Chapter 4 analyzes country lessons on building confidence through coalitions and early results. Most states moving back from the brink of violence have developed “inclusive-enough” coalitions for action, with different forms suiting their circumstances. In forming such coalitions, leaders took action to build trust by signaling that new policies would be different from the past and would not be reversed. They built confidence by achieving a few concrete results as a prelude to wider institutional transformation. States that have succeeded in early confidence-building measures have often done so through a pragmatic blending of policy tools and by calling on non-state capacity, both civic and international.
Restoring confidence: Moving away from the brink

Drawing on lessons from national reformers

Leadership actions to restore confidence of stakeholders and citizens in collective capacities for change are a crucial first step in moving away from the brink of violence. As chapters 2 and 3 described, the trust that the population and stakeholders have in state institutions to deal with violence can become shaky when insecurity is rising, or in the aftermath of repeated bouts of conflict. Knowledge about effective ways to restore confidence in countries affected by violence is limited. This chapter thus expands ideas explored in the policy and academic worlds, with lessons drawn from the WDR background papers and country consultations, including the views of national reformers involved in efforts to lead their countries away from the brink.1

Analysis of country cases reveals a variety of pathways away from the brink—but also suggests two common elements. The first lesson is the importance of building inclusive-enough coalitions and identifying the signals and commitment mechanisms2 that can galvanize support for change. Second, national reformers have delivered results on the ground to build confidence in citizen security, justice, and economic prospects. In both elements, successful transitions made astute use of supplemental capacity beyond government: from the private sector, from traditional institutions, and from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This chapter considers what makes coalitions “inclusive-enough” and the signals, commitment mechanisms, and early results that can help achieve momentum for later institutional transformation.3

These pathways away from violence have been analyzed in the literature. Stedman and Nilsson suggest that pacts to end violence need not be all-inclusive—they can promote peace if they are minimally inclusive at the beginning.4 Fearon, Keefer, Azam and Mesnard examine why some conflicts may be more intractable because of distrust and how commitment mechanisms (ways to ensure that promises will be difficult to reverse) can be designed to solve those problems; examples include peace agreements, power-sharing arrangements, and security sector reform.5

Societies use these and other commitment mechanisms to suit conditions on the ground. More important than the form of these mechanisms is their adaptability to changing conditions over the course of multiple transitions. The lessons explored in this chapter build on this research through practical country examples and cross-country lessons.
Inclusive-enough coalitions

This section looks at country experiences in building “inclusive-enough” pacts for change; different approaches to coalition-building at national, subnational, and local levels; and the guiding principles that emerge on what is “inclusive-enough.” It considers the type of immediate actions and signals on future policy that have built support for change.

How inclusive is inclusive enough?

Action by national leaders during transitional moments can be decisive in preventing violence. Two contrasting cases illustrate this point. In Kenya, warnings of election-related violence in 2007 led Kenyan groups and several foreign governments to offer support to peace committees and other forms of mediation or violence prevention; leaders of the various political factions refused them.6 The predicted violence following the announcement of the election results led to nearly 1,000 deaths and the displacement of 300,000 people. By contrast, the Ghanaian government took decisive action in 2003 to forestall a potentially serious dispute over succession rights between rival Dagomba clans in the north. After national efforts failed to find compromise between the feuding groups, the government requested United Nations (UN) assistance in designing confidence-building interventions, including the facilitation of government and civil society dialogue and negotiations.7 That action defused the potential for violence, and the country avoided a major conflict that could have undermined the 2004 national elections.

Leadership is sometimes shared, and sometimes dominated by individuals. That was the case with Mali’s General Amadou Toumani Touré, whose willingness to deal differently with the Tuareg rebellion launched a sustained tradition of democratic resolution.8 South Africa benefited both from the exceptional personal leadership of President Nelson Mandela and the depth of collective leadership developed during decades of resistance in the African National Congress, the Communist Party, and the civil society organizations of the United Democratic Front.

Transition opportunities have led to more decisive action where leaders have built coalitions for change.9 Inclusive-enough approaches may be formal power-sharing arrangements, as with the government of the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland.10 Most frequently, the coalitions are informal, as with the Colombia and Timor-Leste approaches described below. Some successful experiences and challenges in coalition-building in situations of political and civil conflict include the following:

- Inclusive rather than exclusive approaches can be important in preventing a recurrence of violence. Timor-Leste leadership reached out in 2007 to other political parties and to entrepreneurs to help in reconstruction, involving independent figures and those from other parties in government, and providing for local business involvement. This approach contrasted with that taken in the period between independence in 2002 and renewed violence in 2006, when the ruling party engaged relatively little with civil society, the church, or other domestic actors to build support for its program.11

- In some situations, specific focus on building national and provincial support for change simultaneously can be important. In Aceh, Indonesia, which had experienced a long and costly civil conflict, a careful process of mediation involving the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM)—a rebel movement—and leadership and government leaders from the province and from Jakarta secured a peace agreement in 2005 that mobilized a broad range of stakeholder support, as well as international engagement (feature 4).

- Inclusion strategies can change over time. In Sierra Leone, the initial inclusion of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the
1999 Lomé Agreement was subsequently repudiated in 2000 as conditions changed and following repeated abuses. Although initial arrangements did not succeed, they were nonetheless necessary to encourage the RUF leaders to cease fighting. Having the leaders in the capital also helped in monitoring their activities once the arrangements collapsed.12

• Conversely, in Sudan, peace talks between 2000 and 2005 were held between a narrow group of leaders on both sides, with both North and South continuing to face internal divisions that were not managed through a broadening of the coalition after the peace agreement was signed in January 2005.13

Inclusive-enough coalition-building has also been important in successful non-postconflict political transitions, as the following examples demonstrate:

• The political transition in Chile in 1990 and onward involved heavily institutionalized political mechanisms to reach agreement in policy among the five political parties of the “concertación democrática”; outreach to labor and civil society; and clear signals to business that responsible economic management would be part of the new direction. In Chile, as in other middle-income country political transitions such as Indonesia, a delicate balancing approach was used to undertake security and justice reforms while maintaining support from the military for change.14

• In South Africa, inclusive-enough coalition-building in the run-up to the 1994 election meant involving all political parties and civil society in discussions over the country’s future, although the African National Congress (ANC) maintained a hierarchy where it led decision-making among other ANC Alliance and Democratic Front members.

• The Colombian government mobilized the military, civil service, business groups, and civil society actors in 2003 to support its democratic security policy. This process excluded the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), whose breaches of the peace talk provisions from the late 1990s to 2002 created nationwide demand for action against the kidnappings and violence. Government communication and outreach bolstered popular confidence for difficult military and police actions and civil service reforms.15

• The Consultative Assembly (CA), established to draft a new constitution, was the basis of Ghana’s inclusive-enough coalition-building process during the transition to multiparty democracy. The 260-member Consultative Assembly was made up of 117 representatives from the District and Metropolitan Assemblies, 121 representatives of various “established organizations” (that is, corporate groups) and associations, and 22 government appointees. The Assembly, which contained many opposition sympathizers, displayed independence and drafted a constitution that was approved in a referendum that set the stage for an orderly nonviolent transition.16

In diverse circumstances of negotiated peace settlements, military victories, and political crises, leaders have often used broad-based governments to send a positive signal on inclusion—but it is no simple matter. Cabinets in developed countries not affected by violence, where efficiency is a primary concern, generally range from 15 to 20 appointments in each administration. But when stability, rather than efficiency, drives the composition, cabinets are often larger, as in Kenya and Zimbabwe.17 When fragmented decision-making is exacerbated by internal divisions, the efficiency costs can be considerable. The stresses that spur violence can be rooted in provincial or local as well as national dynamics, and local coalitions can be crucial in preventing violence. The links made between central and provincial govern-
While in the short run, recovery from violence can be supported by external assistance or natural resource revenues, the path to longer-term development is dependent on a healthy private sector. Private sector activity often cuts across ethnic and religious lines, where rules-based competition is the cornerstone. Violence shortens the time horizons of consumers, producers, traders, and policy makers. Outreach to the private sector can help build a sense of the long term, which is critical for planning, investment in the future, and sustainable growth. In the Colombia, Chile, and Timor-Leste examples above, reaching out to the private sector was a crucial part of coalition building.

