

Harnessing the Diaspora for Development in Europe and Central Asia

Migration and Remittances Peer Assisted Learning (MIRPAL) Discussion Series

September 22, 2011



The World Bank

*Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit
Europe and Central Asia Region*



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EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

CURRENCY AND EQUIVALENTS UNITS (Exchange Rate as of February 28, 2011)

Currency Unit	Euro (EUR)
US\$1.00	Euro 0.7506
Fiscal Year	

January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

ACS	American Community Survey	MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
BERCO	Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center	MIRPAL	Migration and Remittance Peer-assisted Learning Network
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina's	MNM	Macedonian National Minority
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States	NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
DIOC	Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
DNMLLA	Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad	POEA	Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
DRA	Department for Romanians Abroad	TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
ECA	Europe and Central Asia	UK	United Kingdom
EU	European Union	UMD	United Macedonian Diaspora
FMS	Federal Migration Service	UN	United Nations
FSU	Former Soviet Union	UNDP	UN Development Programme
GDP	Gross domestic product	UNGMD	United Nations Global Migration Database
IDP	Integrated Data Processing	USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ILO	International Labour Organization	WAK	World Association of Kazakhs
IME	Institute of Mexicans Abroad	WLC	World Lithuanian Community
IOM	International Organization of Migration		

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was prepared by Timothy Hleniak, professor at University of Maryland under the guidance of Sudharshan Canagarajah, Coordinator ECA Migration program. The report was reviewed by peer reviewers Sanket Mohapatra and Sonia Plaza and additional comments were received from Borko Handjiski. The authors would also like to thank participants at a Brown bag Seminar in June 2011, as well as Country Economists from the Europe and Central Asia region for their careful review of the number. Mismake Galatis was responsible for organizing the publishing.

The work is a product of ECA MIRPAL and analytical work.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Migration has become an important phenomenon in many countries of Europe and Central Asia.¹ The development implications of migration in the region were first examined in the flagship report *Migration and Remittances: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*. This report builds on the World Bank's earlier work and focuses on an aspect of migration which is important, from various aspects, to practically all countries of the Europe and Central Asia region. The role that the diaspora can play is a major part in overall migration policy of the countries of Europe and Central Asia. This report represents a first step towards understanding the role that Europe and Central Asian diaspora can play in their home countries and how the Bank can facilitate these relationships. The report is part of World Bank's migration program in countries of Europe and Central Asia, which was initiated with the aim to help countries respond to policy, institutional and program challenges of migration and remittances in the quest for sustained economic growth and poverty reduction.

For the countries of Europe and Central Asia, it is important to determine exact levels of involvement of the diasporas. There is a need for better tracking of Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations. Diaspora goals should be clearly defined and linked to development policy. The countries of Europe and Central Asia can draw on the experience of other countries in formulation of their diaspora policies, including some best practices within the region. According to a recent policy report on the diaspora engagement a government's strategy for diaspora engagement should include the following: identifying goals, mapping diaspora geography and skills, creating a relationship of trust between diasporas and governments of both origin and destination countries, and ultimately mobilizing diasporas to contribute to sustainable development.

There is a need to distinguish among Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations as obviously, the countries of Europe and Central Asia are at quite different levels of development. The diaspora populations differ considerably in size, geographic dispersion, socioeconomic characteristics, and ties to their home countries. The countries also differ considerably in development of diaspora policies and institutions.

Literature on Diasporas and Development

There has been a growing recognition of the importance of diaspora populations to development in their home countries. There has also been a growing literature and an increased number of policy documents demonstrating this. The issue of using the diaspora as a source of development assistance to the countries of Europe and Central Asia has not fully been explored in spite of the size of the diaspora population and that some countries in the region are among the most migration-dependent and remittance-dependent in the world.

Types of diaspora engagement. The recognition that diaspora populations can be a source of development assistance to their home countries is rather new. The trend in many low-income countries has moved from indifference to actively courting their diaspora. This includes many in the countries of Europe and Central Asia in a variety of different ways. One major impediment to effective use of a country's diaspora population is the lack of comprehensive data on their numbers and characteristics. Most countries offer services to one degree or another to its citizens abroad. This includes typical

¹ Europe and Central Asia consists of the following thirty countries: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Republic of Kosovo, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

consular services of issuing visas and passports. However, some countries go far beyond this. Overseas employment is becoming institutionalized in some countries and a similar process of large-scale migration for work is occurring in a number of the countries of Europe and Central Asia but state policy and administration are slowest to adapt and assist tier diaspora populations abroad.

For the countries of Europe and Central Asia, policies of assistance in destination countries of its citizens abroad will differ depending on whether they are largely abroad under legal labor contracts, such as most of the new EU members working in EU15 countries, or whether many are in the country under less than fully legal circumstances, such as many Tajiks in Russia. Allowing diaspora members to have dual citizenship is a form of stretching the homeland, allowing members outside the country to remain a part of the body of citizens living within the country. Many countries of Europe and Central Asia do not allow dual citizenship but some are revisiting this issue. The sending of remittances is the most visible and immediate way in which the diaspora can assist development and poverty reduction in the homeland. Currently, several of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly-dependent on remittance at both the macro and micro levels. By having knowledge of both source and destination countries, diasporas can facilitate trade and investment between the two. There are several ways that diaspora wealth can be used to mobilize via capital markets: deposit accounts, securitization of remittance flows, transnational loans, diaspora bonds, and diaspora mutual funds.


In many cases, diaspora populations have been important sources of technology transfer, skills development, and research and innovation for the home country. The extent of actual return migration of the diaspora to countries of Europe and Central Asia appears to be small and dwindling. What seems to be a better option is to facilitate travel and to bring back skill nationals for temporary teaching assignments.

The Size and Composition of the Diaspora Populations from the Europe and Central Asia Countries²

The Europe and Central Asian diaspora is large. The size of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora is 49 million people, the largest of all development regions. Nearly one-quarter of the world's migrants emanate from a country in Europe and Central Asia. Nearly 11 percent of the population in the region resides outside their country of birth, while just 3.1 percent of the world's population resides outside of their country of birth (figure 1). Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have forty percent or more of their populations outside their countries, while Armenia³, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, and Moldova have roughly one-quarter. A number of other countries of Europe and Central Asia have smaller but still significant shares of their populations residing outside their home countries. Globally, the estimated percent of people residing outside their country of birth was 3.1 percent. The Europe and Central Asian country with the smallest percent of its population residing outside the country is the Czech Republic with 4 percent. Most countries of Europe and Central Asia have much larger diaspora shares thus pointing to considerable potential for their contribution to development in their home countries.

² The data presented in this report are based on available information that has obtained from, largely international, public sources. In some cases, more recent or different data may be available for some countries which are not included in this report.

³ It should be noted that estimates on Armenia's diaspora should be taken with care, because a large majority of the diaspora emigrated from Armenia in the late XIX and early XX centuries.



There are “old” and “new” Europe and Central Asian diasporas. A large number of people migrated from countries of Europe and Central Asia during the period between World War II and 1990 providing a large stock of migrants in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. With the economic transition, there has been a new wave of migrants from the countries of Europe and Central Asia. Policies towards these two diaspora populations need to be different.

The Europe and Central Asian diaspora is highly-educated and skilled. World-wide, about 5 percent of tertiary educated persons live outside their country of birth. For nearly all countries of Europe and Central Asia, the percent of the tertiary-educated population who have migrated is much higher with a number having more than 20 percent of their tertiary-educated populations abroad.

The Europe and Central Asian diaspora is concentrated in a few countries. The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations are concentrated in a few destination countries with half residing in just four countries – Russia, Germany, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. There are also sizable Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom Greece, and Austria and in the United States and Canada.

Diaspora Engagement Policies of the Europe and Central Asian Countries

Diaspora policies in most countries of Europe and Central Asia are under development. For most of the countries of Europe and Central Asia, they either do not have policies towards their diaspora populations or if they do, they have only developed them recently. For those that do, most have developed these after 2000 or their development is ongoing or under discussion. Few explicitly link diaspora policy to development policy in the country although some do. Many more link diaspora policy to foreign policy and for that reason; diaspora offices are often housed with ministries of foreign affairs.

Issues with diaspora policies in countries of Europe and Central Asia. Based on the review of diaspora policies in the countries of Europe and Central Asia, the following are some of the main issues mentioned in policy documents. Tracking of diaspora populations by countries of Europe and Central Asia is

important and many of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are making efforts to collect data on their diaspora populations, though many cite that current efforts are often inadequate. Beyond just normal consular functions, a number of countries cite assistance of migrants as a goal for their diaspora policies. This especially applies to labor migrants, which is a rather new phenomena for many of the countries and the migrants. Given that many of them do not migrate under fully legal conditions; their protection abroad is a priority. Nearly all of the countries cited preservation of the native language and cultural as part of their diaspora policy and for some, this was the primary goal. For many, this was a component of diaspora policy that received tangible financial support.

Dual citizenship is a somewhat controversial policy because not all countries allow dual citizenship, often forcing people to make a decision between home and host country. None the less, it is a policy advocated by those who support diaspora engagement as a way to make the diaspora feel connected to the homeland. Some of the countries of Europe and Central Asia allow dual citizenship and more seem to be revising their policies to allow it ethnic or other homeland kin. Philanthropy is another area of diaspora engagement with the homeland and there was some mention of past philanthropic actions of the diaspora especially during the economic difficulties of the 1990s. A few countries mentioned this as a way diaspora could get involved but overall, this was not a prominent feature of diaspora policy in the countries of Europe and Central Asia.

Policies to encourage or reduced the cost of remittances was mentioned by very few of the countries in their diaspora policies. This is surprising given that, many of the lower-income countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly dependent on remittances, with several being among the most remittance-dependent countries in the world and many countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly dependent on one source country for remittances. Given this dependency on a small number of sending countries, when countries of Europe and Central Asia take steps to facilitate or reduce the cost of sending remittances, they can do so in a small number of countries. The potential diaspora savings are large in low-income countries of Europe and Central Asia.

One criticism is that most attention to the diaspora is focused on migrant remittances to the detriment of other possible sources of assistance including diaspora investment in capital markets in their home countries. It is difficult in the countries of Europe and Central Asia or others to systematically determine the level of diaspora investment in home countries, though there is certainly considerable anecdotal evidence. In spite of considerable emigration of highly-skilled, only a few of the countries of Europe and Central Asia mention either return migration or otherwise tapping into this segment of the diaspora as a component of diaspora policy. This is another area that could be developed further. It seems from the review, that the diaspora from nearly every Europe and Central Asian country has a number of diaspora organizations. This indicates that at least, these people identify themselves to be from these countries and that they have some nostalgia towards their home counties. Recognizing this, several of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are using these external diaspora organizations as their point of contact and in some cases are offering direct financial support to them.

Diaspora institutions in the Europe and Central Asian region. The following are the current institutional arrangements in the countries of Europe and Central Asia for interacting with their diaspora populations.

Ministry: Armenia, Georgia, Serbia, Kosovo

Sub-ministry: Russia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Poland, Albania, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Other: Ukraine, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary

No diaspora office: Belarus, Estonia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Croatia

This is not to say that one type of institutional arrangement for dealing with a country's diaspora is better than another. It should be based on the needs of the diaspora and the country and the existing institutional structure. Of course, the existence of a diaspora office implies the goal of incorporating the diaspora in the economic and political life of the country but not necessarily the fulfillment of those goals.

Typology of Europe and Central Asian countries by diaspora issues. Based on the review of current diaspora policies in the ECA, a tentative classification of countries can be made depending on the main thrust of their policies. This is not to say that this is the only aspect of diaspora policy, as many are multi-faceted and seek multiple types of engagement with this diasporas.

A number of the countries are quite remittance-dependent including Moldova, Tajikistan, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and often cite increased or improved remittance flows. Russia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Poland mention the return or engagement of highly-skilled prominently in their diaspora policies. In Latvia, Estonia, and Kazakhstan, using the diaspora to compensate for demographic decline seems to be a major focus of policy. Using the diaspora as its representatives in the EU seems to be the main goal of Turkey's diaspora policy. However, previously Turkey had successfully used remittances as a source for growth when it was sending larger numbers of labor migrants to Europe, a policy that many countries of Europe and Central Asia are seeking to replicate. The Belarusian diaspora are wary of involvement given the political situation in the country. Cultural and language preservation is the main focus of diaspora for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, though this is mentioned as at least part of diaspora policy for nearly every country. Hungary's diaspora policy seems focused on enlargement of the nation and drawing back in the large diaspora in neighboring countries. A number of countries seem to have rather comprehensive diaspora policies including Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia, Romania, Montenegro, and Bulgaria. Ukraine, Croatia, and Macedonia have only recently developed diaspora policies and Kyrgyzstan is lacking a diaspora policy. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are either hostile to or are ignoring their diaspora populations.

I. INTRODUCTION

IMPORTANCE OF DIASPORA POPULATIONS TO DEVELOPMENT

1.1. **The diaspora populations from Europe and Central Asia are the largest in both absolute and percentage terms of all development regions.** Of the total global stock of migrants of 215.8 million in 2010, 43 million emigrated from a country in Europe and Central Asia.⁴ Globally, 3.1 percent of the world's population resides outside of their country of birth but from the countries of Europe and Central Asia, 10.7 percent of people do. There has been a growing recognition of the importance of diaspora populations to development in their home countries. There has also been a growing literature and an increased number of policy documents demonstrating this.⁵ The issue of using the diaspora as a source of development assistance to the countries of Europe and Central Asia has not fully been explored in spite of the size of the diaspora population and that some countries in the region are among the most migration-dependent and remittance-dependent in the world. This paper is a first attempt to review the size and composition of the diaspora populations from the countries of Europe and Central Asia and their current levels of engagement with their home countries.

UNIQUE ASPECTS OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIAN DIASPORA POPULATIONS

1.2. **There are various definitions of the term *diaspora* and there is no single useful definition.**⁶ A recent report on the African diaspora defined diasporas as those migrants who were dispersed, voluntarily or involuntary, across socio-cultural boundaries and at least one political border; have a collective memory and myth about the homeland; have a commitment to keeping the homeland alive through symbolic and direct action; among whom there exists the presence of the issue of return, though not necessarily a commitment to do so; and have a diasporic consciousness and associated identity expressed in diaspora community media, creation of diaspora associations or organizations, and online participation.⁷ Another simple definition is “modern diaspora are ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin, their homelands”.⁸

1.3. **The important aspects for this paper are the ties of diaspora populations to their home countries, including their countries of birth, countries of ethnicity, or countries of origin.** In some cases, these might be second- or third-generation diaspora populations. Many diaspora populations from countries of Europe and Central Asia migrated shortly after World War II or during the Cold War, never

⁴ World Bank, *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2010.

⁵ Kathleen Newland, editor, *Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2010. Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, editor, *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009.

⁶ Shuval, J. T. 2000. Diaspora Migration: Definitional Ambiguities and a Theoretical Paradigm, *International Migration* 38 (5): 41-56.

⁷ Dilip Ratha et al., *Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments: Advance Edition*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011.

⁸ Gabriel Sheffer, *Modern Diasporas in International Politics*, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986.

thinking that would be able to return to their home country but now have a chance to re-engage.⁹ While keeping these definitions in mind, including the important element of ties to the home country, in order to estimate the size and characteristics of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations, they will be defined rather pragmatically according to different criteria in international or national databases on diaspora populations. These typically include categorizing diaspora migrants based on being foreign-born or having a different citizenship than the native population of the host country. Upon independence, many of the new countries of Europe and Central Asia had to create citizenship laws which defined a body of citizens and thus created diaspora populations.

1.4. ***The history of diasporas in the countries of Europe and Central Asia is long and complex.*** The diaspora populations from many countries of Europe and Central Asia are unique because they became members of a diaspora following the moving of borders and not through them crossing an international border (though they had undertaken at least one internal migration). The creation of ethnic homelands and ethnic spaces was crucial to the creation of diasporas in the Soviet Union and how these groups would react in the post-Soviet period. Following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, there was a need to take stock of the multi-national empire that they were now ruling.¹⁰ This also included defining and categorizing people by nationality, race, or ethnicity.¹¹ They did this in the first Soviet census in 1926 and subsequent censuses. They used the results of these early censuses to demarcate ethnic homelands. The drawing of homelands was imperfect in Central Asia,¹² as well as other parts of the Soviet Union. By 1939, the process of drawing homelands was essentially finished and the resulting political administrative structure was very complex, reflecting elements of administrative convenience, recognition of ethnic groups, and traditionalism. Of the ethnic homelands which were created, fifteen would become the successor states to the Soviet Union.

1.5. **A similar process took place in Yugoslavia. In 1918, Yugoslavia, the land of the Southern Slavs, or more precisely the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes became an independent state.**¹³ It was an ethnically complex state made up of the five southern Slavic peoples plus a number of other minority groups from the Balkans. After World War II, the Serbian-dominated kingdom was replaced by a federation of six equal republics and two autonomous regions, all but one of which are now independent states (Vojvodina in northern Serbia being the exception). There were considerable diaspora groups based on ethnicity formed by the creation of Yugoslavia and even more by its dissolution.

1.6. **In 1990, prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, there were eight countries encompassing the countries of Europe and Central Asia, those three plus Poland, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania.** Only these latter five have remained in their same borders over the past two decades, although they had all undergone considerable boundary changes earlier in the twentieth century. Border changes are hardly unique to the countries of Europe and Central Asia

⁹ Some recent presidents including the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, were actually diaspora members living outside of these countries before they returned.

¹⁰ Francine Hirsch, *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union*, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 2005.

¹¹ Nationality (*natsionalnost* in Russian) is the term used to categorize people according to various cultural and linguistic characteristics. It is different than how the term is commonly used in the west to refer to country of one's passport or country of origin.

¹² Alexander C. Diener, "Diaspora and Transnational Social Practices in Central Asia", *Geography Compass*, No. 2, 2008.

¹³ Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 153-158.

but the process was especially intense in the 1990s, often accompanied by refugee and IDP movements, in addition to international migration flows, which created diaspora populations. Others who didn't move often found themselves living outside their ethnic homeland or their country of birth or origin and thus became part of a diaspora through the movement or creation of borders not through their migration. The process of how people in the region came to be part of a diaspora population is an important element in their links to their homeland and their willingness to support its development.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

1.7. **The study starts with a review of the growing literature on the role of diaspora populations in development.** This includes key independent variables which might cause these groups to contribute to their countries of origin, the different types of diaspora engagement with their home countries, and best practices in terms of diaspora engagement. The next section compiles data on the size and composition of the diaspora population from the countries of Europe and Central Asia from various international and national databases of the stocks and flows of migrants. One key point is that because of the shifting boundaries in the region, estimates of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora are somewhat problematic. Following this is a review of current diaspora engagement in the countries of Europe and Central Asia on part of both the diaspora groups and their countries of origin. A final section offers recommendations for countries of Europe and Central Asia to increase diaspora engagement and also points to knowledge gaps about the Europe and Central Asian diaspora and possible areas of further research and information gathering.


II. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON DIASPORAS AND DEVELOPMENT

2.1. **There is a long literature on diaspora populations in general and on Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in specific.** Those aspects important for understanding how the current Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations can contribute to development in their home countries will be focused on here. The section will start by examining the three key factors impacting diaspora populations – the host country, homeland, and the diaspora populations themselves. Following this will be a discussions of the links between diasporas and development, which is a rapidly evolving literature. This will be followed by discussion of the different types of diaspora engagement and best practices.

TRIAD AMONG DIASPORA, HOMELAND, AND HOST COUNTRY

2.2. **There are three sets of actors relevant to diaspora issues - the host country, the homeland, and the diaspora group (Figure 1).** Of importance for evaluating the possible contributions of different diaspora groups to development in their home countries are the characteristics of each group and also the relations between each set of actors.¹⁴ These three actors and the relations among them should be kept in mind when examining the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations.

Figure 1: Actors and Relationships in Diaspora Migration



Source: Timothy Heleniak.

2.3. **Characteristics of the diaspora groups.** Important characteristics of the diaspora group are the chronology of the diaspora group, the causes of their dispersion, the differentiation among sub-groups, and attitudes and feelings towards their homeland. Many among the Europe and Central Asian diaspora groups are unique in that they made an internal migration within one country and then became either ethnic or foreign-born diasporas following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia. Under these circumstances, the extent that they would feel ties to their home country is an important question. The process by which any group has come to live beyond the territory considered its historical homeland is a key variable in their views of the homeland.¹⁵ People migrating away from the countries of Europe and Central Asia, including outside the region is hardly new. There have been several “waves” of emigration from the region following the Bolshevik revolution, again following World War II, and episodically during the communist period. Thus, many countries of Europe and Central Asia have both “old” and “new” diaspora populations whose motives, characteristics, and ties to their home

¹⁴ Shuval, J. T. 2000. Diaspora Migration: Definitional Ambiguities and a Theoretical Paradigm, *International Migration* 38 (5): 41-56.

¹⁵ Alexander C. Diener, “Diaspora and Transnational Social Practices in Central Asia”, *Geography Compass*, No. 2, 2008.

countries might differ considerably. The degree to which these emigrant and their decedents retain emotional ties and material links to their homelands is crucial to how much they contribute to development in their countries of origin.

2.4. ***Characteristics of the homeland.*** Important characteristics of the homeland are the attitude of residents and its government towards the diaspora populations, the behavior towards returnees, and the behavior of returnees. Of course, in development practice, attitudes of governments have shifted from viewing those who have left as traitors to viewing them as a source of development assistance. Much more will be discussed below about the relationship between home countries and diaspora groups. Also important is how diaspora groups are viewed if they return to the home country, whether they are able to re-assimilate or whether they decide to migrate again. Do all diaspora groups have a “natural right” to return as they often assume? Since many countries of Europe and Central Asia are new, an important feature is the citizenship policies they adopted upon independence and whether this extended to ethnic or native-born kin residing outside the countries and whether dual citizenship was offered.

2.5. ***Characteristics of the host countries.*** For host countries, attitudes towards minority groups, including large migrant populations and the relevance of the home country are crucial. For the key destinations of Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations, how welcoming they are to these populations and how much they legitimize their stay is important. As is well-documented, there are significant differences for migrant populations in their well-being, earning potential, and ability to assist in their home countries depending on whether they are legal or illegal migrants. This is the case for Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations as well as many other migrant groups elsewhere in the world.

TYPES OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

2.6. **The recognition that diaspora populations can be a source of a variety of different types of development assistance to their home countries is rather new.** Because of this literature on the exact pathways and the effectiveness of each type of engagement is only now being developed. Discussion of diaspora in the development literature differs in tone from that in the humanities literature. In humanities, it has a negative tone and tragic connotation, while in policy discussions; it is quite upbeat and positive.¹⁶ The trend in many low-income countries has moved from indifference to actively courting their diaspora. This includes many in the countries of Europe and Central Asia.

2.7. ***Tracking of diaspora populations.*** One major impediment to effective use of a country’s diaspora population is the lack of comprehensive data on their numbers and characteristics.¹⁷ This is true for many developing countries including many countries of Europe and Central Asia.

2.8. ***Assistance in destination country.*** Most countries offer services to one degree or another to its citizens abroad. This includes typical consular services of issuing visas and passports. However, some countries go far beyond this. The Philippines and Mexico are regarded as having the most sophisticated diaspora institutions in the developing world.¹⁸ There are currently 12 million Mexican-born people in

¹⁶ Kathleen Newland, *Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in the Their Countries of Origin*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2004, p. 1.

¹⁷ Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009, p. 70.

¹⁸ Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009, p. 21.

the United States along with another 19 million US-born people of Mexican descent.¹⁹ The goal of Mexican diaspora policy is to help the large Mexican population living in the United States to integrate which they believe will increase their ability and inclination to assist Mexican development. To this end, the Mexican government has established the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME) and has 50 consulates in the United States to implement its programs. The example of Mexicans in the United States is illustrative because such a large portion of the population is unauthorized in one way or another thus requiring special treatment.

2.9. **For the Philippines, a country with a large diaspora population and a well-established government policy in deploying their labor abroad, one of their major objectives is that Pilipino workers abroad are in host countries legally and that they strictly adhere to the terms of their labor contracts.**²⁰ According to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), there are 8.2 million Philippine migrant workers employed in 200 countries around the world, meaning about ten percent of the population is employed overseas. The institutionalization of employment abroad from the country has a long history beginning after the United States colonial period which left a well-educated population with good English-language skills, and Americanized nursing education. Overseas employment is becoming institutionalized in the Philippines and a state apparatus has developed around it. A similar process of large-scale migration for work is occurring in a number of the countries of Europe and Central Asia but state policy and administration are slowest to adapt and assist tier diaspora populations abroad.

2.10. Thus, for the countries of Europe and Central Asia, policies of assistance in destination countries of its citizens abroad will differ depending on whether they are largely there under legal labor contracts such as most of the new EU members working in EU15 countries and whether many are in the country under less than fully legal circumstance such as many Tajiks in Russia.

2.11. **Dual citizenship.** Allowing diaspora members to have dual citizenship is a form of stretching the homeland, allowing members outside the country to remain a part of the body of citizens living within the country. This can provide an important link between the diaspora and the homeland allowing easier trade, investment, and technology transfer by making travel easier between home and host countries. The Philippines accords their citizens a rather flexible form of citizenship that comes with “rights” and benefits from overseas labor but at the same time obligations such as the need to return home immediately upon completion of a work contract in order not to sully the reputation of future Philippine migrant workers. Thus, the Philippine nation extends far beyond the borders of the Philippines. Many countries of Europe and Central Asia do not allow dual citizenship but some are revisiting this issue.

