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South Sudan Governance Analysis (P156685)

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Building sustainable public sector capacity in a challenging context

January 2017

Governance Global Practice

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This task was guided by Renaud Seligmann (Practice Manager, GGO23) and subsequently by Hisham Waly (Practice Manager, GGO27). The team wishes to thank colleagues from the Health GP for their excellent inputs and comments at various stages of the report, including Noel Chisaka (Senior Health Specialist, GHN07), Anne Margreth Bakilana (Senior Health Economist, GHN07), and Carmen Carpio (Senior Operations Officer, GHN13).

The team wishes to thank all the interlocutors for their time and the insights and information provided for this study, in particular, Mme Therezine Filbert (Director for Institutional Development, MLPSHRD), James Tipo (Director General for Human Resources Development, MOPSHRD); Mubarak Bol (Director, Directorate Human Resource Management); Patricia Thompson (Director Emeritus, School of Public Service of the University of Juba); Moses Mabior (Director for Aid Coordination, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning); Dr. Dimitri (Director General for Reproductive Health Services, Ministry of Health); Dr. Kediende (Director General for International Aid Coordination, Ministry of Health); and Dr. Lako (Director General Policy, Planning, Budgeting and Research, Ministry of Health).

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Acronyms

AU	African Union
AfDB	African Development Bank
ARCISS	Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan
BoSS	Bank of South Sudan
BPS	Budget Preparation System
BSI	Budget Support Initiative
CABIHRD	Capacity Building, Institutional and HR Development
CANS	Civilian Authority of New Sudan
CBTF	Capacity Building Trust Fund
CCSS	Coordinating Council of Southern States
CHD	County Health Department
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIPS	Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supplies
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CSC	Civil Service Commission
DFID	U.K. Department for International Development
EDFC	Economy, Development and Finance Committee
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EU	European Union
FCS	Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations
FMIS	Financial Management Information System
GATC	Government Accounting Training Center
GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
GRSS	Government of the Republic of South Sudan
HFSSS	High Frequency South Sudan Survey
HPF	Health Pooled Fund
HR	Human Resource
HRD	Human Resource Development
HRH	Human Resources for Health
HRM	Human Resource Management
HRIS	Human Resource Information System
HRTC	Human Resource Training Center
HTI	Health Training Institution
ICRG	International Country Risk Guide
ICSS	Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan
IDCBP	Institutional Development and Capacity Building Project
IFMS	Integrated Financial Management System
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IT	Information Technology

JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JDO	Joint Donor Office
KSG	Kenya School of Government
LGB	Local Government Board
LGRP	Local Government Recovery Programme
LGSDP	Local Governance and Service Delivery Project
LIC	Low Income Countries
LMIC	Lower Middle Income Countries
LICUS	Low-Income Countries Under Stress
MDAs	Ministries, Departments, and Agencies
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDI	Management Development Institute
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MDTF-SS	Multi-Donor Trust Fund - South Sudan
MMR	Maternal Mortality Ratio
MoHE	Ministry of Higher Education
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoI	Ministry of Infrastructure
MoIB	Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
MoLPSHRD	Ministry of Labor Public Service and Human Resource Development
MoRB	Ministry of Roads and Bridges
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTCDS	Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NLA	National Legislative Assembly
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PALAMA	Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy
PFM	Public Financial Management
PFMAA	Public Financial Management and Accountability Act
PHCC	Primary Health Care Center
PHCU	Primary Health Care Unit
PPIU	Parallel Project Implementation Unit
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PROGRESS	Project for Good Governance in the Republic of South Sudan
RATC	Regional Accountancy Training Center
RCB	Regional Capacity Building
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SEADGOSS	Support to Effective Administrative and Democratic Governance in South Sudan
SEG	Strengthening Economic Governance
SMoH	State Ministry of Health

SMoF	State Ministry of Finance
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SPLM/IO	Sudan People's Liberation Movement In Opposition
SPS	School of Public Service
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSAC	South Sudan Audit Chamber
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SSEPS	South Sudan Electronic Payroll System
TA	Technical Assistant
TBA	Traditional Birth Attendant
TGNU	Transitional Government of National Unity
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization

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Executive Summary

In a conflict-affected and newly independent country like South Sudan, rebuilding public sector capacity is an important aspect of state building, both in the short and in the medium to long term. If capacity strengthening is not pursued or is ineffective, government functionality remains patchy and dependency on technical assistants (TA) remains high. While even in a best-case scenario capacity gains take time, moving in the right direction and accumulating capacity is crucial for facilitating postconflict development.

Capacity strengthening has been considered amorphous and a difficult topic in academic literature. Intellectual interest has waned since the late 1980s. Much greater attention has been focused on policies, and more recently on governance and institutions. Part of the challenge is that it can be hard to pin down exactly what (public sector) capacity is, how to measure it, and how to monitor progress. There is also a widespread sense that public sector capacity has not actually increased in many countries, despite substantial efforts both by governments and by development partners over several decades.

As part of the increasing engagement of development partners in conflict-affected states, interest in capacity strengthening is reviving. In postconflict countries, capacity deficits tend to be particularly stark, giving the issue special urgency. For many countries, achieving the Sustainable Development Goals will require substantial scaling-up of resources as well as substantial increases in capacities to use available resources and achieve results.

This paper looks at the experience of efforts to strengthen capacity in South Sudan over the decade from 2005 to 2016. The context has proved challenging for capacity-building efforts. On the one hand, some improvements have been seen and some skilled civil servants are in place. On the other hand, wider progress has been difficult and punctuated by crises and setbacks. Renewed conflicts from December 2013 to August 2015, and again since July 2016, have disrupted progress and planning for development support. The report's recommendations are based on the assumption that minimum stability will eventually return for capacity strengthening to restart; but it cannot be predicted when this will be the case.

Conceptual underpinnings

The term 'capacity building' refers to a range of objectives from the broadest one of state building to the specific of training civil servants. State building comprises a range of mutually reinforcing processes and efforts including establishing a political settlement, public sector institutions, revenue and expenditure systems, legal frameworks, and systems for provision of outputs for citizens ranging from basic security to infrastructure to social services. At its heart, state building requires the government to be able to make credible commitments, and to induce coordination and enhance cooperation for carrying out key functions (see World Development

Report 2017; see also World Development Report 2011 and Fritz and Rocha Menocal 2007). The civil service, that is, the cadre of staff employed by the government, is both part of the constitutive domains of the state as well as part of the ‘arms’ of the government for delivering public goods and services (that is, the output domains or ‘infrastructural powers’).

A common feature across fragile and conflict-affected states is that they rarely move along a linear and continuous trajectory from conflict to stability. State building is a difficult and nonlinear process in which periods of achievement are often followed by periods of setback. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicators show that for the fastest 20 countries to move to the ‘threshold’ took 20 years for bureaucratic quality.

In the 21st century, public sector capacity building does not take place from scratch: all inhabited territories have been governed by some form of state, and some form of public sector staff are employed even in remote areas. Moreover, templates for how a state and a public sector should function are extensively available, if not always realistic; there is an accumulated international and regional experience that can be accessed or used for capacity strengthening in a given postconflict country.

Public sector capacity has a number of key elements, a first of which is individual skills. The skills of individual civil servants result from the quality of the (primary to tertiary) education that they have gone through, the quality of selection processes (recruitment), and the expertise developed while in government (both on the job and through professional development). Only if the government seeks and is able to attract staff with suitable education and experience will it have strong individual skills.

Wage and non-wage operating resources and a functional (and safe) working environment are further essential inputs to overall capacity. Staff need at least a minimally safe and functional work environment to perform assigned tasks: for example, forms to record transactions, medical supplies in the health sector, and power and functioning information technology (IT) systems if these are expected to be used. Typically, some office space and furniture, as well as storage for archiving documents is also essential. Furthermore, while debates about appropriate levels of pay are wide ranging and so far inconclusive with regard to the ‘optimal level’, there is broad agreement that if pay drops below the poverty line or is in arrears, the willingness and ability of staff to function will suffer.

An ingredient that is essential but less tangible is the motivation and therefore the incentives to perform. Some civil servants may be strongly mission driven, and there are many examples of staff who remain dedicated even in highly dysfunctional systems that do not assess or value performance. Yet, many civil servants are likely to limit their efforts if they perceive that they can receive pay without actually carrying out their assigned tasks, or do so for only a fraction of the officially specified working time. In contrast, if politicians and public sector

managers convey that public service delivery is urgent, that good performance will be rewarded, and that absenteeism and poor performance have negative consequences for the individual, then civil servants face an incentive to do what they can within their given possibilities and constraints of individual skills, specific guidance, and the operating environment.

In addition to general capacity constraints, there are differences between levels of government and among sectors. Civil servants at subnational levels often have less education (length and quality), fewer opportunities for ‘on-the-job’ training or to upgrade their skills, and fewer operational resources at their disposal. The requisite depth of professional training also varies significantly by sector and by specific job group—for example, a few months for a junior tax auditor, two years for a primary school teacher, and five years for a doctor or a civil engineer, with different costs attached to such training. This is another factor influencing how quickly new qualified staff may become available, and is often affected (negatively) by the fact that in-country training institutions are dilapidated or absent and take time to develop after periods of conflict.

Context of capacity-building efforts in South Sudan

The starting point of capacity-strengthening efforts in South Sudan was challenging. At the postconflict starting point in 2005, socioeconomic indicators were all low, including levels of education. Formal state institutions were weak or absent. Infrastructure was very limited. Moreover, the legacies of governance in South Sudan in 2005 were those of Sudan; and Sudan itself is widely assessed as having some of the weakest governance by regional and global comparisons.

Nonetheless, the public service did not start from scratch, but rather with tens of thousands of staff already in post who had been employed either by the Sudanese administration, or by the South Sudanese rebel forces. According to the 2005 civil service census, at least 32,865 staff joined the new administration from the Civilian Authority of New Sudan (CANS) and 29,307 from the Coordinating Council of Southern States (CCSS) side.¹ Many existing public sector staff had received their training in the North (in Arabic) or abroad (in English). The switch in the official language to English involved some initial capacity loss for those who had been predominantly trained and worked in Arabic. Furthermore, gender inequality is significant, and this has been reflected in the composition of the civil service.

While staff were thus inherited from the start, institutional structures and new laws and regulations only emerged over time. Most ministries started proper functioning only from 2008 onwards. Also, given the uncertainty over South Sudan’s independence, key laws such as the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act, the National Audit Chamber Act, and the

¹ Including civilian staff and organized forces. Organized forces made up around 20,000 of the 62,000 respondents.

Civil Service Act were adopted only in 2011. For many of these acts, implementing regulations were still being prepared as of 2016. Thus, for the past decade, staff and institutions have operated in an uncertain and fluid regulatory environment, which has been a constraint for using capacity effectively and for providing in-service training to bring staff together around a common system.

Subsequent recruitment as well as the allocation of positions among existing staff was driven by considerations related to the political settlement, more than merit. For senior appointments all the way down to hiring of drivers and cleaners, patronage and loyalty played a role. Furthermore, public employment functions as a social safety net, as many of those receiving government salaries support a significant number of dependents. The fastest and most significant expansion in public employment occurred in the organized and armed forces. The South Sudanese armed forces grew from an estimated 90,000 in 2005 to about 200,000 in 2015 and the organized forces from about 30,000² in 2007 to over 100,000 by 2015. There are also well-qualified staff in the civil service, but the selection and deployment of well-qualified and performing staff has not been systematic and has remained far from optimal.

Aid interventions in South Sudan started with a high level of ambition in terms of coordination and were guided by ‘New Deal’ principles, but rapidly became more fragmented. Concerns about pooled arrangements, low coordination capacity on the government side, as well as overoptimistic initial assumptions made it difficult to implement a ‘New Deal’ arrangement in practice. The initial vehicles for directly supporting capacity development were the ‘Skills for Southern Sudan’ program and the Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF). The World Bank-managed Multi-Donor Trust Fund - South Sudan (MDTF-SS) included components targeting direct contributions to service delivery (building roads, classrooms) and provided capital funding for refurbishing and equipping key ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs), and capacity supplementation by hiring consultants for key functional areas. Over time, other partners such as the European Union (EU), African Development Bank (AfDB), U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank and others became significantly engaged through individual projects.

Ex post evaluations of capacity-building efforts supported by development partners have been very critical, especially with regard to (a) a lack of understanding of the severity of the weaknesses in the context at the outset; (b) fragmentation; (c) a focus on training relative to other dimensions of capacity; (d) training that has been too short and not well funded; and (e) insufficient focus on private sector development.³

² Based on the 2007 Government of South Sudan (GoSS) budget.

³ *Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity in Southern Sudan since 2005: Annex 4: Capacity Building, p. 7.*

Efforts toward a more coordinated and effective approach were being made in 2011–2013. On the government side, this included the development of a *South Sudan Development Plan* (SSDP) and an associated *Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy* (MTCDS), and on the side of the development partners considerations about core government functions. However, with the eruption of renewed conflict in late 2013, these plans were set aside and have not been systematically implemented.

Cross-cutting issues

The pool of educated citizens from which public sector staff can be recruited continues to be quite limited, but should be just large enough to allow the recruitment of qualified staff. Basic literacy stood at 27 percent in 2009 and is likely to have expanded since then. The secondary enrollment rate was 9.3 percent in 2015. At the tertiary level, enrollment levels in public universities stood at 11,000 as of 2016, producing less than 3,000 graduates annually. However, this number is supplemented by those studying abroad as well as by those being trained at teacher and nursing colleges. Across levels, the quality of education continues to be a significant challenge.

While the number of educated citizens remains limited, good recruitment and deployment practices could ensure that those with qualifications and experience are brought into the public sector. The typical size of a civil service relative to population in Low Income Countries (LIC) and Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) is 1–2 percent of the population; legacy CCSS and CANS staff already accounted for 0.6 percent of the population in 2006.⁴ So even the limited pool of secondary school leavers and tertiary graduates should at least be nearly sufficient if recruitment was well focused on selecting capable candidates. Training bottlenecks are more acute in the health sector as discussed in Chapter 5, as qualified nurses and doctors were particularly scarce at the start of the state-building process.

South Sudan has a sizable diaspora, and many families continue to send children abroad to obtain an education; however, in contrast to some other countries with fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS), there has been a reluctance to recruit from the diaspora. The size of the diaspora is roughly estimated at 500,000. Despite some initial attempts, there have been no systematic efforts to draw on the diaspora as a potential pool of capable staff.

Gatekeeping functions for recruiting capable staff into the public service have been rather weak, with some efforts made to strengthen and adequately calibrate them over time. Initially, a Civil Service Commission (CSC) was established with the intention to build on East African models, including a gatekeeping role in hiring. However, legal underpinnings and

⁴ CCSS staff had often received training at Sudanese institutes and universities, as well as at the University of Juba, founded in 1977 (relocated to Khartoum during the civil war in the 1980s, and back in Juba since 2011).

political commitment were insufficient, and recruitment-related functions were moved in principle to the Ministry of Labor, Public Service and Human Resource Development in 2008. A Civil Service Act was adopted only in 2011. Chapter VI of the act sets out key provisions related to recruitment, including a requirement for the Ministry of Public Service to issue a letter of clearance and appointment (para 33). Implementing regulations and effective institutional arrangements to verify that rules have been followed still remain under preparation.

Since 2012, a recruitment freeze has been in place in principle, while the decision to create 18 additional states and numerous additional counties triggered a new subnational hiring wave in 2015–16. While the 2012 hiring freeze was originally intended as a temporary measure due to the shutdown in oil production, it was subsequently extended due to continued austerity needs. Exceptional recruitment can be carried out by an ‘austerity committee’, for example, to decide on the hiring of additional doctors. MDAs also hire staff on temporary contracts who are then paid from operating budgets, and possibly also from salary payments allocated to ‘ghosts’ that emerged when previous staff left the service. Since the creation of additional states and counties in October 2015, there has been a new hiring wave at the subnational levels, with limited monitoring and oversight.⁵ Moreover, the main focus of such hiring is toward more administrative staff, as such posts are replicated in each newly created unit, rather than service-delivery-related staff.⁶

Despite the widespread and significant problems, it is important to recognize that there has been some selection of people with relevant skills into the public service. For example, according to available data, most teachers have at least secondary school degrees and most accountants have had some form of relevant initial training. The recognition that skills matter and some efforts in this direction particularly in politically less-sensitive areas offers at least a potential entry point for stronger efforts to tackle this issue.

Further renewal and skill upgrading have been hindered in recent years by the extended recruitment freeze on the one hand and the absence of a public sector pension system on the other hand. Due to the recruitment freeze and the fact that current staff cannot retire on a government pension, there have been very few opportunities to employ newly qualified staff.⁷ Constraints to expanding staff numbers have been a particularly difficult issue in the health sector—which has generally suffered from a lack of prioritization among expenditures.

⁵ The increasingly small fiscal resources reaching subnational levels may begin to act as a constraint, while subnational governments can in principle hire staff and then go into salary arrears.

⁶ Adding more administrative staff may possibly even be to the detriment of the latter in a context of shrinking resources.

⁷ Staff hired by Northern Sudan accrued pensions, but payment of these has not yet been fully agreed. Since the creation of a southern government, pension contributions have been subtracted from salaries; however, those funds were not saved, but rather used for general expenditures.

Several efforts have been and are being made to provide training focused on public sector management in the country. A challenge is that for such training to be effective, at least a secondary and typically some prior post-secondary training is required. University of Juba hosts a School of Management Sciences and since 2014 also a School of Public Service (SPS), offering master's-level training. The Ministry of Public Service is seeking to operationalize a Human Resource Training Center (HRTC) and transform it into a Management Development Institute (MDI), and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) is seeking to revive the Government Accountancy Training Center (GATC)—which was first established in the 1970s as a provincial-level training institution for accountants.

South-South linkages to develop national training institutions as well as to access training opportunities have already been initiated and could expand further. For the HRTC, the Ministry of Labor Public Service and Human Resource Development (MoLPSHRD) has collaborated closely with the Kenya School of Government. The GATC has started being in contact with the Liberia Financial Management Training Institute. There are also Government-to-Government agreements for sending students to study at universities in Ethiopia, and a number of mid-level and senior civil servants have been trained in Kenya.

Beyond the training institutions targeting core government functions and induction training for civil servants at large, there are a number of relevant sector-specific training institutions. These include teacher training colleges as well as institutions to train medical professionals such as nurses, midwives, and doctors. As in other postconflict contexts, the training of physicians poses a particular challenge, given the rigor and depth of theoretical and practical training required. Some tertiary institutions (colleges and universities) offer training in other disciplines needed for the public sector including law, engineering, and others. However, training at these institutions faces a number of constraints, as is explored in Chapter 5 with regard to the health sector.

The Ministry of Public Service has sought to take a lead in identifying and addressing training needs; but these efforts still remain in the early stages. A *National Curriculum* was first prepared in 2008. Since 2009, at least three larger-scale training needs assessments have been implemented under the guidance of the MoLPSHRD and funded by development partners. Based on these, an *MTCDS* was prepared in 2011. With funding from the AfDB, facilities for the HRTC have been built outside of Juba. Initial courses have been held with trainers provided by the Kenya School of Government under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The center is currently overseen by the Director General for Human Resource Development (HRD) in the ministry; however, it was looted following the July 2016 conflicts. Other line ministries have made efforts in their respective sectors. For health, the Ministry of Health has made significant efforts to identify capacity needs, and has sought to mobilize funds for training with mixed success.

A key problem observed regarding training provided by development partners as well as regional partners⁸ is that it is (a) overly short; (b) not sufficiently specific on the rules, regulations, and processes that civil servants are expected to follow in South Sudan; and (c) not sustained. This concern has been voiced by the MoLPSHRD as well as by individual participants in such trainings. The issue is also recognized by some staff and consultants who have designed training on behalf of development partners. Many courses are held for a few days only. Furthermore, such training is not sustained and its availability remains solely dependent on particular funding contracts. The learning materials prepared and used have typically not been shared with or retained by national institutions.

Essential resources to carry out assigned functions were somewhat adequate at the national level for main MDAs, but fell below this since 2016 and were inadequate at subnational levels. Due to its oil wealth, South Sudan started its state-building trajectory with substantial and growing levels of revenue. However, spending has been concentrated on security functions, and revenue volatility has been substantial. Especially from 2008 to 2013, efforts were made to roll out manuals and IT-based systems both at the national and subnational levels. However, due to successive waves of austerity since 2012, capital expenditures have been very scarce and operational budgets have become increasingly squeezed. At subnational levels the availability of forms and Internet connectivity have long been constraints; and at the national and subnational level, access to office space and transport.

Wage levels were initially rather high, albeit varying over time and employment categories, but dropped below subsistence level in 2016. Due to initial revenue wealth as well as learning from neighboring countries, the initial intention was to establish a well-paid but relatively small civil service, and wage levels were set relatively high in 2007 (World Bank 2015b). However, for a number of years there was no adjustment of core wages for inflation, followed by the introduction of various allowances (monthly, housing) and generous per diems for travel benefiting a smaller group. Pay gaps were still significant for certain employment groups such as nurses relative to pay provided by international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Following the currency liberalization in December 2015 and hyperinflation triggered by steep fiscal imbalances, the purchasing power of civil service salaries has dropped below subsistence level in 2016, aggravated by salary arrears.⁹ This has a significant negative impact on civil service capacities both in core and in service delivery functions.

⁸ A regional partner particularly engaged in public sector training efforts has been Kenya, and to a lesser extent Ethiopia.

⁹ The inability and approach of the government in balancing revenue and expenditures is to a significant extent driven by excessive employment in security functions. As dismissing those staff is considered sensitive, the default is to erode the value of salaries for all. The fall in the oil price since 2014 combined with rising conflict-related expenditures led to a deficit of 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015–2016 and to inflation running at over 700 percent.

Additionally, as of 2016, operational budgets are also increasingly too tight to allow for normal functioning. As of mid-2016, even core national MDAs no longer have power most of the time, and employees largely rely on privately purchased ‘airtime’ to make calls or access the Internet. Institutions newly created by the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS) lack even basic office furniture. Even MDAs central to keeping the government ‘alive’, such as the Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP), have lacked power to process tax receipts and returns.

Sector-specific capacity challenges and development - Public financial management (PFM) and health

Capacity for PFM was to a considerable degree inherited from Northern Sudan. A total of 3,096 staff were identified as falling under finance and economic planning in the 2005 public service survey, of which 2,622 came from the North.

Despite the availability of some staff, formal institutions such as national ministries initially existed only on paper, and during the early Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) period, starting in 2005, budgeting and accounting were largely outsourced. The real establishment of a functioning national Ministry of Finance started from 2008 onwards. As of 2015/16, 375 staff were employed in central sections of the MoFEP (excluding tax and customs); a further 622¹⁰ as accountants throughout national-level MDAs; and about 3,500 staff in state-level Ministries of Finance.

The number and qualifications of PFM-related staff at the national level indicate at least basic capacity.¹¹ In terms of qualifications, at the national level, 66 percent of accounting staff have tertiary education (diploma level or higher) according to a census undertaken in late 2013. There is also no obvious ‘missing middle’ in terms of the distribution of staff across grades in the national Ministry of Finance, although the balance of staff is toward junior grades (grades 9 and below). At state levels, staffing numbers in Ministries of Finances have been rather high.

However, national capacity to actually operate PFM systems has remained limited, due to a combination of incentive, organizational, and skills constraints. National staff head the directorates, but have relied to a significant extent on the remaining TAs as the backbone of the workforce for key areas (budget, accounts, tax, IT). The number of TAs embedded in the MoFEP has declined since the re-ignition of conflict in late 2013, but this has only increased ‘self-reliance’ to a limited extent. PFM capacity at subnational levels remained relatively weaker throughout, and has been negatively affected by the recent fragmentation process.

¹⁰ Figure as of December 2013 (most recent available).

¹¹ There is no agreed international standard for the volume or level of qualification of PFM-related staff. A World Bank research effort into staffing numbers at Ministries of Finance indicated an average size of 1,100 (World Bank 2013).

Political interference and the absence of performance orientation of management appear to be important contributing factors to weak PFM capacity. Interference frustrates staff seeking to perform their roles to a professional standard; and staff have also been rotated in what appear to be retaliatory ways. Expectations and monitoring of performance of staff have remained weak. No performance system or formal attendance monitoring is in place to date. At the same time, it has to be noted that a number of staff are committed and are seeking to carry out their functions despite a difficult and volatile environment.

A National Audit Chamber (NAC) has been created and developed alongside core PFM functions; its capacity remains nascent. The NAC had about 100 staff on payroll as of 2016, albeit only three with professional auditing qualifications. Furthermore, its resources to carry out audits that involve any site visits have remained very limited and dependent on external funding. Review and follow up on audit findings by the National Legislative Assembly (NLA) has remained very weak.

In the health sector, the initial cadre was far smaller relative to needs when state building started in 2005. In 2001, there were less than 2 physicians per 100,000 people, similar to other postconflict environments such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, but less than in Somalia.¹² The total number of health-related staff inherited from the CCSS and the CANS was 5,900, about equally split between the two sources. However, this included only about 1,700 nurses and 1,100 ‘medics’.¹³ Thus, while for PFM in principle sufficient staff was available, this clearly was not the case in the health sector. Unlike other countries where conflict disrupted the health system and institutions, there was no such system in place before the CPA in South Sudan. During successive North-South wars in Sudan, health services had been delivered mostly by humanitarian organizations.

Following independence, the additional number of staff needed in the sector were estimated at 15,000. This increase would have brought South Sudan slightly closer to international minimum standards in terms of nurses and doctors per 100,000 population. Capacity strengthening was also urgently needed for the national- and state-level Ministries of Health to play an effective coordinating and regulating role. However, this scale-up has not happened, and the strengthening of management functions only took place to a limited extent. Government budget allocations to the health sector have decreased and remained extremely low compared to regional and global levels.

The number of staff positions allocated to the sector has remained constant at the subnational level and shrunk at the national level in recent years. Government relies on the

¹² According to World Health Organization (WHO) statistics.

¹³ Based on the 2005 civil service survey. The accuracy of these figures and the specific qualifications cannot be assured.

assumption that humanitarian and other sources of funding will resource the sector, continuing the legacies from the pre-CPA period. At the same time, political and administrative elites access government funds or pay privately to seek treatment abroad. The availability of such ‘outsourcing’ and ‘exit’ options limits the incentives to invest in strengthening of the national health system.

Training health sector staff has been challenging. Training institutions are themselves weak and struggling to find and retain sufficiently qualified teaching staff. The ongoing fiscal crisis has worsened the situation further by eroding the value of government salaries as well as of the public scholarships provided to medical students, and by aggravating salary payment arrears.

Rather counterintuitively, it has also been difficult to absorb newly trained national staff into the public service or (even) into NGOs providing health care. For public health care, the official hiring freeze since 2012 and irregular salary payments have posed key obstacles for recruiting and retaining newly trained staff. Initially, ex-soldiers and individuals from local communities were rapidly (and insufficiently) trained to serve as primary health care workers; as long as budget allocations and staff ceilings are not increasing, these low-skilled staff continue to occupy positions and cannot be replaced by those who received longer-term and more in-depth training. Information flows between medical training institutions and NGOs are poor, limiting awareness of and the ability to connect to recent graduates available for recruitment. Following independence, efforts were being made to bring public sector and NGO salaries into closer alignment to facilitate a transition to public provision; but this has been thrown off track following the devaluation and hyperinflation, and as of 2016, salaries diverge to an increasing extent (see Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5).

Implications and recommendations

Identify options to cope with a nonlinear state-building process which affects capacity-strengthening efforts in multiple ways

- *Because achieving a political settlement in South Sudan has been and will remain very challenging, capacity-strengthening support needs to find (better) ways to bridge periods of renewed conflict*

The environment is very likely to remain challenging and volatile. Country volatility tends to reinforce existing tendencies toward fragmentation and stop-go provision of development assistance. However, to progress, capacity strengthening requires establishing and subsequently embedding new systems, interlinked classroom-based and on-the-job training, investments in better primary and secondary education, institutionalizing domestic post-secondary training institutions, as well as a sequencing of assessing needs, developing strategies, and actually rolling out training efforts. All of such ‘sequenced’ steps are negatively affected when the

funding to sustain them is too short term, uncertain, or cancelled as new crises erupt. While it will be impossible to completely avoid volatility in external support to capacity strengthening, more should be done to anticipate and address such volatility. This may also require some agreements among the international community on how to react to crises.

- *Development partners face a dilemma, in that the government has not demonstrated commitment to improve governance, but withdrawal of support will further weaken institutions*

While especially rapid or significant progress is not likely under conditions of limited commitment, continuation of capacity strengthening and TA support, as well as calibrating humanitarian assistance in ways that enable rather than undermine national capacity particularly in the health sector, remains crucial to build gradual progress and to avoid deeper backsliding. Some assistance can in principle be provided even during periods of heightened insecurity. Curricula can be developed, externally advised on, and delivered by national staff even during crisis periods, and discussions on lessons learned organized, even when travel restrictions are in place.

- *Development partners need to ‘up their game’ on coordination efforts, systematic lessons learning, and building on previous interventions*

Coordination poses tremendous challenges in particular in fragile states. Ministries and departments are less able to lead on coordination and (nascent) coordination efforts lapse during periods of renewed crisis. In addition, staff rotations tend to be more frequent for a fragile environment. For new staff and teams, it can be very challenging to access what has been done to date, who has benefited and what are lessons learned, previously developed plans for further work, and so on. Development partners can do much more to accessibly document and share (a) what has been done and with what effects; (b) lessons learned; and (c) materials developed—plans, curricula, training content, and so on.

- *Prioritizing funding in a situation of deep austerity in the short and medium term while seeking to keep sight of longer-term goals*

Development partners have significantly less resources available than during the CPA period and the government is facing extreme austerity in the short and medium term. In this context, it will be easy to become exclusively focused on near-term priorities rather than continue to foster investments in the building blocks of a more capable state. But maintaining (also) a longer-term view of what steps need to be initiated or continued to not be in the same place in 10 or 20 years remains crucial. This includes considering how to prioritize between different capacity ‘ingredients’ as set out—wages, training, operating funds, enabling retirement, as well as additional hiring for service delivery functions.

Training on its own cannot deliver results—civil service reforms need to be brought into the policy dialogue, while recognizing that simple ‘best practice’ approaches will not work

- *Civil service reforms are difficult but critical and should receive greater attention in the policy dialogue and development efforts*

Improving who is being recruited into government core and service delivery functions, ensuring that basic incentives to perform are in place, and stabilizing salary payments are essential elements of improving state capacity in a conflict-affected country such as South Sudan. Accordingly, these issues should receive more central attention both in the policy dialogue and in the programming of specific operational engagements.

In contrast to the provision of training, civil service reforms tend to go ‘against the grain’ of government incentives, and hence there is also less demand from the government side. However, development partners can be much clearer in their dialogue that one is not useful without the other. Given that wholesale civil service reforms have been recognized as rarely successful, a potentially feasible approach to explore is to focus on specific sectors and government and service delivery tasks. Highlighting positive experiences from other countries may also be useful.

Training isn’t everything, but significantly more could be done to strengthen its quality and impact

- *Reconsider the design of training efforts*

Training investments funded by development partners can be improved on a number of dimensions: investing more in institutionalizing training (and certification where relevant) and less in ad hoc and one-off efforts; making training more specific to the day-to-day tasks officials are expected to undertake, including usage of national rules and regulations, training on existing IT systems, and so on; and a better linking of organized/classroom-based training and the provision of ‘hand-holding’ assistance through TAs, including through ensuring that TAs are aware of what training efforts are being made for staff in the units where they are posted. **As set out above, moving in this direction also requires improved access to lessons learned and to basic data on what previous training has been carried out and who has benefited among development partners.**

- *Especially for shorter-term training, it is important to focus on specific skills that are needed and immediately usable on the job, and to select staff with ‘upgradable’ existing skills and performance*

For those short-term training efforts that continue, it is important to focus on specific skills that are needed and immediately usable on the job. Given the low levels of individual

capacity coupled with the limited training budgetary allocation as noted in the findings, it would be advisable to focus on developing skills directly relevant to delivering on the job, through appropriate combinations of classroom-based and on-the-job training.

- *Considering cost-benefit tradeoffs between national and foreign training, invest in strengthening domestic training institutions*

There need to be some decisions about what training can best be provided in country and what training should be sought abroad, and to invest in the strengthening of domestic training institutions, drawing also on regional and international linkages. Once training best provided in the country has been identified, it is important to invest in domestic training institutions, including those geared to meeting sector needs for a future workforce such as the universities' specialized colleges, training colleges for medical and educational staff, the University of Juba SPS, GATC, and HRTC. Developing and reviving these local institutions creates a stronger foundation for continuous capacity, and once initial progress has been made, it also provides some buffer, for example, against reductions of TAs due to renewed crises.

- *Development partners should consider provision of co-funding to and coordination with existing South-South collaboration which largely has run on 'parallel tracks' to training efforts sponsored by development partners and is more cost-effective than other modalities*

Several MDAs have concluded MoUs with various regional countries and further afield to send staff for longer-term training, and some of the envisaged training was implemented successfully. However, development partner efforts have largely been pursued separate from these types of initiatives. There is scope to provide additional funding to regional teaching staff to come to South Sudan to provide training, as well as to efforts of sending South Sudanese to regional institutions on government initiatives, with a strong pull for such staff to return and assume positions in the public sector.

At the same time, not all South-South collaboration has worked equally well. Again, documenting and sharing lessons learned among those providing capacity-strengthening support—as outlined above—is crucial to ensure that the South-South potential can be used to the best effect.

Connecting the dots between training and overall development interventions in sectors

- *Make TAs and NGOs more fully part of capacity-strengthening efforts*

Technical Assistants and international NGOs can make important contributions to capacity-strengthening efforts, but this potential has not been fully utilized. TAs often have a very close knowledge of 'who can do what' in a given ministry, as well as of the specific

training needs that exist. Moreover, some TA providers and NGO staff have been far longer in the country than the staff of development agencies. This inside knowledge can be utilized more fully in the design of capacity-strengthening efforts. For the health sector, international NGOs that receive donor funding to deliver health services could take on newly trained national staff for further practical training, for example, for 6–24 months. This could make a significant contribution to upgrading the practical skills of national medical staff.

- *Better connecting training efforts and other investments*

Staff who receive training need a functional working environment to actually use new or improved skills. Government and development partners need to jointly commit to ensuring that staff have at least basic equipment, such as desks, chairs, paper forms, or IT equipment, power, and water (especially in hospitals, and at least water in health posts), and basic pharmaceuticals and medical supplies in the health sector. Ideally, the availability of such basic inputs should be part of the joint information collection and monitoring efforts about the ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘with what effects’ of capacity-strengthening efforts. This requires effectively linking capacity-strengthening efforts with overall development efforts made in a particular sector.

