for what teachers are supposed to do are with performance data to help them improve teaching explicitly laid out in legal regulations and teachers are practices, and these data are also used by principals to guided by performance goals. However, in Bauchi, develop professional development plans for teachers. In teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their Ekiti, there is an opportunity to strengthen its policies in duties. Similar to top-performing education systems, this domain. Bauchi’s school year consists of 800 hours or more at both the primary and the secondary level. However, Motivating teachers to perform: With the exception of teachers’ working time is defined as the number of Anambra, the other states are Established in this policy hours spent at school. While this definition is wider than goal, which means there are minimum mechanisms to the number of teaching hours, it is limited by not hold teachers accountable as well as rewards and recognizing that lesson planning and grading may take sanctions for high- and low-performing teachers, place outside of the number of hours spent at school. respectively. In Anambra, there is an opportunity to Primary and secondary school teachers working time is strengthen its policies in this domain. between 1000 to 1520 hours per year. In comparison, working time in most successful systems ranges between 1,520 and 1,650 hours in both levels, and in SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 4 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 the highest-performing, it is 1,650 hours or more. In school teacher. However, less than 50% of primary Bauchi, the number of hours that teachers are expected school teachers meet these requirements. to devote to teaching is 60% to 76% of their working Approximately 51% to 89% of applicants enter pre- time. Again, most successful education systems with service teacher training programs in Bauchi, indicating data make teaching hours 30 to 50% (primary) of that entry requirements are somewhat competitive. A working hours, suggesting that they build in time for concurrent training program (which allows for students other tasks that teachers need to carry out, such as to acquire subject matter knowledge and pedagogical administrative duties and grading assignments, among skills simultaneously) and an alternative model of others. teacher training (which includes alternative pathways into teacher training and makes it easier to recruit 2. Attracting the Best into Teaching students from other fields) exists for primary school teachers. In addition, pay and benefits are appealing for talented candidates, with highly competitive starting Getting talented people to go into teaching is essential salaries (80% or more of GDP per capita). Teachers in for several reasons (Guarino, Santibáñez & Daley Bauchi are generally paid on time, and pay changes 2006). First, more able individuals make better teachers considerably over a teacher’s career. Teachers receive (Boyd, et al. 2008). The better the quality of the monetary bonuses for teaching a specific subject and teaching force, the more likely an education system is for teaching at specific grades/levels; however, pay to have effective teachers. Second, top candidates does not take into account performance evaluations. maximize the impact of teacher training (whether Teachers are entitled to both retirement and health traditional or abridged). If the quality of student benefits. teachers is too low, training is likely to focus more on While there are attractive career opportunities, making up for their deficits in knowledge and skills and working conditions could be made more appealing for less on turning them into effective teachers. Finally, talented candidates. Approximately 50% to 69% of luring top talent into teaching has a “multiplier� effect: schools comply with the standards for infrastructure, if teaching attracts qualified people, competitive hygiene, and sanitation. In addition, there are 31 to 50 candidates who had not considered teaching might be primary school students per teacher, and 51 or more drawn to it. SABER - Teachers considers four policy secondary school students per teacher. It is worth levers education systems can use to reach this goal: 4 noting that top-performing education systems usually • Are entry requirements set up to attract talented have less than 25 students per teacher. Attractive candidates? career opportunities exist; at the school level, upon the • Are pay and benefits appealing for talented decision of either, principals, school owners or candidates? municipal authorities, teachers can take on leadership • Are working conditions appealing for talented positions. In addition, teachers can apply for both candidates? principal posts and academic posts, such as, academic • Are there attractive career opportunities? lead-teachers, master teachers and heads of departments. In Bauchi, entry requirements are set up to attract talented applicants and pay and benefits are 3. Preparing Teachers with Useful appealing. There is an established process to screen applicants to pre-service teacher training, and there are Training and Experience requirements to become either a primary or secondary 4 One issue that is not included in this list because of lack of clear guidance from available evidence on how to tackle it is Equipping teachers with the skills they need to that of the “flexibility� of the profession. Several studies find succeed in a classroom is crucial. First, few (if any) that some women prefer to teach because they can take individuals are born effective teachers. Teachers needs leaves of absence to take care of their families without subject matter knowledge, classroom management incurring wage penalties when they come back (Flyer & Rosen skills and lots of practice in order to be successful in a 1997; Stinebrickner 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b). Yet, it is classroom. In addition, preparation puts all teachers on unclear that education system want to attract these an equal footing, giving them a common framework to candidates any more than other groups. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 5 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 work and improve their practice. SABER - Teachers Second, it is a way of ensuring teachers are distributed considers three policy levers education systems can use efficiently—i.e., to minimize the number of surplus to reach this goal: 5 teachers at a given grade, subject or geographic area. • Are there minimum standards for pre-service Finally, ensuring teachers are a good match for their teaching training programs? school can also increase their effectiveness and reduce • Are individuals required to have classroom turnover rates (Boyd, et al. 2002, 2005b; Jackson experience to be allowed to teach? 2010). 6 SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers • Do teachers have a smooth transition from pre- education systems can use to reach this goal: service training into their first job? • Are there incentives for teachers to work at hard- to-staff schools? In Bauchi, there are minimum standards for pre- • Are there incentives for teachers to teach critical service training, individuals are required to have shortage subjects? classroom experience, and beginning teachers are required to participate in an induction or mentoring In Bauchi, teachers are not provided with monetary program. There is an accreditation process for pre- incentives to work in hard-to-staff schools; critical service teacher training programs, and specifications on shortage subjects have been identified, but no subject content have been established. In the incentives exist. Teachers working in hard-to-staff specifications for initial teacher training, primary school schools, such as those serving students from teachers devote more hours to pedagogy than subject disadvantaged populations, are not entitled to receive matter, while secondary school teachers devote more either bonuses or a better compensation packages. In hours to subject matter than pedagogy. Primary and addition, teaching experience is used in making transfer secondary school teachers are required to have 3 to 6 decisions; using seniority as a basis for approving months of practical professional experience. In transfer requests may motivate the most seasoned and comparison, most successful school systems have potentially best teachers to leave hard-to-staff schools. mandatory classroom experience of at least a year and In several countries, the practice of allocating teacher often longer, for both primary and secondary school positions based on seniority has resulted in higher teachers. In Bauchi, beginning teachers are required to turnover rates in hard-to-staff schools, as well as a participate in an induction or mentoring program of at larger proportion of teacher entrants, who may not be least a year to help smooth their transition from as effective as more experienced teachers. Bauchi has training into the classroom. identified critical shortage subjects, but not created monetary incentives for teachers to focus on them. 4. Matching Teachers’ Skills with Students’ Needs 5. Leading Teachers with Strong Principals Ensuring that teachers work in schools where their skills are most needed is important for promoting The quality of school heads is second only to classroom equity and efficiency. First, it is a way of ensuring all teaching as a predictor of student learning (Eberts & students in an education system have an equal Stone 1988; Leithwood, et al. 2006). Quality principals opportunity to learn: without purposeful incentives, attract and retain quality teachers (Boyd, et al. 2009a; teachers tend to gravitate towards schools with better Ingersoll 2001a, 2001b; Papa Jr., Lankford & Wyckoff working conditions, which often serve better off 2002). Also, capable principals can spearhead much- students (Boyd, et al. 2005a; Hanushek, et al. 2004b). 6 Much research has been devoted to the issue of turnover. 5 Much research has been devoted to the issue of turnover. Several studies have noted that it is not always the most Several studies have noted that it is not always the most effective teachers who leave (Boyd, et al. 2007; Hanushek, et effective teachers who leave (Boyd, et al. 2007; Hanushek, et al. 2005; West & Chingos 2008). Yet, these studies also al. 2005; West & Chingos 2008). Yet, these studies also concede that there is still considerable room for schools to concede that there is still considerable room for schools to enact targeted policies aimed at retaining only the most enact targeted policies aimed at retaining only the most effective performers. effective performers. SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 6 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 needed change at the school level, so having strong need to be able to know when to provide struggling leaders is important not only to ensure acceptable classrooms with adequate support to improve. Finally, levels of performance but also to drive improvements. such information is useful for accountability purposes. Finally, good principals can facilitate teachers’ work and SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers continuous improvement. The more capable a principal education systems can use to reach this goal: is, the more he or she can support teachers, create a • Is there enough student achievement data to sense of community, make teachers feel valued and inform teaching? ease their anxiety about external pressures (Mulford • Is there enough teacher performance data to 2003). SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers inform teaching? education systems can use to reach this goal: In Bauchi, teaching and teacher performance • Are requirements to become a principal set up to evaluations are regularly conducted, but student attract talented candidates? achievement data is not used to inform instruction. • Do principals have incentives to perform well? Bauchi has