Policy Research Working Paper 11153 A Global Assessment of Domestic Petroleum Fuel Prices Elcin Akcura Energy and Extractives Global Practice June 2025 Policy Research Working Paper 11153 Abstract Oil prices have been increasingly volatile since 2004. How- the war in Ukraine. The paper finds that domestic prices ever, the impact of this volatility on domestic end-user in many countries did not follow international fuel prices prices differs significantly by fuel and country. Some coun- within the period analyzed. Countries with price controls tries fully pass through global price movements to domestic had much lower levels of pass-through than those with end-user prices, and some countries freeze domestic fuel price deregulation. Countries that adjusted their fuel prices prices for long periods of time. Fuel subsidies emerge or at frequent intervals (weekly or monthly) had higher levels grow if domestic prices significantly diverge from inter- of price pass-through than those adjusting them quarterly national prices in times of rising international oil prices. or less frequently. Currency depreciation and the existence This paper draws on two new databases developed by the of an official fuel subsidy are associated with lower levels author for the purposes of this paper to analyze the degree of of price pass-through, and the impact of being a net crude pass-through of international price volatility onto domestic oil or net refined fuel exporter is mixed. The results show consumers for eight fuels between December 2017 and that not tracking international prices closely is associated December 2023 for up to 125 economies, depending on with higher incidences of fuel shortages, fuel smuggling, the fuel. This period saw significant oil price volatility on and fuel black marketing. account of events such as the COVID-19 pandemic and This paper is a product of the Energy and Extractives Global Practice. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://www.worldbank.org/prwp. The author may be contacted ateakcura@worldbank.org. The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. Produced by the Research Support Team A Global Assessment of Domestic Petroleum Fuel Prices By ELCIN AKCURAA* JEL classification codes: Q41, Q48, E31, H23, O13 Key words: Fuel subsidies, retail fuel prices, price pass-through, gasoline, diesel, kerosene, liquefied petroleum gas, heavy fuel oil * Elcin Akcura (eakcura@worldbank.org) is a Senior Energy Economist with the World Bank. The author would like to recognize Francis Cuadros Bloch for excellent research assistance in preparation of this paper. The author is grateful to Glory Kweka for assistance in collection of fuel price data. The author would like to thank Masami Kojima and Ani Balabanyan for their guidance in preparing this paper. The author would also like to thank Zeljko Bogetic (Lead Economist, World Bank) and Ugo Gentilini (Lead Economist, World Bank) for their review and comments. The underlying data analysis benefited from support from the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP). ESMAP is a partnership between the World Bank and over 20 partners to help low- and middle-income countries reduce poverty and boost growth through sustainable energy solutions. ESMAP's analytical and advisory services are fully integrated within the World Bank's country financing and policy dialogue in the energy sector. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work and does not assume responsibility for any errors, omissions, or discrepancies in the information, or liability with respect to the use of or failure to use the information, methods, processes, or conclusions set forth. The boundaries, colors, denominations, links/footnotes, and other information shown in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. The citation of works authored by others does not mean the World Bank endorses the views expressed by those authors or the content of their works. 1 Introduction Refined fuel prices have been increasingly volatile since 2004 with several instances of sudden spikes in prices followed by ebbs (Figure 1). The supply-demand balance for a given fuel affected by geopolitical events, macroeconomic factors, and weather-related incidents drives these price movements. Figure 1: Monthly Average Prices for Select Fuels January 2009-April 2024 (2023 US$) Source: S&P Global Commodity Insights (Platts) and Rim LPG Intelligence Daily Note: Prices are monthly averages of Platts quotations for Mediterranean cargos of gasoline, diesel, heavy fuel oil, and jet kerosene. LPG prices are averages of Saudi Aramco’s monthly contract prices of propane and butane. See Appendix 1 for further details. In Figure 1, the prices of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) are shown to be more volatile than other fuel prices. This is in part because more than half of LPG is derived from natural gas and the balance is from crude oil, whereas all other fuels in the figure are produced by refining crude oil, thereby making their prices more dependent on crude oil prices. Crude oil costs can account for more than half of the end-user prices of these refined fuels even in deregulated markets with relatively low fuel taxation (Figure 2). Figure 2: The United States (US) Retail Conventional Gasoline Price Breakdown (%) – January 2000 to July 2024 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18 Jan-19 Jan-20 Jan-21 Jan-22 Jan-23 Jan-24 Refining Distribution & Marketing Taxes Crude Oil Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Gasoline Fuel Update 2 The COVID-19 pandemic, which began in the spring of 2020, led to a collapse of demand for all fuels as many countries imposed strict containment measures. In April 2020, refined fuel prices dipped to their lowest since December 2008, although there were differences depending on fuel use. Jet fuel was impacted the most as global aviation came to a halt following widespread travel bans, leading to a 41 percent decline in demand for these fuels in 2020 from the previous year. Gasoline demand declined by 12 percent in 2020 from 2019 as road traffic fell sharply. By contrast, demand for diesel was not as severely impacted and only fell by 6 percent as freight transport activity continued to ensure transportation of goods (IEA 2021). The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 on the heels of the global economic recovery from the pandemic had a significant impact on fuel prices. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Europe was Russia’s main export market for both crude and refined oil products, such as diesel. Immediately after the start of the war in Ukraine, several Western countries started to reduce their purchases of Russian oil. This was followed by EU embargoes on oil imports and price caps coordinated by the G7, Australia, and the EU, which came into force in late December 2022 and early February 2023 to curb Russia’s vital oil revenue. Disruptions in oil supply from oil sanctions resulted in oil price shocks. By June 2022, Brent crude prices rose to US$127 (in 2023-dollar values), the highest level since August 2014, as did gasoline, diesel, and kerosene prices. Governments follow a range of pricing policies for the domestic prices of petroleum product. Some countries, mainly advanced economies, have deregulated fuel prices and prices are driven by market forces. The primary role of a regulatory agency is to monitor the fuel sector to ensure there is adequate competition in the market. By contrast, in countries with fuel price regulation, the government through a ministry or an agency sets fuel prices typically through a formula (Box 1). Some countries have deregulated prices for certain fuels but regulate others. For example, in Ecuador the price of premium gasoline is deregulated but all other fuel prices (e.g., regular gasoline, diesel, LPG) are controlled by the government. The Agency for the Regulation and Control of Energy and Non-Renewable Natural Resources (ARC) publishes monthly prices for the latter fuels. Box 1: Application of a fuel pricing formula – Experience of Cabo Verde Cabo Verde is an island archipelago nation located off the West coast of Africa with a population of 593,000. It relies solely on fuel imports. Two private companies (Vivo Energy and Enacol) operate in the domestic market. They import, store, transport, distribute, and retail all liquid fuels. Thermal plants (using mainly diesel) provide almost 80 percent of the electricity produced in the archipelago. ARME (Agência de Regulação Multissectorial da Economia), the multi-sector regulator, announces monthly fuel price caps based on a pricing formula that takes into account fuel import costs, transport/logistics costs, value- added tax (VAT), and other taxes. There is a single price cap for each fuel and prices can vary by location as long as they are below the official price cap. Cabo Verde switched from fixed fuel price regulation to price cap regulation in 2009 to promote competition in the oil market. Prior to 2009, fuel prices were not allowed to deviate from ARME’s published prices. The price caps are based on the monthly averages of daily quotations from Platts. The pricing formula takes an average of the daily Platts prices from the previous month to determine the importation costs component in the formula. Prior to 2017, the regulator reviewed the Platts quotations from two months earlier to set the price cap. In times of steadily rising international oil prices, a lag of two months led to growing price gaps between domestic and global prices. In 2017 the regulator switched to monthly updates to better reflect international oil price dynamics in the national market. The fuel price caps are published monthly on the regulator’s website (https://www.arme.cv/). Currently, there are no fuel subsidies, and all costs are passed to the final retail price. 3 The pricing for a given fuel is set by the formula below: PMVCF = CP + CUGSL + MMUD + IVA + other taxes ±ARR The formula is composed of the below components:  PMVCF: Maximum retail price of fuel  CP: Cost of purchasing the product on the international market, including insurance costs international shipping and additional import expenses  CUGSL: Unit cost of managing the logistics system, which incorporates related costs with the management of storage facilities including return on invested capital and inter-island maritime transport  MMUD: Maximum unit distribution margin and retail sales  IVA: Value added tax  Other taxes: Other tax components and fees such as road maintenance tax  ARR: Rounding The regulator is responsible for setting CP, CUGSL, and MMUD. The CP incorporates the fuel import reference cost, shipping cost with associated costs of evaporative losses and insurance, customs taxes, and additional import costs. CUGSL and MMUD were last revised in June 2022. They are reviewed and set by the regulator every 5 years and are otherwise fixed. These parameters allow the collection of sufficient revenue to cover reasonable operating costs, amortization and an adequate rate of return. More than half of the countries with regulated fuel prices in this study review and adjust them on a periodic basis. The longer the period for adjusting prices, the higher the risk that domestic prices will become decoupled from international price movements. Some countries freeze fuel prices for months or years, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa regions (Table 1). Freezing fuel prices for long periods leads to significant distortions in the fuel market and potentially ballooning of subsidies. Table 1: Economies with regulated fuel prices in 2023 - Frequency of Price Revisions Latin Middle East Europe & Sub- Frequency of Fuel Price America & East & North South Asia & Central Saharan TOTAL Adjustments the North America Asia Pacific Asia Africa Caribbean Africa Weekly 7 7 9 0 1 3 0 27 Monthly 3 0 10 2 0 0 10 25 Every 3 months 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 4 Prices frozen for more 4 2 6 8 1 1 24 46 than 3 months Source: "Global Fuel Subsidies and Price Control Measures Database" (World Bank 2025) The 2022 spike in oil and gas prices led to an unprecedented global proliferation of liquid fuel subsidies and price controls as governments tried to reduce, redistribute, or delay the impact of rising and volatile energy prices on consumers. Some countries decided to maintain or expand existing subsidy programs, some delayed planned subsidy reforms, and several even introduced new subsidies and support programs. In countries where there were existing subsidy programs, the costs of these programs rose with commodity prices, requiring some governments to increase the allocation in the budget or withdraw from price stabilization funds to finance rising subsidy costs. This paper analyzes the degree of pass-through of international price fluctuations onto domestic consumers for eight fuels from December 2017 to December 2023. The fuels analyzed by this paper include two grades of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, heavy fuel oil (HFO), heating oil, bottled LPG, and automotive LPG. The 4 paper calculates the degree of international fuel price transmitted to the domestic market by comparing the change in international fuel prices to the change in domestic retail prices of fuels in economies ranging from 27 to 125 in number depending on the fuel. It is important to note that the calculations do not capture whether the full impact of higher or lower refined product prices have been transmitted to the domestic market. They examine only the changes in costs outside the domestic market, and not changes in domestic supply costs or taxes and fees. The limitations of the method followed are described in more detail in section 3 to aid interpretation of the results presented. Examining the level of pass-through is a useful tool to assess how different countries have been reacting to rising oil prices in the past few years. There are several past studies of fuel price pass-through. Kojima (2009) analyzed international fuel price pass-through to domestic prices for gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and LPG in 48 countries between 2004 and 2008 when oil prices reached historic heights and during the time when price controls were more