Improved monitoring and evaluation of capacity-building efforts is critical

- *There is a dearth of information on who has been trained in what; the quality and impact of training received; how classroom learning has been coordinated with other avenues for capacity building; and the overall contribution to effectiveness.*

Better information is an essential basis for knowing what was done, assessing what works, and improving on practical challenges such as matching newly trained staff or staff who have upgraded their skills with recruitment or promotion opportunities. Keeping track of relevant training efforts will need to be done sector by sector, but must move beyond being ‘within projects’ only. Monitoring efforts will need to be as simple as possible, matched to the incentives and institutional capabilities on the ground.

To provide aggregate monitoring and to coordinate and channel external support, it would be beneficial to have a stronger hub in the MoLPSHRD. In principle, the MoLPSHRD’s directorate for HRD has this responsibility, but it has been a rather weak directorate in recent years. The MoLPSHRD overall also has potentially an important role to play in linking capacity-strengthening efforts and pursuing reforms of the civil service which are crucial for capacity strengthening to have an impact.

Further sector-specific recommendations are reflected in Chapter 6 (in particular for the health sector).

1. Purpose, Scope, and Approach

1. This report was developed in the first half of 2016, when the signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS) and subsequent establishment of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGNU) presented a possible window of opportunity to restart and ‘reset’ state-building efforts, in particular, to initiate a more strategic approach to capacity building. From the government side, it was possible incentives would emerge to signal a break with the past by delivering services to citizens. Further, the ongoing macro-fiscal crisis held potential for creating incentives to improve the management of public resources by addressing capacity constraints across tiers of the government. For development partners, it provided an entry point for better coordination and alignment of capacity-building support in areas already gaining traction in the country.

2. In this context, the main objective of the note has been to contribute a stronger evidence base for renewed efforts at supporting capacity building. While at the ‘big-picture’ level, capacity constraints in South Sudan are reasonably well understood, a more detailed analysis was needed to guide (a) future interventions with regard to needs, as well as feasibility and robustness to governance constraints and (b) efforts to better monitor what is being achieved.

3. Despite the renewed deterioration since mid-2016, it is expected that many of the key challenges and tensions analyzed will remain important considerations when capacity-building efforts are eventually renewed. Since the completion of this report, South Sudan has faced renewed conflict and a deepening macro-fiscal crisis. Shortly after the formation of the TGNU in late May 2016, fighting broke out in Juba and the security situation in the rest of the country has subsequently deteriorated. With regard to scope, this note mainly covers the period until June 2016, as a contribution to providing a more nuanced understanding of efforts at capacity building in South Sudan.

4. A second objective of this analysis is to propose a better monitoring framework for capacity-building efforts. Over the past decade, development partners (including the World Bank Group) and the government have been mutually frustrated about the slow and uncertain progress in capacity development. One important task ahead will therefore be to develop stronger monitoring not only of individual interventions, but also of overall outcomes and impacts of capacity-development efforts. The intention would be to better track the progress being made, and potentially to propose a system for regularly exploring underlying reasons for progress or lack thereof in identified key areas. This would contribute to a more evidence-based ongoing dialogue and better targeting of interventions.

5. With regard to scope, this note is primarily concerned with capacity in the civilian public service in South Sudan, and its ability to deliver public services. The note explores

cross-cutting issues and challenges related to developing a capable and effective civil service and drills down into two specific areas: public financial management (PFM) and the public health sector. Given that development of institutional capacity is embedded in the wider processes of state building, the report highlights areas in which the overall state-building trajectory in South Sudan has created opportunities or constraints.

6. **As discussed further in Chapter 2, public sector capacity emerges from a range of factors that jointly shape civil servants' ability and incentives to perform.** Critically, the success reforms tackling any of these factors depends in part on the quality of the specific intervention, as well as whether or not other factors are also moving toward greater capacity. This note specifically addresses the following subset of factors shaping capacity building: the availability of key skills in South Sudan, the way recruitment decisions have shaped how these skills are absorbed into the public; the availability of essential resources (buildings, transportation, information technology [IT] systems and supplies, as well as relevant policies manuals and forms); and civil servants' opportunities for training and learning (on the job as well as classroom based).

1.1 Data and information used and caveats

7. **The report draws on the following main sources:** For the empirical chapters it draws on primary data and information, including laws, government strategies and policies, national and state-level budgets, and data from the electronic payroll system, existing reports and data analysis, in particular the 2005 survey of civil servants, and the December 2013 census of accountants; evaluation reports addressing interventions aiming to strengthen capacity in South Sudan, as well as interviews with government officials, staff at training institutes, technical assistants (TAs), representatives of development partners, and other relevant interlocutors. For the conceptual underpinnings set out in Chapter 2, the report draws on key items from the relevant literature on state building, political settlements, public sector reforms, and capacity development, and on pertinent recent research carried out by several of the contributors to this note.

8. **The report combines an analysis of the opportunities and constraints created by the evolving country context; cross-cutting factors which have shaped core public administration functions across sectors since 2005; and analysis of capacity in two selected state functions—PFM and health care.** The sectors were selected to provide a more detailed understanding of how capacity constraints concretely play out in functional areas. PFM is a core government function, and health services are a key social service which the government is expected to regulate and aspires to deliver. While these two selected functions have some representativeness also for other core and service delivery functions, it is important to keep in mind that there are important specifics within each function (between health and education, for

example). The coverage of specific functions is necessarily selective; but similar sector-specific ‘drill-downs’ could be replicated for other state functions if and when needed.

9. **There are several important caveats.** One is that no visits to subnational levels were possible during the period when this report was developed. The team has sought to use available sources of information on subnational levels, in particular, budget documents, existing analyses of institutional arrangements, as well as information from TAs and government staff who travel to subnational levels as part of their duties.

10. **A second caveat is that data are limited, patchy, and not in all cases reliable.** For example, data on adult literacy rates is still only available for 2008; there are important differences between staff numbers as reflected in the electronic payroll system and in annual budgets (including less as well as more staff for specific functions); and in the absence of a monitoring system, it has been challenging to establish who has been trained in which functions in recent years. Achieving a clear picture of the number and qualifications of public sector employees in South Sudan is difficult. Generally, more information exists regarding the composition of the civilian civil service as compared to the organized forces and national security sector. Yet, the most recent civil service census was carried out over 10 years ago in 2005. Annual budgets contain detailed staffing numbers, but these capture the number of ‘allowed positions’, or nominal rolls, rather than the actual number of staff. While noting these constraints, it remains important to utilize existing data with an understanding that they provide approximations more than precise measurement, as a way to establish as strong an empirical basis for the assessment as possible.

11. The main empirical work for the report was carried out between November 2015 and May 2016, and reflects data and information available and accessible at this time. As discussed above, renewed conflict in South Sudan has contributed to a deterioration in overall state capacity.

12. **The rest of this note proceeds as follows:** Chapter 2 covers the conceptual underpinnings of the paper. Chapter 3 provides a cross-cutting perspective on capacity-building efforts in South Sudan, providing an overview of public sector as a tool for the management of political support, as well as the evolution of aid architecture. After describing the composition of the civil service, the chapter then discusses (a) the availability of key skills, (b) recruitment practices, (c) adequacy of wages and availability of essential resources to carry out key functions, and (d) opportunities for training and learning. Chapter 4 covers PFM in South Sudan and Chapter 5 addresses the health sector. Chapter 6 reviews key findings and emerging lessons and concludes with recommendations and options for improving monitoring of capacity-building efforts going forward.

2. Conceptual Underpinnings and Methodology

13. **The term ‘capacity building’ is often used to refer to a wide range of objectives from state building to training civil servants.** This note is primarily concerned with building the capacity of public sector to carry out core functions and deliver services to citizens. Yet as discussed below, the development of an effective public sector is embedded in wider processes of state building—both feeding into the legitimacy of the state and also being shaped by the political settlement. As set out in the forthcoming WDR 2017, state capacity is the ability of the government to enable credible commitment, induce coordination, and enhance cooperation to carry out a set of functions. It is widely agreed that these functions include the provision of security, delivery of public goods, and generation of political legitimacy.¹⁴ States which cannot deliver in these areas are often considered to be fragile or failed, and to have weak capacity.

14. **Beyond this, there is a wide range of thinking about the desirable and realistic scope of government functions.**¹⁵ This originates in part from ideological debates about the ideal size and scope of government, as well as from historical and practical considerations about what is feasible in a given country context.¹⁶

15. **Some states may choose to directly deliver basic services such as health, education, water, or electricity.** Others may choose (or need) to outsource delivery to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), humanitarian organizations, or the private sector—in which case the state takes on the role of managing, regulating, and monitoring providers.

16. **Similarly, certain ‘core’ functions such as financial management or accounting can be contracted out, carried out directly by civil servants, or involve a mix of civil servants and TAs.** As set out by OECD (2008a), in nearly all contexts, states requires a minimum level of administrative capacity (that is, to operate central ministries, carry out policy making, and oversight), including a ‘reasonably well functioning civil service and public management system and the ability to raise funds, particularly through taxation.’ A recent United Nations (UN)-World Bank report, *Rebuilding Core Government Functions in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, identified specific areas in which minimal functionality should be prioritized in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. These include executive decision making and coordination at the center of government; public revenue and expenditure management; government employment and public administration; local governance; aid management; and security.

¹⁴ Brinkerhoff 2010. Fritz and Rocha Menocal (2007), sets out that state functions are divided between an ‘internal domain’ concerned with management of public resources and staff, as well as ‘output domains’ which concerns the delivery of tangible outputs to citizens (that is, security, social services, public infrastructure).

¹⁵ See Srivastava and Blum (forthcoming); World Bank (1997).

¹⁶ See for example, Fukuyama (2005); or Levy and Fukuyama. 2010.

17. **A key consideration is that capacity building is both a ‘technical’ and a ‘political’ challenge.** As highlighted by Fukuyama (2011), the presence of an impersonal bureaucracy composed of civil servants who can design policies based on evidence and implement them according to rules rather than personal, political, or family connections is a key element of an effective civil service. This is difficult to achieve in postconflict contexts in which formal and informal arrangements that allocate public jobs and resources are typically designed with attention to continued stability, while the gradual establishment of rule-bound systems to manage public finances and deliver public goods is often a secondary goal. Government agencies may be divided between previously warring parties as part of a peace agreement¹⁷ and pressure may exist to recruit staff based on security or patronage considerations rather than technical qualifications.¹⁸

Box 2.1. Priority Areas for Capacity Building in Postconflict Countries

- *Human capacity:* Civil servants may have been displaced or have emigrated to safety; basic and advanced training facilities may be destroyed; and in many cases, institutional memory lost through the destruction of data. Cross-government personal and functional relationships that are critical to the functioning of state agencies may have been disrupted. Trauma and uncertainty prevail, and are a hidden part of the legacy of conflict that affects people at all levels.
- *Institutional and organizational capacity:* Almost all postconflict countries possessed central institutions prior to the conflict, and in many cases core systems, particularly centralized systems, may have remained largely unaffected by violence itself. Nevertheless, peace agreements or changes to basic law may bring into question their relevance or validity. It is important to understand what institutional legacy remains, while also understanding where specific commitments have been made in peace agreements to reform systems of the past.
- *Physical infrastructure:* The destruction of government buildings and equipment can prevent public agencies from being reestablished. The loss of transport and communication networks may isolate particular regions and limit the extension of the state. The degree of destruction has varied widely.

Source: United Nations and World Bank, forthcoming, 9.

18. **At the same time, in low-income or fragile environments, many of the ‘inputs’ for an effective state are absent** (see figure 2.1). There is often a dearth of qualified staff, especially in environments with low human development, where education systems have been eroded because of prolonged conflict, and experienced civil servants have left their posts due to security conditions. Qualified staff may be particularly hard to find for positions outside of main urban

¹⁷ As in the case of Liberia in 2003 or South Sudan in 2015.

¹⁸ Countries with very low literacy and numeracy can make this particularly problematic as compared to contexts with an overall more educated workforce. When meritocratic recruitment cannot be relied on to select the most qualified, it helps to have a much wider pool of qualified citizens from which to draw.


centers, and particularly in areas where violence was concentrated during the conflict.¹⁹ Further, there are likely to be gaps in formal laws, policies, or regulations that guide staff in the performance of their duties; and infrastructure (roads, buildings, IT systems) may be damaged or destroyed.

19. **Approaches to capacity building have often focused on the missing ‘inputs’ to capacity,** providing training for individual civil servants, putting in place necessary infrastructure for staff to carry out their assigned function (that is, providing IT equipment) and placing technical assistance in key ministries to transfer skills. A key challenge has been that these efforts can fall short of expectations when they are not aligned with incentives to develop a more effective public sector or do not sufficiently navigate the wider political economy context (see forthcoming WDR 2017).

20. **A related issue is that some development partners, TAs, and local policy makers have approached public sector challenges as something that can be addressed through training in relative isolation from other interventions.** Even when such interventions are well aligned with the state-building trajectory, public sector capacity emerges from the interaction of a range of factors which jointly shape civil servants’ ability to perform. These mechanisms include the availability of key skills and overall quality of the pool of potential civil servants; recruitment practices, and decisions about who from the general pool of potential civil servants applies to and is selected into the public service; the relative experience of public employees and performance incentives; and the opportunities for training and learning ranging from on-the-job mentoring to classroom-based. These factors are laid out in stylized form in Figure 2.2 and summarized in Annex 1. Critically, the success of reforms in any of these areas depends in part on the quality of the specific intervention, as well as whether or not other mechanisms are also jointly moving toward greater capacity (McCourt and Eldridge 2003).

¹⁹ With regard to capacity, there are a range of situations. Some countries emerging from war were previously states and had relatively developed administrative systems. Others emerge from conflict as new states (that is, Kosovo, Timor, and South Sudan). Levels of development prior to and after conflict can also vary (for example, Iraq as compared to Liberia).

Figure 2.1. Ecosystem Shaping Civil Service Capacity



These factors are located within, influence and are influenced by the overall state-building trajectory including: (a) security and political context and prevailing ideology; (b) incentives and examples set by decision makers; (c) prevalence, characteristics, and impact of a donor-funded ‘parallel public service’.

Source: Adapted from Fritz and Ort (2016).

21. **An additional consideration is that capacity-building initiatives often attempt to transplant blueprint institutional models or to influence institutional ‘forms’ rather than functions.** As highlighted by Andrews and Pritchett (2012) and in the WDR 2017, a gap often emerges between formal organizational models and the functions they carry out. A police force may have the uniforms and equipment that make it appear similar to those providing public security in many countries, but in practice it may be a mechanism for collecting bribes. A civil service may in principle be established to deliver services to citizens, but in practice acts as a social safety net in lieu of other such systems. Conversely, just because a Ministry of Finance or of Public Service has not adopted the best systems and models does not always mean it is not effectively or efficiently managing resources. Typically, it is easier to influence organizational forms than functions, especially for external actors—including development of bills, strategic plans, organograms, regulations, master curricula, and so on. Though in some cases these are necessary perquisites to moving ahead with capacity building, they are not sufficient conditions to influence the effectiveness or function of the organization.

2.1 Capacity in the context of conflict and fragility

22. **Rebuilding public sector capacity is a key priority in low-income and fragile contexts.** As set out in the 2011 WDR on Conflict, Security, and Development, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship between transformation of institutions and restoring confidence in the state. To do so requires that the government is able to function and deliver tangible outputs (policing, rebuilding infrastructure, organizing service delivery) (OECD 2010). As set out by Brinkerhoff (2010), capacity building in fragile and non-fragile contexts share a number of similarities (see Figure 2.3), but there are also importance differences. These include the pressure to rapidly restore services and security, a typically more limited skills base on which to build, and a hyper-politicized environment.

23. **In the 21st century, public sector capacity building does not take place from scratch:** all inhabited territories have been governed by some form of state, and some form of public sector staff are employed even in remote areas. Moreover, templates for how a state and a public sector should function are extensively available, if not always realistic; and there is an accumulated international and regional experience that can be accessed or used for capacity strengthening in a given postconflict country. As is discussed further in Chapter 3, South Sudan's initial capacity and institutional legacies were inherited from Sudan. Similar to other recent new states such as Kosovo and Timor-Leste, South Sudan had been a relatively neglected and backward region within larger Sudan, and the region had experienced decades of civil war, but some form of administration still existed especially in the main urban centers. Structures created by the South Sudanese rebel forces were another legacy that affected the state-, institution-, and capacity-building processes at the outset of the post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) period.

Table 2.1. Comparison of Capacity Development in Fragile and Non-fragile Contexts

Similarities	Differences
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Need to consider sustainability and reinforcement of endogenous capacity• Long timeframe• Change agents and champions, political will and ownership• Importance of adaptation of intervention templates• Systems perspective to capture complexity and interconnections	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Pressure to restore services and security quickly• Short timeframe• Limited capacity to build on• Often not simply rebuilding, but creating new capacities• Little 'margin of error' (for example, lack of trust and social capital, institutional resilience)• Hyper-politicized environment

Source: Brinkerhoff 2010.

Table 2.2. Scenarios for Improvements in State Capacity

International Country Risk Guide Indicator	Indicator Level	Threshold	Years to Threshold at Pace of			
	Current Actual Fragile Situations		Recent Average Fragile Situations	Average Non-fragile All Countries	Fastest 20	Fastest Over the Threshold
Bureaucratic Quality	1.0	2.5	Infinity	116.1	19.9	12.0
Corruption	1.8	3.5	Infinity	Infinity	27.4	14.3
Military in Politics	1.9	4.0	Infinity	103.4	16.6	10.3

Source: Pritchett and de Weijer 2010.

24. **While fragile states vary in their level of economic development and the nature of violence faced, a common feature across this diverse group of countries is that they rarely move along a linear trajectory from conflict to stability** (Brinkerhoff 2010). Countries which experience conflict face a high risk of renewed violence; Collier et al. (2003) finds the risk to be at 40 percent within 5 years (Collier et al. 2003). As OECD (2008a) describes, capacity “is worked out over the long term, although attention is often focused on its short-term characteristics. State building is a difficult and nonlinear process in which periods of achievement are followed by periods of set-back” (OECD 2008a, 22). While gains in capacity can be achieved, moving toward greater state capacity is a long-term process characterized by distortions and setbacks. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) indicators show that for the fastest 20 countries to move to the ‘threshold’ took 20 years for bureaucratic quality (see figure 2.2).

25. **The political settlement and the incentives it creates for leadership is a foundational factor influencing postconflict trajectories** Sitting at the heart of the state and state-society interface, political settlement can remain fragile and is affected by incentives such as asserting power or coopting groups that threaten violence (WDR 2011; Rocha Menocal 2015; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 2013). Some postconflict countries have seen the emergence of leadership pursuing improvements in governance and economic growth. While typically still far from perfect and facing various constraints, tangible state-building progress can be observed in such countries within time horizons of 10–15 years. Available cross-country analysis (World Bank 2012) suggests that the quality of leadership and leadership incentives linked to the political settlement and other wider goals (such as seeking external support) are decisive for the degree to which public sector rebuilding is likely to progress.

26. **While postconflict periods offer the possibility to break with legacies of the past, at least some legacies typically continue to linger.** With regard to ‘breaking with the past’,

Kosovo and Timor-Leste introduced completely new laws modeled on international standards, rather than continuing existing legal traditions from Serbia and Indonesia, respectively; Rwanda and South Sudan changed their official languages in their respective postwar periods. Yet preconflict legacies continue to influence the postconflict period, and prior systems of governance shape the evolution of the public sector as countries emerge out of conflict. For example, Srivastava and Blum (forthcoming, 5) find that over time, the public sectors of five very diverse postconflict countries each “converged toward their distinct pre-conflict sizes and administrative traditions.”

27. An additional feature of fragile states has to do with the design, management, and gradual phasing out of ‘parallel systems’. A large number of actors engage in the aftermath of conflict; given the uncertainty and urgency, the attention of humanitarian and development partners tends to be on getting service delivery up and running. As a result, TAs or service providers are often put in place for core management, fiduciary, and also service delivery functions. In many cases, the long-term objective is to scale down capacity substitution, yet experience shows that transfer of knowledge and skills is typically challenging for numerous reasons. Even those TAs explicitly brought in to advise, mentor, and coach may find difficult to resist stepping in to directly address day-to-day urgencies. They may face contradictory incentives, as the more coaching and training of local public servants they do, the less their own continued presence will prove necessary.

28. The effects of these parallel structures are complex and vary between countries as well as within countries across sectors; yet generally they (a) create a dual market for (quasi-public) employment and (b) create challenges with regard to sustainability, transitioning to a regular public service, and impacts on longer-term national institutional development (Blum and Srivastava, forthcoming). The importance of these issues has been highlighted in South Sudan by the sudden withdrawal of TAs supporting core government functions in 2013–2014, as well as the challenges associated with developing a more country-led health sector, as discussed in this note.

29. Finally, in fragile states, subnational capacity poses a particular challenge. Typically (in any context) capacity is more constrained at subnational levels and can be a significant constraint to ‘getting things back up and running’ especially for frontline service delivery which predominantly takes place at the local level. Many with the right skills to serve in the government are attracted to posts in the capital or main urban centers. Finding civil servants willing to live and work in rural areas with often limited services and (basic) infrastructure or still facing security issues can be a challenge. Other factors, such as whether it is considered possible to be employed in a district with a different language or ethnicity also play a role and limit the pool of potential staff. Providing training or technical assistance to staff in rural areas is also particularly challenging, as it involves additional costs for bringing staff to the capital or

trainers out to rural areas. Further, resources to carry out assigned functions such as administrative buildings, availability of power or Internet, and roads connecting regional to local cities are typically limited.

2.2 Public financial management in the aftermath of conflict

30. **PFM is a ‘core’ capacity of the state;** management of revenue and expenditures is comparable to the heart pumping blood through the body and as such is essential for all other functions. The management of public funds needs to happen jointly with policy directions, and to be linked to actual execution capacity of staff. Capacity for PFM itself poses a challenge in postconflict environments, while typically preexisting in some shape or form. Preparing meaningful budgets, and executing and recording expenditures are challenging functions that require specialized training and experience in various roles. However, since the staff numbers required especially in central functions are limited, development assistance is often directed at providing TAs who may be national, regional, or international as a way to supplement or ‘short-circuit’ constraints (World Bank 2012). While this is feasible at the national level, it is often more difficult to also use as a strategy at subnational levels. A further key problem is that PFM-related staff can be particularly exposed to tensions between professional ethics and political directives, for example, what payments to authorize or to prioritize.

31. **With regard to training, there can be several key issues: staff have to learn new skills and concepts, the government needs to ensure that staff are familiar with the new laws and regulations being issued, and that incentives are (at least broadly) in line with formal rules rather than the reverse.** Operating new IT systems requires pertinent training as well as new capacities to maintain and upgrade systems (or to outsource such services effectively). Arriving at sufficient capacity for PFM typically requires training for existing staff as well as of new recruits, across levels of the government. Furthermore, all such efforts will only feed into good enough PFM systems if decision makers refrain from excessive abuse.

2.3 Restoring and rebuilding health systems in fragile contexts

32. **In the health sector, postconflict key challenges are usually centered around transitioning away from a system exclusively reliant on humanitarian organizations with extensive use of foreign workers.** Conflict is usually associated with the displacement of local medical personnel, destruction of facilities, high logistical costs, high reliance on donor funding and humanitarian NGOs, and coordination challenges between donors, NGOs, and the government. Attention and resources are focused on responding to short-term humanitarian needs rather than building local capacity and systems. In South Sudan, recurrent conflicts disrupted the development of a strong health system and thus currently, the challenge is to

continue building (not properly restoring) the *capacity of the system* as a whole to deliver health services to citizens in terms of availability, accessibility (physical and financial), and quality.

33. **Developing health systems requires substantial numbers of medical** (such as doctors, nurses, midwives, laboratory technicians) **and non-medical personnel** (administrative staff, monitoring and evaluation [M&E] specialists, logisticians, accountants, guards, cleaners, and so on). The ability to train new workers rapidly (availability of qualified tutors, training facilities, financial resources, and inputs) and call on the diaspora and expatriated skilled workers to fill the gaps define to a greater extent the time required to achieve a relatively well-staffed health system. A particular challenge for the health sector is that the number of staff needed is relatively large, training is relatively complex and time-consuming, and staff has to be deployed across the entire territory if it is to serve citizens effectively and equitably. There is a need to continuously provide supplies (pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies) and ensure staff complementarity for such staff to be able to carry out their functions.

3. Key Cross-Cutting Capacity Challenges in the Public Service

34. **This chapter discusses the mechanisms jointly influencing civil service capacity and frames the tensions faced by stakeholders when trying to move the public sector toward greater effectiveness.** It provides a snapshot of the contextual factors and legacies that shape capacity-building efforts in South Sudan, including the use of the public sector as a mechanism for managing political support and the evolving aid architecture since 2005. It then provides a brief overview of the size of the civil service, distribution of civil servants between sectors, and civil servants' qualifications and professional experience. Finally, the chapter explores several cross-cutting issues related to public sector capacity including education outcomes, recruitment processes, and the availability of essential resources to carry out assigned functions, and efforts to strengthen the skills of existing civil servants.

3.1 Country context: Overall dynamics and constraints²⁰

35. **In 2005, South Sudan emerged from a long civil war with a history of relative isolation and limited experience with governance through state institutions.** State and capacity building did not start from scratch as South Sudan had been governed through the administrative structures of Sudan, but capacities were patchy, affected by the long conflict with the North, and included legacies of poor governance. Some administrative structures existed in particular in the main 'garrison towns' controlled by the North, Juba, Yei, Malakal, and Wau, while more ad hoc institutions and staffing had been established in the rebel-controlled areas.

²⁰ A deeper exploration of the historical-institutional, socioeconomic, and political economy context can be found in two recent World Bank reports covering human resource management and intergovernmental arrangements in South Sudan (World Bank 2015a, 2015b). More detailed analysis corresponding to the following sections can be found in this report's annexes.


The process of integrating these two groups into a postwar public service is analyzed in World Bank (2015b and 2015c).

36. Indicators reflecting public sector effectiveness for South Sudan are only available from independence (2011) onward and indicate a performance well below regional comparators (see Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2) and a declining rather than improving performance over time. The comparison with other postconflict countries indicates that South Sudan performs below these, that is, its performance thus far is worse than what would be expected solely as a consequence of conflict.

37. **While not documented through indicators, some initial gains in state capacity are widely perceived to have been made during the initial years from 2005 to 2013, mixed with significant distortions.** During this period, national and subnational institutions were developed, rules approved, and staff hired. This period of institution building benefitted from windfall oil revenues as well as a strong influx of development aid as discussed in the following paragraphs. Key distortions included non-merit-based hiring and the beginning of pervasive corruption also fueled by windfall resources.

38. **Since 2012, South Sudan has experienced multiple shocks, which have stressed fragile and still nascent institutions.** This included a political decision to shut down oil production for 15 months from January 2012 onward, triggering a first fiscal crunch. After a radical restructuring of the Cabinet in mid-2013, the political situation became increasingly tense. A full-scale conflict re-erupted in late 2013. Despite a peace agreement reached in August 2015, the country has not returned to peace. The fiscal situation has deteriorated since mid-2014 due to the steep decline of oil prices, with a full-scale macro-fiscal crisis taking shape since early 2016 that remains unresolved.


Figure 3.1. Comparative CPIA Ratings for Other Postconflict Countries



Source: World Bank DataBank 2016.

Note: The approximate start of peace building efforts for each country is noted in parentheses.

Figure 3.2. Worldwide Governance Indicators for South Sudan 2011–14



Source: www.govindicators.org. Data for 2011 are the earliest available for South Sudan.

Note: Estimate of governance measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5; higher values correspond to better governance.


39. **Frequent violence has remained a feature of life in South Sudan.** Rent-seeking rebellions and intercommunal violence (such as cattle raiding) continued to characterize daily life for many citizens, even before the outbreak of civil conflict in December 2013. The signing of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCISS) in

August 2015 formally brought renewed peace, but armed conflict between groups continued. The country fell back into conflict in July 2016. Worsening economic conditions and delayed salary payments to the security sector, along with the proliferation of small arms and the increasing number of armed groups, compound this.

40. **The macro-fiscal context has been volatile, with initially high, especially since mid-2014, increasingly constrained government revenue, linked to reliance on oil.** At independence, public expenditure reached levels well above the East African region: over US\$300 per capita, as compared to US\$100 or less in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia. However, oil revenue declined with the shutdown in production during FY12/13 and again as a result of the civil conflict and falling oil prices in the subsequent years. The fiscal deficit reached a staggering 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for FY15/16.²¹

²¹ South Sudan Macroeconomic Outlook, May 2016.

Figure 3.3. Timeline of Main Events



Source:

Authors

41. **The ability to translate initially abundant resources into development outcomes has been low.** The country has an estimated population of 12.5 million.²² As of mid-2016, nearly 74 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, worsening by over 20 percent compared to previous years.²³ The recent civil conflict disrupted livelihoods and the functioning of markets leaving nearly 25 percent of the population in urgent need of food assistance.²⁴ Development indicators have remained low and are likely to have deteriorated again since 2014 (see also section 3.2 on education as an input to capacity and section 5 on the health sector). As is discussed further in sections 4 and 5 on PFM and health sector capacities, there have been bits and pieces of potential and of progress, but overall capacity remained weak, both due to poor leadership and management and fragmented external support.

3.1.1 The public sector and management of political support in South Sudan

42. **A key challenge in South Sudan has been a tension between supporting the political settlement, on the one hand, and fostering merit, effectiveness, and efficiency in the public sector, on the other hand.** Public sector employment—both in the civilian and the security sectors—has been a mechanism for incorporating powerful stakeholders at the national and regional levels into the political settlement. It has also been seen as a source of livelihoods for extended family networks. As in other low-income countries that have problems controlling violence within their territory, political support has been managed through distribution of benefits—including higher-level positions within government and associated access to rents and to positions that can be awarded to lower-level followers—to powerful stakeholders with the ability to disrupt the political order through violence (see also Chapter 2).

43. Further, ensuring distribution of employment across regions and communities has been seen as a way to meet demands for inclusion and an equitable share of running government, even though existing legislation makes this only a subordinated priority. Public sector employment has thus been central to the political settlement in South Sudan, with (negative) implications for efforts to gradually reform government employment and human resource management for improved institutional capacity.

44. **During the CPA period, the President pursued a ‘big tent’ coalition-building strategy of bringing the diverse militias who had fought against the North together under the umbrella of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM).** Many community militias were merged into the SPLA or the organized forces (police, prisons, fire, and wildlife services), resulting in the expansion of public employment in the security sector (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). A key tension embedded in this approach is the

²² South Sudan Macroeconomic Outlook, May 2016; South Sudan National Human Development Report, 2015.

²³ At US\$ 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP) 1.90.

²⁴ South Sudan Food Insecurity 2015–2016.

ception that those who generate violence are rewarded with further access to benefits and that those unsatisfied with their allocation can access more through conflict. Further, it comes at a high fiscal cost with 46 percent of the national budget going to security sector salaries in FY15/16. This strategy was initially feasible due to the high amount of public resources from oil, but following the drop in oil prices since mid-2014 it was no longer sustainable. The enormous security sector costs negatively affect civilian capacities by aggravating the fiscal imbalances and due to the trade-offs with other expenditures.

45. **A further element of the ‘big tent’ strategy has been the incorporation of subnational powerbrokers into the national political settlement through devolved governance arrangements.** Formal structures of devolution have been used to reward local elites who might otherwise rebel, with positions in subnational administrations and access to associated rents. Devolved governance has been used to accommodate diversity by giving groups (often with a tribal, clan, subclan, or family dimension) control over territory, resources, and jobs. Simultaneously, the system has also created tension between and within groups as communities and political entrepreneurs’ jockey for control over these resources. The decision to expand the number of states from 10 to 28 in October 2015 reflects the strategy to co-opt support, but its effect has been to dissipate nascent capacity and to further stretch fiscal resources.

46. **A related dynamic is that government employment—from the level of ministers to cleaners and drivers—has been associated with the ‘peace dividend’.** The 2014 World Bank Jobs and Livelihoods Report found that 40 percent of citizens expected a government job within one year, increasing to 50 percent within two years.²⁵ It also found a perception that public sector employment paid extremely well; respondents expected to earn SSP 7,200 a month as a civil servant, which was more than twice the actual average government salary of the time (SSP 3,200 in 2011).²⁶

47. **Government employment is an important source of livelihoods for extended families.** A single civil servant may be the main source of income for an entire extended family, and those with government jobs feel significant pressure to deliver resources to their families and communities. This may be through drawing a single salary, by finding positions for others in one’s groups or for higher-level officials through the use of state resources to benefit themselves, their families, and their communities. The World Bank Jobs and Livelihoods Report found that:

In urban centers across South Sudan, those who have jobs, mainly those from Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el- Ghazal, are compelled by social

²⁵ World Bank. Jobs and Livelihoods Report (2014), P. 55.

²⁶ World Bank. Jobs and Livelihoods Report (2014), P. 57. In 2016, salary payments have been made with two to three months of delay, and the purchasing power of salaries has been sharply eroded due to inflation.

obligations to sustain those without jobs. In large towns, the level of dependency on these social networks finds expression in households of the salaried government officials, which often house tens of relatives. The relatives rely on the salaried person to feed them, buy them clothes, pay school fees, pay for medical expenses etc... There are often further responsibilities and obligations to relatives back in the rural villages, with the expectation that these senior government officials supply urban goods to relatives in the village.²⁷

48. **Beyond the use of a single salary to support extended family networks, there are other opportunities for gaining benefits through public sector employment.** Evidence suggests that a variety of individuals draw ‘ghost workers’ salaries. This can be used to substitute for a social safety net; for example, when a family’s main income earner passes away, his or her name is left on the payroll so that the family can continue to draw a salary. In other cases, it is a way to supplement the salaries of senior officials.²⁸

49. **A further issue is the fact that government staff can face security challenges, especially if they are not from a group dominant in a particular area.** Information on ethnicity in the civil service has not been officially recorded at any level, making it difficult to provide evidence about favoritism in hiring, domination by particular groups, the impact of successive earlier peace deals that absorb community or regional militias, or the impact of the current conflict on inclusiveness and regional representation in the national civil service. A key consideration for subnational employment has been that it is not considered feasible to have a position in state or county governments unless one is a member of a politically important group from that area.

