Report No. 46110-UG Uganda Post-Conflict Land Policy and Administration Options The Case of Northern Uganda May 2009 Document of the World Bank TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .........................................................................................................i A. Introduction.........................................................................................................i B. Findings...............................................................................................................i C. Recommendations............................................................................................ iii I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................1 A. Background ........................................................................................................1 B. Methodology ......................................................................................................3 C. Respondents' Demography................................................................................6 II. KEY FINDINGS .......................................................................................................7 A. The IDP Return Process.....................................................................................7 B. Tenure Security..................................................................................................8 C. Public Knowledge on Land Rights ..................................................................12 D. Land Conflicts and Disputes............................................................................13 E. Land Dispute Resolution..................................................................................15 F. Claims and Compensation ...............................................................................18 G. Post ­Conflict Vulnerable Group Issues..........................................................20 H. Land Transactions............................................................................................20 I. Status and Performance of Land Administration Institutions..........................21 III.EMERGING ISSUES AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS ..............................24 J. The Context of IDP return ...............................................................................24 K. Tenure Security................................................................................................25 L. Implications on the Policy Framework ............................................................29 M. Implications for the Legal Framework.............................................................30 N. Implications on the Institutional Framework...................................................33 O. Implications on PRDP......................................................................................36 P. Recommended Areas FOR IMMEDIATE Actions .........................................36 ANNEX 1: SURVEY RESULTS ..........................................................................III-38 LAND DISPUTES AND CLAIMS ..........................................................................62 LAND TRANSACTIONS ........................................................................................81 LAND ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTIONS........................................................84 ANNEX 2: TYPOLOGY OF LAND DISPUTES IN AMURU DISTRICT.............91 ANNEX 3: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE FORMALIZATION OF TRADITIONAL LAND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS AND CODIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAND RIGHTS...........................................................................92 REFERENCES..............................................................................................................94 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Study Sites in Lango Region ................................................................................ 4 Table 2: Study Sites in Acholi Region................................................................................ 5 Table 3: The Changing Aspects of Customary Tenure in Lango and Acholi Regions................................................................................................................................ 9 Table 4: Threats to IDP Land on Return and Resettlement .............................................. 11 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Factors for Choice of Dispute Resolution Forum/Institution............................ 17 Figure 2: Status of Land Cases Handled at the Lira Circuit Tribunal, Lango Region...... 18 Figure 3: Applications for Land Titles Received and Approved at Gulu and Lira Land Offices...................................................................................................................... 22 Final Report: _____________________________________________________________________ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The study on "Uganda Post Conflict Land Policy and Administration Options - The Case of Northern Uganda" was undertaken, between 2007 and 2008, by a team from the World Bank and experts from a Uganda consultancy firm, Associates in Development. The World Bank Team comprised Wilson Onyang Odwongo (Task Team Leader and Rural Development Specialist, AFTAR), Frank Fulgence Byamugisha (Operations Advisor, AFTAR), Gautam Madhur (Lead Economist, AFTAR), Kees Kingma (Sr. Social Development Specialist, (AFTCS), Suleiman Namara (Sr. Social Development Specialist (AFTH1), Mary Bitekerezo (Sr. Social Development Specialist, AFTCS), Meseret Kebede (Program Assistant, AFTAR) and Harriet Kiwanuka (Program Assistant, AFMUG). The experts from Associates in Development included Margaret M. Rugadya (Lead Consultant and Development Sociologist), Eddie Nsamba Gayiiya (Land Economist/Valuer), and Herbert Kamusiime (Agricultural Researcher). Rexford Ahene (Senior Technical Advisor, MLHUD), and Richard Oput (Coordinator, Land Tenure Reform Project, MLHUD) worked closely on the study with the Bank team and Associates in Development consultants. They also assisted in compiling the feedback from MLHUD on the study. Malcolm Childress (Sr. Land Administration Specialist, LCSAR), Klaus Deininger (Lead Economist, DECRG), and Bernard Harborne (Lead Specialist, AFTCS) served as peer reviewers. Stephen Mink (Lead Economist, AFTSN) provided advice and comments throughout the study and during the preparation of the report. John McIntire (Country Director, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi), (Country Manager, Uganda), Karen Mcconnell Brooks (Sector Manager, AFTAR), Christine Cornelius (Program Coordinator, AFTAR) supported the study and ensured that resources were available for its implementation. The team would also like to acknowledge the support provided for the study by Kundhavi Kadiresan (Country Manager, Uganda) when she joined the Country Office in 2008. Special gratitude goes to the various Development Partner institutions, UN agencies, NGOs and the management of various projects operating in Northern Uganda for their support and cooperation with the team during the execution of the study. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A. INTRODUCTION 1. This is the second part of land studies on Northern Uganda designed to inform the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). The PRDP is a comprehensive program prepared by the Government of Uganda (GoU), with the support of the international community, for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Northern Uganda following over two decades of civil war and unrest in this part of the country. The studies were also designed to provide input into the National Land Policy (NLP) being prepared through a consultative process. This second part of the study, undertaken during the second half of 2007 in Lango and Acholi regions, builds on the first phase conducted in 2006 in the Teso region where there had been shorter periods of conflict and internal displacement. This second study has been designed to present a more quantitative analysis of trends on disputes and claims on land before displacement, during displacement and on return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the greater conflict areas of Acholi and Lango regions. 2. The key findings of the Teso study were: (a) there was a high level of distrust about the Central Government's intentions towards land; (b) customary tenure had undergone evolution in response to changing circumstances but was still seen locally as legitimate; (c) there were few land disputes contrary to what was anticipated before the study; (d) the statutory and customary institutional framework for land administration and justice had been severely weakened; and (e) vulnerable groups such as women and children had been marginalized during the return process. However, Teso has been one of the more secure regions during the northern conflict and had a much shorter period of displacement of its rural population. It was, therefore, adjudged not to provide a good standard for the rest of Northern Uganda and the present study was undertaken specifically for Lango and Acholi to provide better in sight into the main conflict areas of Northern Uganda. B. FINDINGS 3. IDP Return. The return from IDP camps to original homes was progressing with varied results tied to the length of time spent in the camps. This ranged from an average of 5 years to over 15 years in camps for the IDPs of Lango and Acholi. The return in Lango region was advanced and approximately 92 percent of the IDP population had already returned home. In Acholi region the return was still very low; about 5 percent at the time of survey. 4. Tenure Security. The study found about 85 percent of the respondents had experienced threats to tenure security and 59 percent felt these threats were significant. There was a close relationship between land conflicts/disputes and tenure insecurity. Land disputes cases had risen from 12.8 percent of total disputes at displacement to 15.5 percent i during displacement and 16.4 percent on return (or post conflict). It was anticipated that the incidence would rise further as more IDPs continue to return in the Acholi sub-region. 5. Public Knowledge on Land Issues and Rights. The study found misgivings about Central Government's intentions towards land. Up to 23 percent of the respondents felt that the government, the army and rich people had taken too much interest in their land without clearly declaring their motives or intentions, and this presented a serious threat to their tenure security. This perception was higher in Acholi region at 48 percent of their respondents than in Lango where it was at 44 percent of their corresponding respondents. A major factor contributing to increased tension was lack of effective communication to the IDPs on land matters from the responsible authorities. An aggregate of 90 percent of the survey respondents had no knowledge of the 1998 Land Act, Cap. 227 (LA) which is the main substantive land law. The survey showed that less than 15% of the population of every district surveyed was awareness of or had any knowledge of the LA. 6. Land Conflicts and Disputes. Disputes mainly occurred on land abandoned upon displacement, which on return had a dispute prevalence rate of 65 percent and predominantly on inherited land (71 percent) and land given as gifts (17 percent). Respondents who had returned attached very high value to land. They were moving to individualize what was previously perceived to be communal land while at the same time defending what had earlier been allotted to them for access and use by members of the community. The most prevalent disputes were boundary related with the overall average rate of 23 percent of all disputes, but having a high rate of 28 percent before displacement, decreasing to 17 percent during displacement and steadily rising to 25 percent as return commenced (at time of study). Pursuit of land by business speculators and grabbers also caused tension particularly in Acholi. 7. Land Administration. Another finding of the study was that both the statutory and traditional dispute resolution institutions in northern Uganda lack capacity for resolution of disputes and conflicts occurring on return of IDPs. 8. The statutory dispute resolution mechanisms under the LA do not function effectively and in some cases do not exist at all in the study areas. The statutory decentralized land administration structures (under the LA) i.e. the District Land Boards (DLBs), District land Offices (DLOs), Area Committees and Recorders (ACRs), at the sub-county level, would be sufficient to manage land services but these institutions are virtually non-functional in the Lango and Acholi regions. The records in land offices were found to be very poor, often with incomplete information. In some instances, the districts were unable to produce records because they did not exist. 9. Traditional institutions have been important in the past for dispute resolution and protection of tenure in Northern Uganda. The traditional institutions were in many instances the courts of first instance. The Local Council (LC)1 system had been strongly dependent on their structures and services. When a dispute on land occurred the Rwot Kweri or the Won Pachu2 intervened first. If a dispute involved violence then the LCs intervened because they 1In the Ugandan system of decentralized administration, there are five levels of LCs. They include LC1 (at the village level), LC2 (at the Parish level), LC3 (at the sub-county level), LC4 (at the county level), and LC5 (at the district level). 2Rwot Kweri and Won Pachu are the traditional leaders, in Lango and Acholi areas, at the local community and village levels, respectively. They preside over most of the issues at their respective levels including land ii had powers to apprehend and punish. The traditional institutions have been weakened by the war and their roles have diminished. 10. Land Titling and Registration. Given the high uncertainty in the study areas over Government's intentions on land, there were misgivings over official tenure reform proposals such as systematic demarcation, land registration and titling. There was general agreement that titling needs to be pursued in a manner complimentary to customary tenure and not in a manner aimed at immediately replacing it because customary tenure is at times better equipped to manage communal or collective land rights. Respondents believed that a swift and not well managed erosion of customary tenure in northern Uganda could lead to increased landlessness. 11. Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs). Female-headed households, child- headed households, widows, orphans and children, generally classified as "Extremely Vulnerable Individuals" (EVIs) were inadequately served in the return process and needed specially tailored interventions. Many of these groups had failed to assimilate / resettle or had not joined in the return and had remained in the IDP camps. They also lacked the financial and human capacity to rebuild their shelters and livelihoods in their places of origin, given that the social safety nets that would have supported them were weakened or cut off altogether. 12. Loopholes in the policy, laws and institutional frameworks. Existing policies (the National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons - NPIDP and draft NLP), laws (the Uganda Constitution and the Land Act), and land administration institutions do not adequately provide for land issues pertaining to the return of IDPs. They are particularly inadequate in issues pertaining to resettlement, restitution and compensation for IDPs. C. RECOMMENDATIONS 13. PRDP. Northern Uganda in general is at a significant transitional moment, from over 20 years of conflict. The eventual conclusion of the ongoing peace negotiations between the GoU and the LRA rebels will define the end of internal displacement. PRDP is a comprehensive program specifically designed by the Government of Uganda, with support from the international community, for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the region following over two decades of civil war and unrest. Given the centrality of land in development, it is critical that the recommendations derived from the current study be incorporated and implemented as part of PRDP. 14. Areas for Immediate Action. After 20 years of conflict, and moving towards the conclusion of the peace negotiations between the Government of Uganda and the LRA, this study recommends three key areas for immediate action on land issues in northern Uganda: · Cultivating trust among the people over land issues through policies that demonstrate government commitment to protecting land and natural resource rights of IDPs on return. There is a large information gap not only on rights under current laws but also about Government intentions towards land in northern Uganda. Programs should be implemented to inform the public about land policies, strategies and interventions. conflicts and disputes. The Won Pachu is at the level of LC1 while the Rwot Kweri operates at a lower level (usually community level) than the LC1 level. iii Information should also be given to advise people on how to protect their land rights, and on the procedures for restitution, compensation, resettlement, and formalization of rights. A wide range of messages need to be created for different audiences and using different media and forums as well as actors. Additionally, there is need for information on the pros and cons of registration and titling so that they are not viewed as mechanisms for land grabbing. The Information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy recently developed by the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MoLHUD) with support from the World Bank-supported Private Sector Competitiveness Project II (PSCP II) should be used to implement this process in northern Uganda; · Government should suspend the issuance of land titles to investors or any other persons who seek legal interests in land in rural Acholi region until IDP return is completed and sensitisation on land rights has taken place. Therefore, in the rural areas of this region the work of Uganda Land Commission (ULC) and DLBs, in regard to land titling, should be temporarily frozen until IDPs return and understand their rights. The Lango region could be exempted from the temporary ban of the issuance of land titles because: (i) it experienced a much shorter period of displacement, (ii) its return of the IDPs is complete, (iii) it has been relatively more secure now for a longer period of time, (iv) and the feeling of government taking land away from the population was less intense in the Lango region. However, both Lango and Acholi would still require very active sensitisation of their populations on their land rights. · The government should use the findings of this study to develop detailed guidelines to handle the urgent issue of camp closures particularly in the Acholi region where large camps have been in existence for many years. For government to meet the immediate needs of the returning IDPs, it may require additional support (outside that provided in the PRDP) for operationalizing the recommendations of this study. 15. Tenure Security. The recommendations on tenure insecurity are: (a) codify customary tenure so that it can be used in litigation; (b) customary tenure be allowed to gradually evolve towards registration; (c) certification and registration should be encouraged but not forced on the local populace; (d) the legal processes and procedures for registration and certification need urgent reform as they are at risk of being used by individuals for land grabbing; (e) the first point of jurisdiction for dispute resolution and land administration over customary tenure should rest with traditional institutions (clans) and to the extent possible these institutions need to be integrated into the statutory land administration system, and (f) customary and statutory institutions need to be realigned and strengthened to provide better local dispute resolution mechanisms and tenure security, given the centrality of customary tenure in northern Uganda. 16. The Policy Framework. The NPIDP and the draft NLP do not adequately provide for the issuance of resettlement, restitution and compensation packages for IDPs returning to their places of origin. These policies need to be amended so that they provide adequately for IDPs. A National Resettlement Policy must therefore be developed. 17. The Legal Framework. The recommendations of the study for the legal and regulatory framework are as follows: · During the on-going comprehensive reform of laws relating to land, all matters pertaining to compensation should be incorporated under the Land Acquisition iv Amendment Bill. The new Land Acquisition Act should be harmonized with the Land Act to provide for prompt, adequate and fair compensation. Both Acts should be amended to define what is eligible for compensation and the basis of assessment. The basis of compensation, interests to compensate, verification of claims and processing of claims should be part of the amendments. 18. The Institutional Framework. The study makes the following recommendations on the institutional framework: · Legitimate informal institutions (clans, for example) must be identified and supported as they can manage post-conflict land disputes. Where the traditional institutions are operational, it is pertinent that they are institutionalized and regularized in a manner similar to the statutory ones and harmonized for acceptability.3 It was also found that customary and community mechanisms for conflict resolution in Acholi and Lango regions are very relevant especially alternative dispute resolution approaches such as mediation, reconciliation and arbitration. · Simple disputes can be resolved through the LC court system following the return of IDPs. Since LC1s are effectively engaging in disputes resolution rather than the LC2s, which are the legally recognized courts of first instance, the law needs to be amended to reflect local reality. Complicated cases which require adjudication should be referred to the district level courts. · A claims processing unit should be established at Parish level (Parish Development Committee) who should ensure that applications have the minimum administrative requirements before submitting them for decision. Claims for compensation and applications for resettlement should be verified at the parish level by the Parish Development Committee and the traditional institutions on land (clans) and sent to the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC). The DLO should have the mandate of assessing compensation, and the DLB should assist the DDMC in matters of resettlement. Legal aid units should inform people of procedures and assist them to complete the forms. · The future institutional arrangements for land in northern Uganda should be a mix of the traditional clan system, and the modern one that accords statutory powers and functions to LCs or ALCs. This recognizes the new changes brought by war but also the fact that the clan bonds and traditional land authority systems have been weakened or even destroyed by conflict. · Targeted institutional strengthening for dispute handling to promote more efficient resolution is necessary. Support should focus on the formal and the informal / customary systems. · Land administration institutions at all levels will need financial resources and capacity building to provide the basic services, including record keeping. 3See Annex 3 on the formalization of the role of traditional land administration authorities. v · Legal documents must be translated into local languages so that they can be used more widely by the relevant grassroots institutions. vi I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND 1. At the peak of displacement in northern Uganda in 2004-2006, there were about 2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), living mainly in protected camps. The problem of IDPs arose because, for the past two decades, northern Uganda has been the scene of wars and insecurity caused by the armed rebellions of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Acholi land (Kitgum, Gulu, and Pader districts), Lango region (Apac and Lira districts), and Teso region (Kaberamaido, Katakwi and Soroti districts). The problem was worsened by the activities of armed cattle rustlers from Karamoja (Kotido, Moroto, Nakapiripirit districts) leading to massive displacement into either camps or other locations away from the original homes. 2. Since the Government of Uganda (GoU) and the LRA rebels announced, in 2006, their intentions to negotiate a peaceful end to the 21 year conflict, there has been a gradual improvement in security. This prompted GoU to announce, in 2007 a return and resettlement program for IDPs, and also to develop a rehabilitation and reconstruction framework for northern Uganda - the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). At the same time, Government has renewed efforts to produce a comprehensive National Land Policy (NLP). 3. The existing Ugandan policy and legal frameworks and laws4 do not adequately cater for land issues pertaining to the return of IDPs. It is, therefore, probable that land issues may become the major cause of disputes and controversy in post conflict northern Uganda, if they are not addressed effectively. 4. In response to the above concerns, the World Bank, working in consultation with other stakeholders, undertook a Northern Uganda Land Policy and Administration Study in two main phases. The first phase, completed in 2006, included: (a) a literature review of situations and experiences of IDPs in the Great Lakes Region in Africa and other parts of the world, and (b) a limited reconnaissance survey in Soroti District (Teso region) where a relatively short duration of internal displacement, followed by spontaneous return of IDPs, had occurred recently. 5. The findings and recommendations from phase one of the studies were: (a) The Teso regions' internal displacement and return patterns varied (even within Teso itself) and were peculiar in relation to the rest of northern Uganda. Therefore, the anticipated escalation in land claims and conflicts after IDP return did not happen to any significant extent in Teso. (b) There was widespread distrust and fear of government's intentions on land leading to speculations and rumors of possible land grabbing. The presence of the pastoral Balalo5 in parts of Teso at this time and the spill over effects of speculation from Acholi and Lango regions reinforced some of these suspicions. 4The current land policy and administration frameworks governing the return of the IDPs to their places of origin and to their lands include the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995), the Land Act, Cap 227, the National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons - NPIDP- (2004), and the Land Acquisition Act, Cap. 226. 5Balalo are a pastoral ethnic group mainly from the south western areas of Uganda. 1 (c) After the IDP return, customary tenure had undergone some transformation in terms of institutions and practices. Contrary to earlier practices, household heads had generally become "owners" and not only "trustees" of rights in land. The power base of this tenure had shifted to some extent from the clans to the household heads. (d) Land sales were undertaken after consultations with clans but final approvals were, in many instances, not with the clan. The clan was merely informed and was no longer the sanctioning authority. The anticipated increase in land sales had not taken place; instead an increase in land transactions was taking place (mainly as sharecropping, cash rentals, or lending) without regulation. (e) Common Property Resources (CPRs) and other common land resources were at the greatest risk of being seized from communities, generally by individuals. (f) The emerging squatter situation was creating complications for urban planning. In some urban areas, slum dwellers were replacing IDPs in camps that were being evacuated, while some IDPs were settled outside the camps in road reserves and on private land. (g) Decentralized land administration structures, as laid out in the Land Act, Cap. 227 (Land Act), were in theory sufficient to handle post-conflict situations but the entire framework was almost non-functional because of inadequate funding, inadequate human resource capacity, and weak institutions. The apex district institutions ­ District Land Board (DLB) and District Land Office (DLO) ­ were in place but suffered from underfunding, operational inefficiencies, limited services in urban areas and low demand for services in rural areas. Grassroots institutions, including the Area Land Committees (ALCs), were either non-existent or non- functional, creating a vacuum that Local Councils (LCs) and clans were attempting to fill. In this regard, LCs (1-3) were beginning to emerge as grassroots institutions for land administration and dispute resolution on customary tenure replacing clans and to some extent eroding their authority and legitimacy at the grassroots. (h) There was no suitable working institutional framework to handle restitution (recovery of land), resettlement and compensation issues on IDP land. The existing IDP policy mandates local governments to handle restitution but they have neither the resources nor the technical capacity to undertake this. No national agency has the overall responsibility for compensation. 6. It was agreed that a second study would be necessary because the Teso findings were not applicable to all of northern Uganda. This current report gives a deeper analysis of land conflicts and identification of resolution mechanisms in the greater conflict areas of the north (Acholi and Lango regions). In reaching conclusions and making recommendations for the post conflict land policy and administration for northern Uganda, this second study draws upon the results of the first phase literature review and field survey of the Teso region. 2 B. METHODOLOGY 7. The core objective of the second phase is to inform the PRDP for northern Uganda and the NLP with respect to land laws, policies and administration arrangements needed to ensure a peaceful return of IDPs to their places of origin. This phase investigates: (a) the types of land conflicts and claims that are likely to arise during the return of IDPs; (b) mechanisms for prevention and resolution/adjudication of land conflicts within the context of the current land policy and administration frameworks, including the legal provisions as well as the formal and informal institutions; (c) gaps in the current land policy and administration frameworks for handling potential land conflicts and claims, and the options available for filling such gaps; and (d) the resources needed to implement the proposed actions and policies. Study Sites 8. In the Lango region, the two districts of Lira and Oyam most affected by the LRA incursions were selected. In Acholi region, four districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Amuru and Pader were selected. Specific sub counties and villages where community surveys and Focus Discussion Groups (FDGs) were conducted were selected in consultation with the District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs). In addition to the recommendations given by the respective DDMCs, the study also utilised criteria which stipulated that the sampling sites be representative of the demographic and land characteristics of the returning communities. The districts where the studies were undertaken are shown in the Map of Uganda attached at the end of this report. The actual study sites are described in Table 1 and Table 2. 