STITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | I STITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | INSTITUTIONS | I Erica Bosio Prosperity Notes REFORMING JUSTICE click here for direct access. Engaging with Countries on Judicial Budgets available at http://reproducibility.worldbank.org, A verified reproducibility package for this publication is © 2024 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. 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TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgments 1 Key Findings 3 Why the Judiciary Needs to be Adequately Budgeted 4 Three Basic Facts about Judicial Budgets 5 Three Trends in Reforming Judicial Budgets 8 A Trustworthy Judiciary 10 References 11 REFORMING JUSTICE 1 Prosperity Notes Acknowledgments This Note was written by Erica Bosio, with research support from Virginia Upegui Caro and Meng Su. Generous comments were provided by Richard Sutherland. Overall guidance on the Note was provided by Arturo Herrera Gutierrez, Roby Senderowitsch, and Adrienne Hathaway-Nuton. This Note is part of a series of thematic briefs produced by the Global Program on Justice and Rule of Law. The series highlights lessons learned from justice reform efforts and focuses on the “why, how, and what” of reform. This publication was funded by the World Bank’s Governance & Institutions Umbrella Program (G&I). G&I is a multi-donor trust fund established in 2022 with the generous support of the Chandler Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, and the MacArthur Foundation. Since then, the UK Government’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), the European Union, the Ministry of Economy and Finance of the Republic of Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia, the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), the Federal Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Austria, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) have also joined the program. To learn more, please visit www.worldbank.org/giup. For questions on this Note, please contact Erica Bosio at ebosio@worldbank.org. REFORMING JUSTICE 2 Prosperity Notes © Rymden / Adobe Stock file #263225615. Further permission required for reuse. REFORMING JUSTICE 3 Prosperity Notes KF. Key Findings • Judicial budgets account for less than 2 percent of government expenditure on average. • Judicial budgets shrunk during the COVID-19 pandemic and have not returned to pre-pandemic levels. • The lack of dedicated budget lines for computerization in low- income countries can motivate the World Bank engagement. Adequate budgeting of the judiciary is critical for the effective delivery of justice. This brief presents trends in judicial budgets. Courts account for less than 2 percent of total government expenditure on average, with significant portions dedicated to fixed costs such as salaries, thereby limiting investments in technological advancements essential for improving judicial efficiency. This brief identifies three major trends in judicial budgeting reforms: increasing autonomy for the judiciary in budget management, accountability for budget execution at the court level, and a shift towards performance-based budgeting models. These reforms aim to bolster the operational efficiency and public perception of the judiciary, ultimately linking adequate judicial funding to enhanced social and economic outcomes. The findings emphasize the necessity for judicial leaders to continuously advocate for resources by demonstrating the judiciary’s integral role in maintaining law and order, promoting democracy, and fostering societal stability. REFORMING JUSTICE 4 Prosperity Notes Why the Judiciary Needs to be Adequately Budgeted Adequate resources are essential for courts to Beyond the everyday functioning of the courts, deliver justice quickly, cost-effectively, and with calibrating the size of judicial budgets also requires high quality. While often in the background of an understanding of which judicial services are economic and institutional development, the most needed to meet the public interest. This judiciary plays a vital role in upholding individual prioritization, in turn, goes to the heart of why it rights and freedoms, as well as the constitutional matters that the judiciary is adequately budgeted, principles upon which society functions. With few that is, to uphold the rule of law by interpreting established guidelines on funding judicial systems and applying rules in ways that are consistent, for these purposes, many countries struggle to predictable, and based on existing laws. Financing do so adequately. Economic downturns, budget the judiciary means supporting the fulfillment of a cuts at the national or local level, and natural necessary public function – the maintenance of law disasters and emergencies trigger additional and order – that guarantees democracy, prosperity, funding challenges, as resources are allocated and peace. with priority to sectors like security, healthcare, To achieve these tasks, judges must be independent or infrastructure. Furthermore, judicial budgets of political influence and have the skills and are often spent on fixed costs like salaries and resources needed to perform the work. In the 21st buildings’ maintenance, leaving little financing for century, judges have access to advanced computing, investments in new technology. This is especially word processing, research, and communications the case in developing economies. services which are far better than what they once Appropriate funding is required for