Social Protection at the Humanitarian-Development Nexus: Insights from Yemen

Yashodhan Ghorpade and Ali Ammar
Abstract: In its seventh year of conflict, facing successive shocks and a heightened risk of famine, Yemen has been termed the world’s ‘worst humanitarian crisis.’ Against this backdrop, there has been a drastic transformation of Yemen’s social protection landscape, with the disruption of several governmental SP programs, the continued functioning of some national institutions and a massive increase in humanitarian assistance programs. In this paper, we first review conceptual differences between humanitarian and development assistance along several features, also noting the blurring of sharp distinctions in reality. We then assess the institutional landscape of social assistance in Yemen, using a unique dataset we collated using administrative data from a range of humanitarian and development agencies. We compare programs in terms of scale, geographical coverage, average benefit levels, and targeting. We find that while there are important differences between humanitarian and development approaches, there are also many areas of convergence. While the total number of people covered by all humanitarian and development assistance programs exceeds the national population, we also find evidence of likely exclusion of many poor households, suggesting that there is significant scope to reduce exclusion through improved coordination. The paper concludes with a discussion of areas and specific proposals for enhanced humanitarian-development coordination in the social assistance space at the strategic, program, and delivery-systems levels.

JEL Codes: I30, I31, H53, H55, I390

Keywords: Humanitarian-Development Nexus, Cash Transfers, Humanitarian Assistance, Humanitarian Coordination, Social Protection, Social Assistance, Conflict, Fragility, Yemen
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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<td>CFN</td>
<td>Cash-for-Nutrition</td>
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<td>CFW</td>
<td>Cash-for-Work</td>
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<td>CMWG</td>
<td>Cash and Markets Working Group</td>
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<td>ECT</td>
<td>Emergency Cash Transfer Program</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GHI</td>
<td>Global Hunger Index</td>
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<td>HDP</td>
<td>Humanitarian-Development-Peace</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IPC</td>
<td>Integrated Food Security Phase Classification</td>
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<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIWCS</td>
<td>Labor-Intensive Works and Community Services</td>
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<td>MCG</td>
<td>Multipurpose Cash Grant</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>Oxford Committee for Famine Relief</td>
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<td>PMT</td>
<td>Proxy Means Test</td>
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<td>PWP</td>
<td>Public Works Project</td>
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<td>SFD</td>
<td>Social Fund for Development</td>
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<td>SMEB</td>
<td>Survival Minimum Exchange Basket</td>
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<td>SP</td>
<td>Social Protection</td>
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<td>SWF</td>
<td>Social Welfare Fund</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>YER</td>
<td>Yemeni Rial</td>
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In its seventh year of conflict, Yemen faces an unprecedented economic collapse and humanitarian crisis. Currently, over 20 million people are food insecure while a staggering 10 million people are at risk of famine. The conflict has impeded efforts to restore human development in what was already known as the poorest country in the MENA region, and jeopardized the lives and livelihoods of millions of Yemenis. As a result, access to basic services like education and healthcare have been disrupted, simultaneously depriving civilians from income and bringing the country’s human capital under strain. The situation has been further exacerbated by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and successive shocks including natural disasters, a cholera epidemic, and the desert locust crisis. The combination of these crises has led to Yemen being termed as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

The alarming level of poverty and food insecurity in Yemen called for immediate action by humanitarian and development actors to protect the growing numbers of poor and vulnerable people in the country. While, prior to the conflict, the country had expanded its social protection coverage through the provision of social assistance and pension fund benefits, the onset of conflict led to the disruption of several programs and services. This collapse of many development programs has been accompanied by an increased reliance on international humanitarian aid, leading to a drastically altered institutional landscape of social protection in the country.

In this paper, we first describe conceptual differences between humanitarian and development assistance across a range of features, drawing on an extensive review. We note that while there are important differences between these two approaches, in reality there are also many areas of convergence, and therefore much scope for greater collaboration. We then specifically assess the institutional landscape of social assistance in Yemen, based on an empirical analysis of administrative data that we collated from a wide range of humanitarian and development programs operating in Yemen.

We find that programs implemented by humanitarian and development agencies share some common features, including an increased reliance on cash as the modality of assistance, some similarities in the use of delivery systems, and a focus on target groups including the poor and food-insecure populations and IDPs. We also find important differences in terms of scale (humanitarian programs, with the exception of those implemented by the WFP, tend to be much smaller than development programs), coverage (development programs tend to serve larger numbers of households and operate across the entire country), and benefit levels (where humanitarian assistance transfer values far exceed those provided by development agencies). Importantly, we find that the total number of beneficiaries of all humanitarian and development programs put together (not accounting for overlaps between programs) is more than enough to cover the entire Yemeni population, with significant spatial variation. However, we also find evidence to suggest that many households receive benefits from multiple programs on the one hand, and several households receive no assistance whatsoever, on the other. Such exclusion can be reduced considerably with better coordination between agencies and programs, including through the harmonization of transfer values and mutually intelligible approaches to geographical and household targeting. Improved coordination can also result in (i) maximizing complementarities between programs, such that recipients of low-transfer value programs can benefit from top-ups and complementary services offered by other agencies (representing a beneficial form of program overlap), and (ii) minimizing instances of households benefitting from programs with similar objectives and large transfer values (avoidable overlaps across programs). We propose specific recommendations for improved coordination at the Strategic, Programmatic and Delivery levels.
Strategy-level coordination

- **Data Sharing for Needs Assessment**: Greater coordination on needs assessments by different agencies using commonly agreed and openly shared data sources can enable coordinated and better-informed prioritization and action for all agencies.

- **Thematic Alignment**: Given the extreme food insecurity crisis and risk of famine in Yemen at present, we propose a convergence of aims between programs on supporting food security. This may call for a prioritization of interventions that directly address the food security challenge across humanitarian and development agencies.

- **Institutional Coordination**: While inter-agency coordination is currently limited to the humanitarian agencies (through the Yemen Cash and Markets Working Group), there is scope for greater high-level engagement with a wider range of actors, including a prominent role for development institutions (national institutions as well as donor agencies) as well. Involving development agencies to play a coordinating role can provide the necessary ownership and institutional sustainability, to support post-conflict transition and long-term development.

- **Political Economy Challenges**: Humanitarian and development agencies operating in Yemen can benefit from a joint approach towards navigating challenges on the ground posed by a complicated political economy, including by adopting commonly agreed principles of engagement, establishing common ‘red lines’ and harmonizing responses to political economy risks.

- **Financing Horizon**: The differences in financing horizons of humanitarian (shorter, typically annual) and development (usually longer term) programs is an impediment to effective coordination, especially as some of the institution-building requisites for enhanced coordination require the assurance of longer-term financing. A short financing horizon also typically limits the duration of benefit receipts by households, resulting in a trade-off between the generosity of assistance and the duration of program coverage. When donors support humanitarian agencies in settings such as Yemen, a longer financing horizon can enable investments in systems required for enhanced coordination, better calibration of transfer generosity and duration of coverage to support longer-term risk management, and can also encourage development agencies to explore synergies with humanitarian actors beyond very short time periods.

Inter-program / agency coordination:

- **Harmonization of Cash Transfer Duration and Values**: There is considerable scope to achieve greater harmonization between programs with respect to transfer values, duration of transfer receipts, and targeting, especially among the larger-scale programs. This would help narrow gaps between programs, limit disparity in benefit levels between programs with similar objectives, and potentially enhance coverage as well as transfer adequacy.

- **Referrals to Other Cash/Cash-plus Programs**: Connections between programs can be established to refer beneficiaries (or even unserved applicants) of one program to assistance or services provided by another, especially where the two programs are complementary, or when individual program benefit amounts are relatively low (so that referrals can address inadequacy of cash transfers from one program through reasonable top-ups from another).

- **Targeting**: Humanitarian and development agencies can work more closely towards defining commonly agreed approaches to prioritize populations in need, focusing on the poorest and most vulnerable. Greater synergies may be realized either by the adoption of common and well-founded geographical and household
targeting approaches and criteria, or by frequent and standardized assessments of the targeting accuracy of various programs, to enable learning and improvements.

**Delivery systems coordination:**

- **National IDs:** The national ID system is the foundation for social registries and integrated beneficiary registers. It is particularly weak in Yemen due to low coverage. Expanding the coverage of national IDs among beneficiaries of all programs could offer multiple opportunities for streamlining, coordinating and inter-linking a wide range of social services and the benefits of such a system would extend far beyond a singular cash assistance program. Facilitating national ID access in such a way could be a worthwhile, low-cost investment made by all programs.