prevalent. The study found higher pass-through coefficients in the 8 industrial countries studied compared to developing countries in the sample. Net exporters of crude oil and refined products combined had the lowest levels of pass-through while net importers among developing countries had higher levels of pass-through compared to industrial countries in two of the three time periods considered in the paper. Kojima (2012) analyzes pass-through coefficients between January 2009 and January 2012 when oil prices in nominal terms more than doubled. The paper again found that net oil exporting countries were less likely to pass on international fuel price increases during this period. The level of pass-through in general increased with the income of the country. Coady et al. (2010) also found that many countries did not fully pass through the rises in international fuel prices in 2007 and 2008. From the 155 countries they analyzed for gasoline, about two-thirds did not fully pass through international price increases while for the 135 countries they studied for diesel about half did not. Of the 63 countries for which they had kerosene price data, more than three-quarters did not fully pass through international price increases. Coady et al. (2016) analyzed diesel price pass-through from 2008 to the end of 2014 in 102 countries. They found that more than half of their sample passed through less than two-thirds of the international fuel price increases. Kpodar and Abdallah (2017) analyzed pass-through coefficients for gasoline, diesel, and kerosene from January 2005 to December 2014 in 162 countries. A shortcoming of this study is that the authors calculated price pass-through only using crude oil prices as the international price benchmark. Refined fuels typically have different price dynamics from crude oil—price levels as well as supply-demand balances differ by fuel. For this reason, price pass-through calculations should use international price benchmarks for each fuel. Against the backdrop of these limitations, the authors found that many countries failed to fully pass through increases in crude oil prices to domestic prices. There was significant heterogeneity in pass-through coefficients by country, with the highest coefficients observed in advanced countries, whereas the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) had the lowest pass-through coefficients. Kpodar and Imam (2021) examined a range of factors that influence the level of international oil price pass- through to domestic gasoline and diesel prices in 109 countries from 2000 to 2014. Their econometric analysis found higher pass-through coefficients during times of low or moderate international oil price volatility. Currency depreciation and lower retail fuel prices in neighboring countries were correlated with lower levels of pass-through. The authors took US spot prices of gasoline and diesel cargos as benchmark prices, which might have increased uncertainties in certain regions with different supply-demand dynamics. This paper takes the period from 2017 to 2024 and examines the following policy-related questions: 1. What was the degree of pass-through to consumers of changes in world prices of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, HFO, heating oil, and LPG between 2017 and 2024? 5 2. Are there any distinct differences in the level of pass-through among countries as well as among fuels? 3. Are there any trends in terms of the country context and domestic fuel market characteristics that drive the degree of price pass-through? The paper considers factors such as the type of fuel price regulation, net oil export status of the country, the level of currency depreciation, and the starting prices. The paper contributes to the existing literature on fuel price pass-through in three areas. First, this paper considers more fuels than any other prior study. It considers two grades of gasoline based on the octane number, and includes heating oil, HFO, and automobile LPG, which have not been previously studied. Second, studies on fuel price pass-through after 2014 do not seem to have been published. Third, this paper is complemented by two new databases compiled by the author, which contains pricing and policy data on 158 countries. The databases are publicly available and will be updated on a periodic basis by the World Bank, filling an important data gap in information on fuel prices around the world. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the new databases created for the analysis of the paper and describes the data collection methodology. Section 3 explains the price pass-through analysis methodology and summary statistics of data. Section 4 provides the results of the price pass through analysis and Section 5 summarizes the key insights and concludes. 2 New Global Databases on Retail Fuel Prices, Fuel Subsidies and Pricing Mechanisms Having readily available and regularly updated data is crucial to advance knowledge and inform policy on fuel pricing and subsidies. One of the hurdles to assessing regional or global responses of domestic fuel prices to international oil price movements has been the lack of comprehensive and high frequency time series and cross-country data on retail fuel prices as well as up-to-date country specific information on domestic fuel regulations and market conditions. The starting point for computing pass-through coefficients is collection of domestic end-user fuel prices. There have been earlier efforts to collect fuel price data made freely available to the public. However, these datasets have been discontinued or were one-off endeavors and were not updated after the publication of the relevant research pieces. Currently there are no freely available time-series databases of fuel retail prices at a global level. In order to fill this data gap, the author collected monthly data on retail prices of regular gasoline (research octane number, RON, below 95), premium gasoline (RON of 95 or above), diesel, kerosene, LPG for automobiles, bottled LPG, heating oil, and HFO for the period between December 2015 and September 2024. This new Global Fuel Prices Database is the most comprehensive publicly available time-series dataset to date in terms of frequency, time horizon, country coverage, and diversity of fuel products. The database relies on publicly available information. For countries that regulate fuel prices, the author manually collected monthly price announcements from the websites or social media of petroleum agencies, ministry of finance, ministry of energy, and statistical offices. In some cases, the data were sourced from local news articles publishing the government’s press releases on price adjustments. For countries with deregulated prices that conduct regular fuel price surveys, the author manually collected the published monthly average prices for the country and if available for several major cities in the country. There is also no single source of comprehensive data and information on the type of fuel pricing mechanisms and fuel subsidies as well as the fuel market conditions across countries. In order to fill this 6 data gap, the author developed the Global Fuel Subsidies and Price Control Measures Database. 1 This database provides information on (i) each country’s oil sector, including crude oil and refined fuel products trade status and the total domestic refining capacity; (ii) type of fuel pricing regulation implemented in the country; (iii) domestic fuel market conditions (such as fuel rationing, smuggling, and shortages); (iv) type(s) of fuel subsidies implemented in the country; and (v) whether the country is undergoing or considering pricing reforms. It provides these data for 154 economies annually for 2021, 2022 and 2023. The data were collected in English as well as local languages using publicly available sources including websites of ministry of energy, ministry of finance, central bank, petroleum regulatory authority, international sources (e.g., International Energy Agency) and local and international news articles. Both databases are consolidated in World Bank’s new Global Fuel Pricing and Subsidy Policies Dashboard, which is free to use, regularly updated, and built from more than 2,000 verified sources. The other main hurdle to assessing price pass-through is access to relevant international fuel price benchmarks. A few global fuel price benchmarks are available publicly. Access to more comprehensive databases requires paid subscriptions to companies that provide the information, such as Platts and Argus. This study used both publicly available benchmarks as well as fuel price assessments from Platts. It is important to note that a full fuel price pass-through analysis would also require country-level data on local transportation and storage cost of fuels in the domestic markets as well as the margins across the fuel supply chain. This type of data is rarely available and typically requires detailed surveys of transportation, storage, and retailing costs within each country. Thus, pass-through calculations in this and all previous studies are limited, as described in the next section, and therefore the results should be interpreted with caution. 3 Fuel Price Pass-Through Calculations Methodology Throughout this paper the income category classifications are those of the World Bank as of July 2024. 2 The regions are also classified based on the World Bank Country and Lending Groups classifications. Economies are mapped to seven different regions. 3 The analysis covers eight fuels. Table 2 shows the number of economies covered by each fuel type. In addition to analyzing the data by income group and region, this paper further classifies countries based on whether they are net crude oil and refined fuel importers or exporters, 4 whether they subsidize fuels, whether they have fuel price controls in place, the initial domestic prices, and the level of currency depreciation. The study covered the period from December 2017 to December 2023 and further sub-divided this period into three subintervals: December 2017 to April 2020, April 2020 to June 2022, and June 2022 to December 2023. 1 The analyses in this paper rely on the February 2025 version of the databases. 2 For the 2025 fiscal year, economies are classified by GNI per capita using the World Bank Atlas method. Low-income economies have a GNI per capita of $1,145 or less in 2023. Lower middle-income economies have a GNI per capita between $1,146 and $4,515. Upper middle-income economies have a GNI per capita between $4,516 and $14,005. High-income economies have a GNI per capita exceeding $14,005. Source: World Bank Country and Lending Groups. The World Bank. Accessed in July 2024. 3 The seven regions are: East Asia and Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa; North America; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: World Bank Country and Lending Groups. The World Bank. Accessed in July 2024. 4 Net fuel export status of the country is calculated based on IEA’s World Energy Balances subtracting total imports of the relevant fuel from country’s exports of the fuel in the last year of the subperiod considered. Economies are classified as net exporters if net exports are above 500 ktoe for all fuels except kerosene, where a threshold of 100 ktoe was used. The threshold to calculate net crude oil export status was also 500 ktoe. For a few countries with missing data from the IEA database, data from BMI and OEC was used. 7 Table 2: Summary of data Economy category Number of economies in the analysis per fuel type Regular Premium Diesel Kerosene LPG LPG Heating Fuel Gasoline Gasoline Bottled Auto Oil Oil Income classification High income 14 46 49 7 5 23 26 19 Upper-middle income 21 28 32 15 13 13 1 6 Lower-middle income 29 20 29 22 15 2 N/A 6 Low income 9 4 15 10 8 1 N/A 3 Regional breakdown East Asia and Pacific 11 13 14 8 3 3 N/A 1 Europe and Central 5 36 37 2 N/A 24 26 19 Asia Latin America and the 17 21 23 12 13 7 N/A 2 Caribbean Middle East and North 10 11 12 4 5 2 N/A 1 Africa North America 2 2 2 N/A N/A 1 1 N/A South Asia 3 4 6 2 3 1 N/A 1 Sub-Saharan Africa 25 11 31 26 17 1 N/A 10 TOTAL 73 5 98 6 125 7 54 8 41 9 39 27 34 Source: “Global Fuel Prices Database” (World Bank 2025) As an illustration of how the fuel price pass-through coefficients were calculated, the pass-through coefficient in the first subperiod would equal � ( ) − ( ) � 2020 2017 � ℎ ( ) − ℎ ( ) � 2020 2017 where all domestic retail fuel prices are expressed in local currency units (LCU) and the Platts benchmark prices are the free-on-board (FOB) prices of the fuel in the relevant international market (e.g., Arab Gulf, West Africa, US Gulf Coast) 10 converted to the same LCU, unless landed prices were available. More specifically, if Platts quotations based on cost, insurance, and freight (CIF) at a port in the country or close to it were available, they were used instead of FOB prices. The equation above shows that benchmark fuel prices are lagged by one month to provide retail prices with adequate time to adjust to changes in global prices because shipping, storage, and transportation of fuels takes time. The actual lag is likely to depend on the size of the economy since smaller economies tend to import fuels less frequently (e.g., every few months). The distance between the consumption centers and the locations of the benchmark prices would also impact the actual lag between international benchmark prices and the domestic retail prices. All the international price benchmarks used in the analysis by region and fuel are provided in Appendix 1. These were matched to each country in the analysis based on the proximity of the benchmark fuel’s cargos to the country. For example, for the gasoline price pass-through analysis of countries in West Africa, Platts CIF price quotations for gasoline delivery to Lome and Lagos were used. These price quotations take into 5 The analysis for regular gasoline includes 72 countries and 1 territory (Cayman Islands). 6 The analysis for premium gasoline includes 95 countries and 3 territories (Cayman Islands, French Guaina, and Netherland Antilles). 7 The analysis for diesel includes 122 countries and 3 territories (Cayman Islands, French Guaina, and Netherland Antilles). 8 The analysis for kerosene includes 53 countries and 1 economy (West Bank and Gaza). 