Madagascar

Building Leadership and Management Capacity through the Rapid Results Approach

In 2002 Madagascar’s new government under President Mark Rovolamana recognized the urgency of addressing the peoples’ high expectations for concrete economic and social improvements. While it rushed to put the economy back on track and improve the quality of life, its vision and strategy for reform were no match for the realities on the ground. A Malagasy citizen noted that, “there [was] a contradiction between the state we inherited and the objectives we set for ourselves.”1

By the time the Rovolamanana government assumed power in 2002, GDP had declined by 13 percent, key public services were discontinued, and the poverty rate soared from 69 percent in 2001 to 80 percent. There was widespread joblessness and high inflation.2

Within the government, there was little capacity for policy planning or monitoring and evaluation in most sectors. Collaboration was weak, with no existing mechanism to allow for a joint ministerial response to problems that cut across sectors.

Leadership and Management Program (LAMP)

The World Bank responded to the president’s request with an innovative Leadership and Management Program (LAMP) tailored to the needs of his leadership team and environment. The LAMP was comprised of four components:

• A series of government/cabinet retreats combined with rapid results pilots;
• A one-week management training in Canada by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC) and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration Publique (ENAP);
• A three-day self-management seminar by the Art of Living Foundation; and

The following article is based on a case study from the volume Leadership for Development Results. This volume is a compilation of country case studies from the “Leadership and Change Forum,” Marseille, France, October 2007. The complete case studies as well as more information on the Forum can be found at the World Bank Institute (WBI) Leadership Development Services website: www.worldbank.org/capacity/leadership.
The Madagascar Action Plan: Madagascar’s development vision and strategy

The Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) 2012 sets out a roadmap for achieving the government’s vision of development. Its purpose is to produce a quantum leap in the development process by mobilizing the Malagasy people and the country’s international partners to ignite rapid growth, and thereby achieve poverty reduction.

The MAP outlines eight specific areas of focus: (i) good governance, (ii) educational transformation, (iii) health and family planning, (iv) environment, (v) rural development, (vi) the economy and the private sector, (vii) the environment, and (viii) national solidarity. For each focus area, there are quantifiable goals to be achieved by 2012.

The MAP further delineates the long-term vision in national development strategy called “Madagascar Naturally,” which the president put forward in 2004 as a roadmap for the period 2007–11. The vision foresees the transformation of Madagascar from a subsistence economy, with significantly increased exports of pharmaceuticals and textiles; enhanced linkages between the rural and industrial economies through agro-industry; the transformation of mineral products; and the provision of economic services such as tourism and agricultural credit.


The Madagascar Action Plan (MAP), to a review by a panel of high-level development experts.

The president as change agent

Under the president’s leadership, and with support from high-level political and technical officials, a partnership emerged with economic actors and various financial and technical partners. This was guided by administrative authorities, opinion leaders, and traditional leaders, (“Ampanjaka” or kings of tribes), who liaised with the rural population as community-based decision makers and messengers par excellence about socioeconomic and political reforms.

The president’s commitment made it possible to rapidly deploy coaches, experts, and trainers to assist key leaders...
in sketching out a new plan while tackling the barriers to change. The MAP would emerge from this process to become the unifying road map for the country’s vision and strategy for development.

**RRA process:**

**Desired outcomes**

In February 2005, when the government launched its first rapid results pilot, the goal was to mitigate the effects of a significant shortfall in rice production, importation, and distribution. The crisis was solved by a combination of policy-based and technical interventions. Rice production increased significantly in two of the four targeted regions when the RRA was applied. In the region of Boeny, production went from 2.5 tons per hectare in 2004 to 4 tons per hectare in 2005, and in the region of Menabe, it increased from 22,000 tons to 37,000 tons.³

This success generated an interest in using the RRA in other sectors and regions. The World Bank supported the government’s roll-out of RRA pilot programs in selected sectors in 2005. The program supported RRA initiatives in the Diana region to increase tourism revenues, and in the Antsinanan region to expand the production of litchis.

In Anamalanga, RRA initiatives supported the expansion of family planning activities of the Ministry of Health. The use of contraceptives by women of childbearing age increased from 10.8 percent in 2005 to 21.5 percent by the end of 2006.

In the Betsiboka region, RRA initiatives contributed to significant increases in local government revenues from mining activities. In 2005 a pilot program started in two communes to regularize the informal sector and legalize small-scale mining by issuing mining certificates. The quantity of gold declared by small-scale miners and registered went from 400 grams (before the RRA initiatives) to 12 kilograms. The program was expanded to other regions and led to the registration of over 12,000 small-scale miners.⁴

An independent review of the results of the 2005 pilot phase concluded that 67 percent of the pilots in the rice, tourism, and infrastructure sectors met their objectives,⁵ 22 percent achieved them partially, and 11 failed. The RRA also contributed to tangible results in health (family planning, HIV/AIDS, and nutrition) and tourism (infrastructure, electrification, and water completed). It has also been used to increase textile production, litchi production, and exports.

Impressive performance results were seen in Analamanga region. Access to family planning sites/services reached 100 percent within 100 days (September 2007). Similarly, acceleration was noted in contraceptive rates, from 18 percent to 24 percent in 2006.⁶

Beyond these tangible outcomes RRA has also helped build social capital and rally stakeholders; it has improved collaboration within multisectoral initiatives by enabling ministries to work together and ministries with local service agents. It has built new confidence and capacity for action, management, and leadership skills.

The application of RRA in support of the government’s decentralization efforts has advanced capacity development by improving the results orientation and instilling a sense of shared responsibility and unity for achieving results at the local level.

**Future demand for RRA**

In 2005 the minister of Health and Family Planning decided to scale up the RRA. The directors of the 22 regions met and agreed on a common vision, and on the challenges to be met. As a result, the directors decided to scale up the RRA across all their regions. Each region competed to improve performance, and their efforts were supported by donors. The approach was also scaled up in other central ministries such as Justice, Public Security, and Mining.

Maintaining the availability of well-trained local coaches is essential to sustainability. Coaches are recruited through a competitive process, and are supported by a World Bank-funded project.
There is, however, concern that this may not be possible in the future; and the sustainability of coaching support is a concern. One promising suggestion is to develop a professional coaching practice in-country and a ready pool of external and internal coaches.

**Sources**


**Notes**

1 Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007, p. 5.

2 Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007, p. 3.

3 The other regions of Vakinankatra and Bongolava were less successful, primarily because of a lack of resources.

4 Heidenhof, Teggemann, and Sjetnan 2007, p. 11.

5 Association Hevitra Maro 2006.

6 EDS, 2006; EPM, 20xx.