- **Beneficiary Lists and Databases:** Mutually intelligible beneficiary lists and databases can help prevent duplication/double-dipping across programs with similar objectives and offering relatively high benefit amounts (avoidable overlaps between programs), as well as provide the foundation for effective referral services and top-ups between complementary programs (beneficial overlaps between programs). The ongoing assessment of the interoperability of some humanitarian cash assistance programs could be built upon to include a wider range of actors. Another option would be to build on the national beneficiary list of the SWF program (that has data on 1.7 million households) by ensuring that other agencies can collect similar beneficiary data that can potentially be used for combining lists across agencies in the future.

- **Payments Systems:** As cash assistance programs in Yemen tend to use similar financial service providers to make payments to beneficiaries, coordinated agreements with such providers can enable smaller (especially humanitarian) agencies to benefit from terms and conditions that bigger agencies are better placed to negotiate. Convening humanitarian and development actors on payment systems can also help ensure a coordinated response to frequently encountered challenges relating to payments, including the use of mobile money.

- **Monitoring and Evaluation:** Finally, agencies can work towards sharing experience and practices in beneficiary monitoring and adopt commonly agreed measures of need and vulnerability to facilitate aggregation and comparison of program/agency-specific estimates. Another fruitful venture could be to integrate questions on the receipt of benefits from other agencies in beneficiary monitoring surveys to assess the extent of overlap between and across programs at the household level.
I. Introduction

Yemen was projected to be the most food insecure country in the world in 2020. According to the Global report on Food Crises 2020, the short-term outlook for 2020 showed that “the combined effects of conflict, macroeconomic crisis, climate-related shocks and crop pests, including fall armyworm and desert locusts, were likely to ensure that Yemen remained the world’s worst food crisis.”¹ The 2019 International Food Policy Research Institute Global Hunger Index (GHI) ranked Yemen 116 out of 117 counties.² Over five years of relentless conflict in Yemen have devastated the lives of millions of people by accentuating hunger, economic hardship, and physical and economic insecurity. An alarming 24.1 million people—over 80 percent of the population—require some kind of humanitarian or social protection support.³ Currently, over 20 million people are food insecure while a staggering 10 million people are at risk of famine.⁴ An estimated 4.3 million people have fled their homes since the start of the conflict, of which 3.3 million remain displaced.⁵ Hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition are the most pressing and overwhelming challenges faced by the country at present, at a scale that is not being fully met by national authorities and the international development and humanitarian communities.

Even prior to the conflict, Yemen was already experiencing a protracted crisis characterized by widespread poverty, low human capital, conflict, poor governance, and weak rule of law. Low investments in good quality education, health, and nutrition resulted in poor human capital acquisition. Yemen’s Human Capital Index score was calculated as 0.37, indicating that the future earnings potential of children born today in Yemen will be 63% lower than what it could have been with complete education and full health (World Bank, 2018). These long-standing development shortfalls have been further exacerbated by the conflict, a consequential and sustained economic contraction, and a series of shocks including a cholera epidemic, cyclones, floods, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the desert locust crisis. With an estimated $89 billion loss in economic output, 233,000 conflict-related deaths, and 36 percent of children without access to schools in 2019, the conflict reversed hard-won gains in development indicators by 21 years (UNDP, 2019). In addition to the direct effects of war and violence on mortality and displacement, the conflict has had significant impact on Yemen’s economic development and human capabilities through the destruction of infrastructure, contraction of employment, and disruption of programs and services.

Yemen faces an unprecedented crisis that simultaneously demands an immediate response to the looming risk of famine and heightened food insecurity, as well as addressing rapidly deteriorating development shortfalls. The need for both humanitarian and development assistance is critical in Yemen, not least as the two efforts combined still fall short of meeting the comprehensive needs in the country. It is essential to maximize the impact of humanitarian and development actions on the ground. This in turn requires an informed assessment of how best can humanitarian and development agencies complement and support each-other in a way that promotes impact, efficiency and sustainability, and achieves common goals. To that end, this paper seeks to assess the similarities and differences in humanitarian and development/social protection approaches to social (particularly cash) assistance in Yemen, with the aim of identifying areas of potential convergence and enhanced coordination.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; section II describes the institutional landscape of social assistance programs in Yemen – recognizing the increased salience of humanitarian agencies at present. Section III assesses the conceptual distinctions and similarities between humanitarian and development approaches drawing on a review of literature. Section IV presents a mapping and empirical assessment of the major humanitarian and development cash assistance programs based on original analysis of secondary (administrative) data. Section V concludes with a discussion of opportunities for enhanced coordination between humanitarian
and development cash assistance programs, relevant to Yemen at present, and possibly also to other fragile and conflict-affected settings.

II. The Social Protection Institutional Landscape in Yemen

Before the conflict, Yemen incurred large expenditures on energy subsidies and pensions, and had also expanded social assistance/social protection coverage. The largest social expenditures comprised energy subsidies, pensions, and social assistance cash transfers paid by the Social Welfare Fund (SWF). Universal energy subsidies (mainly on hydrocarbon fuels), accounting for as much as 6 percent of GDP in 2014 (a third of public expenditure) constituted the largest public transfer. Despite some reforms between 2009 and 2014, these subsides remained heavily regressive, with an estimated 77% of benefits accruing to the non-poor. Yemen has four major pensions funds (for the military, security, private, and public/mixed sectors) to cover old age, disability, death, and workplace injuries. Before the conflict, while coverage for the public sector was complete, pension coverage in the private and especially informal sectors remained very low.

Among social assistance programs, the SWF was the single largest program in the country, followed by a number of small and fragmented programs. In 2014, cash transfers under the SWF covered 1.5 million beneficiary households, representing 29.1% of the population, an increase from 12.4% in 2005. Despite its substantial coverage and improvements in targeting accuracy following the introduction of Proxy-Means Testing (PMT), the impact of the SWF was limited by the low adequacy of its transfer value, targeting errors (both of inclusion and exclusion), and the weakness of delivery systems for payments, grievance redress, and monitoring. The Cash for Work program, one of the largest operated under the Social Fund for Development (SFD) was launched in 2008 following the global food crisis, as a shock-responsive instrument to supplement the SWF program by addressing temporary (rather than chronic) poverty. Despite its adoption as a safety net program, its coverage remained relatively low (at 2% of the national and 3% of the rural population in 2014). Besides Cash for Work, the SFD also implemented a few other programs including Community and Local Development Program (including labor-intensive public works), the Cash for Nutrition program, and the Small and Micro Enterprise Development Program. Another 5 percent of households benefitted from school feeding programs. Other assistance programs with relatively small coverage include the Public Works Project (PWP) that implemented Active Labor Market Programs (ALMPs), the Agriculture and Fishery Promotion Fund, the Disability Fund (that provided cash and in-kind support), the Fund for Martyrs and the Wounded. Informal transfers were another important source of assistance to households and included remittances (11% coverage), zakat (10%), and other charitable transfers (8%). While no specific data on the pre-conflict coverage of all humanitarian assistance is available, in 2014 an estimated 2.4% of the Yemeni population received emergency in-kind food assistance.

In its seventh year of conflict, the institutional landscape of social protection in Yemen has been drastically transformed, with the disruption of several national social protection programs, and the continuation of a few national SP institutions and programs. For the majority of pensioners, payments have been interrupted as the sources of financing of pension funds (government bonds, and employees’ contributions) have been depleted and remain inaccessible. Programs such as the Disability Fund, and the Fund for Martyrs and the Wounded have ceased payments to recipients. The SWF suspended payments to beneficiaries in 2015. However, beginning in 2017, the World Bank, in partnership with UNICEF, launched the Emergency Cash Transfer (ECT) program to resume cash

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1 SWF transfers represented 4.4% of the average recipient household’s consumption expenditure, and 10% of that for recipients in the lowest expenditure decile (WB estimates using HBS 2014)
transfer payments to SWF beneficiaries under the International Development Association (IDA)-financed Emergency Crisis response Project (ECRP). While the ECT retained key features of the SWF program (including its beneficiary list and cash transfer benefit structure), it implemented some important changes in the delivery of cash transfers including the use of private banks for payments (to improve access compared to the previous system of payments through post offices), the development and use of a modern GRM, an up-to-date MIS, and frequent and close program monitoring. The SFD and PWP are among the few national institutions that have remained functional and active even during the conflict. The Cash for Work program of SFD has been harnessed to respond to the threat of growing poverty and food insecurity, including to respond to the significant increase of food insecurity during the conflict and shocks such as cyclone Mekunu in Socotra in 2018, and the desert locust crisis in 2020. The Cash for Nutrition program of the SFD has also been scaled up to address the increase in malnutrition in target districts in the country. The Public Works Project has also continued its labor-intensive public works programs across the country, despite reductions in funding over time. Both, SFD and PWP have sustained their programs through donor support, including funds from IDA.