3 Table 1: Study Sites in Lango Region DISTRICT FDGs & AREA DESCRIPTION SURVEY SITE LIRA APALA · Located 28 Km from Lira Town, comprising of six parishes · Respondent population sampled was mainly returnees (95% returns) · Camps sites have been declared de-gazetted and closed · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies piloting land restoration work · Return Population already tilling and planting to establish garden · Home rebuilding or replacement of burnt houses and huts is common AROMO · Located 25 Km from Lira Town, comprising of three parishes, 16 villages · Respondent population sampled was mainly returnees (98% returns) · Camps sites have been declared de-gazetted and closed · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies piloting land restoration work · Return Population already tilling and planting to establish garden · Home rebuilding or replacement of burnt houses and huts is common ADWARI · Located 90 Km from Lira Town, close to the Karamojong border and suffers displacement from cattle rustling practices of Karamojong · Respondent population sampled was combination of returnees (85% returns) and those still in main camp (approximately 10% of former camp population) · Camps sites in the process of de-gazettement · Limited restoration of gardens through tilling by early returnees · Home rebuilding or replacement of burnt houses is beginning CORNER · Urban camp located within Lira Municipality, yet to be closed DAKATAL · Respondent population sampled was mainly Extremely Vulnerable (TOWN) Persons (EVIs) who are yet to return. OYAM NGAI · Located 118 Km from Lira Town, in new Oyam District, comprised of 6 parishes · Respondent population sampled was mainly returnees (90% returns) · Camps sites being de-gazetted and resumption of garden tilling is evident · Home rebuilding or replacement of burnt houses is evident ABOKE · Located 77 Km from Lira Town, in new Oyam District · Respondent population sampled was mainly returnees (85% returns) · Camps sites being de-gazetted and resumption of garden tilling is evident · Home rebuilding or replacement of burnt houses is evident 4 Table 2: Study Sites in Acholi Region DISTRICT FDGs AND AREA DESCRIPTION SURVEY SITE AMURU PABBO · Located 96 Km from Gulu Town · Respondent population in main camps (less than 20% returns) · Population beginning to relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies still providing relief items LAMOGI · Located 89 Km from Gulu Town, · Respondent population in main camps (less than 20% returns) · Population beginning to relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies still providing relief items GULU PAICHO AND · Located 25 Km from Gulu Town, at the peripheral of the Gulu UNYAMA Municipality · Respondent population sampled was still in main camp (40% in return sites) · Population beginning to relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps PALARO · Located 70 Km from Gulu Town · Respondent population sampled is in return sites (over 80%) · Population relocated from main camps LALOGI · Located 55 km from Gulu Town · Respondent population sampled is in return sites (over 85%) · Population relocated from main camps KITGUM PALABEK-KAL · Located 72km from Kitgum Town · All respondent population relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps(75% relocation) · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies still providing relief items MUCWINI · Located 25 km from Kitgum Town · All respondent population relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps(85% relocation) ATANGA · Located 55 Km from Kigum Town · All respondent population relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps(80% relocation) · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies still providing relief items PADER LIRA-PALAWO · Located 84 kms from Kitgum Town · All respondent population relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps(65% relocation) · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies still providing relief items PADER-KILAK · Located 126 kms from Kitgum Town · All respondent population relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps(75% relocation) · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies providing relief items KILAK CORNER · Located 132 kms from Kitgum Town · All respondent population relocated from Main camp to decongestion sites, returns sites or home camps(55% relocation) · International Relief and humanitarian Agencies still providing relief items 5 C. RESPONDENTS' DEMOGRAPHY 9. The study was conducted mainly at two levels; the community and the district (mainly leadership and stakeholders). It collected data in the following manner: (a) Structured questionnaires administered to the sample community of about 1,200 respondents of whom 48.3 percent (541) were female while 51.7 percent (578) were male (Annex 1). The sample was stratified for purposes of generating an aggregate pool of information. The assumptions for stratification included; (i) The intent of the study was to provide information essential in planning for peaceful and prosperous return and; (ii) It had been established from previous studies that the tendency in northern Uganda is for displaced communities to return to their original lands rather than to resettle elsewhere, therefore, the more pertinent issue was return, which took the largest part of the composite sample; (iii) A level of choice was built in the sampling to ensure that at least 40 percent of the respondents, represented Extremely Vulnerable Individuals (EVIs) including widows, orphans and vulnerable children and other minorities; and (iv) Multi-stage simple random sampling using community lists from local leaders were used for individual respondent identification. (b) Key informant interviews were also carried out with institutions, organizations and stakeholders undertaking interventions that directly touched on land matters with local communities; (c) Relevant data was extracted from the land services delivery institutions on dispute resolution and land administration in Lango and Acholi regions; (d) The district Local Government (LG) staff and the DDMCs within Lango and Acholi regions responded to specific issues, at an average of 35 respondents in each district (for the six selected districts). This was meant to establish a common understanding of land issues at the district level; and (e) In addition, at least 15 institutions and organizations involved in relief, emergency and development assistance were either interviewed individually or participated in round table discussions for Lango and Acholi to understand their views on land issues. 6 II. KEY FINDINGS 10. The study investigated land issues pertaining to IDPs in northern Uganda including inter alia: (a) return from IDP camps, (b) the dynamics of tenure security, (c) public knowledge on land rights, (d) prevalence, causes and resolution mechanisms of land conflicts and disputes, (e) post conflict land restitution, and compensation issues, and (f) the gaps in the current policy, legal and institutional frameworks for land administration in regard to IDP return and resettlement. The findings are summarized in the sections below and the detailed data and information on the study are presented in Annex 1. A. THE IDP RETURN PROCESS Return levels 11. At the time of the field survey for the study (during the second half of 2007), the transition from conflict and war to peace and return from IDP camps to original homes were progressing at varied and unpredictable rates for the people of Lango and Acholi regions. The return in Lango region was advanced and approximately 92 percent of the IDP population had already returned to their original homes. In the Acholi region the return was still very low, as out of the total of over 1.1 million people who lived in IDP camps at peak displacement period (2004-2006), only 55,000 people (5 percent) had returned to their original homes, and 359,000 people (32 percent) had moved to transit camps ("new settlement" and "decongestion" sites). In Gulu and Amuru districts of the Acholi region, 88,000 IDPs had left the main/mother IDP camps to the transit sites (120 newly created transit sites), while in Kitgum district 77,000 IDPs had gone to the satellite areas (69 transit sites). In Pader district, 194,000 IDPs had moved closer to their villages in 171 transit sites. Non-Returnees 12. The high return in the Lango region was because of the improved security situation within Lango, progress reported on peace talks between the Government and the LRA and improved freedom of movement. In the Acholi region, IDPs were still skeptical about the success of the peace talks and given their past experiences were still reluctant to return to their original homes. The land owners where IDPs had continued to stay were also uneasy and had begun asking for compensation for their lands. 13. The people remaining in the IDP camps included: (a) the EVIs who lacked the financial and human capacity to rebuild shelter and reasonable livelihood at places of origin; (b) those who lacked faith in the peace processes; (c) those who were waiting for the resettlement packages (iron sheets) promised by the government because roofing materials especially grass was yet to mature, hopefully by December / January during the dry season; (d) those who continued to stay in the IDP camps because of the poor conditions of social amenities in the villages that they ought to return to, especially roads, health 7 services, water sources, and schools and the distances between camps and these amenities; (e) those who felt that the camps had become their real homes; and (f) those who had employment and income opportunities around the IDP camps. Decongestion or Transit Sites 14. The mushrooming of the decongestion sites/transit camps/new settlements (numbering about 360) was a new phenomenon, causing additional challenges for humanitarian provision and the delivery of basic services. These sites were considered by both the Government and the IDPs as temporary, pending their return to their original homes. 15. The setting up of these transit sites had resulted in humanitarian demands and land tenure challenges similar to those of mother/ original camps. In addition, the land tenure and administration issues that arose during the initial set up of IDPs camps were also being replicated and generated in the transit sites. 16. This study did not explore land issues in relation to the setting up of satellite camps or decongestion sites. Nevertheless, it was clear to the research team that a more in-depth understanding was needed in regard to the nature of movements out of the `mother camps' in Acholi land to satellite camps and the exact nature of secondary land issues arising because of such movements or relocations. Distortions in the Return Process 17. From the findings, there was also emerging a new distortion in the notion of "return home", in terms of places where one had to return. Though it was generally perceived that return would be to the same area where one was actually living before displacement, a number of clans were tracing lineage and lands to areas of earlier ancestral descent and opting to return to those. This was likely to precipitate additional land wrangles in Acholi region (mainly) and particularly in the district of Amuru, where a number of persons were reportedly inventing cases to back up such claims6. The survey did not explore this issue, but some FDGs kept referring to it. B. TENURE SECURITY 18. The literature review undertaken during the first phase of the study show that tenure systems have two important dimensions: (a) property rights definition7 (security of land rights associated with land possession); and (b) property rights distribution (to whom land rights are distributed). Land tenure security is the individual's perception of his/her rights to a piece of land on a continual basis, free from imposition or interference from outside forces. It also embraces the ability to reap the benefits of labour or capital invested in land, either in use or 6Refugee Law Project (June 2007): Rapid Assessment of Population Movement in Gulu and Pader (unpublished). 7According literature reviewed in phase one of the study, formal property rights may be regarded as those that are explicitly acknowledged by the state and are protected using legal means. Informal property rights are those that lack official recognition and protection. In some cases, informal property rights are illegal, i.e., held in direct violation of the law although they may be legitimate within society. 8 upon alienation. The application and also implications of the above concepts to the findings on the IDPs land in Lango and Acholi regions are summarised below. Tenure Security and Return of IDPs 19. Displacement and return had worsened tenure security, compared to the pre- displacement period. In some instances it had sparked off new fears that were not in existence before displacement, such as the suspicion on the Government's perceived interest in land in Acholi and Lango regions. The study findings show that 85 percent of the respondents had experienced threats to tenure security of which 59 percent felt these threats were significant. However, 41 percent of the respondents felt that whatever threats existed, they were not major (according to FDGs mainly in Lango region), because mechanisms existed within either the clan system or in the LC system which were able to address them as they occurred or emerged. In addition, in some instances, displacement did not result in complete detachment from land, especially in areas where camps were within a 3 ­ 10 kms radius from the displacement areas. 20. The study showed that displacement and return of the population at such a huge scale presented different sets of conditions for IDPs as the network of social relations upon which land access and use depended also changed as summarized in Table 3. Table 3: The Changing Aspects of Customary Tenure in Lango and Acholi Regions GENERIC PERCEPTION REALITY Insecure tenure because there are no titles Secure because, it is known, understood and the values appreciated by the owners and users. Better to have individualized registered land Fears that titles would be given with the ulterior motive of grabbing land by government Customary land collectively owned by clans or Individualization at family level on the increase families, and heads of families are trustees or in Lango stewards A lot of land still under communal ownership in Acholi sub region Clans do not allow customary tenure to be titled Some individual household heads (despite the fear of the unknown and clan reaction to such a move) indicated willingness in titling their customary tenure. Clans with authority and power to control and In Lango region clan control not as strong as in make accountable household heads on their Acholi region. The Acholi regard their land actions on land such as sales collectively as "Acholi land" Common Property Resource (CPR) areas and CPRs though still open to community access but common land communally held under the greatest threat of individualization and appropriation. IDPs on return would not be able to locate Not a serious problem in Lango. Cannot be boundaries to their land because not demarcated ascertained yet in Acholi as return is still low. Customary land tenure administration systems Customary land administration weakened collapsed due to war and displacement and cannot substantially however there is vigorous revival of manage IDP return process these systems through the institution of Rwot Kweri and Won Pacho in both sub-regions. 9 Threats to Tenure Security 21. According to the study, 36 percent of threats to tenure security were boundary disputes over cultivation into the neighbors' land. The second threat was associated with the gendered nature of access and user rights over land defined through patrilineal relations by virtue of marriage or inheritance. Thus, 23 percent of respondents expressed fears on tenure security due to fears of disinheritance. This was followed by threats of eviction or being chased by relatives at 15 percent and possible sale by relatives at 13 percent. Persistent Tenure Security threats 22. According to 67 percent of the respondents, there were persistent threats mainly because of delays in concluding a permanent and comprehensive peace deal, with the LRA rebels. However, even with the positive conclusions at the Juba Peace Talks during the study, the following were observed on the ground; (a) Many respondents in both regions felt that the government, the army and rich people had taken interest in their land, hence constituting threats to their tenure security. This was expressed more in Acholi region but was also reported in Lango. (Similar fears on tenure security were also reported in the Soroti study). (b) About 14 percent of the respondents indicated that land registration was a threat to their tenure security, because of their mistrust of Government. This is one of the avenues that should have helped those who felt threatened or insecure but it was actually serving as an additional threat, because the land registration services were not fully understood, and were considered too expensive and inaccessible. (c) Land registration was widely viewed as a design by government to grab land. For example, during FDGs, respondents expressed deep mistrust of government because of allegedly disposing of whatever it lays its hands on through its policy of privatization of public assets. They cited examples of government properties that had been divested, such as the Uganda Commercial Bank, which they felt set precedence for selling whatever government lays its hands on. (d) About 23 percent of respondents expressed uncertainty on Government's intentions in introducing both systematic demarcation and land titling. The majority of the respondents in FDGs advanced the argument that they felt comfortable with customary tenure which they had known for centuries. Besides, 14 percent of respondents felt the cost of registration was high and could ironically also be made to fall on their shoulders, when they had not put forth any demands for such a process. It was their thinking that such concepts were propagated out of what was considered to be keen interest in the land of the Acholi and Lango people by the government. (e) Interviews with the political leadership revealed that the majority felt the need to prepare their people for the eventual and inevitable future arrival of land registration in the region otherwise they would be failing to provide adequate leadership and direction for their people. It is evident that such a process must be carefully managed. It was also apparent that such a process needed to be managed by the people and backed by extensive public information so that there would be opportunities for individuals or families to make informed choices. 10 23. For the majority of IDPs8, the ultimate dream was to return to their land. Any possibility obstacle to this dream effectively erased rationality provoked bitterness, feelings of personal isolation, and mistrust of the Government. The various aspects related to this, and the associated linkages observed during the study, are summarised in Table 4. Table 4: Threats to IDP Land on Return and Resettlement THREATS IMPLICATIONS State grabbing land for investors Proposals by Madhvani to acquire 40,000 Hectares for Sugar growing being interpreted as an indicator of what is to come and the level of sophisticated approach to grabbing land Allegations of land grabbing, and Numerous cases reported in Amuru, where local leaders feel manipulation by the "elite" in position to powerless to intervene. manipulate the institutional, administrative and legal framework to deliver land through "undue" titling processes to themselves Double claims by clans; land occupied Likely to result into inter-clan and intra - clan conflicts and before displacement; and the ancestral fights over ancestral land on clan basis areas where such clans migrated from Media, CSOs role worsening this perception and needs disentangling Perception of land grabbing by pastoralists Continued stay of Balalo pastoralists in the region is a direct (Balaalo) threat and evidence that local government cannot tackle the issue. Fear of operations of the land market and Real and genuine threat on ground, since IDPs are devoid of susceptibility to heightened sales on return documentary proof of land ownership and no alternative of IDPs survival and livelihood means The proposed urbanization policy of Skepticism and opposition to any government program or creating rural growth centers out of the IDP plans on land without adequate justification camps The proposed introduction of systematic Introduction without adequate preparation and information to demarcation or titling leaders and local populace can easily degenerate into conflict or violence. This requires a concerted effort towards "assurance of rights for the Acholi and Langi" not only in words but also by actions that curtail particular threats The camp decongestion policy being New tenure issues and compensations issues being replicated implemented to a wider scale. Claims that government owns land in the Acholi Parliamentary Group insists that this land belongs to north, that can be given to investors or the community thus challenging Government on the `politically connected individuals' ownership e.g. Aswa Ranch Need to set and broker equity conditions in investment agreements with investors on return of IDPs in order to bring the vast land resources into production. Marriage and succession: gendered access Population of Lango and Acholi sub-regions are now and use and re-stabilization of production significantly aware of the appreciating economic value of relations and return of fallow land to land. Subjective decision making to the disadvantage of production; access and use are being would be producers (EVI's) could severely weaken the redefined for users of land;(women and obligatory and sanctioning values of "clans" to support children) socially weak groups within society Measures to Improve Tenure Security 8Reports supporting this finding include studies on land issues in Northern Uganda by the Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda - CSOPNU - (2004 and 2005), and Uganda Humanitarian Situation Report No.1/06 (OCHA, 2006) 11 24. Some 55 percent of the respondents considered demarcation or re-definition of boundaries to be an important aspect for improving tenure security. About 31 percent of the respondents felt that they needed documentation to show proof of ownership or interests held in land as a measure of tenure security. This finding draws attention to what is regarded as legitimate evidence by community members and the apparent quest to successfully re-claim rights. However, this study and the previous study in Teso showed that the traditional institutional framework is still closely connected to ethnic identity and cultural leadership. This creates a powerful system of allocative regimes that defines and protects the community and remains vital to preserving the inalienable claim to land of each member of the community. 25. To ensure cultural cohesiveness, and to make ownership more certain (secure) and more static, a deliberate course of action will have to be taken to demarcate and formally register all customary land interests of communities in recognition of communal land claims. The entire land area demarcated and registered as falling under the jurisdiction of each community can be used to disclose the root of title and allocating jurisdiction of legally recognized traditional leadership. As observed by the study, the ability to operate informally collapses when the cost of legal transactions increases as a result of the failure of traditional institutions to facilitate exchange and enforce contracts. The absence of legal recognition of traditional property rights makes those in the traditional informal sector vulnerable . 26. The other measures necessary for improving tenure security in the north are related to public knowledge on land rights and dispute resolution mechanisms, as discussed below. C. PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE ON LAND RIGHTS 27. Some 90 percent of the study population in Northern Uganda had no knowledge of the LA (the main substantive national land law). From the results of the study it was evident that not a single district amongst those in the survey had more than 15 percent of its population with any knowledge on the contents of the LA. In addition, misinformation and confusion were common regarding the little that was known. Much of what was "known" was highly distorted or quoted out of context. 28. In the discussion groups, few people who had knowledge about the LA, had not disseminated the information or in other instances had used the information for selfish gains. There were examples of distortions of the meaning and implications of: (a) "adverse possession" as provided for under section 31 of the LA regarding bona fide occupants on registered land, and (b) the power of "compulsory acquisition" by government in public interest, as provided for under Articles 237 and 26 of the Constitution. Capacity gaps in the interpretation and dissemination of the LA were also evident among CBOs, NGOs and the media houses especially FM radio stations undertaking public education on land rights. 29. The study found that public education and sensitization on land rights had been undertaken mainly by CBOs and only on a small scale, often targeting only the leaders. FDGs and interviews revealed that such efforts had concentrated on executive committees of LCs and specific land administrators9 leaving behind traditional land management institutions 9Sensitisation initiatives on land acknowledged in FDGs included those from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), MoLHUD, Legal Aid (Uganda Law Society), and Land and Equity Movement of Uganda (LEMU) in Lango, and the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) program. 12 especially at the clan and the Rwot Kweri and Won Pacho levels. For government services and programs that depend on land as a natural resource and use it as a major factor for production, it is important that their public education components integrate land issues in liaison with MoLHUD. D. LAND CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES 30. The findings of the study on IDP return process; tenure security and public knowledge of land rights demonstrate clearly their close linkage with land disputes and conflicts. This section establishes the magnitude of land disputes and related trends since war began in northern Uganda over 20 years ago. Nature of Land Disputes and Conflicts 30. The ranking of and description of the types of land disputes were undertaken from the survey results. A typography of land disputes observed in Amuru District, although not representative for all districts, is presented in Annex 2 because of its instructive nature. The study found the following: (a) The most prevalent type of disputes were boundary related averaging 23 percent for all respondents, but having a high of 28 percent before displacement, decreasing to 17 percent during displacement and steadily rising to 25 percent at time of the study. From FDGs and judging from the high rates in Lango (higher than Acholi), boundary disputes were likely to increase as return and recovery progresses particularly in the Acholi region. (b) Land use disputes accounted for 18 percent of all disputes. The incidence had been highest during displacement because of the limited areas available within the precincts of camps and the small areas surrounding the camps where the army could provide protection. (c) Illegal occupation of land by neighbors (early returnees) and relatives accounted for 17 percent of land disputes while trespass accounted for 16 percent of land disputes with the incidence rising as IDP return gained momentum. (d) Inheritance disputes especially those related to land rights of widows and orphaned children, arising from the family (paternal uncles or clan heads) accounted for 13 percent of all land disputes. (e) Fears of pursuit of land access by large-scale commercial interests, speculators and grabbers were causing tension in the Acholi region. Prevalence of Conflicts and Disputes 31. The survey sought to establish the prevalence of land disputes in the pre-displacement phase, while in displacement and at the onset of return, or in the post-conflict period. Across the two regions, the incidence of occurrence of land disputes reported by the survey respondents increased from 12.8 percent at the time of displacement, to 15.5 percent during displacement, and to 16.4 percent at the post conflict stage. 13 32. Similar results were observed by Samaritan's Purse (SP) ­ Uganda, a relief agency10, who recently carried out interviews at the community and local leadership level in Otuke County, Lira District, and targeting one parish in each sub-county. They reported that with an increasing numbers of IDPs returning, there was an increase in the number of land dispute cases in Otuke County. In 5 months, an average of 45 percent of all cases reported in return areas were land disputes. 33. Of the three main categories of land (land left behind, land in camps and land of host communities) disputes mostly occurred on land that was left behind upon displacement. On return such land had a dispute prevalence rate of 65 percent. Also in the particular case of the land left behind, the disputes on inherited land accounted for 71 percent while disputes on land given as gifts accounted for 17 percent and the rate was at only 3 percent for purchased land. According to the FDGs, a number of people on return attached a very high value on land and thus were moving to individualize what was previously perceived to be communal land while rigorously defending what had been allotted to them for access, use and sharing by the members of the community. 34. Camp areas also experienced high levels of disputes during the displacement period at a prevalence rate of 26 percent. These disputes were attributed to the struggle to access the limited land available close to the camp or within the camp itself. In the process some of them overwhelmed land owners who were attempting to take charge and control of their property. In most cases negotiations ensued which led to the gradual emergence of land rentals or share cropping arrangements. However, disputes related to payments and charges set by the land owners also arose frequently. Causes of Land Disputes 35. The study also investigated the causes of land disputes in general, before displacement, during displacement and on return. Unclear or obscure land boundaries were the major cause of disputes accounting for 34 percent of total land disputes in the two regions followed by land scarcity (perceived) accounting for 15 percent. Perceived land scarcity was driving people into a state of jealously protecting the little land they had and reacting to the slightest provocation by trying to protect their land. Displacement was also cited as a casual factor for land disputes by 14 percent of the respondents while 12 percent of the respondents indicated segregative tendencies11 to be the cause of land disputes. Obscure or unclear land rights were rated low at 10 percent. 36. For the Acholi area in particular, the study also showed that absence from the land, especially for prolonged periods of time was the leading cause of disputes (on IDP return) accounting for 28 percent of the land dispute cases in the area. This was closely followed by unclear boundaries which accounted for 27 percent of disputes, in the Acholi region 37. The higher land dispute rate observed in Lango compared to Acholi, on return, may be attributed to the percentage or rate of return in each region, whereby Lango had approximately 92 percent return rate while Acholi was just commencing return with a large percentage of its population still in original camps, and decongestion camps. According to 10Samaritan's Purse (SP) ­ Uganda, 2007 (Personal communication) 11Segregative tendencies are those practices in some communities whereby the females, the disabled, the youth and other disadvantaged groups are not accorded the same rights and privileges as the rest of the members of the communities. 14 FDGs it is expected that the volume of boundary disputes and the perception of land scarcity would increase and probably surpass that in the Lango region, by the time return is complete in Acholi region. This is because the displacement period was much longer in Acholi with the average of 13 years compared to the average of 7 years in Lango. In the Teso sub-region, displacement was on average less than three years. 