2.12. **Remittance sending.** The sending of remittances is the most visible and immediate way in which the diaspora can assist development and poverty reduction in the homeland. Currently, several of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly-dependent on remittance at both the macro and micro levels. This means that a high share of GDP comes in the form of remittances and that many households are dependent on remittance income. Reducing the cost of sending remittances and channeling their uses to productive uses is a goal for many low-income countries.

¹⁹ Carlos Gonzales Gutierrez, “The Institute of Mexicans Abroad”, in Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009, pp. 87-98.

²⁰ Robyn Magalit Rodriguez, *Migrants for Export: How the Philippine State Brokers Labor to the World*, Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2010.

2.13. ***Diasporas can facilitate trade and investment in the homeland.*** By having knowledge of both source and destination countries, diasporas can facilitate trade and investment between the two. One study found that immigrant-founded companies were twice as likely as native-founded companies to have strategic relationships with foreign firms such as major suppliers, key partners, or major customer. These could be a source of potential partners of local firms in developing countries. There are several ways that diaspora wealth can be used to mobilize via capital markets: deposit accounts, securitization of remittance flows, transnational loans, diaspora bonds, and diaspora mutual funds.²¹

2.14. ***Philanthropy and volunteering.*** Philanthropy comes not only from wealthy diaspora groups but also from middle-income and even low-income groups. Volunteering on the part of diaspora populations can take many forms including pro bono professional services and advice and training to institutions in their countries of origin, medical care to underserved areas, training and medical care to underserved areas

2.15. ***Knowledge transfer to homeland.*** In many cases, diaspora populations have been important sources of technology transfer, skills development, and research and innovation for the home country. The exact mechanism for knowledge transfer can take many forms including knowledge spillovers when diasporas work in firms in the countries of origin, involvement in scientific or professional networks in destination countries that promote research directed towards origin countries, temporary or virtual return to the home country, and permanent return to the home country after working and gaining experience and skills abroad.

2.16. ***Return migration and travel.*** The extent of actual return migration of the diaspora to countries of Europe and Central Asia appears to be small and dwindling. Return migration is usually an option but not one that is undertaken in large amounts to developing countries and not one that is usually advocated, especially when diaspora populations are fully integrated in destination countries. What seems to be a better option is to facilitate travel and to bring back skill nationals for temporary teaching assignments, such as the UNDP programme.²² The program is called TOKTEN, or Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals, and it allows expatriates from programme countries to return home for a period ranging from two weeks to three months to contribute their skills and services to their homeland's development.²³ The program started in Turkey in 1977.

2.17. ***Diaspora tourism and “nostalgia” trade.*** There are a number of forms of diaspora tourism which can benefit a home country and open up overall tourism and trade. Many home countries encourage this and facilitate it, some going so far as to provide financial support.

BEST PRACTICES OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

2.18. According to a recent policy report on the diaspora engagement a government's strategy for diaspora engagement should include the following: identifying goals, mapping diaspora geography and skills, creating a relationship of trust between diasporas and governments of both origin and destination


²¹ Kathleen Newland, editor, *Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2010, p. 6.

²² Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009, p. viii.

²³ TOKTEN channels global expertise back home (<http://www.unv.org/en/what-we-do/countries/vietnam/doc/tokten-channels-global-expertise.html>).

countries, and ultimately mobilizing diasporas to contribute to sustainable development.²⁴ The process of arriving at the destination where the diaspora is true partner in development in the country of origin is shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: A Roadmap for Diaspora Engagement



Source: Migration Policy Institute 2010

2.19. **Identification of goals and capacities.** Diaspora engagement needs to begin with goal setting. Governments need to think through how they want their citizens or others of origin from their country residing abroad to be able to contribute to development in the origin country. The countries of Europe and Central Asia are at quite different levels of development and have diaspora populations that differ in

²⁴ Kathleen Newland, editor, *Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2010, pp. 15-24.

size, geographic dispersion, and composition. If the country of origin seeks to reduce poverty, its policy will likely focus on remittances, business investments, and capital markets. However, if the goal is to improve national competitiveness, its policy will likely emphasize the knowledge and skills that diasporas can channel, either through their own efforts or by connecting with home country institutions of learning and business. Over the past few decades, the government of the Philippines has pursued a strategy of large-scale deployment of labor overseas in order to reduce unemployment and provide a steady source of remittance income. Several countries of Europe and Central Asia are currently among the most remittance-dependent in the world, though not necessarily through conscious policy choice. By contrast, India and China in recent years have given priority to encouraging diaspora entrepreneurs and highly skilled professionals to develop activities in their countries of origin. As will be shown, a number of countries of Europe and Central Asia have highly-skilled diaspora populations and could mount such a strategy, albeit on much smaller scales than India and China.

2.20. ***Knowing the diaspora.*** Once the goals of diaspora engagement have been articulated, the second crucial step for a government is to know its diaspora. This involves collecting data and mapping diaspora populations' skills and experience, creating inventories of relevant information and conducting listening tours and surveys to understand what the diaspora has to offer and what it expects from the government in return. Simple data on the Europe and Central Asian diaspora are a bit more difficult to come than those from other regions but the data contained in this paper are a start. Countries themselves need to go beyond this and to gather information on the numbers, distribution, skills, history, prosperity, and levels of integration of their diasporas, as well as their links to their homelands. Policy options will differ for those countries of Europe and Central Asia where the diaspora is concentrated in one country such as Mexicans in the United States versus those with a highly dispersed diaspora.

2.21. ***Building trust.*** Building trust with the diaspora is the next critical step. Diasporas have to be seen as more than simply cash cows. This can include taking steps to improve the business climate and greater transparency in business and investment regulations. Countries need to acknowledge their diasporas' unique position as belonging to two countries and not as traitors to the homeland. This is best done through dual citizenship. Beyond these steps, many governments assist the diaspora through measures to retain native cultures and languages. Countries of Europe and Central Asia are obviously at quite different stages in the development of conducive business environments and in building relations with their diaspora populations.

2.22. ***Mobilization of the diaspora.*** The final step is mobilization of the diaspora which is often done through creation of government ministries dedicated to diaspora relations. Means should be created to communicate with the diaspora, coordinate policies, and provide support and follow-up. Destination countries and donor agencies could play a role in this process as well. This paper contains an inventory of the institutions developed to date by the countries of Europe and Central Asia to communicate with their diasporas and implement diaspora policy.

III. THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE DIASPORA POPULATIONS FROM THE EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES

3.1. **This section provides data on the size and composition of the diaspora of the countries of Europe and Central Asia in order to determine the parameters of these populations which might be a source of development assistance to each country.** Data on the Europe and Central Asian diaspora from several international migration databases as well as national data from key destination countries for the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population are reviewed. These databases are analyzed for information about the Europe and Central Asian diaspora on educational levels, occupation or sector, age structure, length of time abroad, income levels, language, citizenship, ties to family in the homeland, or other characteristics which would indicate their level of involvement with their home countries and their ability to contribute to development. As will be shown there are contradictions among datasets because of differences in measurement, timing, definitions, ability to capture all migration movements, differences between flows and stocks of migrants, and other reasons. They also vary in the amount of detail available on the composition of the diaspora population. There are problems with the data in that many receiving countries don't recognize some of the new countries of Europe and Central Asia or record them in different ways. Many of the newer countries of Europe and Central Asia not disaggregated, especially for historical data. When asked for their countries of origin, Europe and Central Asian diaspora members respond with a mix of previous countries (e.g. USSR, Yugoslavia) and countries according to their current configuration. National and international statistical offices lag in classifying migrant populations by country of origin according to the current borders. Data for the diaspora populations from the former Yugoslav countries should be treated with more than the usual degree of caution, especially the newest country, Kosovo.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

3.2. **Before proceeding with analysis and discussion of the diaspora populations in the countries of Europe and Central Asia, it is useful to distinguish among countries of Europe and Central Asia based on their demographic situations.** The population of countries grown or decline through a combination of natural increase or decrease (the difference between births and deaths) and net migration (the difference between immigration and emigration). There are significant differences among the countries of Europe and Central Asia in their overall patterns of population growth or decline and the components of population change. Table 1 shows these trends for the countries of Europe and Central Asia over the past two decades.

3.3. **A first category is those countries with both more births than deaths and more immigrants than emigrants.** There is probably only one Europe and Central Asian country, Slovenia, that belongs in this category (Turkmenistan is not included because of data problems). Slovenia can count on its demographic situation to contribute to economic growth both now and in the future because of additions to its labor force. A second category is those countries with more births than deaths and net emigration. This is situation characterizes most of the countries in the region especially the lower-income countries in Central Asia and the former Yugoslavia. The emigration from many of these countries, either permanent or temporary, is sizeable. The population of most of the countries continues to grow because births exceed deaths by a significant amount. This will likely lead to continued emigration.

3.4. **A number of the countries of Europe and Central Asia currently or in the recent past have had quite low fertility rates of less than 1.5 children per woman.** This has caused this group of countries of Europe and Central Asia to be among a small group of countries in the world where deaths

exceed births, along with several countries in Western Europe. A third category is those where deaths exceed births combined with net immigration into the country. There are four countries of Europe and Central Asia with this situation but for all but one, net immigration is quite insignificant. The country of Europe and Central Asia where immigration is significant is Russia. Russia hosts a number of diaspora migrants from other countries of Europe and Central Asia. With current and expected population decline in Russia, there is a debate about the role that migration should play in development. A fourth category is those countries where deaths exceed births and emigration exceeds immigration. In Europe and Central Asian, these include Ukraine, the three Baltic states, and Romania and Bulgaria. These countries are losing both current and future additions to their labor forces.

Table 1: Population Change in the FSU and CEE States, 1989-2008
(beginning-of-year; thousands)

	Total population		Absolute change			Percent change		
	1989	2008	Total	Natural increase	Migration	Total	Natural increase	Migration
Russia	147,022	142,009	-5,013	-11,352	6,339	-3.4	-7.7	4.3
Ukraine	51,707	46,373	-5,515	-4,792	-722	-10.7	-9.3	-1.4
Belarus	10,152	9,690	-462	-507	45	-4.6	-5.0	0.4
Moldova	4,338	4,097	-241	97	-337	-5.5	2.2	-7.8
Latvia	2,667	2,271	-396	-196	-200	-14.8	-7.3	-7.5
Lithuania	3,675	3,366	-308	-45	-263	-8.4	-1.2	-7.2
Estonia	1,566	1,341	-225	-73	-152	-14.4	-4.7	-9.7
Armenia	3,449	3,228	-220	448	-668	-6.4	13.0	-19.4
Azerbaijan	7,021	8,630	1,609	1,820	-212	22.9	25.9	-3.0
Georgia	5,401	4,611	-790	291	-1,081	-14.6	5.4	-20.0
Kazakhstan	16,465	15,572	-893	2,479	-3,372	-5.4	15.1	-20.5
Kyrgyzstan	4,254	5,224	970	1,492	-522	22.8	35.1	-12.3
Tajikistan	5,109	6,920	1,812	2,583	-771	35.5	50.6	-15.1
Turkmenistan	3,518	5,402	1,884	1,692	192	53.5	48.1	5.4
Uzbekistan	19,882	26,664	6,782	8,419	-1,637	34.1	42.3	-8.2
Poland	37,885	38,116	231	940	-709	0.6	2.5	-1.9
Czech Republic	10,360	10,381	21	-176	197	0.2	-1.7	1.9
Slovakia	5,264	5,401	137	170	-34	2.6	3.2	-0.6
Hungary	10,589	10,045	-543	-647	104	-5.1	-6.1	1.0
Albania	3,182	3,170	-12	794	-806	-0.4	24.9	-25.3
Bulgaria	8,987	7,640	-1,346	-664	-683	-15.0	-7.4	-7.6
Romania	23,112	21,529	-1,583	-335	-1,248	-6.8	-1.4	-5.4
Slovenia	1,996	2,026	30	4	25	1.5	0.2	1.3
Croatia	4,495	4,435	-60	-87	27	-1.3	-1.9	0.6
FYR Macedonia	1,881	2,045	164	238	-74	8.7	12.7	-3.9
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4,435	4,571	136	3.1
Serbia	7,516	7,366	-151	181	-332	-2.0	2.4	-4.4
Montenegro	652	627	-25	42	-67	-3.8	6.4	-10.2
Serbia and Montenegro	10,445	10,662	217	398	-182	2.1	3.8	-1.7

Sources: (UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre). All population figures have been adjusted following population censuses conducted in the years 1999 to 2002. Net migration was computed via the residual method except for Turkmenistan. For Turkmenistan, actual net migration figures from this source were used because net migration computed via the residual method produces an implausibly high net immigration into the country. Thus, the sum of natural increase and net migration do not equal total population change.

3.5. **These different demographic situations in the countries of Europe and Central Asia play a role in both diaspora and migration policy.** As shown, only a few of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are currently gaining people through migration while most are losing people and some in rather substantial numbers. As will be shown, it is necessary for those countries of Europe and Central Asia losing larger numbers of people to turn this situation into a positive and gain from the diaspora populations leaving and residing outside those countries.

UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL MIGRATION DATABASE

3.6. **One source of data on the size and gender composition of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora is the United Nations Global Migration Database (UNGMD).**²⁵ The database is a comprehensive collection of empirical data on the number (“stock”) of international migrants by country of birth and citizenship, sex and age as enumerated by population censuses, population registers, nationally representative surveys and other official statistical sources from more than 200 countries and territories in the world. Data for a differing number of countries of residence are included and not all countries of destination are included so the numbers shown for Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations should be seen as an estimate, and likely a low estimate.²⁶ Table 1 shows the size of the diaspora populations from the countries of Europe and Central Asia based on this source, the share of the diaspora as a percent of the population of each country, and the percent female.²⁷ Data are for the latest year available in the mid-to-late 2000s.²⁸

²⁵ United Nations Population Division, *United Nations Global Migration Database v.0.3.6* (<http://esa.un.org/unmigration/index.aspx> accessed March 22, 2011).

²⁶ Given the peculiar nature of the countries of Europe and Central Asia, there is likely to be considerable recall and classification error of source country given the shifting borders of these states. This seems to be especially true for the countries of the former Yugoslavia. If data for both country of origin by place of birth and country of citizenship were available, data on country of birth were taken because for many countries of Europe and Central Asia, citizenship of diaspora populations had not yet been established or many people had not claimed citizenship in their country of birth. Data for Israel, a major destination of migrants from the countries of Europe and Central Asia during the 1990s was not included in the database. Another major gap was that the most recent data for Uzbekistan, a major destination for smaller Central Asian countries, was 1989, the date of the last Soviet census. The stocks of migrants in Uzbekistan have obviously changed considerably since then.

²⁸ For simplification, only those destination countries from countries of Europe and Central Asia which had data after 2000 and more than 1,000 migrants, either based on place of birth or country of origin were included.

Table 2: Diaspora Populations from the ECA Countries , Late 2000s

	Population (ths.)	Diaspora population (ths.)	Percent of population	Average percent female
Russia	142,009	12,599	8.9	63%
Ukraine	46,373	6,070	13.1	60%
Belarus	9,690	1,664	17.2	61%
Moldova	4,097	649	15.8	55%
Latvia	2,271	200	8.8	61%
Lithuania	3,366	392	11.7	57%
Estonia	1,341	126	9.4	61%
Armenia	3,228	813	25.2	48%
Azerbaijan	8,630	1,269	14.7	47%
Georgia	4,611	956	20.7	50%
Kazakhstan	15,572	3,984	25.6	57%
Kyrgyzstan	5,224	922	17.7	51%
Tajikistan	7,216	1,417	19.6	49%
Turkmenistan	5,402	394	7.3	49%
Uzbekistan	26,664	3,907	14.7	52%
Poland	38,116	2,222	5.8	54%
Czech Republic	10,381	339	3.3	61%
Slovakia	5,401	418	7.7	56%
Hungary	10,045	862	8.6	56%
Albania	3,170	1,472	46.4	44%
Bulgaria	7,640	922	12.1	56%
Romania	21,529	2,126	9.9	57%
Slovenia	2,026	93	4.6	53%
Croatia	4,435	802	18.1	48%
FYR Macedonia	2,045	404	19.8	47%
Bosnia	4,571
Serbia	7,366	171	2.3	50%
Montenegro	627	80	12.7	47%
Serbia and Montenegro	10,662	1,274	12.0	50%
Total	405,534	46,296	11.4	54%

Sources and Notes: Population: UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre, Transmonee database. Data are for 2008. Data for Serbia and Montenegro are for 2002, the last year for which a combined population figure was given. Diaspora population: United Nations Population Division, United Nations Global Migration Database v.0.3.6 (<http://esa.un.org/unmigration/index.aspx> accessed March 22, 2011). According to the Extended Migration Profile of the State Migration Service of Ukraine, about 3–5 million people left Ukraine between 1990-2006 to live and work in other countries.

3.7. *The Europe and Central Asian diaspora population is large.* According to these data, there are approximately 46 million people living outside their country of birth or country citizenship from the countries of Europe and Central Asia. This is the largest diaspora population of any development

region.²⁹ This amounts to over 11 percent of the total Europe and Central Asian population and is a far higher share than the approximately 3 percent of the global population residing outside their country of origin as estimated by the United Nations.³⁰ The percent of population residing outside of the countries of Europe and Central Asia ranges from 3 percent of the Czech Republic to 46 percent or nearly half of the population of Albania. There is a slightly inverse correlation between population size and share of the country's population residing outside the country, similar to the pattern found elsewhere in the world, though actually not as strong in the countries of Europe and Central Asia.

Table 3: Main Destinations of the Diaspora Populations from the ECA Countries, Late 2000s

Main destination countries (number)						
Russia	Kazakhstan	4,479,700	Ukraine	3,613,240	Uzbekistan	1,653,478
Ukraine	Russia	3,559,975	Kazakhstan	547,100	Poland	309,131
Belarus	Russia	935,782	Ukraine	270,751	Kazakhstan	111,900
Moldova	Russia	277,527	Ukraine	165,126	Italy	68,591
Latvia	Russia	102,518	United Kingdom	23,000	United States	22,537
Lithuania	Russia	86,199	United Kingdom	57,000	United States	45,726
Estonia	Russia	67,402	Finland	19,174	Sweden	9,763
Armenia	Russia	481,328	Azerbaijan	120,700	United States	69,666
Azerbaijan	Russia	846,104	Armenia	115,689	Ukraine	90,753
Georgia	Russia	628,973	Ukraine	71,015	Greece	67,400
Kazakhstan	Russia	2,584,955	Uzbekistan	808,227	Ukraine	245,072
Kyrgyzstan	Russia	463,521	Uzbekistan	174,907	Kazakhstan	93,616
Tajikistan	Russia	383,057	Ukraine	32,386	Kazakhstan	25,600
Turkmenistan	Russia	175,252	Uzbekistan	121,578	Kazakhstan	42,141
Uzbekistan	Tajikistan	1,197,841	Russia	918,037	Kazakhstan	370,700
Poland	United Kingdom	461,000	United States	459,355	Germany	393,848
Czech Republic	Slovakia	75,585	United States	63,806	Austria	51,819
Slovakia	Czech Republic	285,372	United Kingdom	51,000	Germany	24,477
Hungary	Slovakia	515,219	United States	79,383	Germany	60,024
Albania	FYR Macedonia	509,083	Italy	375,947	Greece	481,663
Bulgaria	Turkey	480,817	Spain	150,742	United States	64,849
Romania	Spain	706,164	Italy	625,278	Hungary	155,364
Slovenia	Croatia	21,985	Germany	20,463	Austria	16,179
Croatia	Serbia	351,263	Germany	223,056	Austria	60,650
FYR	Italy	78,090	Germany	62,682	Switzerland	60,898

²⁹ Dilip Rathna and Sanket Mohapatra, *Preliminary Estimates of Diaspora Savings*, Migration and development Brief, No. 14, Migration and Remittances Unit, World Bank, February 1, 2011.

³⁰ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision* (<http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp>, accessed March 25, 2011).

Macedonia

Bosnia
			FYR			
Serbia	Germany	91,525	Macedonia	35,939	Australia	17,328
Montenegro	Serbia	72,033	Germany	6,380	Australia	848
Serbia and Montenegro	Switzerland	196,833	Austria	190,163	Germany	177,330

Sources and Notes: Population: UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre, Transmonee database. Data are for 2008. Data for Serbia and Montenegro are for 2002, the last year for which a combined population figure was given.


Diaspora population: United Nations Population Division, United Nations Global Migration Database v.0.3.6 (<http://esa.un.org/unmigration/index.aspx> accessed March 22, 2011).

3.8. ***Most of the diaspora from CIS countries migrate within the region.*** Given geographic proximity, history, and other factors, there are major differences in countries of destination between the CIS countries and those in Eastern and Central Europe (table 2). For most CIS countries, the major destination country was Russia, followed either by Ukraine, or a neighboring country. For most of the states of Central Asia, most of their diaspora populations went to Russia and other Central Asian states. There were a few minor exceptions where there were sizeable diaspora populations from the CIS countries residing in high-income countries in Western Europe. This included 70,000 Armenians in the United States, 69,000 Moldovans in Italy, and 67,000 Georgians in Greece.

Western Europe and the United States are primary destinations for the diaspora from western Europe and Central Asian. For most countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the general trend was of migration to either the United States or high-income countries of Europe, such as Germany, Austria, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. There were also some major diaspora populations among these states that were historical in nature such the flows among the former Yugoslav states and between the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

3.9. ***Differences in income levels in destination countries are important.*** These differences in major countries of destination between the CIS countries and those in Central and Eastern Europe are important because diaspora populations in the latter are able to earn much higher incomes. This is shown in figure 3 for two countries in the former Soviet Union. Moldova is an interesting case of its diaspora population being both in the former Soviet Union, and also in Western Europe, Central Europe, and the United States. Nearly half of the Moldovan diaspora is in Russia (GDP per capita \$15,460), another quarter in neighboring Ukraine (GDP per capita \$7,210). But there are also sizable Moldovan diaspora groups in Italy (GDP per capita \$30,800), Romania (GDP per capita \$13,380), and the United States (GDP per capita \$46,790). Obviously, having significant diaspora populations in these higher-income countries is a greater potential benefit to the home country. As will be shown, there are significant gender and occupational differences in the Moldovan diaspora populations among these countries. For Tajikistan, these data show that most of the diaspora population resides either in Russia or other low-income countries of Central Asia (though the numbers residing in Uzbekistan are probably overstated as the number is from 1989, and understates the numbers in Russia since there have been large labor migration flows into the country, many of which are not recorded). At least according to these data, there are no significant diaspora populations from Tajikistan outside of the former Soviet Union (the only exception were 2,655 Tajiks in the United States in 2000).

Figure 3: Countries of Destination of Diaspora Populations from Moldova and Tajikistan



Source: Diaspora population: United Nations Population Division, United Nations Global Migration Database v.0.3.6 (<http://esa.un.org/unmigration/index.aspx> accessed March 22, 2011).

3.10. *There have been significant shifts in destinations of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora.*

For most of the countries of Europe and Central Asia for which data are available for more than one year, there are indications of significant shifts in the geographic composition of their diaspora populations. For most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, the pattern has been one of decreased diaspora populations in most non-Russian FSU states, increased diaspora populations in Russia, and small increases outside of the countries of Europe and Central Asia in Western Europe and the United States. Exceptions are countries such as Australia where the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations have either declined or stayed at about the same levels. Some of this is due to these being “older” diaspora populations who had migrated during the Soviet period, and likely did not have strong ties to their countries or origin. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the general pattern has been one of decreases in the diaspora populations in Argentina, Brazil, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Israel, and France and increases in the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Sweden, Norway, and Finland.³¹ These changing patterns are due to the aging of the diaspora populations in some of these countries as some of the flows to them took place decades ago, more recent restrictive policies in some of them, and stagnant economies making them less attractive as migration destinations. For those countries now attracting large numbers of diaspora populations, this is due to more welcoming policies such as in Sweden, Ireland, and the UK which in 2004 opened their labor markets to the new EU members upon entry and the dynamics of their economies (until recently, as these data do not reflect the effects of the economic recession).

3.11. *The Russian diaspora is smaller but more reside in high-income countries.*

These changing geographic patterns of diaspora residence are shown in table 4 for Russia. Though the data are not complete by country of destination and the early and later time periods differ, the shifts in the geographic distribution of the Russia diaspora are apparent. The Russian diaspora in the FSU states for which data are available show a decline of 4.2 million, a 31 percent drop.³² This was offset by an increase of 29,000 in the other countries of Europe and Central Asia, which is more than double, and an increase of 190,000 outside of the region, which is a one-third increase. Thus, it appears from these data that the number of Russians living outside of the country has declined but that there has been an increase in those residing in high-income countries.

³¹ Obviously a more nuanced picture would emerge by examining the changing geographic patterns of diaspora destinations for each country separately.

³² Detailed data by country are available.


Table 4: Changes in the Russian Diaspora Population in by Region

	Year	Total
FSU	early	13,943,667
	later	9,651,806
	Absolute change	-4,291,861
	Percent change	-31%
Other ECA	early	14,808
	later	43,342
	Absolute change	28,534
	Percent change	193%
Outside ECA	early	571,316
	later	761,595
	Absolute change	190,279
	Percent change	33%

Sources and Notes: United Nations Population Division, United Nations Global Migration Database v.0.3.6 (<http://esa.un.org/unmigration/index.aspx> accessed March 22, 2011).