The ability of leaders to govern and to effect change also depends on a network of civil society and informal institutions and actors—and the interaction between the state and informal institutions takes on even greater significance in societies ravaged by violence. Many nongovernment initiatives have helped contain or stop violence. The inclusion of civil society, informal, and traditional institutions in inclusive-enough coalitions helps in acquiring broader societal legitimacy and in ensuring that citizen security, justice, and jobs reach all segments of society. Community, traditional, and civil society structures can also be crucial partners for the delivery of early results where state reach and trust with violence-affected communities is low. By drawing on nonstate capacity, governments can “stretch” their

**Box 4.1 “All politics is local.”**

George Yeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Singapore; WDR Advisory Council Member

Successful efforts must begin at the local level. Without emphasis on local results, citizens lose confidence in their government’s ability to provide a better life. Actions to restore security, create trust, generate employment, and provide services in local communities lay the foundation for national progress. It is not enough to deliver results in big cities. In cases of ethnic and religious strife, where mutual insecurity can feed on itself, a local authority that is seen to be fair and impartial by all groups is absolutely essential before the process of healing and recovery can take place. This was Singapore’s experience when we had racial riots in the 1960s. A trusted leader can make a decisive difference.
ability to deliver public goods and signal an inclusive partnership between the state and other parts of society.

Informal patronage networks also mediate the effects of attempts to prevent violence in many fragile situations: these networks can undermine the institutional change needed to develop resilience to violence in the long run, but in the short term there is often little to replace them. Country lessons indicate a balance between the credibility of initial coalition-building efforts—which the involvement of individuals and groups known to be corrupt can undermine—and the need to dismantle patronage systems over time as institutional strength builds. Chapter 5 discusses lessons on sequencing anti-corruption efforts in fragile situations.

The participation of women in political reform can help to broaden initial coalitions to serve wider groups of citizens. As peace negotiations between the Liberian government of Charles Taylor and rebel groups in 2003 were under way, the Liberian Women’s Mass Action for Peace movement mobilized thousands of supporters in Liberia and Ghana, where the talks were being held, and barricaded delegates in meeting rooms, prompting international mediators to set deadlines and secure agreements. In Papua New Guinea/Bougainville, women’s delegations consulted with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army to end the war, held initiatives to create peace areas, and convened and led peace talks. Southern Sudanese women in the New Sudan Council of Churches organized the Wunlit tribal summit in 1999 to bring an end to hostilities between the Dinka and Nuer peoples. The Wunlit Covenant resulted in an agreement to share rights to water, fishing, and grazing land, which had been key points of disagreement. In Latin America, women’s groups have been active on human rights abuses; one of the most well known is Las...
Madres de la Plaza—a group of mothers who began nonviolent demonstrations in 1977, demanding information from the Argentinean government on the whereabouts of their “disappeared” children during the years known as the Dirty War (1976–83).26

An essential, yet often underrated, ingredient in successful transitions from violence is proactive communication by the government to build public understanding and support. Successful coalitions have usually managed to “capture the narrative”—that is, to articulate a compelling vision of hope, develop a sense of shared identity, generate broad popular buy-in, and mobilize citizens even when the vision entails some short-term sacrifices for their supporters. Common to successful leadership, whether individual or collective, is this ability to redefine citizen and elite expectations, to move them beyond negative frames of reference, and to transform public policies and institutions in ways that will enable the state to address immediate and long-term sources of discord.

Citizens who lack credible information about progress made and challenges ahead will likely attribute the lack of visible improvements to a lack of political will, and they can lose trust in—and even turn against—those they believed or elected.27 An inclusive public dialogue requires capacity and resources, not just of state institutions or of civil society, but also of the media, which can play an important role in ensuring public accountability and act as a citizen voice. Experience indicates this capacity needs to be developed in a coordinated manner—media development should focus not only on basic skills and journalistic training but also on establishing of professional standards and an enabling regulatory environment for the media. Governments, meanwhile, need to be endowed with appropriate outreach and communication capacity.

How inclusive is inclusive-enough? It may seem that conflict can only be prevented when all parts of society work together to set the country on a new path. This is correct in one sense: successful efforts to prevent and recover from violence have built alliances. But as illustrated above, they have not necessarily included all groups within society.

Four key lessons on what makes for inclusive-enough coalitions are as follows:

- Groups may legitimately be excluded where there is an evolving belief among the population that they have sacrificed their right to participate due to past abuses.
- Including groups that bring political legitimacy and financial and technical resources and will continue to press for deeper institutional transformation—such as business, labor, women’s, or other civil society groups—is valuable, but there may be a hierarchy of decision making at the beginning, with parties present at the table but deferring on some decisions to political leadership.
- There can be trade-offs between wide inclusiveness and the efficiency of subsequent state decision-making, as when governments with very large numbers of ministries are created.
- Inclusion strategies can change over time as it becomes possible to marginalize consistently abusive groups.

**Signals and commitment mechanisms**

In the early stages of transition, gaining the confidence of these stakeholder groups often requires policies that signal a break from the past and instill trust that the new directions will not be reversed. Signaling a break from the past can include immediate actions or announcement of future actions. Committing to the future requires assuring stakeholders—who may be skeptical on the basis of broken promises in the past—that changes will be difficult to reverse. The signals used by countries that successfully made the initial transition away from the brink involved combined actions across the security-economic or political-economic domains.

The most powerful signals show that leaders are not prisoners of anti-reform, anti-
compromise forces among their own supporters. Strategic appointments can be a vital signal of future intent. The first president elected after the Nicaraguan peace agreement retained the chief of staff of the army in his position. That sent a strong reassuring signal to the defeated opposition that she would not use an electoral victory to resume military campaigns.28 In Mozambique, the former RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance, the former rebel movement that is now an opposition party) supreme commander was appointed deputy chief-of-staff of the Mozambican Defense Force, and seven RENAMO members were appointed to the national electoral commission (alongside 10 government representatives).29

In the security sector, signals from governments or opposition armed movements have demonstrated what the security forces will not do—as much as what they will do. The Mozambique government unilaterally announced the start of troop confinement as part of the demobilization. This created enough trust for RENAMO to announce its own steps toward demobilization.30

In Iraq, the “surge” to restore order in 2006–07 was preceded by a decision to withdraw the police, who were accused of taking factional sides in the violence, from insecure urban areas and to deploy the army instead. While this created longer-term challenges of returning the army to its typical role and building up the civilian police, it did restore civilian confidence.31 Strong signals can also be sent by rebel movements: the decision by Xanana Gusmão in 1999 to confine to barracks the Timorese resistance troops, Falintil, even in the face of widespread destruction in the country, avoided a repeat of the 1975 descent into civil war.32

Signals on political reform are crucial where political exclusion was a central factor in motivating violence or civil protests. These may include rapid action toward elections or lay out a series of preparatory steps—as with the transitional executive bodies and constitutional reform processes in South Africa, supported by civic education and national and local action to maintain security during the political process through the National Peace Accords (box 3.9). Where elections will take place quickly, indicating that these are not an end but a step toward institutional transformation (as described in the inputs by Lakhdar Brahimi and Nitin Desai in box 5.11) is important. The creation of commitment mechanisms to ensure that announcements on political reforms will be honored in their implementation—such as robustly independent electoral commissions, supplemented where useful by regional or international technical and monitoring capacity—can help to build trust.