9 The analysis for LPG Bottled includes 39 countries, 1 territory (Netherland Antilles) and 1 economy (West Bank and Gaza). 10 The international fuel prices used in the analysis are listed in the Appendix Table A1.1. 8 account shipping costs to West Africa. If applicable CIF prices were not available, then FOB prices in the relevant region were used. For example, for the diesel price pass-through analysis of Turkish prices, the Mediterranean FOB prices were used as the international benchmark. These prices thus do not account for transportation of diesel to Türkiye and are likely to be lower than actual importation costs of diesel. However, because the calculation formula takes the difference between two months, the absolute levels of shipping costs affect the coefficients less than their differences between the two time periods. For kerosene, this paper analyzed local retail prices for domestic kerosene used by households for lighting and cooking. Unfortunately, there are no international price benchmarks for household kerosene. As a result, the analysis used international price benchmarks for jet kerosene, which has more stringent specifications than domestic kerosene and may be costlier. An additional consideration is that fuel quality in a given country does not necessarily match those of benchmark fuels. For example, ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) is chosen for some locations, which may be far more stringent than the fuel quality in the country being examined, making the benchmark price higher. However, again because differences are taken, absolute price levels matter less. It should also be noted that there is variation in the domestic prices used in the analysis. Some countries (e.g., Gabon) follow pan-territorial pricing where there is one regulated fuel price for the entire country. The price pass-through calculations for these countries are based on these uniform prices on the domestic market. In some countries that follow pan-territorial pricing there is an active black-market in fuels where prices deviate significantly from regulated prices, but higher prices from black marketing are unrelated to calculation of pass-through coefficients and instead represent unintended consequences of consumer price subsidies. Some countries with regulated prices allow spatial price variation by setting differentiated fuel prices by region. In such cases, this paper captured the price pass-through for the fuel price in the capital city of the country (e.g., Gaborone in Botswana) or the region closest to a port (e.g., coastal regions for South Africa). In countries with deregulated fuel prices, this study used the average of the surveyed fuel prices across the country (e.g., UK), or in the capital city (e.g. Moscow for the Russian Federation), or in a main city in the country close to a port (e.g., Istanbul for Türkiye). To complement the interpretation of price pass-through coefficients for gasoline and diesel, this paper also presents a comparison between retail prices reported by the US Energy Information Administration for Petroleum Administration for Defense District 3 (PADD 3) and domestic retail prices in the countries studied. There are six states including one landlocked one in PADD 3, which are on or near the US Gulf Coast (USGC). There are large-scale, efficient refineries processing a mix of domestic and imported crude oil in PADD 3 and taxes on gasoline and diesel are low. Markedly lower domestic pump prices than those in PADD 3 may suggest the presence of consumer price subsidies in the country. The price pass through coefficients were calculated for four distinct time periods: • December 2017 to April 2020 (first subperiod) • April 2020 to June 2022 (second subperiod) • June 2022 to December 2023 (third subperiod) • December 2017 to December 2023 (full period) These dates were chosen to ensure sufficient large price differences to provide confidence in the qualitative trends observed. December 2017 and December 2023 were chosen as the start and end periods because the average PADD 3 regular gasoline prices (in real 2023 US$/liter) were within ± US$0.05/liter of the average for the entire study period. PADD 3 diesel prices during these months varied by ± US$0.04/liter from the overall average. Moreover, the average Brent price during these months was within US$0.06/liter 9 of the average for the entire six-year analysis. April 2020 was selected because Brent oil price fell to its lowest level since February 1999, decreasing by approximately US$0.32/liter from January 2020 to April 2020. Accordingly, the FOB prices of PADD 3 regular gasoline decreased by about US$0.20/liter during this period. Similarly, the FOB prices of PADD 3 diesel dropped by US$0.16/liter from January to April 2020. June 2022 was chosen because Brent oil prices peaked at their highest level since September 2014, rising about US$0.22/liter from December 2021 to June 2022. FOB prices of PADD 3 regular gasoline increased by approximately US$0.41/liter during this period, reaching their highest level in June 2022, the same month as the Brent peak. Similarly, PADD 3 diesel FOB price rose by about US$0.52/liter, reaching its highest price of US$1.47/liter in June 2022. Table 3 highlights changes in PADD 3 prices for gasoline and diesel in the months analyzed by the paper. Table 3: US Gulf Coast Prices (PADD 3) for Regular Gasoline, Premium Gasoline, and Diesel December 2017 April 2020 June 2022 December 2023 PADD 3 regular gasoline prices 0.71 0.50 1.24 0.69 (US$/liter) PADD 3 premium gasoline (US$/liter) 0.73 0.61 1.39 0.90 PADD 3 diesel prices (US$/liter) 0.87 0.71 1.47 0.92 The selection criteria for these dates were further based on two additional factors: • The time gaps between these dates are long enough to allow governments to adjust fuel prices. This is crucial in countries with regulated prices, where adjustments take time compared to deregulated markets with market-clearing prices. • The price differences between these periods are large enough to minimize noise in the data, making it easier to isolate the impact of price changes from other factors. 11 There are several limitations to the price pass-through analysis that should be noted and results interpreted with caution. The analysis is constrained by a lack of country-specific data for shipping costs of fuels to the country (unless benchmark prices are CIF and typical parcel volumes are comparable to those assumed for the benchmark prices), costs of domestic transportation and storage, and the margins of distributors and retailers. As a result, the price pass-through calculations do not capture the full pass-through from international benchmark prices all the way to end-user prices. The analysis also considers only a one-month lag between international price movements and domestic retail price movements. The time lag is likely be much longer for small economies with low consumption or locations far from major refining centers setting benchmark prices. For example, some countries import fuels only every three or four months. In such markets fuel prices would be expected to follow international price movements with a longer lag than what this study assumed. Another limitation is that this study did not assess exchange rate subsidies and instead used the official exchange rate to convert international fuel prices to the local currency. Some countries had multiple exchange rates, with over-valued rates applied to fuel imports. In such cases, using the official exchange rate, which is more depreciated, would be justified because using the latter captures the exchange rate subsidy. However, in other countries foreign exchange at the official rate is rationed and severely restricted, forcing most firms to purchase dollars on the parallel market, where exchange rates are considerably more depreciated. In such cases, the parallel-market rates should be used to compute the pass-through coefficients. Due to resource limitations, parallel-market rates were not collected, resulting in over-stated 11 These two factors were obtained from: Kojima (2012), “Oil Price Risks and Pump Price Adjustments,” The World Bank. 10 pass-through coefficients in the latter case. Appendix 4: List of Economies with Multiple Exchange Rate Practices provides a list of economies in the analysis with multiple exchange rate practices and the possible reasons for their use. Because of the foregoing limitations, pass-through coefficients should be interpreted with caution. The pass-through coefficients may enable qualitative assessment, but not necessarily quantitative. A pass- through coefficient of less than 1 does not necessarily indicate a subsidy, fuel tax reductions, or financial losses by oil marketing companies. Conversely, a pass-through coefficient of greater than 1 does not mean that consumers were over-charged, taxes and other fees were increased, or even that international fuel price changes were fully passed on to consumers. If starting prices were subsidized to begin with, increasing domestic prices by more than the percentage changes in international prices may still leave domestic prices subsidized. 4 Findings: Passing-Through of International Fuel Price Changes to Retail Prices This section presents observations from the fuel price and subsidy datasets as well as the findings of the price pass-through analysis for each fuel. The full results of the pass-through analysis are provided in Appendix 2, including the average and median pass-through coefficients organized by a range of country and sector characteristics such as country income classification, region, oil trade status, and the type of fuel price regulation. 4.1 Gasoline Gasoline is used primarily as an automotive fuel in small and medium vehicles. In low- and lower-middle- income countries, gasoline is regarded as a fuel of the better-off because the poor do not own vehicles. As a result, gasoline pricing is often among the first to be deregulated. There are different grades of gasoline based on RON, which is a measure of the fuel’s ability to withstand knocking in city driving. Modern vehicles require a RON of 90 or higher. The higher the compression ratio of an engine, the higher the fuel economy and the higher the RON required, but using gasoline with a higher RON than what the engine requires does not increase fuel economy. Typically, regular gasoline has a RON of 90–92, premium gasoline about 95, and super gasoline 97 or 98. Some countries—notably in North America—use an octane index instead of RON. An octane index averages research and motor octane numbers and may be about 4–5 points lower than RON. For this reason, regular gasoline has an octane index of 87 in North America. This study considers gasoline with a RON lower than 95 to be regular gasoline and that with a RON of 95 or higher to be “premium”. Within the regular gasoline grade, however, there is considerable variation. Some countries have gasoline with RON in the 80s, as in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Gasoline grades with such low octane numbers tend to be (heavily) subsidized. Figure 3 shows the fluctuations in US PADD 3 pump prices for regular gasoline prices against movements in domestic retail prices in several countries. Gasoline prices in the US PADD 3 are among the lowest deregulated prices globally because US federal and state fuel taxes in PADD 3 are low and supply costs are also relatively low because the market is efficient and highly competitive with good supply infrastructure. If other countries’ domestic gasoline prices are markedly below the PADD 3 pump prices, then there is a high likelihood that their pump prices do not reflect costs of supply and are subsidized. For example, gasoline prices in Algeria are consistently below PADD 3 pump prices while Azerbaijan’s are well below US pump prices since 2021. Domestic gasoline pump prices in these two countries do not track international oil price movements and are much less volatile than those in PADD 3. Azerbaijan’s 92 RON gasoline price was frozen in the local currency from January 2017 until July 2024 when Azerbaijan’s tariff council at the request of the State Oil Company of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) raised the prices of gasoline and diesel. By contrast, gasoline prices in Peru are deregulated and are overall either above or around the same 11 level as PADD 3 pump prices. Among the countries examined in this study, thirty-four countries in June 2022 had gasoline prices that were lower than the US PADD 3 pump prices. Figure 3: US PADD 3 Regular Gasoline Prices vs Domestic Regular Gasoline Prices in Select Countries (US$2023/liter) Note: Dashed lines show price movements for PADD 3 pump prices. The solid lines show movements in domestic retail prices of gasoline in selected countries. The price pass-through coefficients for regular and premium gasoline indicate that many countries likely did not fully pass through changes in international prices to domestic pump prices. The results of pass- through coefficient calculations in each of the four subperiods studied are presented in the paragraphs below, placed in the context of the relevant geopolitical and market developments in each. The first subperiod between December 2017 and April 2020 was a period of declining international oil prices. If countries passed through the decrease in international prices to their retail prices, then the coefficient should be positive. However, for this subperiod’s price pass-through coefficients in some countries are negative because their prices in December 2017 were too low, prompting governments to adjust domestic prices upward while international prices were trending downwards. Indonesia, as an example, raised domestic prices to bring them more in line with international gasoline prices. Indonesia subsidizes one grade of gasoline called ‘Pertalite,’ which has a RON of 90. Its price in December 2017 was only 90 percent of the price in PADD 3 and the government increased the price of Pertalite by 17 percent in real terms during this subperiod. Overall, the average and median for price pass-through coefficients for regular gasoline are negative for this subperiod in low-income countries (e.g., Sierra Leone’s gasoline price increased by 32 percent in real terms during this period) and the countries in South Asia, MENA, and Europe and Central Asia (ECA) regions. There is a different trend for the second subperiod from April 2020 to June 2022 when international oil prices rose significantly. The average and median price pass-through coefficients during this period for both classes of gasoline are below 1 for the whole sample indicating that most countries did not pass through the rise in international prices fully onto their population. All of the low-income countries in the sample had coefficients well below 1 for this subperiod, suggesting that these countries subsidized gasoline prices. Nearly all countries with regulated gasoline prices did not pass through the rise in international prices fully to their pump prices. Only 13 percent of the countries with regulated prices have coefficients above 1 compared to 47 percent of countries with deregulated prices (Figure 4). Among the countries with regulated prices, 3 percent even decreased rather than increased prices in this subperiod. 