3.12. ***There are significant gender differences by destination country.*** It appears as if there are some interesting gender patterns of migration destinations. These differential gender compositions of migration flows are obviously reflective of different occupations that migrants are engaged in but also have implications for earning potential and ties back to the home country. Russia is somewhat peculiar among countries of Europe and Central Asia in that it has the highest percent female among the diaspora population at 63 percent. This is partly because Russia has lowest male-to-female sex ratio in the world. The general gender trend for the Russian diaspora is that flows to Western Europe tend to consist of more females than average while those to elsewhere in the former Soviet Union tend to be more male (figure 4). This also reflects the timing and occupational composition of these diaspora populations with many Russian men going to work in industrial and management positions during the Soviet period in the states of the former Soviet Union. For Moldova, about 55 percent of the diaspora population is female. It seems as if Moldovan female migrants are predominant in flows to Western Europe. The percent female of migrants from Moldova in Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Romania is far higher than average. For the countries of the former Soviet Union for which data are available, it seems as if the flows are predominantly male. There are some odd exceptions to these trends such as Ireland and Portugal but those flows are rather small. From Albania, the flows are predominantly male, with women making up 44 percent of migrants. Of the largest flows from Albania, the gender composition to Italy is the same as the overall composition but that to Greece is far below this with women making up only 31 percent of Albanian migrants there. For the flows from these countries and other countries of Europe and Central Asia for which data are available, the general trend is one of increased percentages of females migrating out of these countries.

Figure 4: Gender Composition of Migration by Destination from Selected Countries of Europe and Central Asia



Source: Diaspora population: United Nations Population Division, United Nations Global Migration Database v.0.3.6 (<http://esa.un.org/unmigration/index.aspx> accessed March 22, 2011).

WORLD BANK BILATERAL MIGRATION MATRIX

3.13. **Another source of information on the diaspora population is the World Bank's update and expansion of the bilateral migration data set of the University of Sussex.**³³ The 2010 version of this bilateral matrix covers 212 countries. Important for the purpose of analyzing the Europe and Central Asian diaspora is that data on country of birth and citizenship for Russia are included from the 2002 census. The migration matrix is not without its problems, especially when it comes to migration in the countries of Europe and Central Asia but the resulting final bilateral migrant stock matrix is, according to the authors, "the fullest, though arguably the least accurate set of data" among their different versions. The database is a general equilibrium model which assigns all migrants to a country and is thus more comprehensive and complete than the UN Global Migration Database. However, the matrix is scaled to match the 2010 global migration stock of 215 million global migrants. Of the 30 countries of Europe and Central Asia, all are included in the matrix which was not the case with UN Global Migration Database.

3.14. ***Migration matrix shows even larger Europe and Central Asian diaspora.*** Based on the matrix the percent of the diaspora population residing outside the country are shown in figure 5.³⁴ The total size of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population is slightly larger according to the matrix, 48.9 million, than the UN Global Migration Database, 46.3 million, as it should given its more comprehensive nature. In general, the size and percent diaspora populations are consistent from the two sources for most countries.³⁵ If there are deviations, the matrix usually shows a larger diaspora population. Among the discrepancies were Moldova, where the matrix showed a diaspora population of 22 percent while the UN Database showed 12 percent with the former likely being more realistic given the situation in that country. On the other hand, the matrix showed a diaspora population from Tajikistan of 11 percent while the UN Database showed a population of 20 percent. In this case, the latter seems more plausible given that Tajikistan is one of the most migration-dependent countries in the world. The matrix also showed a diaspora population of 7 percent from Uzbekistan while the UN Database showed 15 percent.


3.15. ***The diaspora populations from some countries of Europe and Central Asia are very large.*** Overall, about 10 percent of the population originating in a country of Europe and Central Asia reside outside that country. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have forty percent or more of their populations outside their countries, while Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, and Moldova have roughly one-quarter. A number of other countries of Europe and Central Asia have smaller but still significant shares of their populations residing outside their home countries. Globally, the estimated percent of people residing outside their country of birth was 3.1 percent. The Europe and Central Asian country with the smallest percent of its population residing outside the country is the Czech Republic with 4 percent. Most countries of Europe and Central Asia have much larger diaspora shares thus pointing to considerable potential for their contribution to development in their home countries.

³³ World Bank, *Bilateral Migration and Remittances 2010*, November 2010.

³⁴ Kosovo, Serbia, and Montenegro are not included. Data for migration from Kosovo are available from another source (The World Bank, *Migration and Development in Kosovo*, Report No. 60590, April 14, 2011.) which estimates that migration over the period 1983 to 2003 was about 11 percent of the population. The primary destinations were Germany and Switzerland.

³⁵ There could be either numerator or denominator problems in some cases which need further investigation.

Figure 5: Percent of Population Residing Outside ECA Countries, 2010



Source: *Diaspora population: United Nations Population Division, United Nations Global Migration Database v.0.3.6* (<http://esa.un.org/unmigration/index.aspx> accessed March 22, 2011).

3.16. ***Geographic dispersion of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora varies.*** Given that the matrix is more complete than the UN Global Migration Database, a more complete picture of the main destination countries of the diaspora populations from the countries of Europe and Central Asia can be discerned. The countries of Europe and Central Asia vary in how dispersed or concentrated their diaspora populations are among top destination countries. These range from Albania, where 97 percent of its diaspora population reside in just five countries to the Czech Republic and Hungary which are more dispersed where only 62 percent reside in the leading five destination countries (table 4). For the countries of the former Soviet Union, typically Russia and Ukraine were among the leading countries of residence for their diaspora populations, along with Germany, Israel, the United States (Israel figures more prominently as a destination country because of more complete data than in the UN database). For most of the Central Asian states, Kazakhstan has become a leading destination country. For western Europe and Central Asian countries, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States are leading destination countries for their diaspora populations, as well as for some a neighboring country with which they have long historical ties. The relative dispersion or concentration of a country's diaspora population is important for a number of policies starting with tracking them.

Table 5: Main Destination Countries of ECA Diaspora Populations, 2010

Country	Percent of total diaspora in top five destinations	Top five destination countries (number of diaspora in each)				
Albania		Greece	Italy	Macedonia	USA	Germany
	97%	676,846	522,647	91,128	83,018	15,964
Armenia		Russia	USA	Ukraine	Azerbaijan	Georgia
	79%	493,126	77,208	53,193	42,596	17,769
Azerbaijan		Russia	Armenia	Ukraine	Kazakhstan	Israel
	84%	866,843	164,483	92,536	38,921	35,101
Belarus		Russia	Ukraine	Poland	Kazakhstan	Israel
	82%	958,719	276,070	112,197	55,623	49,204
Bosnia and Herzegovina		Croatia	Germany	Austria	USA	Slovenia
	79%	532,528	252,262	162,362	121,495	82,669
Bulgaria		Turkey	Spain	Germany	Greece	Italy
	74%	538,686	173,255	74,675	53,973	43,530
Croatia		Germany	Australia	Austria	USA	Canada
	77%	359,367	74,104	52,160	46,499	45,692
Czech Republic		Slovak Republic	Germany	Austria	USA	Canada
	62%	67,801	54,654	49,830	32,071	25,646
Estonia		Russia	Finland	Sweden	USA	Israel
	73%	69,054	18,637	15,099	12,738	7,491
Georgia		Russia	Armenia	Ukraine	Greece	Israel
	81%	644,390	75,792	72,410	41,817	26,032
Hungary		Germany	USA	Canada	Austria	UK
	62%	89,583	81,905	53,474	38,732	24,979
Kazakhstan		Russia	Ukraine	Uzbekistan	Israel	Germany
	87%	2,648,315	249,886	197,773	79,270	75,070
Kyrgyz Republic		Russia	Ukraine	Israel	Germany	Kazakhstan
	87%	474,882	30,055	21,366	11,363	5,418
Latvia		Russia	USA	UK	Ireland	Germany
	71%	105,031	30,167	27,061	20,690	13,536
Lithuania		Russia	Poland	UK	Ireland	USA
	71%	88,312	85,057	68,694	36,754	27,853
Macedonia		Italy	Germany	Australia	Switzerland	Turkey
	77%	101,539	99,646	59,013	46,581	35,308
Moldova		Russia	Ukraine	Italy	Romania	USA
	79%	284,330	168,370	89,188	39,091	25,280
Poland		Germany	UK	USA	Belarus	Canada
	65%	613,768	521,446	487,934	235,853	198,476
Romania		Italy	Spain	Hungary	Israel	USA
	78%	813,037	810,471	189,055	182,099	171,253

Table 5: Main Destination Countries of ECA Diaspora Populations, 2010

Russia		Ukraine	Kazakhstan	Israel	Belarus	USA
	70%	3,684,217	2,226,706	712,261	680,497	421,459
Serbia		Austria	USA	France	Macedonia	Denmark
	100%	130,844	35,107	22,526	6,433	300
Slovak Republic		Czech Republic	UK	Germany	USA	Austria
	82%	288,276	49,959	39,010	25,356	23,971
Slovenia		Germany	Croatia	Austria	Canada	France
	75%	33,449	25,642	17,757	11,013	10,860
Tajikistan		Russia	Uzbekistan	Ukraine	Israel	Kazakhstan
	87%	392,446	227,988	33,022	26,325	12,775
Turkey		Germany	France	Netherlands	Austria	USA
	82%	2,733,109	299,547	195,029	160,698	107,284
Turkmenistan		Russia	Ukraine	Israel	Latvia	Turkey
	87%	179,548	25,416	18,061	2,405	2,279
Ukraine		Russia	Poland	USA	Kazakhstan	Israel
	74%	3,647,234	332,950	332,155	271,951	248,699
Uzbekistan		Russia	Ukraine	Kazakhstan	Israel	Kyrgyz Republic
	80%	940,539	247,151	184,266	101,519	96,746

Sources and Notes: World Bank, *Bilateral Migration and Remittances 2010*, November 2010. Data for Kosovo and Montenegro are not included. Data for Serbia should be regarded with caution.

3.17. **Countries of Europe and Central Asia both send and receive migrants.** The countries of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are both sending and receiving countries for migrants, with some more so than others. Based on the available data, there has been a net emigration of 18 million persons from the countries of Europe and Central Asia (table 5). As stated above, the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population is estimated at 48.9 million persons, while there are 30.5 million persons from other countries residing within countries of Europe and Central Asia, with many residing in countries of Europe and Central Asia from other countries in the region. Of all regions, Europe and Central Asia has the largest share of migrants going to other countries in the region (59 percent) and the lowest share going to high-income countries (41 percent).³⁶ Nearly all countries of Europe and Central Asia have more persons who originated in the countries residing outside their borders than persons from other countries residing within them. According to these data, only Russia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Slovenia, and Estonia are net recipients of migrants while all of the others are net senders.

³⁶ Dilip Ratha et al., *Leveraging Migration for Africa: Remittances, Skills, and Investments: Advance Edition*, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011, p. 19.

Table 6: Net Diaspora Flows in the ECA Countries, 2010

Country	Emigration	Immigration	Net migration
Albania	1,438,451	89,106	-1,349,345
Armenia	870,458	324,184	-546,274
Azerbaijan	1,433,513	263,940	-1,169,573
Belarus	1,765,877	1,090,378	-675,499
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,460,639	27,780	-1,432,859
Bulgaria	1,201,191	107,245	-1,093,946
Croatia	753,529	699,947	-53,582
Czech Republic	369,737	453,041	83,304
Estonia	169,213	182,464	13,251
Georgia	1,058,300	167,269	-891,031
Hungary	462,418	368,076	-94,342
Kazakhstan	3,719,766	3,079,491	-640,275
Kosovo	25,252
Kyrgyz Republic	621,076	222,731	-398,345
Latvia	275,177	335,022	59,845
Lithuania	429,016	128,855	-300,161
Macedonia, FYR	447,138	129,701	-317,437
Moldova	770,528	408,319	-362,209
Montenegro	..	42,509	..
Poland	3,155,509	827,453	-2,328,056
Romania	2,769,053	132,757	-2,636,296
Russian Federation	11,034,681	12,270,388	1,235,707
Serbia	196,013	525,388	..
Slovak Republic	519,716	130,682	-389,034
Slovenia	131,895	163,894	31,999
Tajikistan	791,618	284,291	-507,327
Turkey	4,261,786	1,410,947	-2,850,839
Turkmenistan	260,953	207,700	-53,253
Ukraine	6,525,145	5,257,527	-1,267,618
Uzbekistan	1,954,460	1,175,935	-778,525
TOTAL	48,872,108	30,507,020	-18,365,088

Sources and Notes: World Bank, *Bilateral Migration and Remittances 2010*, November 2010.

3.18. ***The Europe and Central Asian diaspora is concentrated in a few countries.*** The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations are concentrated in a few destination countries with half residing in just four countries – Russia, Germany, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan – obviously reflecting considerable migration among the FSU states (table 6). There are also sizable Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in other countries of Western Europe such as Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom Greece, and Austria and in the United States and Canada. In most cases, the main sending countries are the most populous Europe and Central Asian countries of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and Poland although there are other flows of neighboring countries. Obviously a more nuanced picture of Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations could be made by examining the dispersion for each country. Important for the

amount of possible remittances and other development assistance is that nearly half the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population resides in another FSU state, mainly Russia, and about 35 percent reside in a high-income OECD country.

Table 7: Top Destination Countries of Diaspora Populations from the ECA region, 2010

Destination	Total Diaspora from ECA	Percent of total ECA diaspora	Main sending countries (top three)		
Total	48,872,144	100%	Russia	Ukraine	Turkey
Russian Federation	11,792,769	24%	Ukraine	Kazakhstan	Belarus
Germany	5,242,767	11%	Turkey	Poland	Croatia
Ukraine	4,932,325	10%	Russia	Belarus	Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan	2,886,178	6%	Russia	Ukraine	Uzbekistan
United States	2,300,921	5%	Poland	Russia	Ukraine
Italy	2,012,929	4%	Romania	Ukraine	Poland
Israel	1,794,384	4%	Russia	Ukraine	Romania
Spain	1,330,495	3%	Romania	Bulgaria	Ukraine
Belarus	1,078,648	2%	Russia	Poland	Ukraine
United Kingdom	969,639	2%	Poland	Turkey	Lithuania
Greece	948,651	2%	Bulgaria	Romania	Georgia
Uzbekistan	830,116	2%	Russia	Tajikistan	Kazakhstan
Austria	818,388	2%	Bosnia	Turkey	Serbia
Canada	743,205	2%	Poland	Romania	Ukraine

Sources and Notes: World Bank, *Bilateral Migration and Remittances 2010*, November 2010.

OTHER INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MIGRATION DATABASES

3.19. **ILO's LABORSTA database.** There are other international and regional databases which have information on the Europe and Central Asian diaspora as well. Some offer the same data as of the UN and World Bank migration databases. These include the International Labour Organization's LABORSTA database of International Labour Migration Statistics.³⁷ This has data on international migrant population, employed international migrant population, migrant flows by country, and if applicable, flows of employed migrants and nationals abroad (stock) and outflows by gender and country of destination. The database is not comprehensive of all Europe and Central Asian sending countries.

3.20. **Eurostat migration data.** The European Union's Eurostat Database has information on migration and citizenship, including information on population stocks by citizenship and country of birth, on migration flows by citizenship, country of birth and country of previous/next residence, and on acquisition of citizenship.³⁸ It also contains data on residence permits granted to non-EU citizens, disaggregated by citizenship, length of validity, and reasons for the permit being issued.

³⁷ LABORSTA Internet (<http://laborsta.ilo.org/>).

³⁸ Eurostat (<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/>).

3.21. ***OECD migration data.*** The OECD has several Migration databases.³⁹ The International Migration Data 2010 presents tables with recent annual series on migration flows and stocks in OECD countries, disaggregated by source country. The Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) includes information on demographic characteristics (age and gender), duration of stay and labour market outcomes (labour market status, occupations, sectors of activity), fields of study, educational attainment and the place of birth. However, some of these detailed data are only broken down into native-born and foreign-born and not by country of either citizenship or birth.

3.22. ***Extensions of the OECD's brain drain database include more countries of Europe and Central Asia.*** The most recent improvement is the extended Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC-E).⁴⁰ Emigration rates of the total population (15+) and of highly educated persons by country of birth have been calculated using the database. With more than 200 countries of origin represented, including now many of the countries of Europe and Central Asia, these figures allow making worldwide comparisons of the extent of international migration. Emigration rates of tertiary educated persons, which are computed using the figures of the Barro and Lee (2000) database for the tertiary educated population in origin countries, are obtained for more than 100 countries and provide an estimate of the scope and characteristics of the “brain drain” to OECD countries. It covers 89 destination countries including 61 non-OECD countries so is fairly comprehensive of the main destination countries.

³⁹ OECD Migration databases

(http://www.oecd.org/document/49/0,3746,en_2825_293564_44268529_1_1_1_1,00.html).

⁴⁰ Dumont, Jean-Christophe, Spielvogel, Gilles, Widmaier, Sarah (2010), “International Migrants in Developed, Emerging and Developing Countries: An Extended Profile”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers No.114, www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers.

Table 8: Emigration Rates of Highly-Skilled from ECA, circa 2000 (population 15 and older)

	Emigrant population (thousands)	Tertiary educated (percent)	Emigration rates (percent)	
			Total	Tertiary educated
Albania	528.0	9.0	20.01	26.82
Tajikistan	370.9	19.5	9.44	25.83
Kazakhstan	2,657.2	18.2	20.89	25.05
Moldova	374.7	24.1	10.66	22.35
Kyrgyz Republic	449.8	20.1	12.25	21.14
Armenia	474.5	21.3	17.20	20.51
Croatia	870.1	13.2	18.88	20.12
Belarus	1,242.2	23.2	13.20	18.66
Georgia	758.2	24.2	17.00	17.99
Latvia	179.7	31.8	8.41	16.95
Macedonia, FYR	259.9	12.2	14.24	15.48
Lithuania	271.3	23.2	8.82	13.70
Poland	2,264.4	21.9	6.80	13.02
Turkmenistan	169.7	26.9	5.58	12.73
Romania	1,144.1	24.1	5.96	12.08
Serbia and Montenegro	1,161.1	12.1	11.85	11.94
Hungary	382.5	28.5	4.31	10.24
Estonia	105.4	30.0	8.59	10.19
Uzbekistan	955.9	23.1	5.80	9.56
Slovak Republic	364.4	13.1	7.75	9.42
Ukraine	4,730.8	26.2	10.51	8.46
Bulgaria	659.8	14.4	8.91	7.88
Czech Republic	275.2	24.6	3.12	7.04
Slovenia	101.8	13.0	5.74	5.88
Russian Federation	3,158.3	27.4	2.55	4.35
Turkey	2,134.9	7.1	4.31	4.23
Azerbaijan	951.7	20.3	14.48	..
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1,431.7	11.2	31.61	..
World			2.38	5.44
High-income			3.05	3.80
Upper-middle income			4.41	6.91
Lower-middle income			2.02	6.67
Low income			1.73	6.28
Africa			2.00	10.56
Asia			1.16	4.32
Europe			5.80	7.81
Latin America			5.70	8.79
North America			0.92	1.38
Oceania			4.52	7.21

Source and notes: Dumont, Jean-Christophe, Spielvogel, Gilles, Widmaier, Sarah (2010), "International Migrants in Developed, Emerging and Developing Countries: An Extended Profile", OECD Social Employment and Migration Working Papers No.114, www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers.

3.23. *There is preliminary evidence of brain drain from the countries of Europe and Central Asia.* From these migration databases, preliminary evidence points to migrants from countries of Europe and Central Asia being more highly-educated than average. Migration of the highly-skilled is often referred to as “brain drain” and couched in rather negative terms and it certainly can be. There is also the issue of ‘brain waste’ or migrants working in occupations below their skill or educational levels in destination countries because they can earn higher wages. Globally, the emigration rate is 2.4 percent and that for the tertiary-educated is 5.4 percent. For the countries of Europe and Central Asia for which data are available, emigration rates of the tertiary educated populations are substantially higher, with seven countries having emigration rates of highly skilled of more than twenty percent and another eleven having rates of between ten and twenty percent.⁴¹ These emigration rates of the highly skilled in most of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are higher than most other world regions, including Africa, and higher than for most income levels. Countries differ in the extent to which it is the highly qualified or less skilled that migrates abroad. There are a number of factors which determine the extent of emigration of the highly-skilled including the size and income levels of the country. The countries of Europe and Central Asia generally follow this pattern of the smaller and poorer countries having the largest percent of highly-skilled persons emigrate. One exception is Kazakhstan, which is presumably high because of the high emigration rate of ethnic Russians, Germans, and others during the 1990s. There are also significant differences among countries of Europe and Central Asia in the educational attainment of migrants. Globally, 21 percent of migrants have a tertiary education. The overall educational levels of Europe and Central Asian migrants are generally much higher than this. Some of the new EU members including Latvia, Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic plus Russia and Ukraine have the most highly-educated diaspora populations while migrants from some of the southern European countries of Europe and Central Asia including Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, and Turkey tend to be composed of less skilled migrants. There is some heterogeneity in the skill composition of Europe and Central Asian migrants that could be explained by factors such as the age composition of migrants, primary destination countries, and other factors.

FOREIGN-BORN DIASPORAS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

3.24. *The foreign-born population in the FSU increased considerable since 1960.* Much is made of many of the diaspora populations in the countries of Europe and Central Asia, especially the FSU, having become so due to border changes and not through international migration. It is useful to put these estimates into historical context. Estimates of the ‘foreign-born’ in the republics of the USSR are presented in table 8 for the census years of 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989.⁴² As can be seen the number of ‘foreign-born’ has risen steadily from 20.9 million in 1959, to 24.3 million in 1970, 26.8 million in 1979, and 30.3 million in 1989. In percentage terms, the share of the foreign-born of the total Soviet population has also risen slightly from 10.0 percent in 1959 to 10.6 percent in 1989.

⁴¹ These figures differ somewhat from those in the *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011*.

⁴² This is abstracted from Timothy Heliak, “Migration Trends and Patterns in the Former Soviet Union, 1960-1990”, which was done as background for a box for the *Human Development Report 2009, Overcoming barriers: Human Mobility and development*, UNDP, 2009. See Box 2.3: Migration trends in the former Soviet Union, p. 31.

Table 9: Estimates of the Foreign-Born Population in the former Soviet Union, 1959 to 1989

	1959		1970		1979		1989	
	Total (thousands)	Percent of population	Total (thousands)	Percent of population	Total (thousands)	Percent of population	Total (thousands)	Percent of population
USSR	20,859	10.0	24,332	10.1	26,771	10.2	30,333	10.6
Russia	8,554	7.3	8,916	6.9	9,691	7.1	11,472	7.8
Ukraine	4,927	11.8	6,009	12.7	6,657	13.4	7,120	13.8
Belarus	860	10.7	967	10.7	1,109	11.6	1,269	12.5
Uzbekistan	943	11.6	1,245	10.5	1,464	9.5	1,702	8.6
Kazakhstan	2,457	26.4	3,314	25.5	3,548	24.2	3,750	22.8
Georgia	332	8.2	355	7.6	352	7.0	362	6.7
Azerbaijan	412	11.2	459	9.0	452	7.5	417	5.9
Lithuania	281	10.4	311	9.9	340	10.0	376	10.2
Moldova	386	13.4	490	13.7	551	14.0	596	13.8
Latvia	431	20.6	553	23.4	627	25.1	692	26.0
Kyrgyzstan	407	19.7	546	18.6	608	17.3	672	15.8
Tajikistan	214	10.8	293	10.1	362	9.5	443	8.7
Armenia	255	14.5	342	13.7	377	12.4	734	8.1
Turkmenistan	191	12.6	239	11.1	281	10.2	318	9.0
Estonia	208	17.3	294	21.7	353	24.1	411	26.3

Sources: Timothy Heleniak, "Migration Trends and Patterns in the Former Soviet Union, 1960-1990", box for the 2009 UN Human Development Report: Human Development on the Move, April 2009.

3.25. ***There were differences in growth of the foreign-born populations among FSU states during the Soviet period.*** The absolute number of foreign-born grew in every republic over the thirty-year period. However, there were significant regional differences in the percent that the foreign-born made up each republic. These differences were due to a combination of migration patterns and differential rates of natural increase between natives and foreign-born populations. In the three Slavic republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, the foreign-born shares of the total populations increased over the period. In the three Baltic states and Moldova, the shares either increased significantly (Latvia and Estonia) or stayed roughly the same (Lithuania and Moldova). In the three states of the Transcaucasus of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and the five Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, the percent foreign-born declined significantly over the thirty-year period. The immigration to these republics from Russia and other Slavic states had slowed and during this period had actually reversed in many of the republics, partially contributing to a decline in the foreign-born.

3.26. ***"Foreign-born" diaspora populations in the FSU in 1989.*** The newly independent states differed in the degree to those born in each republic had dispersed through other states of the FSU and thus became diaspora members overnight when the Soviet Union broke apart (table 9). The largest diaspora populations were those born in Russia (11.6 million), Ukraine (6.3 million), and Belarus (2.3 million). People born in these Slavic republics were among the most educated and skilled in the country and were among the most mobile, spreading out to the periphery to staff industrial and administrative positions that many locals could not fill. Kazakhstan (2.7 million) and Uzbekistan (1.0 million) also had large diaspora populations residing elsewhere in the Soviet Union. (More detailed data on the foreign-born diaspora populations are in annex table 3).

Table 10: "Foreign-Born" Population of the USSR, 1989 (thousands)

	Thousands			Percent		
	Total population born in republic	Residing in republic	Residing elsewhere	Total population born in republic	Residing in republic	Residing elsewhere
Total population	285,743	255,409	30,333	100	89	11
Armenia	2,972	2,570	402	100	86	14
Azerbaijan	7,429	6,604	825	100	89	11
Belarus	11,168	8,883	2,285	100	80	20
Estonia	1,248	1,155	94	100	92	8
Georgia	5,748	5,039	710	100	88	12
Kazakhstan	15,409	12,715	2,694	100	83	17
Kyrgyzstan	4,092	3,586	506	100	88	12
Latvia	2,138	1,975	164	100	92	8
Lithuania	3,517	3,299	218	100	94	6
Moldova	4,215	3,739	476	100	89	11
Russia	147,187	135,550	11,638	100	92	8
Tajikistan	4,978	4,650	328	100	93	7
Turkmenistan	3,507	3,205	302	100	91	9
Ukraine	50,601	44,332	6,269	100	88	12
Uzbekistan	19,154	18,108	1,046	100	95	5
Other countries and not indicated	2,378			100		

Sources: CIS Statistical Committee and East View Publications. 1996. 1989 USSR Population Census, CD-ROM
Minneapolis: Eastview Publications.

