Report No. 36545-MOR Kingdom of Morocco Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of the National Slum Upgrading Program Final Report June 2006 Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure Department Middle East and North Africa Region Document of the World Bank Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram. andSocialImpactAnalysis Report Poverty TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword ........................................................................................... 1 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 2 ExecutiveSummary ....................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ........................................................................................ 7 PART I:Morocco's HousingSector Reforms .............................................................. 9 2. 1. HousingSector Reformsand World Bank Support .............................................. .................................. 9 3. The NationalSlumUpgradingProgram 11 ImprovingAccessto HousingFinance ................................................... 16 PART11:The Povertyand SocialImpact Analysis ....................................... 18 4. ........................................... 5. Objectives andMethodologyofthe Study 18 StakeholderAnalysis of "Villes SansBidonvilles" .................................. 21 6 7. . Profiles,problemsandexpectations ofthe slumpopulation ................................................ ....................... 27 Benefitsandadverse impactsanalysis 34 PART In:PolicyLessons ...................................................................... 42 ................................ 9. 8. Limitationsandrisksofthe currentprogramdesign 42 Relevantinternationalpolicy lessons ................................................ 47 10. PolicyRecommendations ............................................................... 49 ANNEXES: .......................................................................................... 59 ..................... 2. 1. Profilesofthe six slum settlements surveyedunderthe PSIA 59 Selectedexcerpts from the field work interviewswith slum-dwellers ............ 63 Bibliography ....................................................................................... 82 TABLES: 1. Tranches and interventionmodesofthe "Villes Sans Bidonvilles" program ... 12 2. Landandfinancialrequirementsofthe "Villes Sans Bidonvilles"program ..... 12 3. 4. InstitutionalStakeholderMatrixof"Villes Sans Bidonvilles" .................... 22 Ascendingand descendingtrajectories into slum settlements ..................... 28 5. Monthlyconsumptionandexpenditurelevels andpropensity towards 6. savingsandmortgagepaymentsofhouseholds livinginslum areas ............ 29 7. Mistrust. hopeandresistanceto slum upgradingby segment of slumresidents 32 Degree of responsivenessofupgradingmodalitiesto the segments of population 36 ............... 9. 8. Average costs of upgradingoperations per beneficiaryhousehold 37 10. Matrix ofcosts and adverse impactsper upgradingmodality ..................... 39 Sample loanamounts andmonthlypaymentsat current marketrates ............ 40 1 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand SocialImpact Analysis Report Foreword The presence in Moroccan cities o f sub-standard housing, and of slums settlements in particular, represents a real challenge to the social integration of low-income communities in the urban space, and to the ability of the public sector to satisfy the basic needs o f all citizens. The Government of Morocco has stated very clearly as of 2003 its will to intervene in a more effective and integrated manner to eliminate all slum settlements, by offering better housing conditions to the relevant communities. New policies have been put in place, accompanied by a substantial increaseofthe financial resourcesmade available. The World Bank, among other institutions partnering with Morocco, supports the Government's effort aimed at attaining this important Millennium Development Goal at the national scale. It supports inparticular the housing sector reforms program, which aims to facilitate the functioning of the housing market and the emergence of market-based solutions to the housing sector's constraints and needs. These reforms are also supposed to increase the access to affordable and better quality housingby households of low and irregular income. Like in all large-scale public interventions, there are undoubtedly some risks in the implementation o f the program to eliminate sub-standard housing, related in particular to the complexity o f the task, to the required mobilization of agencies and organizations, and to local resistances. It seems therefore essential to integrate the perspective of the concerned communities, among those that are most suffering from social exclusion, and to make sure that all along the program's implementation their expectations are met. This requires institutional receptivenessand the ability to convey the point of view o f the inhabitants, enabling them to take active part inthe preparation and implementation o fthe operations. The Poverty and Social Impact Analysis of the national slum upgrading program "Villes Sans bidonvillesy'has been conceived as a contribution to this effort of greater receptiveness. It is the result of a close collaboration between the teams of the Ministry o f Housing and Urban Planning and ofthe World Bank, supported by Moroccan professionals active in social research. . We hope that this study will bring some insights on the social dynamics of the neighborhoods targeted by the program and on the impacts to be expected from the upgrading operations. Our ambition is to contribute to the on-going policy debate, in order to improve and refine the instrumentsand operational modalities ofthe national slumupgradingprogram. Theodore 0.Ahlers Country Director Maghreb Department 1 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report Acknowledgements The poverty and social impact analysis (PSIA) of Morocco's national slum upgrading program has beenconductedduring the course of 2005 by a team leadby Anthony G. Bigio (MNSIF) and comprising Liane Asta Lohde (SDV), Franqoise Navez-Bouchanine and Tom Dichter (consultants), as well as Bachir Oussibla, Nacira Laoujari and Abdelkarim Chengui of the Moroccan Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning. The field work has been carried out by the Moroccanconsulting firm AREA, directedby Abdesselam Tazi. The team wishes to thank the Ministry of Housingand Urban Planningfor its active involvement in all the phases of the study, and in particularNajibLaraichi, Secretary General, Moulay Cherif Tahiri, Director of Housing Promotion, and Najib Lahlou, Director of Social Housing, for their openness and support ofthe PSIA study. The team also wishes to thank all the individuals who took part in the research: the representativesof institutions and other stakeholders who acceptedto be interviewed; the officials and staff of regional and local agencies who supported the field work in the cities of Agadir, Casablanca and Larache; the researchers who conducted the field enquiries; the slum residents that welcomed them and shared in great liberty their opinions, hopes and worries; and finally the participantsto the May 9-10 workshopwho enrichedthe study with their views and experiences. The Report was written by Anthony G. Bigio with Liane Asta Lohde, in consultation with other team members, and was updatedand substantiallycompleted inDecember, 2005. Peer reviewers have been Coca del Castillo (MNSRE), Judy Baker (TUDUR)and Anis Dani (SDV). The French translation of the report was done by Nicole Wautiez de Blaye (MNCO1). The Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning provided comments in February, 2006, which have been incorporatedinthis final version of the report inApril, 2006. 2 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-PovertyandSocial ImpactAnalysis Report Executive Summary Part I:Morocco's HousingSector Reforms In 2003, 900,000 Moroccan households, or about 5 million people and one third of the urban population, lived in sub-standard housing, of which 212,000 households were urban slum dwellers. During the past 20 years, informalhousinghas developed at a faster pace than formal housing despite sustained government efforts to address the problem. 18 million people in Moroccolive inurban areas, a numberthat continuesto grow at roughly2 per cent per annum in the last decade. In2004 GOMinitiateda comprehensivereformprograminan attemptto addressboththe supply and demand side of the housing sector. The new strategy is based on the willingness to let the private sector play the lead role in housing supply, to improve the institutional and regulatory environment of the housing sector, and to increase affordability of housing to low-income households via better targeting and market-driven interventions. The Government goal is to produce 100,000 socialhousingunitsand serviced landplotsannually. As part of this program of reform, the Government's launched its flagship national slum upgradingprogram "Villes Sans Bidonvilles'' (VSB) or "Cities without Slums", which aims at providing decent accommodationto the 212,000 households living in urban slums by 2010. For its successful implementation, and to promote better access to housing credit in general by households with informal and/or irregular earnings, the Government has also promoted the creation ofguarantee funds andofhousingsaving schemes. Part II: Poverty and SocialImpact Analysis The As the reformprogram benefits from World Bank support via the HousingSector Development Policy Loan (HSDPL) approved on June 30, 2005, the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA) was carried out in partnership with the Ministry of Housingand Urban Planningas an analytical input to the policy dialogue, focusingon the nationalslum upgradingprogram and the relatedhousingfinance mechanisms.The study set outto answerthe followingquestions: 0 I s the stated support for the.program, which benefits from the endorsement of His Majesty, resultingin effectivesynergies and is there resistanceto its full implementation? 0 Are the design of the program and the upgradingmodalitiesaligned with the needs and expresseddemands ofthe beneficiaryhouseholds? 0 I s the financial participationexpectedfrom the slum-dwellers realistic, and will the new facilities to access housingfinance improvethe affordabilityo fthe upgradingoperations? 0 Are the mechanismsfor the social supportto andthe participationofthe target population inthe upgradingoperationsappropriateandfunctioningonthe ground? To answer these questions, a stake-holder analysis and a qualitative survey of household and individual attitudes in a sample of six urban slums in Agadir, Casablanca, and Larache were carried out, with the involvement of a Moroccan firm and of two internationalconsultants. A national stakeholder workshop was carried out jointly with the Ministry of Housingand Urban Planningin May 2005 to validate and discuss the results of the first two outputs. A benefits and adverse impact analysis was carriedout by the World Bank team, which lead to the formulation of policylessonsandofrecommendationsfor the improvement ofthe program. 3 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social ImpactAnalysis Report The Stakeholder Analysis revealed that many key actors with high levels of influence'support VSB. There is wide-ranging enthusiasm for the new city-wide approach to slum upgrading. However, there are systemic challenges that are likely to slow down the implementation of VSB as it is intendedand may threaten its success. Inadequatecollaborationand resulting incoherence across national, regional and local government bodies cause a threat to the achievement of the programgoals. The urgency of VSB's completion seems to exacerbate the insufficient level of institutional coordinationand the implementingactors' focus on technical aspects rather than on much-needed social support and participation. Insufficient incentives are in place at the moment to trigger the active participation of slum-dweller, the involvement of banks and micro-finance institutions to provide credit, and to motivatedevelopers to engage inthe constructionof housingunits. The QualitativeSurvey revealedthe great heterogeneityof the target population, which enters the slum settlements on descending or ascending trajectories, related to migration from the rural areas, movementswithin the city, displacementfrom other slums or the quest of more affordable accommodation. Their income varies from one of destitution for about 15 to 30 percent of the residents, to barely adequate for another third, to sufficient for the rest. Their attitude towards credit is characterizedbythe generalmistrusttowardsthe banks andformal financial transactions. Social organization within the slum communities is weak and ad hoc, often appearing around specific attempts of improving access to services. Differing attitudes towards community organization are relatedto age, sex, level of education, access to information, and to family ties, with the most vulnerable residents beingalso the least inclined to participatesocially. Expectationsof slum residentstowards VSB are very much determinedby their experiences with previous public interventions, and to the quality of interaction with representatives of the authorities that have regulated their insecure occupancy status and attempts at improving the permanence of the dwellings. Residents appeared ill-informed or non-informed about the program, besides the King's public promises, and have not perceived any changes with the previous top-down upgradingmodalities. Hope, mistrust and potential resistance to the program vary, but there is awillingness to be involved inthe definition ofthe upgradingoperations. The Benefits and Adverse ImpactsAnalysis provided the understandingof the pros and cons of the four upgrading modalities applied by the MHU: on site upgrading, provision of partially serviced lots, provision of fully serviced lots, and provision of apartment units, revealing that each of them has some unintended adverse impacts, such as weakened access to jobs and social services. The degree of responsiveness of the upgrading modalitiesto the demand of the different social segments of the population showedthat slum upgradingand fully serviced plots respondto the demandofthe largestnumber ofsocial groupspresentinthe slums. The affordability of the upgradingsolutions varies from high for the cheapest (on site upgrading) to low for the most expensive (apartment units). The subsidized costs of the upgradingsolutions compare well with those for the acquisition of a slum dwelling, with the exception of apartment units, which are two or three times more expensive. Based on the qualitative information on resident's incomes, it appears that one third is unable to afford any financial contribution, while about one third would be able to acquire apartment units. Upgrading often implies economic losses such as the added cost of utilities, loss of income and transport costs due to the remote locations of some housing settlements, and these weigh against the residents' already stretched budgets. 4 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-PovertyandSocial ImpactAnalysis Report Guaranteed housing loans would increase the affordability of the upgrading solutions, as they would make the financial participation of slum households possible to all but the destitute residents. However,at the endof 2005 the GuaranteeFundhasbackedonly 2,900 loans, ofwhich only approximately600 went to beneficiariesof the VSB program. Commercialbanks have been reluctant to venture into a market which is unknown to them, and where transaction costs and political risks are high. The Government has preparedbut not carried out yet a credit education program which should help. Housing saving schemes have not been created yet, pending the definition of the financial incentivewhich would encouragehouseholdheads to save for a future houseacquisition. Part III:Policy Lessons In sum, it appears that the overall national support for the program is mitigated by some local resistance to its goals and stated modalities, and that some important stakeholders, such as the slum-dwellersthemselves, private developers, and financial institutions in charge of the credit schemes, are notcurrentlyengagedinthe pursuitofthe programobjectives. It also appears that the upgrading modalitiesare only partially adaptedto the differingneeds of the various social segmentswithin the slum population, and that they are appliedwith little prior knowledge of the demands or preferencesof the resident households.A significant percentage of slum-dwellers, being destitute, cannot contribute to the program costs, and the overall affordability of some of the upgradingmodalities, most notablythe apartmentunits, is uncertain. Social support andparticipation,defined at the outset of the programand consideredto be among its main innovations, are not yet being applied in the preparation and management of upgrading operations, while the technicalmanagement highlightsthe implementationof the physicalworks as the overallmeasureof successofthe program. The study underlines the need to complement the upgrading operations, which are currently limitedto housingimprovements,with the provisionof better access to municipaland community services, social protectionand safety net schemes, and income generating activities. This would greatly contribute to achievingthe poverty alleviation goals of the program, and the recently launchedInitiative Nationale de De'veloppementHumain (INDH)may representthis opportunity. The limitations outlined above highlight risks that the program is facing with regard to the achievement of its objectives. These risks are still manageable if the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning is willing to address them and to introduce the necessary revisions to the program design and implementationmechanisms. Two international case studies, one from Thailand and one from Brazil were reviewed to highlight the way in which the participation of the slum communities in the design and implementation a nationalupgrading program, and the integrationof infrastructure, housingand social investmentscan be achieved. The PSIA concludes with the following Policy Recommendations, which are made in a spirit of partnership, in view of possible improvements to the VSB program. The first four are relatedto the responsivenessofthe programto the slumpopulation: 5 Morocco'sNationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report :. 1. A more flexible approach to the supply of housing solutions to the individual slum households should be developedand applied. 2. Therequirementsof the most vulnerablesegment of theslumpopulation which cannot afford any kind offinancial participation should be addressedat theplanning stage of the operations. 3. Social support andparticipation should be rapidly scaled up at central and local levels and becomepart andparcel of the implementationof the upgradingoperations. 4. The needsfor access to municipal and community services and to income-generating activities by the slum householdsshould be addressed, inpartnership with theINDH. The secondfour policy recommendations are related to the sustainability ofthe programVilles Sans Bidonvilles: Thefinancial structure of theprogram, which currently relies on a beneficiary participation in the order of 70percent, should be revised Access to housing creditshould be rapidly scaled up to improve the affordability of the upgradingsolutions and thefinancial participation of the beneficiaries. Greater resourcesshould be invested in the management of the VSBprogram by the MHU,both at centralandlocal levels, tomaximizeitschances of success. Theprogram's time-table should be revised to align it with more realistic delivery projections and to avoidpotentiallyperverse incentives. 6 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocial ImpactAnalysisReport Introduction This report is the result ofthe collaborationbetweenthe World Bank and the MoroccanMinistry of HousingandUrbanPlanning, which set out inJanuary 2005 tojointly assess the likely impacts of the national slum upgrading program in terms of social development and poverty alleviation. The study was carried out in parallel to the preparation and appraisal of the Housing Sector Development Policy Loan, which supports the Government's agenda in the housing sector, includingthe nationalslum upgradingprogram. The preliminaryresults ofthe Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis were integrated in the design of the Loan, and the final ones are expected to be broughtto bear duringits implementation. The study set outto answerthe followingquestions: 0 I s the stated support for the program, which benefits from the endorsement of His Majesty, resultingineffectivesynergiesand is there resistanceto its full implementation? 0 Are the design of the program and the upgradingmodalitiesaligned with the needs and expresseddemandsofthe beneficiaryhouseholds? 0 I s the financial participationexpected from the slum-dwellers realistic, and will the new facilitiesto accesshousingfinance improvethe affordabilityofthe upgradingoperations? 0 Are the mechanismsfor the social support to andthe participationofthe target population inthe upgradingoperations appropriate andfunctioningonthe ground? To answer these questions, the study includeda stakeholder analysis and a qualitative survey of household and individual attitudes in a sample of urban slums. These providedthe basis for a detailedbenefits and adverse impact analysis. Policylessonswere drawn fromthis set of analyses and from two relevant international cases of upgrading, and allowed to identify the risks and limitationsofthe current programdesignandpolicyrecommendationsfor its improvement. Part Iof this report summarizes the policy context and the general directions of the reform program of the housing sector launchedby the Government, and supported by the World Bank. The characteristics ofthe nationalslum upgradingprogramVilles Sans Bidonvillesare described, as well as its status of implementation as of mid-2005. The housing finance reforms that complement the program, namely the guarantee funds and the housingsaving schemes, are also discussed. Part I1 summarizes the results of the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis conducted on the national slum upgrading program and its associated financial instruments. The outcomes of the stakeholder analysis, ofthe field qualitativesurveycarriedout in six sample slums, are presented. On this basis, likely benefits and negative impacts of the program on the target populationare discussed, by analyzing the responsiveness of the upgrading modalities to the needs of the residents.The affordabilityof these upgradingoptions is examinedboth inthe absenceas well as inthe presenceofaccessto housingfinance. Part I11 outlines the main risks and limitations of the current program design, presents two internationalcases of slum upgradingthat are of relevance to the Moroccan experience in the areas of social support and participationof communities in the design and implementationof the operations, and in the integration of physical infrastructure improvements with social development investments. The report concludes with a set of policy recommendations that are meantto contributeto the improvementofthe design ofthe Villes Sans Bidonvillesprogram. 7 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report PARTI:THE HOUSINGSECTORREFORMS 1. MOROCCO'SHOUSINGSECTOR REFORMSAND WORLD BANK SUPPORT 1.1 The Government'snew approach to the housingsector and the reform program The Government of Morocco (GOM) set out to reform the housing sector in 2003 and requested supportfrom the WorldBank to address Morocco's dysfunctionalhousingmarket and to implement its programs for social housing. In 2003, about 900,000 Moroccan households, or about 5m people and one third of the urban population, lived in sub-standard housing, of which 270,000 households were slum dwellings'. The general characteristics of Morocco's slums are relatedto non-existing or controversial tenure rights, total or partial lack of on-site infrastructure and services (such as water supply, sanitation, electricity, street paving and lighting, solid waste disposal), and makeshift, overcrowdeddwellings. During thepast 20years, informal housing has developed at afaster pace thanformal housing despitesustainedgovernmentefforts to address theproblem. The main problems of the housing market are of a structural nature, both on the supply side as the production of affordable housing units has been constrained by a number of sector-wide factors, and on the demand side whereby low-income families have not beenadequately supported. The main sector issues that were identijied at the outset of the reform included a) lenghtyand cumbersome land titling and registration procedures leading to a scarcity of urban land for development; b) urban planning and zoning practices, planning and construction regulationsthat lead to high urban development costs; c) a sharp decline in the availability of residential rental units because of the current legal framework that is perceived to favor tenants' over landlords' rights; d) limited access to housing products and credit by low-income households from the formal sector, and no access to housing credit by low-income households having informal or irregular earnings, who were hence unable to access the regular housing market; e) a set of subsidies and tax breaks to the housing sector many of which are regressiveand that represented in 2003 a fiscal cost of about MAD 5 billion per year, or 1.2 percent of GDP; f) an institutional setting characterized by insufficient coordination between the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning (MHU) and the Ministry of Finance (MFP) and an overall poor performance of the housing parastatal companies; g) public low-cost housing programs that have proven to insufficiently meet the demand and satisfactionof their target populations. I n 2004 GOM initiated a comprehensive reform program in an attempt to address both the supply and demand side of the housing sector. The new strategy is based on the willingness to let the private sector play the lead role in housing supply, to improve the institutional and regulatory environment of the housing sector, and to increase affordability of housing to low- income households via better targeting and market-driven interventions.The Government goal is to produce 100,000 social housing units annually (including serviced land plots and housing units)until2010. The Government's programincludes three strategicreform areas: a) Reformingthe legal framework of urbanplanningto reducethe costs of servicedland and to promote orderly urban development, creating a legal and fiscal environment for the rentalmarket, and reformingreal estatetaxation and housingsubsidies; ~ The remaindercomprised540,000 housingunits illegallybuilt but of appropriatebuildingquality, and 90,000 housingunits threateningcollapse, mostly concentratedinhistoric urbancores. 8 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social ImpactAnalysis Report b) Designing and implementing a new approach to social housing involving a nationwide program of slum upgrading and the development of serviced or semi- serviced plotsto meet the demandof low-cost accommodation; c) Better targeting public subsidies and increasing access to housing finance for low- income groups, especially householdswith irregular or informal incomes, by shifting intheir favor the Government' support. 1.2 The WorldBank's Housing Sector DeveloumentPolicv Loan The World Bank resumed its involvement in the Moroccan housing sector in 2003, when the new priorities for Bank assistance were agreed upon with the Government and housing was selected together with education, agriculture and public sector management for priority lending. After six months of technical assistance, in September 2003 GOM requested an adjustment operation to support the design and implementation of the housing sector reforms, which was identified in October of that year. Preparation o f the Housing Sector Development Policy Loan (HSDPL) started in early 2004 and was completed in early 2005. On June 30, 2005, the HSDPL was approved by the Board of Directors and the $ 150m loan became effective on August 24, 2005. The development objective of the HSDPL are to: (i)strengthen the institutional, regulatory and fiscal environment for a well-functioning housing market and for the emergence o f market-based solutions to the country's housingsector constraints and needs; and (ii)increase the access of low income and severely disadvantagedhouseholdsto more affordable and higher quality housing. The loan supports the first objective through policy reforms and measures to modernize urban planning standards and regulations, restructure and refocus public sector housing agencies and enterprises, and rationalize and simplify real estate taxes and subsidies. The second objective is supported by reforms and measuresto expand urban slum upgrading and social housingprograms through market-friendly approaches, improve the efficiency of the residential rental market, and expand the access of informal sector and low-income households to market-based housing finance. The benefits expectedfrom this operation include: a) improved living conditions for the urban poor which would result from the progressive elimination of the existing slums and from the increased supply o f low-cost housing; b) a more efficient use of resources allocated to the public housing programs; c) an enhanced access to housing finance for the urban poor through mechanisms of guarantee funds and housing saving schemes; d) reduced cost of land resulting from more cost effective planning regulations; e) better targeted public subsidies to the housing sector; and f ) job creation resulting from increased construction activity. The Loan should also provide a strong confidence-building signal to the housing financial markets that should help assuage risks, and enhance the willingness of the donor community to support the Government's reform program. The Government's efforts to design and implement a national slum upgrading program culminatedin 2004 with the launch of ViIIesSansBidonvilles (VSB) or "Cities without Slums", which has since become the flagship program of the housing sector reforms. For its successful implementation, and to promote better access to housing in general by households with informal and/or irregular earnings, the Government has also promotedvarious housingfinance reforms. 9 Morocco'sNational SlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand SocialImpactAnalysis Report 2. THENATIONAL SLUMUPGRADINGPROGRAM 2.1 Morocco's slum settlements andvast uvgradinpvrograms The Government updated its database of slum settlements and their population in 2003. It registered the presence of about 270,000 slum households, of which about 212,000 live in 885 settlements in 70 urban areas. 