38. Distress sales accounted for only 4 percent of total land disputes. Previous studies had predicted that there would be a high incidence of distress sales due to economic pressure to finance education, health and other livelihood needs. FDGs, however, predicted this rate may rise especially in the Acholi region, where sales made before or at the time of displacement were being revoked or dishonored outright by the majority of land owners or other parties to such transactions. A new phenomenon of "unfair allocation" by the traditional institution responsible for customary tenure was reported at 6 percent and was, therefore, emerging as a significant cause of land disputes especially for the EVIs. E. LAND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 39. Given the prevalence of land disputes, it is imperative to explore options for land dispute resolution mechanisms. Land disputes are not new, but are increasing because of the impact of displacement in which institutional capacities for response and containment both informally and formally become weakened. Foras and Institutions 40. Both Acholi and Langi people have elaborate traditional dispute resolution systems; although those in Acholi land appear more developed than those in Lango. Both systems are based along the structure and organization of the clans. Depending on the severity of the violence both the traditional dispute resolution system and the formal system function alongside each other. While the formal system normally proceeds with hearing of the dispute followed by the verdict the traditional system would also include cleansing and reconciliation rites even in instances where violence had resulted in death with the perpetrator convicted and sentenced. The clan members would still go through payment of fines, cleansing and reconciliation. 41. Before displacement, 38 percent of the population sought the services of the clan or family. Some 22 percent went to both LCI and LC2, and 11 percent of land disputes were taken to LC3 on appeal. The striking statistics were those associated with the Magistrates' Courts that were reported to handle only 3 percent of land disputes. A few cases were reported to the RDC and CAOs offices at the district level. 42. The study findings reveal a gradual decline in the number of disputes resolved by clan and family institutions while in displacement from 38 percent to 31 percent of total land disputes, indicating the fact that the social-cultural context in camps changed community compositions and scattered clan and family heads irrespective of their origins. Land dispute cases (as proportion of total reported land dispute cases) resolved in LC 1 rose to 26 percent while LC 2 gained at 25 percent and appeals to LC 3 dropped to 9 percent. The study further reveals that on return from displacement, family and clan involvement in dispute resolution declined further to 23 percent, as LC1 courts maintained their role in dispute resolution at 21 percent and LC 2 gained at 27 percent. As LC 3 began to function according to statutory 15 mandate and the court of first instance with regard to land disputes, LC 3 appeals rose to 13 percent. 43. There are many land dispute mechanisms, systems and structures, especially at the grassroots (family, clan, LCs, and LCV etc) which thinned out as one went higher in the land administration hierarchy. In general, the multiplicity of mechanisms seemed to be creating variety rather than confusion amongst users to the extent that they were viewed as complimentary (both formal and informal). However the duplicity in roles, hierarchy and jurisdiction need systematization, while recognizing the roles of traditional institutions in defining the functions of statutory institutions. 44. The study found a close interaction between traditional dispute resolution and the LC courts. Although traditional institutions were not legally sanctioned to handle land disputes, they were in most instances the courts of first instance and the LC system was strongly dependant on their structures and services. When a dispute on land occurred the Rwot Kweri12or Won Pacho13intervened first. However, if a dispute involved violence then the LCs came in since they have powers to apprehend and punish. 45. The potential benefit of formal property rights are not well understood in Northern Uganda and has given rise to some of the misconceptions reflected in the results of the study. For example, there is the perception that titling and registration to formalize property rights are invariably associated with the elimination of traditional land administration arrangements. However, as argued in the literature, to formalize property rights is not to change the customary property system. Registration is merely a device to give greater certainty of ownership of land and to enable dealings to be conducted quickly and cheaply. 46. Formal registration of indigenous property rights is common throughout the world. Most employ processes and mechanisms that recognize differences in institutional arrangements and offer provisions for registering family (or group) rights and "customary communal land ownership" so long as there are clearly defined rules of administration, accountability and transparency. A similar formalization of land management responsibilities for traditional and cultural leaders in Northern Uganda is necessary if the strong preference for traditional institutions is to be adopted as a formal policy for dealing with land matters. Choice of Forum or Institution 47. The study found that there were six factors which determined the choice of the dispute resolution institution ( Figure 1). Familiarity with a particular situation operated was found to be the major determinant of choice of dispute resolution institution by 34 percent of the respondents before displacement, 24 percent during displacement and 26 percent upon return to areas of origin. 12Traditional leader at the community level (below LC) responsible for resolving land use related disputes and conflicts in society among the Acholi and Langi 13Traditional leader at the village level (LC1 level) responsible for resolving land related disputes and conflicts among the Acholi and Langi. 16 Figure 1: Factors for Choice of Dispute Resolution Forum/Institution 35 30 nsoi 25 Before Displacement nte 20 In Displacement M 15 Post Conflict of % 10 5 0 Familiarity Legal Distance Fairness Cost Availability Mandate Rate of Disputes Resolution 48. Regarding the speed of dispute resolution, there was a relatively high resolution rate before displacement (52.9 percent). In the displacement phase and at the time of the study the rates declined to 32.3 percent and 24.9 percent. In the traditional and statutory institutions, there was lack of capacity for response and containment of disputes and conflicts arising on return of IDPs. Besides, the traditional institutions were weakened while the statutory/formal system was largely dysfunctional. 49. Figure 2 below presents the rate of dispute resolution for Lira Circuit Tribunal (now Magistrates Court). The case backlog grew from 73 in 2004 to 239 in 2007 at the time of study. In the same period the dispute resolution rate declined from 0.5 to 0 percent. Out of the total 270 cases filed in the circuit tribunal between 2003 and 2007 only 22 were successfully resolved. For the recovery and return period, the cost of moving the statutory structures to full functionality may be much higher than equipping the grassroots institutions (both statutory and traditional) that are able to "nip the problems in the bud" before they sprout. According to interviews, the absence of tribunals would not be gravely felt if the LC courts were equipped and in a position to dispense justice14, because the majority of the cases to the tribunals were appeals. 14Views of the Chief Magistrate and Other Local Leaders 17 Figure 2: Status of Land Cases Handled at the Lira Circuit Tribunal, Lango Region 300 250 200 Received Cases Resolved of 150 Referred Yearly Backlog mber Cummulative Backlog Nu 100 50 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Years Source: Land Tribunal/ Magistrates Court Records Extraction, Lira (2007) F. CLAIMS AND COMPENSATION 50. A total of 23 percent of the respondents indicated that on return their land was still intact as they left it or had been used by themselves only during displacement. An aggregate of 17 percent reported loss of tenure either by tree felling or setting up of public utilities or infrastructure15 to service the established IDP camps. About 7 percent of the respondents returned to find their land with either IDP camps set up in them or found their land occupied or cultivated by the army. This finding has implications for compensation in relation to tenure loss and the institutional responsibility for restorative actions. 51. Issues pertaining to compensation when dealing with customary tenure rights require careful attention because traditional property rights comprise a dense network of intersecting interests including: (a) Overriding interests: e.g., the powers of community to dispossess which are similar to powers of expropriation held by the state; (b) Overlapping interests: e.g., use of a parcel by more than one party through rights of ownership, easements, and leases; (c) Complementary interests: e.g., rights held by several parties in the same property such as common walls and common areas in condominiums; and 15Public utilities such as schools, boreholes, access roads, etc 18 (d) Competing interests: e.g., when different parties contest the same interests in the same parcel. 52. The survey shows that 73 percent of the respondents were in support of compensation as payment for loss, destruction or degradation of land, housing and property. The second best alternative to compensation was the actual resolution of land disputes as indicated by 10 percent of respondents. This was followed by restitution through calling for removal of illegal occupiers or users of land that did not belong to them which was preferred by 8 percent. Only 6 percent opted for universally remarking or re-establishment of land boundaries and 4 percent thought the option of resettlement by government would be ideal for resolving land disputes claims in northern Uganda. IDP Camps 53. Six percent of the survey respondents who were land owners where IDP camps were located claimed they were entitled to compensation for the various reasons listed below: (a) Illegal / unauthorized occupation of their land in breach of their rights as owners; (b) Loss of income that would have accrued from their land during periods of occupation (ranging on average from 3 years in Lango to 13 years in Acholi); (c) Degradation and loss of productivity due to change in land use from agriculture to camp settlements (even on closure of IDP camps the land would need 15 to 20 years to regenerate or regain productivity again); (d) Land lost due to placement of public infrastructure and utilities such as pit latrines, boreholes, water pumps, schools etc.; and (e) Effect of occupation were not limited to the land occupied by the IDP camps alone but stretched to the surroundings up to approximately 3 km radius, which was intensively farmed and land resources (e.g. trees) degraded by IDPs occupying the camps, its fertility and productivity was equally affected and seriously reduced as a result. Army Camps and Military bases 54. Nine percent of the survey respondents who were land owners where army camps or military bases were located claimed that they were entitled to compensation for various reasons: (a) Illegal occupation of their land in the breach of their rights as owners; (b) Destruction of their land with construction of protective ditches ("ndaki") around their lands; (c) Destruction of houses, farms, animals and even produce that came with army occupation of land; (d) Felling of trees for firewood and charcoal; and (e) Cultivation of land by the army. 19 IDP Returnee Property 55. Sixty one percent of IDP returnees who found their original houses either burnt or vandalized claimed they were entitled to compensation in the form of resettlement packages. Forty five percent of respondents were of the view that the stated government resettlement package of 30 pieces of roofing iron sheets per household was adequate compensation while 38 percent of the respondents indicated that they needed additional benefits. 56. There is no clear official policy on compensation in this post-conflict situation. There are conflicting signals from the government to the disappointment of claimants and local leaders in both Lango and Acholi regions. There is no institutional structure in place to receive claims for compensation or to determine which claims are genuine. G. POST ­CONFLICT VULNERABLE GROUP ISSUES 57. Female-Headed Households (FHHs), child headed households, widows, orphans and children are defined as the "Extremely Vulnerable Individuals" (EVIs). They constituted about 8.4 percent of the non-returnees still in the camp. These groups had failed to assimilate or resettle or had not joined in the return and had remained in the IDP camps. They lacked the financial and human capacity to rebuild their livelihoods in their areas of origin. The social safety nets that would have held them were either weakened or cut. They faced the following problems: (a) Lack of proper shelter, due to denial of land rights (especially for orphans) by relatives and guardians, who were instead grabbing land rightfully belonging to orphans and widows. In some cases there were violations through sale of land and household items belonging to the EVIs and thus exposing them to threats of disinheritance by clan leaders and relatives; (b) Some clans and family heads were denying responsibility of allocating arable land for use to orphans and widows as the social system got weakened or had failed to re-establish itself. 58. In terms of dispute resolution, Male Headed Household (MHH) and Female Headed Household (FHH) had different experiences. FHH took long to have their land disputes resolved and this trend persisted even during displacement and upon return (post conflict) taking on average 2 to 8 months to resolve a particular dispute. In contrast, in all cases, the MHH took 1 to 6 months to have each land dispute case resolved. H. LAND TRANSACTIONS 59. Studies16 reviewed before this survey had pointed out that an increasing number of land transactions were taking place since displacement started, often to the disadvantage of 16The studies include: (i) No where to hide, CSOPNU (2004), (ii) Land Matters in Displacement, CSOPNU (2004), (iii) National IDPs Return, Resettlement, and Re-integration: Strategic Plan for Lango and Teso Sub- Regions, Republic of Uganda (2005), and Report on Rural IDP Camps in Lira District: Joint Inter Agency Assessment Mission, Republic of Uganda (2005) 20 indigenous customary land rights holders and the EVIs. It was argued that in most cases the EVIs were being propelled into the land market due to the socio-economic squeeze or due to absence of livelihood options, hence a higher probability of descending in abject poverty or destitution upon return or at the end of displacement. However, the study found that less than 3 percent of respondents had engaged in land purchase and sales. 60. The study also found that there had been a drastic fall in land renting from 57 percent during displacement to 11 percent since IDP return commenced. Borrowing for cultivation had dropped to 5 percent, while sharecropping was only 2 percent. On return 81 percent of respondents had not engaged in any land transactions since the movement out of the camps had begun. I. STATUS AND PERFORMANCE OF LAND ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTIONS 61. The statutory decentralized land administration structures under LA including DLBs, DLOs, ALCs and Recorders (at sub-county level) should be sufficient to handle land services delivery in the post-conflict situation. However, almost the entire infrastructure is either absent or is non functional. The state of records in land offices was found to be very poor and, in some instances, the districts were unable to produce records because they did not exist or could not be found17. Only Gulu and Lira land offices had records that could be extracted. 62. In terms of applications for land titles, the study (Figure 3) found a sharp rise in applications at the beginning of 2004 mainly in Lira for Lango Region. In Gulu land office, which serves Acholi region, virtually no rural land was being titled. However, there was the same level of demand for titles in urban Gulu as in urban Lira. 63. Looking at capacity to deliver in relation to demand, amongst the applications received, successful applications for which title was issued, rose in the period 2004-2006; particularly in urban Gulu compared to urban Lira. Rural Gulu, however, more or less had no titling activity compared to rural Lira which had a low but stable pattern of successful titling. 64. Despite the lower volume of applications in the Gulu office the capacity to respond was very high as almost all applications were processed. However, there was a sharp decline with commencement of return. Lira office's capacity to respond to the much higher applications for titling rural land was low, as the results showed a much higher number of unprocessed applications in the rural compared to urban areas. 17As was the case with Kitgum and Pader districts. 21 Figure 3: Applications for Land Titles Received and Approved at Gulu and Lira Land Offices 450 400 350 300 ved Recei 250 onsitaci 200 Appl of 150 No. 100 50 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Years Gulu Urban Gulu Rural Lira Urban Lira Rural 140 120 100 snoi cati 80 Appl ul ccessfu 60 S of No. 40 20 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Years Gulu Urban Gulu Rural Lira Urban Lira Rural Source: Lira and Gulu Land Office Records 22 65. These trends depict the weaknesses in the district institutions charged with the delivery of land services. Those institutions were severely affected by social dislocation and break-down of state infrastructure capacity which has created an enormous capacity gap for delivery of land services All DLOs (Lango and Acholi) that technically support DLBs in land administration were not fully equipped, especially for the new districts in the regions. Only Gulu was able to recruit half of the staff capacity required to deliver land services. The District Surveyor supposed to serve one DLO for example in either Lira or Gulu was serving both Lango and Acholi regions. Four of the 6 districts had constituted DLBs that were functional. Two districts had constituted land boards that were yet to function, and ALCs to support the functions of the DLBs at the apex were only in Lira and Gulu districts. 23 III. EMERGING ISSUES AND RECOMMENDED ACTIONS 66. To derive appropriate recommendations for land in northern Uganda, it is important to examine and borrow lessons and experiences from international best practices. The review of literature during the first phase of the study demonstrates that successful frameworks for tackling land in relation to IDP return, resettlement and reintegration, have undertaken the following: (a) Refined and resolved matters pertaining to three issues that create the potential for land conflict: (i) security of tenure, (ii) access to land, and (iii) equitable distribution of land; (b) Appreciated that land policy, as an element of the peace-building process, tends to be under-rated and has received little attention yet a good and widely accepted land policy clearly plays a fundamental role, in successful and peaceful recovery from conflict, and ensuring that further conflict does not recur; (c) Agreed that tenure security can only be achieved if a persons' interest in land can be successfully defended when challenged; (d) Agreed that proper management of land disputes and claims calls for the establishment of appropriate institutional mechanisms to support post conflict land administration; (e) Reached consensus that rights of vulnerable groups must be specifically protected in land policy and administrative undertakings; and (f) Fully endorsed the concept that land policy must create institutions and laws to meet claims for property restitution (recovery), resettlement and compensation. J. THE CONTEXT OF IDP RETURN 67. The prospects for peace and security, in Northern Uganda are now better than ever before. The fact that some people have successfully returned and reclaimed their property is a key sign of return to normal livelihoods. Improvements in security are also resulting in more IDP returns in both Lango and Acholi sub-regions. The sustenance of this momentum and eventual conclusion of IDP return depends on the following factors: (a) Successful conclusion of the Juba Peace talks, to rid IDPs of the scepticism about peaceful return to their origins; (b) Provision of socio-economic services and infrastructure in the villages of return; (c) Facilitation of EVIs18 to better manage their returns and to re-establish their livelihoods; 18Evidence from the study shows that return of EVIs was not smooth as the social structures that would cater for their interests and needs were either weakened or not in position to effect actions despite the necessity. 24 (d) Clarification of tenure (including opportunities for negotiated stay) of land where IDP camps have been located, in relation to the realities that the land owners must face upon camp closure and how to manage the populations that cannot return; and (e) Investigation and gaining understanding of the tenure and land administration implications of setting up transit sites, satellite camps or return sites in Acholi land whose scale and magnitude may replicate concerns already raised in relation to the main camps. K. TENURE SECURITY 68. The study demonstrates that displacement and return have worsened tenure security (especially, customary tenure security), compared to the pre-displacement period. In some instances they have sparked off new fears particularly for customary tenure that were not in existence before displacement. Customary Tenure 69. Customary tenure is the dominant land holding system for northern Uganda (covering over 90 percent of land holdings). It comes with its attendant rules for administration and dispute resolution, as well as institutions to enforce the customary norms and practices. In addition, there are large areas of land which are used for purposes other than cultivation and are managed for the benefit of all clan members. 70. The recommendations of the study on customary tenure are as follows: a) Customary tenure system should be codified. Its rationale, its operations, and practices should be written for legal precedent in case of litigation. b) Customary tenure has exhibited the capacity to evolve and should gradually move on to registration. However, should it become a necessity to consider certification or registration, then it should take place with emphasis on full community participation. There is no need of pushing certification and registration when the local populace is not ready. As noted during the first phase of the study, the Cambodian success, with land registration and titling during the post conflict era shows that the key is to engage the community and to develop locally suitable and affordable systems for mass surveys and data collection for land registration and titling. The systematic adjudication, demarcation survey and registration procedures being piloted by the MoLHUD embodies all the attributes required for its application in Northern Uganda and only needs community understanding and resources for sensitization to become an acceptable solution. c) Registration and certification under Communal Land Associations (CLAs) is strongly recommended for CPRs and communal land, which are currently at great risk of being grabbed. However, the legal processes and procedures require reform by ensuring that the rules of procedure for land administration and implementation of the LA which are already formulated are put in use. In addition, the District Registrar of Titles should be recruited, deployed, and funded for effective execution. 25 d) Resettlement on return will not be based on clan loyalties, given a much younger generation and diminished clan authority. It is recommended that in many cases during the interim period, a blend should be allowed to emerge, producing a system that embraces the traditional clan system, and also accords statutory powers and functions of modern institutions such as LCs or ALCs. This does not only recognize the new changes brought by war but also the fact that the clan bonds and traditional land authority systems may now be mal-functional or dysfunctional, in the changed circumstances. Thus, the first adjudication for dispute resolution and land administration over customary tenure should rest with traditional institutions (clans) and to the extent possible these institutions need to be integrated into the statutory land administration system. The key factors to consider in a strategy to formalize the role of traditional land management institutions are presented in Annex 3. Threats to IDP land 71. IDPs have several real or perceived fears on and/or threats to their land. The major threat was that of Government grabbing land either directly or indirectly. The IDPs and local leaders were suspicious that government had intentions of grabbing land for handing over to investors. Evidence on the ground did not point to even a single case where government had grabbed land. However some high ranking military officers and elite Acholi were reported to be trying to grab land in Acholi particularly in Amuru and Kitgum Districts. 72. The possibility that violence would erupt if fears and suspicions were not addressed remained high at the time of the study. The situation was not helped by the fact that there was a low level of understanding of the laws and policies on land amongst the local populace. 73. The recommendations of the study on reducing the threat to IDP land are as follows: a) It will be important to bring together and engage key state players such as the army, local government officials, central government and cultural / religious leaders of IDPs in open dialogue for purposes of creating a common understanding and mutual trust on land matters so as to reduce suspicions and mistrusts. Such communication as was undertaken in post-conflict Cambodia reduces confusion and improves transparency on the actions of government. b) Public education and information campaigns are critical in the entire process. Early public information and education campaigns about land-related issues can help to clarify issues and correct false assumptions. Information should also be given to advice people on how to protect their land rights, and on the rules and procedures for restitution, compensation, resettlement, and formalization of rights. A wide range of messages need to be created for different audiences and using different media and for different actors. The UN-habitat and UNDP together with other UN Agencies have recognized the importance of such an approach and have indicated strong interest in providing support for developing specific Information, Education, and Communications (IEC) materials appropriate for addressing the land issues in northern Uganda; 26 c) The movements of pastoralists far and wide into other districts should be either highly regulated or totally banned19. Land Registration and Titling 74. The understanding of land titling within northern region is highly variable. The majority of the population in Acholi and Lango (and also in Soroti as observed in phase one of the study) have for a very long time believed in the legitimacy offered by customary tenure. On the other hand, there are some who see the advantages offered by the legality and enforceability of land titling. Besides a number of real or perceived threats to indigenous customary interests were also evident (e.g. illegal occupation and logging by private investors) particularly for the weak groups. The fear of a grand government scheme to grab Acholi land and land grabbing by neighbors and relatives had also increased. Protection of the EVIs appeared to have declined. What would be the objectives of titling? 75. It is important to discern the purpose of land titling with the leaders and intended beneficiaries in the sub-regions. The conventional reasoning20 offered by most proponents of titling, is not sufficient. In the medium to long term, the primary objective appears to be to secure re-definition and adjudication of rights and interests in land, probably up to the level of mapping / demarcation and addressing the need for equity, tenure security and reduction in disputes or conflict. A secondary objective is to secure the common property resources against overall. What is the appropriate approach to titling? 76. This study found that it would be ideal to pursue a gradual process, aimed not at the immediate replacement of customary tenure but an adaptation of titling to the conditions of customary tenure. Such an approach would only be successful if it is backed by extensive public education. The public education and sensitization has to address the following issues: (a) how the communities can use common resources and common property rights, and (b) how the family / household claims and rights would be dealt with under clan lands that have been titled. 77. The potential for loss of secondary or derived rights provides challenges on how to ensure the rights of EVIs. This calls for an understanding of how the interests and rights of the family or individuals are addressed within such an arrangement and the modalities of how the community exercises the various "bundles of rights" on land. 19The team was informed that the details of future pastoralist movements would be handled in a Pastoral Policy document being drafted by Government (personal communication from Directorate of Animal Resources, Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries and Fisheries). 20The main arguments advanced in the literature reviewed in phase one of the study include: (i) customary tenure is a constraint to development and should be replaced with freehold, (ii) land titling is a means of increasing tenure security, (iii) there is a direct causal link between formalization of property rights and economic productivity; (iv) increased tenure security enhances investment incentives and raises agricultural productivity; (v) increased tenure security stimulates development of the land markets, and (vi) there is a close link between formal title and access to credit facilities 27 Multiple Rights and Interests 78. A major challenge is how to codify customary tenure ­ the sets of secondary interests, and the various social and economic on customary land. Customary tenure is such that it has a "bundle of rights"21. There have been suggestions that group rights over extensive areas be demarcated and registered under cultural trusts (such as the Acholi Cultural Trust or Lango Cultural Foundation) as opposed to individual titling. However, this approach is normally proposed by the elite leadership in the sub-regions, not always by the communities whose understanding of such proposals may be limited. The major fear associated with this is that of manipulation by the elite which could open new possibilities for conflict and insecurity. 79. The recommendation of the study on land titling based on real or perceived threats to IDP land discussed above is that government should place a temporary moratorium on land sales and titling in the rural Acholi region until IDPs return to their places of origin is complete and sensitization on land rights in the region has taken place. The rural Lango region may be exempted from the moratorium because return of IDPs in this region is now complete. The ban is particularly necessary for the Acholi region due to the following reasons: (a) There are ups and downs in the return patterns particularly for the Acholi sub-region which are attributable to the history of previous attempts to negotiate peace with the LRA. For instance, in 1992, a deal was nearly struck under negotiations spearheaded by Minister Betty Bigombe.22 As the talks were on-going IDPs massively returned to their homes only to be brutally attacked by the LRA as soon as the talks collapsed? This event has proved to be a lesson whose outcomes no IDP wants to forget or fail to heed, thus their skepticism about early return before the peace deal is actually done. (b) The leadership and the communities in Acholi sub-region are leaning towards accomplishing return and reconciliation before settling to land matters. Attempts to tackle the situation in the Acholi region when return is not yet complete will be futile. The experiences of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Rwanda and Burundi, show very clearly that protracted conflicts can occur through allowing or forcing transactions on land to take place while the majority of the original populations are, for one reason or other, in displacement in different locations. (c) Land disputes and tenure insecurity are on the rise due to obscure/ inconsistent boundary markers and (perceived) land scarcity. Such disputes mostly occur on land that was left behind upon displacement. It is important that IDPs go back to their land first so as to ensure that legitimate and transparent transactions (including registration and titling) are undertaken in the areas formerly occupied by them. (d) Public information campaigns about land must be undertaken to clarify issues, correct false assumptions and close the gap on legal awareness of land issues.23. 