12 Figure 4: Regular Gasoline Price Pass-Through Results based on Price Regulation in the Countries The lowest coefficients for regular gasoline are observed in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 5). In 2022, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Gabon and others tried to maintain existing gasoline subsidies to keep pump prices frozen, but rising international oil prices and escalating fuel import bills in 2022 left these countries struggling to find the fiscal space to maintain the subsidies. The government of Burkina Faso accumulated arrears of over US$660 million (close to 3.5 percent of GDP) to the National Oil Company, SONABHY, between March and December 2022, forcing SONABHY to build up arrears with its fuel import suppliers. In December 2022 and January 2023 there were fuel shortages in the country leading fuel rationing by the government. In some countries there is active fuel smuggling from neighboring countries that heavily subsidize prices. For example, in Benin contraband gasoline prices are lower than regulated prices as contraband gasoline is smuggled from Nigeria where it has historically been heavily subsidized. Thus, the contraband gasoline price pass through is -0.01 while the official price’s pass through is 0.23. Figure 5: Distribution of Price Pass-Through Coefficients for Regular Gasoline 13 Note: A few countries appear more than once in the histogram as they have several grades of gasoline. For example, the chart captures Peru’s prices of gasoline RON 90 and 92. The figure includes multiple entries for a few countries where data were available for both official and contraband prices (e.g., Benin). Many countries did not fully pass through the international price increases for premium gasoline in the second subperiod (Figure 6). Low-income countries again had the lowest pass-through coefficients, as well as net crude oil exporting countries such as Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Nigeria, and Oman. Over 60 percent of net crude oil exporters had price pass-through coefficients less than 0.5. For example, Algeria has historically subsidized gasoline. In 2021, Algerian leaders announced plans for fuel tax increases and subsidy cuts in an effort to rein in unsustainable deficit spending. However, as international prices rose in 2022, the government announced they were delaying the planned tax increases and subsidy reforms. Surging demand for Algeria’s oil and gas exports temporarily reduced pressure for subsidy reforms and created fiscal space to continue funding subsidy programs. Fifteen countries that are net crude oil exporters are net gasoline importers as they do not have sufficient domestic refining capacity to supply gasoline to their domestic market and thus rely on imports. Sixty percent of these countries had price pass-through coefficients less than 0.5, indicating they subsidized prices, potentially relying on revenues from their higher crude oil export revenues. Figure 6: Distribution of Price Pass-Through Coefficients for Premium Gasoline Note: The histogram includes several data points for a few countries as they have several grades of gasoline. For example, the chart captures the prices of gasoline RON 95 and 97 in Chile and prices of RON 95 and 98 gasoline in the United Arab Emirates. Because oil prices are denominated in US dollars, currency depreciation is another important factor. If during times of rising global oil prices, local currency depreciation can exacerbate the impact on domestic retail prices. Overall, countries that experienced currency depreciation between April 2020 and June 2022 had low levels of price pass-through. For regular gasoline, 27 countries that experienced currency depreciation had price pass-through coefficients lower than 0.5. For example, Uzbekistan experienced significant depreciation in its currency but only had a price pass-through coefficient of 0.35 (Figure 7). For premium gasoline, Malta, Nigeria, Peru, and Sierra Leone experienced currency depreciation in this period and had coefficients below 0.5 (Figure 8). 14 Figure 7: Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Regular Gasoline Price Pass Through for Select Countries Figure 8: Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Premium Gasoline Price Pass Through for Select Countries 4.2 Diesel Diesel is an intermediate good used extensively in all economies. As an automotive fuel, diesel is used in large vehicles, such as buses and trucks, to transport passengers and goods. Diesel is also used to generate energy. As such, many governments in developing countries are keen to keep diesel prices relatively low because higher diesel prices are transmitted to the rest of the economy in the form of higher prices of goods and services. In many countries, diesel remains subsidized much longer than gasoline. The limits on the sulfur content of diesel are much tighter for automotive diesel than for diesel used in power generation and industries. Most high-income countries lowered fuel sulfur levels to 10–15 parts per million (ppm) many years ago in what is known as ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD). For use in stationary sources, however, the sulfur content is much higher and correspondingly the price is lower. There is variation in how domestic diesel prices track international diesel prices. Figure 9 displays PADD 3 retail prices for diesel alongside diesel pump prices in several countries. While diesel prices are deregulated in the Slovak Republic, they are regulated in Fiji and Bolivia. Diesel prices in both the Slovak Republic and Fiji are above the PADD 3 prices and track them. The diesel pricing formula in Fiji is tied to the international prices of oil and the exchange rate. It is updated monthly based on a formula that passes through the movements in the Means of Platts Singapore (MOPS), international freight rates, and foreign 15 exchange onto pump prices, thereby tracking international prices closely. By contrast, diesel prices in Bolivia are regulated by the government and have been frozen for several years. Looking at the overall sample, in June 2022 fifty-one countries had diesel prices that were more than 70 percent lower than the PADD 3 prices. Figure 9: PADD 3 Diesel Prices vs Domestic Diesel Prices in Select Countries (US$2023/liter) Note: Dashed lines show international price movements for PADD 3 pump prices. The solid lines show movements in domestic retail prices of the fuel in selected countries. Diesel price pass-through coefficients indicate that many countries did not pass through changes in international prices fully to domestic pump prices. The average and the median of the pass-through coefficients for the full sample are above 1 only when the full time period December 2017 to December 2023 is considered. Looking at the first subperiod when global prices were declining, several low-income countries increased their domestic retail prices, leading to an average coefficient of -2.44 for this group. For example, in real terms diesel prices increased by 10.4 percent in Liberia within this time period. For the second subperiod, most countries with deregulated prices passed through the rise in international prices, in stark contrast to only 10 percent of countries with regulated prices having pass-through coefficients above 1.25 (Figure 10). Unlike gasoline, there is no discernible difference in the average pass- through coefficients between net diesel exporters and importers or between net crude importers and exporters. Even the distribution of price pass-through coefficients is very similar among these categories (Figure 11). 16 Figure 10: Diesel Price Pass Through by Type of Fuel Price Regulation Figure 11: Diesel Price Pass Through by Net Diesel Trade Status of Country As with premium gasoline, North America and ECA are the only regions that on average fully passed through international fuel price changes on to domestic consumers in the second subperiod. The Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region has the most divergent range of coefficients for diesel. Panama, where diesel prices are deregulated, followed international price movements closely and had the highest coefficient in the region (Figure 12). By contrast, diesel price pass-through coefficient for Colombia was significantly below 1, reflecting the government’s subsidy policy using its fuel price stabilization fund. Malawi is the only low-income country in this subperiod with a coefficient above 1. Malawi regulates fuel prices and has a Price Stabilization Fund (PSF), which was used in early 2022 to subsidize pump prices but was depleted by June 2022. The Malawi Energy Regulatory Authority in that month raised pump prices by 45 percent, 31 percent, and 29 percent for gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, respectively. The diesel price increase in June 2022 is reflected in Malawi’s price pass-through coefficient of 1.95 for the second subperiod. 17 Figure 12: Distribution of Price Pass-Through Coefficients for Diesel Note: A few countries appear more than once in the histogram as they have several grades of diesel; for example, the figure captures both low sulfur diesel and regular diesel prices in El Salvador. Another significant observation is that in most countries where there is an active black market in fuels the price pass through coefficients were well below 1 in the second subperiod. Eighty percent of countries that have a black market in fuels had coefficients below 0.75 (Figure 13). This is not surprising as keeping official prices low through subsidies typically creates distortions in the domestic fuel market including incentivizing black marketing especially if there are fuel shortages in the country. There were fuel shortages reported in 2022 in more than 80 percent of these countries. Figure 13: Diesel Price Pass Through by Existence of Fuel Black Market in the Country Currency fluctuation is again another factor impacting price pass through. Overall countries that experienced depreciation of their currency had lower levels of pass-through. For example, Algeria experienced significant currency depreciation, but the pass-through coefficient was almost zero (Figure 14). Twenty-four countries, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA, whose currencies had depreciated in this subperiod had price pass-through coefficients of less than 0.5. 18 Figure 14: Exchange Rate Fluctuations and Diesel Price Pass Through for Select Countries 4.3 Kerosene Kerosene is a fuel used in aviation as well as by households for cooking and lighting. Similarly to other fuels, there is variation in how closely countries track international prices for kerosene. For example, kerosene prices in Türkiye (where they are deregulated) and Lesotho (where they are regulated) closely follow the international prices. In contrast, Burkina Faso, Gabon and Niger deviate significantly from international price movements as these countries froze domestic kerosene prices for several years. Guatemala deregulated prices of many fuels in 2013 but still regulates kerosene prices. The kerosene price in the country was frozen between January 2019 till January 2022. Since the beginning of 2022 the price has been fluctuating more in line with international prices. Lesotho is an interesting case of sensible price regulation because monthly adjustments take international and local factors into account and there is a correction levy to account for the difference between the actual international prices observed in a given month and the prices from the previous month, which formed the basis for price setting. Lesotho’s petroleum fund publishes monthly fuel prices on its website and publishes a monthly report on the underlying fundamentals of the regulated fuel prices. Kerosene price pass-through coefficients for the countries examined are well above 1 only when the full study period is considered. The Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA regions consistently had the lowest pass- through coefficients. Angola, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Niger’s coefficients are zero for all four periods suggesting these countries did not pass through any of the changes in international prices. While the Arab Republic of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia’s coefficients are below 0.5 for all periods. Countries with deregulated prices consistently had higher price pass-through coefficients for kerosene than those with regulated prices. In the second subperiod in which international prices rose markedly, over 40 percent of countries with deregulated kerosene prices passed through the rise in international prices (with a pass-through coefficient of above 1.25) compared to only 13 percent of countries with regulated prices (Figure 15). Similarly to diesel, countries that have an active fuel black market had some of the lowest price pass-through coefficients for kerosene. More than 70 percent of this group had coefficients below 0.5. 