50. **Tied to the use of government employment as a tool for managing political support, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS) has made relatively little use of its diaspora, which stands in contrast to the experience of several other postconflict countries (notably Liberia).** Due to the extended north-south conflict, many South Sudanese fled to other countries in the region and beyond. Quite a number of these were able to obtain qualifications in a variety of fields in their host countries. While MoLPSHRD has hosted a small diaspora program, this has been constrained. Emphasis has been put on hiring those who were involved in the armed struggle with Sudan and other criteria (such as hiring staff already employed by the Coordinating Council of Southern States (CCSS) and Civilian Authority of New Sudan (CANS),

²⁷ World Bank. Jobs and Livelihoods Report (2014), P. 5.

²⁸ As discussed in Akech Thiong (2016, 28), “It became clear to many commanders that the more forces you report to be under your command the more money you get since salaries were handed in cash to commanders for distribution to their soldiers without any centralized roster. A government employee had reported that he was shocked to discover that his deceased father’s name remained on the payroll for nearly a decade and the obvious question was that who was pocketing his salary.”

as well as family, security, and political ties). There are reports, for example, of diaspora civil servants being forced to flee the country due to pressure from those who remained. One question going forward is whether citizens who left the country due to the ongoing civil conflict will be able to return into the public service.

3.1.2 Evolution of aid architecture and support to capacity building²⁹

51. **In South Sudan, the architecture of international assistance has been the result of evolving international commitments, shifting political objectives, and technical realities.** As discussed in Chapter 2, development partners face a complex set of incentives when engaging in South Sudan and other fragile contexts. Relatively high revenue during the early years placed the government in a fairly stronger negotiating position relative to development partners compared to more aid-dependent countries with regard to use of countries systems and the acceptable level of intrusion on or supervision of core functions. Despite initial ambitions for a harmonized architecture, aid to South Sudan quickly became more fragmented. Moreover, since the reversion to conflict in late 2013, development aid has been increasingly withdrawn, leading to a stop-go pattern that stands in contrast to recommendations by the 2011 WDR, but which has been difficult to avoid given diplomatic as well as security considerations.

52. **At the outset, in the lead-up to the signing of the CPA, the international community began planning to scale up assistance to Southern Sudan,** and to shift its focus from food aid and basic service delivery through NGOs to state-building objectives. In coordination with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), a World Bank and United Nations (UN) Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) in 2004–2005 set out a framework for peace, development, and poverty reduction in the northern and southern region. It proposed an ambitious set of public sector outcomes to be achieved by 2011, estimating the total cost of achieving these outcomes at US\$1.6 billion from 2005 to 2011 (see Annex 3).

53. **The coincidental timing of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness with the post-CPA planning process established South Sudan as a case study in the application of principles of national ownership, alignment, and harmonization.** Following the publication of the JAM, 60 countries and international organizations pledged over US\$4.5 billion to Sudan and South Sudan to be channeled through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF).

54. **A ‘parallel public service’ was initially less prevalent in South Sudan relative to other postconflict countries,** notably Afghanistan (Srivastava et al, forthcoming; Bhatia and Prasad 2015). Given that the government rejected the idea of establishing a single large project

²⁹ A detailed description of the evolution of aid architecture is provided in Annex 2, and a table outlining development partner support to institutional development and capacity building since the CPA period is provided in Annex 3.

implementation unit within the MoFEP to manage MDTF-financed programs, it was decided to use government systems (and staff) to manage the program, but with specific technical support ‘contracted in’ to the MoFEP. During this period, the MoFEP and other ministries received significant technical assistance, though no count has been undertaken of how many TAs were employed (see also Chapter 4 below).

55. **However, implementation of this streamlined aid coordination system proved to be challenging, as increased Official Development Assistance (ODA) flows were not matched by on-the-ground operational capacity to monitor and implement programming.** The Multi-Donor Trust Fund - South Sudan (MDTF-SS) took longer to establish than foreseen, and given the fund’s reliance on government systems, national capacity constraints increased costs and directly affected the speed of disbursements.

56. **By mid-2007, the international community perceived that their commitments to the GoSS and larger CPA process were not being kept, and that this had an impact on the stability of the CPA itself.** Under mounting pressure to deliver a peace dividend, development partners began to mobilize increased funding outside of the MDTF-SS mechanism, including other pooled funds and direct bilateral support. Projects funded by individual donors became an increasingly important source of financing, particularly from the United States which did not participate in pooled funding arrangements.

57. **A key further issue was the limited coordination of support to public sector capacity building.** On the donor side, the objectives set out in the JAM were not accompanied by a common plan to build capacity—to establish training centers, job descriptions with skills requirements, a common curriculum, a training baseline, trainers, or funding responsibility. While some efforts sought to support these type of activities (such as the Skills for South Sudan and Capacity Building Trust Fund [CBTF] projects), they were limited in scale and duration. Training was provided on an ad hoc, project-by-project basis with short-term planning horizons (see also Annex 3).

58. **By 2008, it became clear that the JAM targets would be more difficult to achieve than initially envisioned.** In 2009, South Sudan faced an initial economic shock as oil prices dropped significantly following the global financial crisis, reducing the GoSS’ budgetary resources significantly. The approach of the 2011 referendum prompted urgent, prioritized action by donors and the GoSS. Planning documents from the time noted that coordination had become increasingly challenging, with donors establishing diverse new projects that did not align with government priorities and did not use pooled funding mechanisms. By 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted that 109 Parallel Project Implementation Units (PPIUs) had been officially established. As set out in the South Sudan

Development Plan (SSDP), the percent “going through pooled mechanisms dropped from 34 percent in 2009 to 24 percent in 2010” with a proliferation of separate projects.

59. **The GoSS joined the G7+ group of fragile states and the ‘New Deal’ on peace and state building in 2011.** Under this framework, focus was to be narrowed from the accomplishment of all Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to five peace and state-building goals related to politics, security, justice, the economy, and revenue/services. Under this approach, South Sudan called for increased budget support from donors to support a proposed four-page compact with a limited set of benchmarks. While state consultations were held on developing a compact, the process was never completed.³⁰

60. **The return of large-scale internal conflict in late 2013 and significant political tensions between the GRSS and the international community led to a rupture in the aid architecture, as donors dramatically reduced use of government systems and discontinued development aid in favor of a return to humanitarian assistance.** In many ways, the aid architecture was reversed to the pre-2005 system of humanitarian support through the UN and NGOs, with the cluster system serving to coordinate the humanitarian response. Distrust between the development community and the government further deepened following the 2015 ARCISS, given slow implementation and slow restart of assistance, and following renewed conflict in 2016.

61. **Looking back at a decade of development partner support to institutional development and capacity building, evaluations have noted three key issues: overly short-term support, insufficient attention to subnational levels, and a lack of monitoring.** First, short-termism by donors reluctant to commit to longer-term programs in the context of state fragility led to short-term capacity interventions.³¹ For example, while the CBTF spanned a ten-year period, it consisted of multiple two-year funding envelopes with no certainty of extension. Within these two-year windows, design, approval, and procurement processes further reduced the possible duration of training programs. Rather than a long-term strategic approach to building training institutions, curricula, and trainers, interventions were bound by near-term priorities. Second, the need for capacity-building efforts to reach subnational governments and to coordinate with subnational ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) was something that was not fully realized during the initial state-building period. Third, it was recommended to improve monitoring of baseline capacity as well as mid-term and end-line outcomes to allow for mid-course corrections and better tracking of overall progress.

Box 3.1. Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activity in Southern

³⁰ [New Deal Compact: Background Information on a New Deal Compact for South Sudan](#), MoFEP.

³¹ [Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity in Southern Sudan since 2005: Annex 4: Capacity Building](#), p. 7.

Sudan 2005–11: Key Findings in Relation to Capacity Building

“In general, donors misdiagnosed the capacity-building needs of Southern Sudan and failed to develop a vision which consisted of a coherent, well-funded approach supporting state building and its key functions. In detail:

- Donors had a piecemeal approach to capacity building and their efforts were uncoordinated and random. Donors have had so much experience in capacity-building programs over the past decades, yet it was only in 2009 that they started a coordination working group to improve coordination.
- The severity of the context was not taken as a starting point.
- Capacity building is more than training and this has not been fully understood by both donors and the GoSS.
- Programs are too scattered, too short, and underfunded to have a lasting impact in the medium to long term.
- The process of capacity building is too slow due to a piecemeal approach and not well targeted.
- Investment in the private sector would have had a positive effect on creating a labor market and would have improved access to jobs. This might have contributed to stability in the sense that those retrenched from the public sector would have had alternative employment.
- Investment in the private sector would have stimulated economic growth and created a limited number of jobs in the formal sector but, more importantly, in the informal sector.”

Source: Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity in Southern Sudan since 2005: Annex 4: Capacity Building, p. 24.

62. The results of investments in public sector capacity building remain difficult to assess in the absence of a coordinated M&E framework. While individual projects measured training inputs and outputs (such as the number of civil servants trained), the overall impact of these programs is unknown. Programs have supported basic operations of government in the context of a fragile state in its first years of independence—technical assistance to build basic institutional infrastructure (that is, buildings and IT), generate oil revenues, prepare and execute budgets, and count and pay employees. The establishment of a robust M&E framework cutting across different interventions was a comparatively low priority.

63. Despite a lack of M&E systems, some progress can be assessed. Key public sector management systems were developed, and legislative frameworks have been established. A basic budget planning cycle was put in operation, as was an integrated financial management system (IFMS) and a public sector payroll system to track and pay civil servants. The MoLPSHRD developed a National Master Curriculum, outlining modules of curriculum for public servants. Although not all modules have been developed, the document provides a strategic starting point. Beyond the national curriculum, many key operational manuals have been developed, such as the Local Government Public Financial Management Manual and its counterpart Local Government Human Resource Management Manual.

64. However, many of these areas have experienced a weakening or backsliding in recent years. Renewed conflict and the fiscal crisis emerging in 2015 and deepening in 2016 are

negatively affecting the areas of progress that were previously achieved. The use of systems and processes has declined for various reasons—the withdrawal of TAs, the fragmentation of states and counties, the shrinking of non-wage resources, insecurity, and others.

65. Overall, the experience of South Sudan indicates that the international community is not well set up to support institutional development in countries starting ‘from scratch’ outside of a temporary UN administration. Recent state-building experiences in Kosovo and Timor-Leste were overall relatively more successful, even if still beset by many challenges.³² These benefitted from having a central coordinating body at least for some time. In the case of South Sudan, expecting coordination through the government as envisaged by the New Deal approach was not effective, while coordination directly among development partners also proved elusive.

3.2 Overview of the public service: Evolving size, distribution and qualifications

66. To frame the following discussion of civil service capacity, this section provides an overview of the composition of the civil service. Detailed analysis of available data underpinning this section is provided in Annex 4, including analysis of the number of government employees, the distribution employees between sectors, as well as the age, qualifications, and years of service of civilian public servants (see also World Bank 2015b). There is currently no single budget or single payroll system that gives a complete picture of public employment across sectors and tiers of government. Therefore, estimating the number of staff in South Sudan requires putting together data from multiple sources. An approximate picture is provided by the FY15/16 Approved Budget, which provides for 347,018 central government and 118,023 state government employees, totaling 465,041 government personnel (including all security sectors). Subnational employment is expected to be somewhat higher, given that states and counties can directly hire staff not reflected in the national budget.


67. Public employment has increased well beyond targets set in 2005 when the GoSS administration first formed. According to the civil service survey completed at the time, the total number of civil servants and organized forces was approximately 62,000.³³ According to approved national budgets, by FY12/13, government employment in the civil service and organized forces had increased well beyond the proposed JAM ceiling to 163,000, and by FY15/16 the figure had increased to 169,842, with substantial additional subnational staff not reflected in national budgets (see Figure 3.4).

³² See for example, Barma, Huybens and Vinuela (2014) on Timor-Leste.

³³ Report on the Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel in Southern Sudan, GoSS Civil Service Agency (April 2006). Not all staff surveyed returned their forms, so the total number may have been somewhat higher.

68. A key feature of government employment has been the high number of staff allocated to security functions, including Defense, National Security Service, Veterans Affairs, and the Organized Forces (Police, Prisons, Wildlife, and Fire Services). According to the FY15/16 Approved Budget, security sector salaries make up roughly 47 percent of national government expenditures and 76 percent of the national wage bill (see Table 3.1). Just over 85 percent of central and state government employees are engaged in security-related functions, as compared to 7 percent of staff engaged in the education sector and 2 percent in health (see Figure 3.5).³⁴

Figure 3.4. Number and Geographic Distribution of Civil Servants and Organized Forces (2005–2006 and 2015–2016)



Source: Report on the Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel in Southern Sudan, GoSS Civil Service Agency (April 2006)³⁵ and FY15/16 Approved Budget Book.

Note: Includes organized but excludes military forces.

Table 3.1. Public Sector Employment and Wage Bill (FY15/16)

FY15/16	Total Public Sector Employment as of 2015/6 ^c	Share of PS Employment/Population (%) ^d	Wage Bill in % of Total Public Expenditures
South Sudan total	465,041	4.3	61.4
Military^a	295,199	2.7	34.1
Organized Forces^b	104,224	1.0	12.5
Civilian	65,618	0.6	14.8
Average Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)		3.8 (o/w 3.2 civilians)	33.4

Note: a. 'Military' = Defense, National Security Service, Veterans Affairs; b. Organized Forces = Police, Prisons,

³⁴ These figures only capture subnational staff being paid through conditional salary transfers. State and county governments hire additional staff using own-source revenue and block transfers, but it is difficult to estimate the number or how they are allocated between sectors.

³⁵ As noted in the report, "The survey covered all serving public service personnel in the classified grades, including in the Organized Forces (Police, Wildlife, Prison, and Fire Services), and personnel seconded to NGOs by the CANS, initially established in 1996 as an organ of the SPLM, and the CCSS. Personnel at all three levels of government—ministries and central agencies, states, and counties—were surveyed."

Wildlife, and Fire Services.


c. Includes national staff serving in the national government or transferred to subnational governments.

d. Assuming a total population of 10.8 million (as per World Development Indicators) for South Sudan for 2012.

For SSA: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2010/tnm1015.pdf>. Figures refer to ‘General Government’.

For South Sudan: 2015/16 Budget Book Approved Budget Tables.

Figure 3.5. Distribution of Public Employees between Security and Non-security



Source: 2015/16 Budget Book Approved Budget Tables.

Note: a. ‘Military’ = Defense, National Security Service, Veterans Affairs; Organized Forces = Police, Prisons, Wildlife, and Fire Services|. b. Includes national staff serving in the national government or transferred to subnational governments. c. Assuming a total population of 10.8 million (as per World Development Indicators) for South Sudan for 2012.

69. **With regard to the national (civilian) civil service, according to the FY15/16 budget, the Ministry of Higher Education, Technology and Science; Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; Judiciary of South Sudan; and Ministry of General Education³⁶ show the highest levels of employment.** Payroll data also suggest a relatively large allocation to the Ministry of Health. At subnational levels, state-level budgets are generally unavailable and payroll data are incomplete with some key agencies not fully enrolled, making comparisons of distribution of staff between sectors difficult. For counties, payroll data reflect a relatively larger share of staff mapped to public administration and education functions as compared to health. The relatively low portion of staff mapped to the health sector may be related to the fact that humanitarian assistance and NGOs provide a large share of health services in South Sudan. Education is handled more directly by the state (see Chapter 5 on health).

70. **Available data suggest overemployment of ‘support staff’ as compared to ‘professional staff’,** but also indicate that there should be a sufficient number professional staff to operate a public administration. According to payroll data, 61 percent of civilian public

³⁶ General education comprises a larger number of staff than higher education, but the bulk of staff is employed at subnational levels.

officers in central government are classified (professional) and make up 71 percent of the wage bill; 38 percent are unclassified (drivers, cleaners, mechanics) and make up 27 percent of the wage bill. For the subnational level, available payroll data for a sample of four states show the distribution between classified (55 percent) and unclassified (45 percent) staff to be more even. Similarly, payroll data from a sample of 17 counties enrolled in the South Sudan Electronic Payroll System (SSEPS) II indicate that 52 percent of staff are classified, with the remaining 48 percent unclassified. As described in Annex 4, given that grading is less than systematic, it is difficult to fully ascertain how staff are actually balanced between professionals and support staff.

71. Assessing the qualifications and skills of civil servants remains difficult, as data are extremely constrained. The most recent survey of public servants and organized forces was that carried out in 2005 (the Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel). Given the expansion of the public service and ongoing capacity-building efforts, this does not provide an up-to-date reflection of qualifications and experience, but provides a useful baseline against which later and much more partial findings can be compared. A 2015–2016 MoLPSHRD Skills Assessment covering a total of 616 respondents from national and state MoLPSHRD, Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MoRB), Ministry of Education (MoE), and Ministry of Health (MoH) provides a more up-to-date picture of a small sample of professional grade civil servants.³⁷

72. The 2005 survey and recent skills assessments suggest that educational attainment may have increased over time. The 2005 Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel found that 42.5 percent of public service personnel (including civilian and organized forces) had attained early education only; 29 percent reached secondary or post-secondary education; 6 percent had a university degree (23 percent did not specify educational attainment). The 2015 Skills Audit sample was composed of directors general, directors, deputy directors, assistant directors, inspectors, human resource (HR) officers, head teachers, engineers, IT officers, and nurses. Of this group, 98 percent of respondents had completed secondary school, 21 percent had a Bachelor's, and 3 percent had a Master's degree.

73. Central government and subnational agencies have not established records of staff credentials, limiting a more systematic tracking of qualifications. In part, this is related to the fact that many South Sudanese have been trained in other countries. As a result, public officers may hold academic or professional qualifications that are not uniform or easy to verify. Within the civilian public service, the MoLPSHRD developed an Excel-based Human Resource Information System (HRIS) with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to capture information from paper records. In 2013, the ministry piloted an upgraded

³⁷ States covered by the survey include Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes.

HRIS with support from the CBTF. This was rolled out to select ministries to record basic information such as date and place of birth, as well as degrees or other credentials held.³⁸ Other ministries have also initiated sector-specific HRISs. An Education Management Information System (EMIS) has been rolled out to the education sector. The Ministry of Health has also begun development of an HRIS, which has been rolled out to five states—these data are analyzed in Chapter 5 on health. Notably, neither system has been implemented in close coordination with the MoLPSHRD.

74. With regard to language skills, a key challenge for capacity development has been the switch from Arabic to English as the main language of the government. A key implication for the civil service has been a need to distinguish between gaps in technical versus language skills (for example, a certified accountant who could not read government documents in English). The 2005 survey found that roughly 60 percent of central government employees had ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ English speaking and writing skills. English skills varied for employees of state government administrations from 18 percent (Northern Bahr el Ghazal) to 48 percent (Western Equatoria).³⁹ Those serving in the CCSS or Khartoum administration were more likely to be fluent in Arabic than English. Some efforts have been made to invest in language training through the ‘Skills for Sudan’ effort in the late 2000s.

75. The majority of staff appear to have been recruited within the past decade. At the *national* level, the 2016 Skills Audit found that 41 percent of respondents had been in their current position for 1–5 years and 33 percent for 6–10 years. It also found that nearly 6 percent of respondents across levels of government were serving in their role in an acting capacity. Two-thirds of national government respondents had no work experience outside of the public sector, though 21 percent had worked with another ministry. At the *state* level, 35 percent of respondents had been serving in their current position for 1–5 years and 22 percent for 6–10 years. Roughly 20 percent of staff in the national government and 30 percent of staff in the subnational government have been in post for over 10 years.⁴⁰

76. Data indicate a potentially substantial problem with employment of staff over the retirement age of 60. The 2005 *Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel* found that roughly 42 percent of government employees in the civil service and organized forces at the national and state levels were between the ages 16 and 35. The report estimated that 14 percent of government personnel surveyed at the time would be at retirement age by 2016. More recent data from the

³⁸ Initially eight computers were provided as part of CBTF funding, though all but one have been damaged or stolen. Further, as of early 2016, the HRIS faces IT challenges which make it difficult to access or analyze the underlying data; resolving these issues requires IT support from the firm which originally designed the system, but resources to do so are unavailable.

³⁹ See Report on the Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel in Southern Sudan (2006) and World Bank (2014).

⁴⁰ Based on data available and reflecting a date of appointment.

Skills Audit suggest 34 percent of civil servants were past the retirement age. This is potentially a considerable challenge for the public sector, given that no government pension system is currently in place.⁴¹

3.3 Education and the link to public sector capacity

77. **Key factors shaping public sector capacity are the primary, secondary school, and university systems in a country.** This is especially the case for sectors such as PFM and health, both of which require (at a minimum) a level of numeracy beyond that which is taught in primary schools. In addition, a relatively strong foundation in the sciences is critical for expanding the pool of potential health workers, including doctors, nurses, midwives, and pharmacists. Linked to the fragile context, South Sudan is characterized by a low level of educational qualifications—limiting the ‘pool of available civil servants’ from which to recruit.

78. **Basic education outcomes remain low.** The adult literacy rate was 27 percent in 2009, below that of other fragile and conflict-affected states when they emerged from conflict (see Table 3.2 and Table 3.3). In 2000, 20 percent of students completed primary school. By 2011, the completion rate had increased to 37 percent (compared to 69 percent for SSA on average). In 2009, 48 percent of primary-aged children were enrolled in school, declining to 42 percent by 2012, and the rate is assumed to have declined further since then due to the conflict.

79. **Data on the number of secondary school graduates in South Sudan are limited.** According to the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), the gross enrollment ratio in 2015 was 9.3 percent, far below the average for SSA and countries with fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS) (see Table 3.3). Those who can afford it send their children for secondary school outside the country, typically to Kenya or Uganda. However, there are no data tracking the enrollment or completion rates for this group, nor is there good information regarding the number of graduates who return to South Sudan or seek employment in the public sector.

80. **With regard to higher education, there are five operational state/public universities:** the University of Juba (founded in 1977),⁴² University of Upper Nile at Malakal (1992), University of Western Bahr el Ghazal at Wau (1990), Rumbek University (2009), and Dr. John Garang University of Science and Technology in Bor (2010).⁴³ The University of Juba has about

⁴¹ While pensions deductions are made from civilian and security sector employees, no functional pension systems exist to allocate payments to retired staff. As a result, many staff stay on the payroll past the retirement age. While some continue to come to the office and act in their professional capacity, anecdotally, others do not.

⁴² During the second North-South War, University of Juba was relocated to Khartoum. It only relocated back to Juba in 2011.

⁴³ The University of Juba is the biggest with 13 colleges including Arts and Humanities; Art, Music and Drama; Applied and Industrial Science; Engineering and Architecture; Natural Resources; Medicine; Law; Social and Economic Studies; School of Management Studies; Computer Science and Information Technology; School of Public Service (SPS) (postgraduate); and Center for Peace and Development Studies (postgraduate). The other

6,000 students in active learning and has graduated about 6,500 students since 2006. According to MoHE data, in 2015 there were 721 professors and lecturers serving in South Sudan's 13 universities (more than half at universities in Juba); all 13 had a library and generators; none had dormitory facilities and one-quarter did not have safe drinking water. Given the ongoing macro-fiscal crisis, salaries and operating expenditures for government institutions have been extremely constrained. As of June 2016, lecturers at public universities had gone on strike over delayed salary payments. Annex 3 provides further details on the university system in South Sudan.

Table 3.2. Comparative Primary Completion Rate, Total (% of relevant age group)^a

	1990s	Mid 2000s	Late 2000s
FCS	53.64 (1992)	62.46 (2004)	70.92 (2012)
SSA	53.87 (1992)	59.82 (2004)	69.61 (2012)
Rwanda	46.62 (1992)	43.31 (2004)	59.34 (2013)
Liberia	—	64.70 (2006)	58.83 (2014)
Uganda	—	57.33 (2004)	54.24 (2013)
South Sudan	—	20 (2000) ^b	37.37 (2011) ^c

Source: Fritz and Ort (2016).

Data from a World Bank Databank. b. JAM 2005 (vol 1, p. 19); c. UNICEF 2011.

Note: a. Primary completion rate, or gross intake ratio to the last grade of primary education, is the number of new entrants (enrollments minus repeaters) in the last grade of primary education, regardless of age, divided by the population at the entrance age for the last grade of primary education. Data limitations preclude adjusting for students who drop out during the final year of primary education.

Table 3.3. Comparative Literacy Rate, Adult Total (% of people ages 15 and above)^a

	1990s	Early 2000s	Late 2000s
Uganda	56.11 [1991]	68.14 [2002]	73.21 [2010]
FCS	—	65.29 [2000]	67.56 [2010]
Rwanda	57.85 [1991]	64.89 [2000]	65.85 [2010]
SSA	53.05 [1990]	57.46 [2000]	59.32 [2010]
Liberia	42.67 [1994]	43.11 [2004]	42.94 [2007]
South Sudan	—	—	27 [2009] ^b

Source: Fritz and Ort (2016).

Data: World Bank Databank; b. JAM 2005 (vol 1, p. 19).

Note: a. Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can both read and write with understanding a short simple statement about their everyday life. b. South Sudan Baseline Survey, NCBS 2009.

universities have about three to five colleges. All the colleges are operational though the University of Upper Nile had to relocate and operate in Juba on a small scale because of the conflict.

Table 3.4. Secondary School Gross Enrollment Ratio (percent)

	Rate	Year
South Sudan	9.3	[2015]
SSA	42.8	[2013]
Fragile states and conflict-affected states	45.1	[2013]

Source: World Bank data; Education Statistics for the Republic of South Sudan National Statistics.

81. **According to available data from the MoHST, there were 11,419 students enrolled across South Sudan’s 13 public and private universities in 2015.**⁴⁴ Of this group, the largest share of students were enrolled in business and management (19 percent), socioeconomic sciences (19 percent), and education programs (16 percent); 4 percent study public health. A newly opened SPS at the University of Juba began offering courses during the 2015 academic year (see Annex 7) with 51 students enrolled in the program. As with secondary school, many students have the opportunity attend university abroad.⁴⁵ However, there are no data tracking the enrollment or completion rates for this group, nor is there good information regarding the number of graduates who return to seek work in the public sector.

82. **If one quarter of total students enrolled annually graduate, then the number of new graduates per year is only about 2,850, a relatively small number.** Even if all of these wanted to join the public service, it gives limited scope to the government to run a competitive, merit-based selection; and even more so taking into account employment offers from development partners and NGOs (which have declined in recent years due to the conflict), as well as the nascent private sector.⁴⁶

3.4 Effective use of potential capacity: Recruitment

83. **Recruitment practices hold potential to improve the qualifications and professional experience of the civil service in South Sudan.** While the available pool of literate and qualified citizens in South Sudan is limited, the pool of educated people needed to sustain or gradually expand the civilian civil service is not large; the percentage of civilian public servants relative to the population is in the order of 0.6 percent. In principle, meritocratic recruitment along with strategic use of transfers and promotions should be able to have an effect. For example, Republic of Korea faced a literacy rate similar to South Sudan’s (22 percent) at the end of World War II, but was able to use meritocratic recruitment practices to draw the most-qualified citizens into the civil service.

⁴⁴ Education Statistics for the Republic of South Sudan National Statistics.

⁴⁵ Education Statistics for the Republic of South Sudan National Statistics.

⁴⁶ However, a significant share of private sector employment is taken up by non-nationals.

84. **Yet the government has not been able to systematically maximize the use of potential capacity in South Sudan.** Institutional arrangements that have sought to improve checking of qualifications, enforce meritocratic recruitment processes, or limit hiring into the public sector have not been able to resist pressures created by the use of the public sector for the management of political support. Further, merging multiple militias onto the security sector payroll as a strategy for maintaining stability limits the resources that can be spent on funding a capable public administration (such as hiring accountants, teachers, nurses, and doctors).

85. **Initial hiring processes appear to have been quite distorted.** In part this was related to the logistical challenge of creating a public sector ‘from scratch’ by merging the CANS and CCSS administrations. Recruitment was devolved to South Sudan’s MDAs, with over 230 appointing authorities across three tiers of government. Staff were absorbed with little consideration of their technical qualifications and experience. Many hired into the civilian civil service had been involved in fighting (Larson, Ajak, and Prichett 2013), and as is common in postconflict settings, patronage-based loyalties overrode rule-based arrangements. During the early CPA years, anecdotally most MDAs at the national and state levels reflected the ethnicity of their ministers. Given successive changes of ministers since 2005, the situation has changed somewhat.

86. **Efforts to address these initial distortions and improve recruitment practices have been uneven; in practice, rules and oversight mechanisms at national and state levels have not been able to exert a strong influence over recruitment processes.** From 2007 to 2012 public sector reforms were initiated targeting adoption of clear legislation and regulations, improvements in payroll controls, a reduction of ghost workers, and better checking of qualifications (see World Bank 2014 for a detailed overview). These reforms faced resistance in the Cabinet, especially with regard to checking qualifications, and ultimately resulted in the resignation of the Minister of LPSHRD in 2012.

87. Among these reforms, a Recruitment Board was established under the MoLPSHRD in 2008, and in 2011, the *Civil Service Act* gave the MoLPSHRD *de jure* leverage over recruitment and hiring for the core parts of the (civilian) public service through its mandate to approve establishment structures setting out the number of posts and associated grade level for all MDAs (World Bank 2014). In practice, the Recruitment Board has not been able to exercise a role in hiring decisions (see Annex 6 for a detailed overview). In its absence, the main gatekeeping exercised for the national level has shifted to the Human Resource Management Directorate in the Ministry of Public Service, which decides if someone can be included in SSEPS II.

88. **Further efforts to reform recruitment processes have been stalled by successive hiring freezes, which have driven some hiring decisions outside of the formal recruitment process.** A hiring freeze was brought into effect in FY12/13 as part of a package of austerity

measures to cope with the shutdown in oil production, and it remained in place as the result of civil conflict and subsequent macro-fiscal crises. During this period, additional militias were brought into the security sector, and emergency recruitment for priority (civilian) civil service positions was carried out by an ‘austerity committee’.⁴⁷ Beyond this, additional hiring may have taken place, but the scarcity of available data makes the picture unclear. For the central government, the MoPSLHRD Recruitment Board does not have records reflecting the number of staff hired since 2012. Data from SSEPS II indicate that at least 1,000 employees received their letters of appointment between 2014 and 2016. The MoLPSHRD Directorate of Human Resource Management reports that no new hires have been added to SSEPS II, but suggests that some MDAs have recruited additional staff ‘outside of the payroll’ who are paid directly by the MoFEP on a contractual basis rather than through SSEPS II.

89. **Additionally, hiring freezes have reduced the opportunities to bring in or move up the increasing number of well-qualified citizens and foster renewal of the civil service.** Though qualifications may be improving in the pool of potential civil servants—for example, for teachers, health workers, IT specialists, and accountants—there is limited new hiring taking place. This is exacerbated by the fact that civil servants rarely retire, given the absence of a pension system, and so there is no turnover in staff. Going forward, the macro-fiscal condition makes it extremely difficult to recruit new staff, while at the same time, pressure to accommodate the formerly warring parties will create pressure for expansion, including the absorption of non-qualified staff.

3.5 Wages and essential resources to carry out assigned functions

90. **For a number of years, wage levels and allowances were relatively high at least for a number of staff categories, but they sharply declined in 2016 to below subsistence.** A detailed analysis of the wage bill and of wage levels for key employment categories is provided in World Bank (2015b). The grid for public sector wages was initially established in 2007, setting wages at relatively high levels compared to other countries in the region. In addition, a small circle of senior civil servants enjoyed generous travel benefits. As the real value of salaries eroded over time due to inflation, the government decided to introduce additional allowances rather than adjust base wages. By mid-2015, the value of base salaries plus allowances had dropped to around 50 percent of the original 2007 value for national civil servants, and 33 percent for subnational civil servants.

91. **A sharp downward shift followed in 2016, when the purchasing power of salaries dropped by a further 80–90 percent due to hyperinflation.** While base wages were increased for lower civil service grades (grades 17–10), which include teacher and nurses, by 300 percent

⁴⁷ For example, the committee approved recruitment of 200 new doctors by the MOH and 27 staff for DDR. See World Bank (2014) baseline assessment for Institutional Development and Capacity Building Project (IDCBP).

in February 2016, the overall reduction in purchasing power even for these categories remains around 60 percent; and erosion further continues from month to month given that no end to high rates of inflation is in sight. The delayed payment of wages and nonpayment of at least one month of wages for FY15/16 (at the national level) further contributed to the decline in value of public sector remuneration. This negatively affects the motivation and the ability of staff to perform their functions, as it generates an urgent need to supplement incomes through other activities.

Table 3.5. Actual Expenditure on Wages and Salaries

	SSP, Millions	US\$, Millions at Parallel Rate	US\$, Millions at Official Rate
FY11/12	3,801.41	—	1,086.12
FY12/13	3,201.71	760.95	914.77
FY13/14	3,636.26	846.59	1,038.93
FY14/15	5,713.84	829.00	1,632.53
FY15/16	7,487.00	289.80	414.58

Source: FY12/13, FY13/14, FY14/15, FY15/16 Approved Budgets and FY15/16 Q4 Report.

Note: Exchange rates calculated based on World Bank Group market survey data, annual averages.

92. **Apart from salaries, a key element for the functioning of government institutions is the availability of basic resources required for staff to carry out their assigned functions.** Since 2005 investments have been made in the physical infrastructure to run a government, largely funded by development partners.⁴⁸ As of July 2016, government facilities in Juba are basic but adequate and remained undamaged by the 2013–2015 civil conflict.⁴⁹


93. **Due to limited or inexistent infrastructure, logistics and utility costs are high for both the public and the private sector.** A national power grid does not exist, making the power supply largely dependent on generators and fuel that is imported through difficult ports and overland routes, resulting in a high cost of energy per kilowatt-hour. Similarly, water is provided by trucks and sewage systems do not exist even in major cities. There is limited roads infrastructure, with only 4,000 km of all-weather roads, and about 60 percent of the country becomes impassable during the rainy season (April–October). Commercial flights are available between major cities, but not on a regular or reliable basis. These transport constraints make moving goods, services, and staff costly. Communications infrastructure is relatively more

⁴⁸ World Bank (2014, Section 5.6).

⁴⁹ Potential damage from the renewed fighting in Juba in July 2016 is not yet assessed.

established, but exclusively relies on mobile connectivity—which has been established in all state capitals and most county capitals.

Figure 3.6. Share of Actual Expenditures by Economic Function



Source: FY12/13, FY13/14, FY14/15, FY15/16 Approved Budgets.

Note: FY13/14 deviation from Supplemental Budget; positive numbers reflect overspend, negative reflect underspend.