21According the literature reviewed the bundle of rights include: (i) the right to derive benefit from the asset (User right), (ii) the right to decide who shall be permitted to use the asset and under which conditions (Management right), (iii), the right to derive income from the use of the resource (Income right), (iv), the right to consume destroy and transform the land (Capital right), and (v) the right to sell or give away or bequeath the asset (Transfer right) 22The then Minister for pacification of northern Uganda. 23There have been attempts by UN-Habitat and UNDP together with other UN Agencies to develop specific IEC materials responding to land issues in northern Uganda with a view to ensuring that appropriate information 28 (e) Facilitation of EVIs to manage their own return process and re-establish their livelihoods will be a must for conclusive return of IDPs. The potential for loss of secondary or derived rights, which is the main form of land access and ownership for such groups, poses the challenges. L. IMPLICATIONS ON THE POLICY FRAMEWORK 80. The experiences of several countries, including Cambodia, Bosnia, El Salvador and Rwanda, on the importance of a favorable policy environment in the resolution of land conflicts were reviewed during the first phase of the study. Four main traits stand out prominently, namely: (a) a policy commitment to protect land and possessions, (b) commitment to resettle and reintegrate IDPs on return by acquiring land, (c) availing mechanisms for recovery (restitution) of IDPs' land, and (d) compensation loss of land or property. These are discussed below in the context of the policy environment for handling land disputes in Northern Uganda. The National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons (NPIDP), 2004 81. The NPIDP places the responsibility of restoring land to the returning IDPs (restitution) on local governments without elaborating implementation mechanisms. The NPIDP requires local governments to resettle and reintegrate the returning IDPs by "acquiring or recovering their land in accordance with the provisions of the LA". Where recovery of land is not possible, local governments are required to acquire and allocate land to the displaced families. No strategies for this process are stated in the policy. Where is the free land to allocate? The NPIDP also assumes that IDPs would return to their places of origin and it does not make provision for the IDPs who may be forced to stay in camps for ever or those who may not opt to return to their areas of origin. 82. The recommendation of the study on NPIDP is to amend it. New guidelines on property rights should be drawn up as necessary. The amendments and guidelines should include the following: (a) Redefine the broad policy responsibility for restitution (recovery) and resettlement as the mandate of the central government ­ specifically MoLHUD ­ because local governments have neither the resources nor the technical capacity. However, the implementation function should still rest with local governments; for this they need guidance and support from the central government,; (b) Settle the issue of those who may wish to remain in the areas of displacement given the opportunities offered in the new locations and the advantages of urbanization rather than returning to their areas of origin; (c) Develop guidelines for the interests to be considered for restitution or resettlement, eligibility criteria, assessment criteria, verification of claims and execution of claims. There will be need to note the peculiarity of northern Uganda in claims verification, given the fact that customary tenure has no records and other evidence must be considered. Additional work is needed to define the operational is passed on to audiences but the results of such initiatives are not readily available yet. MoLHUD has also recently developed IEC materials that need to be translated into local languages for wider distribution and use. 29 elements of restitution/compensation, including costs, locations, eligibility and procedures. The Draft National Land Policy (NLP) 83. The draft NLP upholds the land rights of IDPs under the principle of enhanced equity and social justice in society. However, it lacks in-depth analysis of post-conflict land issues and proposes only one strategy in the entire document i.e. resettle all internally displaced persons in their areas of origin and guarantee their security of tenure (para 50 (iv)24. This fails to address the issues and concerns of those who prefer to remain in camps or around the IDP camps as their places have become urbanized and offer opportunities, facilities and services which may not be readily available elsewhere. 84. The recommendation of the study on the draft NLP is that the following principles, detailed in the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998) be adopted for the NLP: (a) IDP return without restitution is an incomplete solution to displacement or resettlement; (b) The right to return is not an obligation to return nor a condition for restitution of property; (c) Failure to physically return due to security or potential threats, does not nullify a person's restitution rights; (d) Compensation is an acceptable substitute for the physical recovery of original homes and lands The National Resettlement Policy 85. The recommendation of the study on the National Resettlement Policy is that given the issues of failure to return or the preference to return to other areas other than the location from which displacement happened, government should develop a resettlement policy25. M. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK The Constitution of Uganda 86. Objective XIV26 of the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, stated in the Constitution of Uganda, 1995 pledges to fulfill the fundamental rights of Ugandans to social justice and economic development by ensuring maximum social and cultural well being. This broadly provides for the rights of IDPs but it is not as well articulated as that of women and persons with disabilities in objectives XV and XVI27. 24Draft 3 of NLP ( May 2007) 25Further details on preparation of effective resettlement policy is available in the Handbook on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (NRC and UN agencies, 2007) 26Objective XIV of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995). 27Objectives XV and XVI, of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995). 30 Article 45, however, states that non-mention is not tantamount to exclusion for enjoying the rights, duties, declarations and guarantees of human rights. 87. In Articles 26(1) and 26(2)28, the fundamental right of every citizen to own property individually or in association with others, in addition to protecting the right of every citizen not to be deprived of personal property without compensation, is guaranteed. The guarantee is without bias to citizens internally displaced since all citizens are equal before and under the law. In view of this Constitutional right, no enabling legislation under this Constitution should deprive a proprietor or owner of land of his/her interest in the property. These articles provide the major premise under which the loss of property, and in this case land, could be addressed in post conflict land administration. 88. Under Article 32(1)29 the State is obliged to take affirmative action in favor of marginalized groups based on gender or other reasons created by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of redressing existing imbalances. The imbalance in this case would be defined in terms of deprivation of rights of ownership, access to and use of land by IDPs under the circumstances of war. Again in the subsequent Articles (32 1-6, 33, 34, 35 and 36) the marginalized groups are described without mention of internal displacement by war such as in northern Uganda. 89. The Constitution of Uganda under Article 237 vests all land in Uganda in its citizens under four tenure systems; freehold, leasehold, mailo and customary tenure. The significance of this article is in its recognition of customary tenure as a legal tenure for the first time since the constitutional dispensation on land emerged in Uganda. 90. In terms of land administration and institutions, Articles 238 ­ 240 of the Constitution establishes the basic land institutions-the ULC and DLBs. It also prescribes the functions for each of these institutions. While the Constitution prescribes the membership, procedure and terms of service of the ULC, it gives Parliament the power to enact legislation prescribing the same for the DLBs. 91. Article 243 provides for the establishment of DLTs30 and streamlines the jurisdiction of these tribunals to be the determination of land disputes relating to the grant, lease, repossession, transfer or acquisition of land by individuals, the Uganda Land Commission or other authorities with responsibilities relating to land. The jurisdiction also includes the determination of any disputes relating to the amount of compensation to be paid for land acquired31. 92. On the basis of the above, it is clear that the Ugandan constitution does provide the broad statutory requirements for handling land issue pertaining to IDPs and it is the enabling legislation that should be structured to take account of the details pertaining to specific IDP issues and concerns. Land Act, Cap. 227 28Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) states that every person has a right to own property, either individually or in association with others 29Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 30DLTs have since been abolished in December 2006 and their functions transferred to the district magistrates' courts 31 93. The current legal framework as elaborated under the LA does not sufficiently take care of post-conflict land issues, although section 41 of the LA provides for the establishment of a land fund, to be used, among other things, to "resettle people who have been rendered landless by government action, natural disasters or any other cause". This raises two very pertinent issues. 94. First, the LA still lacks guidelines or principles to apply for resettlement, clearly specifying who qualifies to be resettled, and on what terms and conditions. The power of compulsory acquisition of land given to government under section 41 (6) is limited to registered land occupied by lawful or bona fide occupants. The interpretation is that Government cannot invoke powers of eminent domain to acquire land to resettle IDPs. 95. Second, the Land Fund, since its establishment, has lacked an appropriate administrative and institutional framework, resources and capacity. Currently responsibility for the management of the Land Fund is with the ULC which has so far been unable to deliver on the fund. 96. In addition, there will be need to ensure that compensation claims are fully appraised. The elements of compensation must be agreed on; these may include use of land, occupation, degradation and harvested resources such as trees. Claims during verification must be cognizant of land owners out to make false claims especially if IDP directly covered the cost of occupation or use of land during displacement. Hence, the three aspects of managing compensation to be clarified are verification of claims, determination of compensation, and the assignment of institutional responsibility. Land Acquisition Act, Cap. 226 97. The Land Acquisition Act, Cap. 226 which is the principle law on compensation was enacted in 1965. It is outdated and many of its provisions are inconsistent with the constitutional provisions under the 1995 Constitution (especially article 26). The compensation provisions in the LA are not sufficient to handle the expected compensation claims as detailed here. The law does not provide for the basis of assessment; it does not state what is eligible and not eligible for compensation; it does not state who will be responsible for assessing compensation. The basis of assessment is in section 41 (6) and it is restricted to only registered land occupied by lawful or bona fide occupants. Section 72 of the LA limits itself to compensation claims in relation to damages and losses arising out of official encampment on private land by any officer of Government. The section however does not apply to the encampment of any authorized security forces. The LA does not specify the modalities to be used in making the claim and the principles to be used in assessing the quantum of compensation. 98. The recommendations of the study on the legal framework for land comprise: (i) during the comprehensive reform of land related laws all matters related to compensation should be incorporated under the Land Acquisition Amendment Bill, (ii) the new Land Acquisition Act should be harmonized with the LA and made to comply with the constitutional requirement for prompt, adequate and fair compensation, (iii) both Acts should be amended to provide for what is eligible for compensation as well as the basis of assessment, and (iv) the full structure and framework encompassing the basis for assessment of compensation, determining quantum of interests to compensate, verification of claims and processing of claims should be part of the amendments. 32 N. IMPLICATIONS ON THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 99. The mechanisms for land administration in northern Uganda have undergone dramatic changes during the displacement period and the post-conflict era32. Some aspects of these changes are discussed in the sections below. Institutional Framework for Resettlement, Restitution and Compensation 100. In essence the right to restitution cannot be deferred or denied. However, currently there is no established institutional framework to handle restitution (recovery of land), resettlement and compensation. The IDP Policy points to local governments as the responsible centers for recovery of land (restitution) and resettlement (where recovery is not possible). The level of local government and specific agencies of local governments are not specified. In addition, issues arise on whether local governments have the institutional capacities to handle this work. Resettlement 101. The need to provide land for those who are landless or who cannot return to their homes is unavoidable, particularly with regard to the EVIs. EVIs will require separate processes for the allocation of land. The challenge is to find land that is available for their resettlement. Public lands (some controlled by the Central Government and local governments), could be used for resettlement. The other option is to purchase private land on the open market. The use of private land that has been abandoned should be avoided as this is likely to lead to the government creating a dispute between itself, the owners of the land, and the people who have been resettled. Restitution 102. Restitution requires the adjudication of claims to determine the most legitimate claim. Solutions for land claims should not be seen as a simple declaration of entitlement to land rights but should also strive to support national reconciliation. Refugees, IDPs and ex- combatants returning home may find their land/property occupied by others. Unauthorized occupation may also occur on public lands or gazetted lands/protected natural resources. When people recover their property from occupants, how can the occupants be protected from homelessness? Claims and Compensation 103. The rules for treating land claims and disputes must be defined e.g. the types of claims eligible for restitution and the validity date for claims. Land in northern Uganda is held under customary tenure without formal records, so it will be necessary to accept other evidence, including oral evidence, to establish and define land rights and to establish criteria for settling claims. 104. The biggest challenge is likely to arise from submitting and processing claims in a manner readily accessible to the majority. Forms on the process should be in local languages 32Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda - CSOPNU (2004) 33 with consideration of the literacy levels of the population. If any fees are to be demanded for the process, the fees should be affordable to the people. The design of the system should reflect the limited resources available. Institutions for Land Administration 105. The core functions of land administration should be shared between the customary authorities and the statutory institutions established under the LA (i.e. ALCs, Recorder at the sub-county level, and the DLO). However, at present the exact responsibilities for each institution for the various land related issues including restitution and resettlement, evictions, management of public lands and abandoned private lands remain to be defined. Statutory Institutions 106. The statutory decentralized land administration structures (i.e. DLBs, DLOs, ALCs and Recorders) would be sufficient to handle land services delivery. However, almost the entire infrastructure is either not local or is non functional. 107. In addition to the weakness of the decentralized structure, local governments do not consider resource allocation and staff capacity for land a priority; hence they are understaffed and under resourced not only at the apex, but at the level of the base institutions as well. Customary Institutions 108. The current framework fails to take advantage of the roles and functions of customary land administration. Clan leaders such as the Rwot Kweri could go through additional training, which could help in formalizing the customary mechanisms. It would also be very helpful to codify those customary mechanisms that reinforce government land policy objectives and use the outcome for land administration purposes. 109. One finding of this study is that serious misinterpretations of law have led to increased tension. It is imperative that relevant legal documents be translated into local languages and that there be a government agency33 to vet all sensitization materials pertaining to legal documents that are used to train customary institutions so that laws are interpreted correctly. Customary institutions will also need the financial resources and capacity building that would enable record keeping. Though customary institutions are flexible, they are also prone to some of the same faults as statutory institutions such as corruption, and thus along with knowledge and skill training there must be an accountability mechanism for customary institutions. Land Conflict and Disputes Management 110. There is no adequate institutional capacity to manage land disputes. Targeted institutional strengthening to promote handling disputes is necessary. Initiatives and support should focus both on the formal system and the informal / customary conflict-resolution mechanisms. Statutory Institutions 33MoLHUD has a Governance and NGO Liaison Office that would constitute an appropriate agency for such a task 34 111. The institutional roles of LCs in dispute resolution and land administration must be clarified. In dealing with LCs, the concept of separation of powers for governance from the juridical role in dispute resolution needs to be addressed. The capacities of both LCs and clans must be built because neither is able to perform the most basic functions, such as keeping records of disputes or land administration. Since LC1 are effectively engaging in disputes resolution other than LC2, which is the legally recognized court of first instances, the law must be amended to make the roles of LC1 and LC2 consistent. However, moving such courts to LC 1 would be expensive. In general, simple disputes can be resolved through the LC court while the more difficult ones should be referred to the district courts. Customary Institutions 112. Legitimate informal institutions, such as clans, have to be identified and formalized to help manage land disputes. A variety of land disputes, other than restitution, are envisaged in the post-conflict area. Customary and community-based mechanisms for conflict resolution are very relevant especially alternative dispute resolution approaches such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration. These mechanisms can offer effective acceptable means of managing many kinds of land conflicts and disputes. Enforcement mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure that judgments and settlements are implemented. Where traditional institutions are still operational, it is pertinent that they are institutionalized in a manner similar to the statutory ones. In some areas, traditional leaders feel that they are being sidelined by local government structures in development issues, despite the fact that customary law is recognized constitutionally in Uganda. Other traditional leaders wield immense powers over land and natural resources in their areas and this has implications for land and natural resource conflicts. 113. The recommendations of the study on the institutional framework are: (a) Since resettlement, restitution and compensation policy are national functions, they should be handled by the central government in collaboration with the local governments. The appropriate institutional arrangement should detail the executing agency at the centre (MoLHUD) and the horizontal linkages with Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Ministry of Finance and OPM, as well as vertical linkages with the local governments; (b) A claims processing unit should be established at Parish level (Parish Development Committee) which should ensure that applications meet administrative requirements before being submitted for decision. Claims for compensation and applications for resettlement should be verified at the parish level by the Parish Development Committee and the traditional institutions on land (clans) and sent to the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC). The DLO should have the mandate of assessing compensation, and the DLB should assist the DDMC in matters of resettlement. Legal aid units should inform people of procedures and assist them to complete the forms; (c) Future institutional arrangements for land services in northern Uganda include traditional clans, and statutory powers and functions of modern institutions such as LCs or ALCs. This would not only recognize the changes brought by war but 35 also the facts that the traditional land authorities may now be mal-functional or dysfunctional. (d) Targeted institutional strengthening or capacity building at all levels to promote more efficient handling of disputes will be necessary. Initiatives and support should focus both on the formal system and the informal / customary conflict- resolution mechanisms. (e) Land administration institutions at all levels require financial resources and capacity building to enable them provide the basic services including record keeping. Additionally, legal documents need to be translated into local languages so that they can be used by the local people. O. IMPLICATIONS ON PRDP 114. The design of the PRDP focused on other development issues including Natural Resource Management (NRM). It did not address IDP land conflicts stemming from boundary disputes, encroachment, or squatting. The issue of NRM is important and sustainable NRM can mitigate the prevalence of land conflicts. Several studies have found that depletion, such as cutting trees, has led to resource of land conflicts. At one level the NRM and land conflicts are intertwined since land is a natural resource. However, the framework of NRM does not adequately address the whole host of problems arising from tenure insecurity/lack of adequate property rights which tends to be, the main source of land conflicts. Therefore, the recommendation of the study on the PRDP framework is that it should be part and parcel of the various actions recommended by this study on land issues as contained in this Chapter 3. The implementation of the PRDP should, therefore, include the actions recommended in the study. Government may need financial and technical support to do these before the return of the IDPs. P. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 115. Northern Uganda is at a transitional moment, from over 20 years of conflict, to the eventual conclusion of the peace negotiations between the Government of Uganda and the LRA. This presents the defining moment for ending internal displacement, which has affected much of northern Uganda For the Acholi sub-region34 return is taking place at a much slower rate than anticipated. The recorded return in Acholi has shown uneven patterns ranging from 5 percent to 15 percent by the time of the study35, In Teso IDP return was complete, while in Lango it was over 92 percent completed. In general, however, IDP return is dependant upon: (i) successful conclusion of the Juba Peace talks, to rid IDPs of their skepticism about peaceful; and (ii) provision of socio-economic services and infrastructure in the return areas. 116. Given the findings of this study, three major actions must be emphasized: (a) First, "cultivating the desired level of trust in the people over land issues through administrative and other procedures that demonstrate explicit government commitment to protecting land and natural resource rights of IDPs on return". The 34Which at times, was at variance with Lango and Teso regions due to difference in the period of displacement, where in the former displacement had been for 7 - 15 years while in the latter it had occurred for 3 - 7 years 35UNCHR, Jan 2008 (personal communication) 36 information, Education and Communication (IEC) strategy recently developed by MLH&UD with support from PSCP II should be utilized to inform how this process could be implemented in the case of northern Uganda; (b) Second, government must suspend issue of land titles in rural Acholi until IDP return is completed and sensitization on land rights has taken place. Therefore, the actions of Uganda Land Commission and District Land Boards in rural Acholi region should be temporarily frozen until IDP return is achieved and sensitization on land rights is attained. Rural Lango may be excluded from the moratorium because IDP return is now complete in this region. (c) In order for government to meet the immediate needs of the returning IDPs, it may require additional support (outside that provided in the PRDP) for operationalizing the general policy recommendations arising out of this study. Part of this effort should involve using the findings of this study to develop guidelines to handle the issue of camp closures particularly in the Acholi region where large camps have been in existence for many years 37 ANNEX 1: SURVEY RESULTS Sample 1. The survey covered 1,119 respondents of whom 48.3 percent (541) were female while 51.7 percent (578) were male; the distribution of these respondents in the six study districts by sex, household category and where they were located at the time of survey is depicted in Annex Table 1-1 below. Overall in Lango, 35 percent of respondents were FHH, 67 percent were MHH, in Acholi 28 percent were FHH, 70 percent were MHH, on the other hand, child headed household constituted less than 2 percent of respondents in both regions. 35 percent of the total respondents were returned home in their either origin home or return sites that are located in the precincts of their homes less than 2 kms, 15 percent were resettled in other rural areas, less than 1 percent was resettled in urban area, while 49 percent were still in main camps or decongestion camps. 2. The distribution of respondents further shows most respondents (39.5 percent) to have attained upper primary (p.5-p7) as their highest level of education, 22.8 percent had no education at all while less than 2 percent had either had A-level or tertiary education as (Annex Table 1-2). 64 percent of respondents were household heads, 27 percent were spouses of household heads, while 6 percent were children within household, as shown in Annex Table 1-3. 3. Annex Table 1-4, shows that 50 percent of respondents were married in monogamous relationships (by their conviction) 18 percent were widowed, while 15 percent were in polygamous marriages, while 75 were not married. 71 percent were married under customary law, while 23 percent by description of the processes undergone for formalization were cohabiting despite their personal convictions that could have been indicating otherwise. 81 percent of the married had contracted their marriages before displacement while 185 got married while in displacement. 4. Annex Table 1-5 shows more data on marriages. III-38 % 5.1 .8 28.3 70.2 34.9 15.2 49.1 34.9 16.0 49.1 48.3 51.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Total Col 71 9 Table n 315 783 391 170 549 391 179 549 541 578 1115 1119 1119 1119 % 6.1 3. 25.0 73.4 25.3 20.6 53.8 25.3 20.9 53.8 49.8 50.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Col Total 21 2 n 192 564 768 195 159 415 771 195 161 415 771 384 387 771 % 4.9 4.9 13.6 86.4 43.7 51.5 43.7 51.5 42.7 57.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Col Amuru 5 5 14 89 n 031 45 53 031 45 53 031 44 59 031 8. % 27.7 70.5 11.8 17.6 70.6 11.8 17.6 70.6 45.7 54.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Respondents Col of Acholi Kitgum 41 61 26 39 26 39 n 155 220 156 221 156 221 101 120 221 Sex District 3. 9. and % 5.2 5.2 22.5 76.2 48.9 45.0 49.8 45.0 46.8 53.2 Study 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Col Pader 31 2 52 12 12 n 176 231 113 104 231 115 104 231 108 123 231 Location ry, 3. .9 .9 Regions % 0.43 67.3 51.9 47.2 51.9 47.2 60.6 9.43 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Col 39 Gulu Catego 52 2 2 65 85 n 144 214 112 102 216 112 102 216 131 216 IDP 4. % 3.2 2.0 5.2 35.4 63.1 56.3 38.5 56.3 38.5 45.1 54.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Col Total 51 7 11 18 n 123 219 347 196 134 348 196 134 348 157 191 348 Household, 9. 9. 9. 