19 Figure 15: Kerosene Price Pass Through by Type of Fuel Price Regulation Countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA regions had the lowest kerosene price pass-through coefficients (Figure 16). The Philippines is one of only three countries 12 in the sample with pass-through coefficients above 1.2 for all four subperiods. Fuel prices in the Philippines have been deregulated since 1988. The fuel market is regulated by the Department of Energy (DoE), which monitors prices around the country and publishes a survey of retail prices on its website. The DoE regularly reviews the FOB price of each fuel, the costs of freight, customs, and domestic logistics, and exchange rate fluctuations to evaluate whether retail prices are economically efficient. The DoE’s Department of Justice Task Force can intervene in the market if it deems that price changes have been made unfairly, as authorized in the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998. During times of high prices, the DoE engages actively with the media to explain the rationale behind price increases. There were a number of protests in 2022 against rising fuel prices and calls on the government to reduce or suspend taxes and excises on fuels, but the government resisted such measures. It issued several public statements throughout 2022 indicating that the economic cost of reducing taxes on fuels would be high while such tax reduction would benefit mainly wealthier taxpayers. The government in 2022 instead provided monthly unconditional cash transfers to poor households and re-instituted its public transport fuel subsidy program that it had created in 2021 but had suspended since. 12 The other countries where kerosene price pass-through coefficients are above 1 for all four periods are Grenada and Türkiye. 20 Figure 16: Distribution of Price Pass-Through Coefficients for Kerosene Note: The figure includes multiple data points for a few countries where kerosene prices are split by type of user (e.g., Sri Lanka). 4.4 Liquified Petroleum Gas: Bottled LPG and Autogas LPG is a mixture of propane and butane. It is the only fuel of the eight examined that is sourced from both crude oil and natural gas. Automotive LPG is typically propane, but the LPG composition differs from country to country for bottled LPG used for non-automotive purposes. In some countries, such as those in North America, bottled LPG is propane; at the opposite end of the spectrum, LPG is called butane in Panama and other countries. Bottled LPG is used by households not connected to natural gas pipelines for cooking. LPG is in a gaseous state but can be compressed into a liquid under pressure and distributed in cylinders, usually made of metal. This metal management significantly increases the storage and distribution costs of LPG, making end-user prices markedly higher than the prices at the refinery or the gas processing plant gate. The impact of economies of scale for LPG is also much greater than for other liquid fuels, making the unit cost much lower when sold in large cylinders. However, due to affordability constraints, many countries offer small-size LPG cylinders for household consumption, such as 3-6 kilograms (kg), alongside larger cylinders (25–100 kg) intended for commercial purposes. In the past few decades, many developing countries provided universal price subsidies for this fuel as part of the efforts to promote clean cooking by switching from biomass to LPG. For example, the government of Côte d’Ivoire has frozen the prices of bottled LPG since January 2017 and Burkina Faso since February 2021. The type of LPG subsidy varies across countries. Some countries use universal price subsidies in which case all consumers have access to LPG below the cost of supply. Other countries subsidize only smaller-sized LPG cylinders with the expectation that richer households and commercial operators prefer the convenience of using larger-sized cylinders, even if their prices are unsubsidized and much higher. Low-income countries overall did not fully pass through changes in international prices on to domestic LPG prices. Especially in the second subperiod, more than 85 percent of these countries had coefficients below 0.5, indicating they subsidized LPG. The price pass-through coefficient was zero for Angola, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Niger, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Togo (Figure 17). All of these countries had universal price subsidies for LPG in 2022 21 which, along with their other fuel subsidies, increasing put pressure on the budget. For example, Burkina Faso, due to ballooning fuel subsidy costs, stopped subsidizing large bottles of LPG (17–55 kg, intended for manufacturers and restaurants) at the end of 2022 but maintained the subsidy for smaller LPG bottles. Contrary to the initial optimistic expectations by governments, subsidies based on cylinder size have rarely, if ever, been found not to be captured by better-off households and commercial establishments, and Burkina Faso was no exception. Once they lost their subsidies, purchasers of LPG in larger bottles switched to small bottles (2.5–12 kg), which continued to be subsidized. An immediate result was much higher demand for subsidized LPG than expected which in turn caused shortages of subsidized LPG by December 2022 and soaring black market prices. The government in 2023 and 2024 maintained the subsidy on small LPG cylinders, placing a heavy fiscal burden on the budget while shortages of subsidized LPG persisted. In the first quarter of 2024, the government was estimated to owe FCFA 19.28 billion (US$32.7 million) to the state-owned oil company for the LPG subsidy. Figure 17: Distribution of Price Pass-Through Coefficients for Bottled LPG Note: The figure includes multiple data points for a few countries where LPG prices are split by type of user (e.g., El Salvador). LPG is also used as an automotive fuel in some countries, known as autogas. It is more prevalent in European and Latin American countries but some Asian countries such as India and Thailand also utilize it. From the 40 countries studied for this paper, none froze the pump prices of autogas. For the second subperiod, only six countries 13 in the sample had coefficients below 0.5, Thailand among them. Although fuel prices have been officially deregulated since 1991, the country has an Oil Stabilization Fund, which is used to cross-subsidize LPG and a few other fuels. The ex-refinery prices of fuels should always be markedly lower than the retail prices if there are no subsidies. However, between July 2021 and April 2023 ex-refinery prices were above retail prices for autogas (Figure 18). During this time period, Thailand subsidized autogas prices along with other fuels by making lump-sum transfers from the oil fund to fuel producers and importers to compensate for the difference between the ex-refinery price and the retail price. 13 Egypt, France, Mexico, Peru, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand. 22 Figure 18: Thailand’s Autogas prices - ex-refinery vs retail price 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 12/1/2015 12/1/2016 12/1/2017 12/1/2018 12/1/2019 12/1/2020 12/1/2021 12/1/2022 12/1/2023 Thailand (LPG automobile) - Ex-refinery Price Thailand (LPG automobile) - Retail Price 4.5 Heating Oil and HFO Heating oil is typically used in furnaces of buildings for central heating. Heating oil prices are available mainly for ECA and North American countries. From the 27 countries studied, nearly all of them tracked international price movements closely. For example, heating oil prices in Belgium, Croatia, and Poland were well aligned with the movements in Mediterranean cargo prices reported by Platts. For this fuel, the price-pass through coefficients are overall well above 1 for nearly all countries. The main exception is Malta where the price has been frozen since February 2016. The Maltese government has historically subsidized most fuels as well as electricity. It is estimated that the government spent close to US$1 billion between 2021 and 2023 to keep energy prices stable (Xinhua 2023). Prices in Hungary also did not track international price movements during certain time periods (e.g., in 2022). HFO is used predominantly in heavy industry, power generation, and marine transportation. End-user price data on HFO are difficult to obtain because there are no retail outlets and purchase contracts signed between large consumers and fuel suppliers are confidential. From the 34 countries for which price information was available, most followed the international price movements closely. For example, HFO prices in Cabo Verde—where all fuel prices are regulated under an automatic fuel pricing formula that fully passes through import costs—followed the international price movements closely (Figure 19). By contrast other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa froze prices for HFO. Examples include the Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Senegal. The price pass-through coefficients for these countries were below zero in the second subperiod (Figure 19). 23 Figure 19: International Prices vs Cabo Verde Domestic Retail Fuel Oil Price Fluctuations Note: Graph shows price indexes with January 2008 price set at 100. All prices are adjusted for inflation. Dashed lines show price movements of Platts quotations of fuel oil cargos in the Mediterranean. The solid line shows movements in domestic retail prices of the fuel in Cabo Verde. Figure 20: Distribution of Price Pass-Through Coefficients for HFO 24 5 Conclusions Overall, the results indicate that domestic prices in many countries did not track international fuel prices in the second subperiod when international oil price rose significantly. Higher-income countries were more likely pass through the rises in international oil prices compared to other income categories. This result is linked to the fact that most of the high-income countries have deregulated prices that follow market dynamics closely. Across all fuels and time periods, the price pass-through coefficients for countries with deregulated prices are multiple times higher than for countries with regulated prices. This is not to say that all countries with regulated prices deviate from international price fluctuations. In fact, there are several countries with regulated prices that track international fuel prices as closely as deregulated markets. Such country examples for each fuel were provided in the earlier section. Low-income countries in general had the lowest pass-through coefficients and nearly all of these countries have regulated fuel prices. 14 The frequency of fuel price adjustment in regulated markets emerges as another important factor. Figure 21 shows the disparities in average price pass-through coefficients for regular gasoline based on the frequency of price adjustments in the country. 15 Countries that calculate and revise pump prices on a weekly or monthly basis had on average higher levels of pass-through compared to those that revise prices with lower frequency. As expected, countries that freeze fuel prices for extended periods of time had the lowest price pass-through coefficients. The same pattern is observed for all other fuels except heating oil where the sample of countries consisted only of deregulated markets or ones that revised prices weekly. Figure 21: Impact of Frequency of Regular Gasoline Price Adjustment on Pass-Through 14 Liberia and Uganda are the only low-income countries with deregulated prices. Within the lower-middle income group Morocco and the Philippines are the only countries with deregulated fuel prices while Ghana and Nigeria are the only countries where some fuels are deregulated. 15 Average pass-through coefficients for the full period (December 2017 to December 2023) were elevated for some countries given that there was minimal change between December 2017 and December 2023 in the international benchmarks. 25 The degree of deviation between international price benchmarks and domestic fuel prices at the start of the period of analysis is another important consideration. Forty-one countries in April 2020 already had diesel prices well below the PADD 3 diesel price. More than half these countries had price pass-through coefficients below 0.75 in the second sub-period. Similarly for gasoline, at the start of the second sub- period (April 2020), 31 economies had gasoline prices well below PADD 3 prices and over 60 percent of these economies have price pass-through coefficients below 0.75 in the second sub-period. Currency depreciation is another factor that is associated with lower levels of pass through across fuels. Depreciation can magnify the impact of the rise in international fuel prices on the domestic market. Governments may try to shield consumers by not passing through the full increases in prices as currency depreciation elevates the magnitude of price adjustments needed to cover the rise in prices. Overall, countries that experienced currency depreciation between April 2020 and June 2022 had lower price pass- through coefficients. Past studies of fuel price pass-through found that oil exporting countries tended to have significantly lower fuel price pass-through coefficients. Interestingly, this paper finds a more mixed trend between a country being a net exporter of crude oil (Figure 22) or refined products (Figure 23) and low levels of price pass- through. Looking at the sample of net crude oil exporters, there is no significant difference in their price pass-through coefficients for diesel and regular gasoline in the second sub-period and those that are either net importers of crude or do not import crude oil (because there is no domestic refining capacity). For premium gasoline, significantly more net crude oil exporting countries had price pass-through coefficients below 0.8 than non-exporters. The results are slightly different when considering the net trade status of each economy per individual refined fuel. Fewer net exporters of gasoline, diesel, and LPG had price pass- through coefficients below 0.8 compared to net importers of these fuels. The results indicate that fuel exporting countries did not disproportionately subsidize domestic prices of these fuels. Figure 22: Fuel Price Pass Through based on Net Crude Oil Export Status 26 Figure 23: Fuel Price Pass Through based on Net Fuel Trade Status Another common trend is that domestic fuel market conditions are linked to the level of price pass through. In the second subperiod when