94. **A cross-cutting constraint for the central government has been the availability of operating budgets to pay for electric generators or Internet connections.** Given the limited road, water, and electricity infrastructure in the country, South Sudan is an expensive operational environment. Constraints to public sector operating budgets have increased since FY15/16. Fiscal resources have become extremely limited since early 2016 and fuel for generators is now more expensive than in the past. This constrains agencies' ability to carry out their assigned functions, and has increased the costs of external assistance to government which must cover basic inputs. The MoLPSHRD Human Resource Training Center (HRTC) is illustrative. The facility was built in 2013 by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and was not physically damaged by 2013 civil conflict. The Kenya School of Government agreed to provide faculty to teach courses at the HRTC if the ministry covers the operational expenses of holding classes. However, the ministry has not been able to find funds to provide fuel for transportation to the center, fuel to run the generator, or meals to trainees.

95. **At the same time, available operational resources are not well allocated.** This concerns both the allocation of operational resources among sectors, that is, the high funding allocated to security sectors, as well as poor allocations within civilian and service delivery sectors. Ministers use hotels rather than regular housing, invite followers on a regular basis for meals, and bill their charges to the ministry. Per diems related to foreign travel have been very high and frequently made use of. Available budget documents do not allow a disaggregation into 'overhead' and 'productive' allocations of operating budgets.

96. **In contrast to the national government, subnational facilities developed slowly and remained limited, especially for counties.** A key underlying issue is the limited connectivity between the national, state, and county capitals. Infrastructure constraints included availability of adequate school, hospital, and administrative facilities. The impact of the conflict on subnational infrastructure varies across the country. In areas where the fighting between government and SPLM in Opposition (SPLM/IO) forces has been limited, government facilities were relatively unharmed. In other regions where fighting has been heaviest, state facilities were largely destroyed. The situation has been similar for counties; rebels have burned down or looted local government buildings in Bor, Twic East, Duk, and Pibor—though some local governments have already begun to rebuild. NGO infrastructure in these regions has also been affected.

97. **Critically, at subnational levels, scarcity of key inputs such as Internet, computers, and other basic items such as paper and printed forms have limited county communication and reporting with regard to revenue management and service delivery.** Partly, this is related to limited operational expenditure. In addition, in many cases inputs are unavailable in local markets. Counties are further constrained by limited access to banking, transportation, and fuel for generators. A 2012 survey of local government administrative infrastructure in select counties found that Internet access was intermittent and powered by generators; cell phone signals in the county capitals were good, but could be interrupted if fuel was scarce; and there were no bank branches available. The availability of paper forms has also been a constraint (World Bank 2015c).

3.6 Strengthening skills in the civil service: training and learning

98. **Strengthening the skills of existing civil servants is one avenue for improving the overall quality of public sector effectiveness in South Sudan.** Initially, it was important for the public workforce to acquire new technical as well as managerial skills, given the limited and mixed qualification of the civil servants absorbed from the CANS and CCSS administrations. Improving the skills base of existing staff remains important, given that there is limited turnover or recruitment of newly skilled staff into the public sector. The following chapter reviews cross-cutting training initiatives; Annex 7 contains case studies providing a detailed description of South Sudan's public sector training institutions and infrastructure; training specific to PFM and health are addressed in Chapters 4 and 5.

99. **Since independence, efforts have been made to advance a strategic approach to training, but success has been mixed.** Broadly speaking, whether training has an impact depends on the quality of the specific intervention, as well as whether other influential factors are jointly moving toward greater civil service capacity as set out in Chapter 2. Given the

challenging context, delivery of quality training in South Sudan has proved difficult. At the same time, as discussed in this chapter, factors such as good recruitment, performance management, and the availability of essential resources to carry out ones' job have not been systematically present.

100. **The government's ability to coordinate and foster a coherent approach to training has been limited, a challenge faced in many postconflict countries.** The MoLPSHRD is assigned responsibility for developing and implementing cross-cutting training.⁵⁰ Though it has placed great effort in trying to coordinate resources and ensure that training is delivered according to pre-identified needs, its own capacity constraints and ability to influence other ministries has been limited. Many MDAs at both the national and subnational levels move forward with donor-funded training and capacity-building efforts that are not necessarily linked with the MoLPSHRD plans or guidance.

101. **Linked to this, a good deal of the training delivered has been short term and ad hoc.**⁵¹ Most in-service training has been provided by development and bilateral partners. As noted by the MoLPSHRD Directorate of Human Resource Development (HRD), most of this training has been short (3–5 days long), focused on developing specific skills to carry out specific tasks—often related to the implementation of a particular development project—and did not result in certification.⁵² Limited M&E on the part of the government and development partners, paired with the overall difficulty of measuring the impact of capacity building, make it difficult to interpret the extent to which these contributed to better management of projects or wider civil service capacity. However, frustration about their efficacy exists on both sides.

102. **At the same time, some initiatives took a longer-term view but produced strategies, policies, needs assessments, curricula, and infrastructure that have not been fully used in practice.** Among other factors, volatility, over-ambitious plans, and the short time horizons of development partner support have made it difficult to bridge the gap between policy and implementation. On the one hand, significant groundwork has been laid to develop the policy architecture for training from scratch. On the other hand, resources and energy focused on 'form' rather than 'function'—creating comprehensive systems on paper without resulting in actual training for civil servants.

103. The legal foundation for training policy was set out in the *Civil Service Act of 2011*. Following this, the 2013 *South Sudan Civil Service Training and Capacity Development Policy* was developed with the support of a Civil Service Support Officer under the Intergovernmental

⁵⁰ Government of the Republic of South Sudan (2013).

⁵¹ The government did not have a training policy or a strategy nor strong influence compared to donor partners to insist on harmonized approach—trainings offered were ad hoc and not well structured to meet a common goal and vision, or to build on one another to cover different issues or proceed from basic to advanced levels.

⁵² Interview with Mme Therezine, Director of HRD, MoLPSHRD.

Authority on Development (IGAD)/Republic of South Sudan (RSS) Initiative. The first countrywide training needs assessment was undertaken by the CBTF in 2009, covering civil servants across the 10 states. With support from the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID)-funded Support to Effective Administrative and Democratic Governance in South Sudan (SEADGOSS) program, the MoLPSHRD developed a Master Curriculum for Public Administration and Management in 2009, outlining the training needs of all cadres of civil servants, and began development of training modules. The CBTF supported development of additional training modules; however, the series of training materials remained incomplete. A further technical needs assessment was conducted by the African Capacity Building Project in 2012 covering four states across the greater regions of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) undertook a human capacity needs assessment in 2014, which informed the design of the Phase II IGAD placement program for civil servants. With funds from the World Bank-funded IDCBP, a syllabus for the Government Accountancy Training Center (GATC) was developed by the MoFEP and a more recent skills audit was completed by the MoLPSHRD in May 2016.

104. Since independence, investments have been made in training infrastructure, though this has not automatically resulted in better (or more) training (see Annex 4 for overview of public sector training infrastructure). As discussed in Chapter 4, early support from the CBTF provided assistance with an initial renovation of the GATC. As of May 2016, the buildings remain in relatively good condition and were used for donor-sponsored workshops, meetings, and working groups. Yet no accountancy training has taken place at the center for at least the last five years. A multi-million-dollar facility was constructed by the AfDB in 2013 to house an MoLPSHRD HRTC. The venue has largely been vacant with the exception of a number of short courses provided by the Kenya School of Government (KSG). Though it was not initially damaged by the 2013 civil conflict, it has since been looted and is no longer functional. Training facilities were also constructed in state capitals, but information about whether they have been used for their intended purpose or have been damaged by ongoing conflict is unavailable.

105. **A cross-cutting issue has been the ability to execute even short-term training well** (the ‘quality’ of the intervention). Given the context—including among other issues the ability of the government to coordinate, incentives to use training to access per diem or opportunities for travel, and the absence of systematic monitoring—delivering quality interventions has been difficult. Multiple reviews note that supervisors send participants who are not at an appropriate grade, lack the sufficient technical knowledge to make use of the training, or have jobs that render the training useless in improving their performance. Linked to this, limited knowledge of English diminishes training effectiveness. While many government officials can work competently in Arabic, the official language and medium of instruction is English. Further, low levels of literacy and numeracy have also had a major impact on training effectiveness.

106. **A further question is whether domestic and international actors have tried to solve capacity problems through training that have roots beyond the availability of individual skills.** A 2010 government evaluation found that some MDAs failed to release staff for training because they had too few staff to function properly with some away from the office. It also noted the absence of incentives to encourage participation such as linking training to recognition or promotion within the MDAs. As discussed in Section 3.5, resources to carry out tasks on which staff have been trained are often absent. Further, many people emerge from training in a specific area only to be redeployed soon after to a new role in which their newly acquired skills are not relevant.

107. **On-the-job training through the provision of technical assistance has faced its own set of challenges.** Though ‘capacity building’ may be reflected in terms of reference (TORs), in practice, many TAs have been held accountable for delivering specific outcomes (that is, efficient and transparent procurement, a policy regulation or strategic plan, provision of health care). This has incentivized some TAs to do the work directly, rather coach and mentor local counterparts, which can be slower and deliver less perfect outputs. Even for TAs who wish to coach and mentor, the pressure of urgent tasks (that is, ensuring fiscal transfers for health are disbursed so that services are delivered, accounts audited, policies drafted, or reports completed) can be overwhelming. Beyond this, counterpart staff with requisite qualifications to effectively partner have often been absent, and turnover of those counterparts who are in place is high (this is a key lesson emerging from the IGAD program administered by the UNDP).

108. **Despite the overall frustrating picture of training, some bright spots have emerged.** There are indications that regional initiatives have been at least moderately successful. For example, the Kenya School of Government has been an early and consistent partner, sending high-level staff to KSG during the CPA period for instruction and a two-week on-the-job emersion program shadowing their counterparts in Kenya. To expand the number of staff reached by the partnership, KSG has sent instructors to Juba to provide courses for mid-level public servants. Though there have been frustrations that the material is not adapted to the South Sudanese context, there is an overall desire on the part of the MoLPSHRD to directly provide training to its civil servants rather than rely on external actors. Through KSG, nearly 1,550 individuals have been trained (see Table 3.6).

109. **English language courses have been provided to support the transition to English as the official language.** From 2009, Windle Trust has provided English language training to 616 government officials with funding from the CBTF and USAID (Winrock). Courses took place at the national level, as well as in Wau, Torit, Kuajok, Aweil, and Bentiu (See Annex 4 for a more detailed overview of Windle Trust). Though the number of civil servants trained has been relatively limited, systems exist to expand these efforts if relative stability returns.

110. **Some longer-term professional development has taken place.** Senior staff from the MoFEP noted that the most-effective trainings ever provided to the staff of the ministry have been the long-term trainings—staff returned with enhanced skills and have been the drivers of change within the ministry. Most of the long-term trainings were funded by the government and a few development partners. The AfDB is one of the development partners that has provided funding for longer-term training for MoFEP staff in Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. So far, more than 16 staff have been trained in taxation, financial management, and external audit. For taxation, there are 4 postgraduates, 7 diploma, and 2 certificate candidates all trained in Tanzania. For internal audit, 8 were sent and trained in Uganda and for financial management, a bigger number attended shorter-term trainings of 7 to 14 days in Kenya, Namibia, and South Africa. All returned to their duty stations.⁵³

111. **The SPS at the University of Juba was established in November 2014 and began offering courses in 2015.** Established and operationalized during the civil conflict, the SPS has proved durable in the face of security and fiscal challenges. The program has a rigorous admissions process and enrolls 51 professionals from across the country in its two-year MA program. The faculty is composed of staff from South Sudan’s think tanks and academic community. Its courses are adapted to the country context and are viewed as credible by local and international stakeholders. Its operational costs are low and fit for purpose (for example, electricity is provided through solar power as compared to other facilities that rely on expensive fuel). Tuition has also remained relatively low (SSP 12,000 per year), though it may be increasingly difficult for students to afford given the inflation.

Table 3.6. South Sudan Civil Servants Trained, Select Capacity-building Programs

Program	Civil Servants Trained ^a	Course Title
<i>Kenya School of Government: in-service training</i> (Nairobi)	255	Public Administration; Strategic Leadership and Management; Project Planning and Management; Computer Courses
<i>Kenya School of Government</i> (delivered at the MoPSLHRD HRTC, Juba)	836	Supervisory Skills Development; Electronic Records Management; Public Relations and Customer Care; Performance Appraisal; PFM; Secretariat Management; Conduct of Meetings/Minute Writing; Report Writing Skills; Change Management for Effective Reforms for Senior Managers; Human Resource Management

⁵³ Interview with Emmanuel Elisa, Project Coordinator for the AfDB Institutional Support to Public Finance Management and Aid Coordination Project.

Program	Civil Servants Trained ^a	Course Title
<i>Kenya School of Government: sector-specific skills</i> (Nairobi)	414	Public Health Wildlife Management & Conservation; Tourism & Park Management; Air Traffic Control; Radio & TV Production; Postal Services Management; Basic Firefighting Course
<i>Windle Trust</i> (South Sudan)	616	English language training
<i>University of Juba SPS</i> (Juba)	51	Master's in Public Administration
<i>GATC through CBTF II</i> (Juba and 4 states)	1,323	Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supplies (CIPS) Professional Training Program; UK Association of Chartered, Certified Accountant (ACCA) professional training program; Conducted 14 PFM short course training programs; Conducted Short Course Training for States
Total	3,495	

Source: KSG evaluation; GATC program documents; HRTC records.

Note: a. Individual civil servants may have enrolled in more than one course or program; reflects the individuals passing through each course rather than absolute number of civil servants trained by the initiative.

3.7 Conclusions and implications

112. **South Sudan has presented a challenging context for capacity building, one in which progress is difficult to assess and punctuated by crises.** This chapter explored the context and legacies that have shaped efforts to strengthen the public sector. It has discussed the tensions faced by stakeholders when trying to move the public sector toward greater effectiveness, setting out the factors jointly influencing civil service capacity. As is clear from section 3.2.1, the actions taken by the government and development partners have led to a messy and suboptimal, capacity-building process.

113. **Educational attainment remains low in South Sudan compared to other SSA and fragile states—limiting the ‘pool of available civil servants’ from which to recruit.** Those who can afford to send their children for secondary school outside the country; however, there are no data tracking the enrollment or completion rates for this group. There are five public universities in the country. Even if a relatively high number of enrolled students graduate annually, it gives the government very little scope to recruit, especially when taking into account competition from employment with development partners, NGOs, and the nascent private sector.

114. **While recruitment practices hold potential to improve the individual skills mix of the civil service, the government has not been able to systematically maximize the use of potential capacity.** A key challenge in South Sudan has been a tension between supporting the

political settlement and fostering merit. Institutional arrangements that have sought to improve checking of qualifications, enforce meritocratic recruitment processes, or limit hiring into the public sector have not been able to resist pressures created by the use of the public sector for the management of political support. An early reliance on ‘legacy’ civil servants and former combatants, the large size of the security sector as compared to other services, successive hiring freezes for the civilian civil service, and the number of pensionable staff still on the payroll have contributed to the currently perceived problem of ‘inability to employ and move up’ qualified younger staff, rather than finding qualified graduates for the public sector (as explored further in particular in Chapter 5).

115. Initial hiring processes that appear to have been quite distorted are now difficult to address. Initially very low educational attainment limited the pool of potential civil servants from which South Sudan could recruit when the public service was created in 2005. Though educational outcomes are gradually improving—and therefore increasing the pool of civil servants from which to recruit—hiring into the civilian civil service has also slowed. To some extent, this has ‘locked in’ the capacity which existed in 2005. Further, while many South Sudanese have and continue to seek qualifications (secondary school, university degrees) outside of the country, the public sector has not made as much use of the diaspora as other fragile and conflict-affected states. An additional theme is that that institutional arrangements put in place to ensure greater checking of qualifications and a more meritocratic recruitment process have not been able to limit pressures to use the public sector for the management of political support.

116. Resources for carrying out assigned functions have been constrained, skewed toward the national level, and skewed toward operational expenditures benefiting top-level staff rather than actual delivery of tasks. For the central government, basic investments in infrastructure to run a government have been made. However, operating budgets to purchase fuel for electric generators and subscriptions to (mobile) Internet, as well as to maintain IT systems have not always been available, and increasingly less so since the fall of oil prices in January 2015. At the subnational level, investments in physical infrastructure to run a government have been more limited, basic supplies to run an office are not consistently available in subnational capitals, and facilities in the North of the country have been damaged by the civil conflict.

117. Systematic training has emerged only gradually and gaps remain. As is common in postconflict countries, the government was not able to effectively coordinate and foster a coherent approach to training. Linked to this, a good deal of the training delivered has been short term and ad hoc. While some initiatives took a longer-term view, these produced strategies, policies, needs assessments, curricula, and infrastructure that have not been fully used in practice. A further question is whether stakeholders have tried to solve capacity problems through training that have roots beyond the availability of individual skills. Some bright spots have emerged, but understanding their impact is difficult in the absence of systematic M&E.


118. **Reflecting on Figure 2.1 (Chapter 2), constraints exist across factors.** Limited education has reduced the pool of potential civil servants. Recruitment has been distorted by security pressures (high allocation to security sectors versus other services) and the need to manage political support. Pay was not initially a main issue—but on the one hand that has been because of very good access to allowances, per diem, and other benefits for more senior staff—and on the other hand is increasingly an issue due to inflation and the current macro-fiscal crisis. Performance management has not been in place. Availability of resources has been constrained.

119. **A key tension in South Sudan has been between supporting the political settlement and fostering merit and efficiency.** At the same time, development partners have tended to treat capacity building as a technical issue which could be solved by delivering the ‘inputs’ to a more functional state. Donor support has been unsystematic and fragmented, shaped by evolving international commitments, shifting political objectives, and technical realities. While some initiatives took a longer-term view, the time horizon of specific projects was limited by the project cycle. They produced strategies, policies, needs assessments, curricula, and infrastructure that have not been fully used in practice—some of which have been destroyed or made irrelevant by the civil conflict.

4. PFM Capacity in South Sudan - Rise, Leapfrog, Crash, and Beyond


120. **Capacity in South Sudan with regard to PFM offers a mixed and in several ways unexpected picture.** It is easy to presume that South Sudan had ‘no’ capacity given decades of civil war; very low literacy rates; and over the past 10 years, a leadership that has not been very committed to development. However, as in any postconflict country, there was some capacity at the outset, and investments in capacity were made with varying results. The years between 2006 and 2013 can be described as the ‘rise’ and of ‘leapfrogging’ in terms of PFM. From 2009 and up to 2014, South Sudanese budget documents contained extensive information on ‘programs’, and even reflected a review of what had been achieved relative to the programs and targets set in the previous fiscal year in some cases. The 2013–2014 budget, running to 600 pages in total, contains detailed information on major planned public investments, as well as detailed information about aid allocations. Previous year outturns are provided throughout the specific allocations.

Figure 4.1. Comparison of South Sudan, SSA, and Low-income Countries (2012)



Source: PEFA (www.pefa.org).

Figure 4.2. Comparison of South Sudan and Other African Countries at the Starting Point of State and Peace Building⁵⁴



Source: PEFA (www.pefa.org).

121. **At the same time, PFM in South Sudan has remained affected by deep dysfunctions, as the result of several key drivers.** In line with the overall note, this chapter focuses on capacity and hence cannot present a full picture of PFM systems. A key dysfunctionality throughout the past decade has been the fact that reallocations during budget execution have continuously been very substantial. Furthermore, available evidence suggests that public investments carried out at a significant scale during the years of rapidly accelerating fiscal

⁵⁴ Approximate starting point of state and peace-building efforts in African countries: South Sudan (2005–2006); Uganda (2006); Rwanda (1994–1995); Liberia (2003); Sierra Leone (2002).

resources were highly wasteful (cf. Country Economic Memorandum). External audit reports have only ever been produced for 2005 to 2008.⁵⁵ Most recently, the combined effect of renewed conflict since late 2013, and the fiscal ‘firefighting’ since 2012, with the fiscal situation becoming extremely difficult in 2015 and 2016, has led to something of a ‘system crash’ both at the national and at the subnational levels.

122. **Investments were made in improving PFM between 2005 and 2011.** By 2012, systems reached their relative peak efficiency, before declining again as the result of two macro-fiscal crises and a civil conflict. As reflected in Figure 4.1, in 2012 at the peak, PEFA scores for budget credibility, accounting, and reporting and control of budget execution were lower than the SSA average, but were quite good for external scrutiny and audit, comprehensiveness and transparency, and policy-based budgeting (Figure 4.2). Similarly, the country performed lower than a number of other African countries emerging from conflict on accounting and reporting and control of budget execution, but comparable to the Democratic Republic Congo.

4.1 The emergence of PFM capacities - 2005 to 2010

123. **When the South Sudanese Government began to be formed following the CPA, initially as a region within larger Sudan, it drew on pre-existing capacity as has been noted above.** Of the 3,096 staff categorized as ‘Finance and Economic Planning’ in the 2006 survey of the civil service, 2,622 (85 percent) came from the CCSS and only 474 from the CANS (that is, the civilian arm of the SPLM). This is the strongest balance in favor of CCSS as compared to CANS staff across the eight functional areas which the survey considered. Regarding the subnational level, the 2006 survey of the newly formed civil service rated one state (Upper Nile) as having high capacity on PFM and one state (Central Equatoria) as average. All other states were ranked as starting out with low capacity for PFM.

124. **The CCSS Finance and Economic Planning staff were also relatively mature:** 1,000 or 38 percent were 41 years and above, and a further 700 were in their 30s; among CANS staff, 36 percent (171 out of 474) were 41 years and above, and a further 138 in their 30s. A focus group discussion carried out for this analysis in 2016 also confirmed that the accounting cadre often had previous work experience reaching back to the 1980s and 1990s.

125. **According to focus group interviews and other discussions, many of the CCSS accounting cadre had been trained at the so-called Commercial Schools in Khartoum and Juba,⁵⁶ at Juba or Khartoum University, and some in the 1970s at the GATC in Juba. At**


⁵⁵ Reports for 2009 and 2010 are pending in the Legislative Assembly.

⁵⁶ Juba Commercial Secondary School was originally established in the 1950s. As the University of Juba, it moved to Khartoum for periods of time during successive civil wars. There was also a separate Khartoum Commercial

the time, the UNDP had supported the development of a curriculum and the delivery of courses at the GATC (see Box 4.1). One particular constraint resulting from this overall legacy is that many of those with training in bookkeeping and accounting as well as in economics had primarily a knowledge of Arabic rather than English.

126. **However, most of the older generation of accountants and other PFM staff were posted to line ministries, rather than to the Ministry of Finance,** possibly due to the fact that the MoFEP has been a core Dinka-held ministry, and hence preferred to hire new staff. SSEPS II payroll data from February 2016 reflect the age of the MoFEP personnel—though a key constraint is that the birthday of 28 percent of staff is recorded as January 30, 1901, that is, unknown.⁵⁷ Figure 4.3 shows a large share of employees are under 40 (44 percent); and 27 percent are 40–59 years; only 4 percent are shown to be past retirement—while this number could be larger in practice, given that birthdates were least frequently registered for staff hired early in the state-building process.

Figure 4.3. MoFEP Civil Servants by Age



Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: Reflects civilian civil servants enrolled in SSEPS II electronic payroll system as of February 2016.

127. **During the early years—ca. 2006 to 2008—the Ministry of Finance had only rudimentary staff and offices, and many central finance agency functions were directly carried out with the help of TAs and firms hired as agents for accounts and procurement.** During this period, office space was very limited in prefabricated buildings and national staffing was largely limited to the top level (that is, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Undersecretaries) and middle management (Directors General and Directors). Most directorates barely had any


Secondary School. Juba Commercial Secondary School still exists and was partially renovated in 2009 with funds from USAID.

⁵⁷ SSEPS figures include staff in the Tax Directorate.

technical staff. During this period, KPMG served as the Accounting Agent and Crown Agents as the Procurement Agent for the government.

128. Technical staff started to be hired in larger numbers in 2008–2010, as the Ministry of Finance moved to the newly refurbished ministerial compound, which also provided greater space; reaching a total of 375 by 2016 for core public expenditure functions. The allocation across functions has been relatively steady, with the strongest growth over time in the Directorate of Accounts and in the Directorate for Administration and Finance (Figure 4.4).⁵⁸ In principle, and as is discussed further below, the substantial funding provided by development partners for PFM strengthening should have been more than sufficient to provide training for such a number of staff.

Figure 4.4. Staff Numbers of Key Departments of the MoFEP



Source: National budget books 2008–2016; note that budgets indicate position ceilings rather than actual staff.

129. In addition to the expenditure-related functions, on the revenue collection side, the Directorate of Taxation has employed between 100 and 400 staff, and the Customs Directorate between 1,100 and 1,600 staff.⁵⁹ The setup and functions of the ministry have been relatively traditional set-up with budgeting and treasury functions united in one ministry and integrated revenue functions (customs only since independence). Planning and aid coordination are part of the MoFEP's mandate. While having comprehensive functions, the internal organization of the ministry has been somewhat less clear. A Freebalance IT system was introduced in 2008. Use of

⁵⁸ Continuous figures are only available for allocated staff positions, not for staff actually on board, and there is divergence between these figures. The Directorate for Administration and Finance also includes IT staff.


⁵⁹ Customs officers are part of the organized forces rather than the civil service. The Tax and Customs Directorates are expected to be converted into a separate National Revenue Authority from FY16/17.

the system remained highly centralized at the national level, but the accounting and reporting modules were rolled out to the initial 10 states.

130. **One issue that has been lacking is an actual functional design and clear organogram of the national Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning.** A plan was made to hold a retreat and develop a clear organizational structure for the ministry in late 2013. However, the retreat was postponed and subsequently canceled due to the outbreak of renewed conflict. Thus, while the structure of the ministry in broad terms is relatively ‘standard’, there are some areas for which responsibilities are not entirely clear (for example, there are multiple Directors General for different aspects of planning), and there are some functions which one would expect to have dedicated directorates (notably debt management) that currently only exist as subordinate units.

131. **Figure 4.5 shows the year of hiring of the MoFEP staff based on SSEPS II data.**⁶⁰ The graph reflects the initial hiring ‘waves’ in 2006 and 2008, followed by recruitment of around 40 staff per year between 2009 and 2013, and dropping off thereafter, in line with the hiring freeze due to the fiscal crisis.

Figure 4.5. MoFEP Employees by Year of Appointment



Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.


Note: Reflects civilian civil servants enrolled in SSEPS II electronic payroll system as of February 2016.

132. **A review of the SSEPS II payroll data shows that most MoFEP staff are ‘classified’.** Grading within the MoFEP is more systematic than in other parts of the civilian public service, with a clearer match between job description and grade—though it is difficult to verify the

⁶⁰ Note that the ‘hiring date’ reflects the year an official appointment letter was attached their HR file rather than the year they entered the civil service.

qualifications and years of experience of the public officers serving in these posts. Figure 4.6 reflects the distribution of MoFEP personnel between grades. According to SSPEs II data, 72 percent of MoFEP personnel are classified (and make up 87 percent of the MoFEP wage bill). Unclassified staff make up the remaining 28 percent of staff (and 13 percent of the wage bill). This indicates that a much higher share of wage resources are being taken up by the professional-technical cadre than by drivers, messengers, watchmen, and cleaners.⁶¹

Figure 4.6. Distribution of MoFEP Personnel across Grades



Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: Reflects civilian civil servants enrolled in SSEPS II electronic payroll system as of February 2016.

133. **As discussed for the overall civil service in Chapter 3, there is a question about whether one can diagnose a ‘missing middle’ for the MoFEP.** The staffing structure as shown in Figure 4.6 reflects the fact that staffing is concentrated in levels 9 and below—at or below the professional grades (1–7)—but nearly three-quarters of staff are registered as ‘classified’. Grade 9 staff are ‘assistant inspectors’ in Tax and other departments. This suggests that in principle the ministry should have sufficient number and sufficient professional-level staff to operate and to acquire capacity, in particular if initially junior staff were developed over time.⁶² Section 4.2 looks further at the development partner support that has been provided in this regard.

134. **There is a higher level of information about accountants in South Sudan thanks to the USAID Accounting Staff Census and Skills Assessment for the Government of the Republic of South Sudan carried out in late 2013.** It surveyed 788 individuals involved in

⁶¹ The ratio is higher than for the civil service overall (61 percent classified, 38 unclassified).

⁶² Allen et al. (2015) includes a discussion of the range of staffing numbers in Ministries of Finance in OECD and developing countries. With around 400 staff, South Sudan is in the same staff number bracket (200 to 500 staff) as Chile, Moldova, and Nicaragua. Ghana, Uganda, and Mozambique have between 500 and 1,000 MoF staff (excluding tax and custom collection staff).

accounting tasks in the civilian and security sectors of the public service. For civilian central government MDAs enrolled in SSEPS II, only 48 staff have a job with ‘accountant’ in the title. However, the *2013 Census* found that misclassification of staff was common “including non-accounting tasks with accounting titles or accounting tasks without accounting titles.” (USAID 2013, 10). Table 4.1 reflects the highest educational level of accountants surveyed in 2013. Of those surveyed, “89 percent of those with a diploma or degree had a specialization in subjects relevant to accounting. Others had specializations in subjects including English literature, civil aviation, wildlife, chemistry, education, and rural development” (USAID 2013, 10).

Table 4.1. Highest Level of Education Completed by Accounting Staff

Degree Type	Percent
Secondary school	33.8
University diploma	38.5
University degree	23.9
Master’s degree	3.6

Source: USAID 2013.

Box 4.1. Key Findings from Accountant Census

- 66 percent of accounting staff have completed a university diploma or higher; and the average staff member has 11.2 years of experience in government finance.
- 30 percent of staff in the General List belong to organized forces and military; organized forces staff receive less training and were weaker in all areas assessed.
- Accounting knowledge is weakest regarding the Chart of Accounts, bank reconciliations, and preparing financial reports.
- Computer skills are uneven and still relatively weak, with 25 percent unfamiliar with Excel.
- 25 percent of accounting staff have weak English language proficiency.
- 21 percent of accounting staff are women, and there are few women in leadership positions.
- Training opportunities are not regularly scheduled or sufficient for performing duties.
- Accounting staff are not regularly transferred.
- Accounting staff often feel pressure to perform activities that test their adherence to ethics.
- Total staffing at spending agencies does not appear balanced.


Source: USAID 2013.

135. **Key findings from the USAID report that were also reinforced by focus group discussions were that staff have rarely changed ministries in the recent 6–10 years, and that training opportunities were felt to have been few and overly short.** A further key issue raised was the fact that accountants in line ministries have received less and less information about budget execution in recent years, making it difficult to assess what level of funds to still consider

as available for expenditures. Consistent with USAID findings, TAs have also observed that accountants receive instructions that run counter to their professional standards.


136. **Salary expenditures for the national Ministry of Finance have grown significantly over the years, as have allocated operating expenditures** (Figure 4.7). Following a rise in wage allocations during the initial years, staff numbers and the wage bill ‘jumped’ from FY2012/13 onwards, when customs officials started being included, following South Sudan’s independence. Furthermore, *actual* wage bill allocations were significantly higher than budgeted. Higher-than-budgeted expenditures are mainly shown as having been spent by the Directorate of Administration and Finance. Actual operating expenditures have also been significantly higher than what has been budgeted (Figure 4.8). The greatest overrun in this regard occurred in 2008, and the gap has gradually diminished since then, but still continues through the most recent year for which outturn data is available.

Figure 4.7. Staffing Levels and Salaries of the MoFEP (including tax and customs) in SSP



Note: The actuals for 2013–2014 and for 2014–2015 are estimates based on half-year outturns (July–December) reflected in budgets of the following fiscal year.

Figure 4.8. MoFEP Operating Funds - Budgeted and Actuals in SSP



Source: MoF national budget books, various years.

137. **It appears that the operating funds of the MoFEP have served as a de facto contingency fund, in addition to the ‘official’ contingency line in the budget.**⁶³ While this practice was gradually reduced up to 2014–2015, it seems to have resumed with full force in 2016. For the first three quarters, the MoFEP’s operating expenditures exceeded budgeted allocations by over 2100 percent, compared to an average overspending of 345 percent. While some overspending is inevitable due to the differences in nominal figures following the devaluation, this suggests that the MoFEP still spent about 100 percent more in real terms, while nearly all other agencies had to dial back. It is also not entirely clear what expenditures are included, given that power and Internet connectivity in the MoFEP—typical non-wage operating expenditures—have also been reduced.


138. **With regard to the subnational levels, state and county budgets are difficult to obtain and are not uniform across entities, making comparisons more challenging.** Figure 4.9 reflects the number of people on State Ministry of Finance and State Revenue Authorities (SRA) at the beginning of FY14/15 for nine out of ten states.⁶⁴ The figures reflect that staff numbers are substantial also at those levels. Significant technical assistance under the USAID

⁶³ For example, for the very large 2008 overrun, the 2009 budget states that SSP 50 million (~US\$23.5 million) were transferred to the SPLM as oil revenues that should have been sent to the SPLM in 2005 as well as SSP 30 million for transport of Dura to the states. Net of the categories ‘specialized supplies’ and ‘donations’, the overrun shrinks from over SSP 500 million (~ US\$235 million) to (still substantial) SSP 26 million (~US\$12 million) for 2008.

⁶⁴ Some state budgets combine staffing numbers and salary figures for the SMOFEP and SRA under one budget line. For the sake of comparison across states, in states with two separate agencies, staffing numbers and salary figures were combined. Lakes did not prepare a budget in FY14/15.

CORE II program was provided to support state-level use of Financial Management Information System (FMIS) modules. The withdrawal of this support as a result of the civil conflict revealed that state-level staff were reliant on this TA to ensure accurate reporting, especially on the use of intergovernmental fiscal transfers.

Figure 4.9. Number of Staff and Wage Bill SMOF and SRA (2014/2015)



Source: FY14/15 state budget books.

Note: Eastern Equatoria figures for its State Ministry of Finance; Northern Bar el Ghazal salaries for SMOF and SRA included as one budget line; Unity, Upper Nile, Warrap and Western Equatoria do not list SRA in budget (assumption that the function is assigned to the SMOF); Western Bahr el Ghazal figures for State Ministry of Finance, Trade and Industry; Lakes did not prepare a budget in FY14/15.

139. **At county levels, capacity has remained highly constrained.** Beyond the cross-cutting challenge of finding and retaining qualified staff, counties have been particularly constrained by the availability of funding. Own resources are extremely limited, and intergovernmental fiscal transfers have often gotten ‘stuck’ at the state level—either administered on behalf of counties or diverted to other functions (World Bank 2015a, 2015b). As a result, local governments have had only limited opportunity to ‘learn by doing’. Some officials express frustration about why staff should spend time in training or invest in developing budgets if there are no resources to manage.