As economic hardship has intensified over the course of the conflict, there has been a heavy reliance on humanitarian assistance. The collapse and shrinking of several government-run assistance programs in Yemen over the last 6 years has been accompanied by the growing presence of many humanitarian assistance programs, implemented by UN agencies, International and national NGOs as well as local and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs). For example, while only 2.4% of the population reported receiving emergency food assistance in 2014 (HBS 2014), the in-kind food assistance program of the WFP alone covered over 1.39 million households in 2020, roughly around 26% of the country’s population. This heavy reliance on humanitarian assistance, driven by deepening vulnerabilities, the impact of the conflict and a succession of shocks in the context of receding state assistance, has significant consequences for the institutional landscape of social assistance programs, at present, as well as in a future, post-conflict setting. Fig. 1 below shows the dramatic increase in international aid receipts by Yemen since 2015, coinciding with the beginning of the conflict.

Fig. 1. Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (Constant 2015 US$) 2008 – 2018

Source: Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, Development Co-operation Report, and International Development Statistics database. Data are available online at: stats.oecd.org

2 See Section IV for details
Finally, informal transfers are also likely to be come under increased strain, reducing their ability to assist Yemeni households. In conflict-affected settings, remittance receipts may increase as migrants abroad may seek to support the basic survival needs of their family members, while investment-focused remittances may be reduced, due to the uncertainties posed by conflict (Ghorpade, 2017). In Yemen, over 11% of the population received remittances before the conflict (HBS 2014). While no comparable surveys are available to analyze informal transfers in recent years, remittances are likely to remain very important source of financial support for households, especially among those whose other sources of income may have dried up. Owing to external factors, such as changes in foreign labor admissions policies in destination countries, difficulties in transferring money to Yemen, and more recently, COVID-19-induced economic contraction (especially in the GCC that accounts for around 90% of remittances coming into Yemen)\(^3\) and likely resultant lay-offs of Yemeni workers abroad, remittances may have come under much strain\(^4\), especially as a reliable or sustainable source of support. Widespread economic hardship within Yemen may further curtail the ability of other kinds of informal transfers – zakat, domestic remittances, and charitable donations, to extend support to poor and vulnerable households.

### III. Humanitarian v/s Development approaches to Social Protection: Conceptual Distinctions and Convergence

This section examines conceptual distinctions between humanitarian and development assistance on a range of parameters, while also recognizing the considerable areas of overlap between them, reflecting on the global literature, as well as drawing on recent experience in Yemen.

Humanitarian assistance seeks to support specific populations affected by conflict, violence, natural disasters, or other types of shocks and emergencies, to alleviate their suffering and maintain their human dignity. Social protection comprises systems, policies and programs that help individuals and societies manage risks and volatility and protect them from poverty and destitution. It includes instruments that help preserve and promote human capital, protect people against poverty, provide insurance against shocks and enable people to seek more productive employment, all of which contribute to long-term poverty reduction and human capital enhancement.

As social protection programs and policies work towards long-term goals, they are typically characterized as a ‘development’ intervention, even as some forms of social protection, notably adaptive/shock-responsive social protection, also address immediate needs arising out of emergencies and shocks (Bowen et al., 2020; EU, 2019).

While both humanitarian and development approaches contribute to saving lives and sustaining livelihoods and may rely on similar instruments and modes of delivery, a distinction between these approaches is often made, because of commonly observed differences. Table 1 below summarizes some of the differences that demarcate humanitarian from development/SP assistance, based on a review of the literature.

Table 1 characterizes the main differences between humanitarian and development/social protection approaches to assistance in somewhat stark terms, though drawing on a substantial literature review. However, in many instances these distinctions are increasingly blurred, especially in protracted and recurrent crisis situations (Bennett, 2015). In responding to a variety of crises and exigencies, humanitarian and development agencies often seek and achieve a convergence of approaches. This is especially true in conflict-affected settings where the

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\(^3\) Economist Intelligence Unit, 2020. “Yemen General Report”.


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intersection of conflict, climate and other shocks necessitates a balance between immediate and long-term humanitarian and economic needs, simultaneously reducing the potential for further conflict, enhancing the prospects for peace and realizing partnerships towards these ends. The Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus has consequently received much attention in recent years both as a concept (Lie, 2020; Fanning and Fulwood-Thomas, 2019), as well as a framework that motivates operational coordination and action (see for example the ‘New Way of Working’ described in OCHA, 2017).
Table 1: Distinctions between humanitarian and social protection assistance programs

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<tr>
<th>Discourse</th>
<th>Humanitarian Assistance Programs</th>
<th>Development/Social Protection Assistance Programs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Needs</td>
<td>Needs-based</td>
<td>Rights-based</td>
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<tr>
<td>Setting</td>
<td>Contexts where normal livelihoods have been dramatically and suddenly disrupted</td>
<td>Contexts where poverty and/or vulnerability to poverty is high or increasing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Duration of Interventions/Impact</td>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>Medium- to long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Alleviate human suffering, maintain human dignity, provide basic needs, basic social services, and labor opportunities, contribute to protecting and enhancing livelihoods</td>
<td>Protect people from poverty, provide insurance against risks, reduce inequality, promote human dignity, improve access to human capital and social services, strengthen national social protection systems, support access to labor markets and decent work, support sustainable livelihoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>Humanity, neutrality, impartiality, independence</td>
<td>Regularity, risk-sharing/management, adequacy, predictability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing</td>
<td>BI/Multilateral donors, private foundations</td>
<td>National/Sub-national government financing through taxes/other state revenues, often supported by donors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financing horizon</td>
<td>Typically, short-term, annual funding cycles</td>
<td>Longer-term, multi-year committed funding often built into national development planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing Agencies</td>
<td>Typically, non-governmental (including INGOs) or multilateral (UN agencies); Working around governments with some coordination for implementation</td>
<td>Delivered primarily through governments and state institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Target beneficiaries</td>
<td>Specific populations affected by shocks, emergencies, disasters, violence, or conflict</td>
<td>Poor and vulnerable groups in developing countries, especially the chronically poor</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Small and limited to areas affected by specific emergencies/disasters</td>
<td>Large, covering substantial segments of the poor and vulnerable population nationally</td>
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<td>Engagement with Crises</td>
<td>Crisis-response, immediate relief/rehabilitation</td>
<td>Crisis prevention, early warning, post-crisis reconstruction, resilience building</td>
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<td>Targeting methodology</td>
<td>Driven by individual program requirements and boundaries, but generally focused on shock-affected, including the newly displaced. Targeting tends to be categorical or geographical, and typically not focused only on the poor</td>
<td>Targeting by location (geographical), by indicator (proxy-means testing), community targeting, categorical targeting. Stronger emphasis on the (income- and asset-) poor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Targeting Performance</td>
<td>Humanitarian programs tend to have a higher margin of error (viz. poverty) though they may focus more closely on specific vulnerable populations (such as IDPs). Targeting performance is not typically easy to measure/assess systematically given scale, duration.</td>
<td>Relatively better targeting performance, due to program focus on the poor as well as because of stronger administrative capacity, greater coverage, availability of reliable data, and established accountability and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Benefits provided / instruments used</td>
<td>Reconstruction, rehabilitation, provision of food, water, sanitation, shelter, health services, cash transfers, or other direct assistance</td>
<td>Targeting performance routinely measured using national household surveys.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value of assistance provided</td>
<td>Typically determined by the amount of money households need to cover their basic needs/compensate specific damages. Tend to be higher than Social Safety Net programs.</td>
<td>Social assistance transfers typically tend to be lower than transfers provided by humanitarian actors. Transfer values typically represent around 10% of recipient households expenditure globally (and around 11% for Low Income Countries).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact Evaluation</td>
<td>Less common traditionally but increasing interest and application in recent years</td>
<td>Widely undertaken and studied, reporting a range of positive impacts across several dimensions of wellbeing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash Delivery Mechanism</td>
<td>Depends on the country’s financial services ecosystem and the underlying legislation. Humanitarian aid providers tend to lean towards mobile money providers, banks, or even over-the-counter cash as delivery instruments.</td>
<td>Depends on the country’s financial services ecosystem and the underlying legislation. Social assistance programs often leverage existing national delivery structures and payment mechanisms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: See endnotes 9 – 32*
Some convergence is visible in some aspects of programming by humanitarian and development actors in Yemen, even as large gaps may exist in other areas. The complete collapse of several government-run institutions and programs since the beginning of conflict has massively eroded the scope of development interventions, which has also resulted in a greater reliance on humanitarian action. Some illustrative examples of humanitarian-development convergence include the following:

- Critical national institutions such as the Yemen Social Fund for Development, the Public Works Project, and the Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Service have remained functional despite the ongoing conflict and interruption of government funding. This has been enabled in large part by their emphasis on critical humanitarian principles including neutrality, impartiality, and independence, as well as by support from international donors. At the same time their programs seek to simultaneously address short- and medium- to long-term needs and on building resilience among poor communities—priorities that align with development imperatives.