international prices were rising, countries with coefficients below 0.8 had issues with fuel shortages, fuel smuggling, and fuel black marketing (Figure 24). A larger share of countries where there were reports of fuel shortages, smuggling, and black marketing in 2022 had price pass-through coefficients below 0.8 for most fuels. This finding is not surprising as subsidized fuel prices often lead to distortions in the domestic fuel market. For example, fuel prices in Hungary were deregulated until November 2021 when the government introduced a fuel price cap. Retail gasoline and diesel prices in the country were capped at 480 forints (US$1.21) per liter, substantially below market prices and cheapest in the European Union. The artificially low price attracted a surge in demand as transiting lorries and retail buyers from neighboring countries rushed to Hungary to benefit from the low price. At the same time Hungarian fuel importers were unable to recoup their costs and had to lower imports. The low-price cap became unsustainable leading to widespread fuel shortages in autumn of 2022. Hungary removed all fuel price caps in December 2022 and returned to deregulated prices. Figure 24: Occurrence of Black Marketing, Fuel Shortages & Smuggling 27 Note: The figures relies on data from the "Global Fuel Subsidies and Price Control Measures Database” (World Bank 2025). The database captures for 2021, 2022, and 2023 occurrence of fuel shortages, smuggling, and black marketing based on survey of news reports (both in English and local languages(s)). It is important to note that there are data constraints as some countries’ news outlets may not cover these topics, and there are very limited online news sources available for some countries. In countries where there is an official fuel subsidy in place for any fuel, the price pass-through coefficients across all fuels were on average lower than those in the countries without fuel subsidies. The paper analyzed whether the price pass-through coefficients were impacted if the country was removing temporary time bound subsidies or tax reductions that year or whether the country was reforming or considering reforming fuel subsidies in the last year of the subperiod considered. Figure 25 shows that for regular gasoline those countries that had removed temporary subsidy measures had similar price pass-through coefficients to those with no subsidies. By contrast countries that were in the process of reforming or considering reforms had lower pass-through coefficients. This trend underscores the general pattern that reforming fuel subsidies takes time. Countries with a long history of subsidies that were reforming their subsidy programs still had 28 lower price pass-through coefficients. By contrast, countries that had reduced fuel taxes or consumer subsidies that were temporary seem to depart less from international fuel price movements. Figure 25: Impact of Subsidy Reform on Regular Gasoline Price Pass-Through Note: Graph shows the average price pass-through coefficients for each period based on whether in the last year of the subperiod the country was reforming fuel subsidies. The second subperiod considers whether the country was reforming fuel subsidies in 2022, and the other two periods take the subsidy policy in 2023. A measure was classified as temporary if the government provided an expected end date for the new fuel subsidy or fuel tax reduction at the time the measure was introduced. In 2020, several countries announced plans to reform fuel subsidies. However, the subsequent steady rise in international oil prices put pressure on governments globally, resulting in a proliferation of subsidy and fuel price control measures. Based on the Global Fuel Subsidies and Price Control Measures Database, 14 countries in 2021 introduced temporary fuel tax reductions to mitigate fuel price impact as their economies were recovering from the impact of COVID-19. In 2022, this number rose to 61 countries. In 2021, 47 countries had official fuel subsidies in place and a further 35 kept fuel prices frozen; by 2023, these numbers had risen to 59 and 41, respectively. Most countries in 2022 intervened in domestic fuel markets to reduce pressure on fuel prices, either through lowering fuel taxes or by instituting price subsidies on fuels. This result is supported by the price pass-through analysis presented in this paper. A majority of countries had price pass-through coefficients well below 1 during this subperiod for all eight fuels. Not fully passing through the cost of supplying fuels to the domestic market to end-user prices has repercussions. Artificially keeping prices low can lead to the following:  Distortions and disruptions in the domestic fuel market leading to cross-border smuggling and domestic supply shortages  Reduced fuel tax revenue, which can cause a substantial fiscal loss over long periods. Fuel taxes are often an efficient and equitable source of tax revenues that merit protection to avoid the need for higher distortionary taxes elsewhere in the economy. Passing-through of changes in international fuel prices to domestic prices protects fuel tax revenues and avoids untargeted universal price subsidies.  The fiscal cost of incomplete pass-through may crowd out higher priority public spending areas. The current moderation in international oil prices presents an opportunity for governments to reform their fuel price regulations to bring domestic prices more in line with international market movements while 29 phasing out fuel subsidies. Countries with regulated fuel prices can consider reviewing their fuel pricing formulas to ensure they are using the most appropriate international prices as benchmarks as well as updating the local cost elements in their formulas periodically. Sierra Leone is one country that took advantage of the moderation in oil prices in 2024 to institute a wholesale reform of its fuel pricing formula (Box 2). Box 2: Reforming fuel price regulation - Experience of Sierra Leone Sierra Leone is fully reliant on imports of refined petroleum products in the absence of refining capacity. Sierra Leone’s fuel pricing formula had not been reviewed and materially updated in the past 30 years. The decoupling of the fuel pricing formula from import costs led to demand far exceeding supply, fuel shortages, and black marketing. Sierra Leone also had a unique policy of having the same end-user price for gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and heavy fuel oil for the past several years. As a result, end-user fuel prices did not reflect the differences in supply costs of different fuels. In order to maintain this policy, components in the formula, including taxes and duties, were adjusted on an ad hoc basis to equalize end- user prices, resulting in losses of government revenue and fuel price subsidies. In July 2024, the government updated and operationalized the fuel pricing formula. The main revisions entailed: 1. Allowing price variation between fuel types in the fuel pricing formula. 2. Switching, for gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, from using Platts Mediterranean quotations to Platts West Africa to more accurately reflect the country’s import realities. 3. Introducing a price correction levy into the formula to correct for discrepancies arising between the ex-ante “theoretic” regulated price and the actual costs of fuel supply. This levy is primarily used to adjust for import costs and exchange rates as these are two key elements in the formula where the movements are unknown ex ante. 4. Dissecting the “other charges” component in the formula and removing certain elements, such as war risk, which led to substantial reduction in the components cost per metric ton. The revised formula more accurately accounts for cost dynamics of supplying fuels in the domestic market especially importation costs. Fuel prices are now differentiated between fuel types to reflect the heterogeneity of costs between the fuels more accurately. The Petroleum Regulatory Authority now regularly revises fuel prices based on the formula and transparently publishes the breakdown of the price for each fuel on its website on a monthly basis (https://pra.gov.sl/pricing-formula). The authorities benefited from undertaking these reforms during a period of moderation of international oil prices in 2024. The price of each fuel declined under the revised formula, thus avoiding potential public backlash. In addition, the authorities extensively engaged with all stakeholders to discuss the potential revisions to the formula and revised based on feedback from consumer groups, oil companies, and the relevant ministries. Domestic Fuel Prices in Sierra Leone (NLe/liter) September 2023 – June 2024 July 2024 Under old formula Under updated formula Gasoline 30 28.5 Diesel 30 28.5 Kerosene 30 27.4 Fuel Oil 30 25.3 30 Appendix 1: International Reference Prices Used in Price Pass-Through Analysis Table A1.1: International Reference Prices Used in Price Pass-Through Analysis Gasoline Diesel Kerosene Region International Benchmark Prices Region International Benchmark Prices Region International Benchmark Prices Latin • Gasoline Cost, Insurance, Freight (CIF) CIF Latin • Ultra-low sulfur diesel (ULSD) CIF Eastern Latin • Jet CIF Eastern México America Western Mexico America México cargo America • Jet CFR Brazil cargo and • Gasoline 93 research octane number (RON) CIF and • ULSD CIF Western México cargo and • Jet Peru import parity price (IPP) Caribbean Ecuador Caribbean • ULSD CIF Northwest México Caribbean • Gasoline cost and freight (CFR) Brazil North Coast • ULSD CIF Ecuador cargo Port • ULSD CIF Peru cargo • Gasoline CFR Brazil East Coast Port • ULSD S10 CFR Brazil East Coast Port cargo • US Gulf Coast Waterborne • ULSD CIF Argentina cargo • ULSD US Gulf Coast Waterborne Europe • Gasoline premium free on board (FOB) Europe • ULSD FOB Northwest Europe Europe and • Jet FOB Northwest Europe cargo and Mediterranean and • ULSD FOB Mediterranean Central • Jet FOB Mediterranean cargo Central • Gasoline CIF Northwest Europe cargo Central • ULSD CIF Mediterranean Asia • Jet CIF Northwest Europe cargo Asia • Gasoline CIF Mediterranean Asia • ULSD CIF Northwest Europe Basis United Kingdom cargo • ULSD CIF Le Havre French Port cargo North • Gasoline conventional blendstock for oxygenate North • ULSD USGC prompt pipeline North • Jet kerosene ultra-low sulfur America blending (CBOB) 93 RON US Gulf Coast (USGC) America America (ULS) USGC waterborne • Gasoline CBOB 87 RON USGC Houston prompt pipeline East Asia • Gasoline unleaded 95 RON Means of Platts East Asia • Gasoil CFR Australia cargo CFR Australia cargo East Asia • Jet kerosene MOPS strip and Singapore (MOPS) and • Gasoil MOPS strip and Pacific Pacific • Gasoline unleaded 92 RON CFR Australia cargo Pacific • Gasoil FOB Japan cargo • Gasoline unleaded 95 RON CFR Australia cargo • Gasoline unleaded FOB South China • Gasoline unleaded 92 RON FOB Singapore cargo South • Gasoline 92 RON Means of Platts (MOP) West South • Gasoil MOP West India South Asia • Jet kerosene MOP West India Asia India Asia Sub- • Gasoline unleaded 95 RON South Africa Sub- • Gasoil FOB ship to ship (STS) Lomé West Sub- • Jet kerosene CFR South Africa Saharan • Gasoline CIF West Africa Saharan Africa Saharan • Jet fuel FOB STS Lomé West Africa Africa • Gasoil CFR South Africa Africa Africa cargo Middle • Gasoline CIF Mediterranean Middle • Gasoil FOB Fujairah United Aarab Emirates Middle • Jet FOB Mediterranean cargo East and • Gasoline 95 RON & 92 RON unleaded FOB Arab East and cargo East and • Jet kerosene MOPS strip North Gulf Jebel Ali cargo North • Gasoil FOB Fujairah United Aarab Emirates North Africa Africa cargo Africa • ULSD FOB Mediterranean • Gasoil FOB Arab Gulf LPG – Bottled LPG - Autogas Heating Oil & HFO Region International Benchmark Prices Region International Benchmark Prices Region International Benchmark Prices Latin • LPG Brazil East Coast Port IPP Latin • Propane CFR Brazil East Coast Port cargo Latin • Fuel Oil 1%S CIF Mediterranean America • LPG Brazil Southeast Coast Port IPP America • Propane FOB USGC prices America cargo and • USGC average of butane and propane prices and and • Fuel Oil 1%S CIF NWE cargo Caribbean Caribbean Caribbean • Fuel Oil 1.6% sulfur FOB Colombia cargo • Fuel Oil 180 CST 2.0%S FOB Singapore cargo • Fuel Oil 180 CST 2.0%S FOB Singapore cargo • Fuel Oil 3.5%S CIF Mediterranean cargo Europe • North Sea average of butane and propane prices Europe • North Sea propane prices Europe and • Fuel Oil 1% sulfur CIF and • Sonatrach (Algerian company) average of butane and • Sonatrach (Algerian company) propane prices Central Mediterranean cargo Central and propane prices Central Asia • Fuel Oil 1% sulfur CIF Northwest Asia Asia Europe cargo North • USGC average of butane and propane prices North • Propane FOB USGC prices North • Fuel Oil 1% sulfur New York America America America Harbor Strip East Asia • Arab Gulf average of butane and propane prices East Asia • North Sea propane prices (Fiji) East Asia • Fuel Oil 180 centistokes (CST) and and • Propane FOB USGC prices (Mongolia) and Pacific 2.0% sulfur FOB Spore cargo Pacific Pacific • Arab Gulf propane prices (Thailand) South • Arab Gulf average of butane and propane prices South • Arab Gulf propane prices South Asia • Fuel Oil 180 CST 3.5% sulfur Asia Asia MOPS strip • Fuel Oil 180 CST 2.0% sulfur FOB Spore cargo Sub- • Arab Gulf average of butane and propane prices Sub- • Arab Gulf propane prices (Mozambique) Sub- • Fuel Oil 3.5% sulfur CIF Saharan • Sonatrach (Algerian company) average of butane Saharan Saharan Mediterranean cargo Africa and propane prices Africa Africa Middle • Arab Gulf average of butane and propane prices Middle • Arab Gulf propane prices Middle N/A East and • Sonatrach (Algerian company) average of butane East and • Sonatrach (Algerian company) propane prices East and North and propane prices North North Africa Africa Africa Appendix 2: Price Pass Through Coefficients – Averages and Medians by different country classifications and characteristics Table A2.1: Average pass-through coefficients for each period by income classification Income Regular Gasoline Premium Gasoline Diesel Kerosene Classification Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 All 0.18 0.52 0.17 1.42 0.39 0.81 0.52 1.65 -0.30 0.84 0.34 1.47 -0.11 0.71 -0.18 2.31 Low Income -0.73 0.24 -1.26 1.84 0.02 0.34 0.39 0.91 -2.44 0.28 -0.86 1.68 -0.25 0.38 -1.04 1.52 Lower-middle -0.08 0.54 0.06 1.30 0.08 0.65 -0.02 1.60 -1.19 0.78 -0.14 1.36 -0.55 0.76 0.79 2.01 Income Upper-middle 0.67 0.50 0.59 1.30 0.57 0.70 0.61 1.58 0.14 0.74 0.34 1.47 0.72 0.86 -1.40 3.85 Income High Income 0.40 0.70 0.40 1.66 0.47 0.99 0.75 1.77 0.51 1.12 0.92 1.49 -0.01 0.74 0.37 1.09 Income LPG Bottled LPG Auto Heating Oil Fuel Oil Classification Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 – 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 16 2020 2022 2023 2023 17 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 All 0.22 0.67 0.31 1.68 0.36 1.54 1.29 5.58 1.22 1.46 1.64 1.40 0.85 0.71 1.15 1.41 Low Income -0.04 0.09 -0.43 2.01 -0.27 0.74 -0.39 7.01 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 -0.52 0.01 -1.10 Lower-middle 0.21 0.94 0.77 1.08 -0.32 1.48 -0.72 3.37 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.43 0.73 1.54 0.97 Income Upper-middle 0.35 0.60 0.39 1.41 -0.30 1.30 1.61 4.99 N/A 1.01 0.93 0.99 0.64 0.61 1.13 1.40 Income High Income 0.31 1.00 -0.32 4.24 0.73 1.72 1.35 5.94 1.22 1.48 1.66 1.42 1.19 0.94 1.13 1.67 16 Average pass-through coefficients for the full period were elevated for some countries given that there was minimal change between December 2017 and December 20123 in the relevant international benchmarks compared to changes in domestic prices for bottled LPG. Uruguay, Togo, and Central African Republic have elevated pass-through coefficients for the full-period (December 2017 – December 2023). 