Signaling early intent to redress human rights violations is also possible even when the processes take time. Countries emerging from severe violence often carry legacies of human rights violations and trauma that shatter social norms or break the social contract between state and citizen.33 Often poor and marginalized communities bear the brunt of predatory actions by state and nonstate actors, and tackling such evident injustices can be a high priority in a government attempt to break with the past, while starting to rebuild the institutions of the formal justice system.

With trust so important for stabilization and recovery, some societies have signaled early commitments to transitional justice. These efforts include steps leading to truth commissions, reparations programs for victims, and counter-impunity initiatives that may involve prosecuting the worst abusers and vetting security forces.34 Such initiatives send powerful signals about the commitment of the new government to the rule of law. Even if institutional or political factors do not allow for full redress, early gathering of evidence of human rights violations and assisting victims can signal serious intent to overcome legacies of impunity and rights violations at both the community and national level. These approaches have also been tried with some success in middle-income countries making a transition from military rule. The state governments in Brazil pro-
vided early economic compensation to some victims of political violence during the country’s military dictatorship, prompting a process of truth-telling and public discussion of past crimes.35

Given the link between corruption and violence, judicious, rapid transparency and anti-corruption measures can help to restore stakeholder and citizen confidence. In some countries, legacies of corruption leave heavy resentment and mistrust, which must be addressed for the new political arrangements to have credibility. In Liberia, government corruption was widely viewed as a major motivator for the rebellion of 1980, launching Liberia’s long-running sequence of internal wars, temporary transitional governments, coups, and further wars. One of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s first and most popular actions was to fire two prominent figures on corruption charges and maintain tight controls over corruption (box 4.3). The power

**BOX 4.3 Signals and commitments for economic management: GEMAP in Liberia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of violence:</th>
<th>Civil conflict, political violence, criminal and gang-related violence, trafficking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition opportunity:</td>
<td>Moderate space for change, presidential elections, strong international support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stakeholders:</td>
<td>Government needed to restore confidence of opposition parties and civil society, neighboring countries and regional institutions, donors and investors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stresses:</td>
<td>Long history of violence, trauma, grievances and mistrust, corruption, youth unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional challenges:</td>
<td>Extreme corruption and low domestic revenues, undermining political governance and constraining efforts to increase government capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the end of the 14-year Liberian civil war in 2003, the international community became increasingly concerned about the mismanagement and corruption under the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). Corruption was not just an economic concern: political and army reactions to the extensive corruption of the Tolbert government have been widely cited as a trigger for the coup that sparked Liberia’s first civil war in 1989, and the theft of national resources continued to finance violent groups. The extreme corruption prevented improvements in government capacity by constraining national revenues and diverting external resources.

After intense negotiations, diplomatic pressure, and the threat of an embargo on external assistance, the NTGL and Liberia’s international partners agreed to the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP). The AU (African Union) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) led discussions with the NTGL, and the UN Security Council welcomed GEMAP in Resolution 1626 of September 19, 2005. GEMAP’s aim was to improve revenue collection, budgeting, and expenditure management; upgrade procurement practices; strengthen transparency over concessions of national resources; control corruption; and build government capacity.

A defining feature of GEMAP is the use of international experts with co-signatory authority in the operations of ministries and state-owned enterprises, the review of concessions and contracts (including timber and diamonds), and the establishment of an oversight mechanism, the Economic Governance Steering Committee (EGSC), to guide and monitor GEMAP implementation. The EGSC is a mechanism of shared accountability, chaired by President Johnson Sirleaf and the American Ambassador as the deputy chair.

GEMAP has helped bring some rapid improvements and was an appropriate response to Liberia’s particular mix of stresses, stakeholders, and institutional challenges at the time. Revenues increased from US$84.5 million in 2005–06 to a projected US$347 million in 2010–11, and Liberia’s ranking on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index climbed from 150 to 97 between 2007 and 2009.

GEMAP, however, has also ignited debate over the management role of expatriates. President Johnson Sirleaf told the UN Security Council that “a major deficiency still exists as with other technical assistance programs—the lack of capacity development for sustainability. This fault has contributed to tensions between foreign and local experts, thereby raising issues of ownership and sovereignty.”36 A lesson from GEMAP is to look closely at phasing the handover of responsibilities over time and manage local understanding and support.

and enduring effect of such a signal rests on informing citizens that the leader can reject supporters who might prefer to renege on commitments to citizens or the opposition. (Chapters 6 addresses temporary external support to justice systems, especially for redressing crimes committed during episodes of violence.)

Successful early stabilization efforts have often featured greater transparency in decision-making and budgeting to improve trust between citizens and the state. The new government of Timor-Leste broke with tradition in 2008 when it broadcast the budget debate in its entirety on radio and television. Open consultations over policy in Chile and public inputs to appointment confirmation processes in Argentina created confidence that new directions would not be reversed.

Other governments have pursued greater transparency at the grassroots. In the early 1990s in Uganda, concerns arose over the apparent disparity between budget allocations and actual spending on education. This served as an impetus for the first Public Expenditure Tracking Survey. The initial survey of 250 government-run primary schools in 1991–95 revealed that only 13 percent of the education funds from the central government went to the schools, with the remaining 87 percent used for personal gain or non-education purposes. Later surveys, implemented after the first was made public, showed that the flow of funds to schools increased to around 80–90 percent in 1999–2000. The expenditure tracking system boosted citizen and donor confidence in the aftermath of the civil war. However, the system has since weakened.

Wealth-sharing can generate support and confidence in stable situations and in transitions. Most countries rich in natural resources share smaller or larger amounts of the revenues from extraction with subnational governments (as in Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria). Such wealth-sharing arrangements are often vital when civil wars have been fueled by natural resources or have featured disputes over natural resource control. The arrangements for sharing oil revenues in Sudan are an essential aspect of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 (an Agreement on Wealth Sharing, Chapter III of the CPA, was signed in early 2004). In Pakistan the government used a budgetary provision to signal greater attention to areas of growing insecurity (box 4.4). Commitments were built into these agreements by passing them into law—and, in Sudan, through limited third-party monitoring.

Social cohesion policies are another strong signal that helps create a sense of fairness and social justice across population groups. Such policies foster the participation of hitherto excluded groups or areas in economic and political decision-making, enabling them to benefit from development assistance and ensuring that civil service recruitment is nondiscriminatory. To signify the state’s concern for the victims of violence or those previously excluded from state services, Rwanda provided housing support and Timor-Leste cash transfer payments for internally displaced persons.

Signals can involve removing or amending laws perceived as unjust and discriminatory—such as abolishing apartheid laws in South Africa and, in Pakistan, the discussion over the Frontier Crimes Regulation, which applies a legal regime to the federally administered tribal areas differing from the rest of Pakistan.