140. **The right hand scale of Figure 4.9 reflects the PFM-related wage bill at the subnational level.**⁶⁵ A clear oddity is the fact that while Upper Nile has by far the largest number of staff, it shows as having the smallest wage bill. It is unclear whether this is related to

⁶⁵ Given the format of SSEPS II data for subnational levels, it is not possible to disaggregate the grade level or classification of staff carrying out PFM functions for states and counties.

the conflict or due to inaccurate accounting. The second most conflict-affected state, Jonglei, in contrast, shows a high wage bill relative to staff, as does Unity State. The other states had broadly aligned staffing numbers to wage bills.


141. **With the creation of new states and counties since October 2015, capacities and PFM functionality at subnational levels deteriorated.** Given the withdrawal of support and the deteriorating security situation, no detailed assessment is possible. The national Ministry of Finance made some efforts to offer guidance and training to subnational staff in new states and counties. As of late 2016, only 3 out of 28 states (Jonglei, Jubek, and Imation) were reporting their expenditures through the FMIS. Additional efforts were made to enable new states not connected to the system to use and submit manual expenditure reports.


4.2 Capacity strengthening support provided by development partners

142. **Ministry of Finance and other PFM-related officials in spending ministries and at subnational levels have benefited from significant efforts at strengthening capacity of the various departments over the decade since 2006.** Figure 4.10 provides a schematic overview of the type of institutions and their main directorates which training efforts have targeted. The main development partners contributing to PFM strengthening efforts have included the AfDB, DFID, the European Union (EU), UNDP, USAID, the World Bank Group, as well as the bilateral donors contributing to the CBTF.

143. **However, these efforts have faced a number of challenges.** Initially the needs were overwhelming, and so various efforts started in different areas and seem somewhat scattered in retrospect. Further, the timing of certain training posed challenges, as there were often expectations that new legislation would be in place, which would then provide the standard on which the training would be focused. However, all PFM-related draft laws experienced delays of several years, and some laws, such as the Procurement Bill, as well as the implementing regulations for the Public Financial Management and Accountability Act (PFMAA), still remain pending.

Figure 4.10. Overview of PFM structures to be strengthened





144. **Additionally, while it should have been feasible in principle to provide a substantial share of staff with training, there were limiting factors both on the government side and on the side of development partners.** Even taking into account that some training would have been needed to ‘build basics first’ for staff with insufficient prior skills and qualifications, in principle the provision of training to address such shortcomings and then develop skills further could have been feasible. However, this succeeded at best partially. On the one hand, the government has had insufficient commitment to create the enabling conditions for such training to take hold and have an impact. The acceleration of revenues collected until 2011 (from the oil sector) dampened incentives to actually pursue good management of public funds. On the other hand, from the side of development partners, short funding horizons, volatility, fragmentation, and rotations made it difficult to stay the course with regard to supporting capacity.

145. **An important limiting factor from the South Sudanese side were the decisions to discontinue Sudanese legislation, combined with substantial delays in adopting new legislation—in a context of initially uncertain independence, as well as other factors.** An organic budget law, the PFMAA, was initially expected to be adopted by 2008, to enable implementation on a clear legislative basis within semiautonomous Southern Sudan. De facto, the PFMAA was only adopted at independence in 2011, while implementing regulations still remain under development five years later. New procurement legislation to replace 2006 interim regulations still remains pending as of 2016.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ While the decision to discard Sudanese legislation is understandable, and in line with decisions taken by some other countries that won independence after a period of conflict (for example, Kosovo with regard to former

146. **Since independence, the national government initiated several steps to improve policy and regulation for subnational governments, with support from development partners** (and specifically through the Local Governance and Service Delivery Project [LGSDP] and Budget Support Initiative [BSI]). The adoption of the 2012 Local Government PFM Manual and Local Government Human Resource Management (HRM) Manual provide clear guidance on how systems are to be managed. In turn, this has helped harmonize donor partner training at subnational levels including under EU technical assistance for sub-national capacity building in payroll and public financial management (EUTAPP) and the LGSDP.

147. **Sufficient resources were dedicated in principle: the initial JAM estimated a need for support of US\$53.9 million for PFM capacities between 2005 and 2011, and this amount was subsequently exceeded de facto.** Early assistance was provided by a Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) TF, the MDTF-SS, the CBTF, and USAID's CORE I project (see Table 4.2). Funding from development partners helped establish the initial physical infrastructure to run a government in Juba, including refurbishing and putting in place new buildings, equipping the Ministry of Finance with IT systems (hardware and software), starting a ministry website, and so on. Assistance was provided under the MDTF-SS focusing on planning capacity, and on procurement and external audit. Early support from the CBTF provided assistance with developing initial financial statements and with an initial renovation of the GATC and trainings held there. In addition to trainings provided at the GATC, staff were sent on trainings outside the country.

Table 4.2. Development Partner Support Provided for Establishing and Strengthening PFM Systems

Funder and Project Name	Main Areas of Support	Financial Volume
World Bank LICUS TF	Capacity building and institutional development for fiduciary and aid management systems (north and south)	US\$4.5 million
World Bank Core Fiduciary Systems	Core Fiduciary Systems (2006–2013) mainly focused on providing fiduciary assurance for use of MDTF funds, but included some support to the NAC	US\$11.15 million (Core Fiduciary Systems)
Multiple bilateral donors CBTFPhase I and II	Covering PFM as well as other public sector reforms US\$22.3 million (Phase I) - about US\$4 million for direct PFM-related activities US\$26 million (Phase II until 2012) - US\$4 million	About US\$13.65 million for PFM and revenue generation

Yugoslav laws), this contributed to a greater legal void at the outset compared to countries that experienced conflict but had been continuously independent (for example, Sierra Leone or Liberia).

Funder and Project Name	Main Areas of Support	Financial Volume
	for the MoFEP/GATC (3.2 plus 0.8 for the SSDP), US\$1.5 million for PFM and Tax in states + US\$24 million (2012–2014), of which US\$3.8 million for PFM/GATC and 350,000 for local PFM	
USAID CORE I and II	Focused on PFM strengthening	US\$93 million + ca. US\$90 million
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Technical Assistance	Focused on Bank of South Sudan (BoSS), MoFEP	Ca. US\$5.6m
UNDP	Assistance to PFM at state levels, and at the central level for planning and budgeting	Ca US\$10m
EU	EUTAPP	Ca US\$5m
DFID	Support via BSI since mid-2010, continuing as of 2017	ca US\$6.5m
Norway	Advisors to the macro-fiscal department	N/a
AfBD	Training for internal auditors, tax staff	US\$4.8

148. **Some of the funding flowed toward ‘bridging capacity gaps’ through technical assistants, rather than building national capacity.** An Accounting Agent was used to prepare the accounts of the government from 2006 until 2009; and a Procurement Agent was in place from 2007 to 2009. Both of those contracts were largely focused on directly executing the tasks at hand—that is, regularly producing accounts and undertaking specific procurement processes—and did not involve significant capacity transfer. Interviews with procurement TA who worked during this period indicate that though knowledge and skills transfer was a part of the TOR at the time, TAs were held accountable for ensuring rigorous and timely procurement, which often required doing the work directly themselves. Interviews also revealed that counterparts at the time were not well placed to absorb new skills; subsequently, a younger cohort of procurement specialists with a better skills mix has been brought into the Ministry of Finance and has received additional training; but in those years a key challenge was that very little procurement was carried out given the shift from development to humanitarian assistance and the macro-fiscal crisis, and so staff were unable to learn by doing.

149. **There were significant challenges in coordinating support, particularly with regard to reaping synergies, and in ensuring continuity of support for specific institutional aspects.** There was a broad division of labor—with USAID-funded assistance focusing on budget execution and on revenue, Norwegian technical assistance focused on advice to the macro department (including estimation of oil revenue), and BSI support focused on budget preparation

and transfers to subnational levels. However, there was no mechanism to coordinate further what the support across these functions was meant to achieve. Also, any disagreements—for example, how to focus on basic systems rather than seeking to achieve more advanced functionalities and what this would mean for individual directorates and processes—remained largely unaddressed.

150. **One major project to support the development of PFM functions started in 2006, with the USAID-funded CORE I project (2006–2013), followed by a second phase CORE II (2013–mid-2015).** The project had a volume of US\$93 million, that is, going well above what the JAM had estimated as ‘needs’ for PFM strengthening. A review of the project led to some changes being made during the implementation period in 2010. USAID decided to continue this support in 2012–2013, initiating CORE II. However, first it took some time for the second round to get off the ground; and then implementation was disrupted by the outbreak of conflict in late 2013. In mid-2015, CORE II was cancelled. This reflects how capacity-strengthening efforts in South Sudan have been affected by stop-go support.

151. **The development, sustained maintenance, and use of IT systems for PFM functions has posed significant challenges.** An FMIS was first installed in 2008 with assistance from development partners. The selected package was Freebalance, which has also been used in a number of other postconflict countries (Kosovo, Liberia, Timor-Leste). However, in parallel, a different system for budget preparation (Budget Preparation System [BPS]) was developed by members of the Deloitte team under USAID CORE II. There were some disagreements as to whether the Freebalance budget module or the BPS should be the main software used for budget preparation. Due to several factors, the BPS remained in use: no development partner committed sufficient funding to technically roll out Freebalance to the line ministries, and as the USAID/Deloitte team had to scale down their support, the BSI team decided to help the Ministry of Finance continue the BPS as the relatively simpler solution. At subnational levels deploying and maintaining IT resources (that is, computers, mobile Internet, generators, and fuel for electricity, toner, and printer paper) has posed an even greater challenge.

152. **A further limitation with the use of the FMIS has been that there was no political commitment to ‘commitment control’.** This is true at both the national and state levels. Thus, the potential functionality of the system to limit commitments of spending agencies to their budget allocations has never been put to use—something that the IMF as well as other partners have repeatedly highlighted as a key shortcoming. Rather, the system was only used to record actual expenditures and to generate monthly and quarterly expenditure reports. For some years, developing timely and ‘cleaned’ expenditure information was supported through the Deloitte team. However, this process slipped once the support ended. This is especially the case for state-level reporting, which was eroded significantly by the withdrawal of CORE II.

153. **For the Tax Directorate, the CORE projects sought to support the development of a database of individual tax payments, which likewise faced significant challenges of continuity after support ended.** Programming information was not left with government counterparts. On the government side, the ministry failed to acquire sufficient programming capabilities (either through hiring IT staff or through contracting with a capable national or regional firm). While the Ministry of Finance developed a small IT team within its Administrative Directorate, this is mainly skilled in networking issues, that is, keeping existing functionalities running, but not in programming. Programming skills are essential for addressing emerging software problems, as well as for reconfiguring systems even in limited ways when any changes to processes or systems are adopted—which can be quite frequently in a recently established system.

Box 4.2. National Audit Chamber

South Sudan's Supreme Audit Institution is modelled on the Westminster model. In 2006, the South Sudan Audit Chamber (SSAC) was established under Article 195 of the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS) of 2005. Currently, Clause 186 (1) of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan, 2011, provides for the establishment of an independent institution to be known as the NAC. The constitutional provision was operationalized through enactment of the National Audit Chamber Act, 2011.

The Multi Donor Trust Fund South Sudan (MDTF-SS) Core Fiduciary Systems Support Project which closed in March 2013 supported the NAC with External Audit Agents who were professionals and assisted in preparation of a strategic plan (for 2011–2015), manuals, training, and audit of government accounts from 2005 to 2010.

The World Bank subsequently supported the chamber through an Institutional Development Fund (IDF) titled *Strengthening the Capacity of South Sudan National Audit Chamber*. The core objective has been to strengthen the institutional systems and capacity of the SSAC and promote accountability in the use of public resources. This is done through South-South learning through support from regional Supreme Audit Institutions, and face-to-face and on-the-job training for the staff. It is intended that the NAC will effectively leverage on its limited financial and human resources, experience sharing, building sustainable capacity, and improving the quality of their audits.

As of 2016, the chamber had about 100 national staff. Out of these, only 3 (Auditor General and 2 Deputies Auditor General) are professionally qualified. So far, the NAC has managed to audit and report to the President and Parliament on the national government accounts for the financial years ended June 2005 to 2008. Through the support of this IDF, the audit of the accounts of financial years ended June 2009 to 2013 have been completed awaiting but remained pending in the National Legislative Assembly (NLA).

In principle, the NAC is responsible for auditing at national as well as subnational levels. However, it has lacked non-wage operating resources to actually visit subnational entities.

Source: World Bank staff based on information provided by the NAC.

154. **To create an in-country training platform, the government sought support for the revival of the GATC from 2010 onwards, but with limited success (see also Box 4.3).** First,

courses were offered for accounting staff from the MoFEP and from spending ministries in 2008 (see Budget 2009: 46), and training courses delivered by external consultants using the GATC as a venue since 2007. However, doing so effectively has proved challenging, and has also been affected by stop-go engagement in recent years. There is a perception that many of the initial ad hoc trainings offered at the GATC were too short—for example, only 5 or 10 days—and the duration was insufficient to really absorb new ways of doing things;⁶⁷ that trainings focused too much on general principles, as well as on examples from other countries (for example, Kenya or Tanzania) and not enough on specific processes as in place in South Sudan; and that they did not offer certificates (Fritz and Ort 2015). Efforts to create a proper curriculum and syllabus were initiated, but this process has struggled as most assistance went on hold in 2016.

Box 4.3. Government Accountancy Training Centre (GATC)

The GATC, originally called the Regional Accountancy Training Center (RATC), was established in 1978 by the UNDP. The UNDP and the University of Juba determined training standards and the center trained civil servants from Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr el Ghazal. The UNDP handed the center over to the government in the 1980s when the war broke out and they were unable to operate it. The GATC operated during the war with only short interruptions, providing training in bookkeeping and accounting. Some courses lasted as long as several months. Trainees applied for training and were pre-screened by level of education. Training was provided for approximately four hours per day, and trainees were assessed at the end of the training and given certificates after passing exams administered by the GATC.

Following the CPA, the first funding for the GATC was from CBTF-I through the HELM Corporation in 2006. HELM started delivering training in 2007. From June 2009, the AfDB funded HELM to continue providing trainings. This support ended after 12 months in June 2010. HELM training (largely delivered from the GATC) is often referred to as ‘GATC training’, but this is a misnomer; the GATC used to be an institution but became more of a venue.

In 2010, the MoFEP began efforts to revitalize the GATC as an institution and transform it into a key resource for building PFM capacity among civil servants, including those from subnational levels of government. This effort was supported by the CBTF and the Joint Donor Team under a project which also provided for local trainees to attempt United Kingdom Association of Chartered Certified Accountants qualifications with the GATC serving as the examination center. However, out of the 50 national PFM staff who enrolled, most failed to achieve even the lowest ACCA qualification.

The GATC operates under a GRSS steering committee headed by a Director General for Budget in the Ministry of Finance.

Renewed support was provided under the Project Preparation Facility from the World Bank in 2015–2016. In collaboration with the University of Juba, the GATC developed a draft curriculum in 2016. The curriculum was peer reviewed by similar institutes in Africa, including Liberia’s Financial Management Training Program. A draft syllabus has also been developed by the GATC and is under review.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Focus group discussion, May 5, 2016.

⁶⁸ Interview with Thomas Amudeng, Director of the GATC.

The Department of Accounts in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning has made requests to development partners on several occasions to revamp the GATC to make trainings homegrown. This could potentially reduce the cost of trainings relative to sending staff abroad. However, reviving the GATC has remained difficult for various reasons. After the renewed outbreak of violence in July 2016, further support remains on hold.

Source: Interviews by the authors.

155. Training was also provided for subnational-level staff, including on planning, budgeting, and budget execution. Successful government initiatives to standardize systems and train subnational staff managing public finances have been supported by development partners. These include annual state budget workshops where budget ceilings are released and state officials develop their annual budgets. A further innovation which was developed by the government and has been funded by various development programs (LGSDP, State and Peacebuilding Fund [SPF], EUTAPP, and BSI) has been ‘state mentoring teams’. Composed of an official from the MoFEP, MoLPSHRD, Local Government Board (LGB), and a service delivery agency (MoH, MoE, or MOWRI), these teams travel to state capitals periodically to coach staff on systems for PFM (largely execution of and reporting on intergovernmental fiscal transfers) as well as payroll management. However, at the subnational level, staff turnover and shifts have posed significant challenges. This was then aggravated with the decision in late 2015 to create 18 additional states.

156. Capacity support activities also enabled government staff to undertake a number of study tours and to participate in regional conferences. Generally, management-level staff in South Sudan are well familiar with PFM practices in neighboring countries, including Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. A consideration is the high level of per diem and travel allowances which are associated with such trips. Given that these are seen as a way to compensate for low and decreasing salaries, selectivity and careful design may be required to ensure that further tours have an effect.

157. Alongside specific training activities, development partners funded a number of budget and budget-execution related workshops—between the MoFEP and spending ministries as well as between the MoFEP and state-level ministries. Efforts were also made to combine some ‘frontal delivery’ of training with on-the-job support/on-the-job learning. This was mostly done by TAs who were resident or semi-resident, and who had a good sense of specific training needs.

158. The number of TAs who worked in different directorates and functions of the Ministry of Finance alone is estimated as having grown to around 10 by 2009, and to around 40 at the peak in 2011–2012. This would correspond to around 10 percent of civil service staff. As of 2016, the figure is again around 10, in particular following the closure of the

CORE II project in mid-2015.⁶⁹ Some TAs have been resident in South Sudan, while others have been ‘peripatetic’ with varying durations of presence in the country. TAs report that they delivered both organized training sessions and on-the-job training.

159. **One important missing element of capacity-strengthening efforts for PFM is an absence of monitoring.** Given that ‘capacity gains’ are difficult to quantify or even to assess objectively, few efforts in this direction have been made. This is an important lacuna. There has been a mutual sense between the government and development partners that the results of capacity-strengthening efforts remained unclear. TAs consulted as part of this analysis noted that monitoring of ‘skills transfers’ remained limited; and the issues are also noted in various evaluations for the key major projects that were undertaken (for example, for CORE I).⁷⁰ While not subject to easy fixes, Chapter 6 of this report seeks to set out some ideas of how monitoring could be improved going forward. One important aspect in this regard is to ‘go beyond’ the narrow monitoring between individual development partners and specific consultancy teams and to develop a more holistic monitoring with regard to what improvements in capacity are being achieved in the key functional areas; passing of exams for specific qualifications, and so on.

160. **A further missing element—more from the government side—has been a lack of attention to staff performance even in an elementary way.** Staff are receiving their monthly pay whether they are making an effort or not. Thus some staff receive pay even while rarely actually undertaking work; and those who do engage in work have typically not received extra pay or career opportunities. One TA noted that a key bottleneck to transferring knowledge was the fact that they only met their counterpart six months into a yearlong deployment.

161. **Related to attention to staff performance, turnover has been a challenge.** The UNDP-managed IGAD program which twinned over 1,000 regional civil servants with counterparts for one to two years in national and subnational ministries found that turnover of subnational staff made it difficult to transfer skills. Phase II of the program has adapted by twinning regional civil servants with a larger number—between 4 and 16 twins—with the hope that at least some of the counterparts will remain in place for the 1–2-year program.

162. **Overall, one issue that stands out in South Sudan is the mixing of (most) basic challenges with attempts at more advanced reforms.** On the one hand, South Sudan started off very limited capacities in 2005–2006, including an absence of staff, very low level of familiarity with any form of IT applications, and so on. At the same time, at least for some years, South Sudan’s budgets became fairly sophisticated in terms of reflecting programmatic information, and even providing detailed information on planned investment projects in 2013–2014. Efforts were being made to establish macroeconomic modeling capabilities in the Ministry of Finance,

⁶⁹ This number may drop further after the July 2016 insecurity in Juba.

⁷⁰ See: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAC644.pdf.

and to develop a national development strategy. At the same time, on the ‘basics’ side, some initial efforts were made to develop good enough cash management and accounting and reporting capabilities; however, signs that progress in these areas was stagnating and then slipping emerged relatively early on.

4.3 Main causes and symptoms of slippage in capacity since 2012

163. **Since 2012, the quality of PFM in South Sudan has stagnated or slipped backwards in several areas, with limited further progress in some.** This deterioration was gradual in 2012–2013, including some still hopeful actions taken in 2013, and then deepened since 2014.

164. **With regard to budget preparation, efforts at including programmatic information in the annual budget declined.** Efforts in this regard peaked in 2011, and were reduced subsequently. Following the restart of oil production in May 2013, 2013–2014 saw an attempt at including greater information on key public investment projects, also linked to a top-level initiative to introduce a greater performance orientation in the government. However, this was a one-off attempt that was not continued the following year, when the country was already in conflict.

165. **Also, from FY13/14, only the first six months of execution are reported in the annual budget plans for the following year, reflecting a deterioration in the capability to produce timely reports.** Changes in assistance with generating budget execution reports on the one hand, and greater challenges resulting from the austerity situation on the other hand, triggered a backslippage on the timely production and distribution of in-year expenditure reports.

166. **From FY14/15 the situation worsened, and it has been less and less possible to actually capture and record spending, as well as to develop budgets that had any realism even in aggregate terms.** With the drop in available resources relative to spending commitments, as well as the continuation of internal armed conflict until August 2015, the ability and the commitment to record expenditures in a meaningful way declined.

167. **One of the few remaining areas of relative progress in 2012–2014 was the commitment and efforts toward strengthening the systems for making subnational fiscal transfers and for creating systems to obtain expenditure reports from subnational levels.** New fiscal transfers targeting service delivery were devised, and the government sought to honor these commitments even after the outbreak of conflict in late 2013. However, the limited further progress that was achieved in this area is likely to deteriorate in 2016 and beyond. On the one hand, there are barely any transfers to be made following the devolution and the decline in revenues related to the fall in oil prices. On the other hand, capacities have been disrupted significantly by the establishment of 28 states. The Ministry of Finance is seeking to shore up past gains at least somewhat by distributing instructions on manual recordings and related forms.

168. **As of 2016, deterioration in PFM capacities continues, with a particularly challenging situation with regard to treasury functions.** Many staff in the Directorate of Accounts who previously received training have left for other roles, while the pressures and challenges on the treasury continue to grow. Payment orders are being issued by the Treasury, but are not associated with funds actually being transferred to the block account of spending ministries. Suppliers have remained unpaid, and increasingly, salaries and operating costs are also in arrears, while the value of salaries has collapsed.

169. **The very large discrepancy between available resources and spending commitments creates a widespread pressure toward circumvention of rules and formal processes.** This starts with the collection of revenue and with ensuring that such revenue actually reaches the consolidated fund, and continues at all points along the expenditure chain.

4.4 Conclusions and implications for potential future support

170. **Despite the substantial assistance provided over the past decade, PFM capacity remains inadequate in South Sudan as of 2016, combining some limited improvements with unresolved constraints, as well as backsliding in recent years.** Some of these weaknesses are not only due to the successive crises since 2012 (austerity, civil war, ongoing fiscal crisis), but also due to reasons going beyond this crisis period. Regarding the latter, leadership and managers throughout the system have not encouraged or may even have discouraged financial accountability. This has put staff who have actually sought to apply their training into a difficult position, and seems to have been associated also with the rotation of such staff.

171. **Within the Ministry of Finance, capacity gains appear to have been stronger in the budget directorate, and less so in accounts.** The budget directorate currently has a larger number of active staff. Those who have been involved as TAs over a period of time report increased strategic capacities as well as of basic skills (for example, using Excel, PowerPoint, and so on). Support from the Budget Strengthening Initiative has been concentrated on this department, and over the years, staff who received degrees and work experience abroad (mostly East Africa) have been added.

172. **In part, operating a PFM system literally ‘under the gun’ has been a key constraint.** In South Sudan, the military side of government has continuously dominated over the civilian side rather than vice versa. Moreover, the military has not been one coherent force, but comprises competing groups. Thus, payment vouchers are being issued under a direct threat of violence, as well as under the influence of rent-seeking interests who can—vaguely or more directly—also resort to threatening violence.

173. **The current crisis environment is aggravating capacity constraints.** As of mid-2016, the fiscal and forex crises have led to a situation where many ministries, including the Ministry

of Finance, only have intermittent power or Internet access. At the same time, the value of salaries has dropped by 70 to 90 percent since the devaluations; and salary payments experienced delays. Given this situation, attendance of staff at work has declined.

174. **The acute fiscal crisis has led to a situation where control over cash management has been lost.** Payment vouchers are issued by the Ministry of Finance, but funds are then not de facto available in the accounts of MDAs at the BoSS. As a consequence, payment orders are left pending or need to be reversed and arrears mount. With only few TAs currently available in particular to the Accounts Directorate, recording what payments are actually executed and which ones remain pending has become rather chaotic; and this is overwhelming the capacities of staff.

175. **To get traction on how capacity is strengthened and deployed going forward will require some significant changes, as well as building on some fragmented foundations that currently exist.** Experience from previous TAs suggests that creating routines and systems that everyone can follow and ‘grow into’ is an important asset for making and consolidating capacity gains. This in turn is reliant on a sufficient number of TAs being in place to support establishing systems and routines and to keep them robust for some time, and then to gradually scale back the external support. It also requires a commitment that civil service staff will stay in place long enough to adjust to routines and learn systems.

176. **The risk of a ‘strong TA’ approach is that it just continues dependency rather than involving real capacity transfer, but it is also important to see TAs more as an asset and a source of information for the design of interventions.** As past experience shows, to the extent that TAs are required to produce results, they will often focus on getting the job done first and foremost. At the same time, TAs have to be recognized as an important asset in a difficult context as they often have more detailed information and ‘institutional memory’. A number of TAs have remained far longer in country than the staff of development partners who rotate more frequently. Thus, TA providers can potentially be an asset for identifying what has been tried to date, and how support could be calibrated for any new interventions.

177. **A further risk is that TA providers can face incentives to ‘keep quiet’ about problems, such as those with better embedding the FMIS, as long as they face strong incentives to show continuous progress to funding agencies.** Approaching assistance to South Sudan with realism and being frank about the fact that progress is being hindered by technical, financial, as well as political reasons will be important going forward.

Specific further suggestions for how these challenges could be addressed are set out in Chapter 6 of this note.

5. Capacity in the Health Sector

178. **Decades of civil war and underinvestment have maintained South Sudan's health system in a chronic state of fragility.** In spite of the external support, progress in health outcomes has been modest over the past 20 years and outcomes remain among the lowest in the world while in line with most conflict-affected states in the region such as the Central African Republic or Somalia. Since the first Sudanese civil war in 1955, the health system has almost entirely relied on humanitarian organizations. At the time of the CPA and independence, the key question facing the government and donors was how to transition from a humanitarian-led health system to a government-led one while fostering equity and quality services.

179. **National human capacity⁷¹ in the health sector has been built very slowly and remains highly insufficient but finding skilled people has been only one of the barriers to the transition to a more nationally led health system.** As highlighted in Chapter 2, it is important to underline that other variables also are critical to the overall capacity to deliver services: health infrastructure; inputs such as pharmaceuticals or medical equipment; robustness and equity of the health financing structure (donors, government, user fees, and so on); and PFM (particularly procurement and intergovernmental fiscal transfers). Core functions of the health systems depend entirely on external financing such as the provision and distribution of pharmaceutical commodities. Several stock-outs have been experienced since independence, highlighting the vulnerability of the delivery system to the external health financing structure. Overall, more than two-thirds of the health sector is funded by donors and humanitarian organizations.

180. **Challenges have grown more daunting because of the civil conflict and the ongoing macro-fiscal crisis.** The amount of resources flowing to health, including for operating costs as well as salary expenditures, has been reduced. As of June 2016, the Juba Teaching Hospital had limited electricity and health worker salaries were delayed by up to three months, which has directly affected the quality of care. The latest cycle of violence has led to looting and destruction of health facilities, especially Upper Nile, Unity, and Jonglei, and health workers fled the conflict-affected areas and the country. This compounds an already severe human resources shortage rooted in an underperforming basic education system and professional training, recruitment, and retention challenges. The proposed creation of new states and counties is putting an additional stress on intergovernmental fiscal transfer and human resources systems that had—up to 2015—been gradually improving.

⁷¹ In the context of South Sudan, human capacity refers to the availability of skills to perform the core functions of the service delivery system and achieve the quality of services set out in the Basic Package of Nutrition and Health Services in 2009.

181. **Between 2005 and 2015, capacity shortages have been repeatedly highlighted in key documents⁷² as a bottleneck and priority for improving the health service delivery system in South Sudan.** The policy recommendations formulated in these documents have focused on the production of newly trained health workers. However, efforts to implement these recommendations have suffered from (a) limited funding and attention from both government and donors due to competing humanitarian needs and (b) from systemic issues outside the health sector that weaken their feasibility, especially the poor general education system.

182. **Government and donors’ efforts to produce newly skilled health workers have achieved only limited results due to systemic challenges, especially in attracting, recruiting, and retaining staff in public facilities.** As public servants’ salaries are not paid regularly, and facilities not equipped nor staffed with critical workers, the MoH and donors’ strategy to increase the number of newly trained health workers—although necessary—will not produce the expected outcomes in the expected time frame.

183. **This chapter provides an analysis of the main capacity development challenges, drawing the scarce data available in the country, previous reports, and interviews carried out in May 2016 with government officials, health care workers, training institutes, students, NGOs, UN agencies, and donors.** It provides first an overview of the structure of the health system and institutional capacity challenges, the resources flowing in the sector, and the government responsibilities in human resources management before providing an analysis of the availability, production, training, and recruitment and retention of clinical health workers.

5.1 Health status

184. **South Sudan’s key health indicators have slightly improved over the past 15 years while remaining significantly behind neighboring countries** (see Chapter 3). Chronic exposure to conflict, widespread malnutrition, low access to water and sanitation, and the overall underperforming health system are key determinants of this situation.

185. **Indicators strongly influenced by the availability of skilled clinical personnel seem to have had mixed performance.** Only 19 percent of births are attended by skilled personnel, far behind the Sub-Saharan countries’ average of 49 percent and other postconflict countries such as Liberia (61 percent). While huge disparities within South Sudan are noticeable (Western Bhar el Ghazal reached 60 percent in 2015) (MoH 2015; LQAS 2015), this poor performance is partly the result of human capacity shortages, particularly skilled midwives, obstetricians, and gynecologists. While the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) was one of the highest in the world in

⁷² The JAM in 2005, the “Assessment of Current Capacity of the Ministry of Health in Human Resource Planning, Management and Training” in 2010, the Health Facility Assessments survey in 2011 and 2013 and the Health Sector Development Plan 2012–2016, the strategy paper on “Scaling up Mid-level Health Cadre in South Sudan” in 2014, and the National Health Policy 2015–2024.

2006 with over 2,054 deaths per 100,000 live births,⁷³ in 2015, model estimates suggest that the MMR in South Sudan could have dropped to about 789 per 100,000 births, a level near the Central African Republic, Burundi, Somalia, and Liberia. South Sudan's MMR is still three times higher than neighboring countries such as Rwanda (290), Sudan (311), or Uganda (343).⁷⁴

5.2 Structure of the health system

186. Overall, the system is inefficient and vulnerable to financing shocks, but it is relatively effective in maintaining a minimum level of services across the territory through the combination of government, NGO, and private sector providers.

187. The structure of the health system is complex and reflects the leading role played by humanitarian organizations in delivering services since the first Sudanese civil war. The current system embeds three subsystems: the government system, the humanitarian system, and the private for-profit system. Each system can be modeled using three variables: (a) Funding, (b) Point of delivery, and (c) Staff who deliver services. Staff, funding, and medical inputs (especially pharmaceutical commodities) flow across the subsystems' boundaries which, in practice, creates strong interdependencies between them. Health workers can be recruited by government, nongovernmental, and private for-profit providers. The distribution of this resource among the three subsystems is fluid and changes depending on the constraints and incentives that health workers (salaries, conflict, geographical location, resources to carry out their duties, and so on). Notably, some government health care workers are paid by donor-funded programs while some humanitarian staff deliver services in both government and NGO facilities. Medical supplies are provided by a combination of NGOs, donor programs, UN agencies, and, to a lesser extent, user fees collected at the facility.

188. Donors' support to service delivery is organized geographically through three main programs. Since 2012, the Health Pooled Fund (HPF) covers service delivery in six states, while USAID and the World Bank each support two of the remaining four states.⁷⁵ This has created

⁷³ World Bank (2013). Based on the 2006 household survey, MMR was estimated at 2,054 per 100,000 live births (2006 Southern Sudan Household Health Survey). In addition to significant statistical caveats, it is important to note that this figure is a rough estimate of the MMR during the mid-1990s and not for 2006. Although there are no recent robust estimates of MMR, for the 2007–2008 period, a 2013 World Bank poverty assessment put the figure at 2,000 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births and noted that this “updated estimate indicates that maternal mortality in 2007–08 remained at a catastrophically high level, similar to that during the height of the conflict.”


⁷⁴ WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group, and the United Nations Population Division. 2015. Trends in maternal mortality: 1990 to 2015. Estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group, and the United Nations Population Division. Caution is needed in understanding the MMR estimates as the estimate points are also associated with wide confidence intervals. For example, the confidence interval for the Sierra Leone MMR is 999–1980, and the MMR confidence interval for South Sudan is 523–1150.

⁷⁵ USAID has been supporting the states of Central and Western Equatoria and the HPF has covered Eastern Equatoria, Lakes, Warrap, Unity, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, and Northern-Bahr-el-Ghazal, while the World Bank supports Jonglei and Upper Nile States.

inequities in funding between states, coordination challenges for the MoH, and inefficiencies in the health system, notably for the provision of pharmaceuticals, contracting of NGOs, and monitoring. Some HR systems are linked to particular donor programs, which partially explains incomplete geographical coverage. Among others, the Human Resources Information System has been rolled out only to the states covered by the HPF, although there are plans to expand it to the whole country. Capacity-building activities have focused mostly on national institutions and County Health Departments (CHD), giving the State Ministry Of Health (SMOH) less attention (mostly due to the key role of counties in delivering primary health care). The World Bank has been the only program contracting the CHD instead of NGOs for service delivery while building their management capacity.

Table 5.1. South Sudan's Health Delivery System

	Government	Humanitarian	Private Sector (for-profit)
Source of Funding	Government Budget HPF World Bank USAID Other vertical programs funded by individual donors	Public and private donors Partners such as USAID UN agencies, programs, and funds	Unknown but probably private investors and patients' out-of-pocket expenditure
Point of Delivery	Mostly government health facilities (PHCC, PHCU, hospitals at all levels)	NGOs' and faith-based facilities UN facilities (Refugee and Protection of Civilians Camps, and so on) "Mobile health caravans"	Private facilities (mostly in Juba and other towns), including health services, diagnostic and laboratory services, and pharmacies
Who Delivers Health care	Government employees (paid by the government or NGOs) NGOs' personnel (contracted through donors and the government)	NGOs' personnel UN agencies	Private local; government employees and expatriate providers



Source: World Bank 2016b.