17 Average pass-through coefficients for the full period were elevated for some countries given that there was minimal change between December 2017 and December 2023 in the international benchmarks (North Sea propane prices, Arab Gulf propane prices, and propane FOB USGC) compared to changes in domestic prices. Table A2.2: Average pass-through coefficients for each period by regional breakdown Regional Regular Gasoline Premium Gasoline Diesel Kerosene Breakdown Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 East Asia & 0.39 0.77 0.06 1.32 0.49 0.75 0.63 1.28 0.47 0.94 0.56 1.27 0.71 0.96 0.77 1.40 Pacific Europe & -0.33 0.40 -0.13 1.10 0.79 1.19 0.71 1.73 0.29 1.27 1.02 1.51 1.15 1.48 1.37 1.19 Central Asia Latin America 1.00 0.60 0.81 1.52 0.33 0.67 0.59 1.88 0.67 0.74 0.49 1.59 0.68 1.06 -2.64 5.32 & Caribbean Middle East & -0.22 0.14 0.30 1.18 -0.20 0.28 0.22 1.46 -0.41 0.27 0.16 1.05 0.36 0.30 0.08 0.44 North Africa North America 1.00 1.26 1.28 1.85 1.00 1.13 1.04 1.67 0.74 1.19 1.31 1.44 N/A N/A N/A N/A South Asia -0.65 0.79 -1.02 1.76 -0.32 0.89 -1.05 1.64 -0.14 0.94 -0.12 1.61 -0.65 0.80 0.21 1.61 Sub-Saharan -0.33 0.36 -0.40 1.46 0.10 0.53 0.58 1.58 -2.36 0.53 -0.62 1.56 -0.80 0.51 0.54 1.62 Africa Regional LPG Bottled LPG Auto Heating Oil Fuel Oil Breakdown Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 East Asia & -0.67 0.54 0.43 1.94 -0.24 0.75 0.03 5.83 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.29 0.90 0.38 1.22 Pacific Europe & N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 1.64 1.37 6.31 1.27 1.51 1.75 1.35 1.16 0.96 1.21 1.67 Central Asia Latin America 0.42 0.48 0.08 1.71 2.02 1.90 2.77 3.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.88 1.04 0.80 1.35 & Caribbean Middle East & -0.01 1.20 0.86 2.28 -1.62 0.06 0.04 7.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.90 0.87 1.22 0.58 North Africa North America N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.45 1.56 0.00 -8.24 0.99 1.51 2.41 0.95 N/A N/A N/A N/A South Asia 0.14 0.70 -0.15 -0.64 0.00 2.90 -1.81 6.15 N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.86 1.50 2.62 1.55 Sub-Saharan 0.30 0.69 0.51 1.81 -0.27 0.74 -0.39 7.01 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.05 -0.067 0.00 -1.10 Africa Table A2.3: Average pass-through coefficients by domestic oil sector characteristics Classification Regular Gasoline Premium Gasoline Diesel Kerosene Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 Net trade status specific to each fuel Fuel exporters 0.54 0.56 0.50 1.40 0.65 1.00 0.95 1.51 0.34 0.78 1.13 1.50 0.04 0.49 0.88 1.41 Fuel importers 0.18 0.49 0.10 1.33 0.29 0.73 0.37 1.70 -0.20 0.86 0.23 1.47 -0.15 0.72 -0.21 2.36 Net crude oil 0.72 0.43 0.58 1.37 0.25 0.48 0.80 1.22 0.33 0.68 -0.05 1.40 0.49 0.57 1.43 1.26 exporter but net fuel importer Overall refined fuels net trade status (trade status across all refined fuel types) Refined fuel 0.35 0.56 0.41 1.35 0.40 0.81 0.68 1.54 0.34 0.97 0.59 1.33 0.16 0.65 0.50 1.25 exporters Refined fuel 0.20 0.49 0.10 1.34 0.39 0.81 0.47 1.69 -0.21 0.81 0.29 1.51 -0.16 0.72 -0.26 2.49 importers Net crude oil trade status Crude Oil Exporters 0.69 0.37 0.52 1.39 0.24 0.46 0.61 1.28 0.32 0.60 0.00 1.33 0.41 0.53 1.43 1.26 Not Crude Oil 0.05 0.56 0.02 1.34 0.45 0.92 0.49 1.76 -0.20 0.91 0.44 1.51 -0.30 0.78 -0.60 2.61 Exporter Fuel price regulation Deregulated 0.35 0.87 0.63 1.87 0.67 1.06 0.76 1.69 0.31 1.25 1.26 1.56 0.00 0.91 0.34 2.61 Regulated 0.03 0.43 -0.11 1.22 0.05 0.61 0.28 1.63 -0.54 0.61 -0.18 1.39 -0.33 0.65 -0.45 2.26 Fuel subsidy (existence of an official fuel subsidy on any fuels) Subsidizers 0.18 0.44 -0.09 1.20 0.12 0.68 0.33 1.54 -0.55 0.66 -0.22 1.38 -0.51 0.68 -0.86 2.72 Non-subsidizers 0.30 0.74 0.71 1.83 0.67 1.05 0.84 1.77 0.42 1.22 1.12 1.59 0.54 0.82 1.29 1.51 Fuel shortages Countries with fuel -0.28 0.51 -0.31 1.18 0.19 0.68 0.11 1.64 -2.92 0.60 -0.56 1.47 -1.33 0.57 -0.62 3.11 shortages Countries without 0.34 0.52 0.46 1.53 0.41 0.85 0.87 1.73 -0.01 0.93 0.78 1.47 0.19 0.88 0.18 1.69 fuel shortages Fuel smuggling Countries reporting 0.18 0.38 0.18 1.47 0.42 0.64 0.34 1.39 -1.09 0.69 -0.03 1.52 -0.48 0.71 0.97 2.12 fuel smuggling Countries without 0.30 0.59 0.16 1.37 0.39 0.87 0.57 1.72 0.02 0.91 0.49 1.45 0.08 0.72 -0.93 2.47 fuel smuggling Fuel black-marketing Countries reporting -0.39 0.17 -0.92 1.51 -0.05 0.29 0.03 1.41 -2.48 0.36 -0.67 1.62 -1.38 0.34 0.52 1.33 fuel black- marketing Countries without 0.48 0.64 0.58 1.37 0.43 0.86 0.57 1.67 0.07 0.94 0.56 1.44 0.38 0.92 -0.45 2.72 fuel black- marketing Classification LPG Bottled LPG Auto Heating Oil Fuel Oil Dec Apr Dec Apr Dec Apr Dec Apr Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 2017 - 2020 - 2017 - 2020 - 2017 - 2020 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr -June Apr June Apr June Apr June Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2020 2022 2020 2022 2020 2022 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 Net trade status specific to each fuel Fuel Exporters 3.38 0.93 1.96 1.21 -2.61 0.94 7.02 N/A 1.18 1.58 2.05 1.62 1.34 1.07 1.14 1.49 Fuel Importers 0.18 0.65 0.27 1.73 0.45 1.57 1.13 5.58 1.24 1.37 1.38 1.27 0.64 0.58 1.15 1.43 Net crude oil 0.38 0.78 0.85 2.19 1.62 2.48 2.33 4.93 0.99 N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A exporter but net fuel importer Overall refined fuels net trade status (trade status across all refined fuel types) Refined fuel 0.53 0.65 0.37 -0.41 0.29 1.33 0.74 4.76 1.38 1.65 2.12 1.41 1.23 1.05 1.18 1.26 exporters Refined fuel 0.24 0.66 0.30 2.22 0.39 1.56 1.38 5.90 1.07 1.31 1.38 1.40 0.63 0.58 1.13 1.53 importers Net crude oil trade status Crude Oil Exporters 0.68 0.79 0.96 2.08 0.78 1.97 3.12 4.93 0.99 1.51 2.41 0.95 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A Not Crude Oil 0.11 0.63 0.08 1.59 0.29 1.47 0.95 5.66 1.23 1.46 1.61 1.42 0.94 0.82 1.15 1.41 Exporter Fuel price regulation Deregulated 0.69 1.35 1.39 1.78 0.17 1.37 1.45 5.46 1.18 1.47 1.60 1.43 1.15 0.94 1.28 1.64 Regulated 0.00 0.43 -0.04 1.30 0.66 1.70 0.78 5.73 1.68 1.39 1.82 1.24 0.48 0.41 0.86 0.90 Fuel subsidy Subsidizers 0.05 0.49 0.06 1.68 0.60 1.59 0.73 6.34 1.26 1.46 1.76 1.54 0.37 0.52 0.74 0.98 Non-subsidizers 0.75 1.02 0.94 1.20 0.21 1.52 1.64 5.13 1.21 1.46 1.61 1.37 1.13 0.96 1.28 1.54 Fuel shortages Countries with fuel -0.08 0.50 0.23 2.24 N/A 1.37 0.11 2.72 N/A 1.28 1.93 1.52 0.94 0.94 1.19 1.43 shortages Countries without 0.31 0.78 0.37 1.03 0.36 1.58 1.59 6.17 1.22 1.48 1.60 1.39 0.00 0.19 0.93 1.26 fuel shortages Fuel smuggling Countries reporting 0.59 0.74 0.64 1.33 -0.30 1.55 2.41 0.50 0.86 1.06 1.05 1.09 0.53 0.70 1.27 1.56 fuel smuggling Countries without 0.03 0.60 0.14 1.70 0.44 1.54 1.16 6.05 1.23 1.49 1.66 1.43 0.92 0.71 1.12 1.38 fuel smuggling Fuel black-marketing Countries reporting 0.27 0.42 0.33 2.10 0.01 0.40 3.75 6.63 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.07 -0.09 0.01 -1.10 fuel black- marketing Countries without 0.23 0.77 0.30 1.38 0.37 1.57 1.22 5.55 1.22 1.46 1.64 1.40 0.99 0.90 1.19 1.51 fuel black- marketing Table A2:4 Median pass-through coefficients for each period by income classification Income Regular Gasoline Premium Gasoline Diesel Kerosene Classification Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 All 0.02 0.44 0.05 1.50 0.43 0.79 0.71 1.66 0.26 0.90 0.50 1.46 0.00 0.80 0.03 1.49 Low Income -0.29 0.17 -1.01 1.83 -0.24 0.33 0.30 0.97 -0.50 0.20 -0.46 1.64 -0.18 0.15 -0.64 1.57 Lower-middle 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.47 0.25 0.53 0.01 1.605 -0.01 0.80 0.08 1.40 0.00 0.89 0.24 1.71 Income Upper-middle 0.15 0.56 0.25 1.29 0.38 0.71 0.6 1.66 0.25 0.78 0.26 1.37 0.58 0.91 0.37 1.49 Income High Income 0.52 0.79 0.79 1.57 0.7 1.14 0.95 1.68 0.76 1.22 1.24 1.53 0.12 0.92 -0.10 1.15 Income LPG Bottled LPG Auto Heating Oil Fuel Oil Classification Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 All 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.98 0.28 1.56 0.96 6.22 1.27 1.51 1.75 1.35 0.90 0.88 1.15 1.41 Low Income 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 -0.27 0.74 -0.39 7.01 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.01 -1.10 Lower-middle 0.04 0.79 0.50 0.65 -0.32 1.48 -0.72 3.37 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.35 0.88 1.19 0.89 Income Upper-middle 0.15 0.20 0.02 1.13 -0.01 1.34 0.88 6.14 N/A 1.01 0.93 0.99 0.52 0.90 0.80 1.39 Income High Income 0.10 0.98 0.00 0.98 0.57 1.58 1.20 6.24 1.27 1.55 1.75 1.37 1.04 0.93 1.15 1.56 Table A2:5 Median pass-through coefficients for each period by regional breakdown Regional Regular Gasoline Premium Gasoline Diesel Kerosene Breakdown Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 East Asia & 0.28 0.79 0.79 1.57 0.62 0.86 0.755 1.33 0.72 0.91 0.28 1.34 1.10 1.00 0.64 1.35 Pacific Europe & Central -0.22 0.35 -0.12 0.88 0.79 1.22 1.16 1.80 0.76 1.37 1.51 1.55 1.15 1.48 1.37 1.19 Asia Latin America & 0.37 0.62 0.57 1.32 0.19 0.68 0.53 1.7 0.57 0.86 0.32 1.38 0.50 1.08 0.14 1.92 Caribbean Middle East & -0.32 0.07 0.00 0.73 -0.08 0.25 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.47 0.23 0.26 0.05 0.41 North Africa North America 1.01 1.25 1.29 1.80 1.00 1.13 1.04 1.67 0.74 1.19 1.31 1.44 N/A N/A N/A N/A South Asia -0.64 1.14 -1.02 1.76 -0.02 0.82 0.26 1.64 -0.45 1.07 0.29 1.59 -0.77 1.04 0.47 1.39 Sub-Saharan 0.00 0.27 -0.21 1.51 0.13 0.63 0.29 1.78 -0.07 0.43 -0.16 1.47 -0.03 0.46 0.00 1.72 Africa Regional LPG Bottled LPG Auto Heating Oil Fuel Oil Breakdown Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 East Asia & 0.14 0.53 0.87 1.77 -0.20 0.67 -0.26 5.83 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.29 0.90 0.38 1.22 Pacific Europe & Central N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.65 1.64 1.45 6.23 1.31 1.55 1.74 1.37 1.02 0.96 1.15 1.58 Asia Latin America & 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.23 0.49 1.11 0.79 3.77 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.88 1.04 0.80 1.35 Caribbean Middle East & -0.35 1.27 0.96 0.98 -1.62 0.06 0.04 7.10 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.90 0.87 1.22 0.58 North Africa North America N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.45 1.56 0.00 -8.24 0.99 1.51 2.41 0.95 N/A N/A N/A N/A South Asia 0.14 0.79 0.24 -0.64 0.00 2.90 -1.81 6.15 N/A N/A N/A N/A -0.86 1.50 2.62 1.55 Sub-Saharan 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 -0.27 0.74 -0.39 7.01 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.01 -1.10 Africa Table A2.6: Median pass-through coefficients by domestic oil sector characteristics Classification Regular Gasoline Premium Gasoline Diesel Kerosene Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - -Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 Net trade status specific to each fuel Fuel Exporters 0.60 0.44 0.79 1.31 0.71 1.15 1.02 1.65 0.67 0.79 1.13 1.46 0.00 0.49 0.88 1.41 Fuel Importers 0.00 0.42 0.03 1.41 0.32 0.71 0.54 1.66 0.12 0.90 0.30 1.43 0.00 0.82 0.03 1.54 Net crude oil 0.00 0.24 0.05 1.19 0.16 0.49 0.57 1.10 0.00 0.82 0.02 1.25 0.00 0.53 0.40 1.21 exporter but net fuel importer Overall refined fuels net trade status (trade status across all refined fuel types) Refined fuel 0.54 0.27 0.00 1.33 0.56 0.78 0.81 1.59 0.57 0.99 1.01 1.33 0.07 0.55 0.38 1.41 exporters Refined fuel 0.02 0.44 0.04 1.45 0.43 0.80 0.66 1.69 0.13 0.88 0.30 1.48 0.00 0.82 0.03 1.55 importers Net crude oil trade status Crude Oil Exporters 0.00 0.15 0.00 1.30 0.16 0.31 0.50 1.23 0.00 0.34 0.02 1.25 0.00 0.06 0.40 1.21 Not Crude Oil 0.06 0.47 0.04 1.50 0.65 0.92 0.77 1.70 0.46 0.95 0.58 1.51 0.04 0.87 0.05 1.54 Exporter Fuel price regulation Deregulated 0.37 0.96 0.69 1.61 0.73 1.15 1.02 1.69 0.67 1.34 1.40 1.53 -0.19 1.00 1.01 1.41 Regulated 0.00 0.38 0.00 1.32 0.16 0.63 0.25 1.59 0.00 0.66 0.00 1.18 0.00 0.78 0.00 1.54 Fuel subsidy mechanism Subsidizers -0.05 0.33 0.00 1.36 0.16 0.67 0.46 1.40 0.00 0.65 0.00 1.30 0.00 0.79 0.00 1.87 Non-subsidizers 0.19 0.64 0.58 1.61 0.71 1.13 1.02 1.74 0.72 1.20 1.17 1.54 0.29 0.92 0.85 1.41 Fuel shortages Countries with fuel -0.12 0.42 0.00 1.50 0.06 0.71 0.04 1.48 -0.22 0.66 0.04 1.35 0.00 0.63 0.00 1.68 shortages Countries without 0.10 0.44 0.27 1.47 0.48 0.85 0.98 1.70 0.43 0.96 0.77 1.53 0.02 0.92 0.36 1.46 fuel shortages Fuel smuggling Countries reporting -0.05 0.30 0.00 1.53 0.29 0.66 0.60 1.36 0.00 0.65 0.00 1.48 0.00 0.75 0.21 1.97 fuel smuggling Countries without 0.19 0.61 0.32 1.42 0.56 0.88 0.74 1.69 0.54 0.96 0.72 1.38 0.04 0.82 0.00 1.42 fuel smuggling Fuel black-marketing Countries reporting -0.07 0.12 -0.37 1.57 0.00 0.23 -0.12 1.59 -0.62 0.20 -0.34 1.47 -0.48 0.1 0.00 1.18 fuel black- marketing Countries without 0.23 