1-1: % 3.5 4.4 32.7 67.3 00.01 94.7 00.01 94.7 00.01 50.4 49.6 00.01 Col Table Lango Oyam 4 1 1 5 1 37 76 57 56 n 113 107 113 107 113 113 District Annex % 1.2 3.0 2.6 5.5 36.8 61.1 37.9 56.6 37.9 56.6 42.6 57.4 Study 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Col Lira 5 7 6 86 89 89 13 n 143 234 133 235 133 235 100 135 235 rural Urban Total Total Village Site Total Total camp H camp H HH FHH MHH C Group IDP Returned Resettled Resettled In Group Location Home Return main Group Sex Female Male Group .8 .7 .5 % 22 22 39 12.4 1.2 1.5 100 Total n 542 532 414 138 13 17 1116 .2 .4 .8 % 26 21 39 8.7 1.9 1.9 100 Amuru n 72 22 14 9 2 2 103 % 5.52 3.22 0.94 9.1 0.5 0.9 100 Kitgum n 56 51 90 20 1 2 220 .8 .1 .2 % 21 20 40 12.7 3.1 2.2 100 Respondents %) Pader n (Col 50 46 92 29 7 5 229 Survey of District % 22.2 24.5 43.1 8.8 1.4 100 40 Study Gulu n 48 53 93 19 3 216 Education 1-2: % 23.9 21.2 40.7 10.6 0.9 2.7 100 Table Oyam n 27 24 46 12 1 3 113 Annex % 19.6 24.3 33.6 20.9 0.9 0.9 100 Lira n 46 57 79 49 2 2 235 Education of Primary Primary Level Education No Lower Upper O-Level A-Level Tertiary Highest Total % 6.1 1.9 0.5 64.3 27.1 100 Col Total 6 6.5 2.7 6.3 0.6 81 68 21 % 17.7 15.9 50.4 100 1.9 3.6 71.1 23.4 100 1.2 714 301 Col 17.8 n 1110 Total 7 72 30 70 17 32 12 1 n 196 176 559 636 209 894 810 178 100 1110 7.8 % 56.9 34.3 100 1 % 5.8 2.9 7.8 7.8 35 39.8 100 2.2 1.1 64.5 32.3 100 2.2 64.1 33.7 100 Amuru 8 1 l 58 35 n 102 Amuru 6 3 8 8 1 2 1 2 36 41 60 30 93 59 31 n 103 100 6.4 1.4 67.1 25.1 100 % 1 9.2 4.6 12 0.5 92 % 18.9 13.4 41.5 100 4.4 64.2 31.4 100 82.6 16.4 Kitgum 3 1 7 2 55 14 Kitgum 20 10 41 26 29 90 50 32 n 147 219 n 217 102 159 161 100 5.7 2.6 4.8 0.4 7.9 18 5.7 1.7 0.9 % 16.3 62.1 100 5.5 2.7 73.8 100 0.5 76.8 22.7 195 Head % 62.4 29.3 100 cti Pader 6 1 5 1 13 37 11 18 10 33 45 Pader 4 2 n 141 227 135 183 152 100 67 13 n 143 229 Distr District Respondents 1 Household of % 7.9 2.3 6.5 0.5 19.4 16.2 47.2 100 2.5 68.7 28.8 100 77.5 21.5 198 9.3 3.3 1.4 Study Study % 55.8 30.2 100 with Gulu 5 1 4 2 17 42 14 35 47 43 Status n 102 216 112 163 155 100 Gulu 7 3 65 20 n 120 215 41 1 5.4 0.9 17 0.9 % 10.7 65.2 100 3.1 3.1 79.2 14.6 100 7.9 91.1 200 Marital Relationship 1.8 % 66.4 31.9 100 Oyam 1-4: 6 1 1 3 3 8 1 n 19 12 73 76 14 96 92 112 100 1-3: Oyam 2 75 36 n 113 1 6 Table 4.3 2.1 4.3 1.3 8.9 1.9 % Table 20.9 19.6 47.7 100 75.5 17.5 100 89.3 101 Lira 4.7 2.6 0.4 100 Annex 5 3 2 4 % 73.7 18.5 10 49 10 46 12 35 19 n 112 235 151 200 191 100 Annex Lira 6 1 43 11 n 171 232 214 nte ade onogamous H Displacem Displacement in Displacement married ehold rried-Polygamousa rried-Ma mother Not Separated Widowed Co-habiting Divorced M M Islamic Christian Customary Cohabiting Before While After Hous daughter to Head is father/ son/ got Type my my Marital is is Head Spouse ied en Relationship Am My Head Head Others Total Respondents Current Status Total Respondents Current Marriage Total Wh Respondent Marr Total 8 % 92 87.4 12.6 100 100 44.7 55.3 100 % Total Total 73.0 18.6 8.4 Col 100.0 n 25 15 38 47 85 173 198 173 188 oupr G n 373 95 43 511 2.9 100 3.1 75 25 Col % 97.1 96.9 100 100 District Amuru 1 1 9 3 34 35 31 32 12 place n % Study took 15.5 67.4 17.1 Col 100.0 5.6 Col % 94.4 100 88.6 11.4 100 33.3 66.7 100 cement No 2 4 6 Kitgum 34 36 31 35 12 18 n Displa 9.3 Col % 71.1 28.9 100 90.7 100 41.2 58.8 100 which n 20 87 22 129 Pader 4 7 from 32 13 45 39 43 10 17 n IDPs Respondents of Land of of 9.1 Col % 89.1 10.9 100 90.9 100 46.2 53.8 100 Gulu 5 4 Patterns Parcelt Periods 41 46 40 44 12 14 26 n Exac % 42 80 20 20 80 Return the 92.4 2.1 5.5 Col 100.0 Col % 100 100 100 100 to Marriage 1-6: its Oyam 8 2 9 9 1 4 5 10 Yes 1-5: n Table etherh W 8 7.7 92 Table Col % 92.3 100 100 42.9 57.1 100 Annex Lira 2 2 3 4 7 n 8 24 26 23 25 Returned: 353 21 382 Annex n Yes No Yes No Yes No of at Site) wives returned Whether Whether Return Spouse other have ent: Displacement: ) as in had Camp/ ct who Village) lacement: ri P Camp Spouse ID Disp Dist Displacem as Married of in in be Husband (Home (Satellite (Main & Total ge ied Same Tri ied e ia Marr from Total Marr Sam Total Female Whether marr Total Location Returned Returned Returned Group Return or Relocation: Trends and Impacts 5. The transition from war to peace and from camps to homes has come, with varied and unpredictable changes after a minimum of 5 years to a maximum of 13 years for the people of Lango and Acholi regions. The return in Lango region is advanced with approximately 92 percent of the IDP population returned home.36 About 17,200 people including the elderly, disabled (who are unable to return) and business people (who feel they still have investments to protect) are still in 9 camps in Lira, Oyam and Apac districts37. 6. Acholi region is in initial stages of relocating from main camps to the decongestion sites or camps, or satellite or return camps (the terms applied to them are varied and are meant to allow people access their land for cultivation). it is estimated that out of 1,111,987 people who lived in IDP camps, only 55,000 people (5 percent) have returned to their original homes, while 359,000 people (32 percent) have moved to transit camps ("new settlement" and "decongestion" sites). In Gulu and Amuru Districts, 88,000 IDPs have left the main/mother IDP camps to the transit sites (120 newly created transit sites), while in Kitgum District 77,000 IDPs have gone to the satellite areas (69 transit sites), 194,000 IDPs in Pader District have moved to closer to their villages (171 transit sites).( 3839404142) Trends in Population Movements 7. Three distinct patterns of return movement are observable as shown in Annex Table 1-6. 8. First, the government encouraged moves to decongestion sites or to satellite camps accounting for 19 percent of the respondents mainly evident in Acholi region. Such returns imply the majority of the returnees are congregating in designated points (67 percent of them) as opposed to 2 percent who actually access and live in their homes on return. 9. Second, spontaneous movements to new settlement sites or return sites in response to changing conditions in main camps as humanitarian organizations change strategy to recovery response hence a shift in delivery of services to return sites. These are also in line with spontaneous movement to original homes which have been significant in Lango region, although happening on a smaller scale in Acholi. In such cases the relocation is first discussed in the main camp by the Clan meetings, the decision to move is then made by individual family at household level. This has yielded a trend whereby villages have returned in one unit and where clans have held the legitimacy of guiding households in the return process. Within households, men decide whether to move or not. Women in Focus Group discussions suggested that the push factor for them is the need to access land and to produce sufficient amounts of food for the household. This pattern of return accounts for 73 percent of movements of which 92 percent return to the homes that they lived in before displacement 36DDPMC Lira District, interviewed July 2007 37UNHCR, September 2007 38Chairman, LCV Gulu District interviewed 19th July 2007 39are the long-standing IDP camps which existed prior to the recent movements of return 40are identified by the Government, some with assistance from humanitarian agencies 41these are new settlements identified by the IDPS themselves or demarcated by Government or demarcated with help of humanitarian agencies but are not the pre-displacement homes. 42Officials Figures as given by Hon. Amama Mbabazi the Minister for Security (New Vision, August 10 2007, page 10) 43 while 15 percent are in locations next to their homes where access to their land, especially for food production, is eased. 10. However, there is still a proportion of IDPs remaining in the main camps either because they are extremely vulnerable groups (EVIs), whose presence evident in Lango return as constituting the total unreturned population of about 5 percent-8 percent or as evidenced in Acholi region are strategically maintaining a presence in the main camp, should the peace process falter or for humanitarian food ratios and supplies access, these as per survey results account for 8 percent of the respondents. 11. Whereas the categories above seem distinct, they do not able to depict the number of relocations that IDPs have been through nor that in some instances the indigenous persons of an area where a particular IDP camp is situated often fled only to be replaced by others from another area. Therefore, some return points are either the precincts of an IDP camp or the actual location of either the main camp or satellite camp area. In addition, a distortion in the notion of "return home", is emerging partially fuelled by media43, in terms of places where one was actually living before displacement as opposed to areas of ancestral descent. This has caused land wrangles in Acholi region and has enlisted caused some to indulge in "political opportunism and invented history to back such claims"44. This finding is common in other post-conflict situations45 where groups seize the opportunity to advance land claims based on historical occupation and the pursuit of a "return" to historical lands or territory from which groups were expelled or departed long ago. 12. Most of the movements have taken place in the past year. They are attributable in part to the signing of cessations of hostilities agreement between the Government and the LRA/M, and in response to the government's directive for all IDPs to vacate the camps, however only when comprehensive peace, security and law safe guards are in place will IDPs have the confidence to put a conclusive end to their displacement status, this according to focus group discussion will be signaled by the positive conclusion of the Juba Peace talks, without that ideal return is still affected by perception of "insecurity" for most of the respondents to this study accounting for 71 percent of non-return to land held before displacement. 13. The majority of the respondents revealed that they were still awaiting the maturity46 of roofing grass that was in short supply. This tells the extent to which return efforts have addressed basic need for shelter, which is evident among 17 percent of the respondents On going land conflict' accounted for 9.9 percent of the non-return to exact parcel of land before displacement, for both the Acholi and Lango regions as illustrated in Annex Figure 1-1 below. 43Focus Group Discussions revealed that Mega FM broadcasts a program on land that is influential in how people perceive return and has propagated the notion of return to "your area of ancestral origin", making clans retrace their migration routes back to 50-100 years of history, leading to clashes between Lamogi and inhabitants of Amuru Sub County in Koch Goma 44Refugee Law Project, June 2007, Rapid Assessment of Population Movement in Gulu and Pader. 45Was common in Middle East, Israeli and Palestine situation also exhibited this. 46Expected to mature in the months of November and December, 2007 44 Annex Figure 1-1: Failure to return to Land Parcel held before Displacement 80 71.3 70 elpitluM 60 50 of onit s)senosp 40 Re 30 (Propor% 20 16.8 9.9 10 6.9 2 0 On-going Land too Land Area No Roofing Land Conflict small now Occupied Insecure Grass Reasons for not returning to land parcel held before displacement 14. The two regions are not on the same levels of return. It is possible that Acholi region conflicts are not adequately captured in this survey since majority of the respondents are still in return sites or satellite camps. In addition, land was occupied either by other relatives or by an existing return site or main camp accounting for 7 percent of non-return to land held before displacement but within proximity of their land considered either as home or ancestral land. Changes in Land Holdings 15. The people of Amuru district have had the longest displacement period of 12 to 13 years; Oyam district had the shortest displacement period of average 3 years. The displacement or transition had at least 2 events or moments of relocation for most of the IDPs over the last 15 years (Annex Table 1-7). 16. Since the displacement camps or sites were close (in the radius of 3-10 kms) from homes, IDPs never had complete detachment from their land except where the distance from their home were longer on where relocations from the first point of displacement to next become necessary. 17. Survey findings show at least 65 percent of the respondents were continuously in touch with their land holdings either through day time access for cultivation or periodic visits to establish the status of their land, while 22 percent made occasional visits to check the status of land. Some 15 percent completely lost touch with their land (Annex Table 1-8). This finding may encourage land disputes, especially on boundary claims and the continuity of usufruct on return. 45 7 2 el % 14.2 65.6 21.6 100.0 Tab Total Total 7 7 3 2 Col Mean 2 Average 12 tal Table n 130 600 198 915 To 2 % 7 7 3 2 M 13 12.4 65.6 23.3 100.0 Total Col 2 Amuru F 12 Total 76 n 034 431 146 6 2 8 9 3 2 Amuru Total % 11.0 71.2 19.4 100.0 6 2 Col M Acholi Male Acholi 6 7 3 3 6 1 35 62 n 227 319 Kitgum Kitgum F Acholi 7 1 Parcels % 13.9 59.7 27.5 7 7 2 2 el 100.0 Pader Total Col ma Holdings Regions Land 8 2 Displacement Regions Fe M 41 81 N 176 295 7 8 3 3 and in Gulu Pader 7 1 Land F of Regions % 8 2 while 17.9 65.4 18.3 100.0 Period size Col 7 7 3 3 Total in Total Total Land 54 55 46 9 1 n 197 301 M of Gulu F 8 2 Lango 6 6 3 2 % 19.7 64.7 17.3 Changes Oyam 3 1 Displacement Status 100.0 Col 1-9: 1-7: Total 1-8: Lango Male 7 7 3 3 34 30 Lira n 112 173 3 1 M Table Table Table Oyam 3 1 % F 15.6 66.4 19.5 100.0 Annex Lango 5 2 Col Annex Annex Female 20 85 25 Total n 128 5 2 M Lira F 5 2 Total ent ely nt on Study Study relocation of IDP holdings Displacem of Checked all holdings Displaceme time land while time period, at at at before at in was while/seldom/rar land Displacement Displacement: Not/ a Size Size often/always/ in in in relocated ni Land Parcels Parcels changes se e of of Never Very Once Displacement and Years Tim Whil Times Changes Household Household No. No. 18. Specifically in relation to land, the effect of displacement has not been significant on the individual stock of land holdings available to a specific household, although in Acholi region there is a slight decrease from the average of 3 land parcels to 2 land parcels for a household over the displacement period, while the number of parcels in Lango region have remained the same per household. This difference could be attributed to the difference in the period of displacement which is relatively shorter in Lango (between 3 -5 years) and longer for Acholi (between 11-13 years) illustrated in table 6 above. In terms of total acreage available to a household, there is no significant change in acreage, which is still standing at the average of 6 to 7 acres per household before displacement and upon return (Annex Table 1-9), this trend however does not imply absence of changes in land access and the changing composition of users of land, across genders who opt to encroach on common or communal property resources. Impact of Displacement 19. Overall 3 to 13 years of displacement in Acholi and Lango disrupted the continued occupation and use of land which in summative terms is referred to as dislocation, therefore return presents different conditions for IDPs as the network of social relations upon which land access and use depend are re-configuring to re-establish home areas and ways of land use (Annex Table 1-10). Survey findings indicate that the most out-standing impact of displacement, is the state of housing units upon return, as a result of vandalism, burning or disrepair that an aggregate 40 percent of the respondents felt, had a direct bearing on one's ability to resettle and protect land and property rights. 20. At least 23 percent of respondents indicated that on return their land was still intact as they left it or was being utilized by themselves during the displacement period. An aggregate 17 percent reported loss of tenure resources either by tree feeling or unfilled manholes or set up of public utilities or infrastructure47 to service established IDP camps. 7 percent of respondents returned to find their land with either IDP camps set up or found their land encamped by the army or cultivated by the army. This finding has implications on the responsibility for compensation in relation to resource tenure loss and the institutional responsibility for restorative actions on land resources in relation to productivity and justice or rights protection. 47Public utilities such as schools, boreholes, access roads, etc 47 Annex Table 1-10: Land Parcels upon Return Study District (Only Col % presented) Condition in which Parcels of Land were Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Total found on Return/ visits to check Col (Analysis of Parcel Multiple Responses) % % % % Col % Col % % Doesn't know 1.3 0.3 2.4 4.2 1.7 1.9 Boundaries changed/ markers tampered 8 4.3 6.6 1.7 3 6.8 5.1 Occupied/ cultivated by unknown persons 7.2 1.5 5.3 3.8 3 4.7 4.5 Occupied/ cultivated by family with out authority 2.7 2.8 2.9 0.6 1.9 3.6 2.3 Occupied/ cultivated by early returnees 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.6 2.9 0.7 Cultivated by army 1.1 0.3 2.2 0.8 3.6 0.7 1.6 Encamped on by army 5.4 0.9 1.3 3 2.8 4 3.0 Cultivated by self/ intact as was left 29.1 32.2 19.3 20.4 24.8 10.1 23.2 Has an IDP camp on it 4 0.4 1.9 2.8 2.9 2.1 Trees have been cut/ has un filled holes 9.8 11.5 13.8 17.6 13.8 18.7 13.9 Housing vandalized/ burnt 17.9 24.8 25.2 27.2 25.5 24.5 24.0 Housing in state of disrepair 8.7 20.1 19 17.6 15.5 19.4 16.1 A road/ path/ borehole made through it 3.4 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.4 Others 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.3 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 21. An aggregate of 16 percent of the respondents to the survey, returned to find their land either occupied or cultivated by unknown persons or unauthorized family members or occupied by early returnees or their boundary marks shifted from their original positioning or tampered with. This finding has implications on the scale, nature and magnitude of land disputes that are erupting and those likely to erupt during the post-conflict period hence are a pointer to the nature of institutional arrangements needed and legal response required to counter or contain the escalation of such conflicts. Tenure Security: Threats, Knowledge and Access 22. Land tenure security is the individual's perception of his/her rights to a piece of land on a continual basis, free from imposition or interference from outside sources, as well as the ability to reap the benefits of labour or capital invested in land, either in use or upon alienation. This definition contains three components ­ breadth, duration and assurance ­ with legal and economic dimensions; legal dimensions define the composition (breadth) and duration of rights in the bundle48; (a) breadth refers to the quantity or bundle of rights held, or possession of key rights if certain ones are more important than others; (b) duration is the length of time that a given right is legally valid, sufficiently long to enable the holder to recoup with confidence the full income stream generated by the investment; and (c) assurance implies that right(s) and duration are known and held with certainty 48Michael Roth and Dwight Haase, June 1998, Land Tenure Security and Agricultural Performance in Southern Africa 48 23. In the context of displacement and post-conflict situations, the applicability of the above measures is modified for this study and reconstructed around three aspects of perceived threats or fears that the community hold in relation to tenure security, availability of information or knowledge that IDPs or returnees are able to utilise for protection of their rights and the socially constructed relations that determine access, use and transfer of interests and rights on land given the gendered nature of societies in Uganda. Threats to Tenure Security 24. In Lango and Acholi, it was imperative, as a starting point to establish in this study, whether tenure security is an issue, that post conflict recovery ought to engage, 85 percent of respondents to survey experienced threats to tenure security to the extent that 59 percent indicated, these threats were significant. The significance was elaborated in the FDGs, where respondents felt immediate response from government was warranted in terms of directing the general populace on how such threats should be dealt with and which institutional avenues are available to address them either formally or informally. Annex Table 1-11: Threats to Tenure Security Whether Fears over Land are Still Pertinent Regions Group Total Lango Acholi Count Col % Count Col % Count Col % No 59 43.4 93 39.9 152 41.2 Yes 77 56.6 140 60.1 217 58.8 Group Total 136 100.0 233 100.0 369 100.0 Whether Fears over Land were often the Case Lango Acholi Count C % Yes 118 80.8 199 87.3 317 84.8 No 28 19.2 29 12.7 57 15.2 Group Total 146 100.0 228 100.0 374 100.0 25. Annex Table 1-11 illustrates that 15 percent of the respondents felt they were not threatened on their land, which serves to show that tenure insecurity is not a universal trend for the whole of northern Uganda, however, to the extent that 41 percent of the respondents felt, that whatever threats existed they were not yet significant to warrant attention, because49 of mechanisms exist (either within clans or from local council) in which they are able to address them as they emerge. 26. In order to premise the findings of this study, in reality, it was important to establish the status of tenure security before displacement, so that appropriate inferences are made in relation to the changing trends and the uniqueness that the end of displacement presents in terms of policy and institutional response. Results from the survey show that in Acholi region, 28 percent of respondents felt they had insecure tenure before the displacement took place while 72 percent, representing the majority felt that they had secure tenure before displacement, compared to Lango where 37 percent felt insecure before displacement and 63 percent were secure in their tenure before displacement as illustrated in Annex Figure 1-2. 49FDGs mainly in Lango region. 49 Annex Figure 1-2: Threats or Fear on Land before Displacement 39.8 40 36.5 34.9 35 s 30.7 nt 30 28.2 27.9 26.9 25.8 25 pondese R 20 of) 15 %( 10 5 0 Lira Oyam Lango Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Acholi Districts/ Regions 27. Despite, constitutional recognition of customary tenure which is the predominant tenure in northern Uganda, and its recognition came with hidden distortions by failing to accord its traditional institutional framework the same stature. Indeed findings show that the informality of its traditional institutional framework does not necessarily imply tenure insecurity for the holders (72 percent in Acholi and 63 percent in Lango) before displacement. It is however, undeniable that displacement and return has worsened tenure insecurity for the holders, and in other instances sparked off new fears that were not in existence before displacement, such as the suspicion as to government's perceived interest in land in Acholi and Lango region. Attempts to address this situation need to lend themselves to the possible configurations and the volatile tenure issues on ground which may have developed during conflict, and those that are operative in the current return and subsequent post-conflict period, given the fact that they can thrust tenure security into new directions or dimensions. Annex Table 1-12: Nature of Threats Responses: Fears Over Land Regions Total Lango Acholi n Col % n Col % n Col % Boundary discrepancies with neighbors 52 37.4 115 35.7 167 36.2 Threats to evict/ chase by relatives 38 27.3 31 9.6 69 15.0 Threats to evict/ chase by husband 2 .6 2 .4 Possible sale by husband 5 3.6 7 2.2 12 2.6 Possible sale by relatives 6 4.3 53 16.5 59 12.8 Disinheritance 18 12.9 87 27.0 105 22.8 Others 20 14.4 27 8.4 47 10.2 Total 139 100.0 322 100.0 461 100.0 28. Annex Table 1-12 shows the nature of threats to land where 36 percent of threats are in form of boundary disputes with neighbours; these (according to focus group discussions) are often over cultivation into a neighbour's land parcel or use of neighbour's parcel who is yet to return or is unable to utilise all his/her land, igniting boundary conflicts. The second dominant nature of threats is within the construct of family relations especially in marriage 50 and in inheritance. The fear of disinheritance referred to by 23 percent of respondents is premised on the nature of land rights definition and transmission of rights under customary tenure, this is closely followed by threats of eviction or chase by relatives at 15 percent and possible sale by relatives at 13 percent. All these threats or fear are associated with the gendered nature of access and use rights over land defined through patrilineal relations by virtue of marriage or by virtue of descent either as a wife or a girl child respectively. 29. The nature of threats on ground reveal that the social and spatial repercussions of violence, dislocation, destruction of property, and food insecurity, together with the breakdown of administrative, enforcement, and other property-related institutions, significantly alter ongoing relationships between people(s), land uses, production systems, and population patterns. Annex Table 1-13: Persistent threats over Land Regions Total Lango Acholi Col n Col % Why threats over Land are Persisting (Responses) n % n Col % Relatives are still threatening 2 3.4 2 1.5 Previous owners are still threatening 5 8.5 4 5.1 9 6.6 Karamojong raids still take place 1 1.7 1 .7 Security is not assured 26 44.1 38 48.7 64 46.7 Government/ Army and Rich People have a lot of interest in Land 9 15.3 22 28.2 31 22.6 Have a Dispute that is still pending 5 8.5 6 7.7 11 8.0 Land Registration/ services are expensive 11 18.6 8 10.3 19 13.9 Total 59 100.0 78 100.0 137 100.0 30. The IDP return process is influenced by the progress of the Juba Peace Talks, tenure security no exception to this influence, since 67 percent of respondents to the survey pointed out that threats to tenure security are persisting because of the delay in concluding a comprehensive peace deal, that will signal the return of permanence to rights in land especially access and use rights (Annex Table 1-13). However, even with the positive conclusion of the Juba Peace Talks, 23 percent of respondents to the survey felt that government, the army and rich people have taken a lot of interest in their land, without clearly elaborating their motives or intentions hence remain a looming threat to their tenure security. This is more articulated in Acholi region at 48 percent and is still felt in Lango at 44 percent, coupled with existing inter-family and inter-community disputes, this state of affairs is reinforcing vulnerability of rights on tribal basis. It is not helped by the fact that one of the avenues that should have helped those who feel threatened is actually serving as an additional threat itself, 14 percent of the respondents to survey felt that land registration and land services, which are expensive and not accessible are a threat to their tenure security. 31. According to focus group discussions this feeling is fuelled by the fact that government is the agent attempting to introduce compulsory registration or titling as an alternative to customary tenure whose comfort and security they have known for centuries. In addition, to introducing such concepts considered alien, discussions also pointed out that the cost of registration which considered to be high is ironically assumed to fall on their shoulders, when they have not put forth any demands for such a process, this thinking is propagated out of what is considered to be keen interest in the land of the Acholi and Langi 51 by government and the mistrust of government which has a history of disposing off, whatever it lays its hands on50. 32. However, interviews with political leaders51, revealed a different level of understanding and reaction, they expressed the concern that failing to prepare for the eventual arrival of land registration as a trend in the region, is equal to failing to provide adequate leadership and direction for their people, however such a process needs to be nurtured and directed at a pace commensurate to the people's ability to absorb it, therefore despite the recognition that in the medium term and the long-term, land registration may be inevitable, it is essential that it is managed by the people and backed by extensive sensitization so that there is opportunity for individuals or families to make a choice. In the interim collective / common registration processes for common property resources and tribal lands would be ideal especially for the Acholi under the Acholi Cultural Trust and the Langi under the specific clans responsible with guidance from the Lango Cultural Union52. Annex Table 1-14: Measures for Secure Tenure Regions Total Responses: What would help respondent Lango Acholi Col feel secure on land Col Col n % n % n % Demarcated/ Definitive Boundaries 150 48.4 449 58.0 599 55.3 Document to Show Ownership 109 35.2 227 29.3 336 31.0 Having my names on Land Documents 38 12.3 73 9.4 111 10.2 Others 13 4.2 25 3.2 38 3.5 Total 310 100.0 774 100.0 1084 100.0 33. To improve tenure security, 55 percent of respondents to the survey considered demarcation or re-definition of boundaries to be an important aspect, based on existing history and with the participation and approval of traditional institutions in their areas. 31 percent of the respondents felt that they needed documentation to show proof of ownership or interests held in land as a measure for improving tenure security, while 10 percent felt that such document should show their own names as opposed to any other person or institution's names as the rights holders (Annex Table 1-14). 34. This finding, draws attention to the fate of evidence (proof) of rights to land and property as an issue in the recovery process especially as related to land claims, this calls attention to what is regarded as legitimate evidence by community members and the ability to successfully re-claim rights as claimants find themselves with evidence different from what is considered legal. It is therefore important that information is provided to guide the process of securing rights on return. Knowledge and Information 35. Annex Table 1-15, shows that 28 percent of respondents felt that information on how boundary disputes and trespass can be resolved without going to court, would improve their tenure security. Twenty percent of respondents noted that knowledge or information on how 50 FDGs put forth the examples of government properties that have either been privatised or divested such as Uganda Commercial Bank, which they felt set a trend of selling whatever government comes across. 51LCV Chairman Gulu, Vice chairperson LCV Amuru, Vice chairperson, LC Kitgum and several administrators and in local government round table discussions 52Roles of these institutions discussed under land administration. 52 to acquire land and register it, would improve their tenure security while an equal 20 percent of respondents, felt that knowledge of avenues and processes available for dispute resolution including options, hierarchy and authority of the different fora in place would not only improve their choice but their tenure security as well. The peculiar finding was 1.6 percent of respondents felt they needed to know the rights of government over private land or their customary land, which shows lack of understanding on content of law that is discussed in the subsequent paragraphs especially on exercise of the power of eminent domain (compulsory acquisition). Annex Table 1-15: Information Needed on Tenure Security Regions Total Responses: What Key Issues on Land Lango Acholi the Respondent would like to know Col Col Col n % n % n % Boundaries and Trespass Issues 185 34.4 254 24.6 439 27.9 Land Acquisition/ Registration/ Ownership 152 28.3 160 15.5 312 19.9 Where to settle after displacement 2 .4 1 .1 3 .2 Land Conflict Resolution Options 97 18.0 209 20.2 306 19.5 Rights of Government Over Private Land 12 2.2 13 1.3 25 1.6 The Whole Land Law/ Don't know any thing 90 16.7 396 38.3 486 30.9 Total 538 100.0 1033 100.0 1571 100.0 36. Annex Table 1-15 also shows that 31 percent of respondents to the survey were not knowledgeable or in know of what is contained in substantive statutory law on land (the Land Act Cap. 227), in addition misinformation, worry and confusion abounds on the little that is known. To the extent possible, it is highly distorted or quoted out of context. According to Focus Group Discussions, a few people who have knowledge about the content of the Act have not disseminated the information widely enough or in other instances have used the information for selfish gains. If such persons are leaders or institutions who have access to information, then they lack capacity to correctly interpret it and disseminate it. 37. As a follow up in understanding information needs of the community, the survey further investigated knowledge about the Land Act Cap. 227, in its own standing not as part of considerations of tenure security. Findings in relation to this detailed in Annex Figure 1-3 below, show that overall, an aggregate 90 percent of the survey study population in northern Uganda have no knowledge of what is contained in the substantive statutory law on land. Not a single district amongst those in the survey had a knowledge level of more than 15 percent on the content of the Land Act cap. 227. 