not participated in any assessments of • Can principals make key decisions to improve student learning at any level (international, national, or teaching? sub-national). In comparison, top-performing systems In Bauchi, entry requirements for school leadership conduct regular national or sub-national assessments of exist; however, principals are not provided with student learning. In Bauchi, participation in both performance-based incentives and their decision- internal and external evaluations is mandatory for all making authority could be strengthened. Clear public school teachers. Internal evaluations occur requirements and selection processes exist to become a regularly (daily, weekly, per term), while external school principal. Principals must have completed an evaluations occur at least once every 5 years when the educational level of at least the ISCED 5B, a minimum of school is evaluated. Evaluations in Bauchi rely on 5 or 20 years of professional teaching experience, a more sources and use at least 3 out of the following minimum of 5 years of professional administrative criteria to assess teaching: teacher knowledge, experience, satisfactory performance in a supervised classroom practices, student background and student internship, and participated in an induction or learning. In Bauchi, no teachers failed their last round mentoring program. In Bauchi, principal pay is highly of external evaluations. Further, it is possible to track competitive: principals are paid 140% or more of GDP teachers over time. per capita, but there are no performance-based incentives. While principals must participate in regular 7. Supporting Teachers to Improve performance evaluations, they are not allowed to Instruction receive monetary bonuses based on their performance on the job. In addition, principals are required to provide guidance to teachers and decide on the distribution of time during school hours, but they do not Helping teachers be more effective in the classroom is have a say or decide on teacher hiring, firing, dismissals, vital. First, all teachers can improve—regardless of how or promotions. effective they are at one point in time. Therefore, support mechanisms are necessary to help teachers 6. Monitoring Teaching and Learning reach their potential and perform at their best. Second, changes in classroom assignments and/or student populations can pose new challenges to teachers. Thus, during periods of transitions, teachers will need Assessing how well teachers are teaching and whether additional help to sustain their performance. Finally, students are learning is essential to devise strategies support mechanisms can go a long way in preventing for improving teaching and learning. First, teacher and burnout and reducing turnover. Even motivated student evaluations help identify good practices, which teachers may choose to leave if they are consistently can then be shared among the teaching staff to improve ineffective, do not know how to improve and receive school performance. Second, identifying low- little support. SABER - Teachers considers two policy performing teachers and students is necessary to levers education systems can use to reach this goal: support them in a timely manner. Education systems SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 7 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 • Is teacher performance data used to improve • Are there minimum mechanisms to hold teachers teaching? accountable? • Is there professional development to improve • Are there rewards for high-performing teachers? practice? • Are there sanctions for low-performing teachers? In Bauchi, teacher performance data from evaluations There are some performance-related incentives in are used to inform classroom practice, but professional place and sanctions for low-performance, but development requirements could be strengthened. mechanisms to hold teachers accountable could be The schools conduct teacher performance evaluations strengthened. There are no requirements for primary and use these results to inform teachers as to how they or secondary school teachers to remain in the can develop their instructional practices. Under- profession, but teachers can be dismissed for performing teachers, as judged on the evaluation misconduct or child abuse. Teacher absenteeism is results, may be assigned a supervisor or professional taken into account in performance evaluations, and development. Further, professional development may result in penalties such as salary deductions and/or exists, but is not required and not used in a focused dismissal. In addition, there are some rewards for high- approach to improve instruction. Professional performing teachers, including: monetary bonuses, development includes 5 or more types of activities better chances of promotion, and more public other than courses and workshops or education recognition. The percentage of a teacher’s salary conferences and seminars. The content of professional affected by performance is unknown, and there are development for both primary and secondary school some sanctions in place for low-performing teachers. teachers is broad, including 5 or more aspects related to Performance on the job is used to decide whether to teaching, such as: (i) knowledge and understanding of grant an open-ended appointment, and there is a subjects; (ii) understanding and teaching the mandatory probationary period. In Bauchi, there are curriculum; (iii) relating the curriculum to meeting the pay cuts for low-performing teachers and unsatisfactory required learning standards; (iv) classroom performance on an evaluation may result in dismissal. management; (v) knowledge and understanding of instructional practices in main subjects; (vi) teaching Improving Teacher Policies: Priorities for students with special learning needs; or (vii) school Bauchi, Nigeria management and administration. Further, individual teachers are not responsible for paying for their Overall, Bauchi has achieved acceptable levels of professional