3.27. **Overall, 10.6 percent of the Soviet population resided in a republic other than the one in which they were born in 1989.**⁴³ The republics with the highest shares residing outside of the republic in which they were born were Belarus (20 percent) and Kazakhstan (17 percent). Those with the smallest share were three Baltic states and three Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. For people born in the three Baltic states, there were less incentives to migrate elsewhere as they had the highest standard of living in the country. The three Central Asian states had much younger populations and less educated and skilled populations which limited mobility. The other two Central Asian states also had large Russian and Slavic populations who might have been born in these states but then migrated to their ethnic homelands. Upon independence, most of the new states likely did not realize that they had such large diaspora populations who might have contributed to their development. Also, the extent that being born in one republic of the Soviet Union and residing in another upon independence provided an incentive to retain ties and contribute to one's country of birth needs to be investigated.

ETHNIC DIASPORAS IN THE FSU

3.28. **The Soviet Union was an ethnically complex region.** The Soviet Union was made up of a complex and overlapping system of fifty-three ethnic homelands, of which fifteen became the successor states to the Soviet Union. At the time of the breakup, sixty million persons, over 20 percent of the Soviet

⁴³ Both the number and percent of "foreign-born" were slightly smaller as this figure included a combined category 2.4 million who were either born outside the Soviet Union or who did not indicate their place of birth. If this group was not included, the total "foreign-born" was 28.0 million or 9.8 percent of the population.

population, instantly became classified as members of one of many diaspora groups, based on ethnicity, living outside of their homelands. There was some thought that diaspora migration – the migration of people to their ethnic homelands – would be the dominant factor influencing migration patterns following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Annex tables 1 and 2 show the ethnic composition of the states of the former Soviet Union in 1989 and 2000. All of the successor states have followed the Soviet practice of asking people to identify themselves according to their nationality in post-Soviet censuses.

3.29. ***There was considerable mixing of ethnic groups during the Soviet period.*** At that time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, 43.4 million persons or 17 percent of the total number of the fifteen ethnic groups upon which the successor states are based were classified as belonging to a diaspora. Since both ethnicity and homelands are social constructs, an important issue for diaspora migration in the post-Soviet context is whether people ascribe to these labels.⁴⁴ The question is the degree of loyalty and the strength of ties to these ethnic homelands and how much these ethnic diaspora groups could contribute to development in their homeland. One of the largest ethnic diasporas to emerge from the breakup of the Soviet Union were the 25.2 million Russians who lived in the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union.⁴⁵ This Russian diaspora population was much more highly educated and skilled than the local populations and tended to reside primarily in urban areas, especially in the capital cities of the non-Russian FSU states. One study of the ethnic Russian diaspora population in four FSU states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine) found that most viewed their current state of residence, not Russia, to be their homeland.⁴⁶ Of those surveyed, higher shares of Russians born in Russia viewed Russia as their homeland, providing strength for place of birth to be a stronger draw than ethnicity. Another question was the extent that people would migrate to these ethnic homelands, now that they were independent.


3.30. ***There were large ethnic diasporas in the FSU.*** Between 6 and 33 percent of the titular groups lived outside their homelands elsewhere in the FSU. In terms of the concentration of ethnic groups within their own homelands, Armenians were the least concentrated, with one-third of Armenians in the Soviet Union living outside Armenia (but elsewhere in the Soviet Union), in spite of making up the largest share of their own homeland (Figure 6). Of course, because of the changing borders of the Armenian homeland and other historical factors, there is a large Armenian diaspora population both elsewhere in the Soviet Union as well as outside. Tajiks had the second-lowest share residing within their homeland, with three-quarters in Tajikistan and another 22 percent in Uzbekistan. Some of these large ethnic diaspora populations have historical origins when the boundaries of the republics were not drawn consistently around areas of ethnic concentrations early in the Soviet period. At the other extreme, over 90 percent of Turkmen, Estonians, Latvians, Georgians, and Lithuanians resided in their homelands. For most groups, if there was significant spreading of their diaspora group, it was to Russia, where 12 percent of Armenians and Belarussians and 10 percent of Ukrainians lived.

⁴⁴ Alexander C. Diener, “Diaspora and Transnational Social Practices in Central Asia”, *Geography Compass*, No. 2, 2008.

⁴⁵ Timothy Heleniak, “Migration of the Russian Diaspora after the Breakup of the Soviet Union”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Columbia University, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 99-117, Spring 2004.

⁴⁶ Lowell W. Barrington, Erik S. Herron, and Brian D. Silver, “The Motherland is Calling: Views of Homeland among Russians in the Near Abroad”, *World Politics*, 55 (January 2003), 290–313.

Figure 6: FSU Nationalities Inside and Outside Homelands, 1989



Source: (Goskomstat SSSR 1991). Outside homeland refers to those living elsewhere in the FSU

3.31. *The size of the ethnic diaspora populations in the former Soviet Union has declined.* In table 10, a decrease in the share of the diaspora population residing outside the homeland would indicate that there has been diaspora migration back to the homeland. As the last column in the table shows, the share of diaspora population residing outside of their homeland and elsewhere in the FSU decreased for all groups except Armenians and Georgians. The total number of these fifteen ethnic groups who lived outside their ethnic homeland elsewhere in the FSU declined from 43.4 million in 1989 to 34.0 million in 2000. In 1989, 16.8 percent of the total population of these groups could be classified as being diaspora members as defined here, a share that declined to 13.3 percent in 2000. Thus, it does seem that there was significant migration of ethnic diaspora populations to their ethnic homelands following the breakup of the Soviet Union. One caveat is that these data are based on counts of permanent populations and that there is considerable temporary migration within the region.

Table 11: Concentration of Major Ethnic Groups in their Homelands in the FSU, 1989 and 1999-2002

Nationality	1989			1999-2002			Percentage point change, 1989 to 2002
	Total in USSR	In Homeland	Percent outside	Total in FSU	In Homeland	Percent outside	
Armenians	4,623	3,084	33.3	4,854	3,145	35.2	1.9
Azeris	6,770	5,805	14.3	8,322	7,206	13.4	-0.8
Belorussians	10,036	7,905	21.2	9,547	8,159	14.5	-6.7
Estonians	1,027	963	6.2	963	930	3.4	-2.8
Georgians	3,981	3,787	4.9	3,918	3,661	6.6	1.7
Kazaks	8,136	6,535	19.7	9,738	7,985	18.0	-1.7
Kirgiz	2,529	2,230	11.8	3,488	3,128	10.3	-1.5
Latvians	1,459	1,388	4.9	1,407	1,371	2.6	-2.3
Lithuanians	3,067	2,924	4.7	2,995	2,907	2.9	-1.7
Moldovans	3,352	2,795	16.6	3,455	2,997	13.2	-3.4
Russians	145,155	119,866	17.4	133,978	115,868	13.5	-3.9
Tajiks	4,215	3,172	24.7	6,295	4,898	22.2	-2.6
Turkmen	2,729	2,536	7.1	3,598	3,402	5.5	-1.6
Ukrainians	44,186	37,419	15.3	42,161	37,542	11.0	-4.4
Uzbeks	16,698	14,142	15.3	21,365	18,861	11.7	-3.6

Sources: Based on data in tables 8 and 9. Outside their homeland refers to elsewhere in the USSR or FSU.

RUSSIAN CENSUS AND MIGRATION DATA

3.32. **Russia has become the migration magnet with the former Soviet space.** For that reason, this section and the next review data on the migrant and foreign-born populations from different data sources. This section examines the foreign-born population from census and migration data which are collected and compiled by the Federal Statistical Service of Russia (Rosstat) while the next looks at data from the Russian Federal Migration Service.

3.33. **There was a large increase in the number of foreign-born in Russia between 1989 and 2002.** Table 11 shows the change in the migrant stock in Russia between 1989 and 2002. It shows that the migrant stock has increased, according to the UN definition, from 11.5 to 13.6 million or from 7.8 to 9.3 percent of the population. The foreign-born population in Russia who were born in Ukraine and Belarus decreased considerably, as did the native-born population of Russia. For all three groups, this is due to there being more deaths than births among these populations because of their older age structures, lower life expectancies, and lower fertility rates, and for the Ukrainian-born and Belarus-born populations, net emigration. For foreign populations born in other countries of the former Soviet Union, there was a large increase from all except the three Baltic states. This was because net migration of ethnic Russians who were born in these states, as well as titular ethnics from these states who migrated to Russia following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Table 12: Population by Place of Birth in Russia, 1989 and 2002

	1989	2002	Difference between 1989 and 2002
Total population	147,022	145,167	-1,855
Russia	135,550	131,609	-3,941
Azerbaijan	479	846	368
Armenia	151	481	330
Belarus	1,409	936	-473
Georgia	423	629	206
Kazakhstan	1,825	2,585	760
Kyrgyzstan	261	464	203
Latvia	100	103	3
Lithuania	116	86	-30
Moldova	229	278	49
Tajikistan	154	383	229
Turkmenistan	141	175	35
Uzbekistan	530	918	388
Ukraine	4,596	3,560	-1,036
Estonia	65	67	2
Other countries and not indicated	994	2,047	1,053
Total migrant stock	11,472	13,558	
Percent foreign born	7.8	9.3	

Sources: (CIS Statistical Committee and EastView Publications 1996; Goskomstat Rossii 2004a, Vol. 10, Table 3.)

3.34. **The breakup of the Soviet Union created 28 million migrants.** During the Soviet period, there was little migration either into or out of the Soviet Union. However, there was considerable migration among the states of the former Soviet Union. In 1989, there were twenty-eight million persons who were residing in a republic other than the one in which they were born. This is regarded as the number of

“statistical migrants” which were created by the breakup of the Soviet Union, which greatly contributed to the increase in the world stock of migrants. Between 1985 and 1990, the number of international migrants increased by 56 million from 99 million to 155 million, and from 2.3 to 2.9 percent of the global population. This amounted to 9.8 percent of the Soviet population. Overall, the estimated number of foreign-born in the FSU declined by 4.2 million from 29.6 million in 1990 to 25.4 million in 2005.⁴⁷ In percentage terms, international migrants as a share of the population has declined in every FSU state except for Russia.

3.35. Over 5 million persons migrated to Russia between the 1989 and 2002 censuses. With the breakup, Russia became the home to second largest migrant stock in the world after the United States. Ukraine has the fourth largest and Kazakhstan is also among the top twenty in the world in terms of migrant stock. In terms of migrants as a share of their populations, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Estonia, and Russia are among the top twenty-five countries in the world. For all of the FSU states, except for Russia, the stock of international migrants has dropped in the post-Soviet period in absolute terms and in all but Russia and Ukraine, it has dropped in percentage terms. According to the 2002 Russian census, 5.2 million persons had migrated to Russia who lived elsewhere in 1989.⁴⁸ Thus, of the total of 13.6 million, this could be regarded as the approximate number of new migrants, as opposed to the number of statistical migrants who become such when the country dissolved. The main sending countries of these migrants to Russia were Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, countries where large numbers of Russian diaspora populations resided (figure 7). However, not all of the migration was of ethnic Russians as there was considerable migration of non-Russian ethnic groups to Russia as well, creating diaspora populations from some of the other states of the former Soviet Union. Between 1989 and 2007, 57 percent of total immigration to Russia consisted of ethnic Russians.⁴⁹ Data show that a declining share of immigrants are citizens of Russia. In 2002, 90 percent of immigrants were Russian citizens and in 2008, 80 percent were.⁵⁰ Unfortunately, Russia does not have as detailed of data on its foreign-born population from its census as do other countries.


⁴⁷ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2009). *Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2008 Revision*, (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2008).

⁴⁸ The most recent census in Russia was conducted in October 2010 but as of May 2011, only national and regional population totals have been published, and not detailed data on the foreign-born population.

⁴⁹ Goskomstat Rossii, *Demograficheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii 2008* (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2008) pp. 503-509, as well as previous editions.

⁵⁰ Goskomstat Rossii, *Demograficheskiy yezhegodnik Rossii 2009* (Moscow: Goskomstat Rossii, 2009) pp. 482.

Figure 7: Migration to Russia between 1989 and 2002 by Place of Residence in 1989



Source: Goskomstat Rossii, 2002 Russian Census Results, Table 10-2.

3.36. **This also points to an important distinction between ethnic and foreign-born diasporas in the post-Soviet context.** Many of the ethnic Russians who have migrated to Russia were part of one of the largest diaspora groups in the world, which totaled 25.2 million just prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.⁵¹ Many of them or their children were foreign-born in that they were born outside of Russia, in the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union, and they are part of a foreign-born diaspora. However, now that they have returned they are not part of an ethnic diaspora.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL MIGRATION SERVICE


3.37. **The Federal Migration Service (FMS) of Russia is the government body charged with implementing migration policy and regulating labor migration.** It is in charge of issuing work permits for both persons working in Russia and also regulating work permits for Russians working abroad. Starting in 2007, Russia instituted a new system for registering labor migrants, but there are significant undercounts. The numbers of migrant workers in Russia from some of the non-Russian FSU states is quite significant. Based on national estimates from the origin countries in the early 2000s there are 800,000 to 900,000 Armenians working abroad, 600,000 to 700,00 Azeris, 250,00 to 300,00 Georgians, 400,000 to 450,000 Kyrgyz, 500,000 Moldovans, 600,000 to 700,000 Tajiks, 2.0 to 2.5 million Ukrainians, and 600,000 to 700,000 Uzbeks.⁵² The vast majority of these were in Russia. Thus, there were an estimated 4 to 7 million migrant workers in Russia. The quota for 2007 was 6.0 million but only 1.7 million registered workers, mostly from other FSU countries, though there are increasing

⁵¹ Heleniak, Timothy, "Migration of the Russian Diaspora after the Breakup of the Soviet Union", *Journal of International Affairs*, Columbia University, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 99-117, Spring 2004.

⁵² International Centre for Migration Policy Development, *Overview of the Migration Systems in the CIS Countries*, Vienna: ICMPD 2005.

numbers from outside of the FSU.⁵³ Of countries of Europe and Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova had the largest numbers of registered migrant workers in Russia in 2007 (figure 8).⁵⁴ Difficulties of registering even under the new simplified system and a much smaller quota of permits than demanded are among the reasons for many foreign workers to remain outside the legal migrant system. For diaspora workers from other countries of Europe and Central Asia in Russia, being illegal can lead to abuse, lower pay because of poor bargaining leverage, and other problems.

Figure 8: Number of Registered Foreign Workers in Russia from ECA and Selected Other Countries, 2007



Source: FMS Rossii.

3.38. **The FMS also collects and publishes data on registered workers by age, employment status, sector, region of employment.** Construction was the largest sector for foreign workers in 2007 (40 percent), followed by wholesale, retail trade, and services (19 percent), and manufacturing (7 percent). The FMS also has data on Russians working abroad through official channels by country, region of origin, level of education, length of time abroad, sector, status, and age. In 2007, there were 69,866 Russians who worked abroad under licensing agreements with the FMS. The main destinations for Russians working abroad were the United States (16.5 percent of all registered workers), Cyprus (11.8 percent), Germany (5.6 percent), Liberia (6.0 percent), and Malta (5.4 percent). Of these, 36 percent had a higher professional education, 38 percent had a specialized secondary education, and 25 percent just a high-school diploma.

⁵³ Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation (FMS Rossii), Department for Foreign Labor Migration, *Monitoring Legal Foreign Labor Migration 2006-2007*, Moscow: FMS Rossii, 2008.

⁵⁴ Belarus is not included because citizens of Belarus do not need a work permit in Russia because the two countries have a common labor market.

AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY

3.39. **The American Community Survey (ACS) is an ongoing survey carried out by the U.S. Census Bureau which is a substitute for the long-form in the decennial census, which sampled about one-in-six people.** The ACS includes detailed data on the foreign-born population in the United States.⁵⁵ This is important because the United States has such a large foreign-born population, including from the countries of Europe and Central Asia. It is a rich source of data on various characteristics of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population such as median age and other age characteristics, marital status, educational levels, mobility, citizenship status, language ability, labor force status, occupation, industry, median income, poverty rates, and owner-occupied housing. Data are collected annually from approximately 3 million households and are then combined to produce 12 months, 36 months or 60 months of data. These are called 1-year, 3-year and 5-year data. For example, data collected between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2009 are pooled to produce the 2007-2009 ACS 3-year estimates, which are the most recent available on the foreign-born population.

3.40. ***There are 2.3 million migrants from the countries of Europe and Central Asia residing in the United States.*** As with other international or national databases on the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population, there are a number of problems with classification of country of birth.⁵⁶ Data are available for twenty of the thirty countries of Europe and Central Asia.⁵⁷ The total Europe and Central Asian diaspora population residing in the United States as enumerated in the ACS was 2,252,830 which is close to the 2,300,921 in the World Bank's bilateral estimates of migration stocks and the numbers for individual countries are close to those in the UN Population Division's Global Migration database. The countries of Europe and Central Asia with the largest foreign-born populations in the United States are Poland (467,821), Russia (406,147), Ukraine (316,838), Romania (173,007), and Turkey (101,476).

3.41. ***The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in the United States tend to be more female, older, and married.*** The Europe and Central Asian diaspora population in the United States tends to be predominantly more female with nearly every country having a higher percent female than the national average. The diaspora population tends to be much older with nearly every Europe and Central Asian diaspora population having a median age above the national average of 37 years. For some, the median ages reflected a much older diaspora population that had migrated decades ago and had aged significantly, such as those from Hungary and Latvia (median age of 62 years), Croatia, (52 years), and Poland (49 years). The only significant exception was the diaspora population from Kazakhstan which had a rather young median age of 27 years. One-half of the U.S. population is married and in all cases, the percent of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations have a higher share married than the national average.


⁵⁵ Data are also available by ancestry groups.

⁵⁶ The data on place of birth were derived from answers to Question 7. Respondents were asked to select one of two categories: (1) in the United States, or (2) outside the United States. People born outside the United States were asked to report their place of birth according to current international boundaries. Since numerous changes in boundaries of foreign countries have occurred in the last century, some people may have reported their place of birth in terms of boundaries that existed at the time of their birth or emigration, or in accordance with their own national preference. There are several additional categories to accommodate these former countries including the USSR; Czechoslovakia, including Czech Republic and Slovakia; Czechoslovakia; Yugoslavia (presumably referring to the larger entity which existed prior to 1992), and Yugoslavia (presumably referring to the union of Serbia and Montenegro which existed for a period until about 2005).

⁵⁷ Data were not shown separately for the foreign-born from Estonia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Turkmenistan, Slovakia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, presumably because of the small sample sizes for the foreign-born from these countries.

3.42. ***The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in the United States are quite highly educated.*** Nationally, 18 percent of the U.S. population has a bachelor's degree. For nearly all of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations, the percent having a bachelor's degree is higher, in most cases much higher (figure 9). The only exceptions where the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations have a lower share with a bachelor's degree are those from Poland, Hungary, Croatia, and Macedonia, perhaps reflecting that these are older diaspora populations. Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations tend to have even higher shares of their populations with graduate or professional degrees, with populations except for those from Albania and Macedonia, having higher shares than the U.S. average of 10 percent. The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in the United States are much more highly educated than the overall foreign-born population, thus putting them in a position to be of assistance to their countries of origin.

Figure 9: Educational Levels of the Largest ECA Diaspora Populations in the United States, 2007 to 2009



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007-2009 American Community Survey.


3.43. ***The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations are a mix of older and newer population.*** The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in the United States tend to be more settled than the U.S. population with high shares residing in the same house as the previous year. Overall 0.6 percent of the U.S. population had migrated from abroad in the previous year and 3.0 percent of the foreign-born population had. Most Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations had rates of recent arrivals in this range. The countries of Europe and Central Asia which had significantly higher rates of recent arrivals were Kazakhstan (7.0 percent of the total foreign-born population had arrived in the past year), Turkey (6.3 percent), Uzbekistan (5.7 percent), and Moldova (5.2 percent). Overall, thirty percent of the foreign-born population in the United States arrived in 2000 or later (figure 10). The populations from a number of countries of Europe and Central Asia have much higher shares who have arrived since 2000 including those from Kazakhstan (60 percent), Bulgaria (50 percent), Moldova and Uzbekistan (49 percent), and Albania (47 percent). Large portions of the populations from many countries of Europe and Central Asia arrived during the turbulent period of the 1990s, many presumably as refugees. In contrast, half or more of the diaspora populations from Latvia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, and Macedonia had arrived before

1990. According to migration theory, the longer one is away from their home country, the lower levels of assistance are provided to the homeland.

3.44. *Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations have high rates of citizenship naturalization.*

Citizenship levels are one measure of the ties of a diaspora population to their host country, and perhaps of lack of ties to their home country. Overall, 43 percent of the foreign-born population in the United States are naturalized citizens. The citizenship rates for all Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations are higher than this, indicating a strong desire to assimilate in the United States. Officially, the United States policy is to not allow dual citizenship. However, in practice, the policy is one of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’, as many foreign-born U.S. citizens retain the citizenship of their home country. Origin countries that allow dual citizenship benefit because adopting the host country’s citizenship helps to improve their earnings and thus ability to send remittances.⁵⁸ However, many countries of the former Soviet Union have been opposed to dual citizenship.

Figure 10: ECA Diaspora Population in the U.S. by Decade of Entry



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007-2009 American Community Survey.

3.45. *Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations have high English-language abilities.*


Learning the language of the host country is a key variable enabling both socio-economic success and incorporation into the society of the host country. Having high English-language skills, combined with native language skills of the home country in ECA, also helps to facilitate relations between the two countries. Overall, 16 percent of the foreign-born population in the United States speaks English only at home. Among Europe and Central Asian diaspora groups, those from Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have one-quarter or more of their populations who speak only English. Fifty-two percent of the total foreign-born population reports speaking English less than very well. Europe and Central Asian diaspora groups having higher shares of those speak English poorly include those from Uzbekistan (63

⁵⁸ Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha, eds., *Diaspora for Development in Africa: Overview*, The World Bank, 2011, p. 24.

percent), Ukraine and Belarus (57 percent), and Armenia (54 percent). Overall, the English-language abilities of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations seem quite high.

3.46. *Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations are disproportionately represented in management and professional occupations, have higher incomes, and own more expensive homes of the total U.S.* population, 35 percent are employed in management, professional, and related occupations, as are 28 percent of the foreign-born population. Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations tend to have much higher shares employed in management and professional occupations, including 51 percent of those from Turkey and Latvia, 50 percent of those from Russia, 47 percent from Hungary, 46 percent from Belarus, 44 percent from the Czech Republic, and 40 percent from Ukraine. The median per capita income in the U.S. was \$27,100, while that of the total foreign-born was slightly higher at \$28,462. As shown in figure 11, the per capita income of nearly every Europe and Central Asian diaspora population was significantly higher than this, with only those from Moldova, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have lower median incomes. These high incomes are reflected in high values of owner-occupied homes. The median home value in the United States was \$191,900, with the median value of the foreign-born being higher at \$278,800. The median value of homes of nearly all Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations was greater than \$300,000 with those from Armenia being the highest at \$494,900.

Figure 11: Per Capita Income of the ECA Diaspora Populations in the United States, 2007 to 2009



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007-2009 American Community Survey.

3.47. ***The Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations are diverse.*** These data indicate a diaspora population in the United States that is highly educated, assimilate well with high English language skills and high rates of adopting citizenship, and have high incomes and could thus be a source as assistance to their home countries. There are also differences among the diaspora groups. Groups from Latvia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Croatia, and Macedonia have been in the United States longer and tend to be older, with perhaps less ties to their countries of origin. Groups from Moldova, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Albania are composed of more recent arrivals who have lower incomes.

IV. REVIEW OF CURRENT DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT POLICIES OF THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

POLICIES TOWARDS AND ENGAGEMENT WITH DIASPORA POPULATIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

4.1. **As has been noted, countries have only recently shifted from being somewhat hostile towards their diaspora populations to attempting to tap into them as a source of development.** The degree to which countries of Europe and Central Asia have begun to engage their diaspora populations and to develop institutions to support this engagement varies considerably. These can include government institutions at home, consular networks, and quasi-government institutions.⁵⁹ Government institutions can roughly be grouped into three types of institutions: ministry level, sub-ministry level, and special offices including diaspora committees. Non-governmental and diaspora-formed organizations are also important and in some cases more active than governmental entities. Annex table 4 contains a partial list of government diaspora organizations from the countries of Europe and Central Asia. The structure of diaspora organizations are summarized below on a country-by-country basis.

4.2. ***Russia reaches out to its diaspora population.*** Russia is somewhat unique among countries of Europe and Central Asia in being both a sender of diaspora populations abroad but also a major destination of diaspora populations from elsewhere in the countries of Europe and Central Asia and outside.⁶⁰ While Russia is exporting large numbers of skilled workers, the inflows are predominantly of low-skilled workers employed in construction, retail trade, and agriculture. According to one estimate there are about 650,000 skilled emigrants from Russia in the OECD countries, primarily the United States and Germany, and another 150,000 to 200,000 in Israel. This amounts to only 1.3 percent of the Russian population with a tertiary education, which is low compared to other countries in the region and elsewhere such as Poland, Romania, and Hungary which have more than 10 percent of their tertiary-educated populations residing abroad. There remains a perception in Russia that the size and impact of the ‘brain drain’ from the country is much larger and more significant than is supported by data.