53 Annex Figure 1-3: Knowledge Gap about the Land Act 14 12.6 11.9 12 12 nts 9.8 10 9.5 8.7 pondese 8 6.3 R 6 5.3 of) 4 (% 2 0 Lira Oyam Lango Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Acholi Districts/ Regions 38. Specific areas of concern in the little information that has so far been disseminated is mainly around the distortion of the meaning and implications of "adverse possession" provided for under section 31 on bona fide occupants on registered land and the power of "compulsory acquisition" by government in public interest provided for in article 237 and 26 of the Constitution. Capacity gaps in interpretation and dissemination of the content of law were evident amongst, community based organizations, non-governmental organizations53 and media houses especially FM radio Stations. Annex Figure 1-4: Access to Sensitization on Land Act 35 30.6 30.7 30 26.5 s 24 nt 25 20.9 20 pondese 17.2 R 15 13.6 of) 9.7 %( 10 5 0 Lira Oyam Lango Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Acholi Districts/ Regions 39. To appreciate the impact of existing sensitization efforts, the survey investigated respondents' access to sensitization of any kind on land law. On average 27 percent stated that they had received sensitization of some sort, while 73 percent had not benefited from any form of sensitization on land law (Annex Figure 1-4). 53Capacity issues and roles are detailed in the section on Institutions and Actors 54 40. Annex Table 1-16 illustrates that, for the respondents that had received sensitization, 64 percent had received information on land law and land rights protection while 31 percent had separately received information on agriculture and land use through the NAADS agricultural extension program. This finding further illustrates the need for an integrated approach to sensitization, incorporating aspects of land use, environment and agriculture in sensitization efforts. Annex Table 1-16: Content of Sensitization Received Regions Total Lango Acholi Responses n Col % n Col % n Col % What sensitization on Land Agriculture/ Land use 27 42.2 60 28.3 87 31.5 matters was received Land Law/ Land Rights 35 54.7 141 66.5 176 63.8 Others 2 3.1 11 5.2 13 4.7 Total 64 100.0 212 100.0 276 100.0 41. Given the fact that the study seeks to inform government programs and response of stakeholders, the survey explored the best method of ensuring access to information on land law and rights from the beneficiary's perspective. Annex Table 1-17: Modes for Information Access Regions Total Lango Acholi Col % Responses n Col % n Col % n Best way of passing on Radio 89 24.1 114 12.9 203 16.2 Information on Land matters TV 2 .5 2 0.2 Seminar/ Workshop 38 10.3 66 7.5 104 8.3 Local Language Literature 29 7.9 70 7.9 99 7.9 Community Meetings 208 56.4 615 69.5 823 65.6 Others 3 .8 20 2.3 23 1.8 Total 369 100.0 885 100.0 1254 100.0 42. Annex Table 1-17 shows that 66 percent of respondents thought the best option for receiving Information on land is through community meetings in the proximity of their homes. According to FDGs this reduces the time spent in travel and enables them to attend to their other household responsibilities and roles. Sixteen percent opted for radio as a mode of access especially with the advert of FM radio stations. However this preference is rated low, not because the radio does not have sufficient coverage, probably because a few household have access to radio or own a radio54. Seminars and workshops have a surprising low rating of 8 percent yet it is the most preferred method of sensitization by CSOs translated literature also has a low 8 percent because of the high illiteracy levels, mostly affecting women. Access to Land 43. Access to land as an aspect of tenure security, stems from the appreciation that physical separation due to IDP displacement changes, terminates, or puts on hold prevailing 54UBOS Household Survey 2004/2005 and National Household and Population Census, 2002 and the Poverty mapping exercises have similar findings. 55 rights and obligations among people regarding land especially where actual occupation, or social position forms the basis for; or a significant aspect of; claim or interest such as on customary tenure which is predominant in northern Uganda. In addition, once displaced, people pursue alternative land access avenues in pursuit of food security. This comes about with a change in status as people who were once settled become IDPs or returnees. Secondly, for analysis and articulation of study results, it is useful to simplify access to land by identifying55: (a) User rights: as rights to use the land for grazing, growing subsistence crops, gathering minor forestry products, etc. (b) Control rights: as rights to make decisions how the land should be used including deciding what crops should be planted, and to benefit financially from the sale of crops, etc. (c) Transfer rights: as right to sell or mortgage the land, to convey the land to others through intra-community reallocations, to transmit the land to heirs through inheritance, and to reallocate use and control rights. 44. In addition, for purposes of trends comparison this study makes distinction between pre-displacement access, during displacement access and access to land on return from displacement. Access for Use 45. The results presented in Annex Table 1-18 show that 83 percent respondents in the study had their own land on which they lived and cultivated while 17 percent did not own the land they lived on and cultivated at the time of displacement, they were either borrowing or renting as illustrated in table 29 below. Annex Table 1-18: Land before Displacement and changes on Return Before Displacement: Whether Regions (Col % Presented) Respondent Lived on and Lango Acholi Cultivated own Land Female Male Total Female Male Total n % n % n % n % n % n % Yes 136 87.7 177 93.2 313 90.7 313 81.7 329 85.2 642 83.5 No 19 12.3 13 6.8 32 9.3 70 18.3 57 14.8 127 16.5 Total 155 100.0 190 100.0 345 100.0 383 100.0 386 100.0 769 100.0 Change in Land at Study (on return) Didn't have but have now 0 .0 3 1.7 3 .9 1 .3 2 .6 3 .5 Have Same No. of Parcels 106 76.3 158 87.3 264 82.5 247 79.4 274 82.8 521 81.2 Have More Parcels 2 1.4 3 1.7 5 1.6 2 .6 6 1.8 8 1.2 Have Less Parcels 21 15.1 13 7.2 34 10.6 43 13.8 44 13.3 87 13.6 Had but don't have any now 10 7.2 4 2.2 14 4.4 18 5.8 5 1.5 23 3.6 Total 139 100.0 181 100.0 320 100.0 311 100.0 331 100.0 642 100.0 46. In Annex Table 1-18, only 14 percent had less parcels to access compared to 81 percent who felt that they still had access to the same number of parcels for occupation and use (live and cultivate) on return as at the time of displacement. This finding is contrary to 55Adopted from FAO, 2005 land tenure in post conflict tool for analysis 56 earlier fears that were pointing to loss of arable land and occupancy rights for those who already had such interests in existence before displacement. Only 4 percent stated that they had lost their right to live on and cultivate land that they had before displacement, on return. Annex Table 1-19: Spearman Correlation No. of Parcels No. of Parcels Respondent Had before Respondent Had at Correlations Displacement Study Spearman's No. of Parcels Correlation rho Respondent Had Coefficient 1.000 .890(**) before Displacement Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 N 961 923 No. of Parcels Correlation Respondent Had at Coefficient .890(**) 1.000 Study Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . N 923 930 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 47. To ascertain the relationship between land parcels available at displacement and on return, the data collected was subjected to the Spearman's rho correlation coefficient test (Annex Table 1-19), which shows the significance of 0.01 that is two-tailed, hence re- affirming that the changes in land parcels accessed for cultivation and living before and after displacement are not significant. It is important to note that although the above loss of land is not significant statistically, it could still have an enormously socio-cultural and political impact because it would render some people landless Transfer and transmission of rights 48. Transfer and transmission of land rights in Uganda is conventionally gained through four major ways; donation or inheritance, access by virtue of membership within a family, purchase and borrowing. Annex Table 1-20 indicates that, 62 percent of the respondents to the survey gained access to land through inheritance and 35 percent are given by virtue of membership within a family or by tracing lineage after the male descent56, with a low 2.3 percent utilizing the operations of the land market through buying. Annex Table 1-20: Means of Accessing Land Means of Study District (Col %) Total Accessing Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Land (Analysis of Parcel Multiple Responses) N % n % n % n % n % n % n % Bought 17 4.2 1 0.5 5 1.7 11 3.7 3 0.8 2 1.4 39 2.3 Inherited 260 64.5 107 51.7 179 60.3 182 61.7 217 60.8 102 71.8 1047 61.6 Just Given 109 27 99 47.8 113 38 99 33.6 133 37.3 36 25.4 589 34.6 Just Settled 17 4.2 3 1 4 1.1 2 1.4 26 1.5 Total 403 100 207 100 297 100 295 100 357 100 142 100 1701 100 56land which has been handed over by several generations through the male lineage as a result, of this customary practice, the sons deem their right to family land as automatic while daughters are not eligible 57 49. The implication of the finding above is that the customary system of transfer and transmission of rights is still the widely used method in northern Uganda. FDGs revealed that in the past, the transfers and transmission were a matter for the clan in its entirety, under guidance and wisdom of clan elders, making decisions. It is evident that this system has been modified through the displacement process, placing the clans and the elders in a sanctioning status rather than decision-making, while thrusting the family and household heads into decision-making status. 50. Henceforth, intra-family transfer of land is the most prevalent source of land (Annex Table 1-21) with 70 percent of transfers originating from natal relatives through inheritance, while inter-family transmissions occurred mainly from dead spouse to surviving spouse57. In addition, even the limited transactions of buying and selling rights in land occur mainly within and between families. At household level 18 percent of spouses who accessed are just given by virtue of membership within a family or clan, very few (only 1 percent) are able to buy. Access through marital relatives for 8 percent of the respondents; shows a social safety net that comes with the institution of marriage, especially for those that are land poor. Annex Table 1-21: Sources of Land Access From whom Land Access was gained Means of Accessing Land (Multiple Responses) Total Just (Analysis of Parcel Multiple Responses) Bought Inherited Just Given Settled n % (Col % Presented) N % n % n % n % Marital Relative (In-laws) 2 2.4 44 1.8 261 20.7 307 8.2 Natal Relative (brothers/ sisters/ uncles/ 24 28.6 2204 92.1 403 31.9 5 83.3 2636 70.4 aunties/ My spouse 1 1.2 102 4.3 586 46.4 689 18.4 My child/ children 4 .3 4 .1 Community member-different clan 41 48.8 6 .3 3 .2 50 1.3 Community member-own clan 12 14.3 4 .2 6 .5 22 .6 Others 4 4.8 33 1.4 1 16.7 38 1.0 Total 84 100.0 2393 100.0 1263 100.0 6 100.0 3746 100.0 Access for the Land Poor58 51. Research works reviewed to inform, this study alluded to the danger of an emerging landless class constituted largely by those who lose access to land; (a) by virtue of the operations of the land market through distress sales, or (b) through denial by inequitable inheritance practices (mainly for orphaned children and girls); and (c) through denial for those whose access is dependent upon relations with a male especially through marriage (mainly widows). 57Data not desegregated to show male or female dead or surviving spouse 58This study is hesitant to refer to classes of persons with restrained or constrained access to land as "landless" and has hence preferred the use of the term "land poor" in the presentation of findings 58 52. It is mainly through marriage that women acquire use rights in land, and husbands assign particular fields for cultivation. Upon widowhood, women act as guardians or trustees for the minor children until a male heir becomes of age to take charge. Women with grown up sons are largely assured of cultivation rights, in contrast to childless women or women who bore only daughters, whose position is very precarious. Annex Table 1-22: Sources of Access for the Land Poor Regions Total Lango Acholi Without Own Parcel of Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Land: From Whom Land Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Would be Accessed n % n % n % n % n % n % n % 6 15.0 4 11.1 7 22.6 4 19.0 1 7.7 22 14.9 Marital Relative (In-laws) Natal Relative 19 47.5 3 42.9 23 63.9 20 64.5 14 66.7 10 76.9 89 60.1 My spouse 5 12.5 2 5.6 1 3.2 1 4.8 9 6.1 Community member- 6 15.0 2 28.6 6 16.7 3 9.7 1 4.8 18 12.2 different clan Community member-own 1 2.5 1 14.3 2 15.4 4 2.7 clan Others (My child/ children, 3 7.5 1 14.3 1 2.8 1 4.8 6 4.1 Total 40 100.0 7 100.0 36 100.0 31 100.0 21 100.0 13 100.0 148 100.0 53. The sources of land accessed by the land poor are similar to sources for those who use and live on their own land. In this category the family through natal relatives is still the predominant source of land accounting for 60 percent of access and marital relations taking 15 percent, the difference however, is that the community through arrangements with different clans also emerges as a source for 12 percent of the land poor groups, as shown in Annex Table 1-22 Annex Table 1-23: Means of Access by the Land Poor (Pre-Displacement) Regions Total Without Own Parcel of Lango Acholi Land: Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru How Land was Accessed Col Col Col Col Col Col Col before Displacement n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Borrowing 7 17.1 3 8.1 12 38.7 4 19.0 2 13.3 28 18.4 Renting 11 26.8 4 57.1 7 18.9 5 16.1 5 33.3 32 21.1 Share Cropping 10 24.4 3 42.9 23 62.2 14 45.2 14 66.7 8 53.3 72 47.4 Others (just uses relatives 13 31.7 4 10.8 3 14.3 20 13.2 land) Total 41 100.0 7 100.0 37 100.0 31 100.0 21 100.0 15 100.0 152 100.0 54. Prior to displacement, the terms or conditions for access (for the land poor) were structured around four major means; sharecropping which is the major means of access for the land poor accounted for 47 percent of the arrangements made by the land poor to access land, followed by renting on yearly basis for two planting seasons, which was significant for 21 percent of the land poor respondents and borrowing which accounted for 18 percent of land access arrangement by the land poor, illustrated in Annex Table 1-23. 55. This result gives an insight into customary land access practices that are still prevalent and the relatively low level of commercialization as means of accessing land. This is 59 particularly evidenced by the proportion of sharecropping being twice that of renting land; and, the significant proportion of the other non commercial (borrowing and just using relatives land) means of accessing land. It is also revealing in the extent to which, customary practices provide for the land poor within their communities, with the intent of ensuring that the needs of all are addressed, hence the various social safety-nets in access to land. Annex Table 1-24: Sources of Access by the Land Poor (Post-Conflict) Regions Total Lango Acholi Without Own Parcel of Land Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru but Returned: Col Col Col Col Col Col Col How is Land being Accessed n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Borrowing 4 14.8 3 15.8 5 50.0 1 14.3 13 17.8 Renting 6 22.2 3 50.0 1 5.3 2 20.0 2 28.6 14 19.2 Share Cropping 4 14.8 3 50.0 4 21.1 2 20.0 4 100.0 3 42.9 20 27.4 Others (just using relatives 13 48.1 11 57.9 1 10.0 1 14.3 26 35.6 land) Total 27 100.0 6 100.0 19 100.0 10 100.0 4 100.0 7 100.0 73 100.0 56. However, analysis of results from post-conflict or on return from displacement reveals that these trends are changing, with the weakening of the clan control systems and the reduction of commonality witnessed in the weakened or broken social safety-nets, an element of lawlessness is creeping in, with 36 percent of the land poor indicating that they merely use their relatives land without their express permission or in view of the fact that they were early returnees on ground, this is a breeding ground for land-access and land use conflicts, as presented in Annex Table 1-24. 57. Share-cropping arrangements that were the predominant means before displacement are nearly halved into two while renting and borrowing are still consistent, as shown in Annex Figure 1-5 below. Focus group discussions revealed that, one of the reasons in addition to weakening clan controls and social safety networks for the increase in use of relatives land, is exorbitant land rental values that fall between 20,000/= Uganda shillings at the lowest to 70.000/= Uganda shillings at highest (US $12 to US$ 45) per annum. 60 Annex Figure 1-5: Comparison of Access by the Land Poor (Before and After Displacement 50 47.4 45 40 35.6 35 (%) 30 27.4 oni 25 21.1 19.2 20 17.818.4 Proport 15 13.2 10 5 0 Borrow ing Renting Share Cropping Others (just using relativ es land) Post Conflict Means of Accessing land Before Displacement 58. This was verified by survey results of the land poor, who articulated the fact that apart from limited accessibility of land (by 72 percent), exorbitant rent cited by 10 percent was also a fact affecting access to land, since this is a payment demand prior to access and payable in cash, as shown in Annex Table 1-25. In addition uncertainty for 7 percent related to tenure security and absence of written agreements for terms of access to land worsens the situation for 7 percent of the land poor. This trend, affects land access in post-conflict since as all evidence shows access or re-access is operating under the available customary arrangements, the overall access and use arrangements therefore risk becoming unwieldy, with wider repercussions on agricultural recovery, economic opportunities and food security, because the norms of practices of customary tenure move quickly to re-establish themselves with modifications controlled by the custodians who may actual distort the equity values hence tend to be in position to hold power on tenure faster than the formal state structures or systems that take longer to re-ignite and operationalize. Annex Table 1-25: Perspectives on Access by the Land Poor Regions Total (Multiple Responses): Lango Acholi Col Without Own Land: Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru % Other Perspectives on Col Col Col Col Col Col Access n % n % n % n % n % n % n Accessible land is limited 66 91.7 7 50.0 45 95.7 26 52.0 20 87.0 6 26.1 170 74.2 The rental charged is 4 5.6 3 21.4 1 2.1 10 20.0 2 8.7 3 13.0 23 10.0 exorbitant Activities/ enterprises are 1 7.1 2 8.7 3 1.3 restricted There is a lot of 1 7.1 1 2.1 11 22.0 1 4.3 3 13.0 17 7.4 Uncertainty Usually no written 2 2.8 2 14.3 3 6.0 9 39.1 16 7.0 agreements Total 72 100.0 14 100.0 47 100.0 50 100.0 23 100.0 23 100.0 229 100.0 61 LAND DISPUTES AND CLAIMS 59. For many people across northern Uganda, land is the basis for improved livelihood and long-term security with the prediction is that disputes over land are expected to increase, to the extent of being one of the major hindrances to lasting peace. For this study, the context or hypothesis is that statutory dispute resolution mechanisms under the Land Act cap 227 are currently lacking or not in place. 60. Also years of displacement have substantially eroded the authority and outreach of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. In addition, clarity on intent and meaning of whatever now exists as customary law and rights is distorted resulting in abuse of the system within families and clans. However it is also recognized that it is fundamental to establish the magnitude of land disputes and conflicts and various trends that have been taking place since the war began 21 years ago. Prevalence of Land Disputes 61. The survey sought to establish comparatively the prevalence of land disputes in the pre-displacement phase, while in displacement and during the post conflict period. Results in Annex Figure 1-6 show that across regions, on average the trend of occurrence of land disputes has been steadily rising from 12.8 percent at the time of displacement for the respondents involved in the survey to 15.5 percent during displacement, and the current return or post conflict prevalence at 16.4 percent. 62. In terms of regional variations, both Lango and Acholi reflect a consistent raise, although the pre-displacement prevalence is lowest in Acholi region at 11.7 percent, even though Acholi has the highest displacement and post conflict (on return) prevalence at 17.1 percent and 16.7 percent respectively. District desegregation of the above findings shows that the districts in Acholi region are the most affected with land disputes placing Amuru in lead position with 20.4 percent, followed by Gulu at 19.0 percent at the time of study. On the other hand, before displacement, Lira district had the highest prevalence at 17 percent, which was closely followed by Kitgum at 13.6 percent and Pader at 13 percent (Annex Figure 1-6). Annex Figure 1-6: Prevalence of Land Disputes by Region 18 16.7 17.1 16.4 st 15.5 15.5 16 15.2 licnfoC 14 12.8 11.7 12.1 12 Lango Land 10 Acholi of 8 All Study Areas (%)e 6 alenc 4 Prev 2 0 Post Conflict (At Study ) Before Displacement While in Displacement IDP Phase 62 63. According to focus group discussions, the prevalence trends across districts are influenced by the level of return in combination with the perception that government, the army and rich people have taken a lot of interest in their land, without clearly elaborating their motives or intentions especially in Acholi region and the concept of return not to the land parcels one resided on before displacement but to ancestral locations were a particular clan or lineage descended from, as concept is highly propagated in Acholi region through the media and is responsible for inter-family clashes and inter-clan clashes over land, as well as disputes between villages / clans and government agencies responsible for land reserved for conservation and forestry, Amuru district is a classic example here59. Annex Table 1-26: Prevalence of Land Disputes by Household Category Regions (Col %) Table Lango Acholi Total Prevalence of Land Dispute Whether FHH MHH CHH FHH MHH CHH Respondent ever had a Land Dispute n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Post Conflict (At Study) Yes 16 13.0 37 16.9 41 21.4 86 15.2 1 8.3 183 16.4 Before Displacement Yes 13 10.6 37 16.9 3 6.0 20 10.4 67 11.9 3 25.0 143 12.8 While in Displacement Yes 7 5.7 34 15.5 28 14.6 99 17.6 5 41.7 174 15.5 64. In terms of household analysis (Annex Table 1-26), in Lango region for all periods, the male headed household experience a higher prevalence of disputes averaging 17 percent, while in Acholi region, child headed households have steep increases in prevalence from 8 percent to 42 percent, followed by female headed households that rise from 10 percent to 21 percent prevalence of land disputes, overall the prevalence rates were low while in displacement and increased on return for all categories of households in both Lango and Acholi region. 65. Further desegregation of prevalence on the basis of category of land across the regions shows that disputes are mostly occurring on land that was left behind, upon displacement, which on return has a dispute prevalence rate of 65 percent, this is mainly on inherited land accounting for 71 percent and land given as a gift at 17 percent as shown in Annex Table 1-27 below. This high level of prevalence is surprisingly not evident on land that was purchased which is standing at a prevalence rate of 3 percent, and goes to show that the character of land around which disputes are occurring is that with a notion of "commonality" or "communality", which according to FDGs is because a number of people on return attach a higher value to land and thus are moving to individualize what was perceived common to them and by others, while rigorously defending what had been allotted to them from access, use and sharing by the common members of the community, hence disagreements and clashes. 59see annex for elaborated cases from Amuru detailed by District leaders: 63 Annex Table 1-27: Prevalence of Disputes by Land Category Regions Lango Total Acholi Total Type of Land over Lira Oyam Col Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Col which Col Col n % Col Col Col Col n % Conflict was Experienced n % n % n % n % n % n % Displacement That Left 21 60.0 3 60.0 24 60.0 29 69.0 13 59.1 20 50.0 25 86.2 87 65.4 Phase behind Camp Area 12 34.3 2 40.0 14 35.0 5 11.9 7 31.8 20 50.0 3 10.3 35 26.3 Host 2 5.7 2 5.0 8 19.0 2 9.1 1 3.4 11 8.3 Community Group Total 35 100.0 5 100.0 40 100.0 42 100.0 22 100.0 40 100.0 29 100.0 133 100.0 At time of Inherited 25 73.5 8 42.1 33 62.3 32 80.0 21 65.6 20 58.8 17 81.0 90 70.9 Study (Post Land Conflict ) Bought 3 8.8 3 15.8 6 11.3 1 2.5 1 3.1 1 2.9 1 4.8 4 3.1 Land Given as 4 11.8 7 36.8 11 20.8 5 12.5 3 9.4 11 32.4 3 14.3 22 17.3 Gift Land Borrowed 3 9.4 1 2.9 4 3.1 Land Rented 1 2.9 1 5.3 2 3.8 1 2.5 1 3.1 2 1.6 Land Share 1 2.9 1 1.9 1 2.5 3 9.4 1 2.9 5 3.9 Cropped Group Total 34 100.0 19 100.0 53 100.0 40 100.0 32 100.0 34 100.0 21 100.0 127 100.0 66. Further analysis of the survey results presented in Annex Table40 above, shows that camp areas also experienced high levels of disputes during the displacement period at a prevalence rate of 26 percent compared to communities that hosted or resettled IDPs whose prevalence was 8 percent. These disputes were attributed to the struggle to access the limited land available close to the camp or within the camp itself. In the process the overwhelmed land owners where the camps were located attempted to take charge and have a sense of control over their property. In most cases negotiations ensued which led to the gradual emergency of land rentals or shared cropping arrangement. However disputes related to payments and charges set by land owners arose in the process. Causes of Land Disputes 67. This study also investigated the causes of land disputes in general, before displacement, during displacement and on return. Overall and regional aggregate survey results show that unclear or obscure land boundaries are the major cause of land disputes accounting for 34 percent in the region mainly within families and with neighbors, followed by a land scarcity perceived to account for 15 percent, which drives all persons into a state of jealously guarding the little land they have and reacting to the slightest provocation to protect their land. Displacement is also cited as a casual factor for land disputes by 14 percent of the respondents while 12 percent percentage reported segregative tendencies to be the cause of land disputes and obscure or unclear land rights come with a 10 percent score.(Annex Table 1-28). 68. Regionally, boundary disputes are higher in the pre-displacement period for all regions, but highest is in Lango region at 48 percent. The volume of boundary disputes slightly goes down during displacement and then rises on return from displacement still with Lango region accounting for the highest at 35 percent. On the other hand, the perception of 64 land scarcity rises from 5 percent at the start of displacement to 15 percent on return in Lango region, while in Acholi region it moves from 13 percent before displacement to 17 percent on return at the time the study was undertaken. Annex Table 1-28: Overall Cause of Land Disputes Post Conflict Before While in Multiple Responses (At time of Overall Displacement Displacement Study) Ranking Causes of Land Disputes Lango Acholi Lango Acholi Lango Acholi Col Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % Col % % Obscure boundaries 48.4 37.5 29.2 27.4 36.4 27.2 34.4 Segregative tendencies 15.6 16.0 10.4 13.2 10.9 7.1 12.2 Distress (sustenance/ health/ 3.1 0.7 6.3 2.8 7.3 4.9 4.2 education) Obscure rights to land 9.4 16.0 6.3 8.5 14.5 10.3 10.8 Land Scarcity 4.7 13.2 18.8 21.7 14.5 17.4 15.1 Lack of land transaction agreements 4.7 3.5 8.3 4.2 5.5 2.2 4.7 Absence from the land 7.8 7.6 14.6 17.5 9.1 27.7 14.1 Unfair plot allocation 6.3 5.6 6.3 4.7 1.8 3.3 4.7 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 69. The variations between Lango and Acholi are attributed to the percentage or rate of return in each region, where by Lango has approximately 92 percent return rate while Acholi is just commencing return with a large percentage of its population still in return sites, decongestion camps or return camps. It is (according to FDGs) expected that the volume of boundary disputes and the perception of land scarcity will increase and probably surpass Lango region, by the time return is complete in Acholi region because of the fact that the displacement period was longer in Acholi for an average 13 years than in Lango where the average was 7 years. 70. Similar observations can made in all the causative factors except, the peculiarity evident on absence from land as a cause of land disputes whereby before displacement both regions are level, and difference begin to appear while in displacement, at the time of study, Lango region doesn't consider absence from the land as a causative factor for disputes since most of the returnees are able to re-access their land without resorting to disputes while the perception of absence from land as a cause of land disputes shoots up in Acholi from 8 percent to 28 percent at the time of the study. 65 Annex Table 1-29: Causes of Land Disputes by District (Pre-Displacement)) Causes of land Lango Acholi disputes Before Study District Total Study District Total Displacement Lira Oyam n % Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Obscure boundaries 37. 23 46.0 8 57.1 31 48.4 9 29.0 18 36.7 18 36.7 9 60.0 54 5 Segregative 16. 9 18.0 1 7.1 10 15.6 8 25.8 5 10.2 10 20.4 23 tendencies 0 Distress survival/ 2 14.3 2 3.1 1 2.0 1 .7 health/ education Obscure rights to 16. 5 10.0 1 7.1 6 9.4 3 9.7 9 18.4 10 20.4 1 6.7 23 land 0 Land Scarcity 13. 2 4.0 1 7.1 3 4.7 3 9.7 8 16.3 5 10.2 3 20.0 19 2 Lack of land transaction 3 6.0 3 4.7 1 3.2 2 4.1 1 2.0 1 6.7 5 3.5 agreements Absence from the 4 8.0 1 7.1 5 7.8 4 12.9 5 10.2 2 4.1 11 7.6 land Unfair plot 4 8.0 4 6.3 3 9.7 1 2.0 3 6.1 1 6.7 8 5.6 allocation Total 10 50 100.0 14 100.0 64 100.0 31 100.0 49 100.0 49 100.0 15 100.0 144 0.0 71. In addition, a number of previous studies had pointed to distress sales due to economic pressure to finance health and overall livelihood. The findings of this study show that distress sales is not a significant cause of land disputes in relation to other causes as it accounts for only 4 percent. However FDGs reveal that this score may rise in the near future especially in Acholi region where, sales that were made before displacement or at the time of displacement are being revoked or outright dishonored by majority of land owners or parties to such transactions. 72. Annex Table 1-29 desegregates the findings by district before displacement show that unclear land boundaries are still the leading cause of disputes at 38 percent followed concurrently at the same level by segregative tendencies and unclear rights to at 16 percent for both and land scarcity taking 13 percent. Absence from the land by virtue of displacement still takes a low command at 7 percent and a new phenomenon of unfair allocation by the traditional institution responsible under customary tenure comes at 6 percent as a cause of land disputes. 73. Annex Table 1-30, presents details on the causes of land disputes by district while in displacement, where unclear boundaries are still the leading cause of disputes accounting for 27 percent, followed by perceptual aspects reflected in the thinking that there is a land scarcity accounting for 22 percent of disputes and absence from the land due to displacement causing 18 percent of disputes. Segregative tendencies account for 13 percent of disputes while obscure rights are responsible for 9 percent of disputes during displacement. 