all aspects of had. These technologies have enabled judges and justice delivery. Courthouses need maintenance, court staff to be more efficient, more collaborative, increased accessibility, and security enhancements. and more productive than ever before in various Government funding ensures the safety of court settings. Continued investments in the judiciary are personnel, litigants, and the public. Cybersecurity likely to continue leading to efficiency gains that measures protect sensitive personal and corporate will relieve pressures on judicial budgets over time. data. Courts also require resources to meet the The implementation of Korea’s e-court system, for challenges that emerge from a growing economy example, resulted in savings of $221 per e-filing. and from increased legal complexity – for example, These savings resulted from a reduction in the use storage facilities and subscriptions to electronic of paper, the time spent in court, cheaper service libraries. Technology improves efficiency, case of process, lower transportation costs, easier management, and access to court records (Bosio archiving of documents, and easier payment of fees 2023). (World Bank 2013). The data used for the analysis on this Note was extracted from the following sources: (1) the database of court budgets from the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) with information from 36 countries for the reporting cycle 2020-2022, (2) the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) with information from 25 countries, using the subset “General Government” and “Expenditure on Law Courts” for the year 2020, (3) the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) judicial budget database with information from 26 countries for the year 2020, (4) data extracted from national budget documents for 26 countries for the year 2020, based on identification of line ministry/institution or sector/mission related to judicial service delivery and (5) the BOOST Open Budgets Portal with information from 35 countries for the year 2020. REFORMING JUSTICE 5 Prosperity Notes Three Basic Facts about Judicial Budgets Three stylized facts about judicial budgets are worth There are some differences across regions – with emphasizing at the outset. Where an economy is OECD high-income countries having the lowest placed on these international comparisons largely budgets, at around 1.2 percent of government determines what type of changes policy makers expenditure, and Latin American countries having may wish to pursue. the highest budgets, at 3.8 percent of overall expenditure (Figure 1). Latin American countries First, judicial budgets account for less than 2 tend to have higher judicial budgets as a way to percent of government expenditure on average guarantee judicial independence. Indeed, many worldwide. This average share in total government countries in the region have constitutional expenditure is similar in advanced economies provisions aimed at guaranteeing a minimum and emerging markets, in common and civil law threshold of budgetary allocation. For example, jurisdictions, and in countries with different types in Paraguay, the Constitution establishes that of political systems.1 There are few countries that the Nation must allocate at least 3 percent of the spend a larger share of their budget on the judiciary budget of the Central Administration to the Judicial – for example, Costa Rica, Paraguay, and Honduras Power (Art. 249 of the Constitution). in Latin America. Figure 1: Court budget as a percentage of government expenditure 15 DMA 10 PRY Percentage CRI HND SLV 5 NIC XKX GTM WSM CAF BRA SLE STP TON MEX ECU SRB COD GMB FJI BLZ CHL AFG GNB COG COL MNE DOM PER COM AGO SLB PNG DZA BIH ARG BWA ZAF RWA KEN BGD UKR CPV MNG NAM MDV TUR POL TTO BHS SVN GBR PRT HKG USA LSO UGA NPL CMRMRT CIV MKD BGR PAN GRC AUS DEU MLI TZAKIR SEN TUN JAM ARMALB THA RUS ROU SYCHRV HUNSVK ESP AUT SMR CHE LUX MOZ LBR SOM GINPAK ZMB TLS GHA BTN PHL MDA AZE IDN SWZJOR GEO LBN MHLBLR MUS LCA URY LVA GUY KAZ PLW SAU CZE LTU EST MLT ITA CYP CAN BEL ISL ZWE BEN IND UZBNGA TUV FRA JPN AREISRSWE NLD FIN BDI MDG TGO ETH BFA MMR LAO DNK NOR SGP IRL 0 4 6 8 10 12 Log of GDP per capita (Current US$) Court Budget as % of Gov't Exp. 2020 Polynomial Prediction Source: Author’s calculations. Year: 2020 1. Richer countries in terms of income per capita have smaller judicial budgets, at 2 percent of government expenditure vs. 1.5 percent for lower-income countries. This difference is, however, not statistically significant. Autocratic countries, countries in the civil law tradition, and Latin American countries have larger judicial budgets, though – except for the latter – these differences are again not statistically significant. REFORMING JUSTICE 6 Prosperity Notes This is also the case in Costa Rica, where the case management and evidence management Judiciary receives at least 6 percent of ordinary systems for high courts, and permitted hearings revenues (Art. 177 of the Constitution); Honduras, via videoconference in selected cases (Sourdin, Li, with an allocation of at least 3 percent of the and McNamara 2020). Australia, Canada, Hungary, current revenues (Art. 318 of the Constitution); India, Italy, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, Panama, where the Judicial Power and the Public among others, also introduced videoconferencing Ministry receive at least 2 percent of the Central technology in courts during the COVID-19 crisis. Government income (Art. 214 of the Constitution), These online systems has increased access to and Guatemala, where