4.3. **Current Russian government policy seems to remain largely focused on cooperation with and potential return of Russian academics working abroad.**⁶¹ One study examined the strength of Russian diaspora linkages for four indicators – intentions to support home country’s entrepreneurs, actual contacts of the organization with country of origin, visits to the home country, and share of visits for business purposes. Compared to other countries, Russian diaspora members work for companies that have more contacts in Russia and visit for businesses more often. Overall visits are less frequent in part because of long distances (from the United States) and inclinations to support home country entrepreneurs are less.

⁵⁹ Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, *Committed to the Diaspora: More Developing Countries Setting Up Diaspora Institutions*, Migration Policy Institute, November 2009 (<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=748>).

⁶⁰ L. Freinkman, K. Gonchar, Y.Kuznetsov, *How Can Talent Abroad Help Reform Institutions at Home: A study of Russian technological diaspora*, The World Bank, February 2011.

⁶¹ L. Freinkman, K. Gonchar, Y.Kuznetsov, *How Can Talent Abroad Help Reform Institutions at Home: A study of Russian technological diaspora*, The World Bank, February 2011.

4.4. **The study concluded that efforts should be aimed at support for joint projects rather than return of the diaspora.** A two-pronged approach that includes both a centralized framework that makes the diaspora feel welcome at home and assures rules for their engagement and an institutional space for bottom-up creativity and initiative. The government's role should be limited as in their opinion, ministries of diaspora have been largely ineffective, and should be focused on facilitating an environment where innovation is encouraged.

4.5. **Russian policy towards its diaspora population shifted in 2006 with the signing of the decree by Vladimir Putin titled "Measures Supporting the Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian Federation of Compatriots Living Abroad".**⁶² However, very few Russians have answered this call to return. While there are still an estimated 20 million ethnic Russians residing in the other FSU states, the program was implemented a bit too late as those of the Russian diaspora who would migrate to Russia already had and the others had sought other accommodations in the non-Russian FSU state in which they lived. The program aimed to facilitate the return of 50,000, 100,000, and 150,000 compatriots in 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively. However, only 682 persons took part in the program in 2007, 8,279 in 2008, and 7,357 in 2009.⁶³ To implement these policies, there is a Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Cultural Cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁴

4.6. **There remain a number of barriers or disappointments to involvement of the Russian diaspora including lower than expected qualifications, social tensions between Russian-based researchers and diaspora members, high costs of research in Russia, and excessive regulations.** Some of the social tensions and attitudes towards the diaspora linger from the Soviet and immediate post-Soviet periods when emigration was viewed as an act treason or that people left in the 1990s when the economic situation was dire and only return when it has improved. It appears that the skilled Russian diaspora is not well-informed of policy developments in Russia towards diaspora groups.

4.7. **Ukraine struggles to develop coherent diaspora policy.** There is a large and active Ukrainian diaspora. There are about 10 million people live abroad being Ukrainians by birth. It is divided into the eastern (Russia 4,3 million., Kazakhstan 900 thousand, Moldova 600 thousand, Belarus 300 thousand, Uzbekistan 150 thousand, Kyrgyzstan 100 thousand inhabitants) and the western (USA 2 million, Canada 800 thousand, Brazil and Argentina 400 thousand, Australia and France 40 thousand, Great Britain 30 thousand, Germany 25 thousand). A portion of Ukrainians have resided for a long time in some countries, which after World War II formed a part within the limits of frontiers of neighboring states of Ukraine (Poland 300 thousand, Romania 100 thousand, Slovakia 40 thousand inhabitants of the Ukrainian origin).

4.8. **Among policy priorities for 2010 concerning of the Ukrainian diaspora, the Ministry of Culture has defined an "Innovative program for developing cultural relations with the Ukrainian Diaspora for 2011-2015"; the creation of a digital base of Ukrainian cultural values abroad; and the financial support of Ukrainian organizations abroad.** Recently launched the "2010 Diaspora

⁶² Andrei V. Korobkov and Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaia, *The Russian Intellectual Migration: Myths and Reality*, Paper prepared for the International Studies Association, 49th Annual Meeting, San Francisco, March 2008, p. 24.

⁶³ Rosstat, *Chislennost' i migratsiya naseleniya Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 2009 godu: Statisticheskii byulleten'* (Numbers and Migration of the Population of the Russian Federation in 2009: Statistical Bulletin), Moscow: Rosstat, 2010, p. 34.

⁶⁴ Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Cultural Cooperation (<http://www.government.ru/eng/power/>).

Programme” to raise awareness and improve collaboration with diasporas.⁶⁵ Given that it has a large and well-educated diaspora, relations between Ukraine and the diaspora often get caught up in internal political matters in the country and the relationship is uneasy at times.⁶⁶

4.9. **There is considerable labor migration from Ukraine to the European Union and the United states.** According to research conducted by the State Committee of Statistics of Ukraine in 2001, the number of Ukrainian citizens who work abroad comprises at least 1 million people.⁶⁷ Based on the research conducted by the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy of Ukraine, the total number of labor migration in Ukraine does not exceed 2 million people. Some economists claim there are up to 5 million people. According to the information from Ukrainian embassies, Ukrainian labor migration has the following structure in terms of countries of destination: in Poland there are 300 thousand labor migrants, in Italy and the Czech Republic, 200,000 (each), in Portugal, 115,000, In Spain, 100,000, in Turkey, 35,000, in the USA, 20,000. The number of Ukrainians who work in the Russian Federation is estimated to be 1 million people. Despite the differences in estimates, they prove that labor migration from Ukraine has become rather common.

4.10. **But according to one expert, migration policy has not yet become a priority for Ukrainian authorities regardless of the fact that it is so widespread and that much of it is illegal or that Ukrainians abroad work in many circumstances when they are not permitted to do so.**⁶⁸ Gaining visa-free travel to the EU is also a goal. There is not a clearly defined migration policy and there is also not an effective institutional structure for migration management. Currently migration management in Ukraine belongs to several ministries and institutions. Thus, despite a large “old” diaspora and an emerging “new” diaspora of labor migrants, Ukraine has yet to develop a coherent policy towards these groups or to fully incorporate them into Ukraine development.

4.11. **Belarusian diaspora hopes for reform in the country.** There are large Belarusian diaspora communities both inside the former Soviet Union and outside. There are currently 12 million Belarusians in the world; three million of them lived abroad. Around 1.2 million Belarusians live outside the FSU. Up to one million people live in the United States and Canada, around 130,000 in Israel, 20,000 in Australia, around 7,000 in Great Britain. The largest Belarusian diaspora is in Russia (over 1 million). According to the 2002 census, there were 814,700 Belarusians in Russia (over 1 million according to the unofficial data). The Belarusian diaspora in some ways has followed those of the Russian diaspora, albeit on a smaller scale. There appears to be an active Belarusian diaspora community, whose main focus is reform within the country and on trying to improve the country’s image abroad. There is a Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC) which seems eager to assist the country but which finds it difficult to do so under the current authoritarian regime.⁶⁹ During the past fifteen years many new public associations of the Belarusians have sprung up abroad mainly in the post-Soviet Union countries, the CIS and Baltic states, and also in some European countries, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, and France.

⁶⁵ IOM, Results of the Survey “Engaging Diasporas as Agents of Development”, 2005.

⁶⁶ Kyiv Post.com, “Ukrainian Diaspora must learn how to play hardball with Yanukovich”, Sep 27, 2010, (http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/84019/#ixzz1N7pXxwnW).

⁶⁷ Olena Malynovska, International migration in contemporary Ukraine: trends and policy, GLOBAL MIGRATION PERSPECTIVES, Global Commission on International Migration, No. 14, October 2004.

⁶⁸ Olena Malynovska, Tasks of migration policy of Ukraine in the context of visa dialogue with EU, The National Institute for Strategic Studies.

⁶⁹ Belarus Digest, “Leading Economists of the Belarusian Diaspora Meet in Minsk”, January 5, 2011 (<http://belarusdigest.com/2011/01/04/leading-economists-of-the-belarusian-diaspora-meet-in-minsk>).

4.12. There appears to be no dedicated diaspora ministry or policy but delivering precise and genuine information about Belarus to compatriots abroad is an important task of the government.

The Belarusian language newspaper, *Golas Radzimy*, is published for this purpose. Broadcasts by the Belarus TV international satellite channel and the Belarus radio station are available in the near and far abroad in Russian, Belarusian, and other languages. In 2008, an informational and educational project of the Commissioner for Religions and Nationalities “Belarus Welcomes!” was launched.⁷⁰ The project targets the Belarusian diasporas abroad, ethno-cultural communities and religions in the Republic of Belarus. Thus, there appears to be no coherent, directed policy towards the diaspora regarding investment, remittances, and knowledge transfer though there does appear to be a large educated and willing diaspora eager to assist the country.

4.13. *Moldova takes step to engage its large diaspora.* An estimated 300,000 to 600,000 Moldovans live outside of the country with remittances representing more than 34 per cent of GDP, making it one of the countries of Europe and Central Asia’s most emigration affected countries. There is an active and seemingly well-organized diaspora which held its IV Moldovan Diaspora Congress in October 2010.⁷¹ They issued a resolution which, among other things, called for the creation of a State Agency for Diaspora, which would deal with the coordination of the activities meant to support, develop, and organize the Diaspora; the creation of a Diaspora Board that would offer assistance to the new organizations and would contribute to coordinate Diaspora’s activity; supporting the establishment of some Cultural Centers of the Republic of Moldova in the cities with numerous Diaspora members; promoting some efficient communication policies meant to contribute to Diaspora’s involvement in the economic, social, and political life of the Republic of Moldova; and funding some publications dedicated to Diaspora. Even though mass migration started over a decade ago, it is only recently that the Moldovan government has started to link diaspora policy objectives with its national development agenda.

4.14. Many of the steps that have been taken to involve the Moldovan diaspora in development have been undertaken by international organizations such as IOM, which in April 2008, organized a Policy Seminar on “Diaspora and Homeland Development”.⁷² The seminar was organized in order to consider the positive and negative development aspects of migration in general – and specifically the potential contribution of Moldova’s diaspora – starting from the premise that the benefits that Moldova can secure from migration are at least in part conditional upon the quality of its policies and their implementation. The national context is determined by the profound impacts of migration on Moldova’s economic and social development.

4.15. The seminar produced recommendations in three categories: Promoting Diaspora Involvement and Strengthening the Links with the Homeland; Institutional Arrangements for Diaspora Programming and Policies to Promote Diaspora Networks; and Mobilizing Diaspora Resources for Economic Development. These included recommendations to create a Ministry of Diaspora, have senior Moldovan officials meet with members of the diaspora when they are abroad, encourage the transfer of savings of remittances to financial institutions, enhance competition between

⁷⁰ Office of Commissioner for Religious and Ethnic Affairs. Compatriot Associations, Confessions in Belarus, and Belarusian Nationals Abroad (<http://Belarus21.by>).

⁷¹ IOM Moldova, Moldovan Diaspora Outline Steps to Strengthen Relationship with Home Country, (<http://www.iom.md/index.php/en/media-center/143-congresul-iv-al-diasporei-moldovenesti>).

⁷² Recommendations of the policy seminar on diaspora and homeland development 10-11th April, 2008, Chisinau, republic of Moldova, organized by ministry of foreign affairs and European integration of republic of Moldova and international organization for migration, mission to Moldova (http://www.iom.md/materials/13_diaspora_seminar_recommend_eng.pdf).

money transfer services and investigate possibilities of money transfer transactions through mobile phone technology. Thus, while there seems to be no government agency dedicated to diaspora affairs, there does seem to be a growing awareness of their importance and efforts by the government to strengthen ties to them including a number of meetings by the Prime Minister and other officials with Moldovan diaspora groups abroad.

4.16. ***Latvia's diaspora policy aims to stem demographic decline.*** The Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the government body in Latvia dealing with diaspora issues and there is a policy towards them that is part of the country's overall foreign policy.⁷³ The portion dealing with the diaspora states that one of the intrinsic priorities in Latvian foreign policy is to consider this part of the Latvian nation so as to promote the preservation of the Latvian identity and the links which exist between Latvia and its diaspora. It also serves the interests of Latvia in a very direct way, because the present demographic situation does not suggest that population numbers will increase to any significant degree in the near future. For that reason, it is very important for Latvia not to lose members of the nation for economic, political and cultural reasons.

4.17. **The policy also acknowledged the importance of the contribution of the Latvian diaspora during the period 1945 to 1991 when it was a part of the Soviet Union.** There is a program within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called "A Program of Support for the Latvian Diaspora, 2004-2009" (the "Diaspora Program"). The aim of the Diaspora Program is to preserve the national identity of Latvian communities and to promote cultural contacts with Latvia at the level of organizations and individuals. Increased attention must be devoted to the so-called "new diaspora", which refers to the new generation of émigrés. Support must be given to the establishment of associations among those people. One of the most important duties for the Latvian state is to protect the rights and interests of Latvian people when they are abroad. As the external economic activities of the Latvian people become more widespread and as development of tourism leads to increased international contact, the workload of the consular service has increased markedly.

4.18. The following are Latvia's foreign policy goals for strengthening the Latvian diaspora and defending the interests of Latvia's citizens abroad in the period to the year 2010: to continue to implement the Diaspora Program, intensifying contacts among Latvians abroad at the level of organizations and individuals alike; to ensure the availability of information about the Latvian diaspora whilst popularizing Latvian culture, traditions and arts as key components of the country's image, and ensuring co-operation among institutions in support of the Latvian diaspora; to improve the structure and resources of the consular service so as to protect the rights of citizens and residents of Latvia who live abroad. Because of the situation of having more deaths than births leading to population decline, a key component of diaspora policy is to encourage the return of educated Latvians from abroad.

4.19. ***Lithuania has well-developed diaspora policy.*** There is a well-developed Lithuanian Diaspora Policy. The main governmental institution dealing with the diaspora is the Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad (DNMLLA).⁷⁴ Other agencies who deal with the diaspora are the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several non-governmental organizations such as the World Lithuanian Community (WLC) and Lithuanian Communities Abroad.

⁷³ LATVIA'S FOREIGN POLICY GUIDELINES 2006-2010 (<http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/guidlines/#46>).

⁷⁴ Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (<http://www.tbn.lt/en/?id=29>).

4.20. There are several target groups for diaspora policy: Lithuanians living in ethnographic Lithuanian areas (in Poland, Belarus and Kaliningrad Oblast of the Russian Federation), Exiles of the Second World War and the Soviet occupation and labour migrants and their descendants living in the Eastern bloc (former USSR countries), the “Classical Diaspora” – the largest and the best organized group, Lithuanian organizations in the Western World (the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Germany, Switzerland, France, South America and others), and the “New Wave Diaspora”, economic emigrants who after the restoration of Lithuania’s independence and after Lithuania’s accession to the European Union have migrated to the EU countries (mostly to the Great Britain, Ireland, Norway and Spain).

4.21. **There have been several different government policies of dealing with the diaspora, the most recent of which is “The Inter-institutional program for cooperation with Lithuanian communities abroad for the year 2008-2012”.** Main objectives of the program are: to ensure relationships of Lithuanian communities abroad with Lithuania, to foster the Lithuanian communities abroad to preserve their national identity – to ensure dissemination of the Lithuanian culture, and to foster Lithuanian communities abroad to actively create a positive image of Lithuania abroad. There was a program for returning of political prisoners and deportees during 2002-2007.

4.22. There has also been considerable philanthropy from Diaspora including: political support such as Lithuania’s diplomatic service in exile 1940-1990; assistance in building state institutions in 1990s; financial and know-how support for Lithuania’s education system, especially after restoration of independence in 1990s; financial and know-how support for Lithuania’s economy; financial support for Lithuania’s public health system; and financial support for Lithuanian culture and arts.

4.23. ***Estonia targets the return of educated diaspora.*** Much early Estonian diaspora policy was directed towards reparation of ethnic Estonians living in the FSU, some almost on a refugee basis.⁷⁵ More recent policy has focused on the concept of ‘circular migration’.⁷⁶ Another measure, which the government has been keen on promoting is recalling of the Diaspora. This measure was planned already in 2007 in the Program of the Coalition for 2007–2011. With this purpose, a website has been set up advertising job vacancies for Estonians living abroad and wanting to return home, also Estonians returning home can apply for financial aid. The main measure though which Estonia is very supportive of is recalling the Diaspora. By attracting back Estonians living abroad the state is hoping to increase the amount of highly skilled (taxpayers) workers in Estonia, who would contribute to the national growth in developing sectors. The name of the project is ‘Talents Back Home!’ and it is funded through the European Social Fund in Estonia 2007–2013. The aim of the project is to invite students who have gone to study in universities in foreign countries within the framework of foreign programs and graduates of foreign universities as well as citizens of Estonia who have obtained a significant work experience abroad to come back to Estonia, which can offer them work in both private and public sector. There are between 4,000 and 4,500 young Estonians studying abroad. Research carried out within the framework of the project showed that about 89 percent are ready to return to Estonia if a good job offer came along. In some cases, financial support is offered by the Estonian government for returnees. Thus, like neighbor Latvia, because of a small and declining population, return of educated diaspora members is a key component of diaspora policy.

4.24. ***Armenia has well-established mechanism for dealing with its large diaspora.*** Being what is considered one of the classic diaspora populations, Armenia has one of the oldest and also one largest

⁷⁵ Hill Kulu, “Policy towards the Diaspora and Ethnic (Return) Migration: An Estonian case”, *GeoJournal* Volume 51, Number 3, 2000, pp. 135-143.

⁷⁶ Estonian Academy Of Security Sciences, European Migration Network, Temporary And Circular Migration: Empirical Evidence, Current Policy Practice And Future Options In Estonia, Tallin, 2010.

diaspora populations among the countries of Europe and Central Asia (in terms of percent of the population outside the country). To communicate with this large population diaspora, the Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia was established in 2008.⁷⁷ The objective of the Ministry is to completely and effectively develop, implement and continuously improve the state policy on development of the Armenia-Diaspora partnership and coordinate the activities of the state bodies. The Ministry has 9 departments broken down more or less regionally and a staff of about 50 people. One of the most significant objectives of the Ministry is to promote the self-organization of the disorganized sector of the Diaspora, the creation and activities of pan-Armenian professional committees and unions, as well as the creation and application of clear and specific procedures for Diaspora Armenians to obtain dual citizenship. Armenia became one of the first CIS countries to allow dual citizenship in 2007. Key objectives seem to be help preserve Armenian identity, discover and tap into the potential of the diaspora to help empower the homeland and to facilitate repatriation efforts. The effective governance of labour migration entails making migration work better for development, enhancing possible benefits such as financial flows, technology transfer and entrepreneurship, and mitigating negative consequences such as loss of skilled human resources. While there have been studies concerning Armenia on labour migration and remittances, this was the first study in the framework of migration and development. With the assistance of several international organizations, Armenia seems to have carried out a number of studies which aim at gathering information on its diaspora population,⁷⁸ and remittance sending.⁷⁹ More so than most countries, Armenia seems to have reached out to its diaspora population and effectively organized a governmental apparatus to incorporate them into development processes in the country. There are also a large number of Armenian diaspora organizations which have formed outside the country, with the goal of assisting development inside Armenia.

4.25. **Azerbaijan.** Azerbaijan deals with its diaspora through the State Committee of the Affairs of Azerbaijan living in Foreign Countries, which was founded in 2002.⁸⁰ According to the Committee's website, it has a long list of main duties, among which are: to help Azerbaijanis living in foreign countries to protect rights and freedoms, to preserve and develop their national entity, to study the mother tongue; to provide favorable conditions for Azerbaijanis living abroad to create and develop close relations with the state organs of the Republic of Azerbaijan and non-governmental organizations; with the help of the state organs to aid the cultural centers, cultural-enlightenment organizations, libraries, archives, museums, theatres, musical ensembles and creative collectives of Azerbaijanis living abroad, and; to involve Azerbaijanis living abroad to the process of economic reforms carried out in the Republic of Azerbaijan and to create favorable conditions for them to invest in Azerbaijan and to function independently in foreign countries.⁸¹ While written in a rather general language, all of the elements of properly dealing with the diaspora seem to be present, including providing for an enabling investment environment for them in Azerbaijan. After being elected president in 2003, Ilham Aliyev, showed particular interest to the problem Diaspora. During his visits to foreign countries, he makes it a point to meet with the representatives of Azerbaijan Diaspora. There are some efforts to enumerate the size of the Azeri diaspora.⁸² There also seems to be a large number of well-organized Azeris diaspora groups.⁸³

⁷⁷ Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia (<http://www.mindiaspora.am/en/index>).

⁷⁸ International Labour Organization, *Migration and Development: Armenia Country Study*, Yerevan, 2009.

⁷⁹ International Labour Organization, *Migrant Remittances to Armenia: the potential for savings and economic investment and financial products to attract remittances*, Prepared for ILO by Alpha Plus Consulting, Yerevan, 2008.

⁸⁰ The State Committee on Affairs with the Diaspora of Azerbaijan Republic (http://www.country.az/portal/StatePower/Committee/committeeConcern_06_e.html).

⁸¹ The State Committee on Affairs with the Diaspora of Azerbaijan Republic (<http://www.diaspora.gov.az/> in Azeri).

⁸² Number of Azerbaijanis Living Outside Azerbaijan

4.26. ***Georgia begins to reach out to its diaspora population.*** In 2008, the Office of State Minister of Georgia on Diaspora Issues was created with the object of deepening relations with compatriots, residing abroad.⁸⁴ Main goals of the Office are: establishing and strengthening a wide range of direct contacts and relations with compatriots, residing abroad, encouraging maintenance of national identity among compatriots residing abroad; creating informational analytic contact databank of compatriots, residing abroad, their organizations, individuals and organizations interested with Georgia; Supporting compatriots, residing abroad and corresponding organizations acting abroad in introduction and study of the history, culture of Georgian people and contemporary state building affairs of Georgia; and respectively to its competency searching and inventory of Georgian immovable and movable monuments of spiritual and material culture, antiquities, treasures, manuscripts, archives and other historic and cultural values, existing abroad. The head of the office is a State Minister and the office has a staff of 20 people. Georgia is just beginning to implement a diaspora policy but there are problems in doing so because the majority of its diaspora is in Russia, with whom it has rather problematic relations.

4.27. ***Kazakhstan migration policy de-emphasizes the diaspora and focuses on labor migration.*** Evaluating government policy towards the Kazakh diaspora is complicated because of its size and geographic dispersion. In 1989, 20 percent of ethnic Kazakhs in the Soviet Union resided outside of Kazakhstan, mainly in Russia and Uzbekistan. In that year, 17 percent of persons born in Kazakhstan resided outside the country, with the largest numbers in Russia and Ukraine. Ethnic Kazakhs also made up the largest minority group in Mongolia where in 1989 there were 120,000 Kazakhs who constituted 5.6 percent of the population.⁸⁵ The Kazakh diaspora was concentrated in China (1,150,000), Mongolia (125,000), Afghanistan (40,000), and Turkey (25,000 people).⁸⁶ Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan had large Russian, Ukrainian, and German populations and ethnic Kazakhs had just become a plurality of the population after decades of being the second-large ethnic group after Russians. There were policies to induce the Kazakhs from Mongolia to return and about half of Kazakhs in Mongolia returned.⁸⁷

4.28. **The initial post-Soviet diaspora policy was aimed at attracting ethnic Kazakhs dispersed in other countries, in part to make up for the demographic shortfall of ethnic Kazakhs in the new Kazakh homeland.** The policy of attracting co-ethnics was de-emphasized as of mid-1990s because the demographic balance shifted in favor of Kazakhs due to the emigration of Slavs and other Europeans to Russia, and the relatively high birthrates among Kazakhs. The constitution was revised, dropping the provision calling Kazakhstan home of ethnic Kazakhs; and the multi-ethnic character of state was emphasized. Diaspora policy is governed by the Kazakhstani Law on Migration. The call for diasporic Kazakhs to join their ethno-national kinsmen within the 'historical homeland'. Response to this call (ca 500,000), while not overwhelming when viewed in light of the alleged 4.1 million 'Kazakhs' living outside the new state but was substantial enough to put a strain on the Kazakhstani economy. The labour contracts that brought many diasporic Kazakhs to Kazakhstan had no provision for citizenship, and the

(http://www.azerbaijan.az/Society/Diaspora/diaspora_e.html).

⁸³ (<http://www.angelfire.com/az3/AzeriVoice/links.html>).

⁸⁴ The Office of the State Minister of Georgia on Diaspora Issues (<http://www.iamgeorgian.com/>).

⁸⁵ National Statistical Office of Mongolia, *2000 Population and Housing Census of Mongolia: the Main Results* 2001, 50.

⁸⁶ Ol'ga B. Naumova, The Kazakh Diaspora in Russia [Rossiia], *Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia*. Issue: Volume 41, Number 2 / Fall 2002.

⁸⁷ Alexander C. Diener, "Kazakhstan's Kin State Diaspora: Settlement Planning and the Oralman Dilemma", *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Mar., 2005), pp. 327-348.

passing of a decade since the arrival of the first migrants has seen little progress on this matter. The law has since been amended and diaspora policy does not feature prominently.