18 of these 70 cities comprise 82 per cent of the slum population. The coastal plains cities within the triangle Casablanca-Fes-Tanger have the highest concentration o f urban slums. O f the 885 slum settlements, 509 (58 percent) have a population under 100 households, 280 settlements (3 1 percent) have a population between 100 and 500 households, and 97 settlements (11 percent) have a population over 500 households. The location of the slum settlements varies, and ranges from enclaves within city fabrics, that sometime pre-date Independenceof 1956, to more recent settlementson the outskirts of the cities, often located in dangerous sites such as ravines, unstable lands, or in the immediate proximity of rail tracks and other main infrastructure. Access to health and education services, markets, urban transport, and employment opportunities depend greatly onthe location and age ofthe settlements but are generally insufficient. Morocco has many decades of experience in slum upgrading, but the presence of these informal settlements in the context of the urban areas has steadily increased, due to the continued pressures of demographic growth, urbanization, and of the dysfunctional urban land and housing market. After a temporary decrease at the end of the 1980s, the slum population increased sharply again at the beginningof the 1990s, and slums have continued to increase at a rate of 4 per cent per annum. Morocco's new slum upgrading strategy has emergedfrom a period of intense evaluations of past interventions. The Government has fought slum proliferation since the 1950s but the continued growth of these settlements has been testament to the Government's difficulties to adequately address the problem. Key issues include rising land prices, complex urban planning regulations, inadequate availability of public finance, beneficiaries' insufficient financial resources, low involvement o f local authorities, and ill-defined responsibilities across the different governmental, quasi-public and private actors at the regional and national levels. Rigid project designs, as well as inadequate and insufficient consultation o f the target population in the preparation of the slum upgrading operations, have often undermined the necessary buy-in and support ofthe slum residents. Public housingcompanies have inthe past systematically neglected the social dimensions o f slum upgrading and have given little attention to monitoring and evaluation ofthe results. 2 2.2 General characteristicsof the ``Cities withoutslums" vropram The nationwide "Villes Sans Bidonvilles"program aims atproviding decent accommodation to the 212,000 household%living in urban slums across Morocco by 2010.3This flagship program was formally submitted to the King in July 2004, three years after the King's `Discours Royal du 20 aoiit 2001' inwhich social housing and the Government's efforts against sub-standardhousing DHSAF (2004) EtudeRelative a la resorption de l'habitat insalubre -redefinition des methods d'intervention-Synthese Generale The remainder of58,000 householdsliving inruralslums are not coveredby this program 10 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report were elevated to national priority. The results from evaluations of previous slum upgrading interventions provided a register of lessons learnt and suggestions, giving further impetus for a comprehensive re-engagement in the area of sub-standard housing. The May 2003 Casablanca bombings, which were carried out by terrorists, most of whom were residingin slum settlements, instilled an even greater sense of urgency into the commitment to eliminate of slums as breeding grounds of antisocialbehaviors. The basic principles of the Government's new slum upgrading strategy are asfollows: a) the integration of single operations at city-wide level; b) contractual engagements of private and public actors in the slum eradication efforts; c) increased provision of social housing by private developers, and d) the involvement of the slumpopulationthrough a process of social support and participation. To meet its objectives, the Government has mobilized the Housing Solidarity Fund which is financed through a tax on the sale of cement, dedicated to support the social housing initiative. The Government has also mobilized public land reserves for the slum upgrading and the increased construction of social housing, and created financial incentives to enable households with informal and/or irregular incomes to access the slum up-grading and social housingprogrambenefits. I n contrast to earlier interventions that may have targeted on& particular slums or sub- standard housing needs within a city, Villes Sans Bidonvilles takes a city-wide approach.All slum settlements are to be addressed within an integratedsolution basedonthe city's urbanfabric and available land reserves. While remaining a program of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, VSB is presented as a partnership with the all mayor stakeholders, most notably the local and regional authorities, the public and private sector housing developers, as well as the slum inhabitants. The program's Operating Manual lays out the rules for this implementation approach and defines which responsibilitiesare to be covered by the different partners involved. On a city by city basis, contractual agreements clarify and document the responsibilitiesof the different public actors on nationaland local levels. The program's modes of intervention consist of: a) on site upgrading, or restructuring of the slum settlement with the provision of roads, drainage and water su ply, public lighting and electricity networks; b) production of fully or partially serviced plots `on urban land, on which the households will build new dwellings; and c) construction of apartment buildings for the transfer of the slum households. The choice of the method of intervention will depend on the specific context of each city as well as ofthe size of the slum settlements.Programprojectionsfor the use ofthese operationalmodalitiesare presented intable 1. VillesSans Bidonvilles encompasses all slum up-gradingoperations, includingthose that were being designed or implemented by the MHU and the parastatal housing operators prior to the launch of the program in 2004. These account for about one third of all slum householdsunder consideration. The remaining two thirds were to be programmed as of 2004, with about 30 percentto be programmedin2004 only, and the rest to follow (see table 1). Zones d' amknagementprogressif(ZAP), where on-site infrastructurewill beprovidedover time while households buildontheir plots. 11 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report Table 1.Tranches and interventionmodesofthe Villes Sans Bidonvillesprogram Interventionmodes (numberofhouseholds) Onsite Fully Semi- Fullyfinished Total upgrading serviced servicedlots housingunits lots (ZAP) Commenced 16,834 34,930 1,306 15,211 68,290 before2004 Engagedin2004 20,873 26,555 1,584 13,148 62,460 After 2004 24,792 12,553 28,757 15,768 81,870 Total 62,508 74,038 31,647 44,127 212,320 29 Yo 35 Yo 15 Yo 21 Yo 100 Yo The mobilization of land has been aproblem in thepast and has hindered the development of social housing and slum upgrading operations.To ease the land constraintthe Governmenthas implementedtwo massivetransfers of publicly owned landto the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning. The first one, of 3,400 hectares, was agreed to in December 2003, and the second one, of 5,000 hectares, was agreedto inOctober 2004. This substantial injection of urban land serves two main purposes: first, to provide land for new areas to urbandevelopmentinthe so-called "zones d'urbanizationnouvelle". The amountof Villes Sans Bidonvilles; and second, to put on the marketenough land supplyby opening up large land needed to implement the national slum upgrading program has been estimated at approximately5,180 ha by the MHU.Ofthe 70 cities covered by the program, halfare concerned by the transfers of land from the public domain: 19 have public land in excess of the slum upgrading needs, and 16 have an amount of public land which is sufficient for only half of the program needs. However, city contracts are signed only when all the land needs of the local operations have been met and if public land is insufficient Local Governments contribute their own landreservesand in some cases private land is acquired. Numberof Area of urban cost Subsidies Beneficiary Households landneeded (million (million contributions (ha) MAD) MAD) (million MAD) Commenced 28,290 1,663 6,537 1,818 4,719 before2004 Engagedin2004 62,160 1,411 4,882 1,564 3,318 After 2004 8 1,870 2,106 5,700 2,035 3,665 Total 212,320 5,180 17,119 5,417 11,702 12 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report TheMHU has estimated the budget envelope of the VSBprogram at about MAD 17 billion, of which about one third, or about MAD 5.4 billion, would be covered by public subsidies. It is likely that the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning will be the only public contributor to the program, thanks to the allocation of budgetary resourcesand earmarked funds for social housing, while the municipalities may contribute land, ifavailable, but also have to commit to preventing the formation o f new slums in their jurisdiction. The other two thirds of the program costs, or about MAD 11.6 billion, are expectedto be come from the financial contributions o f the program beneficiaries themselves (see table 2). 2.3 Status of Implementation as of end -2005 The Government has been successful at attracting international backingfor its Villes Sans Bidonvillesprogram. In October 2004 the European Investment Bank (EIB) approved a loan of Euro 71m to HA0for the construction of off-site infrastructure for its land development and VSB operations. Agence Francaise de dkveloppement (AFD) approved inNovember 2004 a Euro 50m loan to HA0 for the implementation of some slum up-grading operations. An EU grant of Euro 90m from the MEDA budget was approved in November 2005 to support both the implementation of programs intended to fight sub-standard housing as well as the creation of socio-economic facilities close to the target neighborhoods. A grant of US $ 0.5m has been approved by Cities Alliance to provide technical assistance to the MHUfor the implementation of the VSB program. Holding A1 Omrane (HAO) was createdin 2004 as a successor to theAgence Nationale de lutte contrel'habitat insalubre (ANHI) for the purposeof incorporatingall public housingcompanies, and its management structure as a Holding Company under the purview of a Surveillance Committee was established in 2005. HA0 incorporated in 2004 two other parastatal housing companies and is preparingfor the incorporationof the remaining sevenregional ones. I n May 2005, as part of the preparation of the HSDPL with the World Bank, the MHU prepared a detailed Implementation Plan for the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program'. This document specifies the delivery targets per year for the completion of the program by 2010 and the role of the national and local committees to oversee program implementation; it stresses the importance of social support and participation as an essential component of the program, underlines the critical role o f access to credit to ensure cost recovery, and defines the activities that will be carried out by the MHUfor the monitoring and evaluation of the program results. A Division entrusted with the management of the program has been established within the Department of Social Housing of the MHU, and staffed withjive employees. Its mandate is to oversee the signing and administrative processing o f operational MoUs with public and private operators (in liaisonwith the responsible services at the Ministryof Finance and Privatization), to carry out monitoring and evaluation functions for the program, and to manage a forthcoming information system for the tracking of informal housing inMorocco. As of end 2005, 41 city contracts had been signed between the MHU and the relevantparties. New Memorandums o f Understandings for the implementationof slum upgradingoperations had been signedwith public and private operators covering 61,000 households during 2004 (against a target of 62,000), and 69,000 have been signed in the course o f 2005, bringingto 60 percent the ______~ MHU,ProgrammeVilles SansBidonvilles,Plande miseen oeuvre, mai2005 13 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report overall programming of the operations. However, as for the completion of the operations, the data available at the MHU shows that by end of September 2005 only 24,500 units had been delivered to slum households, against a target of 43,000 for the end of 2005. while 11.OOO units remainedunsold becausethe target beneficiarieswere unwillingto buy. Social support andparticipation in the implementation of the slum up-grading operations has been incorporated into some on-going operations,where the operators have rallied the support of the Agence de ddveloppement social (ADS), a public agency with a mandate of poverty alleviation or consulting firms specializing in social support measures. However, this essential component of the program, which has been stated as one of the main innovations of Villes Sans Bidonvilles with regardto previouspublic programs, appears far from havingbeenmainstreamed in its implementation. 14 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report 3. IMPROVINGACCESSTO HOUSINGFINANCE The Government sector reform program includesredirectingits support to mortgage finance from the formal sector and the middle class to households with irregular and/or informal incomes, including residents of the slum settlements. The reforms are based on three main mechanisms: a) the establishment of Mortgage Guarantee Funds; b) the establishment of housing savings schemes; and b) the extensionof micro-financeservices to the housingsector. 3.1 Housinp GuaranteeFunds Several housing guaranteefunds were created by the Government at the outset of 2004, one of which, FOGARIM, is specifically targeted at low-income households with irregular and/or informal incomes. Commercial banks are now solicited to extendhousingcredit to this clientele. They are guaranteed 70 per cent recoveryofthe principal balance incase of default, which would come from a fund managedby the CaisseCentrale de Garantie(CCG), a public agency under the purview of the MFP. For this purpose CCG currently manages a fund of MAD 200m made available by the MHU with resources allocated from the Housing Solidarity Fund (HSF). According to the initial agreements betweenMHU and MFP, fund capitalization would triple by 2008, reachingMAD 600m. The eligible targetpopulation6may borrow up to 100%of the valueof theproperty, which has a ceiling value of MAD 200,000, equivalent to the cost of a lower-to-middle income apartment unit.Loans eligible to benefit from the guarantee are fixed-rate mortgages, with a fixed monthly payment capped at MAD 1,500 per month. I n the context of Villes Sans Bidonvilles, access to housing finance by the slum households appears of particular significance, given the level of financial contribution which is expected from them (70 percent of overall program costs in addition to the construction costs of the dwellings'), and their low level of income and savings. Access to credit seems especially critical for those households slated to be transferredto apartmenthousingunits, which represent about 20 percentofthe total. During its first year and a half of operation (March 2004 tu December 2005), about 2,900 housing mortgage loans have been issued by banks with the backing of FOGARIM, mainly by the Banque Centrale Populaire and the Cre`ditImmobilier et Hotelier, the two largest public banks. This modest result, especiallywhen confrontedwith the social housingneeds and with the level of capitalization of the Fund, is explained primarily by: a) insufficient information for the target population around the possibility of acquiring a housing credit; b) the affordability of the housing products currently on the market; and c) the lack of familiarity of the target population with the bankingsystem in generaland converselyofthe commercialbanks with this low-income clientele. From the perspective of the beneficiaries, the fixed repayment schedule and the cap of monthly repayments may be a problem for some categories of householdswith irregular incomes, which ~~ Criteria include: Moroccan citizenship; proofof income-generatingactivity, even ifirregular but excludingpublic sector employment;proofthat the beneficiary does not own other property; the beneficiarymustnot havepreviouslybenefitedfrom a loan for the acquisitionofsocial housing Inthe contextofthe in-siturestructuringandofthe partially or totally servicedplots 15 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social ImpactAnalysis Report might be willing to pay more when cash is more readily available, and less at other times of the year. More generally, the target populationofthe Fundhas not even accessto abankaccountyet. Banks have started by reaching out to wealthier households with irregular or informal incomes (grocers, taxi drivers, etc.) with whom they are morefamiliar. Access to housingfinance by the lower income groups of the informal populationwill only happen ifthere is a deliberate effort to convey more information and to bridge the current lack of confidence between the target population (especially in the case of slum dwellers) and the banking institutions. Therefore by mid-2005 a credit educationprogramwas prepared by the MHUwith the technical support ofthe Bank, and will become effective in 2006. It will target primarily beneficiary householdsof the VillesSans Bidonvilles programwhich are goingto be relocated in apartment units and will need creditto face the relative largeacquisitioncosts. 3.2 Housing Savings Schemes Tofurther expand access to housing credit the Governmenthas decided to introduce housing savings schemes linked to housing loans. A householdcurrently unableto obtain a housing loan because of its low irregular earnings would establish a contractual scheme with a commercial bank in order to save over three or four years by making regular monthly deposits. This would entitle it to: a) obtain a housingcredit from the bank, which could amount to two or three times the total sumdepositedduring the savingperiod; b) negotiatea lower-than-marketinterest rate for the principal to be borrowed; and c) obtain a public financial incentive as a reward for the saving and the engagement with the banking system. Agreements between the Government and the Bank stipulated as part of the conditions for the approval of the HSDPL included the definition of the public financial incentiveby mid-2005 and its inclusion in the draft Budget Law for 2006, so that commercial banks would be able to offer the housing schemes to the interested households as of early 2006. However, no financial measure supporting the creation of a housing savings scheme was introducedinthe Budget Law of 2006. As a result, the implementation of a mechanism that would improve the solvency of beneficiaries has been delayedby at leastone year. Thefinancial incentive, whetherfiscal or budgetary, willprobably be inferior to the escalation in theprice of housing units during the saving period. For this reason previous housingsaving schemes offered by commercial banks to their middle-class clients have been lately deserted. However, for householdswith no chances of accessing a mortgage, housing saving schemes will representthe possibility of overcomingthese impedimentsand of acquiring aformal housingunit. 3.3 Micro-finance services for housing The 2004 Budget Law opened the possibility for micro-finance institutions (MFI) to offer creditfor housing, within a ceiling of MAD 30,000 per household. Lending for housing was previously excluded from the MFI's services, although consumption loans were used sometimes by households to improve their dwellings. During 2004, the four largest MFIs began to develop pilot projects in this area, in order to assess costs and to be able to correctly price this new business line. In 2005, GOM has agreed to allocate HSF resources to promote the accelerated intervention of MFIs in the social housing sector, with the expectation of reaching a significant number of households in need of financial support to build or rehabilitate their units. Two 16 Morocco's National Slum Upgrading Program -Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report Memorandums of Understanding have been prepared by the MHU with the two main national MFIs, andthey are currently beingreviewedby the MFP. 17 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and SocialImpactAnalysisReport PART 11:THE POVERTY AND SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 4. OBJECTIVESAND METHODOLOGYOF THE STUDY 4.1 Goals and scope of work of the PSIA Thepurpose of the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSLL) is to assess the expectedpoverty alleviation and social impacts of some of the reforms supported by the HSDPL. To ensure the success of the reforms and to maximize their likelihood of achieving their development objectives, there needs to be a better understanding o f the beneficiaries' characteristics and expectations and of the roles of the stakeholders involved. Given the importance of the national slum upgrading program as the flagship program o f the housing sector reform, it was decided to carry out the PSIA primarily on Villes Sans Bidonvilles. In view of their complementarities with the program, the housing finance reforms described above were also included in the scope of work o fthe PSIA. The PSIA set out to analyze who stands to gain or losefrom theproposed reforms. The study was to examine whether the housingproducts of Villes Sans Bidonvilles and the related financial services meet the expectations and answer to the needs o f the intended beneficiaries. It was to provide a better understanding of context and life circumstances of the intendedbeneficiaries and thereby enable to better assess and anticipate likely behavioral responses to the proposed reforms. The PSIA was also to determine which groups might support and which might oppose the reforms, with a view to building key stakeholder alliances and reducingresistance. The main research questions to be addressed by the PSIA study were the following ones: 0 I s the stated support for the program, which benefits from the endorsement of His Majesty, resulting in effective synergies and is there resistance to its full implementation? 0 Are the design of the program and the upgrading modalities aligned with the needs and expresseddemands o fthe beneficiary households? 0 I s the financial participation expected from the slum-dwellers realistic, and will the new facilities to access housing finance improve the affordability ofthe upgrading operations? 0 Are the mechanismsfor the social support to and the participationofthe target population inthe upgradingoperations appropriate and functioning onthe ground? 4.2 Partnership with theMHU and methodoloat of the studv The research was carried out in partnership with the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, with the approval of its Secretary General and the active involvement of two Departments (Directionde lapromotion immobili&e, DPIand Direction de I'habitat social et des aflaires foncidres, DHSAF). DPI assigned a high-level staff member to act as the main counterpart of the Bank team for the entire period of the study, and two other technical staff, one from each Department, took active part inthe field work and inthe other researchactivities. The MHUwas also actively involved inthe research design, data collection, selection o f national consultants, and inthejoint organization with the World Bank of the PSIA stakeholder workshop of May 9-10, 2005, ind in the review o f the consultants' reports resulting from the study and feeding into this Report. 18 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact AnalysisReport The sites of the field research were six slum settlements in three different cities, Larache, Casablanca and Agadir, and werejoint& chosen with the MHU. The following criteria were used inthe selection of sample slum settlements, to maximize variability between field locations: size o f city (small, medium, large); location and size of slum settlement within the city (central, peripheral); record of implemented or planned operations (the signing o f VSB city contracts being one indicator). Two slum settlements per city were selected, one located in the city center and one at its periphery. The centrally located slum settlements in Larache, Casablanca and Agadir, were respectively Jnan El Bacha, Douar Skueila and Khiam Larrab. Slum settlements at the periphery of Larache, Casablanca and Agadir were respectively: Guadaloup6, Nakhil and Bakchich (see Annex 1 for a summary profile of the slum settlements characteristics). ThePSlAstudy was carried out in threephases: The first ahase (January -- February 2005) focused on carrying out a stakeholder analysis which examined the institutional landscape with respect to the VSB program and the associatedhousing finance mechanisms. The institutional stakeholders included about 80 representatives from the different layers of government, the private sector and civil society organizations. This phase also included preliminary field work in selected slum settlements in order to develop a more focused roster of guiding themes for the qualitative research to be carried out during the second phase. This field work was carried out with transect walks across the sample slums, with about 30 informal group meetings which included 125 people in all, and the visits of about 20 dwellings. The preliminary results of the first phase were presentedto and discussedwith the management of the MHUDepartments involved. Two staff members of the MHUactively took part in the field work of the first phase and provided extensive inputinto the preparation o f the second phase. Thesecondahase (March --April 2005) consisted ofconducting qualitative research inthe form of focus groups and in-depth interviews with residents and resource persons in the six selected slum settlements. The objective was to examine the situation of slum residents in more detail by collecting information in the following five areas, which had emerged as particularly pertinent duringthe first researchphase: a) drivers of slum residents' housing strategies; b) access to and management o f financial resources and attitudes towards saving and credit; c) community and collective structures present in the slum settlements; d) expectations towards and perceptions of the VSB program; e) expectations of social support and participation in the slum upgrading operations. 19 focus group interviews and 66 in-depth individual interviewswere carried out. The focus groups as well as the in-depthinterviews were heldwith women, men and youth separately. Based on this data which was prepared for analysis by the Moroccan consulting firm, an international consultant prepared a full report (see Annex 3). Significant excerpts from the interviewswith slum dwellers, organized around the five themes mentioned above, are presented inAnnex 2. The third ahase (Mav -- October 2005) consisted of the stakeholder workshop to present and discussthe outcomes of the field work o fthe first and second phases, with the active involvement o f the international consultants and o f the Moroccan research firm; o f the preparation of the consultants reports and o f the workshop report for national dissemination, which were reviewed and approved by the MHU in September; and of the drafting of the Report by the Bank team, in close consultation with MHUmanagement. Thefield research carried out was of a qualitative naturefor several key reasons. Quantitative data on the slum population, their geographical location and socio-economic characteristics is contradictory and insufficient. While the census carried out in 2004 provides more detailed information on Morocco's slum population, its results will only be available in late 2005, and 19 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and SocialImpact Analysis Report previous censuses do not adequately cover slum residents. Moreover, the objective o f exploring the likely social impacts of the reforms on the slum population necessitates primarily an understanding o f its complexity and diversity with respect to socio-economic characteristics, negative life events, survival strategies as well as expectations and hopes. The emphasis of the resultingwork is therefore on presentingevidence inthe form oftypologies (of slum residents, of housing strategies etc) based on the sample studied, from which general statements of expected impact can be ventured. 4.3. Stakeholder workshoD results TheMay 9-10,2005 workshop helped validatethefindings of thefield work, but also offered an opportunity to convey some key messages to policy-makers and technical specialists who participated in the debates. The workshop had a large audience and high-level attendance. The Minister of Housing and Urban Planning and the Minister of Social Development, Family and Solidarity opened the workshop, attended by about 120 representatives of the institutional stakeholders o f the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program. Moroccan TV stations and print media covered the consultation workshop comprehensively. The workshop results and the analytical work had an immediate impact on thepolicy dialogue and reinforced the operational design of the HSDPL as it was carried out at the close of Loan preparation. The research findings highlighted specific shortcomings of the mechanisms to provide access to credit by slum households as well as the limitations, definitional and operational problems o f social support and participation in slum upgrading. In particular, the workshop enabled the officials of the MHUand of the MFP to agree on the need to acceleratethe preparation and implementation of the credit education program, supported under the Bank loan. It also provided the platform to eventually overcome the current blockages concerning the mainstreaming of social support and participationinthe implementationof the VSB program, 20 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report 5. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF"VILLESSANSBIDONVILLES" 5.1 Summarv overview The landscape of actors related to the housing sector in general andparticular to theprogram Villes Sans Bidonvilles is extremely complex. In tandem with the periodic reorientation and change in emphases that have characterized the policy approaches to informal housing over the past decades, the institutional context has also been changing. After an intensive period of evaluation at the end of the 1990s it was recognized that the success of interventions was severely undermined by both the lack of collaboration between key actors on the national, regional and local levels and the lack of active engagement and communication of the target population. The Implementation document of Villes Sans Bidonvilles statesfour conditions on which the success of theprogram depends, including: a) the strengthening of institutional partnerships; b) the outreach to and engagement with the slum population; c) sustained efforts of prevention of slum proliferation; and d) the comprehensive implementation ofthe housing reform program. The Stakeholder Analysis reveals that many key actors with high levels of influence support the program and there is general enthusiasm for increasedpartnership and broad-basedcollaboration across administrative, regional and societal levels. Despite this broad support, however, there are systemic challenges to building genuine and functioning partnerships. Structural obstacles as well as activepoints of resistance in the complex institutional landscape may become critical as cooperation among the stakeholders as stipulated inthe city contracts will be indispensable to the smooth implementation and the success ofthe program. Increasing efforts to incorporate social concerns and to provide social support and participation in the design and implementation of Villes Sans Bidonvilles enjoy formal endorsement but suffer from inadequate capacity and unequal support from the different institutional stakeholders. Engrained habits of measuring outcomes with the physical completion of the civil works and a pressing time frame may be counterproductive for the achievement of the stated goals of satisfying the social demand of slum households for decent and affordable accommodation, and require the attention of policy- makers. In summary, the Stakeholder Analysis identified several sources of challenges and risks that were corroborated during the PSIA stakeholder workshop. The identified sources of risk for establishing functional partnerships include: incoherence and fragmentation across administrative levels, lack o f coordination between main stakeholders, and insufficient accountability mechanisms. The following represent the main obstacles that have emerged from the Stakeholder analysis and from the workshop to achieve effective social support and participation: a lack of clear definition of the social support and participation activities to be carried out as part of the program implementation, inadequate capacity of the implementing agencies in this respect, as well as deficiency of human and financial resourcesdevoted to social support andparticipation.. These conclusions were drawn by analyzing the drivers of support of and opposition to Villes SansBidonvillesas they vary by stakeholder.The program's design and implementation depends on each actor's influence and its stakes and interests in it. The following matrix summarizes the key stakeholders' characteristics as well as their stated and unstated interests in the implementation of VSB, going from the King of Morocco at one end of the spectrum to the slum residents at the other end. 21 Morocco's National Slum Upgrading Program-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report Table 3. InstitutionalStakeholder Matrix of Villes SansBidonvilles Stakeholder Involvement in the Support of Level of Attitudes towardssocial support formulation and Program Goals trustof andparticipatory mechanisms implementationof VSB slum residents HisMajesty the Initiatedthe new reformagenda High levelof support High Favorssocial support as underlined King of Morocco to improvethe life ofslum by recentlaunchof human dwellers development initiative Ministry of Housing Centralto the reforms and key High levelofsupport Medium Technical orientationtowards the and Urban Planning organizer of VSB implementationofVSB; insufficient (MHU) capacity and humadfinancial resources devotedto it Ministry of Finance Responsiblefor the design and High levelof interest NA Technical orientation,little (MW implementationof housing in success ofprogram involvementin, knowledgeof or finance instruments, FOGARIM inclinationtowards social support andHousingSavingsSchemes; andparticipation Ministry of the Interior Walis andGovernorssupervise Supportthe timely Low Social support andparticipationo f (MICL) the implementationof public implementationof slum residents is of little importance programs, coordinate local VSB institutionalactors Ministry of Social No active involvementin VSB as Highlevelofsupport High High level of concernand interest in Development ofyet but little influence social development andparticipation over implementation Local Governments Partnersinthe implementationof Varied levelsof Medium Varied attentionto social support but VSB as stipulated incontractual support as local mainlytechnicalorientation agreements; expectedto make interestsof LGmay significant contributions contradictVBS Parastatal Housing Responsiblefor the Supportiveofthe Medium Technical orientation, little concern companies(OPH) implementationofthe VSB successful for social support which is left to operations implementation MHU, localgovernmentsand authorities Social Development Involvementat the requestofthe SupportiveofVSB High Social support and participationare Agency (ADS) MHUor OPHto accompany but little influence key objectives of ADS and upgradinginterventions; support becauseof characterizeits work andadvisethe slum population insufficientstaffand limited financial resources ContractorslDevelopers Constructionofunitsat the Neutral Low Not concernedwith social support requestof MHU/OPH Commercial Banks Delivery of housingcredit Neutral Low Not concernedwith social support Micro-credit Orgs Delivery ofhousingcredit High levelof support High Mandateto serve the poor, good but limited influence knowledgeof client andhigh interest in social support Civil Society No explicit or foreseen High levelof support High Concernedwith social support for involvementinVSB of but limited influence slum residents Moroccan, slum-basedor internationalNGOs Donor Community Financialandtechnical High levelof support High Socialsupport andparticipationis of contributionsand support for great concern designandimplementationof VSB 22 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report 5.2 Characteristics,relationship to reform and interests of main stakeholders HisMajesty theKing has elevatedthe eradication ofslum dwellings to priority status since 2001, and has increased his support and public commitment to the achievement of the slum upgrading goals with his personal involvement and visible presence via visits to the slum settlements, opening o f building sites, and ceremonies of handing over of housing products to the poor. His personal involvement is extremely powerful in conveying a message of hope and commitment to the residents, as well as in maintaining the focus of the institutions and administrations involved inthe program's implementation. Central Government. The Ministriesof Housing and Urban Planning, Finance and Privatization, Interior and Local Government are the central government institutions directly in charge of the design and implementationofthe program. The Ministry o f Housing and Urban Planning has seen its status raised since 2002 as a result of the King's emphasis on the elimination of sub-standard housing and on sector reform, and it reports directly to the Prime Minister's office. MHU's credibility relies significantly on the success ofVSB, which it implementswith a primarily technical orientation, through its Direction de 1'Habitat Social et des Affaires Foncidres (DHSAF). The Directions Regionales de 1'Habitat are the local departments of the MHU and contribute to setting up the city contracts and the operational agreements with the parastatal operators. While following the directives of the Ministry, their geographical distance from the center shifts their perception of priorities and incentives. Some have voiced frustration over the center's lack o f consideration o f local particularities when planning upgrading interventions, and of the time constraints for their implementation. The Ministry o f Finance and Privatization has a more general involvement in the program: it is responsible for the supply o f public land to parastatal housing operators; it regulates the housing sector fiscal policies and subsidies; it establishes and manages the housing finance instruments aimed at improving access to credit; and it oversees the budgetary allocations to the MHU investment budget as well as the use of the Housing Solidarity Fund. The Ministry has no particular stake in the promotion of the social agenda o f the VSB program, but wants to make sure that the allocation of national resources is effectively utilized, and that the program reaches its statedgoals, considered of nationalimportance. The Ministry of Interior and Local Government is involved in the VSB program through the Regional Prefects (Walk) and Governors that represent the deconcentrated power of the State in the cities where the program is beingcarried out. Their role is to supervisethe implementation of public programs, facilitate the coordination of institutional actors at the local level, and to exert control over Local Governments. The urgency that the King has instilled into the national slum upgradingprogram i s palpable through their focus on technical issues and swift implementation. The social dimension of VSB is of little importance to them, and slum residents are perceived as beingable to potentially frustrate the national objectives o f slum eradication and o f prevention of slum proliferation. The lower-level representatives of the Ministry at neighborhood level, the caids and moqaddems, are often at odds with the slum residents and a source of social tension on account of their often corrupt and authoritarian practices. The Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity was created in early 2005 with the mandate of addressing issues of persistent poverty, social exclusion and their negative effects on social cohesion. It is also charged with the provision of traditional welfare and disability benefits. The Ministry is supportive of VSB and sees the program's success as contributing to its goals of 23 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report combating social exclusion. Opportunities for synergies with the VSB operations abound as this Ministry develops a new generation of programs and investments. Untilnow, however, there has been no active collaboration or involvement. Local Governmentsare partners of the program and are required to make specific commitments as part o f each city contract, ranging from the mobilization of municipal lands to financial contributions, to the one of not allowing the further proliferation of slum settlements. Municipal councils however are closely tied to local interests and responsiveto financial and political forces that may be set against the VSB program objectives and that would rather see the limited municipal resources invested in other areas. Local politicians are known to have exploited the presence of slum settlements in return for votes and corruption, either by promisingthe residents an upgrading operation, or the tolerance of the authorities to their illegal occupation o f the sites, or by allowing the access to much needed on-site infrastructure like water supply and electricity (despite the illegal nature of the settlements). Informal developers that profit from the sale of rural land to establish slum settlements would also be opposed to VSB, and may use their local political influence to counteract the program goals. Parastatal housing companies (Ope'rateurs Publics de 1'Habitat, OPH) have until recently dominated land servicing, the construction of social housing, and the implementation of slum upgrading programs. Holding AI Omrane, created in 2004, is charged with the elimination of redundancies and of restructuring the ten parastatal companies into a single effective group, responsible for the implementation o fnearly all ofthe VSB operations. The Government's goal is for HA0 to move increasingly to land servicing and to disengage from the construction o f social housing, in which the private sector is expected to get more involved. As for the VSB program, HA0 displays primarily a civil engineering approach to the measurement of its outcomes, whereby the slum upgrading operations are carried out according to technical and financial parameters, leaving the responsibility of social support and participation, and even of the transfer o f the households into the new units, to the MHU,Local Governments and the authorities. The Social DevelopmentAgency (Agence de De'veloppementSocial - ADS) is a relatively new body in the institutional landscape of Morocco. Its mandate is to create and support social development projects and programs that contribute to fighting poverty in a manner that engages the target population in a participative and collaborative manner. With a previous focus on rural areas, it has increasingly become involved in VSB operations at the request of the MHU and of some operators, to support and advise the slum population before and during the displacement phase, ADS however is a small agency and is oversubscribed. Financial and human resource constraints make its involvement in slum upgrading projects difficult, and the agency is in a balancing act, managing catalytic and operational work. It i s clear that the mainstreaming of social support and participation inVSB operations cannot be solely based on ADS involvement. Contractors andprivate developers are called upon to increase their role in the production of social housing, and in particular to build apartment blocks in the context of the VSB program. The Government via HA0 is ready to transfer to them urbanized land below market value, on condition that the subsidy is transferred to the buyers in the form of below market sale prices of the housing units, to make them affordable. So far, contractors and private developers have shown reluctance to enter into such agreements, primarily because o f fears of timely cost recovery, which is critical to their cash-flow in operations that by definition have small profit margins. Demand by slum residents for such social housing units is not perceived as reliable, or easily predictable. Concerns as to the ability of slum households of getting access to credit also motivatethe lukewarm response of contractors and developers to the VSB program so far. 24 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report Commercial banks could play a key role in the VSB program as providers of housing credit, guaranteed by FOGARIMand backed inthe future by the housing saving schemes. As the target population i s expected to bear the majority of the financial cost of the program, access to credit is crucial to the success o f VSB. FOGARIM-guaranteed loans could be perceived by the banks as a low-risk opportunity to develop a potentially lucrative new market. However, commercial banks are reluctant to do so because of various risks: limited knowledge of the target population; wariness of establishing long-term financial liabilities with economically weak clients; and the transaction costs of reaching out to an uneducated, uninformed population. Banks are also afraid o f epidemic defaults when slum-dwellers become aware of the Government guarantees. Therefore, despite the Government pressure, the banks are not actively engaged in the implementation of the VSB program. Micro-credit organizations have been allowed to lend for housing purposes since 2004 within a ceiling of 30,000 MAD per loan to buy, build, or improve housing units. Micro-credit organizations have a mandate of serving the poor, have a good knowledge of their clients and social support is implicit and built into the lendingrelationship. As these organizations establish themselves and gain more independence from the institutions that have supported them in the past, they express a growing interest in forging relationships with banks for the establishment of credit lines for loan retailing at the micro-scale. Given their unique knowledge of the slum settlements, their role in the implementation of the VSB program could be very positive, but they are currently marginalized on account of the limited amount of financial resources they can mobilize for this purpose. Civil Society. The voluntary sector is relatively underdeveloped in Morocco, even though it has been growing significantly over the past ten years, a period of political opening. Some Moroccan NGOs, supported by international donors, already work in the slum settlements, but have not been brought into the VSB program. Slum residents generally underplay the value of their own neighborhood associations, when present, as compared with civil society organizations managed by outsiders, which they view as having greater legitimacy. It is clear, however, that the network of NGOs and `formalized' associations is not widely developed and that the community organizations native to the slum areas are not engaged in the planning and preparation of VSB operations in any significant way. There is no notable outreach to or comprehensive inclusion of slum-basedcommunity organizations inthe implementation of VSB operations. Donor Community. The World Bank has supported the preparation o f the VSB framework but is aware of serious risks and constraints related to access to housing finance, affordability and timing issues, as well as management limitations including the program's monitoring and evaluation and delays in the implementation of the social support and participation. Through the PSIA the Bank has explored both its beneficial and adverse implications for the target population, and promotes improvements to the program design to ensure its success. Cities Alliance, USAID, UN-Habitat, AFD, BE1and EU are all supporting Villes Sans Bidonvilles and providing various forms of technical assistanceaimed at correctingperceived weaknesses o f VSB. They representa significant group of stakeholders that could act to ensurethat the program is carried out as per its stated intentions. Program beneficiaries are extremely heterogeneous with respect to their socio-economic characteristics, their residentialtrajectories, their levels o f income and savings, and their interests and expectationsfor the VSB program (see chapter 6 for a detailed coverage of this topic). They are generally uninformed and distant from the reform process and most have only a limited understanding of the government's new policies concerning slum upgrading and access to credit. However, the personal commitment of the King raises their hopes for an improvement of their 25 Morocco's NationalSlum Upgrading Program-Poverty andSocial ImpactAnalysis Report housing situation, which counterbalance thier hostility towards the authorities and their resignation. Contrary to the belief of some stakeholders, a significant proportion o f the slum residents are keen to participate actively in the upgrading operations, often despite a history of prior disappointments, on condition that the public proposals are now firm and that there will be sufficient trust, communication, and follow-through on the declared intentions and plans. 5.3 Stakeholders' influence: likelv imuact on VillesSansBidonvilles A stakeholder's stated or unstated interests may or may not influence the implementation or performance of the reform. While a stakeholder's interests give direction to how influence is wielded, the key actors' impact on the implementation and performance of VSB depends on their political, social and financial resources. Threegeneral observationscan be made: 0 The stakeholders with the highest influence over the formulation and implementation of VSB are located at the centre of political power. The majority of these stakeholders have a technical rather than a social perspective to the upgrading o f slum settlements; 0 Control over the program objectives diminishes both with geographical and political distance from the center, while influence over the implementation of the program may not; interests and stakes tend to be more divergent at the local level and may distort the Government's intentions; 0 Some stakeholders are crucial to the success of VSB but have minimal interest in participating because of insufficient incentives or attention to their needs (slum residents, developers, banks and micro-credit institutions). Their lack of engagement puts the success ofthe program at risk. 26 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report 6. PROFILES,PROBLEMSAND EXPECTATIONSOFTHE SLUMPOPULATION The slum population, as the PSIAfield research of six sample slum settlements confirmed, is extremely heterogeneous with respect to its social, economic and cultural characteristics, which all drive to varying degree its needs and demand for better accommodation. Equally important for the success o f VSB is the understanding of the complex matrix of factors that determine the population's expectations vis-his the program itself, in order to better assess the extent and quality o fthe population's likely acceptanceof or resistanceto the program*. The scope of enquiry and of thefield work carried out under the second phase of the PSIA study was limited tofive subject areas. Drawing on previous evaluation studies and on the results from the first research phase, these were considered particularly important for the understanding o f the slum population: a) housing itineraries and residential strategies of the households; b) incomes, financial resources and attitudes towards credit and saving; c) social organization and community dynamics in the slum settlements; d) previous experienceswith slum upgrading and expectations towards VSB; and e) expectations o f social support and participation inthe program. The diversity of the population that is revealed through the analysis of the sample slum population through thesefive lenses is great, and implies that the design o f interventions and policies has to be sensitive to a great degree of variation in needs and abilities to take part in and benefit from VSB. The analysis also highlights which segments of the population are unable to afford the program benefits, and raises therefore policy questions as to the program's current design. These are developed in chapter 8. 6.I Housing itineraries and residentialstrategies of the households Moroccan citizens move into slum settlementsfor a wide variety of reasons. Understanding the trajectories that lead people into or out of slums can help to understand their economic calculations and survival strategies which will determine their demand for better housing and their responsivenessto the nationalslum upgradingprogram. The results of thefield work identified thefollowing seven trajectories that drive individuals and households into the slum settlements: a) a quest for optimization of scarce financial resources and living space; b) the desire to establish an urban identity and urban roots in migrating to the city; c) the anticipation of a future slum upgrading intervention; d) a contraction o f economic means following a critically negative life event, such as an accident, job loss or divorce; e) the forced displacement by authorities from another precarious settlement; f ) the quest for cheap rental accommodation; and g) the desire or need to leave the family household of origin, These trajectories can be classified as ascending or descending whether they represent an improvement in the quality of life o f the individuals and households, or on the contrary a deterioration: 0 For some o f the social groups and typologies o f slum residents, moving into the slum settlement represents an improvement: this i s the case of those families that seek to optimize the use o f scarce financial resources and find more advantageous to buy a * Unfortunately, there is no comprehensivesurvey data availableofthe characteristics ofthe slum populationthat would allow more detailedbreakdowns alongsocial, cultural and income lines. However, all field research of individual slum settlementsconfirmstheir heterogeneity. 27 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocial ImpactAnalysis Report dwelling in the slum rather than to pay rent for a smaller accommodation, and who consequently make a better use of their limited budget. It is also the case of rural migrants who by settling in a slum (often located in the peripheral areas) establish a foothold inthe urbansurroundings andare able to survive while seekingemployment and perhaps better accommodation inthe city, and maintainingoftentimes seasonallinkswith the region of origin. The trajectory seems ascending also for those households who maintainownership of a slum dwelling, while having movedelsewhere, for the specific purposeof obtaininga subsidizedhousingunitthanks to public interventions. 0 For some of the social .groups and typologies of slum residents, moving into the slum settlement represents insteada deterioration of their living conditions: this is the case of those individualsand householdsthat are impactedby a criticallynegative life event, like an serious accident, loss of employment or source of income, divorce (in the case of women), retirement in the absence of family support, and the like. Households that suffered the forced eviction from another precarious location at the hands of the authorities, inthe context of some land or infrastructuredevelopmentproject, are also on a descending trajectory. Young couples, single young men and students often resort to buying or renting a dwelling in a slum settlement in view of the unaffordable rents of formalunits, when wanting to set off ontheir own. Table 4: Ascendingand descendingtrajectoriesintoslum settlements PrincipalDriver(s) I accommodation I I I These different trajectories and drivers must be taken into account while planning the upgradingofthe slum settlements, as the demands and responsesofeach social segmentwill vary with their residential strategies. Some will be therefore eager and able to engage with the representativesofthe VSB programin view of gaining access to better accommodation, and will be willing to commit resourcesto this goal, while others will be either uninterested or unable to do so. 28 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report 6.2 Incomes, financial resources and attitudes towards credit andsaving Slum residents are among the most marginalized social groups in Morocco, and they experience both poverty of income and social exclusion. Their presence is perceived as a potential threat to the environment, public health, and security. The illegal nature of the settlements prevents their inclusion in urban infrastructure development plans and in the provision of health and education facilities. Access to formal employment opportunitiesand to public social support systems is also often denied to slum-dwellers on account of their lack of formalresidencepapers. The lack of adequate financial resources is among the principal reasons preventing their eventual exitfrom the slums. Whilethere is no survey data on incomeand financialresources of slum residents, several studies converge in their assessmentof income distribution and establish thresholds across the general slum-dwellerpopulation.In the PSIA field research, like in other studies, the slum population was asked to identify what characterizes poverty and destitution; these definitions were then translated into approximate monetary equivalents and poverty thresholds, accordingto suchparameters. Households can be roughly divided into five income groups, of which the bottom one, representing roughly 17percent of thepopulation, lives in destitution.The National2000-2001 Household Consumption and Expenditure Study carried out by the National Office of Statistics provides data on individualconsumption and expenditure and by type of housing. InTable 5 the datahas been convertedto provideinformationon consumptionand expenditure at the household rather the individuallevel. Individualamounts were multipliedby the average size of the urban household, which comprises 4.8 people. This conversion allows hypothetical estimates of affordable mortgage payments and savings ability across different income groups. Separate profile studies of slum areas in Rabat and Agadir confirmthis rough income distribution (ADS, 2004; AREA, 2005). Victims of negative life events (divorcees, older retirees, individuals who have had a major accident or loss ofjob and income) are disproportionatelyrepresented in the bottomfifth incomegroup. Income < 1.416 <2.012 <2.818 <4.352 >4.352 Proportionof 16.8 22.5 23.0 26.8 11.3 households Affordable _-_ 500 700 1.ooo > 1.000 mortgage payments Savings _ _ _ 250 350 500 > 500 ability The amount of monthly income is an incomplete assessment of the socialprecariousness of the slum residents, as the quality of the income-generating activity also matters. The vast majority of slum residents is officially unemployed, inactive or only seasonally employed. Economic activitiesfor both men and women includefactory work, crafts work at home, seasonal work in the countryside, cleaning services, small-scale retail activities in the slum itself or elsewhere in the city viathe use oftransportablevendingstalls. 29 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-PovertyandSocial ImpactAnalysisReport Womentendto experiencepreferential treatment vis-&vis men in the hiringprocessfor factory employment,and the research shows that they are preferredbecauseof the lower wages andjob security demands that they make. Young men seem to be disproportionatelyaffected by high unemployment rates, on account of the conventional perception of them as a potentially dangerous and destabilizingsocial group. Many hide their residenceinthe slums when applying forjobs, on account ofthe social stigma attachedto their residential status. Income and other economic assets are more unequally distributed in centrally located slum areas than in peripheral ones. The reason for this lies in the fact that central slum areas are generally older, andthe residingpopulationhasa longerhistoryof accumulation, investmentsand inheritance. The inheritanceofa dwellingin a central slum, suchas Douar Skuela in Casbalanca, is also more significantthan the one of a similar dwellingin a peripheral slum settlement, such as Nakhil inthe same city. The attitude of slum residents towards acquiring creditfrom banks is tied both to their limited level of solvency and savings capacity, as well as to a general distrust of banks and to anxieties caused by lack of information. In general the residents seem unaware of the fact that the Government has authorized commercial banks to lend them money for home ownership and house construction, although the men and the young ones in particular seem to have had some exposureto these changes via the media. The banks themselves, as described inthe stakeholder analysis, reciprocate this distrust and are not eager to promote their services among the slum dwellers, on account ofthe perceivedrisks andtransaction costs involved. Attitude towards savings are both a question of ability and of choice. For households with the lowest income levels, saving for a housing investment is simply impossible; for the two intermediary income groups, it would have to be carved out of their basic consumption budget, but could reach between 250 and 350 MAD per month; for the two top income groups, the preference will lie in short-term consumption because of significant levels of insecurity about future pay-offs, but it could reach 500 MAD and more per month. For many slum residents, however, their dwellings represent their savings and investments, and any cash surplus is generally investedinmaintenanceor home improvements. Uptakeofcreditwithinthe context of FOGARIM-guaranteedhousingcredit andthe buy-inofthe slum residents inthe housingsaving schemesthat the Government will soon launchwill depend greatly on how well these financial mechanisms are adapted to the solvability of the target population, as well as on the outreach of financial institutionsto overcome the current fears of entering into agreements based on implicit threats of foreclosure that would entail the loss of family shelter. 6.3 Social organizationand communitv dvnamics in the slum settlements The social organization and fabric of a given slum population is an important element for estimating boththe costs of disruptingsocial networks in the course of an upgradingoperation, and the likelihood of resistance to or support of a planned intervention. In addition, this understanding constitutes the basis for evaluatingwhat type of communicationstrategy, social support and participation would be most effective to promote the goals of the Villes Sans Bidonvillesprogram. There is great variability in the qua@, density and types of social networks and community organizations across slum settlements, and there seems to be no correlation with specific 30 Morocco's NationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report characteristics of the settlement, including its location (city centedperiphery), commonality of place o f origin o fthe population, or different trajectories leading the residents to the slum. Within slum settlements, inter-personal networks are the most important and robust social ties but their quality, strength and breadth can vary from one street to the next. These neighborhood-level interpersonal networks depend on active participation of their members, favoring those who are physically more able, as they often revolve around immediate co- operation to improve living conditions (such as the sharing of water supply or electrical connections, or the evacuation of refuse water). Such initiatives often override allegiances or individual attributes that mightotherwise form the basis o f social networks. Solidarity isfleeting in the slum areas:the young, the male and the more educated seem to have a greater involvement in social networks overall, while the old, handicapped and otherwise marginalized and destitute are more likely to be uninvolved and excluded. More recent arrivals, particularly from rural communities, often perceive their new life in the slum settlement as an improvement and therefore engage more eagerly in social networks. In contrast to inter-personal networks, associative life organized around a specific cause or by a particular segment o f the slum population is not frequently manifest in the social fabric of Moroccan slums. Formal associations, if any, are generally organized by external actors and specifically targeted at particular social problems, such as health, education, or nutritional issues. Manipulation of community organizationsby local authoritiesand by public officials in charge of dealing with the slums have generated negative individual and collective experiences with corruption and incompetence, have fuelled the distrust o f external attempts to promote particular community activities, and have created tensions among slum residents. International, national or otherwise formal NGOs and associations are often perceived with suspicion by the slum population as they are seen as representativesof the authorities in some form or other. Besides external influences, there are also internal sources of social fragmentation and conflict. Longer-term residents perceive a rise in asocial behavior displayed by the younger generation, and experience a weakening of social ties and a decline in community activities (except from religious groups). The process of densification of the slums, which has increased with the tighter control o f the authorities over their expansion, leads to a further loss o f privacy and results in family and neighborhood tensions. These perceived changes, in addition to the differenttrajectories that have brought the residents into the slums inthe first place, have led to a diminished ability to deal collectively with problems or opportunities that the slum settlement mightbe facing, such as an impendingupgradingoperation. 