- Another example of convergence between humanitarian and development action relates to the cash transfer program operated by the Social Welfare Fund. Following the onset of conflict in 2015, the SWF suspended payments to its approximately 1.5 million beneficiary households, and to this day remains unable to operate independently. The Emergency Crisis Response Project of the World Bank supported a resumption of cash transfer payments to SWF beneficiaries by engaging UNICEF, thereby leveraging partnerships with the humanitarian sector to revive a critical national social safety net program.

- WFP currently provides in-kind food assistance to approximately 1.4 million households. While the program initially started out by providing food assistance to households for a limited duration of time, the intensifying economic and food crisis in the country has brought about a change in approach whereby households continue to receive benefits over time, and have not been taken off the beneficiary lists after the usual period of support. This approach recognizes beneficiaries’ chronic vulnerability and need for continued support, emphasizing the need for longer-term engagement, even in the case of a humanitarian assistance program.

- The World Bank – UN partnership in Yemen has been institutionalized through a Yemen HDP program that facilitates data sharing as well as operational partnerships that serve both humanitarian and development aims. Despite the suspension of the pre-conflict WB portfolio, partnerships with UN agencies have allowed the WB to address immediate and long-term needs, while engaging national institutions including SFD and PWP. These initiatives are addressing emergency needs, while also preparing for post-conflict recovery and reconstruction by establishing and enhancing SP delivery systems (UN and World Bank, 2018).

IV. Mapping the Humanitarian-Development Nexus for Social Protection Programs in Yemen

This section presents an overview of the current footprint of humanitarian and development assistance programs, focusing mainly (though not exclusively) on cash-based social assistance, over the calendar year 2020. With the aim of assessing similarities, differences, and the scope for better coordination between humanitarian and development agencies, we examine the geographical spread and concentration of various cash assistance programs, as well as other parameters of program design and performance.
1. Data and Methodology

Data for this mapping exercise was collected entirely using secondary sources. The authors requested for and obtained detailed administrative data from SFD, PWP, WFP, UNICEF, and the ICRC, in some cases supplemented by additional data available on these organizations’ respective websites. The Yemen Cash and Market Working Group shared a detailed mapping note and dataset of humanitarian cash transfer programs, which was integrated into our master dataset for the mapping exercise. Additional data on UNHCR programs were obtained from its website. Unless otherwise stated, the analysis pertains to the calendar year 2020. While we have tried to include as large a range of programs as possible and have sought to include all of the larger programs, this is by no means an exhaustive mapping of development and (especially) humanitarian programs in Yemen. Our analysis is ultimately limited by the data available following an extensive and thorough search for recent, reliable and comparable data.

Data collected include details of program coverage, geographical spread, transfer values, duration of coverage, and administrative cost estimates. Unfortunately, not all data were uniformly available for all organizations/programs, or at very disaggregated geographical levels. The analysis below presents data for parameters that are reliably available at least for most programs and organizations to enable meaningful comparisons. We are currently unable to identify duplications (i.e. if the same household receives benefits from multiple programs) as the analysis is based on program-level aggregate administrative data rather than on household surveys that can more easily and accurately reflect receipts of assistance from multiple programs for each household.

2. Scale of Program Coverage

First, we examine the number of households that were provided assistance by each program in the year 2020. Orange bars indicate development programs while the darker blue bars pertain to humanitarian programs. Fig 2 shows that the WB-UNICEF supported Emergency Cash Transfer project (that provides unconditional cash transfers to SWF beneficiaries) is the single largest social assistance program in Yemen at present, followed closely by the WFP’s In-Kind (food) assistance; each covering close to 1.4 million households. It is noteworthy that some of the WFP’s in-kind food assistance and food voucher programs are larger in terms of households covered than the programs run by national institutions, SFD and PWP. A large number of smaller humanitarian agencies cover a total of 182,000 households. As these numbers are derived from administrative data supplied by each agency separately, it does not account for overlaps, as households that simultaneously benefit from more than one program will be counted separately for each. In reality the total number of households receiving any social assistance will be less than the sum of program totals displayed in Fig 2.
3. Geographical Coverage and Concentration

We now examine the presence and concentration of humanitarian and development assistance programs, by development agency across Yemen’s 22 governorates. More disaggregate analysis (at the district and sub-district levels) are not currently possible because such disaggregate data is not available uniformly for all programs analyzed. Fig 3 shows the governorates in which each development program is operational (i.e. provided social assistance to households in 2020) and is indicated in colored shading, while fig 4 presents similar maps for humanitarian programs.

Fig. 3: Presence of development assistance programs by agency (shaded region indicates agency operational)
Fig 4: Presence of humanitarian assistance programs by agency (shaded region indicates agency operational)
Figs 3 and 4 indicate that national development programs of the SWF (now operated as the WB/UNICEF ECT program), SFD and PWP cover all governorates in the country, as do the WFP-supported programs. Other humanitarian programs however tend to operate in specific governorates, with no specific patterns of presence across the country (for example, while ADRA is heavily concentrated in Sana’a and some of the Eastern governorates, Save the Children appears to work in the East and the South. We see no clear pattern suggesting that humanitarian agencies may be focusing only on the North, or the South.

We now examine the number of beneficiaries of all programs combined by governorate. Fig 5 shows the number of total beneficiary households (not adjusted for overlaps of households across programs) by governorate, while Fig 6 examines the relative breakdown of total beneficiaries of all programs by governorate. We see that the ECT program for SWF beneficiary households, and WFP in-kind assistance tend to have the highest number of recipients in most governorates. WFP’s cash assistance program is only operational in the Southern governorates, and accounts for a considerable share of total cash assistance beneficiaries in Aden, Lahj and Shabwah.

Fig. 5: Total number of beneficiary households by governorate, program (‘000s)

*List of all other organizations provided in Annex 1.
Fig. 6: Distribution of recipient households by program, per governorate

Fig 7 shows the coverage rate of all programs, i.e. the total population of recipient households of all assistance as a share of the governorates’ population (governorate population is adjusted for IDP movements since 2015 per IOM data on IDP movements in 2020). It is striking that the coverage rate of all programs combined exceeds 100%. In other words, the combined reach of humanitarian and development programs is enough to cover the entire Yemeni population. However, as a large (though currently unmeasurable) share of households likely receives benefits from multiple programs, many households may not receive any assistance at all. The extent of duplication of households across programs cannot be estimated without a detailed, representative household survey, or integrated beneficiary databases. Equally, some types of duplication may be less concerning than others, especially when households receive benefits from complementary programs, or when the average transfer values of these programs are lower (so that duplication can enhance benefit adequacy). However, to the extent that households may simultaneously benefit from similar programs with relatively higher benefit values, duplication may represent a drain on resources that could be channeled to households that do not receive any assistance. In sum, it appears that there may be significant room to reduce the exclusion of households through better coordination among humanitarian and development agencies.

*List of all other organizations provided in Annex
We also see from Fig 7 that Marib, Hajjah and Lahj have much higher concentrations of households receiving assistance compared to the population (above 150%, but again, not accounting for multiple receipts of assistance per household and in some cases high influx of IDPs not accurately represented in population estimates). In contrast, Amanat al Asimah (Sana’a city), Hadramaut, Dhamar, Raymah, and Ibb have lower concentrations (the total number of recipient households from all programs combined is around or below 80% the total number of households in these governorates). In comparison with the (weighted) average national coverage of 103%, the concentration of beneficiaries in those governorates seem to be very low. Furthermore, trends of concentration do not appear to be markedly different between Northern and Southern governorates.

Differences in the ratio of beneficiaries covered to population between governorates allude to the simultaneous presence of overlaps of multiple programs for a group of households as well as possible exclusion of many households from several programs. There is indeed more supportive evidence on the sizeable extent of exclusion of poor and vulnerable households despite the large combined coverage of programs. For instance, as figure 9 shows, in the year 2020 between 20 and 30 percent of respondents of WFP’s monthly mVAM phone surveys reported receiving no assistance whatsoever. Additional analysis undertaken by World Bank staff indicates that 36 percent of those excluded have food consumption scores that signal food insecurity and that among the rest, a large share were very close to being food insecure. At the same time, the evidence suggesting simultaneous receipts from multiple programs by households indicates program overlaps. In instances where the different programs that a household benefits from are complementary in terms of either offering different types of assistance or assuring benefit adequacy by combining lower-generosity transfers, overlaps may be considered beneficial. In other instances, however where households benefit from multiple similar programs, or where the transfer values of each of these programs is on the higher side, overlaps represent a drain of resources as they could find alternative uses to benefit those who are currently excluded. Such overlaps represent a failure of coordination that needs to be addressed to minimize exclusion and maximize impact (we expand on this discussion in section V).
Fig. 7: Share of individuals receiving assistance (from all programs combined*) as percentage of population compared to national average, by governorate

*Includes all cash and voucher assistance and WFP in-kind support

Fig. 8: Concentration of beneficiaries as a share of population
Fig. 9. Percentage of households receiving food assistance in 2020, by month

Source: WB staff calculations using WFP mVAM Phone Surveys data for 2020

4. Targeting

Social assistance programs deploy a range and typically, a combination, of targeting methods for areas and beneficiary selection. Table 2 below summarizes the main targeting methods and criteria used by different development programs, as well as by the WFP. Owing to data unavailability we are not able to compare targeting methods used by other humanitarian programs.