the Judicial branch receives justice, particularly in countries where citizens at least 2 percent of the Budget of Ordinary need to travel far to get to the nearest courtroom. Revenues of the State (Art 213. of the Constitution). It has also benefited people with disabilities and those with language barriers. Second, the share of judicial budgets in government expenditures fell during the COVID-19 pandemic, Judicial expenditures have not gone back to pre- as other priorities like health and safety became pandemic levels, partly because of other priorities prevalent. The global pandemic propagated a – for example, the need for increased military shift toward online justice and reduced the cost of budgets after the war in Ukraine – keep coming going to court. South Africa, for example, expanded up (Figure 2). Despite lower budgetary allocation, the use of e-filing, implemented an online cloud- demands on the justice system have continued to based collaborative solution enabling digital grow. The International Labor Organization reported Figure 2: Comparison of expenditure shares pre- and post-COVID-19 pandemic 2.5 2 1.5 Percentage 1 0.5 0 2017-2019 2020-2022 Source: World Bank data. Note: A total of 111 countries were observed for 2017–2019, and 148 for 2020–2022. REFORMING JUSTICE 7 Prosperity Notes a 26% increase in the volume of individual and capital expenditures and technology. Comparable collective labor disputes globally post-pandemic breakdowns were available for 52 countries (20 (ILO 2021). In the United Kingdom, magistrate high-income, 10 upper-middle-income, 7 lower- courts experienced an 83% surge in their caseload middle-income, and 15 low-income countries). (Godfrey and Walklate 2021), while the US saw a While all high-income countries have a dedicated 17.9% rise in the number of eligible legal aid clients budget line for computerization (maintenance and following the pandemic (Rubin Gomez 2021). This capital improvements), only three low-income competition for public funds raises the issue of how countries do, and these low-income countries to safeguard judicial budgets. The main approach only dedicate small resources (Figure 3). Overall, is to consistently show relevance, that is, linking the large share of wage expenses precludes efficient judiciary to economic growth and social significant investment in new technology, which welfare. Recent scholarship clearly demonstrates is one reason why judiciaries tend to lag behind the link between efficient judiciary and such other parts of public institutions in providing benefits – but these need to be continuously electronic services. This is especially true in low- highlighted. income countries, where resources are either very small or not allocated at all to electronic services. Third, on average, around 70 percent of judicial The COVID-19 pandemic was a catalyst for the budgets are spent on salaries of judges and provision of more e-services in many jurisdictions, staff. Another 15-20 percent is spent on goods but more is needed. and services, and the remaining 10 percent on Figure 3: Percentage of judicial budget dedicated to computerization 6 5.6 5 4 3.1 3 2 1.3 1 0.2 0 High income Upper middle income Lower middle income Low income Source: World Bank data. These three facts lead to a single conclusion: productivity and quality of judicial services. judicial budgets are under constant stress from Hence, there are opportunities for the World Bank other competing government priorities; and in to support technological improvements toward many countries, they are spent to simply maintain greater effectiveness, especially in low- and lower- the existing operations of the courts. This leaves middle-income countries where dedicated budgets little room for investment in new technology and are often lacking. process enhancements that can lead to improved REFORMING JUSTICE 8 Prosperity Notes Three Trends in Reforming Judicial Budgets Over the past two decades, three distinct trends president or senior court manager, supported by have emerged in the reform of the judicial budgeting the court’s finance office, are made responsible process. for their execution. This is the case in the courts of the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, and the First, countries are reforming their budgeting Netherlands. These courts have the flexibility to practices to give more autonomy to the judiciary allocate their funds as needs change. The court in the preparation and management of its budget. president executes and manages the budget, using This increased autonomy can be achieved by the court’s strategic or action plan as guidance. shifting the burden of preparing the budget from the executive (Ministry of Finance or Ministry In 2009, Italy introduced a court supervision of Justice) to the judiciary, usually through a of budgets, where the budget is classified into dedicated entity. In Armenia, for instance, since missions, programs, and actions. These objectives 2018 the Supreme Judicial Council submits the are included in the “Annual Performance Plan” that courts’ budget request to the government, who is annexed to the budget law. In practice, however, then submits it to the National Assembly. This resources are not allocated based on performance model promotes independence of the judiciary and indicators, though the distribution of resources potentially more efficient spending, as the judiciary among courts still follows an incremental approach. can design priorities in spending categories (World In other words, there are no direct budgetary Bank 