In pursuing social cohesion policies, another signal is restoring public services to the middle class, who may be crucial for political support for change. For example, increasing social investments in Chile in the 1990s was balanced by restitution of civil service pensions and appointments; sunset clauses for white civil servants in South Africa balanced fast action on maternal and child health care for the poorest communities. Policies aimed at tangible results for these groups are often not pro-poor, and hence are often difficult for development practitioners to agree on as priorities. But they can be part of the political economy of successful change.
Delivering early results

Country lessons show that inclusive-enough coalitions have to be complemented by tangible results to restore confidence in national institutions. Results on the ground build confidence for three reasons. First, they are concrete indicators of a government’s good intentions toward citizens. Second, they demonstrate the government’s ability to deliver on its promises. Third, they build confidence by indicating that leaders are able to withstand pressure from their own supporters to play a “winner take all” game and that they instead provide benefits to all citizens. This confidence-building requires listening to popular expectations, setting realistic priorities for what can be delivered, drawing on nongovernment capacity to deliver, and communicating results to the population. This section identifies various practical ways to deliver results to violence-affected populations. (Chapter 5 then presents examples of possible interventions across the security, justice, and jobs spectrum for both the immediate and longer term.)

Perception surveys in Africa and Latin America indicate that employment and security are people’s most pressing problems. Electricity, literally the most “visible” of all results, can be critical for progress in security and job creation. In many countries, a perception of increased justice for excluded populations may come about not only through action in the justice sector per se but also through broader social justice that includes greater provision of health, education, or social protection. The specific short-term results most important for restoring confidence will depend on an assessment of the priorities of the population and the preferences of key stakeholder groups (box 4.5).

BOX 4.4 Pakistan: Using the budget to signal change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of violence:</th>
<th>Subnational, political, cross-border, trafficking, ideological including transnational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition opportunity:</td>
<td>Limited space for change following accession of new government in 2008 and military campaign of 2009 in Swat valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stresses:</td>
<td>Cross-border conflict spillovers; transnational terrorism; regional competition; corruption; political and social inequality; income and asset inequality; regional inequities; youth unemployment; tensions over natural resource wealth-sharing in peripheral regions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stakeholders:</td>
<td>Federal, regional, and local government (including tribal areas); excluded groups; neighboring countries; international partners; national and transnational militant groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional challenges:</td>
<td>Accountability and capacity constraints in public administration; security, judicial, and political institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Late in 2009, the agreement by Pakistan’s federal and provincial government leaders to the Seventh National Finance Commission Award was hailed as a “major achievement and a positive event for those who believe that the future of a vibrant Pakistan lies in a democratic federation.”

In Pakistan, grievances over inequity in revenue-sharing go back a long time and have been part of a broader set of tensions between regions within Pakistan. They have been exacerbated by debates over the distribution of political power and, more recently, over the independence of institutions of accountability, notably the judiciary. All this in a context where Pakistan faces terrorist threats, subnational tensions, separatist movements, regional insecurity, and severe economic inequality.

Attempts to set in place a new agreement had failed for 17 years. As part of the 2009 five-year public finance award, the federal government sacrificed part of its share of the national divisible pool of resources in favor of the provinces. While all provinces will receive an increase in resources, two of them also accepted a reduction in their shares to provide more resources to Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provinces—which were both affected by internal conflict and the war in Afghanistan. The award was also an important part of efforts to assuage separatist sentiments in Balochistan and to settle more than 30 years of disputes between Sindh and Punjab about the distribution of water. On its own, however, the award does not address local governance and institutional challenges. The decline of public revenues and the impact of the floods of 2010 have also constrained the overall potential for the allocation and transfer of funds, and legal and resource challenges remain constraints to implementation.

**What is the right balance of quick, visible results and longer-term institution-building?**

Although tangible results are needed in the short term, these will be insufficient to prevent violence recurring without simultaneous steps toward transforming institutions (see chapter 5). Striking a balance requires an astute reading of available capacity and tradeoffs. WDR consultations in several countries highlighted the need for governments to demonstrate at least two to three visible results locally in the first year following a new pact for change, and ideally one or two in the first months (box 4.6). Results need to be repeated at regular intervals, however, to maintain momentum and citizen confidence.

Combined political, security, and developmental capacities are often needed to deliver confidence-building results quickly.
BOX 4.6 Only a few visible results are needed to restore confidence: Examples from civil war, organized criminal, and subnational violence

Liberia

Types of violence: Civil conflict, political violence, criminal and gang-related violence, trafficking

Transition opportunity: Moderate space for change, presidential elections, strong international support

Key stakesholders: Government needed to restore confidence of opposition parties and civil society, neighboring countries and regional institutions, donors and investors

Key stresses: Long history of violence, trauma, grievances and mistrust, corruption, youth unemployment

Institutional challenges: Corruption and low domestic revenues, undermining political governance and constraining efforts to increase government capacity

The Liberian government capitalized on a well-managed donor program and a long-standing dearth of public-spirited government to visibly deliver public goods, restoring confidence in government. The key was to be specific about what was promised—restoring electricity in Monrovia in a year, for example—and to make sure that the government actually delivered what it had promised. Tonmorlah Varpilah, Liberian Deputy Minister of Health, told the WDR team that Liberia took some immediate actions to satisfy public opinion. The first was to guarantee peace and security using UN forces. Then the President took action to provide free primary education, free primary health care, and electricity in the capital city. Those interventions helped build confidence in the government. Simultaneously, the government worked to improve capacity in the public finance and justice systems for the longer term.

Colombia

Types of violence: Civil conflict, trafficking, criminal and gang-related violence

Transition opportunity: Preventive action in the face of rising criminality and failed peace talks

Key stakesholders: Government, armed groups, citizens, civil society, regional, international partners

Key stresses: Legacies of violence, presence of criminal networks and drug production/trafficking, perceived social and economic deprivation, natural resource wealth

Institutional challenges: Lack of reach of state; accountability challenges

In 2002, the government made restoring security a top priority and defined a set of fairly narrow targets for violence-affected areas: restoring safe transit by deploying military resources to protect the main road network and sponsoring convoys of private vehicles that allowed many Colombians to travel between major cities in safety for the first time in years; reducing homicides and kidnappings; restoring social services to the national average; and improving trust in the state. Meetings around the country during the electoral campaign and a review of the strengths and weaknesses of past efforts informed selection of these targets. A review of the previous Política Nacional de Rehabilitación (PNR) program, for example, indicated that it had spread its efforts too thinly across different regions, so the new government chose a smaller number of violence-affected areas. It also drew on wider capacities to execute the program, including U.S. support for security-sector capacity-building and the engagement of Colombian NGOs and other donors in social programs in violence-affected rural areas. Frequent perception surveys of citizens kept the government up-to-date on progress.

Pakistan

Types of violence: Subnational, political, cross-border, trafficking, ideological, including transnational

Transition opportunity: Limited space for change following accession of new government in 2008 and 2009 military campaign in Swat valley

Key stakeholders: National, regional, and local government (including tribal areas), excluded groups; neighboring countries; international partners; national and transnational militant groups

Key stresses: Cross-border conflict spillovers, transnational terrorism, regional competition, corruption; political, social, income, and asset inequality; regional inequities; youth unemployment; tensions over natural resource wealth sharing in peripheral regions

Institutional challenges: Accountability and capacity constraints in public administration, security, judicial, and political institutions
and initiate cross-sectoral institutional transformations. Governments have used tools associated with one domain of action (security, justice, economic) to achieve goals in another. Navigating transitions has involved a clear focus on the stresses that drive violence and on designing programs to mitigate them. This implies an interdisciplinary approach to strategy based not on sectoral programs and outcomes but on balancing security, justice, and economic opportunity (box 4.7).