Table 2: Targeting Methods and Criteria used by Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targeting Method</th>
<th>WB/UNICEF ECT</th>
<th>SFD – Cash for Work</th>
<th>SFD – Cash for Nutrition</th>
<th>PWP</th>
<th>WFP (All programs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geographical – Selection of areas of operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical – Allocation of funds/beneficiary quotas by area</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proxy-Means Test (PMT)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-targeting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certain categories excluded, esp. those in regular full-time employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition Status as assessed by survey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers hired by private sector contractors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most programs use some or the other type of geographical targeting method to identify areas of operation and/or for distribution of resource allocations, in addition to combinations of other methods. Before the conflict, the SWF, SFD and PWP operated in all governorates and districts of the country but allocated funds based on population size, poverty, and any specific needs/exigencies. The ECT program’s targeting is based on the SWF list of beneficiaries who were identified using a PMT (developed using the 2005 HBS data and applied by the SWF in 2011 before the conflict), as well as geographical quotas for allocating numbers of beneficiaries. The PMT formula includes correlates of chronic poverty including vulnerable categories. The Cash for Work program of SFD relies on self-targeting, by setting program wages below market rates to attract the genuinely poor. SFD’s Cash for Nutrition program relies on a combination of targeting criteria, including district selection based of food insecurity indices, and then selects pregnant and lactating women, and mothers of children below 5 that are either (i) diagnosed malnourished (as assessed through a community-wide anthropometric survey), or (ii) from SWF households (selected using a PMT administered by the SWF before conflict). As the number of programs for which targeting criteria are available is very limited, we cannot draw generalized lessons on differences in targeting between humanitarian and development programs. Yet it is interesting to note that even this very limited number of programs uses a wide range of targeting methods and approaches.

These targeting approaches have different dis/advantages that vary with the aims of the program and the context. Geographical targeting is commonly used in conjunction with other targeting methods, and requires up-to-date, accurate and geographically disaggregated data, to identify poorer areas or those in more acute need of assistance. Proxy Means tests have been found to be useful in enhancing targeting accuracy, especially by reducing inclusion errors in a wide range of low- and middle-income settings where formal incomes are relatively less important or are not accurately recorded. They may also be more difficult to explain to applicants, and while they improve targeting accuracy over the full range of the population distribution, there can be considerable errors of inclusion/exclusion around the eligibility cut-off. On the other hand, while categorical targeting is simple to administer and communicate (to the extent that chosen categories are well-defined), they may perform worse in terms of prioritizing the poorest as many non-poor households may qualify for categorical assistance. Community-based targeting seeks to harness local knowledge of the relative wellbeing of households and community norms relating to fairness in decisions on who should benefit from programs. However, these methods are subject to a greater degree of elite capture, which can be particularly risky in FCV settings where local elites who influence targeting decisions may be aligned with armed groups and parties to conflict. Self-targeting can work well to identify the genuinely poor as only those who are unable to find work at market rates will be interested to apply. This also means that the wages offered for self-targeted programs need to be carefully set to avoid the risk of oversubscription and the participation of the non-poor. Another limitation of self-targeting, which is used typically in public works programs, is that it is available only to work-capable individuals and their households. While we cannot compare the targeting accuracy of these different approaches given the absence of reliable and recent household survey data, it is important to note that given the overwhelming needs for assistance in Yemen, coverage and benefit adequacy are perhaps more important than targeting accuracy. However, as and when the country emerges from conflict and humanitarian assistance reduces, there would be a greater reliance on national SP systems as well as a need to prioritize the poor within a given fiscal space. This would require a new, reliable, and robust targeting system that identifies the (non)poor with good accuracy.
5. Restrictions on Use of Assistance

Assistance provided by humanitarian and development program can be restricted in use. In-kind assistance, and vouchers are more restricted in their use as households receive goods (typically food and basic consumption items) directly in-kind or can use vouchers to purchase (only these types of) items. While cash itself is fungible, cash assistance may be tied to or intended for a specific use. Where programs may seek to include such signals for the intended use of cash by beneficiaries, either by labeling the cash transfers for the intended purpose (often to meet a specific need, such as to pay for shelter or heating) or additionally monitoring expenditures. Cash payments made to WB/UNICEF ECT beneficiaries, as well as those of SFD are not restricted in their use. However, as these programs seek to target the poorest households, it is expected that recipients would use the cash to meet basic needs. Repeated Third-Party Monitoring reports of the ECT program have confirmed, for instance, that the majority of beneficiaries spend the cash transfer benefit amounts to pay for food, followed by health and debt-repayment expenses. WFP cash transfers in the South of Yemen are also unconditional and unrestricted in use. The Cash for Nutrition program labels cash assistance as intended for supporting household access to nutritious food, and is combined with information sessions on nutrition and healthcare for pregnant and lactating women and mothers of children under five. This ‘soft conditionality’ implied by the labelling of cash transfers (rather than strictly conditioning cash receipts on attendance of information sessions, or purchases of nutritious foods) has been found to have a significant impact on both, knowledge of good health and nutrition practices, and children’s nutrition outcomes (Kurdi, Ghorpade, and Ibrahim, 2018; Kurdi et al., 2018).

Among humanitarian agencies, in addition to providing unconditional (sometimes also referred to as ‘multipurpose’) cash, many provide cash transfers that are linked to or intended for specific purposes, such as shelter, WASH, winter support (mainly heating) and for accessing services. From the data available to us in this review, we are not able to assess whether or the extent to which the use of cash for these intended purposes is monitored by the implementing agency, or if any sanctions are taken in case households do not spend the cash received for the intended purpose. Given that it is unlikely that such strict monitoring and sanctions are feasible, or even warranted, in Yemen at present, the added value of nominally restricting the use of cash, instead of providing unconditional cash transfers is not immediately clear. Fig 10 below shows the distribution of humanitarian cash transfers across intended uses, in terms of the number of beneficiaries and amount spent on each intended use of cash. We see that even among humanitarian programs unrestricted cash (referred to as unconditional or multipurpose) is the most common type of cash assistance. This is followed by cash support intended for rent (likely for IDPs), winter support, and WASH. A large number of humanitarian cash transfer recipients receive ‘cash for work’, which probably refers to wages paid in cash to participants of public works programs run by humanitarian agencies.
6. Transfer Values

We now examine average monthly cash assistance values for a selection of programs in figure 11. This includes average monthly monetary value of cash transfer programs to households in the year, average monthly cash assistance provided through SFD Cash for Work, wages paid to PWP beneficiaries (through contractors) and the monetary value of in-kind and voucher assistance programs. Development programs are indicated by orange bars whereas humanitarian programs are in the darker blue shade. Some of these figures merit caution in interpretation and comparison, e.g. for recipients of wages through PWP and beneficiaries of SFD Cash for Work program, indicated amounts refer to their total earnings from participating in a program that lasts for a few months averaged over 12 months, to reflect the average monthly support provided by these programs to a recipient household in a year. On the whole, it appears that development programs tend to have lower average transfer values, and that some humanitarian programs’ transfers values may be 7 to 8 times that provided by the WB/UNICEF ECT program for SWF beneficiaries. A more detailed analysis of the transfer values for the full range of humanitarian and development cash assistance programs for which monthly average transfer values are available (49 in number, many of which are rather small in terms of coverage, shown in annex 2) confirms that the (beneficiary-weighted) mean monthly assistance value of development programs ($54) is lower than that of humanitarian programs ($71), and the combined average value of $69. Similarly, the median value for development programs ($20) is lower than that for humanitarian programs ($71), and for all programs combined ($69) – see Fig. 12. While earlier sections noted that the scale and geographical coverage of WFP are comparable to those of national institutions, when it comes to the generosity of transfer values, the WFP programs resemble other humanitarian programs that are of a much smaller scale.
Average monthly transfers to SFD CFW beneficiaries is calculated as a weighted average of households’ transfers by governorate (for 2019). Average monthly wages of PWP workers calculated as a weighted average using 2019 data by governorate, where average amount = [(total amount paid as wages / total # of working days) * (total # of working days / total number of beneficiaries)] / 12; assuming 1 participant per household.

ICRC cash value per household per month is 73,000 YER or 120 USD for 3 months. The assistance total value amounts to 219,000 YER or 360 USD. This total was divided over 12 months to obtain average monthly transfer amount per household.