2023). In another case in the United Kingdom, consequences if the courts do not reach the since 2013 the Supreme Court’s request for performance goals established (Viapiana 2023). resources must be passed to the Treasury without This is known as “presentational performance any alteration in spending categories (Rosselli budgeting,” where there is no formal link between 2020). In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the performance information and budget allocation 2005 Constitution established that the Superior (Viapiana 2018). Judicial Council is entitled to draft its own budget In France, in 2004, a decree transferred the budget and transmit it to the government for inclusion in responsibility to the chiefs of courts, who are the state’s general budget. tasked with expenditure authorization. Until then, In 2014, the Belgian Parliament passed a law the management of authorization of expenditures related to the “autonomous management of the was done at the local-level administration through judicial organization.” The objective of this new law the préfectures (Kirat 2010). Given that this reform was to decentralize and transfer the responsibility was not accompanied by an increase in staff for budget management to the judiciary. This was and the assignment of administrative personnel done through the introduction of a new managerial knowledgeable of accounting and financial matters, architecture of the judicial system, focused many considered that it negatively impacted the on a shared responsibility between the newly functioning of courts that had to manage the established Public Prosecutor’s College, College of burden of these new administrative functions with the Courts and Tribunals, and the local committees no additional human and financial resources (Kirat managed by the jurisdiction chiefs (Dupont and 2010). Schoenaers 2018). In 2020, Finland introduced the National Courts Second, once budgets are allocated, the court Administration Agency (EJTN, n. d.). It operates REFORMING JUSTICE 9 Prosperity Notes in the administrative branch of the Ministry of depending on the outputs accomplished (in this Justice (MOJ), but it is an independent agency. This case, the number of cases disposed). The price institution is charged with proposing the budget to be paid for each case disposed depends on request to the MOJ and decides on the allocation (1) the level of the court (district courts, courts of the funds to the different courts (Finland of appeal, and Central Appeals Tribunal), (2) the National Courts Administration, n. d.). The budget field of law (civil, criminal, administrative, etc.), allocation is directly attached to the completion of and (3) whether the decision is taken by a judge certain performance targets and indicators. These sitting alone or a panel of judges. These prices are targets are based on the future expected caseload, negotiated between the Ministry of Security and as well as the cost per case and the number of Justice (MSJ) and the Council for the Judiciary and cases disposed by each judge in the year. Other are fixed for a three-year term. These are included performance indicators include the number of in the central government budget.2 incoming cases, the length of proceedings, the This change was implemented to increase the number of pending cases, and quality indicators, productivity of courts and prevent backlogs. among others. The coefficient to calculate the The Council responds to the MSJ regarding the performance indicators is based on working time, information the Judiciary has provided on the the difficulty of the case, the hearings required, and quality of services, the production of cases, and the number of judges that compose the panel of the money received and spent. Each court receives decision (Viapiana 2018). funds depending on the number of cases decided Third, in some jurisdictions, there is an attempt to during the previous year (Langbroek 2010). move from a historical line-item budget focused on In 2020, the Ivory Coast introduced a program- inputs to program-based and performance informed based budgeting, based on which financial budgeting focused on outputs and outcomes. Some allocations are done according to specific missions, countries use the performance information to feed programs, and indicators.3 Justice is included into the negotiation of the budget, while others use under Mission 2: Defense, Security and Justice, it directly as a formula to calculate the allocation which is one of the nine missions established for (for instance, the Netherlands uses a price per the distribution of government resources. Mission case model which directly establishes the budget 2 includes a specific program under the Ministry allocated based on the output indicators). This of Justice and Human Rights called Program 2: model, however, contains some risks. It generates Jurisdictions, which has three specific objectives: a bundle of administrative responsibilities that (1) improve socioeconomic access to justice, (2) create a burden on courts, which are not always reinforce judicial protection to children and young met with the corresponding human and financial people, and (3)improve the quality of the judicial resources to take care of them. It also relies on the system. availability and accuracy of administrative data. In 2010, Uruguay introduced a budget structured For example, under the 2005 Court Sector Funding by programs aimed at linking financial allocations to Decree, the Netherlands introduced the concept the government plan. It defined 17 programmatic