66 Annex Table 1-30: Causes of Land Disputes (In-Displacement) While in Lango Acholi Displacement: Study District Total Study District Total Causes of Land Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Disputes n % n % n % n % n n % n % n % n Obscure boundaries 13 29.5 1 25.0 14 29.2 15 26.8 11 28.2 19 29.7 13 24.5 58 27.4 Segregative 5 11.4 5 10.4 9 16.1 4 10.3 9 14.1 6 11.3 28 13.2 tendencies Distress survival/ 2 4.5 1 25.0 3 6.3 3 5.4 2 5.1 1 1.6 6 2.8 health/ education Obscure rights to 3 6.8 3 6.3 6 10.7 2 5.1 2 3.1 8 15.1 18 8.5 land Land Scarcity 9 20.5 9 18.8 8 14.3 9 23.1 19 29.7 10 18.9 46 21.7 Lack of land transaction 4 9.1 4 8.3 3 5.4 2 5.1 2 3.1 2 3.8 9 4.2 agreements Absence from the 5 11.4 2 50.0 7 14.6 9 16.1 7 17.9 10 15.6 11 20.8 37 17.5 land Unfair plot 3 6.8 3 6.3 3 5.4 2 5.1 2 3.1 3 5.7 10 4.7 allocation Total 44 100.0 4 100.0 48 100.0 56 100.0 39 100.0 64 100.0 53 100.0 212 100.0 Annex Table 1-31: Causes of Land Disputes (On return-Post Conflict) Post Conflict: Lango Acholi Causes of Land Study District Total Study District Total Disputes Lira Oyam n % Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Obscure boundaries 15 40.5 5 27.8 20 36.4 13 27.7 10 19.2 18 32.1 9 31.0 50 27.2 Segregative 5 13.5 1 5.6 6 10.9 4 8.5 4 7.7 4 7.1 1 3.4 13 7.1 tendencies Distress survival / 2 5.4 2 11.1 4 7.3 3 6.4 3 5.8 2 3.6 1 3.4 9 4.9 health/ education Obscure rights to 5 13.5 3 16.7 8 14.5 5 10.6 6 11.5 2 3.6 6 20.7 19 10.3 land Land Scarcity 5 13.5 3 16.7 8 14.5 7 14.9 10 19.2 11 19.6 4 13.8 32 17.4 Lack of land transaction 2 5.4 1 5.6 3 5.5 1 2.1 1 1.9 1 1.8 1 3.4 4 2.2 agreements Absence from the 2 5.4 3 16.7 5 9.1 12 25.5 17 32.7 16 28.6 6 20.7 51 27.7 land Unfair plot 1 2.7 1 1.8 2 4.3 1 1.9 2 3.6 1 3.4 6 3.3 allocation Total 37 100.0 18 100.0 55 100.0 47 100.0 52 100.0 56 100.0 29 100.0 184 100.0 74. Annex Table 1-31 on the other hand presents, the situation on return (at the time of this study) and shows that absence from the land instantly becomes the leading cause of disputes accounting for 28 percent, closely followed by unclear boundaries accounting for 27 percent of land disputes, a slight but very significant change in causal trends, followed by a perceived land scarcity accounting for 17 percent of disputes, obscure rights to land take a fourth position with 10 percent of disputes occurring in the return period, this is specially in relation to land where camps were situated and public utilities such as water pumps, 67 boreholes, schools etc were placed, land owners are not sure how to proceed and the communities are demanding such land as "common" although initially curved out from individual land owners. The absence of land transaction agreements are alluded to the context of land sales that owners are now dishonoring claiming to have sold under distress due to insecurity and the need to relocate to new areas that had been earmarked as camps at that time. Types of Land Disputes 75. In this study, a ranking of and description of the types of land disputes was undertaken. From the survey results, the most prevalent type of disputes were boundary related ranking highest for 23 percent of the respondents (Annex Table 1-32), having a high of 28 percent before displacement, decreasing to 17 percent during displacement and steadily raising now to 25 percent as return commences (at time of study). From Focus group discussions and looking at regional trends where Lango is ranking higher (Annex Table 1- 31), it is expected that as return progresses, boundary disputes will increase in the post conflict and early recovery period. Annex Table 1-32: Types of Land Disputes by period Post Conflict In Before (At Study) Displacement Displacement Overall Ranking Land Disputes Col Col (Multiple Responses) n Col % n % n % n Col % Boundary 76 25.2 53 16.7 76 28.5 205 23.1 Land use 51 16.9 59 18.6 46 17.2 156 17.6 Illegal Occupation 53 17.5 60 18.9 34 12.7 147 16.6 Trespass 50 16.6 48 15.1 43 16.1 141 15.9 Inheritance Rights 38 12.6 36 11.3 38 14.2 112 12.6 Eviction 21 7.0 30 9.4 14 5.2 65 7.3 Breach of Sale Agreement/ Revocation 7 2.3 13 4.1 8 3.0 28 3.2 Others (sales, trees, common access, etc) 6 2 19 5.8 8 3 33 3.8 Total 302 100 318 100 267 100 887 100.0 76. Land use disputes account for 18 percent and have been highest during displacement because of the limited areas available within the precincts of camps and a short radius after the camp where the army could provide protection. Illegal occupation of land by neighbors, early returnees and relatives accounts for 17 percent of land disputes and is mostly felt during displacement by 19 percent of respondents, while trespass accounts for 16 percent of land disputes with the incidence rising as IDP return gains momentum. Inheritance disputes especially those related to rights of widows and orphaned children, often deprived by the family (paternal uncles or clan heads responsible) account for 13 percent of land disputes overall. 68 Annex Table 1-33: Types of Land Disputes by Region Before While in Post Conflict Displacement Displacement (At time of Study) Lango Acholi Lango Acholi Lango Acholi Col Col % Col Col % Col % Land Disputes: (Multiple Responses) Col % % % Boundary 24.5 30.6 21 15.6 26.4 24.8 Land use 22.3 14.5 17.7 18.8 16.7 17 Illegal Occupation 13.8 12.1 16.1 19.5 9.7 20 Trespass 17 15.6 19.4 14.1 26.4 13.5 Inheritance Rights 12.8 15 8.1 12.1 11.1 13 Eviction 3.2 6.4 3.2 10.9 1.4 8.7 Breach of agreement 3.2 2.9 5.1 5.6 1.3 Land sales 2.1 1.2 3.2 1.4 Others (sales, trees, open access area, etc) 1.1 1.8 17.2 3.9 1.4 1.7 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 A regional analysis (Annex Table 1-33) shows, a higher occurrence of land boundary disputes in Acholi at 31 percent compared to 25 percent in Lango, a trend that is reversed during displacement with Lango reporting higher boundary disputes at 21 percent compared to Acholi's 16 percent, which raises for both regions to 26 percent in Lango and 25 percent in Acholi on IDP return (at time of study). Illegal occupation ranks highest before displacement in Lango region at 14 percent, and while in displacement for Acholi region at 20 percent, however on return it doubles in Acholi at 20 percent compared to Lango at 10 percent. Land use disputes decline in all regions as return begins, while trespass significantly raise in Lango which has the highest IDP return rate from 17 percent to 26 percent, while in Acholi, the trend is nearly the same through out the periods. Evictions are highest in Acholi accounting for 11 percent while in displacement, while the peculiar finding is that in Lango, the percentage of evictions that has been steady since displacement has declined on IDP return (at time of study). A graphic illustration of the five most prevalent causes of land disputes (boundary, land use occupation, trespass, inheritance) in northern Uganda for the pre-displacement, displacement and return period is presented in Annex Figure 1-7 reflecting the changes over the periods. 69 Annex Figure 1-7: Changes in Occurrence of Land Conflicts by IDP Phase 30 25 )%(e 20 Boundary encalevrP 15 Land use Occupation 10 Trespass 5 Inheritance 0 Before Displacement Displacement Post Conflict IDP Phase or Period Land Disputes Resolution 77. Given, the high occurrence or prevalence rates for most the disputes, it becomes imperative to explore the disputes resolution avenues and to ascertain which are spill over trends from pre-displacement to IDP return. It is clear that not all is new phenomenon but it is heightened phenomenon because it is playing out in a changed environment (due to the impact of displacement) with dissimilar capacities for response and containment, informally and formally by virtue of weakened traditional institutions with legitimacy but without legality and a dysfunctional statutory systems, that has left an institutional gap on ground, hence a continuation of societal functions may not as well be achieved in such a situation. Annex Table 1-34: Spill over of Land Disputes from Displacement to Post Conflict Table Regions Total Lango Acholi Whether Conflict was Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Resolved at: Col Col Col Col Col Col Col n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Time of Study (Post Yes 15 41.7 8 44.4 10 25.0 6 19.4 1 3.0 4 21.1 44 24.9 Conflict) No 21 58.3 10 55.6 30 75.0 25 80.6 32 97.0 15 78.9 133 75.1 End of displacement Yes 6 50.0 4 100.0 7 28.0 7 38.9 2 7.7 6 42.9 32 32.3 No 6 50.0 18 72.0 11 61.1 24 92.3 8 57.1 67 67.7 Displacement Yes 22 59.5 10 76.9 8 42.1 14 48.3 12 40.0 6 75.0 72 52.9 No 15 40.5 3 23.1 11 57.9 15 51.7 18 60.0 2 25.0 64 47.1 78. Annex Table 1-34 results show a relatively high resolution rate in the period prior to displacement (52.9 percent) while in the displacement phase and at the time of study the rates are 32.3 percent and 24.9 percent. An average of 50 percent of land disputes commenced during displacement and has been carried over to the post conflict period, while 68 percent of respondents believe that the end of conflict brought forward a backlog of land conflicts, and these have translated into 75 percent spill over at the time of the study. 70 Annex Table 1-35: Dispute Resolution Option (Before Displacement) Before Regions Displacement: Lango Total Acholi Total Commonly Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Accessed Dispute Resolution Options n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % LC1 25 39.7 7 43.8 32 40.5 8 22.9 13 27.1 10 20.4 31 21.5 LC 2 11 17.5 2 12.5 13 16.5 9 25.7 10 20.8 7 14.3 5 41.7 31 21.5 LC3 6 9.5 6 7.6 3 8.6 6 12.5 6 12.2 1 8.3 16 11.1 LC5 2 4.1 2 1.4 Magistrates 1 1.6 1 1.3 1 2.9 2 4.2 1 2.0 4 2.8 Court Police 4 6.3 4 5.1 1 2.0 1 .7 Clan/ Family 13 20.6 7 43.8 20 25.3 12 34.3 17 35.4 19 38.8 6 50.0 54 37.5 RDC / CAO / Presidents 2 4.1 2 1.4 Office Others 3 4.8 3 3.8 2 5.7 1 2.0 3 2.1 Total 63 100.0 16 100.0 79 100.0 35 100.0 48 100.0 49 100.0 12 100.0 144 100.0 79. Beyond occurrence of disputes, the study analyzed dispute resolution options available to those experiencing land disputes. Overall before displacement as shown in Annex Table 1-35, 38 percent of the population sought the services of the clan or family when faced by land disputes, while an equal number of 22 percent went to both LC1 and LC2, with 11 percent of land disputes cases seeping through to LC3 on appeal. The striking statistics are those associated with the Magistrates Courts that tackles only 3 percent of land disputes, and the low level of cases that filter to RDC and CAOs offices for mediation. 71 Annex Table 1-36: Dispute Resolution Option (Displacement) While in Regions (Col %) Displacement: Lango Total Acholi Total Commonly Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Used Dispute Resolution Option n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % LC1 19 37.3 2 50.0 21 38.2 18 36.7 7 23.3 17 25.0 8 17.4 50 25.9 LC 2 8 15.7 8 14.5 11 22.4 7 23.3 13 19.1 16 34.8 47 24.4 LC3 7 13.7 7 12.7 2 4.1 1 3.3 10 14.7 5 10.9 18 9.3 LC5 6 8.8 6 3.1 Magistrates 2 4.3 2 1.0 Court Police 3 5.9 3 5.5 1 2.0 2 6.7 3 1.6 Clan/ Family 7 13.7 1 25.0 8 14.5 15 30.6 13 43.3 16 23.5 15 32.6 59 30.6 RDC / CAO / Presidents 1 2.0 1 1.8 5 7.4 5 2.6 Office Others 2 3.9 2 3.6 1 1.5 1 .5 Unclassified 4 7.8 1 25.0 5 9.1 2 4.1 2 1.0 Total 51 100.0 4 100.0 55 100.0 49 100.0 30 100.0 68 100.0 46 100.0 193 100.0 80. While in displacement, (Annex Table 1-36) there is a gradual decline in the number of disputes resolved by clan and family institutions from 38 percent to 31 percent, because the social-cultural context in camps changes community compositions and scatters clan and family heads irrespective of where they belong but in line with security needs. In their declining space, the Local councils have gained the number of land disputes going up to 26 percent and 24 percent for LC 1 and LC 2 respectively and a decline in appeals to LC3 from 11 percent to 9 percent. Annex Table 1-37: Dispute Resolution Option (Post ­Conflict) Post Conflict: Regions Commonly Lango Total Acholi Total Accessed Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Resolution Options n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % LC1 19 50.0 10 41.7 29 46.8 12 21.4 12 25.0 19 26.0 3 7.7 46 21.3 LC 2 2 5.3 2 8.3 4 6.5 18 32.1 13 27.1 17 23.3 11 28.2 59 27.3 LC3 3 7.9 1 4.2 4 6.5 4 7.1 1 2.1 16 21.9 8 20.5 29 13.4 LC5 1 1.8 2 4.2 4 5.5 2 5.1 9 4.2 Magistrates Court 1 1.8 5 10.4 3 4.1 3 7.7 12 5.6 Police 2 8.3 2 3.2 2 3.6 2 4.2 2 2.7 1 2.6 7 3.2 Clan/ Family 10 26.3 9 37.5 19 30.6 17 30.4 11 22.9 11 15.1 11 28.2 50 23.1 RDC / CAO/ 1 2.6 1 1.6 1 2.1 1 .5 Presidents Office Unclassified 3 7.9 3 4.8 1 1.8 1 2.1 1 1.4 3 1.4 Total 38 100.0 24 100.0 62 100.0 56 100.0 48 100.0 73 100.0 39 100.0 216 100.0 81. Annex Table 1-37 shows that on return from displacement, the family and clan involvement in disputes resolution declines further to 23 percent, as LC 1 gains role in 72 dispute resolution to 21 percent and LC 2 begins to function according to its statutory mandate of being the court of first instance with regard to land disputes, and the rate of appeals to LC 3 also goes up, and the number of cases reaching the magistrates courts drastically raises from 1 percent to 6 percent. This finding shows that although clan and family as traditional institutions of land disputes resolution still hold legitimacy, they have been greatly weakened by the displacement process, on the other land local councils and magistrates courts are suddenly pressured to deliver land justice, often at a rate that is slower than the demand for services due to absence of institutional infrastructure on ground to adequately support their services. Annex Table 1-38: Choice of Dispute Resolution Institution (Pre-Displacement) Before Regions Displacement: Lango Total Acholi Total Considerations in Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Choosing Resolution Option n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Distance (It was 21 33.9 4 23.5 25 31.6 2 6.3 19 31.7 14 25.0 3 16.7 38 22.9 Close) Cost (It was 4 6.5 1 5.9 5 6.3 5 15.6 8 13.3 9 16.1 2 11.1 24 14.5 Cheap) Familiarity (I understand how it 21 33.9 5 29.4 26 32.9 12 37.5 23 38.3 17 30.4 5 27.8 57 34.3 works) Fairness (trust the 5 8.1 1 5.9 6 7.6 3 9.4 3 5.0 2 3.6 2 11.1 10 6.0 Institution) Legal Mandated (It is the stipulated 9 14.5 9 11.4 8 25.0 3 5.0 8 14.3 5 27.8 24 14.5 place to go/ its procedure Availability (it was the readily available 2 3.2 6 35.3 8 10.1 2 6.3 4 6.7 6 10.7 1 5.6 13 7.8 option) Total 62 100.0 17 100.0 79 100.0 32 100.0 60 100.0 56 100.0 18 100.0 166 100.0 82. The study, also investigated, the reasoning behind the choice of particular institution, as a way of understanding the changing trends in dispute resolution seeking behavior of respondents in the study area, before displacement, during displacement and on return in the post-conflict era, so that understanding of what influences choice is included and considered in the management of recovery and development in northern Uganda. 83. Annex Table 1-38 explains choice of dispute resolution fora around six factors, in all familiarity of how a particular institution operates or works was the major determinant of choice of dispute resolution for 34 percent of respondents to this survey before displacement in Acholi region compared to 32 percent in Lango region. Distance from location of the dispute which determines ease of reach was important for 23 percent of respondents in Acholi region and 32 percent in Lango region, while cost and the institution being legally mandated accounted equally for 15 percent of respondent's choice in Acholi region compared to 11 percent in Lango region. Availability of a dispute resolution institution was important for 8 percent in Acholi compared to 10 percent in Lango region and perceived fairness was considered by 6 percent of respondents to the study in Acholi compared to 7 percent in Lango. Within the study areas, respondents from Pader (38 percent) and Lira (34 percent) had the highest consideration of understanding how a system works in order to make choice to 73 use it. Distance was significant in the whole of Lango Region and the far flung districts of Pader and Kitgum in Acholi region. Cost and legal mandate were most significant in Acholi region. Annex Table 1-39: Choice of Dispute Resolution Institution (Displacement) While in Regions Displacement: Lango Total Acholi Total Considerations in Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Choosing Resolution Option n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Distance (It was 12 26.7 1 20.0 13 26.0 8 15.4 12 26.7 15 21.1 7 14.6 42 19.4 Close) Cost (It was Cheap) 1 2.2 1 2.0 3 5.8 4 8.9 4 5.6 3 6.3 14 6.5 Familiarity (I understand how it 10 22.2 2 40.0 12 24.0 10 19.2 11 24.4 21 29.6 10 20.8 52 24.1 works) Fairness (trust the 6 13.3 1 20.0 7 14.0 11 21.2 7 15.6 12 16.9 11 22.9 41 19.0 Institution) Legal Mandate (It is the stipulated place 9 20.0 1 20.0 10 20.0 13 25.0 9 20.0 12 16.9 15 31.3 49 22.7 to go/ its procedure Availability (it was the readily available 7 15.6 7 14.0 7 13.5 2 4.4 7 9.9 2 4.2 18 8.3 option) Total 45 100.0 5 100.0 50 100.0 52 100.0 45 100.0 71 100.0 48 100.0 216 100.0 84. Annex Table 1-39, reveals that as displacement happened, the value of understanding how a system works as a determinant of choice for dispute resolution declines from 34 percent to 24 percent in Acholi region and 32 percent to 24 percent in Lango region, but remains the key consideration in making choice. Legal mandate for enforceability of decisions or formality of procedure significantly gains importance from 15 percent to 23 percent in Acholi region and from 15 percent to 20 percent in Lango as the second most important determinant of choice. Distance or location associated with ease of access decreases in importance from 23 percent to 19 percent in Acholi region, from 32 percent to 26 percent in Lango region, while availability and cost stood at 8 percent and 7 percent respectively in Acholi, 7 percent, and 2 percent in Lango region. Annex Table 1-40: Choice of Dispute Resolution Institution (Post-Conflict) Post Conflict: Regions Consideratio Lango Acholi ns in Amu Choosing Lira Oyam Total Gulu Pader Kitgum ru Total Resolution Option n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n percent Distance (It 14. 7 5 17.9 12 16.0 8 13.3 11 22.0 3 6.7 3 12.0 25 13.9 was Close) 9 Cost (It was 1 2.1 2 7.1 3 4.0 2 3.3 5 10.0 5 11.1 1 4.0 13 7.2 Cheap) Familiarity (I understand how 11 23.4 6 21.4 17 22.7 18 30.0 15 30.0 10 22.2 5 20.0 48 26.7 it works) Fairness (trust 9 19.1 4 14.3 13 17.3 13 21.7 6 12.0 10 22.2 7 28.0 36 20.0 74 Post Conflict: Regions Consideratio Lango Acholi ns in Amu Choosing Lira Oyam Total Gulu Pader Kitgum ru Total Resolution Option n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n percent the Institution) Legal Mandate (stipulated place 13 27.7 5 17.9 18 24.0 15 25.0 11 22.0 14 31.1 5 20.0 45 25.0 to go/ its procedure Availability (it was the readily 6 12.8 6 21.4 12 16.0 4 6.7 2 4.0 3 6.7 4 16.0 13 7.2 available option) Total 100. 47 28 100.0 75 100.0 60 100.0 50 100.0 45 100.0 25 100.0 180 100.0 0 85. Annex Table 1-40, presents the choice of dispute resolution institutions upon return of IDPs (time of the study) which reveals that familiarity with how an institution works is still the major consideration for 27 percent of respondents in Acholi region and 23 percent of respondents in Lango region with lesser ranking followed by legal mandate or prescribed institution continuing to rise in value up to 25 percent in Acholi region and 24 percent in Lango region. This is closely followed by fairness which gains a sudden steep rise to 20 percent in Acholi and 17 percent in Lango region, as distances comes in next at 14 percent and 16 percent in Acholi and Lango regions respectively. Duration and Cost of Dispute Resolution 86. Duration and cost are least ranked among the considerations for making choice of a dispute resolution institution to use, but have long been proven to be barrier for access to justice. Considering duration amongst households, In comparison to Male headed Households (MHH), Female Headed Households (FHH) take long to have their land disputes resolved and this trend has not been reversed during displacement and upon return (post conflict) and it takes an average low of 2 months to a high of 8 months to resolve a particular dispute, while the MHH takes a minimum of 1 month to a maximum of 6 months (Annex Table 1-41) 75 Annex Table 1-41: Duration of Dispute Resolution (Households) How long Regions (Months) it Lango Acholi took to Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Resolve Land Dispute: FHH MHH CHH FHH MHH FHH MHH CHH FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH Post 8 5 . 2 4 1 1 . 2 1 . 1 . 1 Displacement While in 2 4 . . 3 5 3 . 6 1 . 3 5 2 Displacement Before 7 6 3 4 3 1 15 4 3 8 5 3 1 7 Displacement 87. Annex Table 1-42) below analyses, further any variations by sex and shows that in all districts, females take longest to have their disputes on land resolved especially in Lira district for all periods (pre-displacement, displacement and on return) a minimum of 3 months and a maximum of 9 months. While in Gulu and Pader districts extreme variations are witnessed with a minimum of one month and maximum of 17 months for males and females, overall land dispute resolution for females still take longer to resolve than for males in both Lango and Acholi regions. Annex Table 1-42: Duration of Dispute Resolution (By Sex) How long Regions (Months) it Lango Acholi took to Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Resolve Land Dispute: (Mean) Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Post 9 3 2 4 2 1 2 1 . 1 1 1 Displacement While in 3 4 . 3 5 3 6 1 3 3 4 3 Displacement Before 8 5 4 3 2 17 13 3 5 3 8 2 Displacement Annex Table 1-43 further shows, in terms of regional district by district, Gulu and Lira district take longest to have disputes resolved, followed by Pader and Amuru Districts. Annex Table 1-43: Duration of Dispute Resolution (By District) How long (Months) it took to Resolve Regions Land Dispute: Lango Acholi Total Total Total Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Before Displacement 6 3 5 12 7 4 6 7 6 While in Displacement 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 Post Conflict 6 3 5 1 2 1 1 1 3 88. On the other hand, the exploration of costs involved in dispute resolution, shows that the cost of accessing justice is higher during post conflict period especially for females than 76 males before displacement and has relatively gone down in post conflict period (Annex Table 1-44) Annex Table 1-44: Average Cost of Dispute Resolution (By Sex) Average Regions Cost (Ushs.) Lango Acholi of Resolving Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Land Dispute: Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Before 21500 16917 2833 10457 4000 53000 23000 19667 49500 5125 7000 12500 Displacement While in 26000 32600 . 4167 30000 8750 0 24167 50000 19000 8750 34000 Displacement Post Conflict 15800 14000 1667 1267 12500 13500 23333 4000 . 20000 50000 8333 89. At household level, MHH on average in Lango spend more on dispute resolution compared to FHH and still highest during displacement, while in Acholi region FHH spend more on dispute resolution and still highest during displacement, as illustrated in Annex Table 1-45 below. In terms, of average cost for dispute resolution by district, still the cost of dispute resolution has been highest during displacement period, with Oyam recording the least cost in Lango region while Gulu and Kitgum had the highest costs of dispute resolution, with Amuru District having the lowest cost of Dispute resolution in the region.(Annex Table 1-46) Annex Table 1-45: Average Cost of Dispute Resolution (Household) Average Cost Regions (Ushs.) of Lango Acholi Resolving Land Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Dispute: FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH FHH MHH Before 3500 21438 3067 10357 3000 45000 . 21182 49500 19917 . 8571 Displacement While in 11750 37250 . 4167 40000 11000 0 24167 . 29333 13333 26200 Displacement Post Conflict 0 18625 1450 1500 10000 14800 23333 4000 . 20000 . 18750 90. These findings illustrate the fact that while in displacement, IDPs had to pay a higher cost for resolving disputes compared to the period before displacement, however it is clear that in Lango region this cost is further declining on return, as well in Acholi. Annex Table 1-46: Average Cost of Dispute Resolution (By District) Regions Total Average Cost (Ushs.) of Lango Acholi Resolving Land Dispute: Lira Oyam Total Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Total Before Displacement 18,605 8,170 15,007 39,000 21,182 27,313 8,571 23,773 19,673 While in Displacement 28,750 4,167 23,833 15,833 14,500 29,333 21,375 19,386 21,189 Post Conflict 14,900 1,467 9,863 13,000 18,500 20,000 18,750 16,059 13,055 91. According to FDGs, this declining cost is associated with the various actors venturing into provision of pro-bono legal services by civil society organizations and the encouragement to utilize alternative dispute resolution mechanisms both the Government and traditional institutions. 77 Compensation Claims and Restorative Actions 92. In post-conflict northern Uganda, a number of land claims that are peculiar to the displacement and return process have emerged and need specific response from policy or administration in land management. The study however sought to seek study respondents views in identifying these peculiar claims and putting across a range of options that policy and administration will consider for action. Compensation 93. According to FDGs, land claims especially for compensation centered around illegal occupation of land by IDP camps and the destruction in land resources as a result of the displacement process specifically; (a) Landlords where IDP camps are located are claim that they are entitled to due compensation on grounds of; (i) Illegal occupation of their land in breach of their land rights as owners (ii) Loss of income that would have accrued from land during displacement period ranging from (3 years in Lango to 13 years in Acholi). (iii) Due to change in land use from agricultural to settlement sites, there has been loss in productivity of the land (despite camp removal or return of IDPs land won't be productive for the next approximately 15 to 20 years). (iv) Land lost to placement of public utilities and infrastructure such as toilets, boreholes, schools and mechanized water pumps. First the issues of who owns such facilities that are placed on their land, given the fact that IDPs are now returning or have returned. In Amuru District a peculiar case has unfolded where the land owner sued the LC 3 for placing a water facility on his land (to service a return camp or relocation site) on grounds of trespass and was awarded 3.5 million Uganda shilling compensation by the Magistrates Court. Local Governments are worried about the precedent such a ruling has set. (v) Occupation effects were not limited to the camp land only but the land surrounding the camps up to approximately 3 Kilometers radius was intensively farmed by the IDPs and its fertility and productivity is considerable reduced now (However, FDGs with IDP returnees and those still in decongestion sites, clarified that land access for agricultural use or food production around camps was on rental basis, detailed in land transactions section of this report). 94. Landlords where army detaches and camps were located claim that they are entitled to compensation on grounds of; (a) Illegal occupation of their land in breach of their land rights as owners 78 (b) Destruction of their land with construction of protective ditches ("ndaki") around their lands (c) Destruction of Housing, Farms and Produce that came with army occupation of land (d) Felling of tree resources for firewood and charcoal by the army (items were being ferried to Kampala for sale) (e) In other instances the army cultivated private land that they occupied. Annex Table 1-47: Importance of Response to Land Claims Status of Land Problem/ Situation arising from Condition Total Condition in which Parcel of Land was Found: Analysis for Not only those with potential for conflict Resolved Resolved Col % Boundaries changed/ markers tampered 5.5 10.7 10.1 Occupied/ cultivated by unknown persons 8.6 7.3 7.4 Occupied/ cultivated by family with out authority 2.4 5.2 4.9 Occupied/ cultivated by early returnees 0.9 1.5 1.4 Cultivated by army 4.9 2.5 2.8 Encamped on by army 11.0 5.3 6.0 Has an IDP camp on it 2.8 3.9 3.7 Trees have been cut/ has un filled holes 15.0 23.7 22.7 Housing vandalized/ burnt 44.6 37.6 38.4 A road/ path/ borehole made through it 4.3 2.1 2.4 Others 0.0 0.4 0.3 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 Resolution Rate 11.5 % 95. The above stated grounds of loss were considered by the landlords to be sufficient for government action for compensation. However survey respondents in Annex Table 1-47 above show that, consideration for compensation is linked to the conditions in which one finds his/her land parcel upon return. Five major issues emerge from the survey results as follows; (a) First, is the destruction of housing or shelter units that have been either burnt or vandalized on return. This condition got the highest ranking of 38 percent of respondents in the survey, of which 45 percent were of the view that the resettlement packages60 are responding to this claim, while 38 percent of the respondents felt that this still needs administrative response for those in need to benefit. (b) Second most important aspect articulated was tree resource loss and un-filled holes or ditches arising from army occupation of land either as detaches or military bases and presence army camp which 23 percent and 5 percent of respondents ranked as important respectively, of these 15 percent felt that this claim was being addressed by the army and 24 percent of those affected that this was yet to be addressed and warranted response from the Uganda Peoples Defense Forces. 60 Provision of 30 Roofing Iron Sheets per household under OPM's office is a soft landing in this aspect and has also influenced return patterns with a number of people maintaining presence in camps in order to access the package 79 (c) Third, issues was the changed boundaries or markers that had been tampered with which 10 percent of respondents ranked as an issue that needs administrative, legislative and policy response, amongst whom 1/3 felt that it was being resolved and 2/3 felt its is yet to be resolved thus greatly warrants immediate attention. (d) Fourth, occupation or cultivation of land by unknown persons and family members with out express authority of the holders also need a directive on resolution. (e) Lastly, the observation that most interests of land owners though put across do not rank highly, because of the numerical weakness of land lords (they are few) but go to show the principles and ground articulated by landlords in the focus groups discussion in the preceding paragraphs. Possible Alternatives to Compensation 96. In terms of restorative actions, for the different land claims, survey results show that 73 percent of respondents support of compensation as payment for loss, destruction or degradation of land and housing property, as illustrated in Annex Table 1-48 below, this action is recommended with relatively similar ranking across the study districts, with Pader having the highest rank of 84 percent shows agreement on course of action that government should consider. The second best alternative to compensation is the actual resolution of land disputes alluded to by 10 percent of respondents in the survey followed by restitution calling for removal of illegal occupiers or users of land that does not belong to them accounting for ranking of 8 percent. Only 6 percent opted for universally remarking or re-establishment of land boundaries and 4 percent thought the option of resettlement by government would be ideal for resolving land disputes claims in northern Uganda. Annex Table 1-48: Suggested Restorative Acholi Land Claims Study District (Col %) Total Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru How Land Problem Should be Resolved % % % % % % % Remove illegal occupant/ user (Restitute) 8.4 4.2 6.0 7.6 10.4 8.7 8.0 Pay for Loss/ Destruction/ Degradation (Compensate) 71.7 76.4 67.3 84.2 73.8 60.6 72.7 Give alternative land (Resettle) 6.6 1.4 1.8 2.7 4.5 3.1 3.6 Resolve Land Conflict 8.4 12.5 16.7 3.3 6.8 16.5 9.9 Have all boundaries marked 4.8 5.6 8.3 2.2 4.5 11 5.8 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Existing Initiatives for Land Restoration (Humanitarian Agencies) 97. UNHCR has started a camp closure initiative (alternatively referred to as camp cleaning exercises). It was launched on 11/9/2007 in Lira District where two IDP camps namely Otwal Railway and Agweng were razed down. The camp closure include razing empty huts, filling pit latrines, leveling the sites and planting some trees for restoration of greenery and soil fertility. In Lango region camp phase out committees have identified sites for closure and advice on activities for transformation. 