Note: PHCC = Primary Health Care Center; PHCU = Primary Health Care Unit.

189. The shortages of clinical capacity in health facilities and coordination and regulation capacity in the government has raised some discussion about the model of service delivery the country should aim for. The debate about the long-term balance between

public and private provision of health services is still a matter for discussion in the country and this report does not take a stance on what the long-term service delivery system should be in South Sudan. It rather offers an analysis of the structural barriers to strengthening the overall capacity of the system and providers to deliver the expected services with concerns for quality, accessibility, and sustainability. Independently of the model that the country will aim to achieve, South Sudan needs to fill the health human resource gaps to improve health outcomes and reduce the dependency and cost associated with international health workers.

190. **Filling such gaps domestically will take decades but South Sudan may be in the same situation 10 years from now if the government and donors do not dedicate significantly higher resources and efforts to capacity development in the short and medium term** (see recommendations section). Current systemic weaknesses in the public delivery system are de facto contributing to the growth of private for-profit health providers in urban areas while rural areas rely on donor-funded NGOs and government facilities, and humanitarian providers. Whether the current cohabitation of the three sub-systems remains or the country shifts toward more private or public delivery systems does not affect the need to strengthen the regulatory and coordinating role of the government, which is currently lacking.

191. **Given the multiplicity of actors involved in the financing, management, and delivery of services, the coordinating and leadership role of the government should be essential but is in practice limited by the low availability of skilled human resources in the MoH and by the low share it has in the overall financing architecture of the sector.** The country faces similar coordination challenges as those often encountered in conflict environments. The fragmentation of the different programs and divergence of interests between the government, development partners, and humanitarian organizations remain a large source of inefficiencies in the service delivery system.

192. **At the national level, there is some human capacity to perform core functions but the MoH's leadership tends to rely on the relatively more efficient technical assistants.** At independence, there was almost no capacity in the MoH to perform PFM and budget-related tasks nor to manage decentralization, and TAs were leading these activities. Several TAs have been put in place after independence to build capacity in health institutions and, where it is lacking, provide capacity substitution. Although the health system has been stressed by the civil conflict and macro-fiscal crisis, longstanding PFM weaknesses have a direct impact on payment of salaries and operational costs and thus on recruitment and retention of staff at the state, CHD, and facility levels. Today, the MoH is leading these processes at the national and state levels. At the state level, there are highly skilled staff who are constrained by the lack of skilled colleagues at all levels in the SMOH.

193. **Technical assistance has significantly reduced since December 2015, which has translated in lower performance and slower response times but overall, core functions are still being carried out.** Anecdotal evidence indicates that 20–25 percent of TA time is dedicated to providing capacity that is not available in the MoH, and 75–80 percent is dedicated to performing functions that could be handled more cost-effectively by local staff (substitution effect).⁷⁶ Several TAs from USAID, World Health Organization (WHO), Liverpool Associates in Tropical Health (LATH), and NGO Coordination Forum have ended, which has affected the functioning of the system. For example, an embedded TA in the MoH supported the coordination between the CHD, SMOH, and MoH for government grant application to support service delivery. As the TA stopped, the coordination was interrupted and the CHD was not receiving information or feedback on applications. The number of grant requests from the CHD fell to zero in January 2016 due to the lack of coordination and information. Another example is that the national coordination with NGOs was almost entirely interrupted when the NGO forum staff who was embedded in the MoH left. Without TAs, other functions would stop. For example, the district health information system (DHIS) is technically managed by the HPF, although with more training (which requires resources), MoH staff have the capacity to take over.⁷⁷

194. **Formal training for staff at the MoH and SMOH level has been scarce but those dealing with daily activities are the most successful.** Some capacity built with past TA remains. For example, the MoH capacity to implement the HRIS to other states is fully owned by the MoH and could be expanded to the remaining areas (security conditions and fiscal resources permitting) in 2017 without the need for HPF technical assistance. After independence, the SMOH received some basic training on leadership and management from the USAID-supported ‘Health System Strengthening’ program. The SMOHs report that trainings such as ‘how to conduct meetings’ or ‘planning operating transfers to counties’ have been the most helpful and are still applied to carry out their daily tasks. At the CHD level, the World Bank health rapid results projects have focused on building basic management, M&E, HR, and PFM capacity in the CHD that had staff with some skills. The pilot has been successful, was expanded to six counties in Jonglei and Upper Nile States, and is under consideration by the HPF and MoH for replicating the approach in other parts of the country.

195. **The fragmentation of the state and county administration is increasing the need for skilled public servants at the state and county levels, which is not fulfilled.** Some core functions (HR, PFM, M&E) need to be handled at the SMOH level and thus require new staff to manage them in the 18 additional states. Given the current hiring freeze, the SMOHs cannot recruit to fill these positions, leaving functional gaps in the new SMOHs. The gaps are

⁷⁶ Interviews indicate that MoH management tend to use TA resources because they respond faster than local staff, even though local staff have the capacity to perform the functions.

⁷⁷ Interview with international TA at MoH (2016).

compounded by SMOH staff leaving the institutions due to the lack of salary payment, or **the salary differential with NGOs or the MoH**⁷⁸ (the SMOH do not receive the infection allowance). At the county level, the more than 200 counties envisioned by the government, in principle, require the creation of as many CHDs, for which staffing will face the same supply and financial constraints as the SMOH. The capacity shortages have created tensions between the former administrations and the new ones concerning the management of resources. The newly created SMOH and CHD are not minimally staffed and technically cannot perform basic functions but they claim their legal right to decision making and resource management.⁷⁹

5.3 Resources for health

196. **A 2016 Public Expenditure Review in Health highlights the high dependency of the health system on external funding.** Government expenditure is only 14 percent of total expenditure in Health. Development and humanitarian partners finance between 65 percent and 74 percent of the spending, while households' out-of-pocket expenditure on health fills the remaining gap (see Figure 5.1) (World Bank 2016b). With US\$9 per capita (at purchasing power parity), South Sudan had the lowest government expenditure per capita on health in the world.⁸⁰ Since the CPA in 2005, the government successively reduced the share of the health sector in overall government expenditure, from over 7 percent in 2006 to 2 percent in 2015, reflecting the increasing priority given to the security sector over social development (see Annex 8.1).

197. **The combined level of government and donor expenditure is insufficient to cover salaries, operational costs, and investment in health infrastructure, creating unfavorable conditions to attract and retain health workers in health facilities run by government and NGOs.** Since independence, macroeconomic and fiscal shocks have limited the ability of the government to finance the investments envisioned in the Health Sector Development Plan 2012–2016, in particular those related to infrastructure and capacity building. Approximately two-third of government expenditure goes to health finances salaries and one-third to operational costs (although a significant share of operational costs seems to be actually used as salaries). In 2014/2016 and 2015/2016, the government did not dedicate any financing to the procurement of pharmaceutical commodities, relying entirely on donors and humanitarian resources, which only partially cover the needs (World Bank 2016c).

198. **The quasi-permanent focus on resolving immediate humanitarian crisis and compensating for the lack of government financing has limited donor financing for building local clinical and institutional capacity.** Almost all capacity-building activities are funded by donors. Over the period 2012–2015, donors have allocated approximately US\$30

⁷⁸ For data on the salary differential, refer to Section 5.7 'Recruitment and Retention Challenges'.


⁷⁹ Interview with SMOH, 2016.

⁸⁰ Data for the year 2013. World Bank (2016b). See annex 8.

million to human resources development programs in the health sector, compared to over US\$900 million to direct service delivery, including humanitarian activities.⁸¹ Since independence, less than 4 percent of the MoH budget allocated to HRD has been executed, totaling US\$600,000 between 2012 and 2015 (see Annex 8.2).⁸²

199. **Given the current macroeconomic and fiscal context, the dependency on external financing for paying health care workers' salaries, operational costs and capacity building activities is unlikely to change in the short term.** The MoH needs to strengthen its ability to monitor, coordinate, and regulate development, humanitarian, and private providers' activities. The link between training, recruitment, and retention of health care workers in public health facilities must be strengthened for both the government and NGOs to avoid newly trained health workers leaving the health sector to work in sectors not related to health.

Figure 5.1. Government and Donor Resources for Health in 2013 (US\$, millions)



Sources: Authors' estimates based on OECD Aid Data/International Development Statistics, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Financial Tracking System, USAID, and the World Bank; Data available as of May 2015.

Note: These figures do not take into account resources from out-of-pocket expenditure. Government expenditure was converted from SSP to US\$ using fixed official exchange rate based on IMF data.

5.4 Government distribution of responsibilities for human resource management

200. **The responsibilities of the government in the health sector are divided among the national, state, and local levels of government (see Annex 8.3).** Counties are responsible for the provision of primary health services while the national and state administrations are responsible for delivering secondary and tertiary care, handling policy and monitoring functions, and allocating resources and ensuring that they flow to frontline services.

⁸¹ Estimates based on donor mapping exercise, GRSS budgets books, and World Bank 2016c.

⁸² MoFEP, GRSS budget books 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016.

201. **The identification of staffing and training needs, the recruitment process, payroll, and allocation of resources are shared between different level of governments and ministries and they are not strongly linked.** In theory, the MoH recruits staff for the three teaching hospitals and Kiir Mayardit Women's Hospital, the SMOH for state and county hospitals, and counties are responsible for recruiting local health staff and paying them (PHCU, PHCC, and CHD) (GRSS 2014). At all levels, staff appointments are confirmed through the MoLPSHRD (for the national level) and through the State Ministry of Public Service (SMOPS) for subnational levels before being incorporated into the government payroll. In practice, there are overlapping HR functions between the MoH and SMOH and between the SMOH and counties. The MoH recruits, deploys, and pays some doctors, nurses, and lab technicians in state hospitals instead of the SMOH. Similarly, although payroll is supposed to be split between states and counties, some counties' HR functions for the PHCC and PHCU are handled by the SMOH. Some CHDs identify staffing needs and send requests to the SMOH which then provides provisional appointments before the SMOPS confirms permanent appointment.⁸³

202. **Training of doctors is shared between the Ministry of Education and the MoH, while training of mid-level health cadres is shared between the SMOH, SMOE, MoH, and MoE.** Post-graduate training is mostly managed by the MoH. The specific challenges associated with HR are further analyzed in the rest of the chapter.

5.5 Current state of skills in the health sector

203. **Skills shortages in the health sector has been chronic in South Sudan.** During the second Sudanese war (1983–2005), a significant number of skilled health workers left Southern Sudan (formerly composed of the three regions of Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Bahr-el-Ghazal) to neighboring countries. Before the CPA, Southern Sudan had the lowest availability of clinical workers in the then Sudan, which is very low by global standards. In 2001, there were less than 2 physicians per 100,000 inhabitants and 8 qualified midwives in Southern Sudan (see Figure 5.2). After the CPA, former soldiers were absorbed into newly created health institutions and were given positions without having the necessary skills (mostly in the MoH and SMOH).⁸⁴


204. **At the time of the CPA, donor-supported programs attempted to bridge the gap through quick-win strategies.** Many health workers who had fled during the war came back to Southern Sudan through a USAID-funded program but most of them did not stay due to the low level of salaries. More than 2,000 South Sudanese were trained as Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) and village midwives through a 9-month-long training and absorbed into the government payroll with the goal of quickly deploying them throughout the country to reduce the catastrophic MMR. Today, village midwives and TBAs remain mostly unskilled workers,

⁸³ Interviews with the MoH, May 2016.

⁸⁴ Interviews with the MoH, May 2016.

sometimes implementing harmful practices for the populations and creating tension with newly trained skilled registered midwives and nurses. As they have poor levels of basic education and literacy, most TBAs and village midwives cannot be upgraded to the level of a registered or diploma midwife. The potential recruitment of newly trained skilled health workers into the government payroll is made more difficult due to the existing TBA wage bill.⁸⁵

Figure 5.2. Physicians Density per State, Sudan 2001



Source: Sudan Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), 2005, Volume III.

Note: Today's South Sudan covers the former Sudanese states of Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal, and Equatoria. Include government NGOs and private providers.

205. **After independence, the estimated gap in health workers was estimated to be 15,000 (see table 5.2).** The recruitment plan would have brought an increase in the number of nurses/midwives from 2 to 3 per 100,000 people between 2012 and 2015 and the number of physicians from 1.5 to 3 per 100,000 people.⁸⁶ Filling this gap would have required a 650 percent increase in clinical staffing within 4 years (2012–2016) across the whole sector. In addition, there was a need to provide supplementary training to active health care workers whose skills were often not at the level of international minimum standards. In 2006, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) developed an 18-month training programs for ‘community midwives’

⁸⁵ Interviews with the HPF, MoH. For an example of the potential harm of TBA, see “Surgeons save baby injured by harmful traditional birth practice.” <https://medium.com/saving-lives-in-south-sudan/surgeons-save-baby-injured-by-harmful-traditional-birth-practice-16c1703c80b9#.lc3ndiayv>.

⁸⁶ MoH. HSDP 2012–2016.

but only some of them were absorbed in the government payroll and skills were not up to international standards.

Table 5.2. Indicative Minimum Human Resources for Health (HRH) Gaps and Recruitment Needs in Public Facilities

Priority Human Resources for Health	2012 Estimated Baseline	2016 (MoH Recommended Staffing Norms)	Number of HRH to Recruit (Gaps Based on Basic Needs)
Consultant/Specialist	18	96	78
Medical Officers	86	472	386
Registered Nurse	83	1,024	941
Enrolled Nurse	1,110	4,984	3,874
Registered Midwife	19	512	493
Enrolled Midwife	132	3,656	3,524
Clinical Officers	224	1,490	1,266
Laboratory Technologist	38	230	192
Laboratory Technician	75	690	615
Pharmacists	18	137	115
Pharmacy Technician	32	822	790
Nutritionist	35	144	109
Dentist	20	81	61
Dental Technician	14	162	148
Medical Imaging Technologist	14	81	67
Radiologist	0	13	13
Physiotherapist	0	26	26
Disease Surveillance Officer	35	160	125
Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	35	318	283
Public Health Officer	37	1,845	1,770
Psychiatrist	0	11	11
Psychiatric Technician	0	112	112
Statistician	0	72	72
Total	2,025	17,138	15,071

Source: HSDP 2012–2016.

Note: Staffing estimates for 2012 is based on public facilities (PHCU, PHCC, and hospitals). It includes staff paid by NGOs and the government in these facilities.

206. The MoH and donors’ plan to fill the gap has not materialized and the number of newly trained skilled staff is marginal. The last staffing assessment conducted in 2013

revealed that only 2.5 percent of PHCCs meet the MoH normal standards.⁸⁷ The same assessment indicated that even if we divided by 2 the minimum number of staff required in a facility and ignore the certification requirements for nurses and midwives, only 13 percent of PHCCs would meet the criteria (see Table 5.3 for disaggregate data by cadre). This is a slight regression compared to earlier years: in 2011, 15 percent of PHCCs met that criteria, and although the difference may not be statistically significant, it confirms that the situation had not improved since independence (MoH 2013).

207. **Partial data seem to indicate that while there has been some progress, there is still a gap of more than 11,000 priority staff in public facilities (independent of whether they are employed by the government or NGOs).** The 2016 HRIS data indicate that there are approximately 2,000 priority staff (as defined in Table 5.2) in 5 out of the 10 states (see Table 5.4) and based on partial data, there could be around 4,000 staff in the remaining 5 states—Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity.⁸⁸

Table 5.3. Human Resources by Cadre and Level of Health Facility (PHCC)

Cadre of Health Worker	% of PHCCs with None	% of PHCCs with 1 or More	% of PHCCs with 2 or More
Nurses	24	76	48
Midwife	56	44	19
Medical assistant or clinical officer (or physician)	28	72	33
Pharmacy technician or assistant	32	68	25
Laboratory technician or assistant	41	59	22
Community Health Worker	24	76	52

Source: MoH, Health Facility Survey 2013.

Note: The total number of PHCCs is estimated to be between 240 and 300.

208. **At the time of the CPA, the government and some donors were planning to progressively absorb part of the South Sudanese health workers working for NGOs into the government payroll while increasing the training of medical students to fill the human resource gaps.** The 2012 oil shutdown and recent macroeconomic and fiscal crisis hindered the MoH ability to absorb more staff on the payroll. Given the persisting humanitarian needs and the limited supply of newly trained local staff, NGOs have maintained their staff on their own payroll and partially filled the gaps by attracting health workers from outside the country.

⁸⁷ A total of 119 PHCCs were surveyed. The total number of PHCCs in South Sudan is estimated to be between 240 and 300.

⁸⁸ This excludes TBAs and village midwives who are on the government payroll but not considered as ‘skilled’ workers in the assessments (due to literacy problems and low level of training—no more than 9 months).

209. **Based on the limited data available (see Table 5.4), foreign workers seem to be a minority of health care workers (less than 4 percent)—but the HRIS is likely to underestimate foreign staff.** In the five states covered by the HRIS, only 69 workers are foreigners, out of 1,989 clinical workers. About 77 percent of foreign clinical workers are Ugandans. Almost all of them work at the facility level, mostly as nurses, midwives, clinical officers, lab technicians and to a lesser extent, specialist doctors (anesthetist, gynecologist, and surgeon). As there are no representative data from nongovernment providers, it is impossible to quantify the extent to which the system is dependent on foreign health care workers for service delivery (though they have a leading role in training and tutoring students; see section 5.6 on training). While there are no comprehensive data on NGO staff, some examples seem to confirm that foreign workers are a minority among health care workers. Médecins Sans Frontières currently deploys a total of 3,000 South Sudanese staff and 330 international staff, indicating roughly a 1:10 ratio of national to non-national staff for both clinical and nonclinical workers.

Table 5.4. Nationality of Workers for Clinical Staff by State (as of May 2016)

	Eastern Equatoria	Lakes	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	Warrap	Western Bahr el Ghazal	Total
South Sudanese	634	112	184	274	716	1,920
Kenya	7			3		10
Uganda	49	2		6		57
Zimbabwe	1			1		2
Grand Total	691	114	184	284	716	1,989


Source: HRIS May 2016.

Note: The data capture HRIS files for positions similar to those included in 2012 estimates of table 5.4. Data cover health workers in facilities run by government, NGOs, and faith-based organizations (but excludes private for-profit providers).

210. **The distribution of health workers across states is uneven and 40 percent of them have their salaries paid by donors and NGOs.**⁸⁹ Western Bahr el Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria have twice as many health workers as Lakes, Warrap, or Northern Bahr el Ghazal. These two states also rely less on donor support. More than 50 percent of the staff in Lakes, Warrap, and Northern Bahr el Ghazal are funded by the HPF while in Eastern Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal, overall, less than 20 percent of the staff are funded by the HPF (see Figure 5.3).

⁸⁹ Data only available for the five states covered by the HRIS. NGOs include faith-based organizations.

Figure 5.3. Health Pool Fund Analysis of Total Health Workforce by Funder



Source: Ministry of Health.

Note: Data include medical and nonmedical staff on HRIS files. Data from HRIS files as of May 31, 2016.

211. **The plans to scale up training of health workers have focused entirely on the supply side (that is, increasing the number of trained people), leaving recruitment and retention issue unaddressed.** In 2014, several HR development strategies and recommendations developed since 2005 have led the MoH to order double the production of newly trained mid-level cadres while upgrading certificates to diploma degrees (extending the period of theoretical and practical training) (MoH 2014). This ongoing strategy foresees the increase of the number of classrooms, qualified tutors, equipment, learning materials, access to facilities for practical training and mentoring, and development of tracking mechanisms of graduating students. However, in practice, only three or four donor-supported institutes have been able to dedicate enough resources to implement the plan in a way that will produce the expected quality of training. While these objectives face feasibility and financing challenges on the ground, they are necessary to fill the capacity needs in the sector 20 or 30 years from now but will take even longer if actions to foster recruitment and retentions of health workers and students are not undertaken.

5.6 Production issues

5.6.1 Limited pool of candidates for training

212. **In South Sudan, the pool of potential candidates is limited due to the dysfunctional and underfunded education system, as discussed in Chapter 3.** In 2005, the JAM already emphasized the severe capacity constraint in the health sector due to limited supply of secondary school graduates. Such capacity shortage has been intrinsically linked to the state of the education system in the country. As all clinical staff should have a minimum level of reading and writing skills, as well as basic mathematical and science skills, a long-term capacity development

strategy in the health sector cannot be built without a performing education system, which is lacking today.

213. **Interviews with partners and training institutes confirm the difficulty enrolling students with the required qualifications in the medical school at University of Juba and in mid-level cadres programs.** The most common challenges are (a) generally low level of literacy and basic education; (b) lack of knowledge of English (primary and secondary education done in Arabic, especially in the northeast); and (c) lack of mathematics and basic chemistry/biology knowledge and more importantly ‘practicals’ (non-theory courses); for students coming from South Sudanese schools compared to those attending schools in neighboring countries (see Annex 8.4); 4), the perception of the relatively low ‘social status’ associated with mid-level cadres.

5.6.2 Limited training capacity for clinical/medical education

214. Although most of the recruitment of students into medical schools and training centers are based on a relatively good meritocratic basis, some enrollments are imposed through political pressures exerted on educational institutions, resulting in unskilled students being enrolled and compounding issues of over-enrollment in programs and crowded classrooms.

215. **South Sudanese students trained in South Sudan attend pre-service training in health training institutions (often called Health Science Institutes) for mid-level cadres and in South Sudanese Universities for physicians.** Mid-level cadres’ programs are mostly funded by donors, faith-based organizations, SMOHs, and student fees. Medical school is mostly financed by the MoE, MoH, and student fees. Those trained outside South Sudan study abroad mostly for high cadres’ programs (mostly in Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Egypt). These finance their studies through their own means or to a lesser extent, through donor-funded programs (to Canada, United States, or other African countries).

216. Building upon ten years of HR assessments and strategies, a 2014 Review of the Health Training Institutions in South Sudan by HPF identified the following key barriers in HRH:

- **Linkages between stakeholders in the system appear weak**, which affects system efficiencies as well as the quality of training and service delivery.
- **Duplication of ‘on-the-job trainings’ from different partners.** The same workers are trained several times on the same topics, with limited impact.
- **Resources currently provided to support health care training and health care systems are insufficient**, especially in the areas of staff; teaching and learning materials (only 2 Health Training Institutions [HTIs] had adequate student/textbook ratio); laboratories/demonstration rooms (only 2 HTIs had adequate structure); and health care

facilities supplies. HTIs are underfunded and overwhelmingly financed by partners. Only 3 HTIs are fully run by SMOHs and the MoH pays staff salaries in 3 HTIs but does not cover any other costs. Partners provide the remaining funding and technical assistance.

- **There are not enough tutors, instructors, and qualified mentors, and their skills are limited.** Faculty and clinical instructors need more support, supervision, and training to perform their roles more effectively and to transfer quality knowledge to students.
- **Policy on attracting and retaining students and tutors and clinical instructors is weak** (no visible career pathway for tutors; no system to link training and professional development to promotion or change in salary).
- **Weak systems for identifying, recruiting, and training clinical mentors or preceptors.**
- **Saturation of clinical placements sites for student's practical training** (not enough health facilities to be trained at with appropriate mentor/student ratio), which affects the quality of training.
- **Curricula for health care training, while strong in many aspects, need evaluation, revision, and standardization** to align with national priorities and international standards.

217. **In 2015/2016, the student intake doubled compared to 2014, and over 950 students were admitted in mid-level cadre programs in 15 Health Science Institutes** (or HTIs), reflecting the fact that efforts to quicken the pace of 'production' are having some effect. One of the institutes has been relocated to Uganda due to the conflict in Jonglei State. Nine of them are concentrated in the Equatoria region while three are in Wau (see Table 5.5). At this pace, the skills gap could theoretically be filled in 15 to 20 years.⁹⁰ However, as in other countries, there are concerns that 'forcing up' the numbers of trainees against quantitative targets ignores the need to also scale up the capacity for quality instruction, related to the factors outlined just above.

218. **The scale-up policy of the government and donors is not supported by the corresponding level of resources (funding, tutors, classrooms, learning materials, and so on) and the financing burden has been transferred to students and donors.** Interviews in Juba indicate that HTIs have been pushed to admit more students than they have capacity to manage, creating overcrowded classrooms, with no equipment and learning materials available to students. Although medical school is theoretically free, in 2015/2016, students had to sign a

⁹⁰ Assuming some degree of dropouts and trained staff leaving the sector, but without a more dramatic turnover.

commitment to pay a SSP 5,000 tuition fee “if the government could not pay”.⁹¹ In response to the lack of government financing, the HTIs for mid-level cadres that are not supported by donors have implemented tuition, which in Juba, is SPP 3,500 per student.

219. The lack of skilled professionals and tutors to train students constitutes a severe bottleneck for scaling up health workers’ training. At independence, HTIs were underdeveloped and there were not enough tutors to cover the training needs. In 2011, an estimated number of 7 tutors were available in the country for a need of 533 (see Annex 5). Tutors are considered ‘qualified’ if they have completed a diploma and a tutor training but as diploma programs have started in recent years, in the short term, training and practical mentoring will rely heavily on international professionals.⁹²

220. Moreover, such a scale-up policy will increase the pressure on placements for practical training, even though there are already not enough skilled health workers in public facilities to mentor students. Partnerships with humanitarian NGOs and private providers could be explored to distribute students more evenly across the 3 subsystems.

Table 5.5. List of Functioning Health Training Institutions (as of June 2016)

Name of Training Institution	Cadre Trained	Ownership of Training Institution	Location of HTI	Total Number of Students in 2014 in the Institution	Last Information on Intake in 2014/15 or 2015/16
Juba College of Nursing and Midwifery (JCONAM)	Diploma Nurse	National (Financial and Technical Support by IMC through funds from CIDA/UNFPA)	Central Equatoria	133	53
	Diploma Midwife				
Juba Health Science Training Institute	Clinical Officer	SMOH	Central Equatoria	128	230
	Laboratory Medical Technician				
	Theatre Technician				
Juba Nursing and Midwifery School	Enrolled Nurse	SMOH	Central Equatoria	60	Unknown
	Enrolled Midwife				
The Kajo Keji Health Training Institute (Private)	Clinical Officer	Faith based (Financial and Technical Support by ICMDA Health Initiatives)	Central Equatoria	128	65
	Laboratory Medical Technician				
Yei Health Science	Diploma Nurse	National	Central	105	Unknown

⁹¹ Interview with students in Juba, May 2016.

⁹² In 2014, half of the tutors in HTIs were international workers. See annex 8.

Name of Training Institution	Cadre Trained	Ownership of Training Institution	Location of HTI	Total Number of Students in 2014 in the Institution	Last Information on Intake in 2014/15 or 2015/16
Institute (Previously: Yei National Health Training Institute)	Diploma Midwife		Equatoria		
	Laboratory Technician				
Kajo Keji Health Science Institute (Previously: Kajo Keji National Health Training Institute)		National (Financial and Technical Support by UNFPA)	Central Equatoria	None	37
Maridi Health Science Institute (Previously: National Health Training Institute)	Clinical Officer	National (Financial and Technical Support by Amref Health Africa)	Western Equatoria	105	105
	Registered Midwife				
Lui Midwifery School	Registered Midwife	Doctors with Africa Cuamm	Western Equatoria	21	21
Torit Nursing School	Diploma Nurse	SMOH	Eastern Equatoria	72	90
	Diploma Midwife				
Catholic Health Training Institute	Registered Midwife	Faith based (Financial and Technical Support by Solidarity with South Sudan)	Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal	33	50
	Registered Nurse				
Mary Help College of Nursing and Midwifery	Registered Nurse	Faith based (Financial support by Diocese of Wau)	Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal	62	50
	Enrolled Midwife				
Wau Health Science Institute (Previously: Wau Midwifery School)	Registered Midwife	National (Financial and Technical Support by IMC through funds from CIDA/UNFPA IMC)	Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal	46	25
Rumbek Health Science Institute (Previously: Health Training School)	Nurse	National (Financial and technical support by EU through Malteser International)	Lakes	Unknown	77
Aweil Health Sciences Training Institute	Clinical Officer	National	Northern Bahr el Ghazal	120	120
	Diploma Nurse				
	Diploma Midwife				

Name of Training Institution	Cadre Trained	Ownership of Training Institution	Location of HTI	Total Number of Students in 2014 in the Institution	Last Information on Intake in 2014/15 or 2015/16
National Institute of Health Sciences (Relocated in 2014 to Mengo Hospital in Kampala, Uganda)	Clinical Officer	Run by International Christian Medical and Dental Association in the buildings of Mengo hospital	Jonglei, but relocated to Uganda	51	51
	Diploma Nurse				
	Diploma Midwife				
Total intake (number of students to be admitted in first year)					974

Source: Information gathered by the research team (as of June 2016).

Note: CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency; ICMDA = The International Christian Medical and Dental Association; IMC = International Medical Corps.

221. **The production capacity of physicians is very low (around 60 students per year compared to over 350 graduating students in Uganda and Kenya) and training is only available for the few areas for which specialists are available in the country.** To train as physicians and specialists, students must study at the College of Medicine at the University of Juba, which was relocated from Khartoum to Juba in 2007.⁹³ Until 2015, graduating students from medical schools had only one year of assignment in one of the three teaching Hospitals (Juba, Wau, and Malakal),⁹⁴ after which they would be recruited by the SMOH or NGOs. However, as the MoH and health partners realized that doctors were not able to deliver the expected services when they were deployed in county hospitals, PHCCs, and PHCUs, the college of surgeons and physicians was created in July 2015 to provide the trainees with the skills to ‘perform basic surgeries with confidence in remote areas’ (at the county and *payam* levels), extending the training from one to two years.⁹⁵

222. **For Juba medical school, the limited pool of potential candidates graduating from South Sudanese secondary institutions is complemented by South Sudanese students who have studied abroad and are better equipped for university studies.** For the cohort scheduled that graduated in 2016, 14 out of 60 students had a foreign educational background (intake of 2008), mostly in Sudan and Uganda, and to a lesser extent in Kenya and Ethiopia. The different education systems create significant knowledge and skill gaps between the students when they enter medical school.

⁹³ In 1992, due to the war, the Universities of Wau, Malakal, and Juba were moved to Khartoum and merged into one entity (for students and staff who were willing to go there). After the CPA, the universities came back to their city of origin.

⁹⁴ Due to the December 2013 conflict, the only places to intern are Juba and Wau. Malakal hospital is not receiving students for practical training.

⁹⁵ Interview with Dr. Maiewen, Juba Teaching Hospital, May 2016.

223. **The challenges experienced by students during their pre-service training reduce the likelihood of joining government facilities, foster dropouts, and also affect service delivery in teaching hospitals.** Scholarships to help students pay for transportation, learning materials, and living expenses suffer from the same woes as government salaries (that is, delays and nonpayment), forcing students to take up other jobs (mostly in security companies or as school teachers) and leaving them with less time to study. In 2015/2016, most students did not receive scholarships and interns (known as ‘house officers’) went on strike at the Juba Teaching Hospital over unpaid ‘incentives’.⁹⁶ Given their role in the referral and delivery chain, service delivery was interrupted at the hospital. Accommodation reserved for students is—irregularly—occupied by former doctors who are not working for the government but for NGOs or oil companies, creating a housing shortage for students and triggering additional out-of-pocket expenses. Although no data are available to assess the extent of the issue, these challenges seem to foster dropouts from the health sector. As some programs in Kenya and Uganda offer up to US\$1,000 (including free accommodations) to intern in referral hospitals, all these issues reduce the capacity of South Sudan to retain human capital in the country, affecting both public and private health providers.

224. **On-the-job training for government and NGO clinical staff working in public facilities is limited.** On average, 81 percent of health care workers reported having received some training over the past 12 months in 2013. This represents an increase of 9 points compared 2011 (see Table 5.6). However, each staff received occasional trainings covering very few different areas. More than half of the staff received training related to malaria, which would reflect both the priority given to malaria diagnosis and treatment by donors and by the government and the relatively high level of resources allocated to its treatment. While it is difficult to isolate the staff-related effect from other variables (availability of drugs, campaign outreach, and so on), we can observe that the rate of treatment of malaria has improved over the past few years (see Annex 8.6). However, the higher trainings in immunizations and antenatal care have not translated in higher outcomes (see Annex 8.7).

225. **In-service training is mostly funded and performed by donors and NGOs.** On-the-job training relies heavily on international staff contracted by NGOs (both doctors and mid-level cadres). Although training is conducted on an ad hoc basis rather than following a planned structure, skills seem to be transferred to local staff working for NGOs though limited by the general weak educational background.⁹⁷ In government facilities, similar skills transfer can occur, where NGO staff work with government workers. However, in government hospitals,

⁹⁶ Although interns do not receive salaries per se, they are supposed to receive financial incentives from the government as a compensation for their work in hospitals. In 2016, 61 interns worked at the Juba Teaching Hospital. In 2016, a newly inaugurated HTI in Aweil was calling for donor support to finance SSP 400 monthly scholarships to prevent student dropout (120 students intake 2015/2016), as well as to buy fuel for the generators.

⁹⁷ Interviews with NGOs.

there is no real training due to the lack of incentives, qualified tutors, resources, and the widespread apathy rooted in the absence of salary payments and overall dilapidated public health system. Few doctors from the diaspora are providing on-the-job training to local clinical staff on an ad hoc basis, with great difficulty in finding ‘trainees to train’.⁹⁸

Table 5.6. Training Capacity in Public Institutions (including both NGO and government staff)

Percentage of health workers reporting receiving some training in the previous 12 months		
	2011	2013
National mean	72	81
Training area in the previous 12 months		
Immunization	31	46
Pneumonia in children	26	42
Diarrhoea	34	42
Malaria	36	54
Artemisinin Combination Therapy (ACT)	43	52
Mosquito nets	31	43
Intermittent preventive treatment	29	39
Nutrition	26	38
Breastfeeding	23	28
Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI)	21	39
Newborn care	18	26
Postnatal care	19	26
Antenatal care	23	29

Source: 2011 and 2013 Rapid Health Facility Surveys, MoH.

226. **The major training initiatives have focused on mid-level cadres with maternal and reproductive health**, partly due to the alarming MMR which was three times higher than most African countries (2,054 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2006). Many partners have supported trainings through HTIs with funding and technical assistance.

227. **International programs for training tutors have very small intakes, they are partially working and graduating tutors face the same disincentives as other health professionals.** In 2014, 29 tutors were in training in Tanzania and Kenya with donor funding.⁹⁹ Despite the need, none of the students were trained in midwifery. For nine of them, the degree

⁹⁸ Interviews with health professional in Juba.