**How can results be delivered when states face a legacy of weak capacity and legitimacy?**

Governments that have restored confidence of stakeholders and citizens have typically mobilized nonstate actors to deliver results rather than doing everything themselves. Drawing on “supplementary capacity” has meant tapping into both local nonstate structures (communities and community organizations, traditional institutions of justice, the domestic private sector, NGOs) and external assistance (regional organizations, international donors, the international private sector; see chapter 6).

Governments are often concerned that drawing in NGO, private sector, or community capacity will take the credit away from the government, or that it will be difficult to transform these modes of delivery farther down the line when state institutional capacity has increased. It is indeed critical that nongovernmental programs, particularly international programs, give appropriate, visible attributions of credit to national institutions. Development programs stamped with the logo of international institutions do not build trust in national institutions. Yet nongovernmental mechanisms can be used to boost confidence in government responsiveness to its citizens, as box 4.8 on Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program indicates. Similarly, the involvement of NGOs under government coordination in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste (see chapter 8) increased the perception of government effectiveness in the health sector.

Community-driven development (CDD) approaches have been applied in varied contexts. While such programs alone cannot transform the security, justice, or economic dynamics in violent settings, their use is a good indicator of the range of purposes they can serve and the relative ease of adapting their design to different needs. Attributes such as participatory planning and decision-making, cooperation between local authorities and the committees selected by community members for the purpose of a CDD program, and community control of funds...
mean the programs can signal a change in the attitude of the state to communities, even before physical projects are completed. They can thereby enhance state-society relations, increase citizen trust in institutions, and contribute to longer-term institution building (box 4.8). Experience from a range of applications suggests that CDD programs can extend the state’s reach, especially in areas from which it has been absent during a conflict; reconstruct social capital and strengthen social cohesion; signal inclusion of marginalized groups (such as women and youth); and contribute to decentralization, either by design or through adaptations over time.

The importance of community engagement in local-level interventions can be illustrated by psychosocial support programs. Political and criminal violence alike can cause significant psychological and social
Afghanistan, one of the world’s poorest countries, has experienced a near continuous period of invasion and occupation, civil war, and oppression since the late 1970s. Between the overthrow of President Daoud before the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the Bonn Accord in 2002, the central government never had authority across the entire country. In addition to a long legacy of violence and poverty, the country faces the daunting stresses of internal conflict, terrorism, ethnic tension, regional and global security stresses, and extensive corruption.

Development under these conditions obviously is particularly challenging. However, the largest development program in Afghanistan, the National Solidarity Program (NSP), has registered some important successes. Since its inauguration in 2003, it has established more than 22,500 community development councils across 361 districts in all 34 provinces and financed more than 50,000 development projects. Through the democratically elected, gender-balanced councils, the program builds representative institutions for village governance. Typical projects construct or improve critical infrastructure, such as communal drinking water facilities, irrigation canals, local roads and bridges, and electrical generators, and offer vocational training or literacy courses to villagers.

Economic evaluations show consistently high rates of return across all sectors (above 12 percent). A midterm evaluation by the University of York in the United Kingdom in 2005–06 found significant evidence of greater public faith in the national government, along with better community relations. The independently conducted Randomized Impact Evaluation of Phase-II of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Program in 2010 reinforced this finding through a large-sample quantitative assessment using randomized controlled trials to compare outcomes in 250 villages covered by the NSP, with 250 villages not yet participating in the program. As part of the independent evaluation indicated above, a survey was conducted between October 2007 and May 2008 that showed that the simple process of electing councils and planning local investments increased villagers’ trust in all levels of government. Across the board, those in villages participating in the NSP had more trust in government officials, showing that it is possible to markedly change perceptions of state institutions through effective local interventions.

Furthermore, a separate study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, DC, found that “the CDCs and tribal shuras” are seen as more responsive to Afghan needs than provincial governments and provincial councils, and in many cases are the only sign of improvement villagers have seen in the past five years.52

Sources: Beath and others 2010; Patel and Ross 2007; Selvarajan 2008; Brick 2008; Barakat 2006.
Successful initial transitions have drawn heavily on nongovernmental capacity associated with the credibility of national institutions. For instance, religious organizations run 81 percent of public primary schools and 77 percent of public secondary schools in the Democratic Republic of Congo, through a protocol-based school management system,57 which was what kept the schools running through the turbulent 1990s.58

Communities can also play a central role in service provision (box 4.9). In many fragile environments, NGOs often ensure that basic social services, such as health care, education, water, and sanitation, continue to be provided to the population. Delivery modes can include government agencies contracting out some social services to local NGOs,59 international NGOs working closely with local NGOs and community groups, and local NGOs collaborating with community groups in the absence of the government.

Box 4.8 Community-driven development strengthens state-society relations in Afghanistan (continued)

Do officials work for the benefits of all the villagers?

Source: Beath and others 2010.

Note: Villages that participated in the NSP program exhibit more trust in national and local governments. Participants responded that they believed that national and local government officials worked for the benefit of all villagers significantly more often in NSP villages than in other villages. Statistically significant differences are shown with asterisked percentages above the Non-NSP Village bars. In the x-axis, the label ISAF is referring to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

regulation of land and family disputes. Such gaps have led to popular frustration and have opened opportunities to violent opposition movements such as the Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which have in some areas of the country established a shadow presence offering an alternative local dispute resolution system.55 Gangs can play a similar role in urban communities. The WDR Fafo perception surveys in countries affected by violence found that most respondents saw traditional authorities as best placed to resolve land disputes, even though they also believed that national or local state structures should deliver other key governance functions.56 (Chapter 5 explores complementarities between traditional and formal systems in justice reform.)

Civil society and faith-based actors can also play an important role in service delivery in many violent contexts when government capacity and reach are limited. Many successful initial transitions have drawn heavily on nongovernmental capacity associated with the credibility of national institutions. For instance, religious organizations run 81 percent of public primary schools and 77 percent of public secondary schools in the Democratic Republic of Congo, through a protocol-based school management system,57 which was what kept the schools running through the turbulent 1990s.58

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One area that does not lend itself well to partnership with nonstate actors to deliver fast results is security. Nonstate actors can be effective in supporting security efforts, for instance in community policing aiming to reduce crime through community partnership; joint programs against crime between municipalities, civil society, and the private sector; and community engagement to prevent and respond to gender-based violence (see chapter 5). Going further and implicitlyceding to others the state monopoly on security should be avoided. New research shows that preexisting social networks, when used by the state and competing elites, can stir up conflict or perpetuate its damaging social effects—as in the evolution of vigilantism in Nigeria (box 4.10). While circumstances clearly vary, the risks of such groups becoming predatory or difficult to demobilize are considerable—not least because their methods of recruitment are not generally based on merit, while their armed status can make their social accountability tenuous. A similar tradeoff exists with private security companies in internationally supported operations. For instance, Coalition Forces in Iraq faced problems in addressing abuses by private security companies entrusted with core state security tasks.