4.29. **Seemingly recognizing this shortcoming in their naturalization policy in the early years of independence, the Kazakhstani government established a program of passport exchange under which ethnic Kazakhs holding Soviet passports could trade them for Kazakhstani passports.** For many of these Kazakhs, the reality of the Republic of Kazakhstan has been far from the ideal that inspired their migration. Interviews conducted within various locales of Oralmandar settlement revealed that the prominence of the Russian language in daily transactions throughout Kazakhstan is particularly troubling to 'return migrants'. Currently, all activities on establishing relationships with compatriots are implemented in conformity with Ministry of Culture's Strategic Development Plan for 2009-2011.⁸⁸ The World Association of Kazakhs (WAK) bears responsibility for developing and maintaining Kazakhstan's amorphous diaspora policy. Thus, Kazakh diaspora policy does not seem to be strongly linked to development issues. Perhaps because Kazakhstan has become a migration magnet within Central Asia, diaspora policy seems to play less of a role. More recent migration policy in Kazakhstan is less focused on the Kazakh diaspora and more on the large contingents of labor migrants from other countries.⁸⁹

4.30. ***Kyrgyzstan seems to lack diaspora policy.*** In spite of large-scale labor migration from the country and high dependence on remittances, there seems to be no coherent government program aimed at the diaspora. There is a Centre for Foreign Employment but they say that information on the exact number of people abroad are hard to come by.⁹⁰ The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Social development have jointly requested money from the government to conduct an in-depth study of migration-related issues, much of which would involve the large labor diaspora from the country. There are some NGOs which operate in this area such as the Bishkek NGO Network of Centres for Helping Migrant Labourers and the Overcoming Poverty in Migrant Workers' Families

4.31. ***Tajikistan supports labor migration.*** The total labor migration out of Tajikistan is estimated to encompass between 500,000 to 800,000 people, which represent about 10 percent of the total population of 6.9 million. Because of this, the amount of remittances sent home by labor migrants from Tajikistan through official channels in 2008 was 49 percent of GDP, the highest rate in the world. Since the early 2000s, the Tajik government recognized the need to interact with the Diaspora on an organized basis. Within the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, departments have been formed to deal issues concerning Tajiks abroad.

4.32. **According to one study, with regards to national policies on labor migration, legislation, structures and mechanisms, even though they are of a rather limited nature, they have focused on the deployment of labor migrants to CIS countries (namely Russia and Kazakhstan) and dealing with problems that arise there.** So far, there are no policies in place to attract the return of skilled migrants either on a temporary or permanent basis or to facilitate the transfer of technology, skills or attract investment or savings. However steps have been taken to make remittance transfers less costly.⁹¹

⁸⁸ "Information on compatriots that live abroad", Electronic Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, (<http://www.egov.kz/wps/portal/>).

⁸⁹ Humanitarian news and analysis: a service of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "KAZAKHSTAN: Focus on new immigration law", (<http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=22690>).

⁹⁰ Alisher Karimov, "Kyrgyz labour migration to be studied", *CentralAsiaOnline.com*, March 18, 2011.

⁹¹ International Labour Organization, *Migration and Development in Tajikistan – Emigration, Return and Diaspora* Moscow, 2010.

4.33. **There are a large number of Tajik diaspora organizations in Russia and other countries.** The sphere of activities of Tajik NGOs abroad and national-cultural centers is fairly wide and includes: protection of the rights of migrants from Tajikistan as well as Russian citizens with Tajik nationality: activities aimed at retaining and developing the Tajik language, culture and traditions of the Tajik people, as well as at the harmonization of interethnic relationships: and assistance to the Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan in Russia in organizing and conducting important political activities of the Republic of Tajikistan for Tajik migrants on the territory of Russia, such as presidential and parliamentary elections, referendums.

4.34. **A State Migration Service was established in 1999 to coordinate and develop new state policies regulating migration flows, and was faced with two principal issues – irregular migration, and protecting the human rights of migrant workers.** Subsequently, in October 2004, the Russian Federation and Tajikistan signed a bilateral agreement on labor and social protection of Tajik citizens seeking jobs in Russia. Tajikistan approved this agreement in January 2005, but Russia ratified it only as recently as July 2006, with implementation due to start in January 2007. This agreement marks some significant steps towards improvement in the status of Tajik migrants working in Russia. Today, no one Ministry bears responsibility for the diaspora. Different aspects of the interaction with the diaspora are handled by different agencies and often in an uncoordinated way.⁹²

4.35. ***Turkmenistan seemingly indifferent to its diaspora.*** Migration within the country and emigration from the country are both severely restricted. As such, there seems to be very little information on the Turkmen diaspora and almost no government recognition of a Turkmen diaspora or any role it could play in development. Initially, Turkmenistan was the only non-Russian FSU state to allow dual citizenship but later revoked this in 2003.⁹³ This was largely due to Niyazov's fears of foreigners and foreign plots after the 2002 attempt on his life. For a while after he died, many Turkmen citizens enjoyed the benefits of the two passports (travel without visas), but after the constitution was revised in 2008, the government decided to modernize its own passport and shift to a new one by 2013. They are now using this deadline to pressure the remaining dual passport holders to turn in their Russian passports if they want to acquire the new Turkmen passport, according to the US embassy. If they opt to keep the Russian one, they get their Turkmen one taken away and forced to leave the country. The only explanation given so far is the official statement released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that article seven of the Constitution of Turkmenistan accepted in 2008 does not allow a citizen of Turkmenistan to hold a citizenship of another state. This policy affects both ethnic Russians living in the country as well as Turkmen diaspora. There is a visa regime between the two countries, but people do appear to be able to acquire Russian visas as long as they can pay for them. The full Turkmen airlines flights between foreign destinations and Turkmenistan suggest a lot of people are able to travel and sometimes work abroad, although the human rights community claims there are thousands of people who are barred from leaving Turkmenistan by the government.

4.36. ***Uzbekistan ignores its large diaspora population.*** About 7 percent of the economically active population of Uzbekistan work abroad. Between two and five million of the country's 28 million people are out of the country, mostly in Russia and Kazakhstan, but also in the United Arab Emirates and South Korea. The majority of whom do not wish to migrate abroad permanently but export of labour is now part of government employment policy, as there is now a National Agency for External Labour Migration Abroad within the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection. However, not much information could be

⁹² International Labour Organization, *Migration and Development in Tajikistan – Emigration, Return and Diaspora* Moscow, 2010.

⁹³ The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, TURKMENISTAN REVISITS A BAN ON DUAL CITIZENSHIP, By Tavus Rejepova (09/01/2010 issue of the CACI Analyst, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/>).

found about official government policy towards the diaspora, in part because there seems to be little recognition of their existence, size, or contributions to the Uzbek economy.⁹⁴

4.37. **Poland seeks to involve both old and new diasporas.** The Polish Diaspora, referred to as Polonia numbers about 20 million. It is almost 50 percent of the total amount of Poles who live in Poland. The largest concentrations are United States (10 million), Germany (1.6 million), Brazil (1 million), France (1 million), Canada (650,000), Belarus (600,000), Ukraine (300,000), Lithuania (300,000), Australia (200,000), Argentina (180,000), Great Britain (170,000), Russia (150,000), Kazakhstan (100,000), and Sweden (100,000).⁹⁵ As with other countries in Central Europe, the Polish diaspora was formed through a combination of emigration and border revisions. Most recently, there was a rather large outflow of Poles working across the EU when labor markets opened, though many have recently returned with economic problems elsewhere in Europe and the Polish economy doing well.

4.38. **To deal with its diaspora, Poland has an Inter-Governmental Committee for Polonia and Polish Minorities Abroad which was formed in 2000.**⁹⁶ It is headed by a deputy minister for Polish Diaspora Affairs in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and includes representatives from the ministries of Education, Culture, Finance, Internal Affairs, and the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, who make up an eight-member committee. The Department of Cooperation with the Polish Diaspora was formed in 2009. Article 6 of the Polish Constitution says that the State bears constitutional responsibility to assist the diaspora in maintaining links with the Homeland. The Department of Cooperation with the Polish Diaspora shapes, conducts and coordinates cooperation with the Polish Diaspora and Polish citizens abroad. It encourages the Polish Diaspora and Polish citizens abroad to actively participate in the social and political life of their countries of residence, as well as to act towards building a positive image of Poland and promote its good name. The Department handles the matters related to protection of the rights of Polish minorities. Poland has also formed a Polish Diaspora Commission in the lower house of parliament.

4.39. **Among recent provisions to deal with its diaspora is “The Card of the Pole” which is a document stating adherence to the Polish nation.** The Card holder is entitled to all the benefits as stated in the Parliamentary Bill, passed by the Polish Sejm on Sept. 7, 2007 including: obtaining a long-term visa enabling multiple Polish border crossings; taking-up legal employment without having to obtain a work permit; running business in Poland on the same conditions as the Polish citizens; taking advantage of the Polish education system, free of charge; using the Polish medical services, in emergencies, on the same conditions as the Polish citizens; visiting national museum in Poland, free of charge; applying, in the first order, for financial support from the State budget or from the Commune Authorities devoted to supporting the Polish citizens abroad.

4.40. **Realizing that emigration for work from Poland was inevitable, a program was developed to improve the care of Polish migrants called "Closer to Work, Closer to Poland".** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has developed a program whose aim is to improve the service, information and care to the Poles in countries with increased migration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also started publishing a period “Biuletyn Polonijny” (Bulletin for the Polish Diaspora), whose goal is to share information about life among Polish diaspora groups.

⁹⁴ Shohida Sarvarova and Kamilla Abdullaeva, “Uzbek Government in Denial on Migration: Official unwillingness to face up to migrant issues is major obstacle to effective protection”, *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, September 24, 2010 (<http://iwpr.net/report-news/uzbek-government-denial-migration>).

⁹⁵ Polish Diaspora (Polonia) Worldwide (<http://culture.polishsite.us/articles/art79fr.htm>).

⁹⁶ Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009, p. 10.

4.41. ***Czech diaspora policy focuses on cultural retention.*** Like some of the other countries of Europe and Central Asia, there have been several waves of emigrants from the Czech Republic, including just after World War II, and again after the Soviet invasion in 1968. The government seems keen on maintain and enhancing links with these groups. The government of the Czech Republic provides support to its compatriots especially in the field of education and culture. The government adopted a legal framework for another period of supporting Czech compatriot communities abroad with its decrees from 2005 and 2008 for "Support of Czech cultural heritage abroad 2006 - 2010". According to this program, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports focuses on programs that promote the preservation of knowledge of the Czech language among compatriots. The Ministry annually provides scholarship study residences at public universities in the Czech Republic, courses in the methodology of Czech language teaching and pedagogy studies at high schools in the Czech Republic. The Ministry supports adoption and preservation of the Czech language among members of regional communities. Czech teachers are sent to compatriot communities in Croatia, Germany, Serbia, Romania, Russia, the Ukraine, Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil, especially those compatriot communities that are interested in maintaining their Czech identity. Teachers also get involved in other activities like helping folklore companies, working with local teachers, helping compatriots to maintain contact with contemporary events in the Czech Republic, helping to organize cultural and sport events, libraries etc.

4.42. ***Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there is a Department for Culture, Education and Czechs Abroad.*** It claims that, there are almost two million people abroad who claim Czech origin – a figure representing one-fifth of the current Czech population. Many of them do not speak Czech, but still feel a sense of solidarity with the Czech nation and the culture of their ancestors. The current migration, which started after 1989, has not yet been documented and there are only few figures or statistics available, though the Department seems to have quite detailed and well-documented information on Czechs abroad. Many Czechs leave in search of temporary work in economically more developed countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs supports cooperation with Czech associations all around the world in many different ways, e.g. providing grants for cultural projects, sending textbooks, books and video-cassettes, issuing certificates for membership of Czech diaspora communities and last but not least, it organizes a Czech language course. Grants are provided for maintenance and repair of diaspora schools, cultural facilities and small monuments. An information service is also provided for Czech associations around the world along with the international magazine *České listy*. The Ministry also collaborates with the Standing Senate Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad and the Subcommittee on Compatriots of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies, in the Parliament of the CR. Thus, the current focus of Czech diaspora policy does not seem to be on economic gain for the country through remittances or investment from the diaspora but rather on retention of Czech language and culture.

4.43. ***Slovak diaspora policy focused on support of culture.*** Like other countries of Europe and Central Asia, there is an awareness that there have been different waves of emigration from Slovakia. According to official censuses, estimates of the Embassies of the Slovak Republic and expatriate organizations, Slovaks now live in more than 50 countries around 2.2 million people and their descendants claiming Slovak origin. This situation led to several migration waves, going from the late 17th century to the present. According to stated policy, the Government considers Slovaks living abroad to be an integral part of the Slovak nation, their life and history as a part of the national history and their culture as a part of the Slovak national cultural heritage. In accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the Government shall support the identity and cultural life of Slovak communities abroad, with the objective to preserve and develop their national awareness. The Government expresses its readiness to solve through the Office for the Slovaks Abroad requirements and the needs of Slovak

minorities and communities all over the world in the field of education, science, research, information and media.⁹⁷

4.44. **The support of fellow-countrymen shall be one of the priorities of the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic.** Its Government will create conditions for support of compatriot communities, with the objective to preserve the language, cultural and religious identity of the Slovaks living abroad. The Office for Slovaks Living Abroad is the coordinating and executive body, which ensures the state policy-making process of care for Slovaks living abroad and ensure the execution of state policy on the care of Slovaks living abroad under the law.⁹⁸ Slovak policy towards its diaspora is guided by “Concept of state policy of care for Slovaks living abroad the year 2015”. There is also an Inter-Ministerial Commission for the preparation of the concept of state policy on the care of Slovaks living abroad until 2015. The strategic objective of state policy is to create conditions to support the expatriate community in order to maintain linguistic, cultural and religious identity of Slovaks living abroad, and there are funds dedicated to these ends. Migration indicators suggest a further increase in the size of Slovak communities in the world, especially in European countries with stronger economies. A new phenomenon of economic and social benefits for the Slovak Republic may also move back - the return of Slovaks living abroad to Slovakia. In this process it is necessary to create structural conditions for their return and to consider more intensive and to some extent institutionalized activities in an effort to motivate people who emigrated from Slovakia. As with some of the other more advanced countries of the countries of Europe and Central Asia, diaspora policy seems focused on cultural preservation.

4.45. **Hungary diaspora policy is driven by internal politics.** Like other countries of Europe and Central Asia, there have been several waves of emigration and border changes which have created the Hungarian diaspora. During the course of the twentieth century, Hungary lost considerable territory. As a result of this, Hungary is close to being an ethno-linguistically homogeneous state, with the population being 99.5 percent Magyar in 1990.⁹⁹ The result of these successive territorial losses was to leave significant Hungarian populations of about 3.3 million outside the new borders. Following World War II and again after the 1956 Soviet invasion, there were waves of emigration to elsewhere in Europe but also to North and South America. The estimated size of the Hungarian diaspora from these border changes is about 5.2 to 5.6 million including 1.4 million in Romania, 500,000 in Slovakia, 290,000 in Serbia, 157,000 in Ukraine and smaller numbers in Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia.¹⁰⁰ From the different waves of emigration, the Hungarian diaspora numbers 1.6 million in the United States, 316,000 in Canada, 250,000 in Israel, 120,000 in Germany, 150,000 in France and smaller numbers in the United Kingdom, Brazil, Russia, Australia, Argentina, Chile, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Turkey, Ireland, and New Zealand. Thus, according to these estimates, the relative size of the Hungarian diaspora is about 50 percent of the population inside the country not 9 percent as per UN estimates. Thus, there are some 15 million ethnic Hungarians and there are efforts to extend the Hungarian state to encompass the entire Hungarian nation.

4.46. On 10 June 2001, the Hungarian Parliament adopted an Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring States in order ‘to comply with its responsibility for Hungarians living abroad and to promote the preservation and development of their manifold relations with Hungary’, as well as to ‘ensure that Hungarians living in neighbouring countries form part of the Hungarian nation as a whole to promote

⁹⁷ Government of the Slovak Republic, “7.1 Democratic State”, (<http://www.vlada.gov.sk/9825/71-democratic-state.php>).

⁹⁸ Office for Slovaks Living Abroad (<http://www.uszz.sk/>).

⁹⁹ Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 147-148.

¹⁰⁰ Hungarian diaspora (<http://hungarian-diaspora.co.tv/>).

and preserve their well-being and awareness of national identity within their home country'.¹⁰¹ The idea of the Law, endorsed by more than 90 per cent of parliamentary members, was to support Hungarians living in countries in the communities where they live in order to protect and promote their culture, discourage brain-drain, and maintain close links between Hungary and Hungarians abroad, particularly after Hungary joined the European Union. The passage of this law was somewhat controversial as it insinuated that the other countries were not protecting the Hungarian minorities properly. Hungary allows dual citizenship and has never extinguished citizenship for the millions of the diaspora residing abroad. The agency dealing with the Hungarian diaspora is the high-level Hungarian Standing Committee.¹⁰² Thus, Hungarian diaspora policy does not seem driven by development needs but is the result of internal politics within the country. One study showed that Hungary's increasingly interventionist policy towards its regional diaspora was driven primarily by the political strategies of right-wing elites.¹⁰³

4.47. ***Albania embraces its large diaspora.*** Albania has had one of the largest recent emigration rates of any Europe and Central Asian country, and among the highest in the world. Recognizing this, the government has taken a number of steps to engage with its diaspora population. A number of these steps have been in cooperation with international organizations. The Albania government has a National Action Plan on Migration.¹⁰⁴ The key agency is the National Institute of Diaspora within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁰⁵ It is mandated with the following tasks: protection of the rights and interests of Albanian communities abroad; elaboration of policies for the promotion of both, the old and new Albanian diasporas; definition of programs on relations and co-operation between Albania and Albanian communities abroad; surveys on the dynamics and development of Albanian communities abroad; encouragement and support to the establishment of specific groups/associations of Albanian migrants, on the basis of common interests, professions or geographical locations; support for the establishment of Albanian cultural centers in receiving countries with a major Albanian community; and drafting of policies on teaching the mother tongue to the children in diasporas. These measures also include a program aimed at facilitating remittance transfers "Albanian National Action Plan on Remittances: Enhancing the development impact of remittances".¹⁰⁶ Policies aimed at stemming and reversing the brain drain are also high on the government's migration agenda.¹⁰⁷ There seems to be a large number Albanian diaspora organizations especially in key destination countries of Greece, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom.¹⁰⁸ Thus, the government of Albania seems to have recognized the importance of engaging with its large diaspora population and is taking a number of concrete steps to engage with it.

4.48. ***Bulgaria seeks to include large diaspora in the life of the country.*** There was a rather large emigration from Bulgaria in the 1990s consisting primarily of more educated persons to Europe and

¹⁰¹ Walter Kemp, The Triadic Nexus: Lessons Learned from the Status Law, (http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no9_ses/07_kemp.pdf).

¹⁰² IOM, Results of the Survey "Engaging Diasporas as Agents of Development", 2005, p. 231.

¹⁰³ Waterbury, Myra A., *The state as ethnic activist: Explaining continuity and change in Hungarian diaspora policy*, New School University, 2007, 391 pages.

¹⁰⁴ http://www.soros.al/2010/foto/uploads/File/migration_strategy.pdf

¹⁰⁵ <http://www.mfa.gov.al/english/>

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.iomtirana.org.al/Remittance/en/NAP%20on%20Remittances.pdf>

¹⁰⁷ UNDP, *From Brain Drain to Brain Gain: Mobilising Albania's Skilled Diaspora*. A policy paper for the Government of Albania, Prepared by the Centre for Social and Economic Studies, in collaboration with the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty, University of Sussex, UK, Tirana, April 2006.

¹⁰⁸ IOM, *The Republic of Albania: Migration Profile*, September 2007, pp. 18-19.

North America. An important element of Bulgaria's public diplomacy strategy is its initiatives aimed at the millions of Bulgarian immigrants scattered across the world.¹⁰⁹ Today about 4 million Bulgarians live outside the borders of their country. While Bulgaria has not been able to afford massive public diplomacy campaigns in every region of the globe, the immigrant Bulgarians have become the primary representation of Bulgaria to the rest of the world and an important pillar in Bulgarian public diplomacy.

4.49. **The State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad was founded with a ministerial act in 1992. In 2000, it was transformed into a State Agency for the Bulgarians Abroad, an instrument of the Ministerial Council for communicating with Bulgarians and their communities in foreign countries.** The Agency maintains constant contact with over 600 organizations in Bulgarian communities worldwide.¹¹⁰ Two of its main priorities are the development of lobbies representing Bulgarian interests abroad and the preservation and popularization of the Bulgarian ethno-cultural and historic heritage. With the help of the Agency many Bulgarians abroad organize initiatives for promoting Bulgarian culture. It also works to acquaint the Bulgarian diaspora as well as foreign readers with the investment climate in the country, the European integration process, and vacationing opportunities in Bulgaria.

4.50. **The Agency is an important unit in the processes of acquiring Bulgarian citizenship and in obtaining permission for long-term residence in Bulgaria.**¹¹¹ There is an effort to enumerate the number of Bulgarians abroad.¹¹² It is supported by the National Statistical Institute, the Agency for Bulgarians Abroad, the Institute of Social Surveys and Marketing and the Association of Bulgarian Media Abroad. Information from the Bulgarian diaspora is collected via a website.¹¹³ Among the questions asked are: What nationality do you have? In which country you live now? When you left Bulgaria? How do you stay in touch with Bulgaria? Do you send money to Bulgaria? How often do you go to Bulgaria? Do you intend to return permanently in Bulgaria? Would you like to apply their experience in Bulgaria? Are you satisfied with the attitude of the Bulgarian state to you? Thus, a quite comprehensive survey of the Bulgarian diaspora which would inform policy. The results will be announced at the end of May 2011 at a world meeting of the Bulgarian media. According to preliminary data, the Bulgarians living abroad are around 3,500,000, but according to one Bulgarian historian, they are some 5,000,000. Thus, the focus of Bulgarian diaspora policy seems quite comprehensive and not focused on just one aspect.

4.51. **Romania develops comprehensive diaspora policy.** There have been various administrative iterations of government agencies dealing with Romanians abroad.¹¹⁴ The Council for the Issues of Romanian Abroad was established in 1995 directly subordinated to the Prime Minister and was the first structure for supporting the Romanian communities abroad. In 1998, the Under-Secretariat of State for Romanians Abroad was established and in 1999 it was transformed into the Department for Relations with Romanians Abroad. In January 2001, it was renamed the Department for Romanians Abroad (DRA) and was integrated within the Ministry of Public Information. In 2003, the DRA has been transferred under the authority of the General Secretariat of the Government, and in March 2004, under the authority of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister. Beginning with March 2005, the DRA activities and funds

¹⁰⁹ Public Diplomacy, *State Agency for the Bulgarians Abroad*, (http://publicdiplomacy.wikia.com/wiki/State_Agency_for_the_Bulgarians_Abroad).

¹¹⁰ IOM, Results of the Survey "Engaging Diasporas as Agents of Development", 2005, p 228.

¹¹¹ The Agency for Bulgarians Abroad (<http://www.aba.government.bg/aba.bg/old/english/index.php>).

¹¹² Radio Bulgaria, "Counting Bulgarians abroad", (<http://bnr.bg/sites/en/Lifestyle/BulgariaAndWorld/Pages/3003CountingBulgariansabroad.aspx>).

¹¹³ <https://www.iniesme.bg/>

¹¹⁴ THE DEPARTMENT FOR ROMANIANS ABROAD (<http://www.dprp.gov.ro/about-us/>).

were ascribed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, institution which developed and implemented the state's policy regarding the relations with Romanian communities outside the national borders through the Department for Relations with Romanians Abroad. As of December 2009, the Department for Romanians Abroad was established as a structure with legal responsibility within the Government, under the coordination of the Prime Minister.

4.52. **The major focus of Romania's Department for Relations with Romanians Abroad is on protecting Romanians abroad and partnering with Romanian organizations.**¹¹⁵ The Department for Romanians Abroad develops and implements the state's policy towards the Romanian communities outside the borders, in accordance with the major objectives of Romania's foreign policy and the Governing Program. The Department has implemented a number of projects to support these goals and seems to have fairly good knowledge of the size of the Romanian community in different countries.

4.53. ***Slovenia reaches out to its highly-educated diaspora.*** Slovenia is a small but relatively wealthy Europe and Central Asian country and an EU member. It has a relatively small diaspora as a percent of the population. The major focus of Slovenia's diaspora policy focuses on the emigration of Slovenian scientists and reasons of their emigration. At least 10 percent of all Slovenia scientists and researchers have been active abroad. The main reasons for the emigration is that there is a considerable lack of financial stimulations and conditions for good career possibilities. Slovenia's diaspora policy seems well-articulated and organized. There is an Office for Slovenians Abroad, headed by a minister.¹¹⁶ It is a small office of just five people which carries out tasks related to the Slovene minority in neighboring countries and Slovene emigrants around the world. The Office maintains constant contact with Slovene minority and emigrant organizations promoting their cultural, educational, economic and other relations with the home country and organizing conferences, seminars, tenders, etc. By means of public tenders, the Office ensures the close collaboration and financial support of the Republic of Slovenia for programs and projects involving Slovenes in neighboring countries and abroad. The Office is also responsible for monitoring and cooperation with Slovenes outside the Republic of Slovenia. There is a policy being developed titled "Strategy of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia regarding the co-operation between Slovenia and the autochthonous Slovenian national community in neighbouring countries in the field of economy until 2020" which supports business contacts and gives grants to teachers of Slovenian. There is an action plan for cooperation with Slovenian scientists and other world-class experts abroad that was passed in November 2009. There seem to be active organizations of Slovenians abroad.¹¹⁷ Thus, being a small economy, the main focus of diaspora activity seems to be on maintaining contact with Slovenians abroad, especially highly-skilled.