Fig. 12 below shows the distribution of cash and voucher beneficiaries (humanitarian and development combined) in different ranges of the monthly average transfer values. The national average of transfer values weighted by the number of beneficiary households from all programs is $36. This is lower than the median ($44), indicating that a large number of beneficiaries (especially ECT beneficiaries) receive very low benefits, and the high benefit value programs account for very few beneficiaries.
7. Program Implementation Costs

Overhead costs were not available for most programs examined in other sections of this report. Fig. 13 below summarizes the value of overhead costs estimated as a share of the value of benefits provided to households, based on reported data (i.e. not drawing from financial accounting data). While there appear to be no major differences in the overhead costs between the development institutions/programs and the WFP’s cash and voucher assistance programs, WFP’s in-kind assistance program stands out as much higher. The large difference is likely based on the modality of assistance, as cash transfers are much more cost-effective to implement compared to in-kind assistance which involves huge logistical costs, that are likely to be especially high in Yemen. While the implementation costs of WFP cash and voucher assistance are comparable to development programs (in orange shading) this may not be the case for other humanitarian programs that operate on a scale much smaller than the WFP’s and are therefore less likely to realize the economies of scale that can help reduce the share of overheads.
Fig. 13: Program administrative costs as a share of program benefits to households

WB/UNICEF ECT costs estimated using figures in Annex 5 of WB Project Paper for the Fourth Additional Financing for ECRP

8. Discussion

The analysis of humanitarian and development assistance programs reveals several areas of convergence, as well as some important gaps. Despite the relatively stark differences described in section II, we find that these distinctions are often blurred. Below we summarize some of the main areas of convergence and gaps between humanitarian and development approaches in Yemen.

First, the combined population of beneficiary households of all programs is roughly close to 103% of the national population. This means that the current combined reach of all programs could, in theory, be sufficient to cover all Yemeni households. Yet, there are important differences across governorates and between households resulting in pockets of exclusion, along with a likely sizeable number of households simultaneously benefitting from multiple programs. While we cannot examine the extent of such exclusion or overlaps without adequate household survey data or integrated beneficiary databases with unique identifiers, this suggests that improved coordination between programs can substantially contribute to reducing exclusion.

When humanitarian agencies operate on scale, such as in the case of the WFP, they begin, and perhaps need to acquire design and implementation features that resemble more typical social safety net programs. This is especially true in terms of the scale, duration of coverage, and geographical presence of WFP programs.

Even among the smaller humanitarian agencies that we are able to study and that do not have a countrywide presence (unlike national organizations and programs, or the WFP), we do not observe a pronounced tendency to work exclusively in either the North or the South of the country. This potentially reflects the need for humanitarian agencies to maintain political neutrality and balance, even when the scales of their programs do not permit nationwide coverage. Equally, principles of neutrality, impartiality
and independence are critical to the ability of development agencies to engage with all actors on the ground to implement their programs in the current setting. The lack of systematic disaggregated (district- or sub-district-level) data on beneficiary coverage limits our ability to analyze heterogeneities in humanitarian/development program presence due to conflict.38

Cash remains a common modality of payment across development and humanitarian agencies, and agencies can potentially benefit from greater coordination and experience-sharing in the rollout of cash-based support. Humanitarian agencies appear to have a slightly wider array of assistance modalities including vouchers and in-kind assistance, that are not currently used in development programs.

Different agencies rely of different combinations of targeting approaches, typically including some form of geographical selection or prioritization. While an assessment of the targeting performance of different programs is not possible without representative survey data, such assessments may be required in the future as humanitarian assistance may be reduced in a post-conflict setting, and there would be a need to develop robust targeting systems to prioritize the poor.

Humanitarian programs tend to have significantly higher transfer values (average value of monthly assistance to recipient households) than social safety net programs. Although even the existing social safety net/development assistance programs are also financed by international donors, benefit levels are more in line with those under government financing (pre-conflict). This divergence raises important questions about the long-term sustainability of humanitarian assistance, especially in an immediate post-conflict setting on the one hand, and the relatively lower level of transfer adequacy (given the worsening humanitarian situation and growing needs for assistance) of development programs on the other.

From a partial analysis of implementation costs of development partners and the WFP, it appears that these costs depend a lot on the modality of support (cash v/s in-kind), where cash transfers are much more cost-effective. However, in the absence of data on implementation costs for humanitarian agencies (other than WFP), we cannot compare implementation costs between humanitarian and development programs.

While a systematic analysis of the duration of assistance is not available for all programs due to data gaps, some examples indicate convergence of approaches. The WFP, which started out by providing food assistance to households for a limited duration of time, has adapted its approach over the course of the conflict whereby households continue to receive benefits over time and constitute a more permanent beneficiary list for the WFP. In contrast, the Cash for Work and Cash for Nutrition programs of the SFD provide safety net assistance for limited durations of time to beneficiary households to address temporary needs associated with employment shortfalls and vulnerability to malnutrition, respectively. This highlights social safety nets’ deliberate choice of limited duration support to respond to anticipated shocks and periods of vulnerability.

V. Opportunities for Enhanced Humanitarian-Development Coordination

As the conflict in Yemen enters its seventh year, with sustained economic contraction, extremely high levels of food insecurity, and continued violence and insecurity, long-term development is threatened. According to a 2019 study by the UNDP, the conflict in Yemen would have reversed development gains by
21 years – posing an incalculable damage to the country’s long-term economic potential, even after the end of conflict (UNDP, 2019). That the conflict and economic situation have only worsened further since then underlines the need to contain, as much as possible, the long-term consequences of the conflict. Humanitarian efforts alone may not be able to address these development challenges. Equally, the implications of conflict on the absence or non-functionality of government include the insufficiency of a typical ‘development-only’ approach; as the neutrality, independence, on-ground functioning, and operational agility, that are integral to humanitarian approaches, will remain critical for the years to come, including to support successful post-conflict recovery and reconstruction.

The considerable extent of exclusion of households (including food insecure households) from any type of assistance, even as the total number of people covered by all programs exceeds the national population indicates a failure of coordination. Improved coordination can also result in (i) maximizing complementarities between programs, such that recipients of low-transfer value programs can benefit from top-ups and complementary services offered by other agencies (representing a beneficial form of program overlap – such as with the ECT and the SFD’s Cash for Nutrition top-ups offered to ECT recipient households), and (ii) minimizing instances of households benefitting from programs with similar objectives are large transfer values (avoidable overlaps across programs), which in turn can free up resources for expanding coverage and reducing exclusion. Table 3 below illustrates hypothetical examples of five different kinds of combinations (A-E) of benefit receipts by a household, to distinguish cases of complete exclusion, no program overlaps with in/adequate benefit receipts, beneficial program overlap, and avoidable program overlap, as well as suggesting possible remedial action for maximizing impact.

Table 3. Alternate (hypothetical) schemes of program receipts by a household, and action for maximizing impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit Receipt Combination</th>
<th>Prog 1: Low Transfer Value CT</th>
<th>Prog 2: Nutrition-Sensitive Cash Top-Up</th>
<th>Prog 3: High Transfer Value CT</th>
<th>Prog 4: Moderate In-Kind Food Assistance</th>
<th>Benefit Overlap Characterization</th>
<th>Actions for Maximizing Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Avoidable Overlap</td>
<td>Attempt to reduce such instances through better targeting, ID-based registries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Beneficial Overlap</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No overlap, transfer adequate</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No overlap, but transfer inadequate</td>
<td>Refer to complementary programs (2 or 4) for top-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Attempt to identify such households and include in suitable program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There have been some important initiatives to enhance humanitarian-development dialogue and coordination viz. cash transfer programs in recent years, led, among others by the country-level UN Cash and Markets Working Group (CMWG). Current efforts have focused on specific activities such as a review of the Survival Minimum Exchange Basket (SMEB) within the CMWG, greater exchange of information on cash transfer beneficiary lists (coordinated by UN OCHA), and an assessment of the interoperability of
beneficiary databases between UN agencies (Nimkar, 2021). While these nascent initiatives are very promising, a lot more needs to be done to synergize efforts across humanitarian and development agencies operating in Yemen, especially in terms of widening the range of partners and stakeholders to include development agencies and national institutions and evolving effective coordination mechanisms. Such broad-based coordination can help maximize reach and impact and jointly address and resolve common challenges. Based on our review of cash assistance programs and institutions, as well as recent studies and reports on the HDP nexus in Yemen (EU, 2019; McLean, 2020a and b; Nimkar, 2021; Birchall, 2020; Goodman et al., 2019a and b; CMWG, 2017; Al-Ahmadi and de Silva, 2018), we identify necessary and promising avenues for enhanced coordination between humanitarian and development actors. This (non-exhaustive) list of opportunities for convergence could enable humanitarian and development agencies to benefit from each-other’s approaches and experience, and where useful, adapt and align operating modalities and program parameters for maximizing impact. We examine areas for enhanced coordination at three levels: the strategic (macro, or high-level), inter-program/agency-level (meso), and at the delivery systems (micro)-level, as depicted in Fig. 14. In addition to informing immediate priorities in Yemen, these avenues may be relevant to a range of other FCV settings.