⁹⁹ Donors include Canada-UNFPA, the EU, and KOHFI.

pursued was unknown. Some tutors did not come back to South Sudan and others did but were not employed as of May 2016.¹⁰⁰

5.7 Recruitment and retention challenges

228. **Increasing the number of South Sudanese health workers can only increase the capacity of the system if they are employed and retained by government, NGOs, and/or private providers.** Currently, the conditions for recruiting and retaining newly trained health workers in the health sector are not met, mostly because too few scholarships are paid, government health workers and tutors are not paid, and the resources to carry out their duties are not available in most facilities (specifically medical inputs, equipment, accommodation, and security).

229. **There is a disconnect between the supply and demand for health workers.** Training institutes and medical school do not have systems in place to track students who graduated. As a result, there is no knowledge of whether students work in the health sector upon graduation or what organizations they work for (government, NGOs, or private sector). The absence of feedback mechanisms between training institutes and employers results in missed opportunities to know whether employers are satisfied with the skills and training of the students and to improve the curriculum accordingly. While the demand for newly trained health workers is high, NGOs and government facilities are not coordinating with training institutions to link job seekers with the job market.¹⁰¹ This disconnect seems to limit the effectiveness of the HR strategy as some students remain unemployed upon graduation and health providers struggle to fill vacancies. The situation for private providers is not known, though, since the localization in urban centers may reduce the recruitment difficulties and linkages with graduating students.

230. **The sector as a whole (NGO, private, government) does not face an absorption challenge from the standpoint of risk of saturation.** As described earlier, the needs for skilled health care worker remain largely unfulfilled, especially in rural areas. In addition to vacant positions, a significant number of personnel delivering health services in government facilities are unskilled (especially TBAs), calling for either their replacement or their training (although limited by the illiteracy rate). The government's most important challenge is its financial capacity to absorb new staff in the payroll given the 2012 hiring freeze and the current macro-fiscal crisis. NGOs have greater financial capacity (although still limited) to absorb new workers and face difficulties to attract skilled personnel (including foreign workers), especially to work in remote areas.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with MoH, May 2016.

¹⁰¹ Interview with donors in Juba.

231. **Nonetheless, interviews with students and partners in Juba seem to indicate that young graduates would prefer to work in public facilities than for NGOs or private providers.** The parameters influencing their decisions are the following:

- Pride and responsibility to serve the people of South Sudan.
- The problem of regularity of payment of government salaries is more important than the relative salary differential with NGOs and private providers (although the current magnitude of the gap seems to ease the decision process).
- Availability of support staff in the facilities (skilled nurses and midwives, administrative staff) to be able to carry out their duties.
- Minimum medical equipment available to carry out their duties.
- Availability of accommodations and water for facilities in remote areas.
- Security conditions in the area of duty.

232. **Graduating students from the College of Physicians and Surgeons mention that working in a region where they are not originally from is not a concern for them as long as the working conditions and salaries are provided.** However, other interviews indicate that NGOs need to adjust the level of salary, benefits, and currency of payment to be able to attract workers from other regions, especially to remote areas. While health actors in some regions (such as Aweil) emphasize the difficulty to attract health workers, the figures seem to indicate that they have a relatively high number of staff compared to other regions (see Table 5.2).

233. **To reinforce the link between training and recruitment, some counties are funding the clinical studies of students from their counties and hiring them as civil servants before they start their programs.** In 2015/2016, 30 students coming from Central Equatoria, Abyei, and Pibor were sent by their counties to the Central Equatoria Health Science Institute. However, counties report facing issues finding candidates with secondary education. Some graduating students do not come back to the counties and go to work for NGOs or abroad due to the low government salaries offered at the county level. So while in principle, it is a good idea to train people on the initiative of their home community, there are still challenges on how to make this work in practice, especially in the context of deeply eroded salary levels.

234. **The nonpayment of government workers who are on government payroll has become an increasing obstacle to attract and retain newly trained workers in government facilities.** For government workers, the problem has been recurrent since independence and is being compounded by the recent macroeconomic and fiscal crisis. As already highlighted in 2010, government health workers are not receiving their salaries regularly—if at all—which

makes it very “unlikely that the recommendations can be implemented and that any effort put into strengthening the capacity of HR planners, managers and trainers will be useful.”¹⁰² By mid-2016, health workers’ salaries had not been paid for at least three months. Interviews in Juba indicate that in the absence of salary, some doctors and mid-level cadres on government payrolls are working ‘part-time’ in private for-profit health facilities while remaining on the government payrolls. In this case, while medical staff may remain in the country, without adequate regulatory capacity, the growth of private providers increases access and equity issues. Moreover, while the government put in place a ‘hardship allowance’ to attract health workers to rural areas, it has—in practice—not been implemented mostly due to budgetary constraints. Few doctors join NGOs since they usually do not recruit doctors to deliver services but rather offer temporary duties to design public health programs and conduct training of lower levels of cadre.

235. Health workers on government payroll seek better income predictability by working for NGOs, private health providers, creating their own clinics (for physicians only) or by leaving the health sector to work in non-health-related businesses.¹⁰³ Salaries paid by NGOs and private sector providers are both higher than the government and workers are almost always paid. In spite of several MoH efforts to harmonize salaries between NGOs and government health workers, NGOs have kept using the U.S. dollar to pay the salaries of local health workers (or they indexed SSP salaries to U.S. dollars) to compensate for inflation and attract and retain health workers.

236. Up to October 2014, the SSP value of salaries paid by the government and by NGOs was relatively close, making the reliability of salary payments the key difference; however, since then the gap has widened significantly (see also Annex 8). Figure 5.4 shows that if two nurses working for an NGO and in government received the same salary in 2012 (SSP 2,000 monthly or approximately US\$450), in 2016, the real income of the nurse whose salary is tied to the U.S. dollar was 2 to 4 times higher than the real income of the nurse working for the government and paid in SSP. Competition among NGOs to attract scarce-skills workers (especially clinical officers) and with private providers have fueled a process of one-upmanship that has contributed to drive up salaries of the health workforce in the country and to a high turnover of staff between the three delivery sub-systems.

237. To bridge this gap, the MoH put in place an ‘infection allowance’ that has been partially implemented in 2015/2016. The infection allowance seeks to increase the salaries of eligible government health workers to meet those of their NGO counterparts. The effectiveness


¹⁰² HR assessment - LATH 2010.

¹⁰³ Interviews with the MoH in Juba, + presentation MoH.

of such mechanism has been limited.¹⁰⁴ The infection allowance should be regularly adjusted to reflect inflation and exchange rate variations. As inflation and exchange rate rise and NGOs keep paying in U.S. dollars, the infection allowance is requiring more and more financing to fully play its compensatory role (see Annex 8.8 and Figure 5.4). While the exchange rate and inflation could stabilize with a future peace process, the irregularity of salary payment combined with the magnitude of the salary gap between NGOs and the government is preventing the government from attracting newly trained health workers in the facilities.

238. **An even more critical issue is that students graduating from medical school and HTIs are leaving the health sector to work in private businesses such as trade or security companies** (interviews with students from Juba medical school refer to 50 percent of graduating students). In such cases, the MoH and donors' resources invested in developing capacity in the health sector are not contributing to reducing the skills shortage. Both donors and the government must urgently address salary issues to strengthen the link between production and availability of skills at the facility level.

Figure 5.4. Real Purchasing Power Difference between Government and NGO Salaries for a Registered Nurse (2012–2016)



Source: Authors' estimates based on national inflation (Consumer Price Index) and exchange rate (in Juba) data from World Bank High Frequency Survey - Market Price Surveys of South Sudan (June 2016).

¹⁰⁴ Key issues relate to the rollout of key IT systems to be eligible. Primary health care workers must meet strict criteria to receive the allowance, including a personnel file on the HRIS and appropriate qualifications verified by the MOH at both the county and state levels, and be paid using the employee payroll system (SSEPS).

Note: Theoretical illustration of real salary gap between a nurse working for the government (paid in SSP and benefitting from government adjustments) and a nurse's salary paid in U.S. dollars (or tied to U.S. dollars; no salary adjustment), starting with the same salary in 2012 (that is, 1964 SSP). Starting salary and subsequent adjustments are based on the MoH Harmonized Salary Scale (July 18, 2013), Common Salary Scale (March 10, 2015), and the Interim NGO Salary Scale (March 18, 2106).

239. The South Sudanese diaspora has a role in providing highly skilled specialist doctors for service delivery, building local capacity, and performing key managerial functions in health facilities. South Sudanese diaspora with medical training are relatively few in number and are often dual citizens. Local health workers recognize them as a key source of knowledge and skills that can be transmitted. Even more so, they are also seen as having influence on political processes and decisions that trigger changes and improve their work environment (funding for the hospitals, provision of inputs, and so on). While some of them state that their motivation to work in South Sudan is driven by their commitment to help their country, the sustained irregularity in the payment of salaries weakens their incentives to stay in the country. Some doctors are also concerned about staying disconnected from up-to-date medical knowledge (due to the lack of books, conferences, and Internet access) and from other countries' labor market for an extended period (loss of practice and knowledge of evolving standard procedures).¹⁰⁵

Box 5.1. Building a Health Sector Workforce in Timor-Leste (from Institutions Taking Root)

“The health sector workforce was decimated by the withdrawal of Indonesian health personnel. Of 135 doctors who had been working in the region during the Indonesian occupation, only 30 remained, and low levels of qualified human resources are still a major constraint on the ministry's performance. The rapid response of emergency health workers and NGOs to the referendum violence, together with the arrival of 230 Cuban doctors in 2004, gave the sector a critically needed boost. The MoH's early and aggressive capacity building also made an important contribution to the MoH's future development. According to the MoH, there are now 1,400 permanent employees and 300 vacancies in the health sector. But, with a fragmented and incomplete health information system, it is difficult to get a comprehensive picture of the size and structure of the health sector workforce.

As of 2007, there were some 50 senior managers or directors (grade-level 6 or above) and at least 130 middle-management personnel at grade-level 5 or above (Asante et al. 2011, 3). Each of the ministry's directors interviewed for this case study had been a nurse or a health administrator during the occupation, although management capacities were still weak after the referendum. Basic management skills further developed through steady and consistent empowerment and under crisis conditions. Several MoH and hospital directors, together with district chiefs, received training to sharpen their management capabilities, although funding gaps affected the functioning of these programs and management skills remain highly uneven.

District health centers are still run by district health management teams, and these tend to be well resourced, but the staff often lack suitable skills. Resourcing sub-district health posts and clinics and staffing the SISCA are

¹⁰⁵ Interviews with members of the diaspora, students in medical school, and the MoH.

particularly difficult, and many services continue to be supported by NGOs and the Cuban Medical Brigade. District health centers propose candidates for recruitment to health posts and take recommendations from *chefes de suco*, but it is difficult to fill vacancies. The ministry has adopted a top-up policy to incentivize health professionals to work in more remote regions. The policy provides an additional 40 percent allowance for staff working in extremely remote regions, 25 percent for those in very remote regions, and 15 percent for those in remote regions—but the policy is failing to have a major impact. There are simply too few health professionals left in Timor-Leste to recruit, and when staff are sent abroad to study, their posts often remain unfilled.

MoH partners have financed extensive professional development schemes, and these have produced mixed results but important lessons. The biggest complaints are that there is no follow-through, training is not linked to the allocation of posts or assignments, and there is no on-the-job mentoring. Emergency management of obstetric care, for example—a model rolled out by the UNFPA—trains midwives to perform normal deliveries and to recognize complications and the need for back-up or referral. But many deliveries are in private homes, and midwives rarely feel competent or confident to practice these skills in the absence of supervision or while working alone. Supervision is needed but, again, finding health workers willing to spend long periods of time working in remote locations is difficult, and the MoH is poorly equipped to support health supervisors on lengthy regional visits.

With tight human resource constraints, the ministry has found a significant source of strength in its overseas professional development partnerships. In the early recovery period, while the European Commission and World Bank were revitalizing Timor-Leste's critical health infrastructure, Australia, Cuba, and China sponsored their own health specialists to work in Timor-Leste. Australia and Cuba further financed two long-term overseas professional development programs to train cadres of skilled and specialized Timorese physicians. The Australian program was financed by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). It was embedded in the National Hospital—Guido Valadares National Hospital—and staffed by the Royal Australian College of Surgeons. Based on a capacity substitution model, the initiative placed Timorese specialists in overseas training programs, while a rotating cadre of Australian surgeons provided specialized clinical services in Timor-Leste. According to respondents, the program did not follow conventional capacity development models, and yet it has proven vastly more successful than the conventional one-on-one adviser models adopted elsewhere in the health sector.

Since 2004, Cuba has also deployed more than 200 doctors, known as the Cuban Medical Brigade, to deliver frontline health services in the sub-districts of Timor-Leste. Rotated every two years, these doctors have boosted health service delivery—including in the most remote parts of the country—and delivered in practicum training to returning Timorese doctors and nurses. The Cuban Medical Brigade was key to service delivery during the 2006 crisis and is the product of a long and productive partnership forged between the governments of Timor-Leste and Cuba on Timorese independence. The Cuban and Australian professional development programs constitute an important and timely pipeline of skilled resources for the ministry, yet the deployment of new doctors and health professionals across the country will continue to test human resource management capacities for some time. (World Bank 2013, 3)."

Source: Anderson (2014) in Barma, Huybens, and Vinuela (2014).

240. Overall, there have been some hopeful signs and gradual steps in the right direction, but these have taken a number of years to emerge. Thus, the number of people being trained in the system is gradually being increased—but with major concerns about quality. Stakeholders in the health systems—from local communities sponsoring medical training to the MOH, NGOs,

and development partners—have experimented with various options for increasing the number of trained health workers.

241. **However, efforts have not yet gelled into an effective system.** The education of incoming students remains weak or patchy, medical training itself faces a number of difficulties and shortages, and the links between initial training, and then practical pre- or in-service training and recruitments have been too weak and not sufficiently addressed.

242. **Moreover, as of 2016, the system is backsliding and further improvements are becoming an increasingly steep uphill struggle.** As of 2016, the system is beset by several coinciding challenges: the erosion in the value of salaries, combined with renewed delays in paying salaries and similarly for scholarships, and the further scarcity of overall funding for the sector, which makes any level of functionality increasingly difficult, combined with renewed and growing insecurity.

243. **If and when system rebuilding can resume, it will be important to build rapidly on the lessons learned over the initial decade of state building in South Sudan, as well as on lessons learned elsewhere,** to begin to more quickly redevelop and scale up national health care provision. Further specific implications in this regard are set out in Chapter 6.

6. Key Findings and Recommendations

6.1 Summary of key findings

244. **This paper has reviewed experiences with capacity strengthening in South Sudan over the decade 2005–16.** The note specifically focused on the civilian public service (only). The overall size of security sector employment has affected the amount of resources available for other areas of the public sector. During this period, the country experienced revenue booms and busts as well as renewed widespread conflict since late 2013 and a failed effort to reestablish peace.

245. **The way in which South Sudan came into being complicated capacity strengthening, with six years of uncertainty over independence between 2005 and 2011.** This experience is not unusual relative to other recently newly independent countries such as Kosovo or Timor-Leste. A key difference to these cases is that South Sudan did not go through a period of international administration with its distinct impact on capacity development.

246. **South Sudan moved toward independence with low human development and extremely limited infrastructure but also with inherited staff.** The newly formed government had no formal administrative structures in place. However, the emerging country did not start entirely from scratch. Staff joined the new administration from the SPLA/SPLM-managed

CANS and Khartoum-managed CCSS, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. In principle, there were also educated members of the diaspora on which to draw.

247. **Aid interventions in South Sudan started off with a high level of ambition in terms of coordination and alignment as per ‘New Deal’ principles, but rapidly became more fragmented.** Some key achievements were made, as highlighted throughout this report. Yet, ex post evaluations of capacity-building efforts supported by development partners have been very critical, especially with regard to the short-term, stop-and-go cycles of support. At the same time, aid efforts were constrained by limited government commitment to establish a functioning public sector. Furthermore, the government sought to coordinate aid and insisted on the use of country systems in ways that did not work in reality.

248. **As in other countries emerging from conflict, a key tension has been the need to support the political settlement on the one hand and to establish sustainability and a minimum level of merit, effectiveness, and efficiency in the public sector on the other.** Initial hiring decisions were highly influenced by patronage and loyalty considerations, tied to coalition-building strategies that brought powerful national and regional elites into the political settlement through the distribution of benefits, including higher-level positions within government.

249. **Efforts to foster a public sector focused on service delivery to citizens have been constrained by several factors.** Among these is the role of public employment as a social safety net. Government jobs have been associated with the ‘peace dividend’ from the long civil war with Sudan. A single civil servant may be the main source of income for an extended family, and those in government feel significant pressure to deliver resources to their communities. An increasingly large security sector has crowded out the availability of funds for staff and operating expenses in service delivery sectors, notably for health. Renewal of the service has been hindered by staff being unable to retire, as well as by hiring freezes for the civilian public service since 2012.

250. **Broadly, the pool of educated citizens from which public sector staff can be recruited remains limited but should in principle be sufficient to recruit adequately qualified individuals.** The magnitude of the ‘skills gap’ varies by sector and employment category. Though no comprehensive survey is available, there is general agreement among stakeholders that lack of academic qualifications is the not the most binding constraint on capacity of the civil service. In PFM, for example, it was found that 89 percent of accountants surveyed in 2013 held a diploma or degree relevant to accounting.

251. **A key issue has been limited willingness and ability to seek more skilled staff.** Gatekeeping functions for selecting and recruiting capable staff into the public service have been

rather weak. Furthermore, South Sudan has a sizable diaspora, and families continue to send children abroad for education. Yet, there has been reluctance to recruit from this pool.

252. Performance management has been a key issue as it can conflict with the wider incentive environment as well as be affected by resource constraints. It has been difficult to discipline and motivate staff who are hired based on relationships. Moreover, in the case of PFM, some staff who sought to carry out their assigned role were transferred. A related issue is that resources to carry out assigned functions have been adequate at the national level for main MDAs but much less so at subnational levels. Furthermore, since oil prices began falling in January 2015 operational budgets are increasingly too tight to facilitate normal functioning.

253. The majority of capacity-building support provided over the past decade was ‘external’, that is, either involving sending civil servants abroad or having training delivered in South Sudan by external consultants and facilitators. The latter included both regional consultants and efforts, as well as non-regional ones.

254. As part of this, it is worth noting that South Sudan has been the focus of significant South-South collaboration. Examples include the trainings provided by the Kenya School of Government, both in Kenya and through Kenyan staff delivering training in South Sudan; the IGAD initiative to send civil servants from neighboring countries (Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda) to South Sudan; and numerous study tours to regional countries on various issues. These initiatives have been overall beneficial but have also experienced constraints and problems. Similar to non-regionally provided training, an important challenge is to ensure that content is relevant and tailored to South Sudan rather than being based on rules and regulations in neighboring countries.

255. Several efforts have been made to make training ‘home grown’. The Ministry of Public Service has sought to take a lead in identifying and meeting training needs. These efforts still remain at early stages. University of Juba hosts a School of Management Sciences and since 2014 also a SPS, offering masters-level training. The Ministry of Public Service has sought to open a Management Development Institute (MDI) and the MoF to revive the GATC. Renewed conflict has halted the latter two efforts, while those at the University of Juba still continue albeit with difficulty.

256. Evidence from regional experiences suggests a number of factors which influence the effectiveness of these efforts. For example, it is important for the right people to be matched with the right courses, for classroom learning to be matched with on-the-job training, for material to be sufficiently tied to in-country policies and procedures, and for there to be some degree of monitoring with regard to who has been trained and in what. A key criticism in South Sudan is that development partner support to training has been too fragmented, too short and with short funding time horizons (for example, not allowing the development of course content and

approaches over multiple years); that the right people are not always matched with the right programs; that there have been very few efforts to monitor the system as a whole, as opposed to outputs from a specific project; and that overall there has been too much focus on training as such and not on the environment in which staff will be redeployed to apply what they have learned. Moreover, ensuring lesson learning *across* development partners and TA providers has posed an important and largely unmet challenge.

6.2 Emerging implications and recommendations

Find better ways to cope with a nonlinear state-building process which affects capacity strengthening efforts in multiple ways

- *Because achieving a political settlement in South Sudan has been and will remain very challenging, capacity strengthening support needs to find (better) ways to bridge periods of renewed conflict.*

257. **The environment is very likely to remain challenging and volatile.** As set out in Chapter 2, fragile states rarely move along a linear trajectory from conflict to stability and global experience reflects that even ‘rapid’ transformations can take 20 to 30 years. In South Sudan, the political settlement has eroded rather than strengthened over the past decade, in particular since 2013. The widespread withdrawal of development assistance and capacity-strengthening efforts during periods of renewed conflicts has been associated with an erosion of coordination and backsliding on efforts previously made.

258. **Country volatility tends to re-enforce existing tendencies toward fragmentation and stop-go provision of development assistance.** However, to progress, capacity strengthening requires establishing and subsequently embedding new systems, interlinked class-room based and on-the-job training, investments in better primary and secondary education, institutionalizing domestic post-secondary training institutions, as well as a sequencing of assessing needs, developing strategies, and actually rolling out training efforts. All of such ‘sequenced’ steps are negatively affected when the funding to sustain them is too short term, uncertain, or cancelled as new crises erupt. While it will be impossible to completely avoid volatility in external support to capacity strengthening, more should be done to reduce such volatility. This may also require some agreements among the international community on how to react to crises.

- *Development partners face a dilemma, in that the government has not demonstrated commitment to improve governance, but withdrawal of support will further weaken institutions.*

259. As previous comparative studies (WDR 2011; World Bank 2012) have indicated, in postconflict countries where government commitment to (demonstrating) better governance is strong, significant progress can be achieved even within limited periods. However, this condition has not held in South Sudan and is not likely to hold in the short to medium term. While especially rapid or significant progress is not likely under these conditions, continuation of capacity strengthening and technical assistance support, as well as calibrating humanitarian assistance in ways that enable rather than undermine national capacity particularly in the health sector, remains crucial to build gradual progress and to avoid deeper backsliding.

260. **Some assistance can, in principle, be provided even during periods of heightened insecurity.** Curricula can be developed, externally advised on, and delivered by national staff even during crisis periods and discussions on lessons learned organized, even when travel restrictions are in place. As emphasized by the 2011 WDR on Conflict and Fragility, a complete withdrawal of development assistance ('stop and go') can itself contribute to fragility.

- *Development partners need to 'up their game' on coordination efforts, systematic lessons learning, and building on previous interventions.*

261. **Coordination poses tremendous challenges in particular in fragile states.** Ministries and departments are less able to lead on coordination, and development agency staff are especially frequently rotated, often with little handover. In addition, regular coordination efforts lapse during periods of renewed crisis. For new staff and teams, it can be very challenging to access what has been done to date, who has benefited, and what are lessons learned, previously developed plans for further work, and so on. Development partners can do much more to accessibly document and share (a) what has been done and with what effects; (b) lessons learned; and (c) materials developed—plans, curricula, training content, and so on.

- *Prioritizing funding in a situation of deep austerity in the short and medium term while seeking to keep sight of longer-term goals*

262. **Development partners have significantly less resources available than during the CPA period and feel the pressure to pursue firefighting to address immediate crisis-related issues.** In this context, it will be easy to become exclusively focused on near-term priorities rather than continue to foster investments in the building blocks of a more capable state. But maintaining (also) a longer-term view of what steps need to be initiated or continued to not be in the same place in 10 or 20 years remains crucial.

1. **Facing extreme austerity in the short and medium term, the question of how funds should be prioritized arises, including potential funding from development partners.** For example, one important trade-off that government has to make jointly with development partners is how to

balance the alleviation of constrained operating funds as well as wage arrears and devaluations to keep existing civil servants functional versus funding for training or versus funding to put in place a pension system to facilitate generational renewal.

Training on its own is not enough. Civil service reforms need to be brought into the policy dialogue while recognizing that simple ‘best practice’ approaches will not work.

- *Civil service reforms are difficult but critical and should receive greater attention in the policy dialogue and development efforts.*

263. **Civil service reforms are widely considered as difficult and risky and hence best avoided.** The experience of relatively low performance of civil service reform projects (DFID, Irish Aid, and SIDA 2013; World Bank 2008) has tempted many development partners to avoid engaging in this area. However, improving those being recruited into government core and service delivery functions, ensuring that basic incentives to perform are in place, and stabilizing salary payments are essential elements of improving state capacity in a conflict-affected country such as South Sudan. Accordingly, these issues should receive more central attention both in the policy dialogue and in the programming of specific operational engagements.

264. **In contrast to the provision of training, civil service reforms tend to go ‘against the grain’ of government incentives, and hence there is also less demand from the government side.** However, development partners can be much clearer in their dialogue that one is not useful without the other. Given that wholesale civil service reforms have been recognized as rarely successful, a potentially feasible approach to explore is to focus on specific sectors and government and service delivery tasks. Highlighting positive experiences from other countries may also be useful.

- *To make at least some public sector reforms viable, there is a need to balance ‘best practice ambitions’ versus feasible, practical steps and gains that can be made during a foreseeably difficult short- to medium-term period.*

265. **Improving recruitment.** Since the national Recruitment Board is weak in ensuring compliance and decentralized recruitment is already ongoing, and since political commitment to strengthening a central function will not be forthcoming in the context of a divided government, a feasible approach might be to (a) invest more in making existing guidelines available and ensuring that HR staff are well versed in these; (b) raise the profile of the importance of ‘good enough’ recruitment in the policy dialogue with government; (c) invest in the capacity of the Recruitment Board and of state-level MoLPS to monitor compliance with the principle of recruiting qualified staff and to reward as well as ‘name and shame’ MDAs that most egregiously go against such principles; and (d) explore the feasibility of establishing complaints

mechanisms that allow individual applicants as well as internal whistleblowers to complain if they feel that rules regarding recruitment have not been followed and that non-qualified candidates have been hired.

266. **Improve HR record management systems.** Beyond simple payroll verification, it is important to track and monitor a wider set of essential HR-related information, such as the qualification and experience of those in a particular position, and ideally also some basic information about performance. Restarting earlier efforts of developing an HRIS is important once the wider context stabilizes and will be an important complement to the electronic payroll system. Ideally, the HRIS and SSEPS II would be linked, reducing the administrative burden (that is, data collection and entry) and enabling better IT support.

267. **Motivating performance.** Staff must feel some urgency to perform their duties. This may require making it somewhat easier for staff to be dismissed and some form of agreements on performance at the leadership level. Better monitoring of what is being achieved and reporting on performance may add value in incentivizing performance.

Training is not everything, but significantly more could be done to strengthen its quality and impact

- *Reconsider the design of training efforts.*

268. **Donors have taken an overall rather reactive approach to capacity strengthening, providing funding for various groups in reaction to government demands as well as perceived needs.** This has frequently been done without taking a sufficiently deep look at whether the absence of trained staff is the underlying key constraint, as well as how training provision will work in giving weak and variable basic education, the need for institutionalizing the provision of training, and for working with the government on how the use of available capacity can be improved.

269. **Training investments funded by development partners can be improved on a number of dimensions.** Investing more in institutionalizing training (and certification where relevant) and less in ad hoc and one-off efforts; making training more specific to the day-to-day tasks officials are expected to undertake, including usage of national rules and regulations, training on existing IT systems, and so on; and a better linking of organized/classroom based training and the provision of ‘handholding’ assistance through TAs, including through ensuring that TAs are aware of the training efforts that are being made for staff in the units where they are posted. As set out above, moving in this direction also requires improved access to lessons learned and to basic data on what training has been carried out previously and who has benefited among development partners.

- *Especially for shorter term training, it is important to focus on specific skills that are needed and immediately usable on the job and to select staff with ‘upgradable’ existing skills and performance.*

270. **For those short-term training efforts that continue, it is important to focus on specific skills that are needed and immediately usable on the job.** Given the low levels of individual capacity coupled with the limited training budgetary allocation as noted in the findings, it would be advisable to focus on developing skills directly relevant to delivering on the job, through appropriate combinations of class-room-based and on-the-job training.

271. Furthermore, it is essential to establish the basic skill levels of participants as a precursor to training through entrance tests. For example, staff lacking basic numeracy should not participate in accounting training. To the extent possible, MDAs should also be encouraged more explicitly to prioritize selecting those staff for training who show a general commitment to their work—in terms of attendance, pursuing assigned tasks, and a demonstrated interest to improve performance. It would also be advisable to continue and scale up invest in English language training given a significant number of Arabic trained graduates¹⁰⁶ who can contribute more toward greater capacity if language limitations are reduced.

- *Considering cost-benefit tradeoffs between national and foreign training, invest in strengthening domestic training institutions.*

272. **There need to be some decisions taken about what training can best be provided in country through national institutions and what training should be sought abroad and to invest in the strengthening of domestic training institutions, drawing also on regional and international linkages.** Training that is needed by a large number of staff—including induction training, training for tax auditors, and for basic accounting skills and similar basic skills—are likely best provided in-country and at national institutions, given the greater cost-effectiveness and a better ability to reach subnational staff. In contrast, for skills that only a few civil servants need, as well as courses that are specialized or require special equipment (for example, for higher-level medical training), training may best be sought abroad.

273. Once training that can best be provided in-country has been identified, it is important to invest in domestic training institutions, including those geared to meeting sector needs for a future workforce such as the universities’ specialized colleges, training colleges for medical and educational staff, the U Juba SPS, GATC, HRTC, and so on. Developing and reviving these local institutions creates a stronger foundation for continuous capacity, and once initial progress has

¹⁰⁶ Many have technical certifications in Arabic and could easily apply the needed skills in managing the public service. The only thing needed is for them to learn and translate whatever is needed into English, which is the official working language.

been made also provides some buffer, for example, against reductions of TAs due to renewed crises.

- *Development partners should consider provision of co-funding to and coordination with existing South-South collaboration which largely has run on ‘parallel tracks’ to training efforts sponsored by development partners and is more cost-effective than other modalities.*

274. Several MDAs have concluded Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with various regional countries and further afield to send staff for longer-term training, and some of the envisaged training was implemented successfully. However, development partner efforts have largely been pursued separate from these types of initiatives. There is scope to provide additional funding to regional teaching staff to come to South Sudan to provide training, as well as to efforts of sending South Sudanese for pre-service or in-service training to regional institutions on government initiatives, with a strong pull for such staff to return and assume positions in the public sector. For example, the World Bank pipeline IDCBP has taken initial steps to enable continuous collaboration between the HRTC and KSG.

275. At the same time, not all South-South collaboration has worked equally well. Again, documenting and sharing lessons learned among those providing capacity strengthening support—as outlined above—is crucial to ensure that the South-South potential can be used to the best effect.

Connecting the dots between training and overall development interventions in sectors

- *Make TAs and NGOs more fully part of capacity-strengthening efforts*

276. **TAs and international NGOs can make important contributions to capacity-strengthening efforts, but this potential has not been fully utilized.** TAs often have a very close knowledge of ‘who can do what’ in a given ministry, as well as of the specific training needs that exist. Moreover, some TA providers and NGO staff have been far longer in the country than the staff of development agencies. This inside knowledge can be utilized more fully in the design of capacity-strengthening efforts. For the health sector, international NGOs that receive donor funding to deliver health services could take on newly trained national staff for further practical training, for example, for 6–24 months. This could make a significant contribution to upgrading the practical skills of national medical staff.

- *Better connecting training efforts and other investments*

277. **Staff who receive training need a functional working environment to actually use new or improved skills.** Government and development partners need to jointly commit to ensuring that staff have at least basic equipment, such as desks, chairs, paper forms, or IT equipment, power, and water (especially in hospitals and at least water in health posts), and basic pharmaceuticals and medical supplies in the health sector. Ideally, the availability of such basic inputs should be part of the joint information collection and monitoring efforts about the ‘what’, ‘how’, and ‘with what effects’ of capacity-strengthening efforts. This requires effectively linking capacity-strengthening efforts with overall development efforts made in a particular sector.

Improved monitoring and evaluation of capacity-building efforts is essential

- *There is a dearth of information on who has been trained in what; the quality and impact of training received; how class-room learning has been coordinated with other avenues for capacity building; and the overall contribution to effectiveness.*

278. Better information is an essential basis for knowing what was done, assessing what works, and improving on practical challenges such as matching newly trained staff or staff who have upgraded their skills with recruitment or promotion opportunities.

279. Keeping track of relevant training efforts will need to be done sector by sector but must move beyond being ‘within projects’ only. Monitoring efforts will need to be as simple as possible, matched to the incentives and institutional capabilities on the ground. The Ministry of Public Service may play a role with regard to providing inputs on how this can best be done, as well as aggregating information from various sectors for higher-level monitoring of progress and gaps. For many core and service delivery functions it will require collaboration between key development partners and the relevant government MDAs.

280. Ideally, information to be collected should include feedback on how training can be improved, as well as feedback from units recruiting newly trained or the staff of which received in-service training on improvements in performance. Even limited efforts to improve information gathering and availability can contribute to significant positive impacts in terms of better training, and better matching.

281. **Moreover, to provide aggregate monitoring and to coordinate and channel external support, it would be beneficial to have a stronger hub in the Ministry of Labor Public Service and Human Resource Development (MoLPSHRD).** In principle, the MoLPSHRD’s directorate for HRD has this responsibility, but it has been a rather weak directorate in recent years. The MoLPSHRD overall also has potentially an important role to play in linking capacity-strengthening efforts and pursuing reforms of the civil service which are crucial for capacity strengthening to have an impact.

Additional priorities for sector specific actions: PFM

282. **For PFM, key areas to focus on are the following:** (a) in-service training (job-focused class-room based linked to ‘on-the-job’) with a view to strengthening the capacity of the existing cadre, (b) a policy-level agreement to better use existing capacities and to dial back political interference and undue pressure, (c) initiate long-term training of new cohorts to be able to replace staff over time and ensure that they meet a contextually relevant public sector accounting qualification scheme. Furthermore, these actions need to be combined with sustained investments in the functioning of systems—the availability of rules and regulations, availability of forms, ability to communicate between levels of government, and sustaining and improving existing IT systems.

283. Technically, the upgrading of skills and of achieving improved overall capacity is easier, and more achievable within a short- to medium-term (3–5 year) time frame, compared to capacity in the health sector, where the sheer gap in numbers is much larger. However, improvements of capacity for PFM is particularly affected by political commitment to use (or not use) existing capacity toward achieving progress on this core state function.

Additional priorities for sector specific actions: Health

284. For the health sector, producing, recruiting, deploying, and retaining more qualified staff will remain a crucial challenge for at least another 10 years and probably beyond. **To begin narrowing this gap, a first key action is to revisit earlier recommendations and commitments and to identify which of these can be funded and implemented,** in particular those of the 2014 HPF/MoH HR report.