A related issue is the proliferation of private security companies around the globe. They provide an array of functions, including monitoring, investigation services, and bodyguards. Their growth is often attributed to a widespread sense of insecurity and a lack of trust in the police and the judiciary. In Central America, the private security industry expanded dramatically in the 1990s following the signing of peace agreements. In El Salvador and Guatemala, private security firms sometimes incorporated ex-combatants from civil wars, and throughout the region, many working for private security firms are former government security personnel. By 2008, legal and illegal private security companies in Guatemala and Honduras employed around 120,000 and 60,000 guards, respectively, with five to six private security personnel for each police officer. A worrisome development, as noted by the president of the Guatemala Chamber of Security, is the severe shortage of trained security personnel, so the typical marginal company ends up recruiting farmers from the interior of the country and sending them to work with little or no training.

**BOX 4.9 Nepal: Bringing others in—supplementing government capacity in education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of violence:</th>
<th>Civil conflict, interethnic and political violence, criminal violence, and trafficking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transition opportunities:</td>
<td>Modest space for change: “palace killings” and stepped-up Maoist campaign in 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key stresses:</td>
<td>Legacies of violence and trauma; social, political, and economic inequality; youth unemployment; corruption; human rights abuses; rising expectations of formerly unrepresented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional challenges:</td>
<td>Feudal structures and associated exclusion; accountability and capacity constraints in public administration, security, judicial, and political institutions; lack of inclusion of different groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2001, recognizing that extensive local capacity to provide education already on the ground had better success than the nationalized education system, the government devolved responsibility for primary schooling back to school management committees through amendments to the Education Act. The government relied exclusively on communities for the delivery of basic education until 1971. The responsibilities of these committees included generating resources; formulating budgets (using a combination of government incentive grants, international aid, and local resources); and hiring teachers. Significant local resources were unlocked, with every rupee of government grants leveraging 1.5 rupees in community financing.

Decentralizing teacher hiring also spurred accountability, as the government froze the number of government-appointed teaching slots and introduced salary grants to allow communities to recruit teachers locally and hold them accountable for classroom performance. Better school governance reduced teacher absenteeism, improved learning achievements, increased community donations, and boosted primary completion rates (from 42 percent in 1998 to 60 percent in 2003).

Even though the country was in active conflict, net enrollment rates in primary education increased from 69 to 92 percent between 1998 and 2008. Gender parity improved from 83 to 98 percent from 2003 to 2008. The impact on girls, dalits, and janajati (Nepal’s lower-caste groups) children was also significant: the rate of out-of-school children dropped from 50 percent in 2004 to 15 percent in 2008 for dalits, from 42 percent to 11 percent for girls, and from 44 percent to 11 percent for janajatis.

Sources: World Bank 2009e.
Vigilantism has often provided security in the absence of effective state performance. While it may be seen initially as legitimate, it presents tremendous risks to both the state and citizens, especially in protecting universal standards of due process (often the justice is summary) or in separating petitioner, prosecutor, and judge (often a mob dynamic prevails).

Although Nigeria has had significant income from oil revenue, the country remained stuck in low per capita income and saw little by way of the development of effective institutions. Throughout the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s, corruption and non-accountable institutions remained defining features of the Nigerian political landscape. Earlier episodes of separatist conflict (in Biafra) had not resurfaced, but oil-rich areas in the south had seen civil violence, and Nigeria had also experienced sectarian violence in its eastern provinces.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, vigilantism was rampant in eastern Nigeria. In response to a rash of robberies and home invasions, residents formed vigilante groups that patrolled and guarded entire neighborhoods at night. One such group was the Bakassi Boys, who initially earned the support of politicians and the public because they reduced crime. In the words of one newspaper columnist: “I am a living witness to the fact that for three years before the year 2000, in my part of Imo State, life was made unbearable by the callous activities of armed bandits. They suddenly seemed to have so multiplied that anybody found outside his front door after dusk was risking his or her life. Then suddenly things began to happen. Well-known hoodlums who were friends of the police gradually took notice and either fled or stayed at their peril. Home was becoming haven again, and evening parties and outside engagements returned to the community. It was such a great relief. Asked thereafter to choose between the Bakassi Boys and the police, the village folks preferred the former.”

Vigilante groups are celebrated in Nigerian popular culture—pictured in movies and on calendars—as appropriate defenders of the public against criminals. Even mainstream observers of Nigerian society, including eminent political scientists like Peter Ekeh, saw the Bakassi Boys as qualitatively different from other vigilante groups. Yet, as noted by Human Rights Watch in 2002, the Bakassi Boys came to be viewed as an uncontrollable and illegal band, which, though filling a void left by a weak state, had become ruthless mercenaries who could be hired to eliminate political or commercial opponents. Beyond these accusations, the celebrated operations of the Bakassi Boys were problematic because of the lack of due process accorded presumed criminals. As one anthropologist notes: “The Bakassi Boys originated in acts of necessity undertaken in the face of terror. Noble intentions, however, have a tenuous existence in the midst of the endemic corruption, political factionalism, and electoral machinations that characterize the Nigerian political landscape. Thus Nigerians remain suspicious of the power ceded to vigilantes.”


Early results need to be compatible with, rather than undermine, long-term institution-building. The choice of results and the manner in which they are to be achieved is important because it can set directions for later institution-building. For instance, if communities are passive recipients of aid, they have fewer incentives to take responsibility for violence prevention; and if social protection is provided by external actors alone, national institutions have fewer incentives to undertake responsibilities to protect vulnerable citizens. Hence, there is a need for building coalitions for delivery that include a mixture of state and nonstate, bottom-up and top-down approaches. Such coalitions are a better underpinning for longer-term institutional transformation; in fact, some early results actively build momentum for institutional transformation, as has been the case with the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan. As countries end one episode of violence or go through an initial political transition, they remain at high risk of recurring violence. The need at this point is to create legitimate social and governmental institutions and improve prospects of economic prosperity. Chapter 5 will discuss these issues.
In the choreography of peace negotiations—from efforts to build both national support and local inclusion to the judicious use of external support—the peace process in Indonesia’s Aceh province exemplifies many of the attributes of effective conflict prevention and resolution after 30 years of suspicion and outright hostility.

**Inclusive-enough coalition**

Agreement on the parameters of the peace agreement—in the form of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed in Helsinki in August 2005—came at the end of six months of carefully mediated negotiations between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM). Both sides did their best to ensure things went smoothly. The team representing the Indonesian government was handpicked by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. In a deliberate effort to assuage GAM’s concerns about adequate representation for non-Javanese, the core team was drawn from other provinces. Learning from previous processes, the government was careful to manage communications in Jakarta and at a national level to demonstrate the benefits of the process, avoiding focusing on provincial buy-in at the expense of national support. The Finnish nongovernmental organization, Crisis Management Initiative, led by former Finland president Martti Ahtisaari, played a key role in facilitating the discussions.

The government mobilized support at the national level for peace talks by emphasizing the cost of the conflict to the national budget—in expenditures on security measures (estimated at US$2.3 billion or 21 percent of the total economic cost of the conflict) and forgone tax revenues from lower oil and gas exports—and the imperative of stability in Aceh to private investment in the country.65

**Signals for confidence-building**

The Helsinki MOU articulated the main elements of the peace settlement, signaling a genuine break with the past. Acehnese demands for greater political autonomy within a unitary Indonesian republic were clearly spelled out, along with provisions for this autonomy to be institutionalized in a new Law on the Governing of Aceh. This would give provincial and local government authority over a broad spectrum of public affairs, except in foreign affairs, external defense, national security, and monetary and fiscal matters, where the central government would retain jurisdiction. The MOU also allowed for greater Acehnese political participation, including a commitment to facilitate the establishment of Aceh-based political parties—a prerogative not granted to other provinces. Provisions were also made to hold local elections in Aceh as soon as possible.