of output-based budgeting to the judicial system, areas (including justice administration) to measure which means that the judiciary receives funding objectives related to the implementation of policies 2. Viapiana and Fabri (2019) call this model “purchaser-provider model,” given that the budget amounts and courts’ funding allocation are based on a “Price x Quantity formula,” where the quantity is the number of resolved cases and the price is set by the Judicial Council in negotiation with the MSJ. 3. Since 2020, the government has pursued reforms to the public financial management framework that allowed the introduction of program-based budgeting (Côte d’Ivoire, Ministry of Budget and State Holdings 2023). REFORMING JUSTICE 10 Prosperity Notes in coordination with the institutions involved in each make modifications before the final review by the program. In turn, each objective is associated with legislative branch of the government. Performance at least one target and indicator, allowing for better based budgeting aims to increase efficiency, but measurement of its completion (OECD 2019). In can lead to perverse incentives (fast decisions terms of institutional arrangements, Article 220 to the detriment of quality). This risk needs to be of the Uruguay Constitution gives the judiciary the carefully managed to avoid potentially higher costs power to draft its own budget and present it to the over time. executive branch of the government. The latter can A Trustworthy Judiciary Adequate funding of the judiciary is crucial There remains a large task for judicial leadership for upholding law and order, bolstering the in every country, to continually justify the spending independence of the judiciary, and fostering public of public resources for effective functioning of the confidence in these institutions. Recent initiatives courts. This motivation relies on analyses that link to enhance autonomy in the budgetary process a functional judiciary to better social and economic are an attempt to make the judiciary appear outcomes. Just like increased expenditure of less like another politically dependent branch of healthcare is motivated by the threat of public government. These reforms have the potential security during a pandemic, the case for increased to not only enhance the operational efficiency funding for the judiciary should be driven by the of the courts but also to strengthen the public’s demands of an expanding economy. perception of their legitimacy. REFORMING JUSTICE 11 Prosperity Notes References Bosio, E. 2023. “A Survey of Judicial Effectiveness: The Last Quarter Century of Empirical Evidence.” Policy Research Working Paper 10501, World Bank, Washington, DC. Côte d’Ivoire, Ministry of Budget and State Holdings. 2023. Rapport Général sur la Performance de la Loi No.2022-927 du 20 Décembre 2022 Portant Réglement du Budget de l’État pour l’Année 2021. Abidjan: Ministry of Budget and State Holdings. Dupont, E., and F. Schoenaers. 2018. “Reform of the Belgian Justice System: Changes to the Role of Jurisdiction Chief, the Empowerment of Local Managers.” Laws 7 (1): 2. EJTN (European Judicial Training Network). n. d. Finland: National Courts Administration. Brussels: EJTN. Finland, National Courts Administration. n. d. Tasks of the National Courts Administration. Godfrey, B., J.C. Richardson, and S. Walklate. 2022 “The Crisis in the Courts: Before and Beyond Covid.” The British Journal of Criminology 62: 1036–1053. International Labour Organization – ILO. 2021. Report on rapid assessment survey: The response of labour dispute resolution mechanisms to the COVID-19 pandemic. Geneva: International Labour Organization. Kirat, T. 2010. “Performance-Based Budgeting and Management of Judicial Courts in France: An Assessment.” International Journal for Court Administration, April 2010. Langbroek, P. M. 2010. “Organization Development of the Dutch Judiciary, between Accountability and Judicial Independence.” International Journal for Court Administration, April 2010. Manuel, M., Manuel, C., Manea, S. and Nagaria, D. 2023. “Domestic financing for justice: who spends most on justice?” ODI Policy Brief. London: ODI. OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2019. “Budgeting in Uruguay: Towards Modern Budgeting Practices in Uruguay.” OECD Journal on Budgeting 2019 (1): 9–104. Rosselli, A. 2020. “Judicial Independence and the Budget: A Taxonomy of Judicial Budgeting Mechanisms.” Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design 5 (2): 1–20. REFORMING JUSTICE 12 Prosperity Notes Rubin Gomez, A. 2021. “Demand Side Justice.” Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy 28(3): 411-436. Simon, H. A., D. Smithburg, and V. Thompson. 1961. Public Administration. New York: Knopf Doubleday. Sourdin, T., B. Li, and D. M. McNamara. 2020. “Court Innovations and Access to Justice in Times of Crisis.” Health Policy and Technology 9 (4): 447–453. Viapiana, F. 2018. “Pressure on Judges: How Budgeting System Can impact on Judge’s Autonomy.” Laws 7 (4): 38. Viapiana, F, and M. Fabri. 2019. “Administration of Justice and Courts’ Budget: An Independence and a Managerial Issue.” Public Sciences & Policies / Ciências e Políticas Públicas 5 (1): 53–68. Viapiana, F. 2023. Funding the Judiciary: How Budgeting Systems Shape Justice: The Impact of Budget Practices on Allocative Efficiency, Organizational Development, and Judicial Values. Utrecht University. World Bank. 2023. Supporting Judicial Reforms in Armenia: A Forward Look. Washington, DC: World Bank. 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