Fig 14: Opportunities for Enhanced Humanitarian-Development Coordination

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<td>Data Sharing for Needs Assessment</td>
<td>Thematic Alignment</td>
<td>Institutional Coordination</td>
<td>Political Economy Challenges</td>
<td>Financing Horizon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonly-agreed and openly shared data resources for coordinated and better-informed prioritization/action</td>
<td>Prioritize extreme food insecurity and famine</td>
<td>Ensure a greater role for national institutions include development agencies, donors in coordination forums currently restricted to humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>Evolve jointly agreed ‘red lines’. Develop a common approach to resolving PE challenges (access, engagement with authorities, payment of incentives)</td>
<td>Encourage humanitarian donors to adopt longer-term financing horizons that can support systems required for enhanced coordination</td>
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| INTER-PROGRAM/ AGENCY COORDINATION                                                       |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| Harmonization of Cash Transfer Values                                                     | Duration of Transfer Receipts | Referrals to Other Cash/Cash-plus programs | Targeting |
| Agree on a range for per-capita transfer value to reduce disparities in benefit levels    | Assess suitability of short-term duration of program; Revisit program parameters, while balancing adequacy, coverage | Provide referrals to other agencies/service providers for top-ups, cash-plus services, for greater impact | Evolve common and well-founded targeting approaches |

| DELIVERY SYSTEMS COORDINATION                                                            |                         |                         |                         |                         |
| National IDs                                                                             | Beneficiary Lists & Databases | Payment Systems     | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| Incentivize and facilitate beneficiary access to national ID cards/numbers                 | Integrate beneficiary lists and databases to improve coordination/referral and reduce duplication across programs | Coordinate agreements with financial service providers | Share their experience and practices in beneficiary monitoring |

|                         |                         |                         |                         |                         |

**Strategy-level Coordination**

**Data Sharing for Needs Assessment:** In the absence of recent, representative, and reliable national survey data, agencies adopt different and often uncoordinated approaches to determining the extent and spatial concentration of assistance needs. Greater coordination on needs assessments by different agencies using commonly agreed and openly shared data sources (such as phone/faceto-face household surveys, food prices and food insecurity assessments/maps, data on displaced populations, natural disaster incidence maps) can enable coordinated and better-informed prioritization and action for all agencies.
Thematic Alignment: As the conflict in Yemen continues, threats to households’ food security and survival are likely to intensify. As sources of domestic and international financing for assistance are further strained, some very tough decisions regarding the prioritization of areas of support may need to be taken. While cash assistance is likely to remain very relevant in such circumstances (as cash allows households flexibility to address their most pressing needs), programs must converge in terms of their objectives to provide the greatest possible support against the risk of extreme food insecurity and famine, which is likely to remain high for the foreseeable future.

Institutional Coordination: While there have been some efforts in recent years to achieve better coordination between humanitarian actors, primarily through activities of the CMWG, these have remained confined mostly to humanitarian actors, and more commonly, among UN agencies. Greater coordination can potentially enable a well-defined division of geographical areas and demographic groups for coverage between agencies, as well as for aligning other program parameters. Realizing the full potential of the HDP nexus would require greater high-level engagement with a wider range of actors, including a prominent role for independent, neutral, and effective national institutions such as the SFD and PWP, as well as donor agencies. While such coordination would, in typical non-FCV contexts, be performed by the government, in FCV settings there is a need to evolve appropriate coordination mechanisms that can leverage the ownership and institutional sustainability offered by credible national institutions, while strengthening them to support post-conflict transition and long-term development.

Political Economy Challenges: Humanitarian and development agencies operating in Yemen can benefit immensely from a joint approach towards navigating challenges on the ground posed by a complicated political economy. This may include jointly evolved and agreed ‘red lines’ (i.e. non-negotiables with a range of authorities), as well as norms and approaches to commonly faced questions such as the payment of incentives to public sector staff for performing certain (project-specific) functions, negotiating physical access to certain areas, and on the extent of oversight by/reporting to authorities in program design, implementation, monitoring and assessment. A commonly evolved and strictly enforced approach to some of the frequently encountered operational challenges could reduce the space for negotiation when undue concessions may be demanded by authorities, and secure core principles of engagement across humanitarian and development agencies.

Financing Horizon: The differences in financing horizons of humanitarian (shorter, typically annual) and development (usually longer term) programs is an impediment to effective coordination, especially as some of the institution-building requisites for enhanced coordination (such as national ID expansion, social registries, improved payments mechanisms) require the assurance of longer-term financing. While there is a growing recognition that many humanitarian agencies remain involved in protracted or recurrent crisis situations for a long period of time (Spiegel, 2017), such engagement is typically built on successive rounds of short-term, often annual financing (Bennett, 2015), which limits the scope of coordination between agencies, and therefore also the ability of humanitarian action to also contribute to long-term institution-building and development. A short financing horizon also typically limits the duration of benefit receipts by households (with the WFP program being an exception), resulting in a trade-off between the generosity of assistance (which tends to be higher in humanitarian programs) and the duration of program coverage (typically longer in development programs). In the context of continuing conflict and successive shocks, the sustained receipts of moderate benefit amounts may be preferable to a short duration of receipts of relatively generous benefits, to enable better risk management and coping. However, a short financing horizon may make it difficult to assure a greater
duration of program coverage. When donors support humanitarian agencies in settings such as Yemen, a longer financing horizon can enable investments in systems required for enhanced coordination and can also encourage development agencies to explore synergies with humanitarian actors beyond immediate actions.

Inter-Program/Agency Coordination

Harmonization of Cash Transfer Values: This review has demonstrated the wide range of average cash transfer values across agencies, noting a sharp difference between programs. While programs vary in terms of their objectives and mandates, and benefit values must respond to those objectives, a wide dispersion of benefit levels across programs and agencies limits coverage on the one hand (as more households can potentially be covered if benefit amounts are reduced), and adequacy on the other (as increasing benefit amounts could potentially improve welfare among recipient households). Some of the observed disparity in transfer values may be attributable to the different mandates informing humanitarian and development assistance. Yet, as the conflict in Yemen continues, distinctions between humanitarian and development mandates may become blurred and humanitarian programs may need to engage more centrally with considerations of the sustainability of these transfer values, and the exclusion that can be addressed by rationalizing benefit levels. Equally, development institutions may need to assess the adequacy of their program benefits in line with the heightened needs. While a complete homogenization of benefit values is neither fully possible nor necessarily warranted, establishing a well-founded and broadly agreed range for the value of per-capita/per-household assistance may help reduce the disparities in benefit levels. Such harmonization could also help improve the perceptions of inclusion errors as the perceived severity of exclusion may be lower if those who are seen to benefit unfairly, do so to a lesser extent in absolute monetary terms (if benefit amounts are scaled down). Harmonization would also enable greater horizontal equity between programs.

Duration of Transfer Receipts: While many humanitarian programs may support households for a limited duration of time, typically to enable them to tide over immediate needs rising out of a specific shock, the long duration of the conflict in Yemen should compel an assessment of whether this approach is still suitable for each program, simultaneously considering how program design may need to be changed to provide benefits over a longer duration of time. This consideration will have to be informed also by critical decisions on the average benefit size, intended coverage, and the program planning and financing horizon.

Referrals to Other Cash/Cash-plus Programs: Connections between programs can be established to refer beneficiaries (or even unserved applicants) of one program to assistance or services provided by another. This could be applied in case the program to which a beneficiary has applied is not able to provide the kind of assistance needed (either due to program saturation or due to a different kind of assistance required by the applicant than what the agency can provide) but can refer the applicant to another agency working in the same area. Another example could be if a top-up or add-on service is needed, in addition to the basic package provided by the agency, on account of specific needs. These referrals can be made to other cash assistance programs, as well as to a range of other social services. For instance, the Cash for Nutrition program of the SFD screens households for malnutrition and refers cases of Severe or Moderate Acute Malnutrition (SAM/MAM) to health services so they can access the necessary treatment.

Targeting: Humanitarian and development agencies can work more closely towards defining commonly agreed approaches to prioritize populations in need, focusing on the poorest and most vulnerable in a setting where long-term development is likely to be reversed as an economic consequence of conflict. This need not necessarily mean a common targeting methodology or criteria for all programs. At a
practical level, greater synergies may be realized either by the adoption of common and well-founded geographical and household targeting approaches and criteria, or by frequent and standardized assessments of the targeting accuracy of various programs, so that better performing targeting approaches/criteria could be adopted by relatively worse targeted programs.