6.4 Previous experiences with upgradingand expectationstowards VillesSans Bidonvilles The expectations of slum residents towards the VillesSans Bidonvillesprogram are very much determined by their experiences with previous attempted interventions of slum upgrading and in some cases of forcible elimination of their settlements. Anxiety, skepticism and distrust are rampant. A lack of adequate, reliable information and transparent communication of the program ground rules, modalities, calendar, and costs have reinforced these feelings, despite notable efforts bythe Government to publicize the programvia different media. The comprehension of the program's goals and benefits is varied because communication channels, internal and native to the slum communities, may not have been effectively utilized. In the absence of communication campaigns by the MHUmaking use of community networks, 31 Morocco's NationalSlum Upgrading Program-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysisReport the established media (radio, TV, print) have failed to effectively convey the important details and key policy messages in a language comprehensible to the residents. There i s considerable confusion, and rumors circulate about the actual modalities and parameters of VSB, which is partly an understandable reaction to a legacy of conflicting interventions and programs in the government's fight against slums. The expectations of success ofthe upgrading operations and of the program as a whole are also colored by slum residents' skepticism regarding the time horizon that the Government has committedto for its completion. Mistrust is generally high given the history of unsuccessful upgrading interventions, but may be less widespread among recent arrivals to the slum areas because of limited prior exposure to the difficulties of life in the slums and of the resulting interactions with the authorities. Households express greater trust towards the authorities at central level, such as the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, than those at the local level, which they perceive as seeking primarily their own gain through the upgradingoperations. Hope among slum residents with respect to the VSB program providing a solution to their shelter problems is generally low to medium, reflecting the sense of resignation, economic and social exclusion which are predominant in the slums. Single, vulnerable residents and young unemployed men have lower levels of hope because of bleaker prospects of economic survival and promotion. Long-term slum residents and extended families have social networks and resourcesthat can sustainthem and on which they can rely, makingthem more hopefulto change their life circumstances. Recent arrivals with no prior experience of upgradingprojects express a higher hope as to the benefits they may derive from the public interventions. Extended Rural families; Nuclear Singleand Young migrants; 1ong term - families; vulnerable unemployed recent residents. residents men, students arrivals Mistrustofthe authorities High Medium High High Low Hope ofprogram benefits Medium High Low Low High Resistanceto slum upgrading Medium Low Neutral Medium Low Influence on other residents High Medium Low High Low The success of VSB depends in great part on the active cooperation of the slum population with the authorities and participation in the implementation of the proposed interventions. Rural migrants and recent arrivals are likely to carry high hopes of a relatively quick access to proper housing and therefore offer low resistance to upgrading operations. Various segments of the resident population may on the other hand have valid reasons for resisting the planned interventions, particularly if they do not agree with the operational modalities selected by the authorities, if the projected move contrasts with their livelihood activities and social networks, and iftheir financial resourcesare insufficient to meet the obligations requiredfrom them. Long-term slum residents may also be unwilling to cooperate in operations based on a relocation given the investments they have made in their dwellings. Single and vulnerable 32 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand SocialImpactAnalysis Report residents may not agree with the proposed interventions but their resources financial, political - and social are insufficient to support any significant resistance. Young, unemployed men often - express high levels of frustration because of the lack of economic prospects and are generally distrustful o f the state. These various segments have different levels of influence on the behavior of other residents, and thus their indirect resistance may be amplified, according to the following they attract. 6.5 Exvectationsof socialsuvvort andvarticivation in the vrowam Although the population is heterogeneous, the expectations and demands of the new social approach of VSB are quite consistent across the slum settlements. They are however mitigated by past experiences with the authorities and by instances of un-kept promises of assistance from the authorities to access a decent accommodation. The slum residents demand clarity and transparency in the communication about theprogram and the planned interventions in which they are to be implicated. Particularly, the slum residents expect to be sufficiently informed so that they can actively participate in the program and prepare for the eventual displacement. They also expect social justice to accompany the process o f assigning housing solutions to families, good governance and an end to corruption. The authorities in charge of planningthe interventions would need to display sensitivity to and understanding of the social characteristics of the households in order tojointly define options that are appropriate to the individual households and tailored to their circumstances. Slum residents value highly external, impartial and expert advice that is not influenced by local institutions but rather takes into account their opinions and finds out about their specific needs. They seek genuineparticipationand engagement. It transpires that the slum residents would like to be included much earlier in the decision- makingprocess, as for example when the size ofthe slumpopulation is assessed and censusesfor individual slum areas are drawn up. Giventhat these surveys serve as the basis on which the type of the upgradingoperation is planned by the responsible authorities, a genuine involvement of the populationmay ensuretransparency and forestall future disappointment and resentment. 33 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report 7. BENEFITSAND ADVERSE IMPACTSANALYSIS The linkages between the stated goals of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program, the role and attitudes of the different stakeholders, and the problems and expectationsof the target population provide the basisfor the analysisofthe expectedbenefits and adverse impactsof the program. This analysis assesses first of all the four operational modalities of Villes Sans Bidonvilles, with particular reference to how they affect the different segments of the slum population, and determines the benefits and adverse impacts foreseen. The affordability of the upgrading operations is then examined, in relation to the incomes of the target population and of the financial instruments put in place by the Government to support the access to credit by householdswith irregular and/or informal income. 7.1 Benefits and adverse imvacts of uvgradingmodalities The upgrading modalities of Villes Sans Bidonvilles have been inheritedfrom the previous social housing and slum upgradingprograms,even ifthey are now part of a more integratedand coherent framework in which they are carried out. Upgrading in situ and the provision of partially or fully serviced lots and of apartment units have been the basis of the previous slum eradication programs in Morocco for the last two decades. Several studies and evaluations have been carried out to examine the differential impacts of the various types of interventions on the target population, including their social and economic effects. In this respect, many of the findings of the PSIA researchmirror the principal observationsresultingfrom these studies. A. On site upgrading is the most beneficial and least disruptive intervention, and is mainly utilized in slum areas that are older and more established, frequently in city centers, and where there is a higher degree of resistance of the resident population to displacement and resettlement. About 70,000 householdsare planned to be upgradedon site within the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program. With the provision of infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, streets and street lighting, the residents finally get access to services that were previously unavailable. If these physical improvementsare accompaniedby accessto secure tenure (which is not always the case because of the disputed nature of their occupancy in the first place) the incentives for the householdsto invest in the progressive improvementsof the dwellings are high, as they acquire transferablevalue. Within on site upgradingQperationsthe displacementof a minority of families inevitably occurs, on account of the widening of streets and ofthe alignment ofthe settlement boundaries. However the displaced families are accommodated in neighboring lots, whenever possible. Pre-existing economic activities remain largely undisturbed, and thus there is little negativeimpact on income generationor disruption of socialnetworks due to the upgradinginterventions. B. Provision of partially serviced lots (ZAP): The incrementaldevelopment of land is not a new type of intervention in the fight against sub-standard housing, and it has experienced somewhat of a renaissance(Altius, 2004) inthe context of Villes Sans Bidonvilles. About 20,000 households are to be transferred to such areas. This approach is either used to accommodate residents from slum settlements, or to prevent the proliferation of slums, or both. New subdivisions are drawn up, primary infrastructureis laid out, and families are asked to settle and to build their dwellings while further infrastructure servicing is planned and eventually carried out over time. Slum residents are also given title deeds at some point, given that ZAP 34 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report developments are generally established on public or municipal land. An evaluation study has shown that beneficiaries are generally critical of these operations, on account of the distance of the new settlements from their original location, of the absence of adequate infrastructure and services, o f the uncertainty as to the completion of the infrastructure works, and of the additional utility costs they face. These factors may encourage the resale of the lots to families with higher income that are able to invest more quickly in the construction, or to wait for the full infrastructure provision to take place. C. Provision of fully serviced lots; Slum residentsgenerally favor this mode of intervention because it gives them the possibility to build according to their needs and financial abilities, and allows for incremental construction according to a family's own schedule. In addition, the acquisition of a serviced lot may mean the possibility of attracting the savings of another family to build two housing units on the same plot, or sometimes to generate additional incomes by building and renting additional rooms. About 75,000 households are supposed to be assigned a fully serviced lot as part o fthe Villes Sans Bidonvilles program. Problems have emerged in some slum settlements because of the condition imposed by the authorities that the slum dwellings be first demolished for the households to qualify for the purchase of the lots and/or to occupy them. The lag between the demolition of the slum dwellings and the purchase of the lots in the worst cases has exceeded several months. This creates a very difficult transition for the households, who are requested to find provisional accommodation while they are experiencing displacement from their original location, loss of social networks, and more difficult access to health and education services, as well as to income- generating activities. Neighborhoods emerging as a result of site and service subdivisions generally suffer from a lower quality o f services and public transport for a long time. Additional costs of formal accessto water and electricity are extra hurdlesfor the householdsto confront. D. Provision of apartment units: This mode of intervention is generally favored by the housing operators in those cities where the availability of public land is scarce, and where urban density makes it difficult to develop low-rise neighborhoods. About 45,000 households are supposed to be transferred to apartment units as part o f the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program. Some beneficiaries value the ascent into legitimacy and home ownership represented by apartment living, despite the space limitations for poly-nuclear families: but profound changes in life-style, sometimes bigger than anticipated, are requested from the families who move into apartment buildings. The limited size of apartment units and their location are the main negative effects, and together with economic losses seem to weigh more heavily than the loss of social networks in these operations. The transfer into apartment buildings often results in a decline in economic and livelihood activities for some households, as informal commercial activities can no longer be carried out from their dwellings or in their immediate vicinity. Formal access to water and electricity i s unavoidable in the new premises, and the related costs can be significant. However, for others residents, particularly the young and women, more urban and service-oriented employment opportunities may become available. Cohabitation is not highly significant, as in 1994, single-householdoccupancy amountedto 93 percentof cases (MHU, 2001). Howeverthere can be great regionalvariations, particularlyinthe slum areas. Cohabitation oftwo or more families can be found inmorethan 60 per cent of slumdwellings inthe prefectureof Skhirat-Temara, while inthe Great Casablancaarea it is about25 percent (MHU, 2001:62). 35 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social ImpactAnalysis Report 7.2 Resuonsivenessof the slum upgradingoperations to the targetuouulation Besides the common features of these operational modalities, and of the typical benefits and adverse impacts described above, each segment of the target population will react differently to the challenges of these interventions, accordingto to the demographic and social characteristics of each segment". The following table summarizes the degree of adaptation of the different upgradingmodalities to the various social groups of which the resident population is composed, while incomeconsiderationsare discussedinthe next section. Table 7. Degreeof responsivenessof,upgradingmodalitiesto the segments of population Extended Nuclear Singleand Young Rural families; long- families vulnerable unemployed migrants; termresidents residents men, students recentarrivals On site upgrading High Low Medium High High Partially servicedlots Medium Low Low Low Medium Fully serviced lots High Medium Low High High Apartment Units Low High Low Low Low The most vulnerable residents and the poorest households benefit the most from on site upgrading because of its lower costs, and they benefit disproportionatelyfrom the upgradingand supply of new services, even if their savings, incomes or energy levels do not enable them to invest in the improvement of their dwellings as a consequence of the upgrading operations. On the other hand, the other three operationalmodalitiesare perceivedas not suitedto their needs, as they imply bigger financial efforts, displacement, and necessary reconstructionofthe dwelling in the case of partially or fully serviced plots, or a major change inlifestyle inthe case of apartment buildings. Young couples and nuclear families will likely give preference to apartment units, as space limitations would not be of immediate concern and there might be more propensities for more modern lifestyles and amenities. For this social group, fully serviced lots would also represent an attractive option, as opposed to on site upgrading and partially serviced lots. Upgrading is unlikely to solve the problem of cohabitation with the extended family, which is less and less desiredby the younger Moroccan generation. For young men and students, who are in the majority male, on site upgradingis likely to be the preferred modality, given that they are often renting and that living in slum areas is likely to be transitory. The other options all imply a muchmore significant investmentthan on site upgrading, and are therefore of less interest to this segment of the population. For the rural migrants, the move into slum areas is frequently one of ascent and an escape from poor livelihood circumstancesand economic deprivation. This social group is likely to benefitthe most from access to on site upgrading and to fully serviced plots, that are seen as offering high lo These segmentsare however notmutuallyexclusive, andtheir overlapswill vary accordingto the social characteristics o f each slum settlement 36 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocial Impact Analysis Report returns and long-time responsesto the family housing needs. Rural migrants are also the social group which is less adapted to transition into apartment living. Large poly-nuclear families, which represent between one and two thirds of the households, are also likely to prefer the on site upgradingand fully serviced sites options, as more adaptedto their needs. From this analysis it appears that slum upgradingandfully serviced lots are the two upgrading modalities that respond to the largest number of the social groups surveyed, as both encounter the preference o f three social groups out of five. The correlations between social characteristics and preferences for upgrading solutions would favor an approach based on the assignment of different upgrading solutions to different groups of households within each slum settlement, as opposed to the imposition of the same upgrading modality to all the households of a given slum settlement, irrespective of their housing needs and preferences, as is currently the practice. These considerations need to be weighed against other factors, such as the physical characteristics of the existing slums that might impede their upgrading, the location of the slum settlements in environmentally unsafe areas, and the availability of land for the provision of lots. 7.3 Affordabilitv of the uuwadina ouerations The four upgrading modalities illustrated above come at very different levels of expected financial contributions from the beneficiaries. Hence their affordability constitutes another significant analytical filter in addition to the preferences and adaptations by social group. Based on operations being carried out at present by public housing operators within the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program, average costs to beneficiary households have been calculated for each upgrading modality and are presented inthe following table. UPGRADINGMODALITY MAD On site upgrading(per dwelling) 10,000 Partially serviced lots (70 m2) 20,000 Fullyserviced lots (60 m2) 30,000 Apartment units(60 m2) 100,000 I I Source: MHU, Division Villes Sans Bidonvilles, September 2005 Thefirst three options compare veryfavorably with the acquisition of an urban slum dwelling, as the prices range from MAD 10,000 to 30,000 on average, but can reach MAD 70,000 in the central slums of main cities like Casablanca. The costs o f apartment units are significantly higher than those o f the other three modalities, and can in fact easily reach MAD 150,000 in Rabat and Casablanca, thus putting apartment units in a class o f their own with regard to the financial contribution expectedfrom the beneficiaries. Slum residents have used different strategies to meet the costs of the upgrading operations:a) by mobilizing cash savings; b) with the sale of other family assets, such as land, animals or jewelry; and c) by borrowing from family members or informal money lenders. Available cash savings will vary, but given the income levels o f likely monthly savings (see table 5 on page 26) 37 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact Analysis Report they will not bevery significant. The same financialsourcesare applied to the acquisitionofslum dwellings, with the difference that in this case the reimbursement of the loans are generally negotiated (and eventually re-negotiated) within family, social or neighborhood networks. As already mentioned, in the case of partially or fully serviced plots only the beneficiaryhousehold can also leverage necessary cash by informally agreeing with another household on the joint development of the lot; this will either generate more cash for the acquisition of the land, or constitutethe necessarycapital for the construction of the housingunits.This privateagreement, which is toleratedby the authorities, makesthis upgradingmodalitymoreaffordable. The ability to afford the different upgrading modalities will vary with thefinancial abilities of each household. In general terms, it is self-evident that the higher the level of financial contribution required from the households, the lower the number of householdsthat will be able to afford the capital expenditure. With referenceto the three income brackets broadly identified amongthe slum population(see Table 5 on page 24), the householdsinthe highest bracket, with a monthlyhousehold income of MAD 3,000 or more, will be the most likely to be able to afford the financial contributionsfor the on site upgradingandfor the partially or fully servicedlots, and some ofthese householdswill also beableto buy the apartmentunits. At the other extreme, households in the lower bracket with incomes below MAD 1,000 per month, and consisting mainly of vulnerable and destitute residents, will likely not be able to afford any financial participationin the upgrading operations, whichever operational modality is applied. Between these two extremes is the middle bracket constituted of households with a monthly income comprised between MAD 1,000 and 3,000, and whose ability to afford the upgradingoptions is varied, and mostly depending on their level of savings and other assets to mobilize. Thoseresidents who are too destituteto contributefinancially have beenpromised to be helped with different initiatives". However, at present, the Government has not provided a detailed outline of how to deal with the extremely vulnerable, amongthem particularlywidows, divorced women, the sick and the elderly. Unless another financing mechanism or a social welfare program is introduced for these particularly marginalizedgroups, it is likely that the benefits of Villes Sans Bidonvilleswill bypassthe bottomthirdofthe target population. 7.4 Summarv analvsis of adverseimpacts The financialcontributionrequestedfrom the beneficiaries ofVilles Sans Bidonvillesis basedon a valid principle of cost sharing, whereby public subsidies are maintained at an overall level of one third of the program costs. However, from the perspective of an adverse impact analysis, financial contributions have to be listed as part of the negative impacts of the program, to be measuredagainstthe benefits that the target populationwill receive. Based on the analysis ofthe four upgrading modalities, and of the different costs to the beneficiaries of each, the following table summarizesall the adverse impactsandthe intensityor importance of eachofthem. Comitede Suivides fonds de garantie pour le logement social, 'Rapport d'evaluationduFondde garantie pour le logementsocialFOGARIM' (May 2005). 38 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report Table 9. Matrix of costsand adverse impacts per upgradingmodality * only for the displacedhouseholds The table illustrates how the level of costs and adverse impacts increases in goingfrom the simplest and least cost& form of upgrading, which is on site upgrading, towards the most expensive form, the transfer into apartment buildings. In particular, it raises concerns as to the trade-offs between the benefits of the apartment units, which can be considerable for some social groups, and their costs, which are very significant. Given the limited incomes of the target population, the likely success o f upgrading operations based on the construction and delivery of apartment unitsshould be further scrutinized before major commitments are made inthis regard. 7.5 Access toguaranteedhousingcredit The affordability of the upgrading operations can be great& increased by access to credit for which the Government has created the FOGARIM guarantee fund, which enables households with informal andor irregular income to access mortgages for the acquisition or the construction o f a dwelling. To date, however, the uptake of banking credits in the context of Villes Sans Bidonvilles operations has been next to nil'2.This is primarily explained by: a) the lack o f information ofthe target population around the possibility of acquiring a housingcredit; b) the lack of familiarity of the target populationwith the banking system in general; c) the fear of loans that could threaten the ownership of the house property in case of delays or default o f payments; and d) the reluctance of commercial banks to engage this low-income clientele which would require significant transaction costs and political risks that go beyond those covered by the FOGARIM guarantee (see part I,chapter 3). These negative factors may be addressed if the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning carries out, as it intends, some credit education programs, the Ministryof Finance and Privatization invests in the broader dissemination of information on the accessibility of housing credit, and the commercial banks venture more forcefully into this new line of business. At the current lending terms that commercial banks are willing to app& (loans with a maturity o f up to 25 years, and an average fixed-term interest rate of 7.5 percent), the following are some examples of capital investments and monthly repayments that could apply to Villes Sans Bidonvilles beneficiaries. l2Accordingto the FOGARIMComit6 de Suivi, the vast majority ofhousingunits acquiredto date have a market value ofMAD 175,000 to 200,000, and are therefore not part ofVilles Sans Bidonvilles operations 39 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram- Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysisReport Table 10: Sample loanamounts and monthly paymentsat current market rates The impacts of housing credit on the implementation of Villes Sans Bidonvilles can be signzpcant, but should not be overestimated, given the levels of monthly payments that slum residentscan afford, which shouldnot go over 25 percentof a household's disposable income. As shown inTable 5 of this report, the lower income groups of the slum populationwould likely not qualify for a housing mortgage on account of their destitution and social marginality. The two middle groups would be able to afford a monthly repayment of between250 and 350 MAD. The two top income groups would likely be able to afford the required monthly repayments of 1,000 or more. The monthly payments shown in table 10 above are considered broadly affordable to the middle and top thirds of the slum population, and would allow them access to the two most expensiveupgradingsolutions, fully serviced lots and apartmentunits, to be selectedaccordingto their preferences and financial abilities. This generic affordability would however have to be verified on a case-by-case basis, especially in those settlements whose residents are slated for transfer into apartmentunits, inview of their higher costs. Besides the systemic constraints that hamper access to housing credit by the slum residents, some restrictionsinherent to the FOGARIMguaranteefurther limit their access.The condition that the last monthly payment of the loan should be made no later than the borrower's 60th birthday will be a constraint for residents 35 years and older, who would have to borrow on maturities shorter than 25 years and thus be facing higher monthly payments. The lack of flexibility in the monthly repayments might also become a constraining factor for households with irregular and/or informal earnings, who might be able to pay more at certain times of the year, and less at others. The cap of MAD 1,000 to the monthly payment currently stipulated by FOGAFUMmay inthese cases become an additionalconstraint. The currently required certification of household incomes by a local representative of the authorities represents a further inhibiting factor towards the presentation of mortgagerequests by the Villes Sans Bidonvilles households, as it may open the door to abuses and corruption. The FOGARlMComite de Suivi is inthe process of reviewing these requirements and constraints, in view of facilitating access to the housingcredits it guarantees and to increase the participation of Villes Sans Bidonvilles households. I n sum, much needs to be donefor FOGARIM toplay an effective role in improving access to credit and to the upgrading operationsof VillesSans Bidonvilles by the slum residents. A year and a half after commencement of the guarantee, there is a risk that the banks will be mostly financing the acquisition of apartments priced at MAD 200,000, of which there is at present a high level of supply are currently plenty. However, this clientele differs significantly from the one originally targetedby FOGARIM. 40 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report 7.6 Access to housing saving schemes Housing saving schemes have not yet been created by banks for households with irregular andor informal earnings, who are the majority of the slum residents.A financial incentivewill have to be established by the Government within the context of the Budget Law of 2007. This will encourage the commercial banks to create such financial products. The housing savings schemes are supposedto help beneficiariesbuild up their credit history with a financial institution with the enticement of public incentives. Based on the current calculations developed by the MinistryofFinance, which is incharge ofdefiningthefinancial incentive, this would probablybe inferior to the likely escalationinthe price of housingunits duringthe savingperiod. For households that are not subject to income tax, the incentive could amount to MAD 1,000, andfor those that are subject to income tax, it may amount to MAD 10,000. A conservative estimate of price escalationfor an apartment unit currently worth MAD 120,000 could bring this to MAD 160,000 three years later. However, for households with no current chances of accessing a mortgage, housing saving schemes will represent the possibility of overcoming these impediments and of acquiring a formal housing unit. Given the amount of variables likely to affect the behavior of banks and households with respect to the saving schemes, their likely impactson the slum populationwere not assessed. 