80 LAND TRANSACTIONS 98. Studies reviewed to inform this survey, point out that there has been an increase in the number of land transactions taking place since displacement started, often to the disadvantage of indigenous customary land rights holders and the extremely vulnerable groups of either orphans or widows, or even female headed household that are propelled into the land market due to the socio-economic squeeze or due to absence of livelihood options, hence have a higher probability of descending in abject poverty or destitution upon return or end of displacement. Nature of Land Transactions 99. First, the survey investigated the nature of land transactions taking place during displacement, which showed that land renting was the most predominant land transaction in which 57 percent of respondents to the study had engaged in followed by land borrowing which 13 percent of respondents had engaged in and 3 percent in share-cropping arrangements. Findings presented in Annex Table 1-49 show that 24 percent of respondents to the survey had not engaged in any land transaction during the period of displacement. However, the most peculiar finding was that less 3 percent of respondents engaged in land purchase and sales, contrary to assertions of the need to control the negatives effects of land sales that were speculated to have happened during displacement. Annex Table 1-49: Land Transaction (Displacement) Response: Regions While in Lango Total Acholi Total Displacement: Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Col Land Col Col Col Col Col Col Col n % Transactions n % n % n % n % n % n % n % None 152 66.4 69 62.7 221 65.2 68 31.6 29 12.0 69 30.9 25 23.6 191 24.3 Share 7 3.1 4 3.6 11 3.2 16 7.4 1 .4 8 3.6 2 1.9 27 3.4 Cropping Bought Land 15 6.6 3 2.7 18 5.3 3 1.4 1 .4 9 4.0 5 4.7 18 2.3 Sold land 3 1.3 3 .9 2 .8 1 .4 3 .4 Rented Land 43 18.8 32 29.1 75 22.1 123 57.2 165 68.2 103 46.2 56 52.8 447 56.9 Borrowed 9 3.9 2 1.8 11 3.2 5 2.3 44 18.2 33 14.8 18 17.0 100 12.7 Land Total 229 100.0 110 100.0 339 100.0 215 100.0 242 100.0 223 100.0 106 100.0 786 100.0 100. For comparative purposes, transactions since IDP return commenced were also investigated, and the findings in Annex Table 1-50 show that there has been a drastic fall in land renting from 57 percent during displacement to 11 percent since IDP return commenced; similarly borrowing ranking have halved to 5 percent, while sharecropping is at an insignificant 2 percent. However, the most peculiar finding that re-affirms the low level of land transactions so far on return is 81 percent of respondents who had not engaged in any land transactions since movement out of camps started. 81 Annex Table 1-50: Land Transaction (Post Conflict) Responses Regions Post Conflict: Lango Total Acholi Total Land Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Transactions Col Col n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % None 77 89.5 59 96.7 136 92.5 111 93.3 44 52.4 71 89.9 31 88.6 257 81.1 Share Cropping 1 1.2 1 .7 3 3.8 2 5.7 5 1.6 Bought Land 1 1.6 1 .7 Sold land 1 1.2 1 .7 1 1.2 1 1.3 1 2.9 3 .9 Rented Land 6 7.0 1 1.6 7 4.8 8 6.7 26 31.0 1 1.3 35 11.0 Borrowed Land 1 1.2 1 .7 13 15.5 3 3.8 1 2.9 17 5.4 Total 86 100.0 61 100.0 147 100.0 119 100.0 84 100.0 79 100.0 35 100.0 317 100.0 Despite the low levels of land sales and purchases, the survey sought to understand the causes or triggers for land transactions both in displacement and on return of IDPs, which found that 72 percent of transactions were induced (distress) related to survival needs or sustenance (sustenance, health and education) and 15 percent were those related to persons who had chosen to resettled in a different location during displacement as illustrated in Annex Table 1- 51. Annex Table 1-51: Triggers of Land Transaction (Displacement) Responses Regions While in Lango Total Acholi Total Displacement: Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Triggers of Land Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Col Transactions n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Opting for 34 42.0 25 58.1 59 47.6 20 11.4 33 13.8 37 28.7 8 10.8 98 15.9 Resettlement Distress (Health/ 5 6.2 5 4.0 19 10.9 24 10.0 9 7.0 2 2.7 54 8.8 Education) Distress 26 32.1 17 39.5 43 34.7 85 48.6 167 69.9 77 59.7 64 86.5 393 63.7 (Sustenance) Land Dispute/ 1 1.2 1 .8 2 1.1 2 .3 Conflict Others 15 18.5 1 2.3 16 12.9 49 28.0 15 6.3 6 4.7 70 11.3 Total 81 100.0 43 100.0 124 100.0 175 100.0 239 100.0 129 100.0 74 100.0 617 100.0 82 Annex Table 1-52: Triggers of Land Transaction (Post-Conflict) Responses Regions Lango Acholi Post Study District Total Study District Total Conflict: Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Triggers of Land Transactions Col Col Col Col n percent Col Col Col Col n percent n percent n percent n percent n percent n percent n percent Investment Capital 8 24.2 7 41.2 15 30.0 13 48.1 10 13.2 1 7.7 24 19.7 Needs Distress (Health/ 2 6.1 1 5.9 3 6.0 2 7.4 21 27.6 3 23.1 26 21.3 Education) Distress 15 45.5 8 47.1 23 46.0 5 18.5 43 56.6 9 69.2 5 83.3 62 50.8 (Sustenance) Land 5 15.2 5 10.0 2 7.4 2 2.6 1 16.7 5 4.1 Conflict Others 3 9.1 1 5.9 4 8.0 5 18.5 5 4.1 Total 33 100.0 17 100.0 50 100.0 27 100.0 76 100.0 13 100.0 6 100.0 122 100.0 101. In comparison to the return period, Annex Table 1-52 shows that survival was still a cause for engaging in land transactions for 51 percent respondents especially in land rentals while a new factors or triggers such as financing health and education for 21 percent of respondents and the need for investment capital emerged on return from displacement for 20 percent of respondents, as livelihood focus change from survival to recovery and development. Cost of Land Transactions 102. Annex Table 1-53 shows that the average acreage sold was 3 acres for those engaging in land sales and purchase at an average price ranging from 165,000/= to 500,000 Uganda shillings, while rental fees varied between 20,000/= Uganda shillings and 70,000/= Uganda shillings for 2 to 5 acres of land per annum. Annex Table 1-53: Value of Land Transactions Regions Lango Acholi Lira Oyam Total Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Total Total Amount of Land Bought 3.20 . 3.20 . . 5.00 1.00 3.00 3.14 (Acres) Buying Price (Ushs.) 162000 . 162000 . . 50000 500000 275000 194286 Amount of Land Sold (Acres) 2.00 . 2.00 . . 3.00 . 3.00 2.50 Selling Price (Ushs.) 500000 . 500000 . . 900000 . 900000 700000 Amount of Land Rented 2.20 2.15 2.18 5.18 2.16 2.50 2.33 2.69 2.54 (Acres) Rental Fee (Ushs.) 52500 44615 48704 186545 44729 21667 26667 66831 61511 However a peculiar figure is the sale price for those that have accumulated (with possibility of speculation) standing between 500,000/= Uganda shillings and 90,000/= Uganda shillings. 83 For all transactions, the costs are higher in Acholi region than Lango region (Annex Table 1- 54). Annex Table 1-54: Assumptions about Land Transactions Regions Total Lango Acholi Col Study District Study District n % Lira Oyam Gulu Pader Kitgum Amuru Col Col Col Col Col Col n % n % n % n % n % n % The cost of renting land True 189 87.5 86 81.1 176 81.9 203 93.1 187 86.6 96 96.0 937 87.5 is higher now compared False 27 12.5 20 18.9 39 18.1 15 6.9 29 13.4 4 4.0 134 12.5 to before displacement The cost of buying land True 196 89.1 94 89.5 203 94.4 210 96.8 194 90.2 98 99.0 995 92.9 is higher now compared False 24 10.9 11 10.5 12 5.6 7 3.2 21 9.8 1 1.0 76 7.1 to before displacement It is a lot easier to sale/ True 31 14.0 9 8.7 18 8.4 28 13.5 25 11.7 11 11.0 122 11.5 buy land now than before False 190 86.0 95 91.3 197 91.6 180 86.5 188 88.3 89 89.0 939 88.5 displacement Since displacement clans True 49 22.1 7 6.5 16 7.4 23 11.0 21 9.8 26 26.0 142 13.3 have less control on land False 173 77.9 100 93.5 199 92.6 187 89.0 194 90.2 74 74.0 927 86.7 sales in this community Many persons in this True 39 17.7 8 7.6 14 6.5 10 4.8 16 7.5 10 10.0 97 9.1 community sold their False land while in 181 82.3 97 92.4 201 93.5 199 95.2 198 92.5 90 90.0 966 90.9 displacement A few persons in this True 133 61.6 69 65.7 132 61.4 113 53.8 107 50.5 54 54.5 608 57.5 community sold their False land while in 83 38.4 36 34.3 83 38.6 97 46.2 105 49.5 45 45.5 449 42.5 displacement LAND ADMINISTRATION INSTITUTIONS 103. To test the demand for formal land services and to gain insights into formal land transactions, the survey team reviewed land office records and extracted data from records. However, the state of records was found to be very poor, with incomplete information and in some instances, the districts were unable to produce records because they were not in existence or there was an administrative wrangle61. Only Gulu and Lira land offices had records that could be extracted. Land Registration Services 104. Land Registration services were investigated from two angles: (i) applications received by the district regional offices for registration which is directly co-related to demand for services; and (ii) successful registration by issue of title which is directly related to capacity for delivery of services. 61 As is the case with Kitgum District, which has a spill over to Pader District 84 Annex Table 1-55: Applications Received (Gulu and Lira Land Offices) Applications for Gulu Land Office Lira Land Office Land Received Urban Rural Urban Rural 2001 - - 14 2002 - - 54 7 2003 - - 74 6 2004 35 10 67 265 2005 204 0 200 420 2006 39 0 112 204 2007 0 0 83 61 Total 278 10 604 963 Source: Lira and Gulu Land Office Records 105. Results show that between 2004 and 2006 Gulu Land Office received 288 applications of which 10 were rural while in the same period Lira Land Office received 1,268 applications of which 889 were rural. A summary of the extraction for applications for title received is shown in Annex Table 1-55e62. Analysis of the tallies depicts a pattern in which there was a sharp rise in the number of applications for land at the beginning of 2004 mainly in Lira, peaking in 2005 followed by a fall in 2006, the pattern is graphically illustrated in Annex Figure 1-8. Annex 1-8: Applications Received at Gulu and Lira Land Offices 450 400 d 350 eve 300 Gulu Urban eciRsnoiatcilppA 250 Gulu Rural 200 Lira Urban 150 Lira Rural 100 50 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Source: Lira and Gulu Land Office Records 106. Investigation of trends, that stand out from the tallies show that Lira which serves the Lango region was relatively stable and the concept of titling has been vigorously promoted by civil society as a secure mode of ownership of land, this together with influences of displacement resulted in a sudden urge to apply for titles even in the Urban. However the peculiar comparison is in Gulu land office which serves Acholi region where virtual no rural 62Records for Gulu applications for the period 2001-2003 could not be accessed as the responsible person was not available to release them. Those available had a higher level of completeness compared to the records on the Lira Land Office. 85 land is being titled and relatively the same level of demand in the urban as equal to demand in Lira urban. Annex Table 1-56: Successful Applications (Lira and Gulu) Applications for Land Gulu Lira Successfully Processed Urban Rural Urban Rural 2001 21 1 2002 62 1 5 2 2003 66 1 50 21 2004 79 2 46 11 2005 125 2 73 17 2006 130 55 15 2007 70 17 11 Total 553 6 247 77 Source: Lira and Gulu Land Office Records 107. Looking at, the capacity to deliver in relation to demand, amongst the applications received, successful application for which title was issued, it is observed that successful issue of titles rose in the period 2004-2006; particularly in urban Gulu compared to urban Lira while rural Gulu more or less had no titling activity compared to rural Lira which depicts a relatively low but stable pattern of successful titling, as presented in Annex Table 1-56. 108. The illustration shows that despite the lower volume of applications in the Gulu office the capacity to respond is very high as almost all applications are processed; however there is a sharp decline since return commenced. Lira office's capacity to respond to the enormous applications for titling rural land is low, as the results show the highest number of unprocessed applications in the rural compared to urban output which is higher despite having lower applications than the rural, this shows that urban applicant are still the preferred clients for titling. These trends are also as a result of administration capacity within the districts for the institutions charged with the delivery of land services. 109. In Annex Table 1-57 below, all the districts were evaluated in terms of the required professional staff level stipulated in the Land Act Cap 227, support positions to the professional and technical staff, as well as the governance mandate for land administration entrusted with the district land board, a number of peculiar findings enumerated below emerged; (a) Professionally, all districts in Lango and Acholi regions have the positions of District Registrar of Titles and District Valuer is vacant. (b) Gulu is the only land office that is able to recruit and retain personnel in at least ½ of the professional positions required for successful and professional functioning of the District Land Offices. (c) All newly created districts in Lango and Acholi (Pader, Amuru, Oyam) are only able to recruit and retain a physical planner in their District Land Offices. (d) District Surveyor for Lira serves the whole of Lango region and that of Gulu serves the whole of Acholi region. (e) In terms of support staff to the professionals, only Gulu and Lira are able to avail at least two to support the functions of the District Land Offices. 86 Annex Table 1-57: Administration Capacity (Staffing Levels) Land Services Delivery (Administration) Lango Acholi Lira Oyam Gulu Amuru Pader Kitgum District Professional Positions 1. District Registrar of Titles 2. District Land Officer 3. District Land Valuer 4. District Surveyor 5. District Physical Planner District Support Staff Positions 1. Cartographer 2. Office Assistants /Secretary 3. Drivers / etc. District Land Management Structures 1. District Land Board CF C CF C CF CF 2. Secretary to Land Board 3. Area Land Committees C NC C NC NC NC Key: Position is filled Position is vacant C Constituted but not functional CF Constituted and functional NC Not Constituted 110. In terms of land management governance: (a) 4 out of the 6 districts have constituted District Land Boards that are functional, while 2 district have constituted land boards that are yet to function (b) Only Gulu and Lira have constituted the base institutions (area land committees) to support the functions of the District Land Board at the apex. (c) All districts have filled the office of Secretary to the District Land Board. Institutions on Dispute Resolution 111. Both formal and informal land dispute resolution institutions were investigated in this study, little or no headway was made with land tribunals since these were already suspended at the time of study. Local council courts and existing informal dispute resolution mechanisms were reviewed. Not a single local council court had any records on the cases they receive. Some partial proceedings of particular cases are recorded in soft cover exercise book but not centrally kept. Records are also a problem for traditional dispute resolution structures. 112. In reality the study found a close interaction between these traditional dispute resolution systems and the local council courts. The traditional institutions though not legally sanctioned to handle land disputes they are in most instances the courts of first instance and the LC system is strongly dependant on their structures and services. When a dispute on land occurs the Rwot Kweri or the Won Pachu intervene first; however if a dispute involves violence then the local councils come in since they have powers to apprehend and punish. 113. Depending on the severity of the violence the both the traditional dispute resolution system and the formal function alongside each other. While the formal system will proceed with hearing of the dispute whatever the verdict the traditional system will also proceed with 87 cleansing and reconciliation rites even in instances where violence has resulted in death while the perpetrator is convicted and sentenced still the clan members go through payment of fines, cleansing and reconciliation. Traditional Institutions 114. Both Acholi and Langi have elaborate traditional dispute resolution systems; although those in Acholi land seemed to be comparatively more developed than those in Lango. Both systems are based and operate along the structure and organization of the clans as presented in Tables 5-58 and 5-59. Annex Table 1-58: Traditional Land Dispute Resolution Institutions Heirarchy in the Acholi. Rwot Kweri Atekere Lawang Rwot Rwot · Translated to mean · Comes next in · Handles referrals from the · Leads a chief of the hoe or hierarchy, leads two Atekere council of leader of work villages called Te-Rwot · In addition handles matters elders that sits · At community level, Kweri involving death/ grievous to decide cases community usually · In addition to handling violence referred from referred to as a sub issues referred by the · Conducts an inquest in the the lower village Atekere handles matters cause of death and leads levels · Handles land of domestic violence burial/ last funeral rights · Elected from conflicts particularly · Also elected by a village · These are also elected by an the council of those involving assembly assembly of the Rwot elders parcel boundaries · But usually men Kweri and Atekere · Is elected by a · Usually an elder (above · Usually an elder (above 45 village assembly 45 years) years) · Can be a woman · Authorized to conduct · Usually an elder mato-oput (cleansing and (above 45 years) reconciliation tradition) 115. It is important to note that the traditional and formal dispute resolution mechanisms interlink when it comes to providing evidence. The Rwot Kweri or the Won Pachu are undisputed custodians of knowledge on land matters in specific localities to the extent that the Local Council courts ordinarily do not decide land matters without these elders. In certain instances it was also reported that the LCs are summoned by the traditional authorities to justify their actions with regard to land. Annex Table 1-59: Traditional Land Disputes Resolution Institutions Heirarchy Lango. Won pachu/ Jago (Sub Rwot Twale Awitong (linked to Bako wijobi County) (County Lango Cultural (Parish Level) level) Union) · Leads less · Leads more · Usually at · Some areas do not have · Highest office than 100 than 100 county this but it exist where the · Member of a clan households households level clan has people elders council that transcending district chooses a leader of boundaries the Langi 116. FDGs also advanced the thinking that traditional institutions have withstood changes like the `nyumba kumi' ­Ten Houses and the village `nyampara' ­ Headman concepts during 88 Obote's regimes and now they are surviving the LC system even in the face of displacement they are being revived wherever return has taken place. It was observed in the focus group discussions that these traditional structures are not efficient in preventing disputes but are quite expeditious in resolving while the formal structures have the reverse advantage. Land Tribunals and Magistrates Courts 117. Access to case records of District Land Tribunals was cumbersome, because most records were transferred to the District Magistrates' Court since the suspension of operations not even the clerk/ secretary to the land Tribunal was present during the course of the data extraction therefore completeness of records was a problem that could not be adequately contextualized. Extraction of cases data was only possible for the Lira Land Tribunal circuit63 for the period 2003 to 2007 where a total of 270 cases were received; these were both appeals and fresh cases. Annex Figure 1-9: Cases Received by Lira Circuit Land Tribunal 120 100 eved cie 80 R sesa 60 C dnaLfo.o 40 20 N 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Fresh Cases 7 61 66 0 50 Appeals 2 26 30 28 0 Total 9 87 96 28 50 Source: Land Tribunal Records Extraction 118. Analysis shows the highest numbers were cases were received in 2005 while in 2006 and 2007, the suspension and reinstatement and then final suspension of the District Tribunals affected the pattern of land cases received as shown in Annex Figure 1-9. The evidence obtained shows that in 2006 only appeals were received while no fresh land cases were recorded as the tribunals were closed only to be reopened as part of the Magistrates court at the start of 2007. 119. Further analysis of the performance of the Lira Circuit Tribunal and the Magistrates Court shows that the case backlog grew from 73 in 2004 to 239 in 2007 at the time of study. In the same period the dispute resolution rate declined from 0.5 to 0. Out of the total 270 cases filled in the circuit tribunal only 22 were successfully resolved. The full result is shown 63The officer in charge of Gulu had had an accident and was hospitalized in Mulago Hospital, given that the rest of the staff in the tribunal was suspended, it became impossible to access the records. 89 in Annex Figure 1-10. This level of performance is at best dismal and showcases the capacity of statutory dispute resolution compared to options available to the public 120. For the recovery and return period, the cost of moving the statutory structures to full functionality may be higher than equipping the grassroots institutions (both statutory and traditional) that are able to "nip the problems in the bud" before they actually sprout to unmanageable levels. According to interviews, the absence of tribunals would not be gravely felt if the Local Council courts are equipped and in position to dispense justice64, since majority of the cases to the tribunals were actually appeals. However, the work load of Magistrates Courts has been increased without extra facilitation to enable them deal with the extract work load. Annex Figure 1-10: Status of Cases Received at the Lira Circuit Tribunal 300 250 sesa 200 C nd 150 La of.o 100 N 50 0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Cases Received 9 87 96 28 50 Resolved 3 16 3 0 0 Referred Cases 0 4 5 0 0 Yearly Backlog 6 67 88 28 50 Cumulative Backlog 6 73 161 189 239 Source: Land Tribunal Records / Magistrates Court Extraction 64Views of Chief Magistrate and Other Local Leaders 90 ANNEX 2: TYPOLOGY OF LAND DISPUTES IN AMURU DISTRICT Discriminatory practices (culture does not allow women to own land; widows who have not produced boys at great risk; girls are expected to be married away so they do not share in the land) Cases of widows chased away by co-wife's children. People returning to home villages ahead of others are encroaching on neighbor's land (boundary disputes). Retired Parish chief grabbed community land reserved for a market (used as polling station, immunization centre and market) and destroyed all trees used as boundary. Case successfully resolved and land returned to the community Clan leaders complaining about army detach. People reclaiming land sold before the conflict Land owners are not happy about the statement by the Minister for Disaster Preparedness Hon. Kabwegyere that land owners will not be paid compensation in respect of land which was occupied by IDP camps. Land owners claim compensation for use of their land; they also want Government to remove remnants of houses and filling of pit-latrines where IDPs have left. One land owner stated clearly that if he had known, he would not have sacrificed his land Destroyed property Vice Chairperson of Aboke IDP Camp claimed that his 3 acres of eucalyptus trees and 2 acres of bananas were destroyed; that he lost 8 goats and 2 cows which fell in latrine and 4 bee hives. Asked how much compensation he would demand, he said that Government should decide. For those still remaining in IDP camps, an old man Okot Celestino, 75 years old in Ibubara camp has no energy to construct a house; another one (Rose Ogwang in Ngai IDP camp waiting for iron sheets from the Government; Clara Onyang in Abok Camp, her 7 acres of land had been used as a detach which left land degraded; Christine Ochaya Itubara Camp, widow with no children, nobody to assist. 91 ANNEX 3: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR THE FORMALIZATION OF TRADITIONAL LAND MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS AND CODIFICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAND RIGHTS The formalization of traditional land management institutions as first point of land dispute resolution, with appeal to the formal court system should consider language similar to that proposed below. I. National Land Policy statement The National Land Policy should recommend a modified and accountable land administration hierarchy. The goal should be to accord statutory recognition to customary land titles, and to regularize the institutional arrangements for rural land administration. It should also be expected that a more transparent and accountable administrative procedure for customary land administration will improve land dispute management systems and simultaneously accelerate land services delivery. II. Traditional Areas of Policy Enforcement and Dispute Resolution. Caution should be exercised in the formulation of policies affecting the role of traditional leaders in land management and community structure. Four principal functions categorize the structure of traditional land use and land resource management. These are: Land allocation functions (i.e., land for settlement, land for cultivation, grazing land and land reserved for cultural, historical, and public uses); Enforcement of national and community land management policies and advice to the government on traditional affairs; Adjudication and land dispute settlement; Serving as notaries to land transactions and protecting the community's cultural values and general welfare. III .Policy recommendation with respect to Customary Tenure: In response to the growing assertion of household/individual rights, and especially to the sale and subletting of land, individual (and family) customary land allocations should be registered as indefeasible right and protected. The fundamental tenets of customary tenure should be codified to ensure administrative transparency and general application to customary land administration. 92 The property rights contained in a customary land allocation will be ownership rights, and once registered, the radical title of the owner should have full legal status to attest to the existence of a social contract that defines the structure of rights and duties that characterize the tenure domain. The registered customary land interest will confer the right of exclusive use and testamentary disposition that is by will, and through conveyance by sale, lease or mortgage to the registered owner. The administrative role and land management responsibilities of traditional leaders and household heads will have to be defined to complement the formalization of the customary ownership and safeguard provided by statute. IV Policy Statement with respect to the administrative role and land management responsibilities of traditional leaders and household heads That the present system of customary land administration be rationalized with a view to uniformity to accompany the upgrading of the customary land rights; That the land management responsibilities of traditional chiefs be refined and institutionalized. Such reforms should encourage transparency and accountability; and The power of traditional authorities to control the allocation of land among members of their respective communities, including access rights gained through traditional rights of escheat to the community be fully restored and protected by statute. 93 REFERENCES Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda ­ CSOPNU-(2004): No where to Hide, CSOPNU Occasional Reports Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda ­ CSOPNU-(2004): Report on Land Matters in Displacement: The importance of land rights in Acholiland and what threatens them. Civil Society Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda ­ CSOPNU-(2005): Fighting and Talking Offers no Relief for People of Northern Uganda, CSOPNU Occasional Reports. Makerere University (2007): Refugee Law Project - Rapid Assessment of population Movement in Gulu and Pader (unpublished). Norwegian Refugee Council (2005). Property Restitution in Practice. The Nowegian Refugee Council's Experience. Paper Written in Connection to the Expert Consultations on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Nowegian Refugee Council and UN Agencies-OCHA, FAO, UNHCR, UN- HABITAT, and OHCHR- (2007): Handbook on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons. Republic of Uganda of Uganda (2005): Report on Teso Region (Soroti, Katakwi and Kaberamaido). Joint Inter-Agency Assessment Mission. Republic of Uganda of Uganda (2005): Report on Karamojong Induced Camps in Katakwi District. Joint Inter Agency Assessment Mission Republic of Uganda (2005): Report on Rural IDP Camps in Lira District Joint Inter Agency Assessment Mission Republic of Uganda (2005): National IDPs Return, Resettlement and Re-integration. Strategic Plan for Lango and Teso Sub Regions. Republic of Uganda (2006): Emergency Plan for Humanitarian Interventions for the North. Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) on Northern Uganda - Republic of Uganda (1995): The Uganda Constitution Republic of Uganda (1998): The Land Act, Cap.227 Republic of Uganda (2007): Draft 3, National Land Policy. Republic of Uganda (2004): National Land Policy for Internally Displaced Persons. Republic of Uganda (1965): The Land Acquisition Act, Cap.226. The World Bank, Uganda (2007): Post Conflict Land Policy and Administration Issues. Review of Relevant Literature. Unpublished Report. The World Bank, Uganda (2007): Post Conflict land Policy and Administration Issues. The Case of Soroti District. Unpublished Report. United Nations (1998): Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Report from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OCHA). 94 United Nations ( 2006) Uganda Humanitarian Situation Report No. 1/06. Report from the Office of the High Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs 95 MAP SECTION IBRD 33504R3 UGANDA DISTRICT CAPITALS DISTRICT BOUNDARIES UGANDA NATIONAL CAPITAL INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES RIVERS MAIN ROADS RAILROADS This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 30°E 32°E 34°E 0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers S U D A N 0 25 50 75 Miles To To Juba To To 4°N Faradje 4°N Moyo YUMBE YUMBE KAABONG KAABONG K E N Y A KOBOKO KOBOKO Yumbe KITGUM KITGUM Kaabong Koboko Adjumani Kitgum Maracha MOYO MARACHA MARACHA Nile KOTIDO KOTIDO Arua ADJUMANI PADER ADER Kotido To To Lodwar ARUA ARUA Albert Kilak GULU GULU Achwa ABIM ABIM Okok Ora Gulu AMURU AMURU Abim Moroto DEM. REP. DEM. REP Nebbi NEBBI NEBBI Nile OYAM OYAM LIRA LIRA Lochoman OF CONGO OF CONGO Victoria Oyam Lira MOROTO MOROTO Bulisa AMURIA APAC APAC KATAKWI 2°N Apac DOKOLO DOKOLO Amuria Katakwi Nakapiripirit 2°N To To BULISA BULISA MASINDIMASINDI Dokolo Beni Lake Lake NAKAPIRIPIRIT Kwania Kaberamaido Lake AlbertHoima Salisbury Masindi AMOLATAR KABERA- Opeta Amolatar Soroti Siti MAIDO Lake Kyoga SOROTI SOROTI Kumi KAPCHORWA Lake KUMI KUMI Kapchorwa HOIMAHOIMA Kafu NAKASONGO Nakasongola L BUKWO A PALLISA ALLISA Sironko Nkusi KAMULI KAMULI Pallisa Bukwo SIRONKO KIBOGA NAKASEKE NAKASEKE KALIRO KALIRO Budaka Mbale Mt. Elgon (4321 m) To To KIBAALE KIBAALE Kiboga KAYUNG Kamuli NAMU- NAMU- Bunia BUNDIBUGYO GAA Kaliro TUMBA TUMBA MANAPWA MANAPW Fort Kibale Luwero Butaleja Bubulo BUDAKA BUDAKA Bundibugyo Portal ROLE Nakaseke LUWERO LUWERO Busiki Kyenjojo Kayunga IGANGA IGANGA MBALE MBALE Mubende Tororo To To JINJA JINJA Bugiri TORORO TORORO Nakuru MITYANA Wakiso Iganga Busia BUTALEJA BUTALEJA Margherita Peak Mityana Mukono Jinja (5110 m) KABAKAMWENGE KYENJOJO KYENJOJO MUBENDE MUBENDE KAMPALA BUSIA KASESE KASESE Kamwenge KAMPALA KAMPALA Kasese Mpigi Katonga atonga To To MPIGI MPIGI Kisumu Lake 0° George IBANDA IBANDA Sembabule WAKISO AKISO 0° KIRUHURA KIRUHURA Ibanda SEMBABULE MASAKA MASAKA MAM Lake MUKONO MUKONO AYUGE BUSHENYI BUSHENYI Kiruhura Masaka Kalangala BUGIRIBUGIRI To To EdwardRUKRU KUUNGIIRRI Bushenyi YUGE K E N Y A Beni MBARARA MBARARA Mbarara Rakai KALANGALA KALANGALA KANUNGU Isingiro KanunguRukungiri Ntungamo RAKAI RAKAI ISINGIRO ISINGIRO NTUNGAMO KISORO KABALE KABALE Lake Victoria Kisoro Kabale GomaoT TANZANIA ANZANIA To To To To TANZANIA ANZANIA Kigali Nyakanazi RWANDARWANDA 32°E 34°E AUGUST 2008