**Delivery Systems Coordination**

**National IDs:** The national ID system is the foundation for social registries and integrated beneficiary registers. As of 2018, only 50% of the adult population has a national ID,\(^3\) which is among the lowest in the world. While different programs tend to use their own unique IDs for their own beneficiaries, a common (national) ID is critical for coordination across programs. While there have been some logistical challenges in obtaining physical ID cards, the issuance of unique national ID numbers has continued. This can be leveraged by humanitarian and development agencies by providing beneficiaries support in obtaining national IDs in case they don’t already have them, to expand ID coverage and make interlinkages between programs easier. For example, in recent years the Social Fund for Development has worked closely with relevant authorities for obtaining national IDs for those beneficiaries that do not have them. Facilitating national ID access in such a way could be a worthwhile, low-cost investment made by all programs. Expanding the coverage of national IDs could offer multiple opportunities for streamlining, coordinating and inter-linking a wide range of social services and the benefits of such a system would extend far beyond a singular cash assistance program. Enhanced national ID coverage can enable better delivery of health and education services, labor market programs, as well as any future humanitarian programs.

**Beneficiary Lists and Databases:** Integrated beneficiary lists and databases can help prevent duplication/double-dipping across similar programs, as well as provide the foundation for effective referral services and complementary cash top-ups between programs. Overlaps between programs may be useful in cases of complementary programs (whether cash or in-kind, or referrals to services), especially when households benefit from multiple, lower benefit value programs (to ensure higher adequacy of benefits overall). In contrast, households receiving benefits from similar programs that offer higher value benefits may represent a form of duplication that could be avoided in the interest of expanding coverage. While coordination between programs would require considerable effort and investments, a notable beginning has been made with the ongoing assessment of the interoperability of some humanitarian cash assistance programs. This initiative could be expanded to include a wider range of actors. Another option would be to build on the national beneficiary list of the SWF program (that has data on 1.7 million households) by ensuring that other agencies can collect similar beneficiary data that can potentially be used for combining lists across agencies in the future. Important challenges to achieving fully integrated beneficiary databases pertain to the safety and security of beneficiary data, data privacy concerns, and the foundational requirements for integrated beneficiary databases, such as the extensive coverage of national IDs, as described above.

**Payments Systems:** Cash assistance programs in Yemen tend to use similar financial service providers (typically large microfinance banks) to make payments to beneficiaries. Coordinated agreements with such providers can enable smaller (especially humanitarian) agencies to benefit from terms and conditions that bigger agencies are better placed to negotiate. Convening humanitarian and development actors on payment systems can also help ensure a coordinated response to recent challenges including liquidity challenges, differences in currency notes and exchange rates between the North and the South, strikes by the money exchangers association etc. Such coordination can also be used to work jointly towards
overcoming existing challenges to interoperability between financial service providers and the use of mobile money/e-wallets for cash transfers.

**Monitoring and Evaluation:** Finally, agencies can work towards sharing experience and practices in beneficiary monitoring, and adopt commonly agreed measures of need and vulnerability (including immediate humanitarian needs as well as key development indicators), including food and income insecurity/insufficiency to facilitate aggregation and comparison of program/agency-specific estimates. Another fruitful venture could be to integrate questions on the receipt of benefits from other agencies in beneficiary monitoring surveys to assess the extent of overlap between and across programs at the household level, which is currently not possible, given the lack of detailed household survey data since the beginning of conflict. While humanitarian and development agencies may be required to conduct their own monitoring (both routine project monitoring and Third Party Monitoring, TPM) for reporting and fiduciary purposes, there is considerable scope for alignment in terms of a minimum common list of indicators to track, as well as for sharing data and lessons learned through monitoring and evaluation.
References


Annex 1: List of Programs/ Organizations Reviewed

Abs Development Organization
Action Contre La Faim (Action Against Hunger) - France
Adventist Development and Relief Agency ADRA
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
Al Maroof Development Association
Alaman Organization for Blind Women Care
Al-awn Foundation for Development
Al-Raeeeda Foundation for Human Development
Altwasul for Human Development
Angela for Development and Humanitarian Response
Bena Charity for Humanitarian Development
Building Foundation for Development
Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere CARE
Charitable Society for Social Welfare
Direct Aid
Danish Refugee Council DRC
Empower Foundation for Development & Humanitarian Response
Food and Agriculture Organization FAO
Generations Without Qat
Global Communities
Human Relief Foundation
International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC
International Organization for Migration
International Rescue Committee
International Training and Development Center
INTERSOS
Islamic Relief - Yemen
Khadija Foundation for Development
Life Makers Meeting Place Organization
Ma’akum Development Foundation
Mayar Foundation for Development
Mercy Corps
Millenium Development Foundation
Mozn Foundation
NAHD Developmental Foundation
Nahda Makers Organization
National Foundation for Development and Human Response
Norwegian Refugee Council NRC
Orphan's Development Foundation (O.D.F)
Oxford Committee for Famine Relief OXFAM
Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale
Pure Hands
Public Works Project Labor-Intensive Works & Community Services
Qatar Red Crescent Society
Raeduun for Sustainable Development
Rawabi Radfan Foundation
Relief and Development Peer Foundation
Relief International
Resality Foundation
Rofqa for Humanitarian Development
Sama Al Yemen Development Foundation
Save the Children
SECOUFS ISLAMIQUE FRANCE
Selah Foundation for Development
Social Fund for Development SFD - Cash for Work Program
Social Fund for Development SFD - Cash for Nutrition Program
Smile Organization for Releif and Development
Solidarities International
SOUL for Development
Steps Foundation for Civil Development
United Nations Development Programme UNDP
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR
United Nations Children’s Fund UNICEF
United Nations Population Fund
War Child
World Bank/UNICEF - Emergency Cash Transfer Program
World Food Programme - Cash Assistance Program
World Food Programme - Food Vouchers Program
World Food Programme - In-Kind Assistance Program
Yemeni General Union of Sociologists, Social Workers and Psychologists
Yemen Aid
Yemen Food Bank
Yemen Red Crescent Society
ZOA International
Annex 2: Additional Figures

Figure A1: Number of households covered by all organizations in Yemen, by governorate
Figure A2: Number of individual beneficiaries by program
Figure A3: Number of beneficiary households by organization
Figure A4: Assistance amount per organization (USD)
Fig A5: Geographical equity in coverage across governorates (viz. total population)
(Governorate share of total beneficiaries in Yemen *minus* governorate share of population)
Fig A6: Geographical equity in coverage across governorates (viz. food-insecure population)
(Governorate share of total beneficiaries in Yemen minus governorate share of IPC 3+ population)

* Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), definitions:

Phase 3: Crisis - Households either have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.

Phase 4: Emergency - Households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.

Phase 5: Catastrophe/Famine - Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality)
Endnotes

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31 Bastagli et al. (2017)
32 Harvey et al. (2010)
33 that had until then worked on a range of humanitarian projects in Yemen
34 Data from the WFP was received in the first half of 2020, for their regular list of beneficiaries that are assisted every month. This may not reflect the latest available information on WFP’s beneficiary households
35 Data were tabulated, aggregated and analyzes using STATA and MS Excel; maps were generated using STATA and Tableau software
36 A similar tabulation by implementing agency (rather than program is presented in Annex 1).
37 including ECT, Cash for Work – SFD, Cash for Nutrition -SFD and PWP
38 See for instance Ghorpade (2020) that shows how conflict reduces access to cash transfers following flooding in Pakistan.
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<td>The Polish NDC Scheme: Success in the Face of Adversity</td>
<td>Sonia Buchholtz, Agnieszka Chłoń-Domińczak, and Marek Góra</td>
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1903 The Italian NDC Scheme: Evolution and Remaining Potholes
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ABSTRACT

In its seventh year of conflict, facing successive shocks and a heightened risk of famine, Yemen has been termed the world’s ‘worst humanitarian crisis.’ Against this backdrop, there has been a drastic transformation of Yemen’s social protection landscape, with the disruption of several governmental SP programs, the continued functioning of some national institutions and a massive increase in humanitarian assistance programs. In this paper, we first review conceptual differences between humanitarian and development assistance along several features, also noting the blurring of sharp distinctions in reality. We then assess the institutional landscape of social assistance in Yemen, using a unique dataset we collated using administrative data from a range of humanitarian and development agencies. We compare programs in terms of scale, geographical coverage, average benefit levels, and targeting. We find that while there are important differences between humanitarian and development approaches, there are also many areas of convergence. While the total number of people covered by all humanitarian and development assistance programs exceeds the national population, we also find evidence of likely exclusion of many poor households, suggesting that there is significant scope to reduce exclusion through improved coordination. The paper concludes with a discussion of areas and specific proposals for enhanced humanitarian-development coordination in the social assistance space at the strategic, program, and delivery-systems levels.

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