41 Morocco's NationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report PART111:POLICY LESSONS 8. LIMITATIONS AND RISKS OFTHE CURRENTPROGRAMDESIGN 8.1 Limited institutionalcapacitv and coordination There is official, broad-based support of theprogram and the interest in successful completion and eradication of the targeted slums by 2010, but in the context o f VSB and the Moroccan landscape o f informal and formal institutions, stated and unstated interests can diverge significantly, making an accurate assessment of the chance of the program's success difficult. This support however is at times highest for the elimination of slums as the unsightlyevidence of social failure, and not for the goal of satisfying the special needs of this socially excluded and marginalized population. The Stakeholder Analysis reveals that many key actors with high levels of influence support VSB, and that there is wide-ranging enthusiasm for increased partnership and broad-based collaboration across administrative, political and societal levels. However, collaboration and broad-based partnership will likely be difficult in the face of structural blockages and active points of resistancethat permeate the institutional landscape, which makes meetingthe condition of establishing genuine and functional partnerships as outlined in the VSB Implementation document difficult. Commitment to social support and participation i s much more limited but nonethelesshighlightedby the MHUas a crucial innovation. However, technical concerns often outweigh social onesfor stakeholders with high levels of power and influence. The inclination to focus on technical concerns is exacerbated by the short time frame that has been set for the completion of the program. While the 2010 deadline motivates the different players into action, it may also undermine key innovations that make up the program, especially when consultations with the resident population are sometimes perceived as unnecessarydelays to implementation, especially by regionalauthorities. Incoherence and fragmentation within and across Ministries and regional layers of -administration andpolitical competenciespose significant obstacles tofunctional partnerships even in light of contractual arrangements and monitoring committees that are to promote collaborationand progress. Structural reforms across the civil service, such as the early voluntary retirement program and the restructuring of the parastatal housing companies, are creating bottlenecks and are making collaboration more difficult. Insufficiently defined responsibilities and an ambiguous scope o f agreements may lead to watered down lines o f accountability. 8.2 Upgradingas the onlv response to social exclusionof slum communities The current approach to upgrading has the limitation of viewing the social exclusion of this marginalized population primarily as a housing problem. The underlying assumption at the basis of the VSB program being that the partially subsidized provision of better accommodation will greatly improvethe quality of life o fthe slum-dwellers, and reduce their social exclusion and marginality. This i s certainly true for those segments of the populationthat are upwardly mobile, as they are able to capitalize on their new physical assets and leverage them for a real improvement oftheir livelihoods. 42 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report However there are other more socially fragile segments of the slum populationfor which the most pressing needs might be better income generation, increased access to affordable municipal and social services and safety nets. A sustainable response to slum-dweller needs would have to consist of an integrated package of housing, services and livelihood support. The national slum upgrading program does not provide any support in the latter, which are the prerogatives o f other line ministries and institutions, hence the need for increasedcoordination to ensure maximum synergy among differentprograms. Thefield work carried out and the review of the relevant literature, show that the improvement in shelter conditions is unfortunately often accompanied by a worsening in the access by the residents to jobs, sources of employment generation, health and education services, whenever the displacement o f the community occurs, and especially if it occurs towards newly urbanized lands in the peripheryof the cities. In addition, loss of social networks, greater distance from the job market and higher transport costs will significantly decrease the capabilities o f the households of investingintheir shelter improvements at the time when they needto do so most. Thus, one of the unintended consequences of the slum upgrading is the risk of increasing the precariousness of the lives of parts of that very population that it supports through an improvement o f shelter conditions. Access to a formal housingunit means more social acceptance and the promise of a more integrated life in the urban community. But if it is accompanied by a deterioration o f access to services and livelihoods, acceptance and satisfaction of the beneficiary households may be low. This has often been the case in the past, according to evaluations carried out by the Ministryof Housingand Urban Planningitself. I n thepresence of a morefunctional housing market than the current one in Morocco, where access to land, housing products and credit would be easier and cheaper, one could imagine that physical slum upgrading investments, as carried out today under the VSB program, could be complemented by local economic development efforts. These would be aimed at improving the incomes o f the upwardly mobile slum population, thus enabling them to eventually afford with their own means access to formal housing options available on the market, instead of resulting from public sector interventions. Subsidized public housing in this hypothetical scenario would be limitedto the neediesthouseholds. I n view of the recent launch of the Initiative Nationale de DkveloppementHumain (INDH), Villes Sans Bidonvilles could become the platform for more integrated operations, targeting the other economic and social development needs of the slum population besides shelter, for a more comprehensive social outcome of the public interventions. 8.3 Limited choice and affordabilitv of urogram benefits The PSIA has identified several concerns emergingfrom the limited choice and nature of the program benefits for a very diverse target population. The Villes Sans Bidonvilles program does not distinguish among the residents, nor does it tailor the housing solutions offered according to their social profile or the income availabilities. A given slum settlement will be slated for on site upgrading, the provision of partially or fully services plots or apartment units, according primarily to the availability of land and other operational and financial considerations of the public housing operators. Residents are not given the option to choose from these four modalities, neither on an individual basis, nor as a community. 43 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report There are also reasonable concerns as to the validity of thefinancial structure of theprogram which reliesfor 70percent on beneficiary contributions. This amount of MAD 11.6 billion is supposedto come from a population which i s by definition among the poorest of the nation, with the lowest levels of incomes and savings. In addition, slum residents, as we have seen above, are expected to pay for housing solutions that they do not get to select, and that are generally designed without them being consulted. In sum, they continue to be considered and treated as recipients o f public aid, insteadof clients of subsidized products that they will pay for. A significant percentage of the slum population is unable to afford financial participation to theprogram because of its absolutepoverty. Another important segment would be able to afford the housing units only if credit is made available, and this as we have seen is yet to happen in a numerically significant way. In addition, the population has a generic sense of entitlement towards the support of the State, which is reinforced by the high-level declarations of commitment to eradicatethe slum settlements, and which promotes a propensity to resist financial contributions inthe first place. 8.4 Program innovationsand "businessas usual" Villes Sans Bidonvilles represents a major break with past policies in some respects, but "business as usual" in others. The innovations are chiefly related to: a) the national comprehensive approach whereby the Government commits to slum elimination by 2010 and earmarks the financial means to carry it out; b) the city approach whereby all the slum settlements of a given city are integrated into a comprehensive plan for their upgrading or elimination, which will address all of the land needs and involve the local authorities; c) the role that private sector developers are expectedto play inthe construction of housing; and d) the concomitant policies of slum prevention and large-scale production of low-cost housing units to discourage slum proliferation. The typology of interventions and the way that they are applied to the slum communities, represent the continuity with past practices. From the point of view of the slum settlement communities, the innovative aspects o f VSB are perceived primarily as a greater commitment of the highest authorities of the land to deliver on their promises of support. But it is the continuity with the past approaches that prevails in practice, as the communities are confronted with the same operational modalities and the same local actors when it comes to their own upgrading prospects. The interaction between the households and the institutional actors hasfollowed by and large the same modalities established in the past, whether the upgrading operations have been contractually defined before 2004 and the launch of the program or later: top-down decisions on the upgrading solutions to be applied to the slum settlement (taken primarily by the technical staff of the public housing companies in consultation with the Ministry o f Housing and Urban Planning, the regional and local authorities), and little consultation with the residents on the modalities or timing of the operation and on the willingness or ability to pay for their part of the costs. A high level of mistrust seems to continue to characterize the relationship between the households and the local representatives of the municipalities and of the central government institutions (Ministry of Interior in particular). The launch of the VSB program and the national commitment to the elimination of slum settlements do not seem to have changed the attitudes of the local actors towards the slum-dwellercommunities. Infact, some local actors have incentives 44 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocialImpact Analysis Report to keep the slum population in its precarious status, and to profit from its insecurities, and such actors are still perceived by the slum communities as antagonists to the satisfaction o f their housing needs. 8.5 Social suuuort and uarticiuation: a uromise to be maintained The most striking element of continuity with past practices is the lack of social support and participation in slum upgrading operations under the VSB program, making a significant divergence between the recently stated program objectives and the on-going practice on the ground. Based on the results of the evaluation of past practices, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning had concluded that social support and participation must be built into the design of the overall program and o f each slum upgrading operation. However, one year after the formal launch o f the program, social support and participation has not gone much further than these declarations o f intents, and only five on-going operations are benefitingfrom the interventions of specialized social staff, via contracts that the Ministry o f Housing and Urban Planning and HoldingA1Omrane have established with theAgence de dkveloppementsocial. The constraints to scaling up of social support and participation in the slum upgrading operationsseem to comprise:a) the Ministry of Housing and urban Planning has little expertise on the subject at central level, and very few cadres specialized in the social sciences in its regional delegations; b) ADS has a broad social development mission to carry out, a small staff, and cannot ensure the coverage o f the slum upgrading operations on a contractual basis to the Ministry or Holding AI Omrane; c) there is a national scarcity of professionals specialized in social development, probably on account of the lack of attention to participatory approaches by previous Governments (as well as to the closure of university departments o f social sciences in the `70s for political reasons). The Ministry of Housing is currently exploring theprospects and the opportunityfor scaling up social support and participation in the Villes Sans Bidonvillesprogram, with the help of some of its national and international partners. Studies on the purpose and modalities of social support and participationhave beencarried out, and more are on their way. A larger investment in social support and participation would help to counteract the mistrust towards the authorities that is quite present among the slum households, and that has to be overcome for a positive interaction. Social support and participation in the VSB program could cover a number of dvferent functions, according to the consensus o f the social development experts gathered in May 2005 around the preliminary findings of the PSIA. In the case o f on-going operations that are already under way, it could provide the necessary communicationbetween the public housing companies, the local authorities, and the slum communities, so as to dispel misunderstandings, communicate clearly the objectives of the operation, its expected benefits and requirements, financial and other, expected from the communities. In this case, social support and participation would be consequently limited to ensure that the operation, as designed, will be better accepted and supported by the population. I n the case of operationsstill to be designed, social support andparticipation could include: a) in-depth consultations with the slum households to elicit their expectations and willingness to engage in the operation, and at what conditions, financial and otherwise; b) conveying the results o f such consultations to the physical planners and financial staff in charge o f the operation design, and allowing for various iterations o f adjustments via consultations with the communities; c) 45 Morocco's NationalSlum Upgrading Program-Povertyand SocialImpact Analysis Report setting up appropriate communication channels that would serve the upgrading operation throughout its cycle, from designto completion and delivery of the housing products, to the move of the families into the new premises, where applicable. I n the dialogue among the parties responsiblefor the implementation of VSB, a tension is noticeable around the issue of socialsupport andparticipation, between the policy-makers that would like to scale it up and mainstream it, and the operational agencies and regional authorities that are accountable for the delivery of the program. The latter tend to see social support and participation as a potentially destabilizing process that might derail the planning o f the interventions according to available resources and to the technical criteria adopted. In the most extreme cases, exemplified by some of the local decision-makers interviewed during the first phase of the PSIA field work, social support and participation are perceived as a dangerous "waste o f time" that can seriously slow down the implementation of the VSB program and the achievement o f its objectives. 8.6 Main risks to the success of the vropram The limitations outlined above highlight risks that the program is facing with regard to the achievement of its objectives. These risks are still manageable if the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning is willing to address them and to introduce the necessaryrevisions to the program design and implementation mechanisms. The main risks identified in the context of the Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis to the success of the program are the following ones: 0 The risk that some of the institutional actors on whom the program depends may not feel the same degree o fownership for the program's approach, or may not havethe incentives or capacity to fulfill their responsibilities; 0 The risk o f emphasizing physical upgrading in the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction approach that would include complementary measures for access to municipal and social services and livelihood security; 0 The risk that the four upgrading modalities may not be consistent with the socio- economic reality of slum dwellers, and that each may be applied to all residents of a given slum irrespective oftheir demands and affordable levels of contribution; 0 The risk that the institutional practices from the past including inertia, political economy interests and mutual mistrust between local actors and slum dwellers will overshadow the innovations ofthe program; 0 The risk that the over-ambitious time frame may not allow the actors involved in the implementation o f the program sufficient time to experiment, learn and innovate in order to make it truly effective. 46 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and SocialImpact Analysis Report 9. RELEVANT INTERNATIONALPOLICY LESSONS The scope ofthe PSIA work carried out did not include a review ofthe sector literature or o f case studies from comparator countries that could provide policy lessons in the review o f the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program. However, during the preparation of this Report it appeared useful to provide at least references to two on-going slum upgrading programs, one of a national scale in Thailand and one from a city-wide scale in Brazil. They offer interesting clues as to how two critical aspects of the Morocco national slum upgrading program reviewed in this PSIA were addressed elsewhere: a) the role of social support and participation of communities in the design and implementation of slum upgrading operations; and b) the integration of social development and income-generating activities with the physical upgrading of the housing conditions. 9.1 Thailand's Baan Makona UDaradinP~rogram'~ The Thai Government launched in 2003 an ambitious national slum and squatter upgrading program called Baan Makong, or Secure Housing, to improve housing, living and security of tenure for 300,000 households in 2,000 poor communities in 200 cities within five years. The program is built on the government experience of the previous decade of providing loans, small grants, and community welfare funds (for education, income generation and other welfare) to community organizations and their networks. Baan Makong i s implemented by the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI), which i s an independent public organization, whose Board comprises representativesfrom Government and from community organizations. Theprogram channelsgovernmentfunds in theform of infrastructure subsidies and housing loans directly to poor communities, which plan and carry out improvements to their housing environment and to basic services. The communities and their networks at first work with local governments, universities and NGOs in their city to survey local poor communities and plan an upgrading program to improve conditions for all of these within three or four years. Once the plans have been finalized, CODI channels the infrastructure subsidies and housing loans directly to the communities. Upgrading existing settlements is supported whenever possible; if relocation i s necessary, a site is sought close by to minimize the economic and social costs to the households. The program recognizes the large investments that communities have already made on their homes, and imposes as few conditions as possible in order to give them the freedom to design their own programs. Infrastructure subsidies per family of $625 are available for upgrading in situ, of $1,125 for re-blocking (Le. reallocating the existing land to better accommodate all families along more rational alignments imposed by the provision of municipal infrastructure) and of $ 1,625 for relocating. Families can draw on low-interest loans from either CODI or banks for housing, and there is a grant equal to 5 percent of the total infrastructure subsidy to help fund the managementcostsfor the localorganizationor network. Urbanpoor community organizations and their networks are the key actors, and they control thefunding and the management of theprogram. They (rather than contractors) undertake most of the building, which makes funding go much further and brings in their own contributions. Securetenure is negotiated in each instance, through a variety of means such as cooperative land l3 Source: Somsook Boonyabancha" BaanMankong: goingto scale with "slum" and squatter upgrading in Thailand" inEnvironment and Urbanization,Vol. 17.N. 1 April 2005 47 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocial ImpactAnalysisReport purchase, long-term lease contracts, land swaps or the establishment of user rights. But in all cases, the emphasis is on communal(rather than individual)tenure. The, program is based on the active participation and the responsible roles of the slum communities in its design and implementation, and starts with identifying the stakeholders and explainingthe program, organizingnetwork meetings, which may include visits from people in other cities, organizing meetings in each urban poor community, involving municipal staff if possible; and establishing a joint committee to oversee implementation, which includes community and network leaders, the municipality, local academics and NGOs. This joint committee meets with the representatives of all urban poor communities, organizes a detailed survey and developsthe community upgradingplan. 9.2 Brazil's RibeiraAzul uugradingpro~ram'~ An integrated approach to urban upgrading has been implemented in the neighborhood of RibeiraAzul in the city of Salvador, State of Bahia, Brazil since 1999 under a program called Viver Melhor, or Living Better. This program combines infrastructureand social interventions andhasbeenperceivedas highly successful interms of its implementationandpositiveimpacton living conditions. The integrated and participatoryapproach has been implementedby the State with the assistance of grant fundingfrom the ItalianGovernmentthroughCities Alliance for the provisionoftechnical assistance and social development activities. RibeiraAzul covers approximately 4 square kilometers along a coastal inlet with 40,000 families and 135,000 individuals, and is part of a broader area which has beencharacterized as `high risk' situated in a flood prone zone, with a large numberof squatter settlements, insecure landtenure, a highly pollutedenvironment by householdand industrialwaste, poor social indicators(the worst inthe city), andvery limitedaccessto infrastructureandbasic services. The Ribeira Azul Program combinesphysical interventions with investments to improve the social and economic conditions of the area's population. This includes housing and infrastructureimprovements (roads, water, sanitation, public lighting), and programs in health care, child nutrition, education, training, and employment generation through cooperatives. Community participationhas been a fundamental aspect of the program. The project has been implemented by CONDER (Urban Development Company of the State of Bahia), the Italian NGO AVSI and the localNGO CDM. This integratedapproach is now the basis for the State's urbandevelopmentstrategy andwill be implementedState-widethrougha WorldBankproject. Inview ofthe generalization ofthis integratedupgradingapproach, a PSIA was carried out onthe Novos Alagados ZZ site, to assess the degree of satisfaction of the communities with the infrastructureand social investments. Residentshave benefitedfrom a child nutrition program, a pre-school day-care program coupled with the training of pre-school monitors, access to educational facilities for students in grades 1-8, a youth sports program and a professional training program. While access to these social welfare services had not been generalized, the degree of satisfaction of those households and residents that had benefitedfrom them was high, and the overall demand was for continued public support to such social investments. It appears also that their provisionhadbeen a significant factor in discouraging householdsfrom cashing in onthe physicalimprovementsto their dwellingsandre-sellingthe housingunits. l4Source: Judy Baker" Integratedurbanupgrading:the experienceof RibeiraAzul, Salvador,Brazil- Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis" WorldBank, July 2005 48 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram- Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report 10. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Inthe spirit of partnershipwith and active support to the Government that the Bank has pursued in the housing sector, and on the basis of the results of the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis carried outjointly with the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, the following are the main policy recommendationsthat are offered for the purpose of further improving the national slum upgradingprogram. 10.1 Responsivenessof ViIIesSans Bidonvillesto theslum pouulation The first four recommendations address the required responsiveness of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program to the expectations, needs and expressed demands of the target slum population. These recommendations focus on: a) introducing flexibility in the selection of upgradingmodalities available to the target population; b) addressingthe need to providetailored solutions for the most vulnerable residents; c) ensuring effective social support to and participation of the slum population; and d) linking the housing upgrading operationsto actions that support income generationand betteraccess to services. A. A more flexible approach to the SUPPIV housim solutions to the individual slum of householdsshould be developedand amlied The Ministry should devise ways to respond to the diverse demands and needs of households within each slum settlement, insteadof applying indistinctly to all of them the same upgrading ' solution, as currently is the norm. Given that under the VSB program a city-wide approach is applied, whereby different kinds of operationscoexist side by side, there is no reasonto assign all of the households of an individual slum to a single upgrading operation. Rather, on the basis of the understandingof the natureof the slum households, of their preferences and ability to pay, the Ministry the public operators and the private developers active in the provision of low-cost housing should be able to provide individual households with on site upgrading, serviced lots or apartment units according to their preferences, willingness to pay, and the objective technical constraintsofthe specific cases. This approach would have the advantage of increasing the responsiveness of the program to the slum household needs, and possibly their financial participation in the program costs, given a higher degree of satisfaction and adequacy of the housing solution. This approach can only be applied ifthere is a sufficient investment in social support and participation that would allow for the in-depthknowledgeof the target communities, and inthe design of a housingsupply that would take that knowledge into account. Operationsthat were programmedprior to or during 2004 would not be affected by this change in approach, so as not to delay the implementationof the program. On the other hand, operations still to be programmed at city-scale or for which resources have been allocated but design has not started, could benefit from this change, The Ministry could start by identifying one city where this approachwould be experimented, draw the appropriate lessons from the consultations and re-programming exercise, and then eventually generalizethe approach. 49 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand SocialImpact Analysis Report B. The reauirements of the most vulnerablesegment of the slum uouulation which cannot afford anv kind of financial uarticiuationshould be addressed at theulanning stage. Appropriate, subsidized solutions should be found to address their special housing needs of households or residents who are too poor to take active part in the program. Given that each slum settlement is likely to contain a certain percentage of them, such solutions should be. identified and will require a further injection of public resources, including by the Local Authorities, and different operational modalities, such as the location-accession which is under consideration by the Ministry o f Housing and Urban Planning. The exclusion of these destitute households from the "normal" slum up-grading operations would enable the public housing operators and private developers to prepare and carry out more financially sound operations, where the risk o f incomplete cost recovery would be minimized. Such attention to the most vulnerablesegments of the slum communitiescan only takeplace if there is sufficient investment in social support and participation that would allow for the in- depth knowledge of the target communities, and a willingness of the public sector to recognize and meet the needs of the most vulnerable residents. The question of moral hazard is however relevant, as waiving the requirement of financial contributions for some households and residents will inevitably discourage the other ones from complying. However, within each community there is good local knowledge of the residents in utmost need, and clear channels of social communication should provide the necessary safeguards to ensure that the rest of the households respecttheir financial commitments. C. Social suuuort and uarticiuation should be rauidlv scaled UD at central and local levels and becomeDart anduarcel ofthe imulementationof the uugradingouerations. Social support andparticipation must movefrom being a program intention to a reality on the ground, as it is one of the most promising innovations o f the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program with regard to the previous generations of public interventions inthe social housing sector. First o f all, the MHU must reinforce its central level staffing with social development specialists assigned to the program, and these should supervise similar staff located in the regional departments of the Ministry. Holding AI Omrane, as the main implementing agency for the program, should also mobilize specialized teams to ensure that social support and participation are part and parcel ofthe design and preparation of each slum upgradingoperation. This might be obtained via collaborativeagreements with the Agence de dheloppement social and with NGOs andprofessional groups able toprovide the appropriate services. The Ministry o f Housing and Urban Planning and the Ministry of Social Development should explore the possibility of setting up a professional training program in social support and participation to establish the credentials o f sector professionals before they are appointed to the teams deployed on the VSB operations. An evaluation o f the first few upgrading operations that have benefited from social support and participation should also be carried out, and the lessons learned should be disseminated and internalized. Information campaigns on the implementation o f the program should highlightthe importance of its social dimension. 