0.63 0.44 1.47 0.51 0.85 0.74 1.66 0.55 0.97 0.74 1.43 0.13 1.04 0.34 1.55 fuel black- marketing Classification LPG Bottled LPG Auto Heating Oil Fuel Oil Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec 2017 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - 2017 - 2020 - 2022 - 2017 - -Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec Apr June Dec Dec 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 2020 2022 2023 2023 Net trade status specific to each fuel Fuel Exporters 3.38 0.93 1.96 1.21 -2.61 0.93 7.02 N/A 1.07 1.59 2.02 1.79 1.02 1.00 1.09 1.47 Fuel Importers 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.96 0.39 1.56 0.93 6.22 1.40 1.48 1.59 1.31 0.54 0.87 1.15 1.53 Net crude oil 0.00 0.29 0.14 1.44 -0.10 1.20 0.79 7.18 0.99 N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A exporter but net fuel importer Overall refined fuels net trade status (trade status across all refined fuel types) Refined fuel 0.28 0.63 0.04 0.47 0.39 1.56 0.51 3.49 1.37 1.64 2.27 1.31 1.15 1.00 1.15 1.29 exporters Refined fuel 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.05 0.07 1.50 0.93 6.66 1.09 1.46 1.58 1.41 0.35 0.87 1.15 1.56 importers Net crude oil trade status Crude Oil Exporters 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.36 -0.20 1.20 2.27 7.18 0.99 1.51 2.41 0.95 0.00 0.00 N/A N/A Not Crude Oil 0.07 0.53 0.51 1.21 0.50 1.58 0.96 6.15 1.31 1.55 1.74 1.37 0.98 0.92 1.15 1.41 Exporter Fuel price regulation Deregulated 0.27 1.25 1.52 1.82 0.33 1.56 1.55 5.37 1.19 1.55 1.75 1.46 0.11 0.88 1.15 1.01 Regulated 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.31 0.20 1.58 0.37 6.82 1.68 1.46 1.84 1.23 1.00 0.96 1.22 1.55 Fuel subsidy mechanism Subsidizers 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.44 0.08 1.58 0.28 6.93 1.18 1.55 1.79 1.41 0.00 0.80 0.71 1.29 Non-subsidizers 0.82 0.58 0.93 1.42 0.50 1.56 1.51 6.18 1.29 1.51 1.74 1.31 1.02 1.00 1.15 1.55 Fuel shortages Countries with fuel 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.05 N/A 1.56 0.25 4.38 N/A 1.50 1.80 1.81 0.00 0.00 1.03 1.27 shortages Countries without 0.09 0.53 0.00 0.65 0.28 1.57 1.42 6.22 1.27 1.61 1.74 1.33 0.98 0.92 1.15 1.55 fuel shortages Fuel smuggling Countries reporting 0.12 0.37 0.00 0.78 0.20 1.72 1.56 1.83 0.86 1.06 1.05 1.09 0.41 0.92 1.07 1.45 fuel smuggling Countries without 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.96 0.33 1.56 0.96 6.39 1.31 1.59 1.77 1.39 0.97 0.88 1.15 1.43 fuel smuggling Fuel black-marketing Countries reporting 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.01 0.40 3.75 6.63 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.10 fuel black- marketing Countries without 0.09 0.50 0.01 0.96 0.39 1.57 0.93 6.18 1.27 1.51 1.75 1.35 1.00 0.92 1.15 1.47 fuel black- marketing Appendix 3: List of Economies Covered in the Analysis of Each Fuel Table A3:1 List of economies included in the analysis (for each fuel) Regular Gasoline Super Gasoline 1. Algeria 38. Japan 1. Algeria 32. Germany 65. New Zealand 2. Argentina 39. Jordan 2. Angola 33. Greece 66. Nigeria 3. Azerbaijan 40. Kyrgyz Republic 3. Argentina 34. Grenada 67. North Macedonia 4. Bahrain 41. Lao PDR 4. Australia 35. Guatemala 68. Norway 5. Bangladesh 42. Lesotho 5. Austria 36. Honduras 69. Oman 6. Belize 43. Liberia 6. Bahrain 37. Hungary 70. Pakistan 7. Benin 44. Madagascar 7. Barbados 38. India 71. Panama 8. Bolivia 45. Mauritius 8. Belgium 39. Indonesia 72. Peru 9. Botswana 46. Mexico 10. Brazil 47. Mongolia 9. Belize 40. Iran, Islamic 73. Philippines 11. Burkina Faso 48. Nepal 10. Bosnia and Herzegovina Rep. 74. Poland 12. Cabo Verde 49. New Zealand 11. Botswana 41. Iraq 75. Portugal 13. Cameroon 50. Nicaragua 12. Brazil 42. Ireland 76. Qatar 14. Canada 51. Niger 13. Bulgaria 43. Italy 77. Romania 15. Cayman Islands 52. Oman 14. Canada 44. Japan 78. Russian Federation 16. Central African Republic 53. Pakistan 15. Cayman Islands 45. Jordan 79. Saudi Arabia 17. Chile 54. Panama 16. Chile 46. Kenya 80. Senegal 18. China 55. Peru 17. China 47. Korea, Rep. 81. Serbia 19. Congo, Rep. 56. Philippines 18. Colombia 48. Kyrgyz 82. Sierra Leone 20. Costa Rica 57. Qatar 19. Costa Rica Republic 83. Slovak Republic 21. Côte d’Ivoire 58. Russian Federation 20. Croatia 49. Lao PDR 84. Slovenia 22. Dominican Republic 59. Saudi Arabia 23. Congo, Dem. Rep. 60. Senegal 21. Cyprus 50. Latvia 85. South Africa 24. Ecuador 61. South Africa 22. Czechia 51. Lesotho 86. Spain 25. Egypt, Arab Rep. 62. Sri Lanka 23. Denmark 52. Lithuania 87. Sri Lanka 26. El Salvador 63. Tanzania 24. Dominican Republic 53. Luxembourg 88. Sweden 27. Equatorial Guinea 64. Thailand 25. Ecuador 54. Malawi 89. Thailand 28. Ethiopia 65. Togo 26. Egypt, Arab Rep. 55. Malaysia 90. Trinidad and 29. Fiji 66. Tunisia 27. El Salvador 56. Maldives Tobago 30. Gabon 67. United Arab Emirates 28. Estonia 57. Malta 91. Türkiye 31. Gambia, The 68. Uganda 29. Finland 58. Mexico 92. United Arab 32. Ghana 69. Ukraine 30. France 59. Mongolia Emirates 33. Guatemala 70. United States 31. French Guiana 60. Mozambique 93. Ukraine 34. Honduras 71. Uzbekistan 61. Myanmar 94. United Kingdom 35. Indonesia 72. Viet Nam 62. Namibia 95. Uruguay 36. Iran, Islamic Rep. 73. Zambia 37. Jamaica 63. Netherlands 96. United States 64. Netherlands 97. Uzbekistan Antilles 98. Viet Nam Diesel Kerosene 1. Algeria 41. Fiji 82. Netherlands 119. Ukraine 1. Angola 38. Nigeria 2. Angola 42. Finland 83. Netherlands 120. United 2. Argentina 39. Papua New Guinea 3. Argentina 43. France Antilles Kingdom 3. Barbados 40. Philippines 4. Australia 44. French 84. New Zealand 121. Uruguay 4. Belize 41. Saudi Arabia 5. Austria Guiana 85. Nicaragua 122. United 5. Benin 42. Sierra Leone 6. Azerbaijan 45. Gabon 86. Niger States 6. Botswana 43. South Africa 7. Bahrain 46. Gambia, The 87. Nigeria 123. Uzbekistan 7. Burkina Faso 44. Sri Lanka 8. Bangladesh 47. Germany 88. North 124. Viet Nam 8. Cabo Verde 45. Tanzania 9. Barbados 48. Ghana Macedonia 125. Zambia 10. Belgium 49. Greece 89. Norway 9. Cameroon 46. Thailand 11. Belize 50. Grenada 90. Oman 10. Central African Republic 47. Togo 12. Benin 51. Guatemala 91. Pakistan 11. Chile 48. Türkiye 13. Bolivia 52. Honduras 92. Panama 12. Congo, Rep. 49. Uganda 14. Bosnia and Herzegovina 53. Hungary 93. Papua New 13. Costa Rica 50. United Kingdom 15. Botswana 54. India Guinea 14. Côte d’Ivoire 51. Uruguay 16. Brazil 55. Indonesia 94. Peru 15. Dominican Republic 52. Viet Nam 17. Bulgaria 56. Ireland 95. Philippines 16. Egypt, Arab Rep. 53. West Bank and 18. Burkina Faso 57. Israel 96. Poland 17. Equatorial Guinea Gaza 19. Cabo Verde 58. Italy 97. Portugal 18. Fiji 54. Zambia 20. Cameroon 59. Jamaica 98. Qatar 19. Gabon 21. Canada 60. Japan 99. Romania 20. Gambia, The 22. Cayman Islands 61. Jordan 100. Russian 23. Central African Republic 62. Kenya Federation 21. Ghana 24. Chile 63. Korea, Rep 101. Saudi Arabia 22. Grenada 25. China 64. Kyrgyz 102. Senegal 23. Guatemala 26. Colombia Republic 103. Serbia 24. Honduras 27. Costa Rica 65. Lao PDR 104. Sierra Leone 25. Indonesia 28. Côte d’Ivoire 66. Latvia 105. Slovak 26. Jamaica 29. Croatia 67. Lesotho Republic 27. Japan 30. Cyprus 68. Liberia 106. Slovenia 28. Jordan 31. Czechia 69. Lithuania 107. South Africa 29. Kenya 32. Denmark 70. Luxembourg 108. Spain 30. Korea, Rep. 33. Dominican Republic 71. Madagascar 109. Sri Lanka 31. Lesotho 34. Congo, Dem. Rep. 72. Malawi 110. Sweden 32. Madagascar 35. Ecuador 73. Malaysia 111. Syrian Arab 33. Malawi 36. Egypt, Arab Rep. 74. Maldives Republic 37. El Salvador 75. Malta 112. Tanzania 34. Mozambique 38. Equatorial Guinea 76. Mauritius 113. Thailand 35. Nepal 39. Estonia 77. Mexico 114. Togo 36. Nicaragua 40. Ethiopia 78. Mongolia 115. Tunisia 37. Niger 79. Mozambique 116. Türkiye 80. Namibia 117. United Arab 81. Nepal Emirates 118. Uganda LPG Bottled LPG Autogas Heavy Fuel Oil Heating Oil 1. Angola 36. Syrian Arab 1. Argentina 1. Austria 1. Austria 2. Argentina Republic 2. Bangladesh 2. Belgium 2. Belgium 3. Bangladesh 37. Thailand 3. Belgium 3. Cameroon 3. Canada 4. Barbados 38. Togo 4. Bosnia and Herzegovina 4. Cabo Verde 4. Croatia 5. Brazil 39. Uruguay 5. Brazil 5. Central African Republic 5. Cyprus 6. Burkina Faso 40. West Bank 6. Bulgaria 6. Congo, Rep. 6. Czechia 7. Cabo Verde and Gaza 7. Canada 7. Croatia 7. Denmark 8. Cameroon 41. Zimbabwe 8. Costa Rica 8. Cyprus 8. Estonia 9. Central 9. Croatia 9. Czechia 9. Finland African 10. Czechia 10. Denmark 10. France Republic 11. Dominican Republic 11. Dominican Republic 11. Germany 10. Chile 12. Egypt, Arab Rep. 12. Equatorial Guinea 12. Greece 11. Congo, Rep. 13. Estonia 13. France 13. Hungary 12. Côte d’Ivoire 14. Fiji 14. Gabon 14. Ireland 13. Egypt, Arab 15. France 15. Greece 15. Italy Rep. 16. Germany 16. Hungary 16. Latvia 14. El Salvador 17. Hungary 17. Ireland 17. Lithuania 15. Fiji 18. Italy 18. Italy 18. Luxembourg 16. Gabon 19. Latvia 19. Jamaica 19. Malta 17. Ghana 20. Lithuania 20. Jordan 20. Netherlands 18. Grenada 21. Luxembourg 21. Liberia 21. Poland 19. Guatemala 22. Mexico 22. Mauritania 22. Portugal 20. Honduras 23. Mongolia 23. Netherlands 23. Romania 21. India 24. Mozambique 24. Poland 24. Slovenia 22. Israel 25. Netherlands 25. Portugal 25. Spain 23. Jamaica 26. North Macedonia 26. Romania 26. Sweden 24. Jordan 27. Peru 27. Senegal 27. Türkiye 25. Malawi 28. Poland 28. Sierra Leone 26. Malaysia 29. Portugal 29. Slovak Republic 27. Mexico 30. Romania 30. Spain 28. Mozambique 31. Saudi Arabia 31. Sri Lanka 29. Nepal 32. Serbia 32. Sweden 30. Netherlands 33. Slovak Republic 33. Thailand Antilles 34. Slovenia 34. Türkiye 31. Niger 35. Spain 32. Nigeria 36. Thailand 33. Peru 37. Trinidad and Tobago 34. Senegal 38. Türkiye 35. South Africa 39. Ukraine Appendix 4: List of Economies with Multiple Exchange Rate Practices Table A4:1 List of economies with multiple exchange rate practices (reasons and references) Economy Reason for Multiple Exchange Rates Reference Angola Managed floating exchange rate since 2018. International Monetary Fund. (2019). Angola: Article IV Consultation. Occasional parallel market activity reported due to https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/09/24/Angola-2019-Article-IV- forex shortages. Consultation-and-Request-for-an-Extended-Arrangement-Under-the-Extended-48677 Argentina High inflation and restrictions on capital outflows. International Monetary Fund. (2020). Argentina: Article IV Consultation. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2020/CR20267.pdf Bangladesh Managed exchange rate with informal market International Monetary Fund. (2021). Bangladesh: Article IV Consultation. influences due to remittance inflows and forex https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/11/29/Bangladesh-2021- rationing for imports. Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-510167 Egypt, Temporary dual rates during economic reforms under International Monetary Fund. (2020). Egypt: Article IV Consultation. Arab Rep. IMF programs. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2020/CR20245.pdf Ethiopia Foreign exchange shortages leading to parallel markets International Monetary Fund. (2019). Ethiopia: Article IV Consultation. for dollars. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2019/CR19217.pdf Ghana Forex controls and depreciation pressures led to International Monetary Fund. (2019). Ghana: Article IV Consultation. informal currency markets. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2019/CR19280.pdf Iran, Sanctions led to dual exchange rates to manage International Monetary Fund. (2018). Iran: Article IV Consultation. Islamic essential imports and stabilize currency. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2018/CR18110.pdf Rep. Kenya Parallel forex markets reportedly develop during times International Monetary Fund. (2020). Kenya: Article IV Consultation. of forex shortages. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/05/29/Kenya-2020-Article-IV- Consultation-and-Request-for-a-Three-Year-Arrangement-Under-the-49368 Malawi Informal forex markets emerged due to shortages in International Monetary Fund. (2020). Malawi: Article IV Consultation. official reserves. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/09/11/Malawi-2020-Article-IV- Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-49776 Nigeria Foreign exchange controls and rationing for critical International Monetary Fund. (2020). Nigeria: Article IV Consultation. imports like fuel. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2020/CR20216.pdf Pakistan Central bank interventions caused dual rates to emerge International Monetary Fund. (2020). Pakistan: Article IV Consultation. in informal forex markets, especially under IMF reform https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2020/04/10/Pakistan-2020-Article- programs. IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-49367 Sri Lanka Currency crisis led to informal markets for dollars as International Monetary Fund. (2021). Sri Lanka: Article IV Consultation. central bank imposed restrictions. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/11/19/Sri-Lanka-2021-Article- IV-Consultation-and-Fourth-Review-Under-the-Extended-Arrangement-510121 Uzbekistan Transition from fixed to managed float in 2018. Some International Monetary Fund. (2019). Uzbekistan: Article IV Consultation. informal exchange rate practices reported during the https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2019/11/06/Uzbekistan-2019-Article- transition. IV-Consultation-and-Request-for-a-Stand-By-Arrangement-and-an-48765 Zambia Forex shortages have led to parallel market International Monetary Fund. (2021). Zambia: Article IV Consultation. development alongside formal rates. https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2021/12/17/Zambia-2021-Article-IV- Consultation-Press-Release-and-Staff-Report-510265 6 REFERENCES Coleman, Nick. "IEA Cuts 2024 Oil Demand Growth Estimate, Reiterates End-Decade Plateau Forecast." S&P Global Commodity Insights, September 12, 2024. https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/091224-iea-cuts- 2024-oil-demand-growth-estimate-reiterates-end-decade-plateau-forecast. Coady, David, Robert Gillingham, Rolando Ossowski, John Piotrowski, Shamsuddin Tareq, and Justin Tyson. 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