Equally important, the MOU dealt with key security and justice concerns: reintegrating former combatants and assisting victims of conflict. Provisions included the release of political prisoners and detainees within 15 days of signing the MOU; amnesty to all who had engaged in GAM activities; and full political, economic, and social rights to all political prisoners and detainees. The Indonesian and Aceh authorities pledged reintegration support to ex-combatants in the form of farmland, employment opportunities, and social security (in the event of incapacity). GAM agreed to demobilize all 3,000 of its military troops and decommission their arms. In return, the Indonesian government agreed to withdraw “non-organic” forces, with the remaining permanent battalions composed mostly of ethnic Acehnese.66

Rights to natural resources had long been a bone of contention, and the MOU addressed them by stipulating that Aceh would retain 70 percent of revenue from all current and future hydrocarbon deposits and from other natural resources
in the province. This was a better deal than that enjoyed by other hydrocarbon-producing regions. Addressing deep-rooted fears about the rule of law and human rights, the MOU provided for the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government.

**Commitment mechanisms to lock in signals**

A key commitment mechanism was the Law on the Governing of Aceh, passed by the Indonesian Parliament in August 2006. This institutionalized many of the provisions agreed in the Helsinki MOU and serves as a framework for relations between Aceh and the central government.

A special effort went into addressing the ongoing commitment to peace and economic integration. The Aceh Peace-Reintegration Board (Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh, or BRA) was created by a governor’s decree in 2006 as the principal local agency responsible for overseeing the peace process and the economic reintegration of ex-combatants, political prisoners, and conflict victims. BRA—a provincial agency reporting to the governor of Aceh—was given a broad mandate encompassing the design, funding, and implementation of various policies and procedures related to the reintegration process.

The Aceh Monitoring Mission, created after the Helsinki MOU, is a good example of external parties monitoring stakeholders’ commitment to their promises. Comprising representatives from the EU, Norway, Switzerland, and five ASEAN countries, it was deployed to oversee the demobilization of GAM, the decommissioning of its weapons, the reintegration of GAM forces, and the removal of “non-organic” police forces and military battalions from the province. In addition, the European Commission funded the Aceh Peace Process Support Program to assist in implementing the peace agreement in four areas: election support, police reform, justice reform, and local governance reform.

**Delivering early results**

In Aceh, the government, working with external and local actors, delivered some crucial early results for peace-building. The total estimated amount of funds committed to reintegration and peace-building is Rp 9 trillion. The distribution of funds across districts is evidence of effective geographic targeting of aid. The four most heavily conflict-affected districts—Aceh Utara, Bireuen, Aceh Timur, and Pidie—received more than 50 percent of all funds. GAM members (both combatants and noncombatants) and political prisoners received the largest share of direct assistance, collectively worth almost Rp 400 billion.

These provisions helped get ex-combatants and other key target groups back into the workforce. The Aceh Reintegration and Livelihood Survey, commissioned by the World Bank, indicates that male ex-combatants are 7 percent more likely to be in full-time employment than their civilian counterparts. Most former combatants and ex-political prisoners have returned to the occupations they held prior to joining the insurgency—mainly farming and agricultural wage labor. The survey also finds that male victims of conflict are 14 percent more likely to be in full employment than male non-victims. Poverty has decreased in Aceh since the end of the conflict, more so in the conflict-affected areas than in the nonconflict-affected areas, but the province still lags behind the national average.

Aceh also shows how community-driven programs can kick-start local reconstruction and social protection. Soon after the peace agreement was signed, BRA initiated community-based reintegration assistance through the Kecamatan Development Program. Aimed exclusively at conflict victims, the program provided US$22.7 million of government money in one round of grants and operated in 1,724 villages in 2007. It focused on conflict-affected communities to help them improve living conditions through small projects. Poverty declined by 11 percent more in villages participating in the program than in those that did not. Given that almost 90 percent of funds went to purchase private goods, community-driven development (CDD) projects can be an effective mechanism for distributing one-off cash transfers in emergency situations. Survey data show that 88 percent of recipients felt that both BRA-KDP and KDP funds were spent on the most important needs.

Notes

1. Background work for this Report included review of almost 30 low- and middle-income country cases—both successful efforts to transition away from violence and those less successful—that experienced a mix of forms of stress and types of violence as identified in chapters 1 and 2. The cases varied widely in their institutional characteristics, ranging from low-capacity countries with relatively accountable institutions to higher capacity countries with weak accountability mechanisms. This work was supplemented by national and regional consultations with politicians and analysts from government and nongovernment institutions.

2. As noted in the guide to the WDR, commitment mechanisms are means of persuading stakeholders that intentions will not be reversed. This follows the common economic definition of commitment mechanisms or commitment devices. See Dixit 1980; Schelling 1960; Spence 1977.


9. According to leadership development literature, the three qualities of effective leadership include the ability to set direction, including defining and vetting a vision among relevant individuals and groups; to create alignment, including coordinating the knowledge and work of a collective in service of this broader direction/vision; and to maintain commitment to this broader direction/vision, including through the expansion of the group’s efforts to achieve collective goals, not just individual goals. For more information about leadership theories, see Northouse 2008; Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy 2005.


14. See Sapelli 2000. Other examples include Argentina, where under the Alfonsin administration, efforts to make more rapid progress in transitional justice within the security sectors were accompanied by four coup attempts, a political crisis, and the subsequent more cautious approach to reform adopted by the Menem administration. See Addison 2009; de Greiff 2010.

15. WDR team interview with former president Álvaro Uribe, 2010; WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organizations, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010.


19. WDR team consultation with government officials, representatives from civil society organizations, and security personnel in Colombia, 2010; WDR team consultation in Timor-Leste, 2010.


21. These include inter-clan pacts in Somaliland; traditional dispute resolution at a national level in Mali; the ceasefire agreement brokered by community action in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea; and the peace committees in South Africa. See also Menkhaus 2010; Bradbury 2008; Van der Graaf 2001; Dinnen, Porter, and Sage 2010; Carl and Garasu 2002.

22. Data on battle deaths in Uganda from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005; Harborn and Wallensteen 2010). Data on homicides comes from statistics based on LA County Sheriff’s Department, California Department of Justice and Los Angeles Police Department, and compiled by the Los Angeles Almanac (Thornton and others 2011).


26. Las Madres de la Plaza first appeared as a distinct group on April 30, 1977, when 14 women decided to gather near the pyramid of the Plaza de Mayo in downtown Buenos Aires and demand that the repressive military regime disclose the whereabouts of their children who were abducted by the military due to their political ideals and associations and subsequently disappeared. Initially dismissed, then ridiculed, and later brutally persecuted, the ranks of Las Madres continued to grow and received recognition internationally for their nonviolent demonstrations in a society cowed into silence where all the traditional means of public expression, dissent, and protest were forbidden. Over time, the group of mothers transformed into a political movement and became a symbol of resistance against the military dictatorship. See Navarro 2001.