development. development in five of the eight core SABER-Teacher policy goals. This indicates that Bauchi has succeeded in 8. Motivating Teachers to Perform setting clear expectations for teachers, preparing teachers with useful training and experience, leading teachers with strong principals, supporting teachers to improve instruction, and motivating teachers to Incentives help education systems signal priorities. The perform. Yet, Bauchi has room to improve in the goals more aligned incentives are with the behaviors and of attracting the best into teaching, matching teachers’ outcomes they expect from teachers, the more likely skills with students needs, and monitoring teaching and they will obtain them. Incentives are also a way of learning. recognizing teachers’ work. Teaching is a challenging job and incentives can let teachers know the results they Attracting the Best into Teaching have achieved are valued so that they continue working There are four policy levers that are key to attracting hard to sustain them. In addition, some types of the best into teaching: (1) entry requirements that incentives can influence the profile of the teaching allow that attract talented candidates; (2) attractive pay profession and make it more competitive, dynamic and and benefits; (iii) appealing working conditions; and (4) performance-driven. The presence of incentives can attractive career opportunities within the teaching have affect the attractiveness of the teaching profession. profession. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal: In this policy goal, Bauchi is Emerging, while Anambra and Ekiti rate Established. Bauchi in particular could benefit from strengthening entry requirements and SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 8 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 improving working conditions. In Bauchi, there are Monitoring Teaching and Learning requirements to become a teacher, but less than 50% of There are two policy levers that are key to monitoring primary school teachers meet them. Meeting the teaching and learning: (1) establishing student learning requirements to enter teaching is important because assessment systems; and (2) teacher performance recent studies have found that no single observable can appraisal mechanisms. predict teacher effectiveness, but that a combination of multiple measures can help identify good teachers While Anambra and Ekiti have participated in selected (Rockoff, et al. 2009). Similarly, Bauchi has standards for international assessments of student learning, Bauchi infrastructure, hygiene, and sanitation, but only 50% to remains without any assessments of student learning at 69% of schools comply with them. There is considerable any level. Making student achievement data available evidence that teachers care a great deal about where to teachers is key to inform their diagnosis of the they work (Boyd, et al. 2005a; Hanushek, Kain & Rivkin strengths and weaknesses of their students and their 2004a; Hanushek, et al. 2004b; Jackson 2010). Schools lesson planning: the more information teachers have that have poor working conditions have a harder time about the learning levels of their students, the better attracting and retaining able candidates; therefore, they can prepare to contribute to their students’ Bauchi might consider measures to improve learning progress. Nigeria’s education systems could infrastructure as well as its high student-teacher ratios. benefit from partaking in more frequent international assessments, and instituting national or sub-national Matching Teachers’ Skills with Students’ assessments of students learning. Needs There are two policy levers that governments can use to reach the goal of matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs: (1) establishing incentives for teachers to work at hard-to-staff schools; and (2) establishing incentives for teachers to teach critical shortage subjects. Both Bauchi and Ekiti rate Latent in this policy goal, while Anambra is Emerging. In Anambra, teachers are entitled to incentives for working in hard-to-staff schools or for teaching critical shortage subject, but teachers do not have these incentives in either Bauchi or Ekiti. One way in which education systems can foster a more equitable distribution of teachers is by using incentives; however, the evidence suggests that the design of these incentives programs matters. Bauchi might consider paying teachers more for working in hard-to-staff schools and/or providing incentives to teachers to teach critical shortage subjects. In addition, across these three education systems, teaching experience is used in deciding transfer priorities. Even in education systems with well-designed incentives to attract teachers into hard-to-staff schools, the distribution of teachers may still be inequitable if experienced teachers (who can be more effective than novice teachers) are given priority in transfer assignments. Thus, using seniority as a basis for approving transfer requests may motivate the most seasoned and potentially best teachers to leave hard- to-staff schools. 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"How Teaching Matters: Bringing the Classroom Back into Discussions of Teacher SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 18 NIGERIA: BAUCHI ǀ TEACHER POLICIES SABER COUNTRY REPORT |2012 www.worldbank.org/education/saber The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative collects data on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world and benchmarks them against practices associated with student learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results—from students, administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, detailed, objective snapshot of how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn. This report focuses specifically on the area of teacher policies. This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. THE WORLD BANK SYSTEMS APPROACH FOR BETTER EDUCATION RESULTS 19