4.54. ***Croatia belatedly adopts policy towards its diaspora.*** Only in May 2011, did the government adopted a strategy on Croatia's relations with Croats outside Croatia which envisages the adoption of a single law to regulate this issue as well as the establishment of a government council and a central body in charge of this issue. This is the first time that an attempt has been made to systematically regulate relations with Croats outside Croatia, which is also a constitutional obligation of the state. The strategy defines three groups of Croats outside Croatia: Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian minorities in European countries, and the diaspora - Croats who emigrated overseas. Separate action plans have been envisaged for each group. The strategy envisages strengthening the position of Croats outside Croatia also by expediting the awarding of Croatian citizenship and by introducing the status of Croats without Croatian citizenship in order to preserve Croatian communities, notably in countries which do not

¹¹⁵ Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009, p. 6.

¹¹⁶ Office for Slovenians Abroad (<http://www.uszs.gov.si/en/>).

¹¹⁷ Slovenians Abroad (<http://www.slovenci.si/en/organizacije.aspx>).

allow dual citizenship. The strategy also envisages making it easier to obtain visas and labour and business permits as well as the introduction of the CRO Card, which would give Croats from abroad who are on holiday in Croatia access to more favorable services.¹¹⁸

4.55. **Macedonia starts to develop diaspora policy.** The main countries emigration of the Macedonian diaspora is Australia (81,898), Switzerland (61,455), US (43,783), Germany (42,550), Italy (34,500), Canada (31,265), and Serbia (25,847).¹¹⁹ Estimates of the size of the Macedonian diaspora vary from 350,000 to 2 million. One of the main causes of difficulties is that some of the censuses include Macedonian citizens while others count only those of ethnic-Macedonian ancestry. Emigration of the citizens of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is not a recent phenomenon and – according to the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – one can distinguish several events/reasons that have caused large flows of people. The Balkans wars of 1912-1913, the First World War, the Second World War, the Civil war in Greece (1945 – 1949) have led to massive emigration to USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In the sixties, emigration of Macedonian was triggered mainly by the poor economical situation of the country and the main destinations were Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, and Sweden while smaller numbers found their way to Austria, Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway. The poor economic performance in the 1990s, the Kosovo crisis and the 2001 internal security crisis increased the number of emigrants and asylum seekers from FYR Macedonia.

4.56. **There is a Directorate of Macedonian Diaspora within the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.**¹²⁰ One stated goal of foreign policy is the care for the position of the Macedonian communities living outside the state borders, and for the improvement of the legal status and treatment of the Macedonian national minority in other countries. According to the department's web site "The new approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the work with and in respect of the Diaspora implies concentration of the thus far dispersed concept of Diaspora, introducing the definition of the term as a concept that involves the Macedonian National Minority (MNM), and emigrants (former nationals of the Republic of Macedonia), as well as all nationals of the Republic of Macedonia staying and working abroad regardless of the duration of their stay, and ethnic Macedonians that have never had Macedonian nationality. This has created the basic preconditions in order that the MFA could perform its functions, i.e. the strategic and political - analytical dimension of the activities in respect of the Diaspora."¹²¹

4.57. **Brain drain has been pointed as a crucial problem for the Macedonian economy in many reports and papers.** One researcher has portrayed Macedonia as a case where: "brain drain is significant, where there is little awareness that a problem exists, and where almost no research has been carried out in order to examine what impact political instability has on highly skilled labour migration out of the country."¹²² There are at present no policies which could reverse the adverse effects of this exodus, and according to the available data, there are no signs of any measures planned for the future." There is also an umbrella diaspora group called United Macedonian Diaspora (UMD) is an international non-governmental organization addressing the interests and needs of Macedonians and Macedonian

¹¹⁸ Government of the Republic of Croatia, "Government adopts strategy on Croats outside Croatia", 05/05/11 (http://www.vlada.hr/en/naslovnica/novosti_i_najave/2011/svibanj/vlada_strategija_o_hrvatima_izvan_domovine).

¹¹⁹ IOM International Organization for Migration, *The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Migration Profile*, Republic of Slovenia, Ministry of the Interior, October 2007.

¹²⁰ Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (<http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default.aspx?ItemID=238>).

¹²¹ Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Diaspora", (<http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=340>).

¹²² Horvat, Vedran "Brain Drain. Threat to Successful Transition in South East Europe?", *Southeast European Politics*, Vol. V No. 1, June 2004, pp. 76-93.

communities throughout the world.¹²³ It seems as if Macedonia's diaspora policy is still in the early stages of development and is not very well articulated with respect to goals.

4.58. ***Bosnia and Herzegovina is slow to develop diaspora policy.*** Like many other diaspora populations in the countries of Europe and Central Asia, the story of the Bosnian diaspora is a rather complicated one. Of Bosnia-Herzegovina's (BiH) pre-war population of 4.5 million, almost a half were dislodged as a result of the 1992-1995 war. Although a half of these refugees returned to their homes, there are still 1 million people dispersed around the world as Bosnian diaspora. It is estimated that today about 1.35 million Bosnians live abroad.¹²⁴ This is about 26 percent of the total BiH population. Diaspora issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina are tied up with refugee and IDP issues.

4.59. **One of the consequences of the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and the associated mass forced emigration of people is that Bosnia is one of the leading countries in terms of inflows of remittances as a share of country's GDP.**¹²⁵ Bosnia today has a large diaspora, which is contributing significantly to its economic development, particularly through remittances. Annual inflows of international remittances, through banking system only, are around 2.4 billion KM. But the World Network of Bosnian Diaspora estimates these inflows to be at least 6 billion, as the majority of these remittances are sent as cash transfers through informal channels. These remittances inflows are a significant source of income for a large proportion of BiH population.

4.60. **Over 90 percent of BiH emigrants in receiving countries solved their status through the acquisition of citizenship, employment and legal or other grounds specified by law.** Bosnia and Herzegovina's leading emigrant receiving countries are: USA, Germany, Croatia, Serbia, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden, and Canada in Australia. As for the total labour population migration, the BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees does not have that data, but estimates of the International Organization for Migration for the most important country of destination notes that the total number of BiH migrant workers increased from 160,000 in 2000 to 218,000 in 2007. There also seems to be potential for tapping into highly-skilled diaspora from Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹²⁶ There is a Diaspora Sector under the Ministry for Human Right and Refugees. At this point, Bosnia and Herzegovina does not seem to have a well-articulated diaspora policy in part because this was a refugee issue until recently.

4.61. ***Serbia begins to court its diaspora.*** Like other diaspora populations in the countries of Europe and Central Asia, the Serbian diaspora has a long and complicated history made up of several waves of emigration and border revisions. Data on the total numbers of the Serbian diaspora have a wide range depending on definitions. One estimate puts the total Serbian diaspora at 3.5 million. This would include different waves of both forced and voluntary migrations across Europe and to the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South America. Many went abroad as "guest workers" and "resident aliens" during the turbulent 1960s and 1970s to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Escaping from the uncertain situation of the early 1990s caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia many migrated to Western Europe, North America and Australia/New Zealand. The existence of the centuries-old Serb or Serbian diaspora in

¹²³ United Macedonian Diaspora (<http://umdiaspora.org/content/view/31/67/>).

¹²⁴ BiH Ministry of Security: *BiH Migration Profile 2010* (www.msb.gov.ba).

¹²⁵ Nermin Oruc, *Remittances and development: The case of Bosnia, 2011*, (Netzwerk Migration in Europa: www.migrationeducation.org).

¹²⁶ Sara Nikolić, Boriša Mraović and Emina Ćosić, *The Scientific Diaspora as the Brain Gain Option: Exploring the Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 2010 (<http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/iseljenistvo/Istrazivanja/?id=1812>).

countries such as Austria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine, is the result of historical circumstances.

4.62. **Serbia has a Ministry of Diaspora for dealing with its diaspora population, which was founded in 2003, though seems have been re-organized in 2009.**¹²⁷ Serbia finally adopted the “Law on the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region” on 26 October 2009. Its goal was to define the relationship between Serbia and its Diaspora, to sustain the Diaspora’s identity and to facilitate its contribution to Serbia’s welfare. The term “Diaspora” is defined as: Citizens of the Republic of Serbia who live abroad and Serb emigrants from the territory of Serbia and the region and their descendants, so it is a quite broad definition.

4.63. **The new law establishes a Diaspora Assembly which will comprise 45 delegates.** Its role is to identify problems facing the Diaspora and offer strategies to resolve them, appoint members to the various councils and to supervise their workings. The Assembly will be the highest organ of the Diaspora and will include participation from: The Serbian Prime Minister, the Ministries of the Diaspora, Foreign Affairs, the Interior, Finance, Education etc. The new law establishes three different councils to aid and assist the Assembly, the Economic Council which aims to create conditions for Diaspora involvement in the Serbian economy – including investment programs and projects, to encourage members of Diaspora to return and to improve micro-level cooperation between the Diaspora and local government and chambers of commerce in Serbia and the Status Council for political involvement and a Council for culture, education, science and sports.

4.64. **Montenegro develops detailed diaspora strategy.** It seemed for a period in the 1990s, that relations with the Montenegrin diaspora had practically ceased when it was part of Serbia and Montenegro.¹²⁸ After several unsuccessful attempts of institutionalizing the communication with Diaspora, in mid-2002, the Centre for Montenegro Diaspora was established as an independent governmental body with the purpose of being the bridge for cooperation of Montenegrin emigrants from all over the world with Montenegro. The Diaspora centre within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro is today the main institution coordinating and promoting Diaspora links with their homeland. The centre has also developed a project called “Fund for Diaspora” that consists in offering loans to help the Diasporas start a small or medium-size business.¹²⁹ The centre also organizes humanitarian assistance from Diaspora to Montenegro and solves individual problems of emigrants. Indeed, the latter also have the possibility to make conclusions, suggestions and proposals to state institutions through the Diaspora centre.

4.65. **More recently, in December 2010, the government has adopted a detailed and promising strategy for diaspora cooperation, “Strategy of cooperation with diaspora for period 2011-2014”.**¹³⁰ It states that by gaining of independence, the need was recognized to adjust the issue of cooperation with Diaspora to the new realities and needs of the state of Montenegro and its Diaspora, and to regulate it systemically. The strategy aims to makes the Diaspora a key component of internal development within the country as the diaspora strategy is an inseparable part of development and other strategies and policies

¹²⁷ Ministry for Diaspora (<http://www.mzd.gov.rs/eng/default.aspx>). Also referred to on its website as Ministry of Religion and Diaspora.

¹²⁸ International Organization for migration (IOM) and Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia, *The Republic of Montenegro Migration Profile*, Ljubljana, September 2007.

¹²⁹ The Diaspora Fund, (<http://www.nasme.me/eng/projects/strategy/st7en.php>).

¹³⁰ Government of Montenegro, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *S T R A T E G Y of Cooperation with Diaspora for Period 2011-2014*, Podgorica, December 16, 2010.

of Montenegro. The Ministry of Foreign affairs is the key government agency, in cooperation with ministries and other state authorities, scientific institutions, local administrations, and the Centre for Emigrants.

4.66. It adopts a rather encompassing definition stating that the term “Diaspora of Montenegro”, that is, “Montenegrin emigrant population”, refers to citizens of Montenegro living abroad as well as all those persons who regard Montenegro as their home country; who identify with Montenegro in national, cultural and civilization terms, regardless of whether they have Montenegrin citizenship or not, whether they are members of all generations of emigrants, whether they live in a region, wider region or overseas countries; whether they are of Montenegrin nationality – ethnic Montenegrins, or they belong to the people or minority who live in Montenegro

4.67. Priority objectives of the Strategy are: preservation and cultivation of language, culture and tradition; promotion and strengthening of state identity and affiliation to the State of Montenegro, which includes engagement of prominent Montenegrin scientist, artists, and business people; strengthening of communications and mutual informing, including modern technologies; enhancement of economic partnership of the home country with diaspora, including creation of a database of people of Montenegrin origin; cooperation in the field of science and education; creation of system privileges and facilities for returnees; protection of status rights and status of emigrants from Montenegro in the receiving country; support to sports activities; diaspora as active actor of social and economic circumstances in Montenegro; and encouraging of donorship and other forms of charity. It also calls for the transformation of the current Centre for Emigrants into a special Government Diaspora Office or Agency and the establishment of a diaspora council. While in the development stage, this new policy towards the diaspora seems to contain all of the key elements for successfully incorporating the diaspora into development in the country.

4.68. Kosovo is strengthening its migration institutions. Kosovo is the newest country in Europe and has among the highest emigration rates in the world and a high share of remittances as a share of GDP.¹³¹ The government seems quite aware of the importance of migration to its development and is taking steps to enhance their positive impact including adopting a National Strategy and Action Plan on Migration 2009-2012.¹³²

4.69. The Strategy envisaged the appointment of a National Coordinator for the implementation the Strategy on Migration, also encompass a Secretariat, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (for consular services), Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (which has established a National Program called Brain Gain, which aims to bring back those intellectuals from abroad to the country of origin, by offering good incentives and opportunities for professional development), Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (which implements policies and provides services for the protection, reintegration as well as employment and training opportunity for repatriated persons), and the Central Bank of Kosovo (which aims to establish a direct payment system, thus enabling money senders whom support their families and relatives in their home country, by directly sending remittances for the specific needs of individuals).

4.70. Moreover, in 2011 the new Government established a Ministry of diaspora, whose role and responsibilities are yet to be defined. There seems to be good awareness on the part of the government of

¹³¹ *Migration and Economic Development in Kosovo*, April 14, 2011, Europe and Central Asia Region, the World Bank, Report No. 60590 – XK.

¹³² Republic of Kosovo, *NATIONAL STRATEGY AND ACTION PLAN ON MIGRATION 2009-2012*, Prishtina, September 2009.

the different waves of emigration from the country, the destinations of Kosovo migrants, and sources of returnees. Overall, the program seems sound and appropriate to the country's level of development.

4.71. **Turkey has detailed diaspora plan.** The diaspora from Turkey has a quite long history and is somewhat unique among countries of Europe and Central Asia. In response to an acute labour shortage in Northern European during the post-war economic recovery, Turkey signed a series of bilateral Labour Export Agreements with Germany (1961), Netherlands (1964), Belgium (1964), Austria (1964), France (1965) and Sweden (1967).¹³³ The initial idea behind such migration was the recruitment of 'guest workers' (Gastarbeiter). The male-dominated Turkish labour force filled low-skilled jobs in restructuring of the industrial sector for a period of two years. The implicit understanding was that these 'guests' would eventually return to their 'homeland'. Host governments, and indeed the Turkish government, therefore saw no need for any form of integration policy. When guest work recruitment officially ended in 1973, it was not possible for Germany, a state with a strong social welfare tradition, to deport guest workers. Today, more than 4.5 million Turks live in the EU. This diaspora population plays a role in shaping EU attitudes towards Turkey.

4.72. **Turkey's policy towards this large diaspora population has a long and complex history was evidenced by a total of 35 governmental programs and 9 development plans implemented in Turkey during the period 1961–2007.** The starting point is the economic and political context of the 1960s in Turkey. The government of the day considered migration of workers as an economic opportunity for Turkey that could help mitigate unemployment problems and foreign currency shortages through worker remittances. It was also expected that migration would bring long-term advantages to Turkish industry through the transfer of experience and technical knowledge by returned emigrants. It was thought that worker's remittances were being wasted and for this reason, successive Turkish governments sought ways to attract remittances by including a variety of incentives in development plans and governmental programs.

4.73. **In 2007, for the first time in Turkey, a State Minister was appointed to coordinate Diaspora affairs. The State Minister is responsible for coordinating 36 institutions.** A Strategy Paper was prepared in January 2008 with the involvement of NGOs established by citizens abroad. The strategy identifies service quality, education, social and economic quality, institutional building, and relationship with Turkey as five main strategic areas. One part of Turkey's diaspora plans that differs from other countries of Europe and Central Asia is that Turkey is trying to use its diaspora in Europe to project a positive image of the country with an eye towards eventual EU membership. Thus, integration of the Turkish diaspora in their European countries of residence is a priority while retaining Turkish language skills and culture.

SUMMARY OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRY POLICIES TOWARDS THEIR DIASPORA POPULATIONS AND DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT WITH THEIR HOME COUNTRIES

4.74. **This section summarized the current policies of the countries of Europe and Central Asia towards their diaspora populations based on the survey above.** It also measures current diaspora engagement against best practice and identifies either shortcomings from ideal diaspora engagement or areas where information on current diaspora engagement is lacking.

¹³³ Burcu Miraç DIRAOR, *How to Mobilise the Turkish Diaspora as a Political and Economic Actor In the EU Accession Process*.

4.75. ***Institutional arrangements.*** Based on the survey above, three countries of Europe and Central Asia have offices dealing with their diasporas at the ministerial level (Armenia, Georgia, and Serbia), twelve at the sub-ministerial level (Russia, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Poland, Albania, Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), eight have special offices (Ukraine, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary), and, seven do not seem to have dedicated diaspora offices (Belarus, Estonia, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Croatia, Kosovo). When a diaspora office was a sub-ministry the most common was within the ministry of foreign affairs. For those without a dedicated diaspora office, this could imply a variety of stances ranging from diaspora policy just beginning to be implemented, to diaspora offices just being established which was the case in several, to hostility towards the diaspora which was also the case in a few. This is not to say that one type of institutional arrangement for dealing with a country's diaspora is better than another. It should be based on the needs of the diaspora and the country and the existing institutional structure.¹³⁴ Also, the existence of a diaspora office implies the goal of incorporating the diaspora in the economic and political life of the country but not necessarily the fulfillment of those goals.

4.76. ***Diaspora policies in most countries of Europe and Central Asia are under development.*** For most of the countries of Europe and Central Asia, they either do not have policies towards their diaspora populations or if they do, they have only developed them recently. For those that do, most have developed these after 2000 or their development is ongoing or under discussion. Few explicitly link diaspora policy to development policy in the country although some do. Many more link diaspora policy to foreign policy and for that reason, diaspora offices are often housed with ministries of foreign affairs. As described above, there are usually "old" and "new" diasporas from the countries of Europe and Central Asia who can contribute to the country differently and who require different things from the country. For those countries with well-articulated diaspora policies, there does seem to be recognition of this distinction.

4.77. ***Tracking of diaspora populations by countries:*** Many of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are making efforts to collect data on their diaspora populations. This included the Russian State Committee on Statistics, which in 2002-2003, conducted research on the number of Russian scholars traveling to work abroad through official channels.¹³⁵ Armenia, being one of the historical diaspora populations has made considerable effort to enumerate its population. Both the UN Global Migration database and the World Bank Bilateral Migration Database estimate the Armenian diaspora population to be just under one million, with about 3 million ethnic Armenians residing in the country. Meanwhile, Armenian diaspora groups estimate the size of the Armenian diaspora to be about 7 million for a total ethnic Armenia population of roughly 10 million, with three times as many residing outside the country as inside.¹³⁶ According to an IOM survey of diaspora policies, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Romania, and Ukraine collected data on demography, location, country of destination, gender, age, qualifications, occupation, and length of stay.¹³⁷ Bulgaria is undertaking an interesting web-based survey of the number, composition, and homeland links of Bulgarians abroad.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Dovelyn Rannveig Agunias, ed., *Closing the Distance: How Governments Strengthen Ties with Their Diasporas*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2009, p. 26.

¹³⁵ Andrei V. Korobkov and Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaia, *The Russian Intellectual Migration: Myths and Reality*, Paper prepared for the International Studies Association, 49th Annual Meeting, San Francisco, March 2008, p. 8.

¹³⁶ Armeniadiaspora.com (<http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/population.html>).

¹³⁷ IOM, Results of the Survey "Engaging Diasporas as Agents of Development", 2005, p. 224.

¹³⁸ Radio Bulgaria, "Counting Bulgarians abroad", (<http://bnr.bg/sites/en/Lifestyle/BulgariaAndWorld/Pages/3003CountingBulgariansabroad.aspx>).

4.78. ***Assistance in destination country.*** Beyond just normal consular functions, a number of countries cite assistance of migrants as a goal for their diaspora policies. This especially applies to labor migrants, which is a rather new phenomena for many of the countries and the migrants. Given that many of them do not migrate under fully legal conditions, their protection abroad is a priority.

4.79. ***Preservation of culture and language.*** Nearly all of the countries cited preservation of the native language and cultural as part of their diaspora policy and for some, this was the primary goal. For many, this was a component of diaspora policy that received tangible financial support.

4.80. ***Dual citizenship.*** This is a somewhat controversial policy because not all countries allow dual citizenship, often forcing people to make a decision between home and host country. None the less, it is a policy advocated by those who support diaspora engagement as a way to make the diaspora feel connected to the homeland. Some of the countries of Europe and Central Asia allow dual citizenship and more seem to be revising their policies to allow it ethnic or other homeland kin. One article comparing ethnic return policies in Asia and Europe stated that citizenship policies in Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Poland were creating ‘fuzzy citizenship’.¹³⁹ Few initially attempted to stretch the homeland when return migration was not desired by allowing dual citizenship. Belatedly, Kyrgyz and Armenia have adopted dual citizenship in 2006,¹⁴⁰ as did Moldova.¹⁴¹

4.81. ***Philanthropy.*** There was some mention of past philanthropic actions of the diaspora especially during the economic difficulties of the 1990s. A few countries mentioned this as a way diaspora could get involved but overall, this was not a prominent feature of diaspora policy in the countries of Europe and Central Asia.

4.82. ***Facilitating remittance transfers.*** Despite the importance of remittances to several of the countries of Europe and Central Asia, policies to encourage or reduced the cost of remittances was mentioned by very few of the countries in their diaspora policies.


4.83. ***Remittances in the countries of Europe and Central Asia are high and growing.*** As with other regions, the importance of worker’s remittances to the countries of Europe and Central Asia cannot be understated. They have grown tremendously since the early 1990s and in many years, especially recently, have far exceeded official development assistance in recent years (figure 12).

¹³⁹ John D. Skrentny et al., “Defining Nations in Asia and Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Ethnic Return Migration Policy”, *International Migration Review*, Volume 41 Number 4 (Winter 2007): 793–825.

¹⁴⁰ Legislationline, 2007 (26 February). Law of the Republic Armenia on Citizenship of the Republic of Armenia. <http://www.legislationonline.org> (last accessed 14 May 2008).

¹⁴¹ International Centre for Migration Policy Development. 2005. *Overview of the Migration Systems in the CIS Countries*. Vienna: ICMPD.

Figure 12: Remittances and Other Development Flows to the ECA Region, 1990 to 2008




Source: World Development Indicators 2010.

4.84. *Many countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly dependent on remittances.* Many of the lower-income countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly dependent on remittances, with several being among the most remittance-dependent countries in the world.¹⁴² In 2009, Tajikistan was the most remittance-dependent country in the world with remittances making up 35 percent of GDP. Five other countries of Europe and Central Asia were among the top thirty countries in terms of remittances as a share of GDP – Moldova (23 percent), Kyrgyzstan (15 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (13 percent), Albania (11 percent), and Armenia (9 percent). On average, remittances make up 0.7 percent of GDP for all countries in the world. But for all but a few of the larger or higher-income countries of Europe and Central Asia income from workers remittance are far more important than this (figure 13).¹⁴³

¹⁴² Dilip Ratha and William Shaw, *South-South Migration and Remittances*, World Bank Working Paper, No. 102, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007. These data are extracted from Table 4: Bilateral remittance estimates using migrant stocks, destination country incomes, and source country incomes. This is compiled using weights based on migrant stocks, per capita income in the destination countries, and per capita income in the source countries which is thought to be the most complete set of remittance estimates.

¹⁴³ Migration and Remittances Unit, The World Bank, *Table 4: Bilateral Remittance Estimates for 2010 using Migrant Stocks, Host Country Incomes, and Origin Country Incomes*. Data are not available for Kosovo, Montenegro, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Figure 13: Remittances as a Share of GDP in the ECA Region, 2010



Source: Migration and Remittances Unit, The World Bank.

4.85. **Many countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly dependent on one source country for remittances.** A number of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are highly dependent on just one source country for the bulk of their remittances (table 12). The FSU states are more highly dependent on one country than those in Central and Eastern Europe. For all of the non-Russian states of the FSU, it is Russia, the largest country and largest economy in the region that is the major source of remittance earnings.

4.86. **This is even the case with the three Baltic states even though a number of migrants from those countries work in Western Europe.** Southern FSU states of Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan all derive more than 59 percent of their remittances from Russia. For many countries in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany is the largest source of remittances, though there are some exceptions. These countries tend to have a more diverse number of source countries for remittances, though both Serbia depends on Austria for two-thirds of its remittances as does Turkey from Germany. Given this dependency on a small number of sending countries, when countries of Europe and Central Asia take steps to facilitate or reduce the cost of sending remittances, they can do so in a small number of countries.

Table 13: Top Remittance-Sending Source of Each ECA Country, 2010

Country	Top remittance source	Percent of all remittances
Russian Federation	<i>Ukraine</i>	32.0
Ukraine	<i>Russia</i>	51.4
Belarus	<i>Russia</i>	53.8
Moldova	<i>Russia</i>	33.2
Latvia	<i>Russia</i>	34.7
Lithuania	<i>Russia</i>	18.7
Estonia	<i>Russia</i>	37.9
Armenia	<i>Russia</i>	53.0
Azerbaijan	<i>Russia</i>	61.1
Georgia	<i>Russia</i>	59.5
Kazakhstan	<i>Russia</i>	70.9
Kyrgyz Republic	<i>Russia</i>	76.3
Tajikistan	<i>Russia</i>	58.9
Poland	<i>Germany</i>	19.9
Czech Republic	<i>Slovak Republic</i>	17.0
Slovak Republic	<i>Czech Republic</i>	53.3
Hungary	<i>Germany</i>	19.5
Albania	<i>Greece</i>	46.6
Bulgaria	<i>Turkey</i>	40.1
Romania	<i>Italy</i>	29.8
Slovenia	<i>Germany</i>	25.6
Croatia	<i>Germany</i>	47.7
Macedonia, FYR	<i>Germany</i>	22.9
Bosnia and Herzegovina	<i>Croatia</i>	30.1
Serbia	<i>Austria</i>	67.7
Turkey	<i>Germany</i>	64.6

Source: Migration and Remittances Unit, The World Bank, Table 4: Bilateral Remittance Estimates for 2010 using Migrant Stocks, Host Country Incomes, and Origin Country Incomes.