27. For instance, shaping a positive and inclusive relationship between citizens and the state has been an important part of Timor-Leste’s institutional and political agenda since 2007. The government has actively worked on improving its communication and engagement capacity; a relaxation of the country’s language policy (though most young Timorese speak Bahasa and very little Portuguese, the official language policy since 2000 mandated that Portuguese would be the national language of instruction and administration. This resulted in poor functioning of the civil service, a lack of development of media, and weak communication between the state and its people) is indicative of a general shift in the government’s approach. Simultaneously, the international community started to lend more consistent support to initiatives that promote dialogue (see Von Kaltenborn-Stachau 2008).

33. See de Greiff 2010, 11: “How do transitional justice measures promote this sense of civic trust? Prosecutions can be thought to promote civic trust by reaffirming the relevance of the norms that perpetrators violated, norms that precisely turn natural persons into rights-bearers. Judicial institutions, particularly in contexts in which they have traditionally been essentially instruments of power, show their trustworthiness if they can establish that no one is above the law. An institutionalized effort to confront the past through truth-telling exercises might be seen by those who were formerly on the receiving end of violence as a good faith effort to come clean, to understand long-term patterns of socialization, and, in this sense, to initiate a new political project around norms and values that this time around are truly shared. Reparations can foster civic trust by demonstrating the seriousness with which institutions now take the violation of their rights . . . vetting can induce trust, and not just by ‘re-peopling’ institutions with new faces, but by thereby demonstrating a commitment to systemic norms governing employee hiring and retention, disciplinary oversight, prevention of cronyn, and so on.”
34. Transitional justice approaches are defined by the UN as the “full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, service justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms and individual prosecution, reparations, truth seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination thereof” UN 2004b, 4. See also Orentlicher 2004, 2005; UN General Assembly 2005a.
38. See Kanungo 2004.
40. WDR consultation with former key negotiators from the ANC Alliance and the National Party in South Africa 2010.
41. Successful social cohesion policies require recognition of language and/or cultural practice in cases where a group perceives itself systemically excluded and disrespected. In so doing, care must be taken to avoid creating further fissures or entrenching practices that curtail the civil rights of women, caste groups etc. See Easterly, Ritzen, and Woolcock 2006; Gupta 1970.
42. Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 2010, 10.
44. WDR team consultation with current and former leaders from conflict-affected countries and regions in Berlin, 2009.
45. The Política Nacional de Rehabilitación (PNR) is a program of the Presidency of the Republic aimed at the establishment of peace; national reconciliation; and the normalization of areas affected by development imbalances, weakness in the institutional presence of the state, and social conflicts. See Presidencia República de Colombia 1993.
46. See Pavanello and Othieno 2008; Baird 2010.
47. Barron 2010.
48. The literature on community-driven development in situations of fragility and conflict is extensive; see, for example, Baird 2010; Cliffe, Guggenheim, and Kostner 2003.
49. Experimental evaluations of CDD programs are rare. One example is Fearon, Macartan, and Weinstein 2009, who carried out research on the impact of a community-driven reconstruction program in 42 communities in Liberia. “A field experiment in which villages in northern Liberia were randomly assigned to receive international development assistance provides evidence that the introduction of new local-level institutions can alter patterns of social cooperation in a way that persists after the program’s conclusion. Villages exposed to a community-driven reconstruction program exhibit higher subsequent levels of social cooperation than those in the control group, as measured through a community-wide public goods game. These results are striking. They suggest that changes in community cohesion can take place over a short period of time; can occur in response to outside intervention; and can develop without fundamental changes either to the structure of economic relations or to more macro-level political processes. Random assignment of communities to treatment provides confidence in the causal nature of the relationship, and the use of behavioral outcome measures reinforces our sense that the effects are real. These findings suggest that post-conflict development aid can have a measurable impact on social cohesion” (Fearon, Macartan, and Weinstein 2009, 12). For a broader discussion of violent conflict and the transformation of social capital, see Colletta and Cullen 2000.
50. The randomized impact evaluation of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) is a multiyear study designed to quantify changes—across indicators such as economic activity, agricultural production, access to infrastructure and services, and structures and perceptions of local governance—in 250 “treatment villages” compared to those villages not participating in the NSP. The evaluation is being led by Andrew Beath of Harvard University; Professor Fotini Christia of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Shahim Kabuli of the World Bank, and Professor Ruben Enikolopov of the New Economic School, and is being implemented in conjunction with the Vulnerability Analysis Unit (VAU). It is being supported by the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) of the Government of Afghanistan. For more information, see the National Solidarity Programme website: http://www.nsp-ic.org/index.html.
51. Shura is an Arabic word for “consultation” or “council.” The word itself can describe an assembly, an organized body of participants, or an administrative body or council, or may describe a decision-making process. In Afghanistan, tribal shuras have played an important role in community security and governance since the absence of a functioning government in 1978, and continue to play a pivotal role in the provision of justice.
52. Patel and Ross 2007, 43.
56. As noted in chapter 1, the WDR team asked the Norwegian research institute Fafo to conduct surveys in seven countries and territories, involving a mix of nationally representative samples as well as subregions affected by violence. One of the survey areas focused on the entity that should be responsible for providing public goods, such as reducing unemployment and protecting national security. The survey offered respondents a range of actors (the national government, private enterprises, traditional authorities, and so forth). In answering the question: “Who should be the main body/entity responsible for allocating land?” respondents as a whole (across the seven locations—Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (North and South Kivu provinces), Mali, Sierra Leone, and the West Bank and Gaza) chose traditional leaders as the second most important entity for land allocation following national governments. In some countries (for instance, Côte d’Ivoire), the percentage of respondents who identified traditional leaders (57 per-
cent) actually surpassed those who identified the national government (30 percent). Of all the responsibilities, land allocation (22 percent) was on average the most popularly identified area for traditional leaders, followed by protecting rivers and forests (6 percent). See Bøås, Tiltnes, and Flatø 2010.

57. Protocol-based school management system is a school management system in which control is decentralized. The government provides authorization for private entities (in most cases faith-based groups) to operate schools under specific government guidelines and regulations. These guidelines cover areas such as curricula, norms regarding class size, qualification and salaries of teachers, and system of assessment. See Baird 2010.

59. Contracting out is one mechanism for accountability between policy makers and service providers and tends to work better when both parties are focused on outcomes and keep the formal processes light. Effective monitoring and evaluation of results is essential to reward good performers and improve those who are not doing a good job. See Baird 2010.

60. See, for example, Wood 2008, which shows how warring parties make use of networks at the sub-state level, and also how legacies of conflict are transmitted through these networks into political and military life, local identities and authority structures, gender roles, and political relationships. See also Peterson and Zuckerman 2010. Blattman charts the need for further micro-level research on the topic. See Blattman, forthcoming; Spear and Harborne 2010.

61. For a discussion about privatizing certain security functions in peacemaking, peacekeeping, and enforcement, see Gerson and Colletta 2002.


64. McCall 2004, 1.


67. MSR 2009.

68. This amount represents only one-seventh of the amount provided for the tsunami reconstruction effort—even though the estimated economic cost of the conflict (Rp. 107.4 trillion) was almost twice the cost of damage and losses from the December 2004 tsunami (MSR 2009).

69. MSR 2009.

70. The MSR report hypothesizes that this could be because people who were employed during the conflict were more likely to be targeted or possibly that nonvictims are more likely to be students. Moreover, it is also likely that employment-generating projects that target conflict victims may miss non-victims who also need assistance (MSR 2009).


73. Morel, Watanabe, and Wrobel 2009.

74. Barron and others 2009.