50 Morocco's NationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocialImpactAnalysis Report D. The needs for access to municiual and communitv services and to income-generating activitiesbv the slum householdsshould be addressed,in uartnershipwith the INDH The Government should act to ensure that slum upgrading is integrated with otherforms of social and economic support, recognizing that the social exclusion and marginality which are the condition o f the slum households cannot be solved only with the provision of better housing. Sector Ministries such as Health, Education and Social Development should be encouraged to plan investments inthe vicinity o fthe slum communities beingrestructured on site and of the new neighborhoods resulting from the resettlement operations, so as to guarantee that the improvement in housing i s not accompanied by deteriorating access to basis services. Programs for local economic development, including access to vocational training and physical space to carry out productive and commercial activities, should be also implemented. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development should actively promote such activities within the recently launched Initiative Nationale de Dheloppement Humain. The INDHcould in fact address the social needs of the poor and marginalized slum-dwelling populations through actions aimed at improving their welfare and access to services. This would minimize the negative consequences o fthe disruption ofthe slumcommunities causedby the upgrading, ensure a quicker integration of the communities in the urban social fabric, and increase their ability to capitalize on the genuine benefits of the slum upgrading program. As the selection of the 250 urban neighborhoods to be part of the INDHgets under way, it is likely that the targeting of these poverty alleviation activities will favor a number of slum settlements that are part of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program. The synergy between VSB and INDHcould be highlybeneficialto the residentpopulation. 10.2 Sustainabilitv of the program "Villes SansBidonvilles" The second four recommendations are related to the allocation of resources and the management of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles program. These recommendations focus on: e) revising the financial assumptions o f the program to adjust for more realistic beneficiary contributions; f ) actively promoting access to housing credit to ensure greater affordability o f the upgrading solutions; g) increasing the investment in human resources for a better management of the program; and h) revising the overall timetable of the program to align it with realistic delivery projections. E. The financial assumutions of the program. which currentlv relv on beneficiarv contributionsin the order of 70percent,should be revised Given the fact that a significant percentage of the slum households will not be able to contribute financially to its implementation, the current financial projections and allocations of public resources will have to be revised by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning. Commitments by the Local Governments to contribute financially to the costs ofthe slum upgradingoperations, ifconfirmed inthecourseoftheestablishmentofthecitycontractsoratalaterstage, havetobe entered in the program budget, as well as eventual grant contributions that the Government may get from development agencies, especially to face the costs of re-housing the most vulnerable segment of the slum population. Realistic financial forecasting at an early stage of the national slum upgrading program is highly preferable to incurring later into budgetary shortfalls which risk undermining the credibility of the program and of the institutions that are responsible for it, and of endangeringthe financial health of the public operators and private contractors involved. 51 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocial ImpactAnalysis Report F. , Access to housing credit should be rauidlv scaled up to imurove the affordabilitv of the uugradingsolutions and the financial Darticiuationof the beneficiaries. Inparticular, the credit educationprogram, which has been designed by the Ministry of Housing andUrbanPlanningduringthe preparationofthe HSDPL, shouldbe implementedwithout further delays, on account of the potential benefits that may accrue from its results. It focuses in particular on those cities with the highest concentrationof apartment units operations, which are currently vulnerable to their low affordability by the target population. It will create a better understandingof the recently expanded legal rights to housing credit for the households having informaland irregular income, and encouragetheir access to commercial banks that are offering such mortgages. At the same time it will facilitate the work of the credit institutionsin reaching out to this difficult clientele, beyondthe guaranteesofferedby FOGARIM. Micro-finance institutions should be actively encouraged to support the construction and rehabilitation of dwellings aspart of the VSBprogram as well. Recent provisionsallowingfor the allocationof resourcesfromthe HousingSolidarityFundto the financing of credit lines to be managedby micro-financeinstitutionsshouldbe put intopractice to allow further accessto credit bythe programbeneficiaries. G. Greater resources should be invested in the management of the VSB urogram bv the MHU,both at centralandlocallevels,tomaximizeits chancesof success. The allocation of human resources and of management tools should be increased, given the complex institutionalpartnerships neededfor the implementationof the program and the critical challenges represented by the provisionof decent accommodation to slum-dweller households. Such resourcesshould be aligned with the magnitude of the investments and of the task at hand. So far, HoldingAI Omrane hasbeenadjusting its structures and operationalmodalitiesto face the new challenges represented by the implementation of VSB and of the other programs that the Ministryhas entrusteditwith. The Ministry itself needs to expand its capacity to steer the VSB program forward and to monitor its implementation and progress and this will require setting up the appropriate managementstructures and staffingthem with an adequatenumber ofhighly qualifiedpersonnel. Inthe course ofthe first two years of implementation, instead, the Ministryhas lost a number of senior officials to the national early retirement program, and the unit in charge of Villes Sans Bidonvillesdoes not seemto be adequately staffedyet. Inaddition, a number of initiativesaimed at improvingthe management of the programand at providingit with the appropriate tools await the availability of donor grants to be implemented, such as the Observatoire de I'habitat insalubre. The amount of public resources invested in the implementationof the VSB program entirelyjustifies that a greater amount offinancing is madeavailable for its management. H. The urogram's time-table should be revised to align it with more realistic deliverv projections and to avoiduotentiallvuerverse incentives. Nearingthe close of the second year of implementationof the program, it appears that the target ofcompletingall ofthe upgradingoperations by end of 2010 is not realistic. While it is important not to lose the momentum and the commitment of all the parties involvedfor the success of the program, the Government should also assess the perverse effects of this sense of urgency on the behavior of the mainactors. Inparticular, this time-line encourages the supporters of a technical 52 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social ImpactAnalysis Report rather than participative implementation of the program, as any effort at consulting with the populationand concerting with the residents the preferred modalities for the upgradingto take place is perceived as additional time requirements. In reality, such time investment upfront is likely to be compensated at the completion of the operation when the target beneficiaries will more readily acquire the housing goods and transfer from the slum settlement to the new premises. Overall, theMHU will also need to introduce a culture of outcomesinstead of outputs,whereby a slum upgrading operation would be declared successful not only if the physical works have been carried out on time and on budget, but equally according to the degree of impacts on livelihoods and quality of life of the target community, to the rate of occupancy and improvementsto the plots or dwellings by the originally identifiedhouseholds, and to the degree of cost-recovery and financial participation of the beneficiaries. This in itself will require a culture change that can only happen as the result of a concerted effort of introducing new approaches, of applyingthe right skills, and of holdingthe institutionsaccountable primarily to the satisfactionofthe citizensthey are serving. 53 54 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysisReport ANNEX 1 Profilesof the six slum surveyed inthe contextofthe Povertyand SocialImpact Analysisof the Villes Sans BidonvillesProgram The sites of the field research were six slum settlements in three different cities, Larache, Casablanca and Agadir, and were jointly chosen with the MHU. In each of the three cities, two slum settlements were selected, one located in the city center and one at its periphery. The centrally located slum settlements in Larache, Casablanca and Agadir, were respectively Jnan El Bacha, Duar Skueila and Khiam Larrab. Slum settlements at the periphery o f Larache, Casablancaand Agadir were respectively Guadaloupd, Nakhil and Bakchich. The cities and slum areas were selected in a manner to ensure maximum variability while maintaining a high level of comparability. The following criteria were used in the selection: size o f city, record o f implemented or planned reforms (the signing of VSB `Contrats de Ville' i s one indication o f reform activity), and location and size of slum areas within the city. The location is an important factor and proxies other differences in characteristics of the slum areas and their inhabitants. The slum portraits presented here are based on by the first researchphase during which the team conducted transect walks across the sample slums, heldabout 30 informal group meetings which included 125 people in all both inside slum dwellings and in the streets, and visited about 20 dwellings. Larache: Jnane el Bachaand GuadalouDB Larache i s a coastal city located in the north of Morocco of roughly 100,000 inhabitants. According to the VSB Implementation plan, about 5,000 slum households are slated to be upgraded by 2008. The majority of households will be displaced to serviced lots and the rest will benefit from on site upgrading. Larache was chosen for the study because the project planning and implementation of upgrading operations is at an advanced stage compared to other cities. The city was among the first ones to sign a city contract, indicating a cooperative and collaborative relationship with the Government and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning in particular. The two chosen slum areas, Jnan El Bacha and Guadeloupd located centrally and peripherally, comprise 1,500 and 500 households, respectively. Jnan El Bacha is an old slum settlement that has dwellings made of permanent materials, the streets are cemented, and sewerage, water and electricity meters are installed. The streets are relatively wide. A local dispensary and a school are close to the slum area, as well as hammam. The dwellings are relatively spacious and some have multiple stories to accommodate several families. However, the quality o f housing varies significantly across the slum area, with single women or young families inhabiting extremely low-quality housing. Most families have long- standing ties to the slum and mostly demand improvemento f services. The slum residents have multiple livelihood strategies, both income-generating activities as well as housing strategies that maximize usage o f space. Both in Jnan El Bacha and Guadeloupd, if with lower frequency, many families reported to have income contributions from family members working abroad inEurope. 59 Morocco's National SlumUpgrading Program-Povertyand Social Impact Analysis Report Guadefoupk is a much newer slum settlement. It was created in 1996 and has attracted many peasants from the surrounding rural areas that have flown from disintegratinglivelihoodsdue to lowering yearly rainfall. On the whole the slum inhabitants live in comparatively worse conditionsthan slum dwellersinJnan ElBacha. Guadeloupehousesroughly 500 householdsbut the lay-out, the service infrastructureand the quality of the housing is abysmal. UnlikeJnan El Bacha, regularized, basic services are not available. Many of the streets are extremely narrow, increasing the danger of fires, and the dwellings are made of precarious materials. The slum dwellers in Guadeloupe live in worse conditions and seemed otherwise poorer in terms of householdpossessionsandofthe oralaccountsofsavings abilityand income.Prostitution,also of girls, was mentioned as an income-generatingbusiness, and violence against women was raised as a problem. This was not raisedin other slum areas, which however does not meanthat it does notoccur. With little variationamongthe two slums, the slumresidentswere little informedaboutthe Villes Sans Bidonvillesprogram, were suspicious of the authorities, were minimally if at all organized and inessence hadhumble demandsfor the establishmentor improvementofbasic services. Casablanca :Douar Skueilaand Nakhil Casablanca, a coastal city, is located south of the capitalRabat and is the most populous city in Moroccowith morethan 3 million residents. It has also the biggest populationof slum dwellers with about 50,000 households, or one quarter of the entire national urban slum population. Accordingto the VSB implementationplan, the majority of households will be either displaced into apartments or the slum settlements will be upgraded. Casablancawas includedinthe study because of the significant size of slum dwellers in absolute terms, the concentration of slum dwelling vis-his regular housing as well as the complex relationshipbetween local and central authorities. In addition, Casablanca has become a particular focus for the GOM following the Casablancabombingsthat were carried out by fundamentalist slumresidents. Douar SkueiZu is among the biggest slum settlements in Casablanca with roughly 5,000 households, and it is centrallylocated. The slum is fairly well establishedwith electricity,sewage system and access to water. For the most part, Douar Skueilahas dwellings made of permanent materials and cemented streets, but distinct neighborhoods with variable quality of housing and cleanliness. One part of Douar Skueila is a conglomeration of households resettled from elsewhere by the authorities with the promisethat the resettlementwould be onlytemporary. Douar Skueila has beenthe object of many planned and yet not implemented interventions, and numerous rounds of censuses were carried out in the past three decades in order to assess the eligible population. In the meantime, apartments for middle-class households have been constructed insteadaround the slum settlement, and the residents are frustrated by the perceived lack of attention to their needs.Theslum area is now slated for bothupgradingin situ as well as relocationof households into apartments; the populationis not only skepticalbut also distrusting of the authorities as a resultof negative past experiences, includingperceived promisesto obtain access to the apartment units that were previously built. Many slum residents seem to be completelyuninformedabout the planned interventions. Given the long existence of the slum and a population that was born there, Douar Skueila is stable, and the social fabric seems to be stronger, evidenced by a seemingly vibrant mosque and coranic school as well as some localinterestgroups. Also, fewer migratoryflows occur inandout 60 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and SocialImpact Analysis Report of the slum than elsewhere: the new residents that do arrive seem to be more often coming from other cities or city slums rather than from rural areas. Livelihood activities include employment at factories that surround the slum, and service jobs like cleaning in surrounding middle-class neighborhoods. Employment is irregular, as the factories seem to not want to enter into formal contracts, which are mandatory following a certain period of employment. Periods of employment are followed by regular spells of unemployment. There is a range of established businesses in the slums, like bakeries, vegetable vendors, groceries, hair dressers, repair shops etc. The population is largely oriented towards urban employment and supplements its livelihood through livestock. The peripheral slum area of Nakhil consists of 900 households and is located near the international airport Mohammed V. The area is an old army complex with dilapidated barracks that have been taken over by slum dwellers and that are overcrowded. There are also self-built dwellings that are dispersed over a large field prone to strong winds, and the structures are quite feeble. There i s no sewage, no electricity and no water supply, and the slum is far from the city boundaries. The planned upgrading i s the relocation o f residents to an apartment complex currently under construction, roughly 2 km from the settlement. The apartment complex is envisioned to be somewhat self-contained, with the provision of health services and of a school. The majority o f the slum inhabitants are retired army personnel with low pensions who are not necessarily from the Casablanca area. In fact, the slum population appears to be from across Morocco. In terms of livelihood, the residents seek employment as cleaners and porters at the airport, which is the closest employer. However, not only is the employment highly irregular, but slum residents are often refused employment because o f the stigma related to their residence. Many women do artisan work that is bought several times a month by traders and sold in Casablanca. The authorities are plans to develop an industrial, productive complex in the vicinity of the new apartment complex, which i s envisioned to provide employment to the slum residents. Like the population of Douar Skueila, the slum residents o f Nakhil are largely uninformed about the nature and time plan of the future intervention, suspicious of the local authorities and fearful. The social fabric of this slum seems quite weak and no community organizingwas visible. APadir: KhiamLaraab and Bakchich A mid-size city, Agadir is located in the south of Morocco and was chosen for the economic, cultural and social set-up that is differs from the other cities. Agadir is a city of immigrants according to an official according to whom most people come from the surrounding, rural areas and work as seasonal workers. Agadir depends on the fish industry, agriculture and increasingly on tourism. This has also increasedthe attraction for people to migrate towards the city. Agadir has the fourth-highest number of households residing in slum in the country, estimated at about 12,000. Khiam Laraab, located centrally, comprises 800 households and is surrounded by middle-class housing, and at one side of the slum settlement construction of sewage lines is under way. The streets are fairly wide, if not cemented; the dwellings are made of stone and fairly well maintained. There is a Red Crescent clinic at the edge of the settlement that provides health services to the residents. Part of the slum area has already been surveyed with files that capture basic information about household size and composition. The residents have the impression that signingthese files impliestheir agreement to whatever upgrading solution that will be decided for them. Relocation to serviced lots is the only envisaged type of intervention, and a significant 61 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact AnalysisReport proportion o f the population is resistant to this solution because of fear of longer distances, costs, loss o f livelihood activities. Also, households have been asked to destroy the slum dwellings in order to qualify for the relocation to the serviced lots where self-help construction is encouraged. However, significant delays in making lots available have caused hardship. Census efforts by the authorities have also been met with some resistance because the questionnaires are perceived too simplistic to capture the socio-economic characteristics and the emerging needs and concerns. The experiences of a small local organization exemplify how efforts from the slum population itself to become engaged in the slum upgrading have been ignored. Following several written requests to consider more multidimensional characteristics when planning interventions, no responsehad beengiven by the authorities. Bakchich, a peripheral slum area, does not show any evidence of electricity supply, be it legal or illegal hook-ups. The slum is sufferingfrom increasing population density for which the residents fault the local authorities whose promises to implement an upgrading program create a inflow of people. The slum is comparatively the worst with respectto quality of housing, access to services and sewage system among those visited. The sewage pipes under construction are filled with garbage suggesting significant time lapses duringthe construction. In as far as the residents are aware o f the planned interventions, they are suspicious and lament the ignorance about their needs and difficulties by the authorities incharge ofthe upgrading operations. 62 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact Analysis Report ANNEX 2 Selected excerpts from the field work interviews with slum-dwellers (original document inFrench) Pendant la deuxibme phase de I'etude, 1'6quipe du BET marocain AREA dirigCe par Abdesselam Tazi a conduit des entretiens approfondis et des focus groups avec les habitants des bidonvilles et des personnes ressources de Jnan El Bacha et Guadaloupe (Larache), Skuela et Nakhil (Casablanca), Khiam Larrab et Bakhchich (Agadir), qui avaient et6 visit& durant la premibre phase par l'equipe. Les outils methodologiques et l'analyse ont 6te conduits par Franqoise Navez-Bouchanine, sociologue. L e document ci-aprks est une selection de fragments d'entretiens, classes en fonction des cinq grands volets d'exploration qui ont et6 retenus suite 1la premiere mission et aux discussions elargies qui ont suivi. Cette selection a et6 operde, dans le cadre de la preparation de l'atelier de Rabat du 9 et 10 mai 2005, pour rendre plus prksente la parole des habitants, avec sa veritC, mais aussi ses lacunes, ses convergences, ses contrastes;sa force, ses analyses marquees de bon sens, ses argumentations rationnelles, mais egalement ses contradictions, et les souffrances que ce discours vkhicule. La selection tente de donner des exemples les plus representatifs tant des convergences que des differences notables sur le terrain. Elle ne se pretend pas Ctre toutefois totalement representative. L'objectif principal de ce document est de rendre plus proche les experiences des bidonvillois et en consequence de focaliser les discussions sur les enjeux les plus pertinents. Afin de garantir l'anonymat des entretiens, aucune reference n'a Bte faite dans le texte qui suit aux villes ou aux bidonvilles d'appartenance des personnesinterviewkes. Stratkgies et itinkraires rksidentiels cc...Je louais une piece h 700 DHdans le quartier X. Je suis rest6 dans la mCme pibcejusqu'a ce quej'aie acheti5 ici. C'Btait dur de payer 700 DHde loyer, l'eau et I'electricite chaque mois. J'ai kconomis6 et j'ai achete ici pour m'kchapper du loyer. J'ai achete une division d'une grande parcelle qui appartenait a mon pbre, je n'ai pas donne la somme au comptant, je lui ai donne la moitie du prix au debut, et je lui ai donne le reste petit A petit, par mois. En fait, c'est mon mari qui l'a achete. Je travaille dans une societe de confection comme couturibre. Je prkfbre habiter ici que de rester locataire, parce quej'ai plus de superficie, mes enfants ont plus d'espace, j'ai mes toilettes, j e ne fais pas la queue pour y aller, etj e profite avec mes enfants de mon salaire. Avant ce que j e gagnais partait a moitie dans le loyer. Mais habiter ici a aussi quelques inconvenients. On souffre quand ilpleut : la boue et les toits qui fuient sous la pluie. L'ete, on n'arrive pas a rester a I'interieurtellement que c'est briilant, on respire la poussibre. Les habitants deposent les ordures n'importe comment et a n'importe quelle heure. On balaye la rue et mCme pas deux heuresplus tard, elle est plus sale qu'avant. Mais quandj e louais,je ne me sentais pas libre car les co-locataires sont sans cesse en train de te regarder : quand j e cuisine, quand je lessive, elles me regardent (. ..).Jesuis revenue ici, parce quej e connais tout le monde et personne ne me causera de problbme. On a toujours vecu ici avec l'espoir d'6tre reloge unjour. Les habitants qui ont des relations dans la commune, nous assurent qu'il y aura un relogement. La seule crainte des habitants est le paiement. 11s disent : ils vont nous demander de mettre 20000 DHcomme avance, 63 Morocco's NationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report et puisqu'on ne I'a pas, ils vont nous deplacer ailleurs, on sera loin de notre travail, de la ville...)) (Femme) ((...Les causes de la venue ici sont d'abord la pauvrete et la skcheresse pour les gens de la campagne, ils viennent ici mbme s'ils ne vendent que des bottes de menthe, ils peuvent gagner 10 ou 20 DHc'est mieux que rien. L e problkme c'est que les gens ne trouvent plus de travail, car on a maintenant un excbs de main d'ceuvres. Puis il y a les cas comme nous, qui nous sommes dpuises A payer des loyers (Homme) )) (( C'est grdce aux elections que les farnilles sont installees A ce lieu, ily avait que 10 familles, qui avaient une situation financikre trks prCcaire et habitaient la mkdina, X, ou Y, alors un Clu leur a propose de s'installer ici pendant les elections de 1996,300 menages en un mois. Ces familles ont construit leurs baraques en plastique. Les autorites ont ensuite essay6 de les evacuer, mais les familles n'ont jamais dCmCnag6, car elles n'ont pas les moyens de payer ni le loyer, ni la nourriture, en plus elles sont des familles nombreuses, et vous trouvez que dans une famille de 8 ou 10 personnes seules la femme ou sa fille travaillent (...). Les autorites ont fini par accepter, mais en revanche, nous nejouissions pas de plusieursdroits, comme celui d'avoir un certificat de residence, d'btre aliment6 en eau potable, et Blectricite et d'avoir un systbme d'assainissement. Alors, les habitants de ce quartier ont fait des manifestations, pour avoir leur droit comme tout citoyen ))(Personne resource) ((Sixmois aprks la naissancedu bidonville, les autorites sont venues nombreusesavec des tracks, les gens ont cru qu'on allait leur accorder des terrains et lanqaient des vivats pour le roi. Mais ils ont vite arret6 quand une personne a demand6 : oh est mon numero pour le lot de terrain ? Pour toute rkponse, ila ete maltraite par un agent d'autorite. Alors les habitants ont compris qu'ils risquaient d'btre depossedks sans contrepartie. Chacun a pris son enfant dans une main et une hache dans une autre, plusieurs personne ont menace de se faire tuer plut6t que quitter leurs habitations, les autorites ont decide de se retirer pour faire revenir le calme. Aprbs que le gouvernement ait 6tC mis au courant, des promesses de reponse ont &e donnees aux habitants, cela fait maintenant 10 ans, la situation est inchangee.. .))(Femme) N . . .La maisonde mon pbre, sa propriete avant d'btre saisie, Btait en dur avec l'eau et l'electricite ainsi que I'assainissement. L e logement que j'ai occup6 avec mon premier mari 6 X. Ctait Cgalement en dur et kquipe, on payait 1500 DH de loyer. Celle que j'ai occupke aprks mon divorce et aprbs avoir quittC la maison conjugale Ctait en dur et BquipBe convenablement. Mais ce dernier loyer (750 DH plus 200 DH pour eau et BlectricitC) pesait trop dans mon modeste budget et particulibrement pour mon menage de femme seule avec enfant, j e travaillais dans un atelier d'exportation de produit agricoles. (..) M a voisine m'a encouragee et m'a introduite auprbs d'une personne qui j'ai achete le droit de monter ma baraque. J'ai fait un grillage et j e me suis installee avec ma fille. A X.(autre bidonville de la ville), le prix Btait BlevC, jusqu'h 40000 DH, il m'aurait fallu travailler des annees pour Bconomiser, d'autres endroit Ctait Cgalement au dessus de mes moyens, le maximum que j e pouvais emprunter Ctait 15000 DH. Ici l'endroit etait trbs marginalise, alors on pouvait acheter a des prix abordables... ))(Femme) a... Je suis venu en 1973, j'avais 14 ans. Avant de venir, j'avais demand6 A mon pBre de me laisser partir pour travailler, mais il a refuse, avec un ami de mon age, on avait prevu de nous enfuir de Tata, on s'est mis d'accord avec un chauffeur de taxi pour nous enfuir;a l'epoque, qa valait seulement 30 DH, on a prevu le depart a minuit. Comme les harraga, maintenant, c'est d'un pays B I'autre, alors que nous c'6tait pour venir A Casa, nous sommes partis sans le dire a personne (...) On a habit6 differents endroits, toujours a Casa, on a loue des chambres avec des voisins ou seuls. Mes conditions de vie Ctaient difficiles, j'etais peu paye, le SMIG comme on 64 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact AnalysisReport dit, tu manges au moins 900 DHpar mois, ilne reste pas grand-chose donc tu passes le temps B chercher un loyer abordable. J'avais entendu parler du quartier X. depuis trbs longtemps, maisj e n'avais pas la possibilitk de venir m'y installer h cause de mes revenus limit& Alors, on s'est decide avec un ami, nous avons achetk directement, 20000 DHchacun; en fait, j'ai emprunte,j'ai achetd et je I'ai rendu comme si c'etait un loyer. On a mis du temps avant de nous habituer, c'etait l'epoque des pluies, on habitait une rue en pente et les inondations ont rempli la baraque. Aprbs, on a regrette et on a commence nous demander pourquoi on est venu habiter la...On a commenc6 A demander comment on pouvait partir et on a su qu'il y aurait un projet pour les bidonvilles mais seulement pour les premiers blocs, pas les derniers (. .).Mais sijamais ily a une . opportunitk d'un lot ou d'un appartement ga serait une bonne solution. Chez nous on dit cc celui quitombe peut se relever...)) (Homme) cc...Les habitants de ce quartier constituent un melange, ils sont Venus de toutes les regions du royaume. 11s travaillaient dans une societe qui avait une ferme. 11s n'ktaient pas nombreux au debut. 11s ont ramene leurs proches et leurs amis pour de multiplesraisons : 6viter la secheresse, eviter le loyer ... C'est l'autoritk qui les a deplace parce que le proprietaire est apparu et voulait rkcuperer ses terres. L'autoritB les a persuade qu'ils seront tranquilles sur les terres de 1'Etat. 11s les ont dkdommag6sy1500 DHla baraque. L'autorite leur a design6 120 m chacun. I1a ramene les matkriaux (ciment, sable.. .) et illeur a construit les murs. C'est aussi I'autoritC qui a ramen6 les autres blocs : ce sont les bidonvillois qui occupaient les alentours de la region. I1 les a tous regroup& ici. L'autorite sait tout ce qui se passe ici. Personne ne fait quoi que se soit sans l'avertir. L e bon exemple est que toi-meme tu es rentrke dans le bidonville avec eux et tu n'es pas venue sans passer par eux. Quand ils vendent, I'autorit6 regoit sa part, c'est repandu dans tout le maroc. C'est souvent le besoin qui A la fois oblige des habitants ti vendre et qui rambne des gens pour y habiter. Par exemple, unchef de menage qui a 7 enfants et qui loue une piece ti 600 DHou a 700 DHtrouve que c'est une solution raisonnable de venir habiter ici ... ))(Personne resource) cc...Les bidonvilles sont d'un c6ttd un problbme mais de l'autre, ils resolvent aussi certains problbmes pour les habitants, car ce type de logement dispense de payer un loyer, le montant 6conomise s'ajoutant ainsi aux maigres ressources des menages pour subvenir aux depenses de nourriture. Ca reste neanmoins une solution provisoire, et elle est d'ailleurs abandonnee dbs que la personnedispose de quoi acquerir un logement salubre ... ))(Homme) - Femme 1 : cc.. .Ici, I'habitant qui perdait sa source de revenu ou avait un gros problbme 21 regler faisait une division de son lot et vendait. I1 y avait aussi ceux qui le faisaient parce qu'ils voulaient s'en aller ..A - Femme2 :cc.. .Parmi ceux qui ont Bte reloges B X., ily a des anciens qui avaient unetrbs grande parcelle, qui ont morcele et vendu 2 voire 3 baraques. 