4.87. **Potential diaspora savings are large in low-income countries of Europe and Central Asia.** The potential contribution of diaspora savings to the countries of Europe and Central Asia varies depending on the size of the diaspora population from each country and the average income earned in those destination countries. Thus, the composition of each country's diaspora population and their destination countries are important determinants of their incomes and potential savings. Obviously, a Russian with a PhD working in the United States can earn significantly more than a Tajik with less than a tertiary education working in Kazakhstan. Using a methodology developed by the World Bank, diaspora savings are a function of the stock of migrants, their average earnings, their share in the working ages, and their propensity to save.¹⁴⁴ For all developing countries, estimates diaspora savings are 2.4 percent of GDP. For the countries of Europe and Central Asia, they are slightly higher at 2.8 percent. Among middle-income countries of Europe and Central Asia, diaspora savings as share of GDP vary from 9 percent in Ukraine to 2 percent in Turkey and just 1 percent in Russia. Among low-income countries of Europe and Central Asia diaspora savings are higher including 14 percent of GDP in Kyrgyzstan, and 11 percent in Tajikistan.

4.88. **Trade and investment.** One criticism is that most attention to the diaspora is focused on migrant remittances to the detriment of other possible sources of assistance including diaspora investment in capital markets in their home countries.¹⁴⁵ There are a number of possible ways that they could include sending remittances including direct investment in business, portfolio investment in emerging stock markets or government bonds, diaspora bonds, philanthropic contributions, and development of trade and business. It is difficult in the countries of Europe and Central Asia or others to systematically determine the level of diaspora investment in home countries, though there is certainly considerable anecdotal evidence. Finding exact mechanisms for diaspora investment seems to be an area of diaspora policy that could be developed.

4.89. **Knowledge transfer and 'brain gain'.** In spite of considerable emigration of highly-skilled, only a few of the countries of Europe and Central Asia mention either return migration or otherwise tapping into this segment of the diaspora as a component of diaspora policy. This is another area that could be developed further. According to two Russian migration experts,¹⁴⁶ the extent of brain drain from Russia has been exaggerated. However, in certain fields such as Mathematics, Physics, and Biology the extent of both emigration from the country, and 'internal emigration', leaving the scientific fields in which they were trained for more lucrative opportunities in the private sector, have threatened the existence of these established fields. They advocate that the goal of Russian diaspora policy should not be to limit intellectual migration but rather to capitalize on the positive aspects through the establishment of long-term international academic contacts and the formation of Russian elite diasporas abroad.

4.90. **Europe and Central Asian diaspora associations in host countries.** It seems from the review, that the diaspora from nearly every country of Europe and Central Asia a number of diaspora organizations. This indicates that at least, these people identify themselves to be from these countries and that they have some nostalgia towards their home countries. Recognizing this, several of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are using these external diaspora organizations as their point of contact and in some cases are offering direct financial support to them.

¹⁴⁴ Dilip Ratha and Sanket Mohapatra, *Preliminary Estimates of Diaspora Savings*, Migration and Development Brief, No. 14, Migration and Remittances Unit, The World Bank, February 1, 2011.

¹⁴⁵ Kathleen Newland, editor, *Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development Policy*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2010, p. 5.

¹⁴⁶ Andrei V. Korobkov and Zhanna A. Zaionchkovskaia, *The Russian Intellectual Migration: Myths and Reality*, Paper prepared for the International Studies Association, 49th Annual Meeting, San Francisco, March 2008, p. 8. One is a diaspora member living and working in the United States and the other who remains in Russia and works at the Academy of Sciences.

4.91. ***Advocacy in the homeland.*** Either requested or not, many diaspora groups are making their political views felt in their home countries are attempting to influence internal matters. In some cases, there are fierce political struggles between the diaspora and political leadership of the country. There is considerable variation in the extent to which voting rights are extended to the Europe and Central Asian diaspora.

4.92. ***Return migration and travel to homeland.*** It is difficult to systematically measure the extent of return migration of the diaspora. It is also difficult to measure travel of the diaspora. A few countries mention return of a portion of the diaspora. Others have taken steps to facilitate travel of the diaspora to the homeland. Heritage tourism is often mentioned as way to keep the diaspora connected to the homeland and some countries of Europe and Central Asia actually fund short-term trips, especially of young people, to the homeland.

MIGRATION POLICIES OF MAIN RECEIVING COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

4.93. **Much of the preceding discussion has focused on the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population and engagement between these populations and their home countries.** However, there is a third important factor in the diaspora triad, that of the host countries. Policies of host countries are important because they help to determine the duration, success, living standards, and legal status of diaspora populations from the countries of Europe and Central Asia and elsewhere. This in turn influences the degree to which Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations are able or willing to assist their home countries. This section briefly reviews the migration and minority policies of four key destination regions for Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations – Russia, Europe, Israel, and the United States.

4.94. ***Russia rethinks its migration policy.*** Russian migration policy has undergone several policy reversals during the post-Soviet period.¹⁴⁷ In the 1990s, with other aspects of state building occupying it and a lack of data to demonstrate the fact, Russia was initially unaware that it had become the migration destination of choice within the FSU and that there were so many labor migrants in the country. There was a wide range of estimates of the number of illegal or undocumented migrants in Russia, ranging up to 20 million.¹⁴⁸ Many of these were unregistered foreign migrant workers who were allowed to enter the country legally through the visa-free regimes that Russia has with many other countries but who worked illegally because of inconsistencies in Russian migration law and over-complicated procedures for obtaining work and resident permits.¹⁴⁹

4.95. **One of the first migration-related acts undertaken by Putin was to withdraw from the Bishkek agreement which allowed visa-free travel among the CIS states and to negotiate travel between CIS and other states on a bilateral basis.** At the end of 2008, Russia had visa-free agreements with nine FSU states. In general, the early 2000s was one of increasingly strict and restrictive migration policies in Russia, in part because of national security reasons and fears of terrorism.

¹⁴⁷ This is a short summary of Timothy Heleniak, *The Evolution of Russian Migration Policy in the Post-Soviet Period*, chapter forthcoming in the volume, *Migration during an Era of Restriction*, edited by David Leal, University of Texas at Austin.

¹⁴⁸ Grafova, Lidiia. "Stop Migration. SOS: migration", *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, December 6, 2006, p. 10

¹⁴⁹ International Organization for Migration, *The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Migration Trends and Migration Policy in the Russian Federation and The Eastern Europe and Central Asia Area*, Moscow. IOM, 2009, p. 15.

4.96. **In 2002, the FMS was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA).** Functions such as regulation of undocumented migration and refugee and forced migrant issues were transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is a law enforcement agency whose aim is to maintain order by any means, including coercive ones. There was a vigorous debate in the early 2000s about the necessity of further migration into Russia. In May 2002, a new rather restrictive citizenship law was passed, which reflected this renewed emphasis on control over the number and types of migrants entering Russia.¹⁵⁰

4.97. **Over the course of the 2000s, the debate in Russia has shifted from restricting migration to the need for carefully controlled labor and other migration into the country as a means to provide for demographic and economic growth.** After 2000, Russian migration policy had definitely become more restrictive but in some cases more tolerant towards temporary labor migrants. The period since the mid-2000s has one of liberalization combined with increased regulation of the flows into the country. The quotas are still often set well below demand for work places in Russia, making many migrants, diaspora from the non-Russian FSU states, vulnerable to abuse because of their undocumented status.

4.98. **European Union.** Europe's migration policy is difficult to characterize briefly. Initially, there was considerable fear of a massive migration from the east following the collapse of communism. This, of course, never materialized. The EU has gradually opened its doors to many of the countries of Europe and Central Asia, a number of which have become EU members. More and more are gaining access to the EU labor market. However, there are some such as Ukrainians who do not have full access for visa-free travel and/or work in the EU. This often leads to a case of either ignorance or raised expectations on the part of potential migrants who travel and work in countries or situations where they are not allowed and they become either illegal, vulnerable or both. Protecting the rights of diaspora populations in Europe but also informing them of their obligations and informing them of the proper channels for legal labor migration is mentioned often as part of diaspora policy.

4.99. **Israel's wary welcome of Soviet Jews.** Israel defines itself as both a democratic society and a homeland for the Jewish people, which require a careful balancing act.¹⁵¹ The Law on Return allows Jews from all over the world the right to migrate to Israel. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, nearly 1 million Soviet Jews have settled in Israel and this group makes up half of the foreign-born population in Israel and about twenty percent of the entire population of Israel. This has caused the Jewish population in the former Soviet Union to decline by more than half. In 1989, there were 1.3 million Jews in the Soviet Union, including 537,000 in Russia, 486,000 in Ukraine, and 112,000 in Belarus.¹⁵² Because many of these people were quite disconnected from Jewish traditions after years of persecution in the Soviet Union, they often don't fit easily into Israel society. Yet, this is a highly educated immigrant population that includes engineers, scientists, and IT specialists living in a high-income country. Though one study has shown that more skilled Jewish migrants from the FSU tended to migrate to the United States while less skilled chose Israel.¹⁵³ How well this large segment of Israeli society had assimilated and the extent to which any retain ties back to their former Soviet state of origin remains a question. There is some

¹⁵⁰ Pyung Kyun Woo, "Russia's Migration Policy and Response of Civil Society", *International Area Review*, Vol. 10, Number 1, Spring 2007, pp.109-130. Federal Law No. 115-F3, "On the legal position of foreign citizens in the Russian federation", 25 July 2002.

¹⁵¹ Martha Kruger, "Israel: Balancing Demographics in the Jewish State", *Migration Information Source*, July 2005 (<http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?id=321>)

¹⁵² Goskomstat SSSR, *Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR* (Nationality Composition of the USSR), Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991.

¹⁵³ Yinon Cohen and Yitchak Haberfeld, "Selectivity and Economic Assimilation of Immigrants from the Former Soviet Union in Israel and the US", unpublished paper, 2005, p. 2.

anecdotal evidence that some have returned and that others have used their language skills and ties to establish business ties.

4.100. ***United States.*** United States immigration policy can be described as nothing other than broken and dysfunctional. This is a situation that will not likely be resolved any time soon. That said, there are a variety of ways for migrants from the countries of Europe and Central Asia to enter the United States and to legalize their stay. In the 1990s, many from the region were allowed to enter as refugees but this door has largely closed. There is a preference under immigration policy for well-educated and highly-skilled which many from the region are. About half of entrants to the U.S. come under family-reunification provisions and since there is already a large diaspora population from most countries of Europe and Central Asia, many have this clause to enter.

V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO INCREASE DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT IN THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

5.1. Following from the broad review of diaspora populations from the countries of Europe and Central Asia, several preliminary recommendations are offered and gaps in knowledge about Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations.

AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

5.2. ***Improve data on size and characteristics of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora population.***

In the review, a number of countries have cited lack of information on the size and composition of its diaspora population as a barrier to creating an effective diaspora policy. There is some variation among countries in how well they are able to enumerate their diaspora populations. The international datasets used in the analysis here is a good starting point for counting the diaspora but as was shown, there are particular gaps for some countries of Europe and Central Asia because of the changing configuration of the countries. Many of these international databases only provide information on the size and a limited number of other socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the diaspora populations. Depending on how many countries a diaspora population is dispersed across, it might be possible to extract data on a diaspora population from census or survey data. This was done for the Europe and Central Asian diaspora populations in the United States based on the American Community Survey. Only a cursory amount of data from that survey were extracted and shown. There are other survey data that could be employed to gain a much more detailed portrait of the Europe and Central Asian diaspora.

5.3. ***Determine exact levels of involvement of Europe and Central Asian diasporas with home country.***

After a reasonable demographic and socioeconomic profile of the diaspora populations has been compiled, a next step would be to determine the levels of involvement in their home countries, including their desire and willingness to assist with development. Much seems to be known about remittance sending, even though a significant portion is acknowledged to be unrecorded. Such information as to levels of investment, travel, return migration, and philanthropy in the home country would be useful. Membership in diaspora organizations abroad is a good indicator of links to home countries. Some of the countries of Europe and Central Asia are in the process of carrying out skills inventories of their diaspora populations which is a positive sign.

5.4. ***Update information on countries of Europe and Central Asia' diaspora policies.*** This desk review was just a first step in determining the current status of diaspora policies in the countries of Europe and Central Asia, if they had a policy which some clearly do not. More detailed research could be carried, including in-country discussions with government officials in charge of diaspora or migration policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA

5.5. ***Diaspora goals should be clearly defined and linked to development policy.*** The best option is to link diaspora policy to national development planning. In this way, countries can more clearly articulate how they want the diaspora to be involved and the diasporas understands its role. This will depend on the size and characteristics of the diaspora and level of development of the country. Again, some countries of Europe and Central Asia seem to have more clearly articulated a diaspora policy than others.

5.6. ***There is a need for better tracking of diaspora populations.*** This is a recommendation offered for the Africa diaspora and other diaspora populations.¹⁵⁴ In order to be able to harness the resources of the diaspora populations, it is necessary to understand the size, characteristics, geographic distribution, and willingness of the population to engage with and assist the home country. According to the IOM, governments face serious challenges in clearly identifying the professional, financial, and social capital of diasporas abroad and in matching these forms of capital with concrete development strategies at home.¹⁵⁵ A starting point would be the international and national databases referenced in this report. “Mirror statistics” of migrants in key destination countries are a useful source of information. Beyond this, governments could use their embassies and other representatives abroad to learn about its diaspora population. Diaspora groups themselves should be involved in this process.

5.7. ***Draw on the experience of other countries in formulation of their diaspora policies.*** Both positive and negative examples of dealing with diaspora populations can be utilized. Mexico and the Philippines are examples of two countries with quite different diaspora populations which have clearly defined diaspora goals and institutions supporting diaspora policy. Because many of the countries of Europe and Central Asia encounter similar diaspora issues being new countries, there is significant learning that can be done based on the experience of other countries of Europe and Central Asia. Based on the review, Lithuania, Armenia, and Montenegro are three countries of Europe and Central Asia which seem to have quite clearly defined diaspora policies and institutional support for them. There is a large and increasing literature on the diaspora and development which can be tapped into.

¹⁵⁴ Sonia Plaza and Dilip Ratha, eds., *Diaspora for Development in Africa: Overview*, The World Bank, 2011, p. 39.

¹⁵⁵ International Organization for Migration, *Results of the Survey “Engaging Diasporas as Agents of Development”*, 2010.

Annexes

Annex Table 1: Ethnic Composition of the USSR by Union Republic, 1989 (thousands)

Union republic	Total	Armenians	Azeris	Belorussians	Estonians	Georgians	Kazaks	Kirgiz	Latvians	Lithuanians	Moldovans	Russians	Tadzhiks	Turkmen	Ukrainians	Uzbeks	Other
USSR	285,743	4,623	6,770	10,036	1,027	3,981	8,136	2,529	1,459	3,067	3,352	145,155	4,215	2,729	44,186	16,698	27,778
Armenia	3,305	3,084	85	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	52	0	0	8	0	72
Azerbaijan	7,021	391	5,805	8	0	14	2	0	0	1	2	392	1	0	32	1	372
Belarus	10,152	5	5	7,905	1	3	2	1	3	8	5	1,342	1	1	291	4	577
Estonia	1,566	2	1	28	963	1	0	0	3	3	1	475	0	0	48	1	40
Georgia	5,401	437	308	9	2	3,787	3	0	1	1	3	341	1	0	52	1	454
Kazakhstan	16,464	19	90	183	3	9	6,535	14	3	11	33	6,228	26	4	896	332	2,078
Kyrgyzstan	4,258	4	16	9	0	1	37	2,230	0	0	2	917	34	1	108	550	348
Latvia	2,667	3	3	120	3	1	1	0	1,388	35	3	906	0	0	92	1	110
Lithuania	3,675	2	1	63	1	1	1	0	4	2,924	1	344	1	0	45	1	285
Moldova	4,335	3	3	20	0	1	1	0	0	1	2,795	562	1	0	600	1	347
Russia	147,022	532	336	1,206	46	131	636	42	47	70	173	119,866	38	40	4,363	127	19,369
Tajikistan	5,093	6	2	7	0	1	11	64	0	1	1	388	3,172	20	41	1,198	179
Turkmenistan	3,523	32	33	9	0	1	88	1	1	0	2	334	3	2,536	36	317	129
Ukraine	51,452	54	37	440	4	24	11	2	7	11	325	11,356	4	3	37,419	20	1,735
Uzbekistan	19,810	51	44	29	1	5	808	175	1	2	6	1,653	934	122	153	14,142	1,684

Sources: (Goskomstat SSSR 1991).

Annex Table 2: Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Successor States, 1999-2002 (thousands)

Country (census date)	Total	Armenians	Azeris	Belorussians	Estonians	Georgians	Kazaks	Kirgiz	Latvians	Lithuanians	Moldovans	Russians	Tadzhiks	Turkmen	Ukrainians	Uzbeks	Other
Former USSR	284,667	4,856	8,324	9,547	966	3,920	9,745	3,490	1,414	3,009	3,457	133,978	6,299	3,602	42,161	21,378	28,519
Armenia (October 2002)	3,213	3,145	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	2	0	51
Azerbaijan (January 1999)	7,953	121	7,206	1	0	15	0.200	0.100	0	0	0.400	142	0.050	0.200	29	0.200	440
Belarus (February 1999)	10,045	10	6	8,159	0	3	1	0.100	2	6	4	1,142	1	0.900	237	2	471
Estonia (March 2000)	1,370	0	0	17	930	0	1	0	2	2	0	351	0	0	29	0	37
Georgia (January 2002)	4,372	249	285	0	0	3,661	0	0	0	0	0	68	0	0	7	0	102
Kazakhstan (February 1999)	14,953	15	78	112	2	5	7,985	11	2	7	19	4,480	26	2	547	371	1,292
Kyrgyzstan (March 1999)	4,823	1	14	3	0.000	1	43	3,128	0.000	0.000	1	603	43	0.400	50	665	271
Latvia (March 2000)	2,377	3	2	97	3	1	0.258	0.023	1,371	33	2	703	0.093	0.045	64	0.306	99
Lithuania (April 2001)	3,484	1	1	43	0.419	0.000	0.145	0.000	3	2,907	1	220	0.000	0.000	22	0.159	285
Moldova (January 1999)	4,293	0	0	0	0	0.437	0	0	0	0	2,997	484	0	0	552	0	260
Russia (October 2002)	145,164	1,130	621	815	28	198	655	32	29	45	172	115,868	120	33	2,943	123	22,352
Tajikistan (January 2000)	6,127	1	1	0.464	0.020	0.161	1	66	0.104	0.040	0.341	68	4,898	20	4	937	131
Turkmenistan (January 1995)	4,418	34	37	4	0	1	87	2	0	0	2	299	3	3,402	23	407	118
Ukraine (December 2001)	47,843	100	45	276	3	34	6	1	5	7	259	8,334	4	4	37,542	12	1,212
Uzbekistan (January 1999)	24,231	47	29	20	0	0	966	250	0	0	0	1,202	1,204	140	110	18,861	1,401

Sources: (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 2003, 362-363; Goskomstat Azerbaijan 2001, 381; MinStat Belarus 2001, 70; Statistical Office of Estonia 2001, 14; State Department of Statistics of Georgia 2006; Agenstvo po statistike Kazakhstan (Agency for Statistics of Kazakhstan) 2000, 6-7; Natskomstat Kyrgyzstan (National Committee on Statistics of Kyrgyzstan) 2000, 26; Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2000, 142-143; Statistics Lithuania 2004; Heleniak 2003b, 131-145; Goskomstat Rossii 2004a; Goskomstat Tajikistan (State Committee on Statistics of Tajikistan) 2002, 155; Goskomstat Turkmenistan (State Committee on Statistics of Turkmenistan) 1997, 12; Derzhgomstat Ukraine (State Committee on Statistics of Ukraine) 2004). Some detailed for Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are taken from CIS Statistical Committee 2002b, 122-123). 0 indicates that no data were given in original source. Figures less than 1,000 are shown to the last person.

Annex Table 3: Place of Birth of the Population of the USSR, 1989 (thousands)

Place of permanent residence:	Place of birth																
	Total population	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Estonia	Georgia	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Latvia	Lithuania	Moldova	Russia	Tajikistan	Turkmenistan	Ukraine	Uzbekistan	Other countries and not indicated
USSR	285,743	2,972	7,429	11,168	1,248	5,748	15,409	4,092	2,138	3,517	4,215	147,187	4,978	3,507	50,601	19,154	2,378
Armenia	3,305	2,570	125	2	0	61	4	1	0	0	1	54	2	2	13	2	467
Azerbaijan	7,021	137	6,604	8	0	25	15	1	1	1	2	162	1	8	32	7	19
Belarus	10,152	3	11	8,883	3	14	62	5	10	17	8	787	5	5	268	15	55
Estonia	1,566	1	2	25	1,155	2	8	1	6	3	2	300	1	1	46	3	8
Georgia	5,401	38	17	10	1	5,039	15	1	1	1	2	191	2	1	66	4	13
Kazakhstan	16,464	11	40	137	2	44	12,715	94	5	10	27	2,450	22	42	511	139	214
Kyrgyzstan	4,258	2	4	10	0	7	126	3,586	1	1	2	348	11	4	54	70	34
Latvia	2,667	1	5	117	5	3	14	2	1,975	37	4	384	4	2	94	5	14
Lithuania	3,675	1	2	88	2	2	14	1	12	3,299	2	174	2	4	47	5	19
Moldova	4,335	1	4	16	1	8	21	2	1	1	3,739	249	1	2	267	6	18
Russia	147,022	151	479	1,409	65	423	1,825	261	100	116	229	135,550	154	141	4,596	530	994
Tajikistan	5,093	2	4	8	1	2	28	15	1	0	2	234	4,650	6	43	87	9
Turkmenistan	3,523	4	20	10	0	3	16	4	1	1	3	176	3	3,205	33	37	7
Ukraine	51,452	36	85	419	11	80	344	39	21	26	187	5,212	36	32	44,332	137	455
Uzbekistan	19,810	12	27	27	2	36	202	80	3	3	6	916	84	52	199	18,108	53

Sources and Methodology:

Goskomstat SSSR, Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya SSSR, Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1991. There was a problem with the enumeration of the population of Armenia by place of birth as a result of the December 1998 earthquake.

Annex Table 4: Diaspora Institutions in the Europe and Central Asian Region		
Country	Institution (level)	Website
Russia	Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Cultural Cooperation (sub-ministry)	http://www.government.ru/eng/power/93/
Ukraine	Diaspora and migration policy is spread across a number of government departments	
Belarus	No explicit agency for diaspora affairs	
Moldova	No explicit agency for diaspora affairs	
Latvia	Secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration (sub-ministry within Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	
Lithuania	Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad (sub-ministry)	http://www.tbn.lt/en/?id=29
Estonia	Seems to be no explicit agency for diaspora affairs	
Armenia	Ministry of Diaspora of the Republic of Armenia (Ministry)	http://www.mindiaspora.am/en/index
Azerbaijan	State Committee of the Affairs of Azerbaijan living in Foreign Countries (sub-ministry)	http://www.country.az/portal/StatePower/Committee/committeeConcern_06_e.html
Georgia	The Office of the State Minister of Georgia on Diaspora Issues (Ministry)	http://www.diaspora.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=72&lang_id=ENG
Kazakhstan	Within the Ministry of Culture	
Kyrgyzstan	No explicit agency for diaspora affairs	
Tajikistan	State Migration Service (office)	
Turkmenistan	Turkmen diaspora representatives in Russia and other states (diaspora organization, mainly for news)	http://www.turkmenistan.ru/ru/
Uzbekistan	National Agency for External Labour Migration Abroad within the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (sub-ministry)	
Poland	Department for Cooperation with Polish Diaspora in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (sub-ministry) Inter-Governmental Committee for Polonia and Polish Minorities Abroad (other)	http://www.mfa.gov.pl/Polish,Diaspora,Affairs,13588.html
Czech Republic	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Culture, Education & Czechs Abroad (sub-ministry)	http://www.mzv.cz/jnp/en/foreign_relations/culture_czechs_abroad/index.html
Slovakia	Office for Slovaks Living Abroad (office)	
Hungary	High-level Hungarian Standing Committee (office)	
Albania	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The National Diaspora Institute (sub-ministry)	http://www.mfa.gov.al/english/

Annex Table 4: Diaspora Institutions in the Europe and Central Asian Region		
Country	Institution (level)	Website
Bulgaria	State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad (office)	http://www.aba.government.bg/aba.bg.old/english/index.php
Romania	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for Relations with the Romanians Abroad (sub-ministerial)	http://www.mae.ro/en
Slovenia	Office for Slovenians Abroad (office)	http://www.uszs.gov.si/en/
Croatia	No government body	
Macedonia	Directorate of Macedonian Diaspora, Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (sub-ministry)	http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ItemID=340v
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Diaspora Sector under the Ministry for Human Right and Refugees (sub-ministry)	http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/Default.aspx?template_id=38&pageIndex=1
Serbia	Ministry for Diaspora	http://www.mzd.gov.rs/eng/default.aspx
Montenegro	Montenegro Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (sub-ministry)	http://www.mip.gov.me/en/
Kosovo	Ministry of Diaspora established in April 2011	
Turkey	State Minister to coordinate Diaspora affairs.	