11s ont achete comptant ... )) cc...Les baraques des habitants qui sont partis dans le relogement ont Bte occupees par de nouveaux Venus; ily a eu aussi des baraques detruites et reconstruites, et d'autres qu'ils n'ont pas detruit et fermi. Surtout, dans le bloc 6 cote de la mosquee, tout a kt6 reconstruit. Ce projet de relogement n'6tait pas dans l'interet de I'habitant qui a de nombreux enfants. I1 prefere rester ici parce qu'au moins ila une bonne superficie. C'est vrai qu'on souffre dans une baraque : ilfait trbs chaud 1'CtB et on est arroses l'hiver, mais c'est mieux que d'aller payer le loyer ou la traite (...). I1 y a des bidonvillois, ici, qui ont des maisons a X, Y., ou autre. Mais ils ne veulent pas demenager pour beneficier de l'operation de relogement. L e moquadem sait tout ga et ilpeut te donner toute cette information, le nombre d'habitants et tout le reste ... ))(Homme) cc...Parmi les nouvelles personnesou menagesqui sont Venus loger ici viennent des gens de X. ou d'endroits proches de ce quartier. 11s entendent parler de relogement, et qu'ils benkficieront de 65 Morocco'sNationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact AnalysisReport logement ou d'un lot de terrain, c'est pour qa qu'ils achbtent ici. 11s achktent A 10000 DH ou 15000 DH, et ils sont ainsi proprietaires d'un Noqui leur est allou6 (. ..)Leshabitants quivendent leur logement font selon leur situation financibre, celui qui a de I'argent achkte un lot de terrain pour le construire, ou achbte carrdment un logement fini ... Mais tout cela est connu des autoritks..A (Homme) ((...Les paysans viennent dans la ville et ce type d'habitat leur convient parfaitement I1y a aussi les locataires qui changent leur statut en propriitaire ici. Mais ily a des personnesqui habitent ici et qui ont un autre logement ailleurs. 11s veulent seulement b6neficier d'un nouveau logement. I1 faut arrbter la speculation et l'extension du douar. Si 1'Etat Btait intervenu ily a longtemps, le problkme ne serait pas de cette ampleur. (. .) I1faut trouver une solution car une partie du quartier . est devenue actuellement un repbre de criminels de drogues .... Du coup, on a une mauvaise reputation, mais ce n'est pas le cas, nous, on veut seulement vivre comme le reste du monde ...)) (Jeune homme) Ressources, Cpargne, crCdit K...I1 n'y a pas de travail, etje constate que c'est la femme qui travaille, l'homme reste oisif, mais oir peut-il travailler ? I1n'a pas de metier, iltravaille comme ouvrier saisonnier unjour ou deux, ily aune usine qui n'embauche que les femmes. I1y ades femmes quitravaillent dans les champs de fraise, de pommes de terre, au rnoukaf, aux usines de Poisson. (. .)Dans une famille, . c'est la femme et la fille qui travaillent, c'est la femme qui est chef de menage, lui garde les enfants, la femme travaille de 5 hjusqu'h minuit ou lh du matin, alors, comment cette femme peut accomplir son r61e maternel ou conjugal ? A cause de cette situation plusieurs enfants deviennent delinquants (Personne-resource, commerpant) ... )) - Homme 1 : cr ...Ce bidonville est un abri pour des gens qui n'ont pas de moyens. I1 y a des femmes veuves, divorcees et des gens sans travail...)) - Homme 2 : .Ouij e suis d'accord, iln'y a pas de travail, mbme pour ceux qui travaillent, il . s'agit principalement de commerpants ambulants. I1 y a des personnes qui ont une activitk ou unmktier mais qui n'ont pas o i l'exercer. L e problbme qui se pose c'est que mdme ces commerqantsclandestins sont talonnds par les autoritks. Alors que ce travail est la seule source de vie pour ces habitants. Moi-mbme, actuellement, li cause des autorites j e ne travaille pas depuis 2 semaines. J'attend jusqu'a 6 h pour qu'ils partent, puis je commence seulement les ventes. Mais aprbs 6 heures, iln'y a plus d'acheteurs ... )) ((...Onpeut cotiser dans unprojet de relogement qui sera A notre portee : personnellement,j e n'ai pas d'avance a donner. I1 y a des habitants qui peuvent, mais moi pas. Je n'ai pas d'argent pour construire un lot. Je n'ai pas un travail stable, j e n'ai pas de fils fige qui peut m'aider A supporter les charges. Je n'ai personne qui peut m'aider A payer. Mais par exemple, j e peux ramener quelqu'un d'autre pour me construire! (. .)Moi, tout ce queje peux payer, c'est une traite de 100 . ou de 150 DHjusqu'h ce que mon fils grandisse et A ce moment la, lui pourra payer. Je n'ai pas un travail continu: si par exemple je gagne aujourd'hui 20 DH, j e consomme 10 DH et j'kconomise 10 DHpour le lendemain. I1y a des fois quej'attends un mois avant de trouver un travail. Avant, j e pouvais faire des lessives chez des gens. Mais maintenant, une trks grande majorit6 des gens ont des machines b laver. Donc, au lieu de travailler A 50 DH, on travaille a 20 DH. (...) Je peux aussi faire du commerce quand j'ai les moyens. Mais ily a une grosse de vendre cette annee des habits et la police m'a piquema marchandise. J'ai perdu 1500DH.(...) contrainte, c'est que I'autoritk peut me prendre la marchandise. Ca m'est deja arrive. J'ai essay6 Dans ce pays, ily a trop de corruption. Tu leur donne 5 DH, ils te laissent Ctaler ta marchandise. 66 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report Mais si tu ne le fais pas, ils t'emportent tout. C'est absurde queje lui donne de I'argent alors qu'il a deja unsalaire de 1'Etat. ..A (Femme) une cocote. Moij e ne l'ai jamais fait parcequej e n'ai pas les 10 DHa mettre toutes les semaines. G.. .Les voisines font des tontines de 10 DH la semaine pour acheter une table, une banquette ou Je n'ai pas d'idee si les hommes le font ou non. Je ne crois pas que mes voisines prennent des credits d'une banque ou d'une association ou si elles ont des epargnes a la poste. Je ne connais pas Zakoura, j'ai rien pour prendre un credit. On n'a pas de garanties A donner a cet organisme. Celui qui peut avoir un credit est celui qui a un travail stable ou un fonctionnaire. 11s ne sont pas nombreux ici. Je prefbre rester ici, c'est mieuxpour moi, car les traites sont comme le loyer. Sij e n'ai pas de quoi payer, ils vont me mettre dehors comme les proprietaires quandj'etais locataire. Quand la banque me mettra dehors, je ferai quoi, m'installer dans la rue? ...))(Femme) cc...Je ne crois pas que les habitants Cpargnent de I'argent, car ils ne sont plus sQrs de la realisation du projet. Personne n'est venu leur dire qu'il y a un projet. S'ils Btaient sQrs, ils vont Btre obliges a faire des economies. Les habitants n'ont pas de raison de prendre des credits (bancaires), j e n'ai jamais entendu que I'un de mes voisins en ait pris un. La somme que les habitants pourraient demander comme credit, c'est un'maximum de 5000 DH, disons mBme jusqu'a 10000 DH. Et mBme cette somme, iln'y a aucun organisme qui voudrait la leur donner parce qu'ils n'ont pas de garanties. Je donne chaque mois un peu d'argent a mon pkre parce qu'il est malade. Sije suis sQreque 1'Etat nous a prkvu un projet, je vais faire des economies. (, .). On . a I'esprit de competition entre les habitants. Personne, ne voudra &re dans une situation faible par rapport aux projets. (. ..) I1fautque les habitants aident I'Etat a realiser ce projet : celui qui peut payer comptant, il faut qu'il le fasse et qu'il ne se cache pas derrikre les pauvres. Ceux qui peuvent donner une avance feront la mCme chose. I1resteraque les plus pauvres, pour cela ilfaut que I'ktat leur fasse des traites selon leurs moyens...)) (Femme) ((...Ici,la plupart des gens sont pauvres, ou trks pauvres, par exemple moi, on me doit plus de 20000 DH.Les uns disent que lejour oh ils travailleront, ils rembourseront, les autres disent qu'il faut quej'attende, mais, moij e dois de l'argent mes foumisseurs. (. .). Les activitds des gens, . vous avez dQ les remarquer : un a une charrette, I'autre vend des legumes, le troisibme est porteur au marche.. ...etles chbmeurs, c'est ce qu'il y a de plus, quand ils ont faim, ils ne peuvent mdme pas s'acheter un sandwich, on essaye de les aider mais on ne peut pas toujours (..).X. (qui etait avec nous hier), ilest licencie, le pauvre. IIm'a dit qu'il aurait bien voulu travailler avec Ittissalat AI Maghreb, revendre les cartes de recharge et gagner 3 DHsur chaque carte mais iln'a pas de sous, ilne peut pas avoir de mobylette pour bouger, pour aller proposer ses cartes ailleurs, 18oh il n'y a pas de concurrence. Et la oh ils vont, les portes sont fermees, sauf les filles, mais elles travaillent pour 750 DH ou 800 DH. Elles doivent s'habiller avec, faire vivre la famille avec.. ...etc. (...)Si ily unprojet a d'habitat auto construit, lesjeunes pourraient travailler comme m a p n ou ouvrier ...mBme pour 40 ou 50 DH par jour qa serait bien ...))(Personne ressource, Bpicier). ((...En general, les gens ici sont pauvres. I1 y a ici 3 classes differentes, les plus pauvres, ils achbtent 1 DHde sucre, 1DHde the, 1 pain et une bougie d' 1 DH, Fa te permet de constater que cette personne vit vraiment une vie de misere et c'est le cas de la plupart des familles, c'est rare que quelqu'un achkte un paquet de sucre ou 5 litres d'huile. Pour moi, j'equipe mon epicerie selon la demande et la capacite des habitants, maintenant, j e sais trks bien ce que chaque personne veut, soit acheter soit emprunter quelque chose. I1 y a des gens qui ne m'ont jamais rembourse, mais j e ne dis rien, car j e connais trks bien leur situation (...). Vous ne pouvez pas savoir exactement ce que les gens pensent ou ont. I1y a des personnesqui ont des terres a la campagne, d'autres n'ont absolument rien. Mais d'aprks ce que je vois, pour 1200 personnes du quartier, 67 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact Analysis Report peine 200 peuvent biitir leur maison...)) (Personne ressource, commerqant) G.. .I1 y a plusieurs categoriespar rapport aux ressources: ceux qui vivent soit de commerce alimentaire soit de vente de drogue ;ily a ceux qui ouvrent une petite epicerie dans leur baraque, gagnent lOdhs par jour et vivent avec. Moi, j e suis bricoleur : peinture, electricit6 et plomberie. J'ai undipl6me en electricit6 et plomberie, j e travaille chez les gens iidomicile donc sans aucune couverture sociale ni retraite ni rien du tout, aucune garantie et par consequentj'angoisse pour moi. Je voudrais pour mes enfants qu'ils aient un r61e dans la societe parce que moij e me sens inutile, j e ne suis pas un element producteur dans la societe. Pour trouver du travail, on passe toujours par des intermediaires qu'il faut soudoyer. (. ..).M a femme travaille dans une societe. Si la societe a du travail, elle peut garder les ouvribres jusqu'h 21 heures, mais s'il n'y en a pas, elle peut leur dire de partir 10h du matin. Des fois, ilest arrive qu'elle travaille avec un contrat de 3 mois et puis aprbs, rien. Moi, ce n'est pas fixe, 1'etB je gagne bien mais I'hiver moins, des foisj e reste 2 mois sans travailler. Alors, j e m'occupe du menage, et des repas, comme une maman. Moi, je gagne entre 500 et 2500 DH. 500 DH quand ily a peu de travail, 1000 ou 1500 DH en moyenne et 2000 ou 2500 DHen haute saison. Quand elle travaille, ma femme, elle, a un salaire fixe de 1600DHplus300 DHdes allocations familiales ... ))(Homme) ((...Chaque habitant a fait des reparations selon ses moyens. I1y a des habitants qui n'ont pas de quoi se payer un diner. I1y a d'autres qui ont construit un R+1, qui ont fait la mosayque ou du carrelage, qui ont bien meuble leur baraque. I1y a un tiers d'habitants qui ont fait ces reparations mais le reste ne pourra pas se le permettre par manque de moyens. Je te donne mon exemple, j'ai 8 enfants, j e ne travaille pas parce queje suis malade, j'ai une seule fille qui travaille et qui nous nourrit. On est des parasites...)) (Homme) (( ...Moi, par exemple, si j e trouve quelqu'un pour m'aider a construire ma maison, j e m'engage, j e peux payerjusqu'h 1500 DH/mois, maisj e pense que les autres n'ont pas cette possibilite, 500 DH/mois c'est trop cher pour la plupart, de 400 A 300 DH/mois ce serait ti la porte de certains. Mais ily aussi le fait de voir son voisin construire, cela les pousserait a les imiter donc a faire des economies...)) (Homme) (<...La grande majorit6 restera ici s'il n'y a pas de grandes facilites de paiement. On cherche A beneficier selon nos propres moyens sans faire de cr6dit. On prefbre rester ici que d'aller habiter un endroit qui n'est pas fini. Ca m'est deja arrive. Je suis l'un de ceux qu'on a deplacd de I'autre c6tB en 1981. On avait une construction en bois et le sol en sable. L'autorite nous a promis de nous construire dans les 6 mois. On a attendu un an et chacun a commence iiconstruire selon ses moyens. On n'aura plus confiance de se deplacer dans un lotissement qui n'est pas fini. (...) La plus part disent que si 1'Etat leur fait une traite de 100 ou de 150 DH, elle les encouragera a se deplacer rapidement. I1 y a des habitants qui ne peuvent pas avancer 2500 DH et il y a des habitants qui peuvent beaucoupplus...)) (Homme) ((;..La solution du credit, c'est qu'il faudrait que le terrain soit donn6 en garantie et avec un credit, aprks, les gens pourront construire, faire en bas un petit magasin pour y travailler, ou louer une ou deux piecespour arrondir les fins de mois ... )) (Personne ressource) G, ..Nous ne connaissons pas le FOGARM Le credit n'est possible que pour ceux qui peuvent presenter des garanties, pour la majorite d'entre nous on se heurte toujours A ce mCme problbme. Une issue possible consisterait B nous donner des lots de terrain, enregistrks a notre nom. Nous pourrions alors presenter les titres de propriete comme garanties pour beneficier auprbs des banques, ou organismes, de credits 21 la construction. Dans ce cas, j e pourrais reserver une partie soit pour construire une chambre iilouer, soit un magasin que j'exploiterais comme commerce 68 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report afin que les revenus puissent me permettre de regler les echeances des traites du credit ... )) (Homme) N . ..FOGARM est un credit qui se donne sur la base d'une garantie, et j e ne pense pas que les gens puissent supporter ce genre de credit et surtout la garantie, car ils n'ont pas quoi garantir, et ils ne pourront pas assumer...)) (Jeune homme) ~...J'attends que les autorites dkcident de nous aider, sinon j e ne pourrai pas, j'espbre par exemple qu'il y ait un projet mais seulement avec des traites et j e demanderais b beneficier du logement si c'est dans les limites de 100000DH, quitte manger mains...)) (Homme) a ((...On n'a pas d'electricite, on a une television qu'on regarde peu parce que la recharge de la batterie qui sert A la faire marcher nous revient trks cher. On s'eclaire avec le butane de gaz, et quelque fois on utilise les bougies. La recharge de la batterie et le butane de gaz d'eclairage coiitent h peu prbs 200 DHmensuellement. Mais ily a des inconvenients avec la butane de gaz, c'est qu'en &e elle degage beaucoup de chaleur, et de plus, la lumibre issue du gaz rend la vision trouble, ce qui nous pose un problbme pour lire et travailler la nuit. Moi qui suis etudiant, j'en souffre enormement parce que la nuit j e n'arrive pas a lire ni travailler. Pour l'approvisionnement en eau, c'est gratuit, mais Fa coiite humainement ; ily a un problbme de transport, on utilise une charrette pour transporter les bidons d'eau, et comme la route est presque impraticable, on a du mal a faire ce chemin. En plus quand on arrive a la fontaine on doit remonter notre pantalon pour qu'on ne se mouille pas et ilfaut avoir des sandales en plastique et non pas des chaussures.Une fois de retour, ilfaut porter les bidons d'eau jusqu'a la maison, donc on perd une moyenne de 2 heures par jour pour se procurer de l'eau. C8tB assainissement, ily a une camionnette de la municipalite qui se charge d'aspirer le contenu des toilettes mais elle le rejette juste derribre ce quartier, a cote des habitations, donc cette operation n'a vraiment aucun resultat positif. C'est gratuit... ))(Jeune homme) Organisation sociale et dynamiques collectives(Fasskes, prksentes,futures) G.. .Avant, on avait des fosses septiques. L'autorite nous l'interdisait par crainte d'une chute d'un enfant. Donc les habitants les creusaient en cachette. En 1996, 1997, tous les habitants avaient des toilettes chez eux. Le problbme c'est quand ces fosses se remplissent, elles degagent de mauvaises odeurs. Donc les habitants, ne supportaient plus leur situation. 11s sont partis a la commune pour voir une solution. A la commune, ils Ctaient d'accord de nous aider a installer (...) I1arrive que les canaux des Bgoutsse bouchent ;chaquebaraquecotise 30 DHet onrambne l'assainissement. Donc, on a mis 350 ou 400 DH par baraque pour installer les canaux d'egout. unreparateur...)) (Homme) cc...Moi aussi, j'ai une responsabilite dans la situation, comme les autres, j'ai Clargi ma baraque de 2m quej'ai pris sur la rue. Avant, on avait de grandes rues, les camions les empruntaient, mais 6 force que chacun en prenne des petits bouts, elles sont devenues etroites. Mais Fa, Fa c'est toujours fait avec l'accord de l'autorite. 11s reqoivent une somme d'argent pour cela. 11s sont au courant de tout ce qui se passe ici. La preuve, c'est bien l'autorite qui nous donne un certificat de residencepour faire la carte nationale...)) (Femme) N . . .Moi,j e n'ai pas de connaissance dans ce quartier, mes seules connaissances sont celle de la faculte, c'est a dire les etudiants qui sont avec moi en cours. Je ne frequente pas les gens du quartier. Les gens ont des formes d'entraide, en cas de decks, les voisins cotisent pour la famille du dtfunt, pour faire le necessaire pour les obsbques car les gens sont pauvres, ily a aussi de 69 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social ImpactAnalysisReport l'entraide en cas de mariage, ou de nouvelle naissance.I1n'y a aucune association, mais avant ily en avait, ses membres 6taient des habitants de ce quartier, des gens respectables, mais ils 6taient oppos6s aux autoritds, ce qui fait qu'ils n'ont jamais obtenu satisfaction. Et avec le temps cette association s'est dispersie ...1)(Jeune homme) ((...Pour la borne fontaine, le &rant, c'est mon voisin, collecte environ 6000 DWmois, ilgarde pour lui 3000 DHet paye l'eau 2500 a 3000 DH, mais au bout de 2 ans, ila commence garder toute la somme, sous pr6texte qu'il ne gagnait pas assez. Nous avons change ce gerant par un autre, mais nous avons trouve le mBme problbme. De plus, nous pouvons avoir accbs l'eau qu'a a partir de 9heure selon l'humeur du nouveau &rant, alors qu'en principe, I'eau doit couler dbs 7 ou 8h (. .).I1 doit faire une bonne gestion, c'est pour cela, nous avons dCcid6 de ne plus payer ; . alors les &rants nous ont interditd'avoir accbs I'eau potable, mais nous nous sommes aliment& a de force et nous avons dit aux g6rants d'aller deposer une requBte auprbs du caid, ce qu'il a fait. Ce dernier a et6 gentil et lui a demand6 de payer lui-mbme les factures ; Ce caid, c'etait un homme qui faisait bien son travail surtout au niveau de la securit6 ... ))(Personne ressource, commerqant) cc...Je ne connais pas I'existence d'une association dans ce bidonville. Ce n'est qu'hier que j'ai entendu par16 de Zakoura quand tu nous as regroup6 pour nous interroger et je ne savais pas qu'elle Btait connue des femmes des autres blocs, Une association peut Btre utile a la population. Par exemple, une association qui donnera des cours d'alphabetisation. Un club f6minin ou la femme peut apprendre a faire la cuisine ou un mktier, apprendre aux femmes des techniques de communication. Pour les jeunes, ils peuvent prdvoir des terrains sportifs, une formation en coiffure. Tout Btre humain souhaite 6voluer. Je crois que s'ils pr6voient ces centres dans le projet, I'habitant va s'y int6resser (...). Quand on a un Bvenement important, deux hommes dg6s et raisonnables font le tour de la rue pour informer tous les habitants de I'CvCnement et aprbs ils font un autre tour pour les informer des d6cisions prises. Pour un 6venement li6 aux femmes, ce sont deux femmes dg6es font lamBme chose...)) (Femme) -- Homme 1 : ((...On dit beaucoupde choses sur I'avenir de ce quartier, mais rien n'est vrai...)) Homme 2 : ((...On a constitu6 une Jmaria pour am6liorer les conditions de notre habitat, la premibre priorit6 c'6tait les bornes fontaines ... -- )) Homme 3 :c(...C'est ungroupement et pas une association...)) Homme 4 : ((...Mais en fait, nous avons besoin d'une amicale, parce que l'association est -insuffisante5pour faciliter les tbhes et les problbmes des habitants avec l'autorit6... )) Homme :((...Les associations ici sont insuffisantes. On a besoin d'aide et d'entraide. Depuis 5 ans, on a essay6 un programme d'alphab6tisation pour les femmes. Mais les hommes ne s'y interessent pas. Et c'est un Btudiant qui s'est port6 volontaire pour leur apprendre A lire et a ecrire...D - des habitants d'abord ...)) Homme 6 : ((...I1 ne faut pas oublier que nous avons besoin de l'aide de I'autoritd mais l'aide ans ;ici, ils avaient une association r6servee seulement a la mosqu6eYet nous sommes Venus leur N . . .Tuveux queje te parle de ma demarchepolitique ? J'ai debut6 ce travail depuis quej'avais 16 dire de discuter avec nous pour r6gler cette affaire. Mais les dirigeants de l'association n'avaient pas accept6 et ils avaient quitt6. Nous nous sommes retrouvks devant une situation embarrassante parce que nous avons trouve que les anciens membres de l'association trouvaient des difficult& pour faire remplir la caisse de l'association. On a donc essay6 de faire des activitks pour remplacer l'association. ...D (Personne ressource, 6lu) 70 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand SocialImpactAnalysis Report - Femme 1 : ..On ne s'adresse pas ((. a 1'61~parce qu'il a change ses rapports avec nous. I1y a une grande difference entre le passe et le present. (...) I1 a ferme sa baraque et il est parti .Aujourd'hui ilnous menace en attaquant nos enfants. I1 nous dit, h nous et a nos enfants, que nous ne sommes bons a rien.Dbs qu'il a gagne les elections, ila ignore tout le monde - Femme 2. cc ...I1 nous ... )) promettait d'ameliorer notre situation et que I'avenir va Ctre meilleur. Mais lorsqu'il a ete avec le president X., ilest devenu contre les baraques ... )) ((...Nous n'avons pas une vraie association qui a son statut. Ce sont des familles qui se sont groupees et ont fait I'association. D'abord une association doit avoir un local. Certains membres de I'association, pour des raisons politiques ont exploites I'analphabetisme et I'ignorance des habitants du quartier pour les manipuler et escroquer de l'argent collect6 pour le systbme d'assainissement ou l'argent de I'adhesion. C'est pour cela que nous ne nous interessons pas A cette association car ses membres n'ont pas d'experience. Ce sont des voleurs, certains membres exploitent I'association pour favoriser leur parti. Nous avons suggerd de constituer une association, avec les habitants du quartier seulement, mais ils ne manifestent aucune volonte. Nous voulons des personnes qui parlent en notre nom, par exemple, nous voulons l'electricite, il membres de cette association qui se sont imposes a nous, moi j e ne suis pas satisfait de leur faut que quelqu'un se charge de cette mission selon le desir des habitants, pas comme les travail.. . )) (Homme) ((...I1 y a une trbs bonne relation entre les voisins. Les habitants sont ((populaires D.On se rencontre dans la rue, a la borne fontaine. La distance entre les maisons est faible, ce qui fait qu'on est oblige de se rencontrer et d'avoir des bonnes relations. La relation entre les habitants n'a pas change au fil des annees. Quand on a un deuil ou un malade, on s'entraide entre nous, ceux qui ont les moyens cotisent. Mais j e ne connais l'existence d'aucune association dans le quartier. Je ne sais pas ce que c'est qu'une association d'habitants. Sinon, ily a des associations extkrieures. Les femmes reqoivent les cours d'alphabetisation 1'Ccole primaire. Je ne peux pas y aller, carj e n'ai personnequi peut garder mon fils, mais c'est important. Tout organisme qui peut mais une fois, j'avais depose un dossier a Rabat pour avoir un agrement de taxi puisque son pbre porter un intCrCt pour la population est bien. Je n'ai jamais emmen6 mon fils A une association, ne travaille pas. J'ai ete au Secretariat d'Etat charge de la famille et de l'handicape qui est a Agdal. 11s m'ont envoye un gendarme pour qu'il fasse une confirmation des renseignements que j e leur avais donne, mais j e n'ai rien vu venir. Je ne connais que trois handicap& dans ce bidonville. Je ne sais pas s'il y en a d'autres. Nous voudrions bien avoir une association d'handicapks dans le bidonville comme cela elle m'aiderait a supporter ces charges...)) (Femme) N . . .On s'est organise par exemple, pour 1'6clairage, quand on etait branch6 illkgalement, ilyavait unseul cbble et des fois le voltage n'etait pas vraiment au niveau. Les habitants se sont organises pour cotiser et ont ramass6 a peu pres 70000 DH; ils ont donne cette somme a quelqu'un qui devait acheter les cables et refaire I'alimentation, mais qa n'a jamais abouti et I'argent est parti, on n'a jamais su oc.. ..Suite a qa,la Bachaouia,pour calmer tout le monde, a mis I'ONE dans le coup et ils ont decide de faire I'alimentation et d'equiper 1'Clectricitb moyennant une somme pour chacun 4 o n c une nouvelle somme a payer- et c'est donc revenu trbs cher ... )) (Homme) ((. ..Les habitants peuvent cotiser pour aider d'autres habitants dans le besoin ; ils se sont Bgalement mis d'accord pour la construction de la mosquee ;des vieux du quartier ont fait le tour et ont collect6 de l'argent. (...) Les gens font plus confiance aux personnes $gees, les jeunes seront soupqonnes d'utiliser I'argent pour d'autres raisons (alcool et autre). Et pourtant ce sont les jeunes qui ont construit la mosquee ici (. ..).I1n'y a pas d'associations, iln'y a qu'une maison de jeune X, mais elle est trop loin d'ici a ... ))(Jeune) 71 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact AnalysisReport G.. .L'assainissement, mdme s'il existe, constitue un grave problbme pour le quartier, car dans chaque ruelle, les canaux uses Cvacuent en plein air. lmaginez les odeurs et la pollution que cela provoque (. ..) Le financement et le travail a kt6 assure par les habitants alors que la commune a assure la fourniture du materiel necessaire. Le problkme c'est qu'aprbs cela, il n'y a pas d'entretien ni de suivi...)) (Jeune homme) ((...I1 n'y a pas d'association dans ce quartier. On a aide cet elu et vote pour lui pendant ces elections, une fois qu'il a eu les elections, on ne l'a plus vu. I1ajuste travaille pour ses interbts. Et pa va dtre exactement la mdme chose si on Cree une association...)) (Homme) G., .Quand on a des problkmes a propos du logement, on s'adresse a 1'Blu du quartier qui nous a promis d'amkliorer nos conditions de vie lors des elections, mais depuis 2 ans qu'on a vote pour hi,iln'a rienfait Apartlaconstructiondeterraindefoot, d'ailleurs jenecomprendpaspourquoi, parce que les gens n'ont pas besoin d'abord de terrain de foot mais d'kquipements de base. (. ..)I1 peut jouer un r61e dans le projet en etant un intermediaire entre les autorites et les bidonvilles, il peut informer les autorites sur les problbmes que vivent les gens, quels sont leurs souhaits et donc ilpeutjouerunr81epositifdanslareussiteduprojet...))(Jeunehomme) a...Les habitants n'ont aucune responsabilite si un projet n'a pas abouti. C'est l'autorite qui est responsable de l'extension d'un bidonville. L'habitant ne peut pas chasser un nouveau venu. On n'a pas assez confiance pour confier aucune tiiche a l'un des habitants. 11faut convoquer tous les habitants l'arrondissement, les informer de tous les details du projet et ecouter leurs reponses. A a ce moment, ceux qui pourront partir, vont le confirmer et ceux qui ne sont pas intkresses vont le confirmer aussi. I1vaut mieux convoquer groupe par groupe et chaque habitant doit presenter son cas devant l'autorite lui-mdme, sans qu'il soit represent6 par quelqu'un. Les habitants peuvent se mettre d'accord sur quelqu'un qui communiquera avec l'autorite en leur presence ; s'ils sont d'accord avec ce qu'il dit, ils confirmeront, sinon ils contrediront ce qu'il dit, c'est la seule fapon de s'organiser devant l'autorit6. L'autoritC n'est pas serieuse dans sontravail et les habitants, eux, ne sont pas d'accord sur les differents points. I1 faut avoir la volonte royale pour arriver a mobiliser les differentes parties responsablesdu projet...)) (Homme) a...lly avait une association de quartier, mais.. .elle a Bchoue car elle etait opposee au Cald. Elle demandait des droits, pour le logement, c'est pour pa qu'ils l'ont supprimee et n'ont pas voulu qu'elle existe. Elle ne peut donc plus rien pour nous, puisqu'elle est arrbtee. L e responsable de l'association, a ete mis en prison parce que ce qu'il racontait ne les arrangeait pas. Elle reclamait des choses sur lesquelles on s'dtait mis d'accord, mais malheureusement...)) (Homme) ((...Quand ils nous ont Crees des problbmes A I'association des habitants, on a travaille avec l'association des retraites. Je suis membre de cette association et en fait, on l'a cr&e pour cette raison. X. est le vice-president de cette association, qui est forte puisque c'est une association de retraites militaires. On ne travaille plus au nom de l'association des habitants mais ce qui n'empbche pas que ses membres sont actifs et travaillent en coulisse. On empdche encore les habitants de faire des amenagements dans leurs logements, par exemple ily avait des dkgiits du dernier hiver et ils n'ont pas pu reconstruire ce qu'etait demoli mdme si en ce moment, on a un caYd comprehensif qui Ccoute les habitants, et leur donne de l'espoir ...))(Homme) ((...I1 faut que les responsables soient conscients et qu'on nous donne le droit de contr8ler l'elu ou bienmdme le changer. J'aurai prefer6 qu'il y ait une femme blue, elle devrait bientravailler et parce qu'on croit qu'elle est plusresponsable ... )) (Personne resource) 72 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report - Homme 1 : ((...I1 y a eu beaucoup d'ameliorations apportees en matiere d'equipement, d'electricite, des bacs a ordures mknageres, d'eau, d'abord de l'eau en citerne (parfois sake) et depuis deux ans lors des elections municipales, d'installation d'une fontaine. Pour chacune de ces ameliorations, ila fallu a chaque fois mobiliser une masse d'habitants pour faire pression sur le president de la commune ou sur les autorites locales :nous restons devant le siege de la commune ou devant la prefecture. Pour l'assainissement, les habitants ont cotis6 pour realiser des branchements sur les canalisations publiques, aprks accord de la commune...)) - Homme 2 : K.. .La construction de la fontaine a ete realiske grdce aux cotisations :50 100 DH a par menage selon les possibilitks, l'eau de la fontaine etant gratuite, payee par la commune. L e coot de branchement a l'electricite est fonction de la distance qui &pare la baraque du centre oh ont CtC installes les compteurs d'electricite individuels.A titre d'exemple, les baraques eloignees de ce centre d'une trentaine de metres ont pay6jusqu'a 3 500 DH..A - Homme 1 : ((...Nous agissons ensemble volontairement, sans organisation prealable ou association. Nous ne nous sommes jamais adresses a des bienfaiteurs et il n'existe pas d'association dans le quartier. La quasi totalite des habitants sont absorbes par la recherche de la -satisfaction2des besoins Blementairesjournaliers de leur famille ... )) Homme : ~...Lorsquenous sommes confront& A des problemes relatifs a l'eau ou a l'klectricite, par exemple, nous nous reunissons entre nous pour faire une reclamation collective auprks des responsablesadministratifs concernes ou autorites locales ...)) - Homme 1 : N. ..Les autorites n'ont jamais discute avec nous dans le domaine de l'habitat. I1y a une association qui etait chargee de cela pour les gens du quartier. Elle assistait aux reunions et tout $a. Mais elle ne nous rapporte rien. 11s ne viennent pas nous dire voila ce qu'ils disent (( D, ((voila ce que demandent ces gens D.. par exemple ils vont distribuer des maisons. Mais que fait , cette association ? Elle se met au courant elle-mQme. Elle ne voit pas 1'intCrQt du quartier ...ilsy sont pour leur propre inter& On n'a jamais vu I'interQtpour le quartier (intervention de ... I'animatrice :cette ide`e d e X , vous lapartagez ?) des hommes : oui ... )) - Homme 2 : ((.. .J'ai et4 membre de cette association de solidaritb, j'ai et6 elupresident, on a fait l'assemblee generale...On s'est organise, on a obtenu la reconnaissancejuridique et nous avons fait des requetes.. ..Depuis, ils ont commence donner les extraits d'acte de naissance, ils nous ont dit celui qui veut inscrire son fils peut le faire (contestation des autres), certificats de residence. (Contestations des autres :on n 'apas de certijkat de rbidence !). J'ai tout dans un dossier dans mon bureau si vous veniez dans mon bureau, je vous montrerais tout...)) .... - Homme3 : K.. .Celui qui parle et qui dit Qtre le president, ce n'est pas le vrai president, ce n'est qu'un presidenttemporaire, iln'a pas l'aval des habitants des quartiers ... )) - Femme 1 :((...Les associationssont inexistantes et on ne beneficied'aucune aide contrairement aux autres quartiers. Par exemple on n'a pas bkneficie de l'operation circoncision qui a ete - Femme 2 : .Nos enfants ont essaye de fonder une association mais on leur a interdit $a. 11s programmke auparavant...)) N . . accusent nos enfants d'Qtre des criminels et des voleurs et qu'il faut les reeduquer. C'est les autorites et mdme certains habitants du quartier qui les accusent ... ))(Animatrice ;et vous n'avez pas des associations defemmes ?) - Femme 3 : ((...Non, Fa ilfaut le laisser aux femmes des quartiers chics. Nous ne sommes que des pauvres femmes qui ne savent ni lire niecrire et de quoi on va parler ? ... )) cc...I1 y avait une association, mais entre l'autorite qui tirait d'un c6te et les differents partis politiques, ils nous l'ont debitee en morceaux de brochettes...)) (Homme) 73 Morocco's NationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report K.. L'ancien Card m'a convoque et . ilainsist6pourquecetteassociationdependedel'autorite. Je lui ai repondu que j'etais Blu par les habitants et non par les mokhaznis et, que s'ils veulent avoir une association ils n'ont qu'a la constituer eux-mbmes. 11s m'ont propose une fonction, juste quej e serai A leurs cat& maisj'ai tout refuse. 11s m'ont alors convoque au tribunal ;quandje me suis renducompte de leur pouvoir, j'ai change ma methode de travail...)) (Homme) Attentes et perspectivesface aux projets N.. J'ai vu . FBs...c'est une bonne chose. Nous ne sommes pas le Polisario, nous sommes le peuple de ce Zi la t&, le roi distribuer des appartements ou des lots a Ain Aouda, a Skhirat, et ti pays ! (...).On reste optimiste pour la realisation de ces projets. C'est les responsables locaux et surtout les Blus qui ont ferme leurs yeux depuis les annees 80. Personne ne parlait en faveur des habitants, mbme pas faire disparaitre les poubelles, amenager des jardins pour nos enfants.. .par exemple, cet Clu (X.) nous ne I'avons plus revu depuis les elections. Si tu veux un papier de la commune, ilfaut lui donner un bakchich pour avoir ce que tu veux. Mais ily a des gens qui le soutiennent. Moi, je preferais Y. parce qu'il n'y avait pas de corruption. I1avait interdit aux gens de donner du bakhchich aux fonctionnaires parce que tout le temps, ildisait qu'ils ont un salaire pour faire leur travail. I1 aidait aussi les orphelins : ilrestait a tes cotes et donnait ses ordres aux fonctionnaires pour qu'ils te preparenttes papiers C'est pour cela qu'on prefere unresponsablede confiance, qui viendra de Rabat pour coordonner I'opkration de relogement. Car si on laisse qa dans les mains des elus, le pauvre sera humilik. Ce responsable doit prendre en consideration les moyens existants des gens et faut qu'il ait la volonte de reloger toute les categories. Et qu'il ne soit pas quelqu'un de corrompu...)) (Femme) ((...La premikre fois ou j'ai entendu parler de projet c'est lorsque le Roi est venu inaugurer un projet h Casa pour eradiquer les bidonvilles, et donc pour notre quartier on entendait que ce projet se realiserait dans 2 ou 3 ans. On nous a dit que ces logements qui sont en cours de constructions Ctaient destines h nous reloger, ily a meme un panneau ou ecrit relogement des bidonvilles de (( X. D. Mais personne n'est venu nous informer, donc on sait que le projet est realis6 pour ce bidonville, mais on ne sait pas qui va en beneficier, ni combien de superficie ou de metres, on ne sait riendu tout...)) (Jeune homme) cc...L'architecte est venu faire ses plans. I1 nous a communique les superficies, il y a 100 appartements de 36 m, ily a aussi des superficies de 48m et de 58m, et ily a des appartementsde 62 m qui ne sont pas nombreux. C'est ce qu'ils ont prevu pour le relogement, et chaque appartementa son prix. C'est grtice A la perequation qu'ils vont nous construire nos logement : ils ont amenage 320 lots pour vendre et sur les terrains qui restent, ils vont construire des immeubles et aussi ils vont construire un march6 de 100 boutiques vendre. Et comme ga ils vont contribuer ?i et vont aider I'operation de relogement ;Tout cecij e l'ai dans mes documents. Mais les habitants n'acceptent absolument pas ce projet. I1est incomplet, car iln'y avait pas de concertation avec les habitants, la superficie ne convient pas aux habitants. On doit avoir la mbme superficie, un prix symbolique mais on ne demande pas la gratuite. Seulement, 11, on a des logements, et on a fait beaucoup de depenses pour les entretenir. On a subi beaucoup de mauvaises choses. I1faut qu'ils nous dkdommagent. Donc, ce qu'on prefkre c'est qu'ils nous laissent nos logements, qu'on reste ici, et qu'ils nous delivrent nos titres. On ne veut pas quitter ici. 11s vont nous dire : vous allez partir, vous payerez 120000DH et aprks 50000 DH, mais on sera &rang16 avec la banque 21 700 ou 800 DH. alors que lh on est tranquilles .. ... ))(Homme) - Jeune 1 : cc ...Les autorites doivent intervenir pour arrbter les beneficiaires qui revendent leur baraque ou leur lot et vont se reinstaller dans des bidonvilles...)) 74 Morocco's NationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocialImpactAnalysis Report - Jeune 2 : N.. .L'autorite doit faire bien son travail et prendre sa responsabilite pour mettre fin a tous les spkculateurs. L e ministere d'habitat doit bien contrdler de fapon continue. Les habitants doivent participer comme des decideurs au projet et au contrdle, participer aux reunions publiques et donner leurs avis...)) - .Jeune 3 : cc ...11s doivent travailler beaucoup pour la reussite du projet. Toutes les familles doivent Ctre benkficiaires ... )) - Jeune 4 : H...Mais les anciens d'abord, leur situation est tres difficile...)) ((...I1faut que I'Etat aide les pauvres pour qu'ils puissent construire leurs logements, par exemple, une veuve qui n'a pas les moyens de construire un logement, elle est obligee de vendre son lot ou bien elle est influencde par les gens qui hi disent de laisser tomber puisqu'elle doit vendre son lot d'une fapon ou d'une autre. Pour distribution des logements,je prefkre le tirage au sort mais avec kgalitd et legitimite loin de la presence de relations personnelles et de la corruption, comme au lotissement X., ils ont vu que toutes les places qui se trouvent au coin des rues sont habitees par les bourgeois ou par les fonctionnaires, par contre les pauvres sont refoulis a I'intdrieur du quartier. L'habitat ne convient pas aux habitants. Vu leurs coutumes, leurs mentalites et le nombre 61eve des personnes dans leurs familles, le logement individuel est convenable pour nous. Un projet est possible. S'il faut reloger les habitants, ilfaut un contrdle, l'accord et la consultation des habitants concernes et en prksence des personnescompktentespour que tout soit fait dans le cadre de la loi. Si on ne prend pas en consideration l'.avis des habitants, qa ne sert ti rien...))(Personne ressource) - Femme 1 : ((...Nous voulons un lot parce que I'appartement ne convient pas aux habitants des baraques : ils possedent des animaux dont ils ne peuvent se detacher parce que c'est leur gagne- pain (he, poules,..) ..A - Femme 2 : ((...Oui, nous voulons un logement individuel. Chaque famille doit beneficier -s6parCment.: c...Pour qui est du logement Les enfants maries ne doivent pas habiter avec leurs parents...)) Femme3 ce nous voulons l'aide de 1'Etat pour payer unmontant decide par traites, par exemple 200 DH. (Animatrice :avec toutes ces exigences, vous pensez qu 'un telprojet peut aboutir ?) oui, ilpeut aboutir avec la participation des habitants. La prise en -compte de4 leurs prioritds et de leurs besoins...)) Femme : H...Non, ce projet ne peut pas reussir parce que les habitants ne sont pas d'accord. Et le douar n'a pas une association qui parle en son nom et qui le reprksente. Et c'est a cause du dksaccordentre nous...)) - .Homme 1 : ((...On doit avoir des papiers etablis dans les regles et a notre nom. Nous avons peur du flou :on ne veut pas quitter unbidonville pour unautre, ou tomber dans des problkmes de co-propriktes insolubles - ... )) Homme 2 : ((...Hormis le problkme financier, les difficult& que nous rencontrons et apprehendons lorsque nous envisageons la participation A un projet de relogement sont I'absence de confiance dans les responsables administratifs ou 61us locaux, la corruption qui gangrene nos differentesrelations d'echanges commerciales, comme administratives. Combien vous me donnez pour telle ou telle faveur? Combien vous me donnez pour avoir telle chose? Que ce soit une faveur ou undroit. I1est arrive de donner 1000,OO DHpour avoir uncertificat de residence - Homme 3 : cc ...Un ... )) autre facteur que craignent les habitants est l'kloignement du site de relogement du lieu de leur travail. Un tel cas occasionnerait une charge supplementaire de transport pour les menages et des retards Bventuels a 1'arrivCe au travail qui seraient -prejudiciables:I1y a pour le maintien de I'emploi. Homme 4 Cgalement, les conflits entre membresd'une famille face au changement : l'un souhaiteun appartement, l'autre un logement individuel, le troisikme unterrain constmire...)) ti 75 Morocco'sNationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty andSocial ImpactAnalysis Report - Homme 5 : G.. .Et en plus, ilfaut reflkchir h ce qu'on fait : affecter une famille contenant, un grand- pkre dge, le dernier &age d'un immeuble sans ascenseur pose problkme, j e connais des cas, le grand pkre en question passait souvent lajournee dehors, les enfants devant lui apporter son dejeuner en bas de l'immeuble ... )) M.. .Pendant les elections, 1'Blu aborde tous les sujets mQmele logement. Les habitants peuvent avoir confiance au ministered'habitat mais pas aux Clus. (..) Mais le ministere, lui, peut Ctudier les cas qui sont dans le bidonville et trouver des solutions pour reloger les bidonvillois. C'est I'Etat : I1a de quoi nous faire un projet et iln'est pas contraignant pour le remboursement :s'il te fait par exemple 100 DHcomme traite, ilpeut la diminuer A 50 DHsi tu lui dis que tu ne l'as pas et que tu ne peux payer que ces 50 DH(. ila5maisons ... ..).Cet Blun'avait mCme pas une bicyclette, maintenant ))(Homme) ((... En cas de facilites de paiement, c'est mieux qu'on change vers un quartier plus reposant. Mais si on demande 600 DHcomme traite a quelqu'un qui ne travaille pas, 21 ce moment-18, c'est mieux qu'on reste ici. Si on sera amen6 a se dkplacer d'ici, il ne vaut mieux pas faire des reparations. Par contre, si le projet sera ici, on aimerait bien que l'etat Blargisse les rues et aide les habitants a construire les toits...)) (Homme) N . ..Un bon projet, c'est d'abord, une bonne localisation, c'est important. Tous les Services doivent Qtre proches du projet (kcole, dispensaire, administration, . On doit nous considerer .. comme des &res humains...)) (Homme) ((...Unappartement, non, pour moi, j e ne peux pas y dormir moi, ma femme, tous les garqons et les filles de tous dges au milieu, tout qa ne peut pas satisfaire les habitants. Les habitants voudraient beneficier d'un lot de terrain que1que soit le metrage decide par l'etat, parce que pour une famille nombreuse, un lot de terrain, c'est ce qui convient bien, on peut construire le rez-de- chaussee, l'etage ....eton peut mQme louer 1'6tage pour payer le credit, et mCme bien vivre ... )) (Homme) - Homme 1 : a...Ceux qui ont bCnefici6 du projet de relogement sont en partie des familles qui exploitaient la Kuryan : ils prenaient des terrains, construisaient des baraques et vendaient ; ces familles ont pu avoir les moyens financiers de participer au projet. D'autres avaient la possibilite d'emprunter des fonds aux membres de leurs familles. D'autres encore ont vendu l'or de leurs epouses. Mais les habitants qui n'ont mQmepas de quoi manger et personne pour les aider, et ceux-la constituent la majorite, n'ont puparticiper au projet...)) - Homme 2 : ((...I1 faut preciser que seules les familles recensees en 1984 avaient le droit de participer au projet, tous ceux qui avaient achete aprks 1984 comme moi et mon ami n'avions pas -leHomme 3 droit de participer au programme...)) : ((...Pour faire reussir un projet de relogement, il faut tout d'abord que les responsables charges de la programmation de projets soient A la fois competents et dignes de confiance. Ces responsables doivent prendre en compte les intirbts des habitants a reloger : les familles qui ont des enfants maries doivent se voir proposer des espaces adequats A leurs besoins : appartement ou terrain. Les familles necessiteusesdoivent se voir proposer des traites en rapport avec les revenus du menage. S'il faut fixer le montant A 100 DH mensuellement, pourquoi pas ? En somme, les responsables du programme devraient commencer par l'ecoute des besoins et capacites des gens...)) a...I1 faut revenir iiinstaurer la confiance entre habitants et promoteurs immobiliers en veillant A dliminer la non qualit6 dans les constructions, les magouilles et les dessous de table lors des echanges ... ))(Homme) 76 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social ImpactAnalysis Report G.. .Les zones d'amknagement progressif, on en a entendu parler h la radio et 21 la tdevision c'est une bonne chose. Mais il faut qu'il y ait des equipements publics comme la mosquee, le hammam, les ecoles, I'assainissement, I'eau, I'klectricite ; si nous sommes servis progressivement, comme dans une liste d'attente, et sans trop de delais, nous n'aurions pas de crainte, surtout si nous disposons d'une attestation de propridte en bonne et due forme...)) (Homme) cc...L'urbanisation progressive, on peut &re pour, mais ilne faut pas confondre progression et lenteur, cyest pas parce que I'urbanisation est programmeeprogressivement qu'il faut attendredes annCes pour passer d'une &ape ?i une autre dans l'attribution et l'amenagement des lots. Ce dernier cas serait de nature A semer des peurs chez les habitants, et qui dit peur dit colbre et desordre ...))(Femme) ((...Cyest possible de se d6placer vers un projet qui n'est pas tout A fait fini, mais il faut qu'il contienne tous les Bquipementsprimordiaux, eau, Clectricite. Mais ils peuvent par exemple ne pas amknager les rues, ne pas mettre 1'6lectricit6 dans la rue. Autrement pour nous, c'est vraiment un retour en arribre, c'est pire que de rester dans la baraque. Et puis, ils risquent de nous oublier une fois dkplaces, c'est arrive, Fa, j'en ai entenduparler ... ))(Femme) ((...Les gens ne peuvent pas avoir avis sur ce projet, car ils n'ont aucune information. Personne n'est jamais venu en parler publiquement. Ce projet peut ne pas reussir, parce que les gens n'ont aucun renseignement, ils peuvent &re surpris par le montant A payer, ou par la superficie du logement qu'on va leur offrir. (. .)I1peut y avoir le problkme de superficie, c'est-&dire que 1'Etat . peut donner une superficie de 60m pour une famille de 11 a 12personnes, Fa sera insuffisant. I1y a aussi, qu'entre I'epoque o i ~I'Etat a procCdC au recensement de ces bidonvilles et aujourd'hui, des mariages, des naissances donc comment seront traitees ces familles fondees aprbs le recensement?(. .) Et comme ils n'ont aucune information, ils ne s'y preparent pas, par exemple pour 1'Cpargne .... ))(Jeune homme) N.. Je sais que d'ici 2008, on . dit qu'il nly aura plus de bidonvilles, maisje ne le crois pas, car les travaux n'ont pas commence. Si les travaux commencent, par exemple dans ce quartier, vous trouverez que les gens de la ville achbteront le terrain ici. Vous avez de l'argent, vous pouvez acheter. Ence qui me concerne, j e suis sur un lieu stratdgique, le boulevard, j e ne me deplacerai jamais, ilne peuvent pas amener quelqu'un d'autres et le mettre 6 ma place parce qu'il aurait donne plus d'argent, moi je vis ici depuis plus de 10 ans personne ne me deplacera, s'il faut donner plus d'argentje le ferai. J'ai achete ce lot A 100DWmZ,j'ai choisi ce lieu qui donne sur le boulevard, j e ne veux pas que mes enfants vivent loin, en plus mon commerce est rentable. Maintenant, si je veux vendre ma maison, on m'en donne 80000,00 DH le problbme c'est que si j'achbte un lot avec les 80000,OO DHavec quoije vais la construire, autant rester chez moi que de reconstruire une autre baraque ... ))(Homme) -- .Homme 1 : ((...Moi, je pensequ'il faut une maison dejeunes ... )) Homme 2 : N.. .Moi aussi, j e suis contre le fait qu'on fasse rien pour les jeunes. La maison de jeunes est trks importante et vous savez pourquoije dis Gayparce qu'on ne pense pas assez a ces choses-la - ... - )). Homme 3 : ((...Cyest vrai c'est la jeunesse qui nous prkoccupe plus que nous-memes. Les jeunes regardent A la tB1e jouer Zairi et Chemakh, Timoumi et Bouderbala. Les jeunes regardent plus que nous maintenant parce qu'ils n'ont rien B faire. C'est pour Fa qu'on a besoin de maisons dejeunes pour que lesjeunes fassent quelque chose, qu'ils soient actifs ... )) 77 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and SocialImpact Analysis Report - Homme 4 : cc...Ici on a besoin de tout d'une mosquCe d'une maison de jeunes, d'un marche, d'une Ccole ...... )) ((...Aucune institution ni personne n'a bouge le doigt pour changer la situation de ce quartier. C'est moi et quelques amis du quartier qui avons pris l'initiative de nous rCunir chez moi et de distribuer nos fonctions pour bien servir ce quartier : on a aide un de nous pour devenir un Clu. Moi, j'ai prCferC travailler en coulisses. Cette terre est au patrimoine des logements des Forces Andes. Parce que comme j e t'ai dis, les terres de Nouasser sont partagkes en trois : une partie des Forces ArmCes, une partie de la commune et une partie de I'agence urbaine, qui n'existait pas avant que la commune ne lui cede une grande partie de ses terres au prix de 8 DH. Avec cet argent, ila CtC construit 5 maisons pour fonctionnaires. Rienne se fera ici, car quand on fait des demandes, ils disent tous que ce n'est pas leur terrain. Celui la estle seul bout de terrain qui est prevu pour resorber I'habitat insalubre. Les architectes viennent d'une fapon hebdomadaire pour faire leur plan. Maintenant, ils veulent nous reloger la-bas maisjusqu'a present, on attend, on n'a aucune information...)) (Homme) N . . . Moi, comme beaucoup de gens ici, on ferait surtout confiance au Ministkre de I`Habitat, en collaboration avec I'association du quartier. Sortout pas les gens de la commune. Les habitants doivent jouer un r81e aussi, ilfaut qu'ils soient unis, qu'ils ne tombent pas en ddsaccord et ne baissentpas les bras devant quoi que ce soit ( .).Le projet devrait aussi consulter les femmes du ,, quartier, ce sont elles tout de mdme qui passeront le plus de temps dans ce nouvel habitat...)) (Femme) a...Une opCration a CtC dCcidee pour notre quartier, et c'est le wali qui a decide pour en finir avec ce probleme(le bidonville). Parce que le bidonville est pres de la route et se trouve au centre de la ville. C'est une place stratkgique pour l'avenir de cette ville...)) (Homme) ((...Dam ces conditions de vie difficile, les habitants des baraques souffrent du regard des autres parce qu'ils considerent que le fait d'habiter une baraque est l'equivalent d'dtre miserable, criminel, pauvre et sale, et aprks les attentats du 16 mai A Casablanca, les bidonvilles sont devenus dans I'opinion des autres comme une source de terrorisme et ce n'est pas vrai. L e regard meprisant et mCfiant des autres habitants sur les gens des baraques ne pourra changer que si on beneficie d'un habitat decent et c'est une solution pour sortir de cette grave situation...)) (Femme) Villes sans bidonvilleset dimensionssociales ((...Jusqu'a maintenant, personne n'est venu nous proposer de discuter des projets ou de nous faire participer dans un projet. C'est donc aux responsables de savoir par qui ils doivent commencer : par les anciens, ou les nouveaux, par les plus pauvres ou les moins pauvres.. . nous, on ne sait pas. C'est nous les plus pauvres qui te disons cela : parce que pour nous, on sera de toutes fagons obligCs de mettre le vdtement qu'ils nous auront cousus. (. .)On n'a pas confiance .. dans le secteur prive. On a confiance en le Roi, quand on le voit inaugurer. C'est vrai que le Roi ne suit pas toutes les opCrations mais ild6lbgue le travail au ministre d'habitat. Et surtout, on n'a pas confiance dans les responsablesde la commune...)) (Femme) c..Villes sansbidonvilles, ils'agit de faire disparaitre les bidonvillesd'ici I'an 2010, et tous les bidonvillois seront reloges dans des maisons avec tout le necessaire pour une vie normale. On I'a appris par la radio et lesjournaux. C'est un programme interessant, mais le problkme qui se pose, c'est que les habitants des bidonvilles n'ont pas d'epargne pour pouvoir construire la maison. (. .)La solutiondes parcelles de terrain ne marchera pas car ces gens n'ont pas les moyens pour .. 78 Morocco'sNationalSlum UpgradingProgram-Povertyand Social Impact Analysis Report construire, ilreste la solution des appartements a condition que I'Etat trouve un arrangement avec les acheteurs`pour un paiement adapt6 de leur logement ... ))(Jeune homme) ...11s disent que d'ici 2006 iln'y aura plus un bidonville. Je l'ai entendu a la tC16 et j e l'ai lu dans lesjournaux. Je crois que c'est un projet qui est bien. S'ils le rkalisent comme ils le disent, ils nous auront secouru. Les enfants d'un bidonville ont une mauvaisereputation. Si unjeune veut travailler, ils ne lui donnent pas de travail par ce qu'il a X. sur sa carte d'identitk. Le cas d'une societe qui est 5 cote, refuse les jeunes du bidonville et accepte d'autres jeunes qui viennent d'ailleurs. Ce projet peut reussir si 1'Ctat fait des facilites de paiement : ils ne demanderont pas une avance pour ceux qu'ils ne l'ont pas et ils prevoiront une traite raisonnable. Les habitants peuvent contribuer a la realisation de ce projet en mettanttout l'argent qu'ils ont ... ))(Femme) ((...I1 faut que les constructions soient faites selon les normes. Ce n'est pas parce qu'on est des bidonvillois, qu'ils peuvent nous construire n'importe quoi et n'importe comment. Comme ce qui est arrive FBs.Onavu a late16 qu'ils habitaient les tentes. Oupar exemple, unefois installk, deux mois plustard, avoir des fissures dans les murs.Nous aussi on va donner de l'argent. 11s disent qu'il y a des aides, qu'on donne des aliments pendant le ramadan. On a beaucoup d'orphelins. Mais je n'ai jamais vu un habitant d'ici recevoir ces aides. I1 y des veuves qui s'inscrivent, elles y vont mais elles restent toute lajournee sous le solei1 et elles reviennent sans rien ramener. I1 faut que 1'Etat prCvoie des gens qui expliquent a ceux qui ne comprennent pas quels sont les papiers administratifs qui leur faut et leur indiquer oh aller, pour les aides, pour le travail et pour tout.... Et puis on a beaucoup de chameur, surtout des hommes. C'est des diplames ch6meurs qui vendent la menthe et autres herbes dans le march6 de legumes ... )) (Femme) - Jeune 1 : N.. Ville sans bidonville, c'est une bonne idee, mais ilfaut d'abord aider les jeunes, . trouver du travail pour les chameurs. L'Etat doit aider la population, c'est comme ga qu'on peut avoir des villes sans bidonvilles. L'dradication du ch6mage permet d'dradiquer les bidonvilles...)) - Jeune 2 : ((...Pour les credits, il faut avoir un travail permanent. L e problbme reside donc toujours dans le travail. Si on ne resout pas d'abord ce problbme on risque d'avoir le contraire, -desJeune 3 bidonvilles sans villes (. .)...D . : ((...L'accompagnement social, c'est bien si cela peut servir les inter& du quartier et des habitants ...)) ((...Nous aimerions Qtre consult& sur les Cquipements prioritaires et sur le montant des traites a payer. Mais par ailleurs, ilexiste dans le quartier des competences dans les diffkrents corps des metiers du biitiment, qui peuvent participer au projet et reglerainsi leur problkme 6conomique ...)) (Homme). ((...Tout le monde ici a entendu parler du projet Villes sans bidonvilles et qu'il n'y aura plus d'habitat insalubre maisje ne sais pas comment ils vont faire pour rCaliser ga. Les bidonvillois de X. ont ete reloges 50.000 DH, ceux de Y. B 100.000DH.La somme de 50.000 DHest parfaite pour un bidonvillois et surtout s'il la paye en traites. Mais ilne faut pas non plus construire des cages a ce prix. Si 1'Etat veut la reussite de ce programme, il faut qu'il mobilise la Wilaya, l'autorite et le ministbre d'habitat. Et surtout qu'il soit suivi par le roi. I1faut que l'autorite verifie les biens de chaque habitant. S'il a une autre maison ailleurs ou ila des terres, ilne faut pas qu'il benefice avec les bidonvillois, et puis, celui qui peut payer, ilne faut pas qu'il mente...)) (Jeune fille) N. Je n'ai jamais entenduparler de ce programme. Une ville sans bidonville, c'est .. bien, cela peut mQme changer la mentalit6 des gens physiquement et moralement. Mais ce qu'on gagne, on le 79 Morocco's National SlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report mange, on va rembourser avec quoi ? Pour les commerqants ambulants, c'est difficile, moi-mdme les autorites viennent de me confisquer ma charrette, j e n'ai plus rien alors que toute ma famille ne peut compter que sur moi. (. ..)L'accompagnement social ? I1 n'y a pas d'accompagnement, en tous cas, iln'y a aucune mise en pratique, c'est seulement des paroles de politiciens ... )) (Jeune homme) ((...Le social, et la participation des gens, ce serait d'abord 1'Etat qui devrait le faire a traversla societe civile et les associations. 11s doivent en mdme temps lutter contre la corruption, il faut absolument empdcher que ga dure, empdcher le clientelisme et essayer d'dtre impartial dans la distribution des lots et des appartements. (. ..) I1 fautque les gens de Rabat viennent refaire le recensement et les habitants doivent prevenir les autorites quand ils apprennent que quelqu'un vend ou revend...)) (Personne ressource) N...L'aide particulikre des blocs non recenses en 1984 continuent a dtre consideres comme des clandestins.. ..dam leur qu'il faut apporter aux gens, c'est avant tout les reconnaitre. Les habitants propre pays : ils n'ont pas de carte d'identite nationale. La premiere aide sociale qu'on peut leur apporter est d'agir auprks des autorites pour faciliter l'octroi d'une carte d'identite a ces personnes.Nous nous sentons ignores, oublies dans ce bidonville...)) (Homme) I1 voir si elle peut s'adapter a un autre mode de vie ou pas, et N . . , faut que les autorites etudient les moyens financiers de chaque famille, son mode de vie, et a partirde la, j e pense que le projet rkussira. Je pense que l'accompagnement social est trks important pour la reussite d'un projet surtout s'il y a transparence au niveau de la crBation d'emploi, sans oublier que les membres qui assurent cet accompagnement doivent avoir un niveau d'instruction assez eleve (. .) ; des . associations dont les membres sont issus de ce quartier pourraient jouer ce r61e (. ..).I1faudrait que les autorites ou les responsables aillent vers les bidonvillois, les informer du projet, prendre leur avis sur certains points, leur expliquer ce qui va se realiser, comment et quand (. .). I1y a . beaucoup de jeunes sans emploi, ce projet peut dtre une occasion de les faire travailler dans la construction par exemple ... ))(Jeune homme) cc...Je pense que les femmes doivent dtre plus impliquees dans les projets de recasement des bidonvilles, parce que l'habitat et le logement, ga concerne d'abord les femmes, car c'est sur elle que repose I'organisation de la famille. L e r61e de l'accompagnement social est expliquer aux femmes comment changer le mode de vie car la vie dans les bidonvilles n'est pas la vie dans les maisons construites en dur. (...) I1 faut aussi penser 6 tous les Bquipements sociaux pour I'accompagnement social, car c'est une population qui vivra toujours dans la prCcarit6, qui aura toujours des problkmes de ch6mages.. . I1faut avoir des complexes oh on pourrait donner des cours d'alphabetisation, les renforcements scolaires pour les enfants, la sensibilisation pour les femmes, des formations de couture, de broderie, cuisine. Et pour les hommes la plomberie, la menuiserie. I1 faut rehabiliter la population, resoudre l'habitat n'est pas le seul problkme du bidonville...)) (Personne ressource) - Homme 1 : cc ...L'6tat doit envoyer de Rabat une commission pour contr6ler l'operation de l'attribution de logement et lots, parce que les responsables ici ne sont pas serieux, et manquent - Homme 2 :H...Nousvivons laHops...N de sens de responsabilite dans l'operation de l'attribution...)). - .Homme 3 :a.. Je propose qu'on recourre aux 12 temoins en plus du recensement 1998, plus la . CIN, les regus, les adresses, les actes adulaires. Pour les nouvelles familles qui sont arrivdes aprks 1998, c'est A 1'Etat de trancher ... )) cc...Les habitants peuvent aider en &ant honndtes et en disant la veritk. I1 ne faut pas que les riches se cachent derriere les pauvres. Mes voisines et moi sommes contre une femme qui veut se 80 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysis Report faire passer pour une mendiante alors qu'elle peut payer. On l'a engueulke, on lui a expliqui que c'est des gens comme elle qui peuvent faire rater tout le projet...)) (Femme) cc...Je ne sais pas ce que c'est que I'accompagnement social, et mQmesi on venait pour m'alphabetiser, j e n'irais pas. J'ai bien trop de problbmes et j e n'ai pas la tQte B ce genre de chases..,)) (Femme) - Homme 1 : ((. ..Oui, cette operation (accompagnernentsocial) existe B la municipalit6 mais on ne sait pas si c'est I'Etat qui va nous aider ou la banquemondiale ... -- )) Homme 2 : a...I1 faut faire participer les habitants...)) Homme 3 : ((...I1 faut la concertation avec les habitants qui sont les interessks dans ces operations...D - Homme 4 : ((...La participationc'est bien mais si elle est seulement dans I'interdt de certaines -personnes, 5 on n'en veut pas...)) Homme :~..Oui,parcequ'ils ne sont pas d'accord entre eux. I1faut qu'ils soient d'accord -sur Homme 6 unseul avis et sur unemdmeaide...)) :((...Les habitants qui habitent ces baraques sont soumis aux conditions de contrainte, ils faut qu'ils beneficient mais ceux qui possedent des maisons et ceux qui ont de I'argent et n'ont achete une baraque que pour etre bkneficiaire, 1'Etat doit mettre un terme B leur faqon d'agir, qu'il leur donne ou pas qa ne nous concerne pas...)) G.. .Nous avons besoin de I'action associative pour la formation des femmes et des jeunes, par I'organisation de reunions dans lesquelles on pourra discuter de tous les problbmes et Cchanger des informations et des points de vue, ex ;j'ktais volontaire au programme de I'alphabktisation, et dans le dClai d'un mois le nombre des femmes avait augment6 dans les classes et elles avaient appris I'alphabet. Mais nous avons rencontr6 des resistances de la part de la mentalit6 masculine et maintenant toutes nos activitks ont CtC arretees (. .). I1 faut encourager tous les habitants des . deux sexes pour participer, mais ilfaut que la participation des habitants soit faite par un groupe ou une association qui les reprisente, tous ne peuvent pas faire reussir une reunion, en plus ilfaut choisir quelqu'un qui nous represente auprbs des responsables. La manibre, c'est qu'il faut que tout le monde soit beneficiaire et de donner des facilites aux habitants pour ameliorer leur condition de vie...)) (Personne resource) 81 Morocco's NationalSlumUpgradingProgram-Poverty and Social ImpactAnalysisReport BIBLIOGRAPHY ANHI (2002) Les interventions en bidonville au Maroc - Unee`valuationsociale,Rabat : Imprimat ADS (2004) Monographiesocialedu bidonville Douar El Kora if AI Omrane (2004) La maitrise d'ouvrage sociale au Maroc :un e`tatdes lieux AREA (2005) Enqu2tesocio-e`conomique-Diagnostic etAnalyse de 1'e`tatdes lieu du Douar OuledMaaza Baker, J. 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