285. **Furthermore, to avoid an erosion of the current baseline and a loss of efforts already made, donors should pool funding for capacity building and implement the following priority actions:**

- (a) **The first priority is, as soon as possible, for the government to return to paying salaries of public health workers and teaching/training staff and finding ways to pay scholarships** of current trainees to prevent dropouts. Once staff and students leave the country or leave the public for the private sector or for employment outside the sector, motivating them to return becomes difficult. As a consequence, past investments made in the medical training of such staff and students have been and are still being lost for the entire health system.
- (b) **Second, it will be important to revisit options for bringing public sector and NGO-paid salaries into closer alignment again while a long-term solution necessarily requires macroeconomic and fiscal relative stability.** Given the ongoing slide of the SSP versus the U.S. dollar, this is an uphill battle as of 2016, but it will remain a critical

issue for retaining health workers not only in the public facilities but in the country in general.

- (c) **Third, develop a platform to facilitate matching graduates to vacant positions**, and establish better monitoring and tracking of the absorption of trainees into the sector.
- (d) **Fourth, systematize practical training of students/future national staff in NGOs' structures, at least in those that receive donor funding (and potentially all international NGOs).** This would contribute to better link college and university-based training with the needs of frontline service provision and explore options for bringing NGOs into practical pre-service and in-service training.

286. **Technically, strengthening capacity in the health sector is more challenging than with regard to PFM**, given the large discrepancy between available staff and sector needs, as well as the challenges associated with training large enough numbers of medical staff to a sufficient level of quality.

287. **Politically, in principle, capacity strengthening should be easier for service delivery sectors compared to PFM**, given that even relatively poor governments typically perceive some need to provide services to citizens so as to retain legitimacy and as having more doctors and nurses has no direct relationship to containing rent-seeking interests. **However, as the analysis has also indicated, the 'dual exit option' of relying on internationally funded provision for citizens and of accessing health care services abroad for elites has significantly reduced the incentive and the revealed commitment to allocate sufficient funds for upgrading and expanding the sector**, even during the time when fiscal resources were available. If and when the political and fiscal situation improves, it will therefore be important to (a) have a frank dialogue on these political constraints, (b) consider options for incentivizing greater domestic fiscal commitments, and (c) raise awareness among nongovernment stakeholders about the policy stance as one option to develop a greater demand for change and for increasing commitments as a proportion of the available resource envelope.

Annex 1: Chapter 2 - Multiple Factors Shaping Civil Service Capacity

From Fritz and Ort 2016:

With regard to the overall ecosystem, a first factor is the availability and quality of *basic, secondary, and tertiary education*, which shapes the capacity of the *pool of potential civil servants* ('1' in Figure 2.2). This pool does not necessarily need to be very large, given that a civil service only makes up 2–3 percent of the adult population. However, governments in postconflict contexts often have to compete with an influx of NGOs, development partners, and private sector activities—from banks, to hotels, to breweries—as well as with continuing opportunities for migration or remaining in the diaspora. The smaller the pool of educated citizens, the higher the risk that the government cannot recruit or retain staff with sufficient general or specific qualifications across MDAs and levels of government, and also that patronage-based hiring results in staff without skills entering the service.

Further crucial factors for civil service capacity are the *recruitment function*—decisions about who from the general pool applies for and is selected into the civil service ('2'), *pay* ('3'), and *on-the-job experience* ('4'). In principle, governments should seek to develop a relatively small civil service that is reasonably well paid,¹⁰⁷ recruit the best and the brightest they can attract, and retain those that perform so as to develop institutional memory and experience. Yet, in many postconflict countries, factors such as political affiliation/association with military leaders, regional considerations, legacies of who was or remained employed during conflict, and family or community linkages play a significant role and shape how the recruitment function takes shape in practice.

The degree to which this weakens capacity relative to what would be feasible for a country depends on the distance in qualifications—and motivation—between the pool of potential applicants and those who actually are selected into the public service. The nature of the postconflict situation and a country's legacy will determine whether initially there are many or few civil servants with longer experience—which can be both a boon and a burden.¹⁰⁸ Once postconflict rebuilding begins, it is in principle valuable if newly recruited civil servants remain in post for some time to build essential 'on-the-job experience'—provided that they have some incentive to perform. Furthermore, where a public sector pension scheme is missing (as is frequently the case for some time into postconflict settings), a share of positions may be held by 'legacy' civil servants in their late 60s, 70s, and even 80s; and the scale of this problem can grow as time passes without a retirement scheme in place.

¹⁰⁷ There is a growing literature on the levels of pay for public servants, with partially contradictory findings about adequate levels of pay. Here we just take the basic assumption that in principle pay needs to be sufficient to compete with alternative options in postconflict environments especially for higher-level professional and managerial cadres.

¹⁰⁸ For a discussion of contrasting legacies see Srivastava and Blum (forthcoming); for example, while Sierra Leone had a central civil service that was largely intact at the end of the conflict, Timor-Leste is an example where almost the entire service had to be newly recruited.

Related crucial factors for civil service capacity are overall organizational and management factors. An overall environment of expecting performance and an ethos of integrity, and whether civil servants are motivated to perform the tasks and duties assigned (overall blue area and ‘5’) plays an important role. Political decision makers, ministers, governors, and county commissioners at subnational levels, and senior civil servants ‘set the tone’ with regard to what is expected of individual civil servants. This can take the form of deliberate ‘performance management’ or be more informal. Decisions about promotions are an important way for signaling whether performance in the public interest is expected, or whether other criteria dominate. If many staff are not recruited on meritocratic criteria, this can also (negatively) affect performance as staff recruited based on connections may feel protected from potential disciplining or dismissal for nonperformance.

In most conflict countries, overall organization and the incentives set by policy makers are not optimal, not least due to the pressures prevailing in a ‘fragile limited access order’ as characterized by North et al. (2012). There is, however, substantial variation—with a greater emphasis and true focus on performance and integrity in some environments, and much less so in others.¹⁰⁹ When political leaders and senior managers signal that a given public sector unit must deliver on assigned functions, this can provide crucial incentives to ensure that good staff are promoted or placed in key positions, and to shed the most incompetent recruits, leading to improvements over time.

Training and learning (‘6’) is a factor that most often comes into play after recruitment decisions have been made for core civil service cadre, but can also take the form of pre-service training based on a selection into a specific program.¹¹⁰ Structured civil servant learning can take a range of forms, including on-the-job mentoring and twinning arrangements with more experienced civil servants or technical assistants; secondment and action learning; as well as classroom-based training. More informal learning also occurs when civil servants absorb the norms and behaviors encouraged by the presence (or absence) of performance management systems as discussed above.¹¹¹

In addition to how staff are selected, managed, trained, and paid, the availability of resources (‘7’) also plays a role, and in many postconflict and other poor countries this poses a challenge. While resources (operating and capital budgets) need not be ample, a minimum is needed to fulfill tasks. If civil servants are not provided with required forms, basic office equipment, or electricity, they will often struggle to do what is expected. Especially during

¹⁰⁹ To some extent, this is a ‘common pool’ problem. If a single political appointee hires some relatives, he or she gains local standing, while the cost is borne by society overall and the effect on the public administration of a single instance is limited. However, if many hiring managers behave similarly, and much of the hiring into the public service is affected, then the overall system becomes dysfunctional.

¹¹⁰ Different, for example, from teachers or nurses who typically attend training colleges first and then may be offered jobs at publicly funded schools or health centers.

¹¹¹ See for example, Rosemary Harrison’s *Learning and Development* 2009.

early postconflict periods and for subnational levels of government, even basic infrastructure such as office space or desks may be missing or may need to be used by multiple staff. A lack of minimal resources, or the fact that these are only available intermittently reduces capacity and can also affect motivation negatively. This can entail a negative circle: the lack of basic resources affects the public service, and in turn, efforts at collecting taxes and ensuring that public funds are well managed suffer.

Annex 2: Evolution of Aid Architecture and Support to Capacity Building

In South Sudan, the architecture of international assistance has been the result of evolving international commitments, shifting political objectives, and technical realities. Development partners also face a set of incentives when engaging in South Sudan and other fragile contexts (as discussed in Chapter 2). A key feature is that relatively high revenue during the early years placed the government in a fairly stronger negotiating position relative to development partners when compared to more aid-dependent countries with regard to use of countries' systems and the acceptable level of intrusion on or supervision of core functions. Though initially harmonized through a pooled fund, development assistance including to human resource and financial management has gradually become more fragmented. A more recent feature is the stop-and-go nature of aid, with many initiatives suspended or withdrawn as a result of the 2013 crisis.

The following discussion of the evolution of aid architecture and support to capacity building is organized into several historical periods. The lead-up to the CPA and early CPA years characterized by a focus getting basic core government functions up and running (2004–2009); the run-up to independence during the late CPA years during which some of the initial optimism around donor coordination began to fade (2010–2011); and the independence period (2011–2016) which experienced at least two major shocks, the shutdown of production in 2012, as well as the civil conflict and macro-fiscal crisis from late 2013 onward.

Lead-up to CPA and early CPA years (2004–2009)

In the lead up to the signing of the CPA, the international community began planning to scale up assistance to Southern Sudan, and to shift its focus from food aid and basic service delivery through NGOs to state-building objectives. With the participation and endorsement of the GoSS and SPLM, the World Bank and UN carried out a 12-month JAM in 2004–2005 to plan for the post-CPA period. The JAM set out a framework for peace, development, and poverty reduction between 2005 and 2011 in the northern and southern regions.

The JAM proposed an ambitious set of public sector outcomes to be achieved by 2011, estimating the total cost of achieving capacity building and institutional development outcomes at US\$1.6 billion from 2005 to 2011 (see table 3.6). These targets were not reflective of experiences in other postconflict countries where decades were required to achieve progress in the best-case scenarios. Notably, the JAM envisioned a lean public service and a sustainable wage bill for South Sudan (JAM Vol 3. 9)

The cost of the initial 2005–2007 phase of the JAM was estimated at US\$7.9 billion for which US\$2.6 billion would require external finance. Following the publication of the JAM, 60 countries and international organizations pledged over US\$4.5 billion to Sudan and South

Sudan. In line with the SPLM views on the use of country systems to strengthen national capacity, donors and CPA parties committed to a ‘recipient-executed’ aid architecture early in this process. The establishment of an MDTF was negotiated, and was viewed as a primary channel through which both national and international funds would be channeled for CPA implementation. Pledges of US\$2 billion were made toward JAM objectives and US\$500 million were made toward two MDTFs (for the north and the south). Remaining pledges were made toward the operations of the UN and the African Union (AU).¹¹² Public sector support was initially concentrated in multi-donor funds. The MDTF-SS was initially the primary donor-funding mechanism accounting for 89 percent of donor commitments in 2006. The GoSS committed to establish itself as the largest MDTF contributor for the south by channeling oil revenues into the pooled fund.¹¹³

Table A2.1. JAM Capacity Building and Institutional Development Objectives - Southern Sudan¹¹⁴

Subsector	2004–2005 Baseline	2011 Target Outcome	Estimated Cost 2005–2011 (US\$, millions)
Public Service	Public service needs to be established basically from scratch. Some basic staff and structures exist under the Civilian Authority of New Sudan.	A motivated, responsive, ethical and professional public service accountable through democratic governance structures, effectively delivering services directly or through private agents	336
	Existing, highly mobile institutions that had emerged in context of the civil war, lacking normal procedures and technical support	Ensure smooth and professional functioning Cabinet processes, with decision making and decisions in a timely way	
Decentralization, Local Government, and Service Delivery	Overall very low level of services, provided mainly through NGOs and UN and church organizations. Rudimentary system of local administration emerging. Power and wealth-sharing protocols provide basic framework.	Effective public institutions at GoSS, state, and local levels, with clearly defined roles and responsibilities; efficient and equitable intergovernmental fiscal framework; accountability structures contribute to democratic development and peace	1,200.6

¹¹² “Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan 2005 - Chair’s Conclusions.” April 12, 2005.

¹¹³ As set out in Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (2013), “(GoSS) positioned itself as the largest MDTF-SS contributor, committing funds at the matching rate of 2:1. Former SPLM negotiators described the ratio as signaling their strong commitment to the MDTF-SS and intention to play the leading role in the fund’s governance.” p. 8.

¹¹⁴ JAM Vol 2.

Subsector	2004–2005 Baseline	2011 Target Outcome	Estimated Cost 2005–2011 (US\$, millions)
PFM	No systems, capacity or basic institutions.	Fully developed systems for open and accountable PFM.	53.9
Public Procurement	No systems in place.	Strong public procurement capacity and accountability mechanisms in GoSS institutions contributing to good governance and service delivery.	5.9
Anti-Corruption	Risk that sudden large financial inflows might lead to excessive spending and corruption.	Effective systems in place for preventing or reducing corruption.	2.8
Aid Management	Fragmentation of mainly humanitarian assistance. Limited ownership and sustainability.	Clear and well-functioning and coordinated aid management, led by GoSS.	30.2
Capacity building and institutional development (Total)			1,630

Table A2.2. Medium-Term Capacity Development Strategy (MTCDS) - Overview of Sectoral Capacity Development Priorities

Sector	Critical Actions
Economic Functions	
Natural Resources	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Research agricultural needs, develop plans and technical guidelines, undertake sectoral coordination and respond to food and agricultural threats and emergencies. ▪ Enact laws and policies on land tenure. ▪ Gradually increase and sustain production and market supply of meat, milk, and fish. ▪ Increase in number of square kilometers under improved protected area management and increase in number of tourists visiting protected areas by opening national parks to tourists. ▪ Increase the number of rural farmers' cooperatives established and/or improve their capacity. ▪ Protect natural resources from significant adverse environmental impacts.
Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish relevant institutions, infrastructure, policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks at central and state levels. ▪ Establish mechanisms for assessments, feasibility studies, and research for investments, technology transfer, and scaling-up of programs. ▪ Identify required human resources and capacity gaps and provide needed trainings, equipment, and facilities at central and state levels ▪ Establish mechanisms for public-private partnerships. ▪ Establish and operationalize systems for researching, mapping, managing, monitoring, and maintaining facilities, developments, and information.

Sector	Critical Actions
Economic Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Develop enabling and effective trade/industry laws and policy framework. ▪ Set up and resource systems for enforcing mining and petroleum laws and regulations. ▪ Set up mechanisms for management, design, and monitoring provision of electricity; build and resource infrastructure for generation and distribution of electricity in critical areas. ▪ Increase access to public media and improve the broadcasting quality of the radio and the TV in South Sudan. ▪ Improve communications.
Governance	
Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pass and implement key legislation (PFM Act, Public Procurement Act, Tax Act, Audit Act, and Central Banking Act). ▪ Formulate macroeconomic policy, establish macroeconomic data base, forecast and project revenue, and set quarterly cash limits; and develop capacities of the staff and provide equipment. ▪ Develop regulations to ensure sound public financial system in place for budget execution and reporting. ▪ Provide advice and guidance to government institutions in GoSS and the 10 states on how to develop corruption prevention action plans. ▪ Train staff in survey design and analysis to reduce dependency on external consultants in geospatial, economic, social, demographic, and census statistics.
Public Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Formulate and resource mechanisms for managing security, travel, protocol, and meeting of the President and Vice President. ▪ Develop and communicate annual statement of national priorities to South Sudan institutions and the public. ▪ Train GoSS Under Secretaries, Ministers, and Executive Directors in procedures on rules for Cabinet Submission. ▪ Public service management and administrative reform. ▪ Establish improved procedures for management of grievances. ▪ Restructure, establish, and resource the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. ▪ Enact and implement Public Service Act, Pensions Act, Labour Act. ▪ Establish and strengthen Local Government Councils for effective service delivery.
Social and Human Development	
Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Increase access to basic health services and health promotion. ▪ Strengthen human resources in the health sector. ▪ Expand the pharmaceutical and medical equipment supply chains. ▪ Strengthen the health system management. ▪ Strengthen the provision of HIV/AIDS services.
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Establish mechanisms to assess state- and county-level needs for teaching staff. ▪ Establish needs to inform planning for additional applied education system sites and establish needs for teaching staff. ▪ Identify human resource needs at central and state levels.

Sector	Critical Actions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish mechanisms for the MoE to plan for and oversee construction of primary schools. Strengthen EMIS.
Social Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Introduce a child benefit cash transfer. Develop a social protection system. Provide family and community-based social services and livelihood opportunities for at-risk groups. Provide social welfare services for special needs groups Develop a national early warning system.
Culture, Youth, and Sport	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop and implement a National Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Action Plan including strengthening the TVET component of the EMIS. Execute a training needs assessment and establish pre-service and in-service training for TVET instructors and managers at the three MoE Teacher Training Institutes of Rumbek, Maridi, and Malakal. Develop and implement a National YVS policy, procedures, M&E, and performance appraisal system. Establish and equip a YVS national training unit and team at the Amadi Rural Development Training Institute managed by the Ministry of Cooperatives and Rural Development. Establish and equip three regional YVS master training units and outreach teams in Wau, Malakal, and Amadi. Develop and adapt foundational training materials for the YVS.
Security and Rule of Law	
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Draft and publish legal and policy framework for NSC and NIS and National Security Strategy. Create a Ministry of Defense and provide staff and infrastructural needs. Draft plan and strategy to transform SPLA into a modern, professional military force; establish staffing needs, create positions, and TORs. Design and budget for a new DDR program and a transformation strategy. Design an early warning policy framework, civic education programs, and projects for peace building and conflict mitigation. Plan and prioritize, coordinate, accredit, monitor, and quality assure mechanisms for clearance, stockpile destruction, victim assistance, mine risk education, and advocacy (including curriculum and reporting methods to free the country from the impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war.
Rule of Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide a legal framework for South Sudan and ensure equitable and speedy justice for all. Coordinate internal security and law enforcement efforts—internal strengthening of Ministry of Infrastructure (MoI) Enhance protection of human rights Review/map existing legislation and prioritize legislative gaps; strengthen Law Review Commission infrastructural and human capacities Combat proliferation of small arms and community insecurity Build institutional capacities for Customs Service and the Directorates of

Sector	Critical Actions
	Immigration, Passport, Nationality, and Identification

Source: SSDP, 2011–2013.

Beginning during this period, a ‘parallel public service’ was less prevalent in South Sudan relative to other postconflict countries, notably Afghanistan (Srivastava et al.; Bhatia and Prasad 2015). Given that the government rejected the idea of establishing a single large PIU within the MoFEP to manage MDTF-financed programs, it was decided to use government systems (and staff) to manage the program, but with specific technical support ‘contracted in’ to the MoFEP. The MoFEP and other ministries have received significant technical assistance. No count has been undertaken of how many TAs were employed.

The coincidental timing of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness with the post-CPA planning process established South Sudan as a case study in the application of principles of national ownership, alignment, and harmonization. The GoSS Ministry of Finance set out an Aid Strategy establishing broad principles and specific structures for coordination, borrowing language directly from the Paris Declaration and OECD discussions of aid effectiveness (Davies et al. 2009; Larson 2013, 7). Also in line with the Paris Declaration Principles, donors established a Joint Donor Office (JDO) in 2006, a partnership between the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and later, Denmark and Canada. The JDO was intended to serve as a single office through which donors would implement their respective assistance programs and coordinate on pooled fund management.

However, implementation of this streamlined aid coordination system proved to be challenging, as increased ODA flows were not matched by on-the-ground operational capacity to monitor and implement programming. The MDTF-SS took longer to establish than foreseen, and given the fund’s reliance on government systems, national capacity constraints increased costs and directly affected the speed of disbursements.¹¹⁵ Without a contracted service provider to design, procure, and manage projects, the MDTF-SS was initially reliant on weak government systems, slowing delivery and raising costs. Further, the World Bank was not able to mobilize staff resources required to implement a functional trust fund. With no functional country office, implementation lagged. As an additional constraint, the GoSS was unable to meet its targets to match donor funding for capacity-building initiatives under the MDTF as oil revenues were lower than expected and public sector employment costs exceeded projections.

By mid-2007, the international community perceived that their commitments to the GoSS and the larger CPA process were not being kept, and that this had an impact on the stability of the

¹¹⁵ Independent Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund- South Sudan (MDTF-SS), July 25, 2013.

CPA itself.¹¹⁶ Under mounting pressure to deliver a peace dividend, development partners began to mobilize increased funding outside of the MDTF-SS mechanism, including other pooled funds and direct bilateral support.¹¹⁷ This left the MDTF-SS accounting for 11 percent of donor commitments by 2008 and just 2 percent of commitments by 2010. Projects funded by individual donors became an increasingly important source of financing, particularly from the United States which did not participate in pooled funding arrangements.

A key further issue was the limited coordination of support to public sector capacity building. On the donor side, the objectives set out in the JAM were not accompanied by a common plan to build capacity—to establish training centers, job descriptions with skills requirements, a common curriculum, a training baseline, trainers, or funding responsibility. While some efforts sought to support these type of activities (such as the Skills for South Sudan and CBTF projects) they were limited in scale and duration. Training was provided on an ad hoc, project-by-project basis with short-term planning horizons. On the government side, after absorption of the CANS and CCSS personnel the GoSS budget was primarily allocated to the wage bill rather than investing in building skills of the new public services.

By 2008, it became clear that the JAM targets would be more difficult to achieve than initially envisioned. In a presentation to a donor conference at the end of the first phase of the JAM in 2008, Southern Sudan’s Minister of Finance noted public sector capacity progress and challenges—budgets had been prepared and executed, central and state planning mechanisms were in place, CANS and CCSS had been integrated, the national and state legislatures were established, and national ministries and commissions were established and equipped. However, he also noted that the JAM had underestimated the contextual challenges, including “the difficulties of establishing a civil service and institutions to deliver services from scratch.”¹¹⁸

Later CPA period and lead-up to independence (2009–2011)

From 2009 onward, the GoSS and development partners focused on a more limited set of priorities. In 2009, South Sudan faced an economic shock as oil prices dropped significantly following the global financial crisis, reducing GoSS’ budgetary resources by nearly two-thirds and reducing funds available for national development projects. The approach of the 2011 referendum prompted urgent, prioritized action by donors and the GoSS to capacity challenges through the GoSS *Priority Core Governance Functions Action Plan*. Developed in 2010 in the pre-referendum planning, it outlined functions “absolutely essential to the sustainability of the

¹¹⁶ Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (2013), p. 11.

¹¹⁷ Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies (2013), p. 11.

¹¹⁸ “Progress in South Sudan 2005-07”, Presentation to the Sudan Consortium, Oslo, May 2008, Kuol Athian Mawien, Minister of Finance, GoSS. The Sudan Consortium was a meeting of international donors chaired by the GoS, GoSS, the World Bank, and the UN.

GoSS after the referendum.”¹¹⁹ Where the JAM was ambitious, the Core Functions exercise was realistic. Deeply concerned about the operationality of a new government post-independence, donors and GoSS outlined 19 priority core functions across six priority areas. The document identified the responsible GoSS ministry and the donor or program that would provide support to deliver these functions. With limited scope, clear GoSS responsibility and pre-identified sources of technical assistance, the Core Functions exercise effectively guided capacity-building efforts in the lead-up to independence.

At the same time, the GoSS and donors embarked on a longer-term planning exercise to map out government and international priorities in the SSDP, which was completed shortly after the referendum that established the Republic of South Sudan in January 2011. The SSDP initially targeted the 2011–2013 period and was later extended to 2015. As a more traditional National Development Plan, the SSDP outlined a grand vision across the pillars of Human and Social Development, Economic Development, Governance, and Conflict Prevention and Security. The SSDP has been criticized as being driven by the donor community, which provided external consultants to write much of the document, seeking government endorsement after the document had been largely completed. The coordination mechanisms established under the 2006 Aid Strategy were also widely criticized as non-functional, as line ministries lacked the capacity to manage multi-stakeholder meetings and donors continued to pursue new projects that did not align with government priorities. Even sharing basic data on project expenditures in AIMS proved to be a major challenge (Larson 2013).

The SSDP and the accompanying MTCDS¹²⁰ provided a capacity-building plan for post-independence (see Annex 1). The MTCDS sought to build the institutional capacity to implement the SSDP and to align donor support from 2011–2013. The strategy covered all of the sectoral pillars of the SSDP as well as ‘cross-cutting’ capacity-building needs, providing an extensive list of ambitious objectives without clarity on responsibility within GoSS or the donor community to finance or operationalize these tasks.

The SSDP noted that coordination had become increasingly challenging, with donors establishing diverse new projects that did not align with government priorities and did not use pooled funding mechanisms. By 2010, the OECD noted that 109 PPIUs had been officially established (OECD 2011). As set out in the SSDP, the percent “going through pooled mechanisms dropped from 34 percent in 2009 to 24 percent in 2010” with a proliferation of separate projects. For example, in 2010 there were 91 separate projects in health and 65 projects in education, many of which used PPIUs outside of ministry systems (SSDP 2011, 360). Donors had also begun to establish independent bilateral missions in South Sudan following

¹¹⁹ “GoSS Priority Core Governance Functions: An Action Plan for Rapidly Building Capacity.” Presented to Brussels High-Level Meeting, September 17, 2010.

¹²⁰ See MTCDS.

independence. The role of joint mechanisms such as the JDO was gradually reduced until the closure of that office in 2013 and repurposing of its facilities as a common campus for separate national embassies.

Independence period (2011–2016)

The GoSS joined the G7+ group of fragile states in 2011, joining the ‘New Deal’ framework on peace and state- building. Under this framework, focus was to be narrowed from the accomplishment of all MDGs (as called for in the SSDP) to five peace and state-building goals related to politics, security, justice, the economy, and revenue/services. Under this approach, South Sudan called for increased budget support from donors to support a proposed four-page compact with a limited set of benchmarks. While state consultations were held on developing a compact, the process was never completed.¹²¹

The return of large-scale internal conflict in late 2013 and significant political tensions between the GRSS and the international community led to a rupture in the aid architecture, as donors dramatically reduced use of government systems in favor of a return to humanitarian assistance. In many ways, the aid architecture was reversed to the pre-2005 system of humanitarian support through the UN and NGOs, with the cluster system serving to coordinate the humanitarian response. The signing of the ARCISS and the formation of the TGNU had signaled the possibility of creating a platform for discussing renewed engagement from a position of considerably less trust on the part of both development partners and the government. A further consideration is that given the macro-fiscal crisis and low oil prices, South Sudan is likely to be far more aid dependent than it had been in previous periods.

Lessons learned and results (2003–2016)

Looking back at development partner support to institutional development and capacity building from 2003–2016, an important reflection is that stop-and-go financing limited donor-financed capacity-building efforts. For example, while the CBTF spanned a 10-year period, it consisted of multiple two-year funding envelopes with no certainty of extension. Design, approval, and procurement processes further reduced the possible duration of training programs. Rather than a long-term strategic approach to building training institutions, curriculum and trainers, interventions have been bound by near-term priorities. A multi-donor evaluation of support from 2005–2011 noted short-termism by donors reluctant to commit to longer-term programs in the context of state fragility.¹²² A key finding from a recent evaluation of the CBTF is the need for capacity-building efforts to reach the state government and to coordinate with

¹²¹ [New Deal Compact: Background Information on a New Deal Compact for South Sudan](#), MoFEP.

¹²² [Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity in Southern Sudan since 2005](#): Annex 4: Capacity Building, p. 7.

subnational MDAs—something that was not fully realized during the initial state-building period. Further, it was recommended to improve monitoring of baseline capacity, as well as midterm and endline outcomes to allow for midcourse corrections and better tracking of overall progress.

Box A2.1. Multi-donor Evaluation of Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Activity in Southern Sudan 2005–2011: Key Findings in Relation to Capacity Building

“In general, donors misdiagnosed the capacity building needs of Southern Sudan and failed to develop a vision which consisted of a coherent, well-funded approach supporting state building and its key functions. In detail:

- Donors had a piecemeal approach to capacity building and their efforts were uncoordinated and random. Donors have had so much experience in capacity-building programs over the past decades, yet it was only in 2009 that they started a coordination working group to improve coordination.
- The severity of the context was not taken as a starting point.
- Capacity building is more than training and this has not been fully understood by both donors and the GoSS.
- Programs are too scattered, too short and underfunded to have a lasting impact in the medium to long term.
- The process of capacity building is too slow due to a piecemeal approach and not well targeted.
- Investment in the private sector would have had a positive effect on creating a labor market and would have improved access to jobs. This might have contributed to stability in the sense that those retrenched from the public sector would have had alternative employment.
- Investment in the private sector would have stimulated economic growth and created a limited number of jobs in the formal sector but, more importantly, in the informal sector.”

Source: Multi-donor evaluation of support to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activity in Southern Sudan since 2005: Annex 4: Capacity Building, p. 24.

The results of investments in public sector capacity building are difficult to measure in the absence of a coordinated M&E framework. While individual projects measured training inputs and outputs (such as the number of civil servants trained), the overall impact of these programs is unknown. Programs have supported basic operations of the government in the context of a fragile state in its first years of independence—technical assistance to build basic institutional infrastructure (that is, buildings and IT), generate oil revenues, prepare and execute budgets, and count and pay employees. In the context of ongoing emergency, the establishment of a robust M&E framework based on comprehensive national data was a comparatively low priority.

Nevertheless, progress can be observed. Key public sector management systems have been developed, and legislative frameworks have been established. For example, a basic budget planning cycle is in operation, supported by an IFMS and a public sector payroll system is in place to track and pay civil servants. The MoLPSHRD developed a National Master Curriculum, outlining modules of curriculum for public servants. Although not all modules have been

developed, the document provides a strategic starting point for donors developing training materials in specific areas. Beyond the national curriculum, many key operational manuals have been developed, such as the Local Government Public Financial Management Manual and its counterpart Local Government Human Resource Management Manual.

Annex 3. Donor Support to Capacity Building and Institutional Development 2003–2015

Years	Title, <i>Donor</i>	Results	Approximate Budget
1 - Planning for Peace The international community supported Sudan and the SPLM in the negotiation of the CPA and planning for the establishment of the GoSS, establishing the broad parameters of the state—highly decentralized, with initial recruitment of civil service based on SPLM/CANS service.			
2003–2004	‘Tent City’ <i>Norway/United States</i>	Established a temporary civil administration complex for the SPLM Core Team. The Core Team developed the broad strategy of a decentralized GoSS drawing heavily on SPLA/CANS personnel.	
<i>Jan 2005</i>	<i>Signing of the CPA</i> <i>SPLM/GoSS agreement to end civil war, share oil revenue, set a timeline for independence referendum</i>		
2004–2005	JAM <i>World Bank, UN</i>	Assessed the needs of Sudan over a six-year post-CPA period. Donor Conference subsequently held in 2005 and MDTF-National and MDTF-SS promised with over US\$500 million of pledges.	
2004–2005	Capacity Building for Development in Post-Conflict Sudan <i>World Bank LICUS Trust Fund</i>	Provided immediate technical assistance to Sudan and Southern Sudan to plan for aid influx under MDTFs, establishing fiduciary and aid management systems, a Capacity Building Unit, and a Project Management Unit.	US\$4.5 million (US\$2.7 million North; US\$1.8 million South)
2 - Multi-Donor Funds Ambitious MDTFs were created to finance the human and physical infrastructure the GoSS required to establish a basic government administration. Funding for public administration was initially pooled (building on the 2005 Paris Declaration), but became more fragmented as donors established their own bilateral programs in the new country.			
2005–2013	MDTF-SS <i>World Bank Secretariat</i>	To finance the JAM Framework, the MDTF-SS was established as a recipient-executed MDTF, with the World Bank as its secretariat. Under the MDTF, the following public sector projects were undertaken:	US\$728 million (546 donors, 182 GRSS) total funding across all sectors

Years	Title, Donor	Results	Approximate Budget
		Capacity Building, Institutional and HR Development (CABIHRD) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support to draft the Labor Policy Bill - Establishment of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) - Training of ~1000 civil servants in strategic planning (national and state levels); network of senior women in management; cohort of young 'leaders' - Electronic archiving system established in the Cabinet Office - Establishment of GoSS email server 	US\$ 13.7 million
		Rapid Impact Emergency Project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 17 out of 19 GoSS ministry buildings, the National Assembly, the Presidential Cottage, and the State Governors' offices were renovated and supplied with generators, office equipment, and furniture, allowing GoSS institutions to run and start providing basic services 	US\$45.9 million
		Core Fiduciary Systems Support Project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Produced, among others, MoLPSHRD Functional and Management Review - Assistance to the Audit Chamber, to the Procurement Unit in the MoFEP 	US\$15.5 million
2005–2012	Strategic Partnership Framework <i>United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands; UNDP-implemented</i>	Provided complementary funding to the MDTF to support Governance and Rule of Law, building awareness of human rights among duty bearers	US\$74.5 million from 2006 to mid-2009, additional financing followed
2004–2008	CBTF Phase I (CBTF-I) <i>Multi-donor</i>	To support public sector capacity, a highly flexible pooled fund was established to respond to GoSS requests. Its main results included: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Supported production of 2005 GoSS financial statements - Renovation and operation of the GATC - Headcount and basic payroll system established in the Ministry of Education in 50% of states 	US\$22.7 million
2006	<i>JDO opened in Juba - The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, and later Denmark and Canada</i>		
2009–2014	CBTF Phase II (CBTF-II) <i>Multi-donor</i>	Following on CBTF-I, a donor-executed trust fund was established with the objective of enhancing GoSS capacity to manage human, organizational, and financial resources, working primarily with the MoFEP and MoLPSHRD	US\$49 million total funding

Years	Title, <i>Donor</i>	Results	Approximate Budget
		Its main results included:	
		- Technical support to draft the SSDP	US\$0.8 million
		- Transition support during lead-up to 2011 to compile list of state assets, analyze oil revenues, and to strengthen legislative drafting capacity	US\$1.4 million
		- SSEPS established in all 10 states for all ministries of the civil service	US\$8 million
		- National pensions fund designed and legislation passed	
		- Pensions Fund Act. The Civil Service Pensions Scheme designed, but legislation was not passed. A Pensions Fund building was constructed in Juba.	US\$4.4 million
		- The BSS supported the purchase of an electronic accounting and payment system, replacing paper ledgers. Completed in partnership with USAID CORE-I.	US\$5.3 million
		- The MoFEP supported the building of a data center for PFM and payroll systems, to wire its building, and to publish a website.	US\$2.7 million
		- The MoLPSHRD was supported to establish an HRIS pilot at the national level. Project success was limited.	US\$2.1 million
		- Support provided to accountability institutions for basic capacity building in administration (NLA, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting [MoIB], NAC, SSACC).	US\$2.7 million
		- MoFEP and the LGB were supported to draft and disseminate a Local Government PFM Manual.	US\$0.35 million
		- Core Skills Training (English, HRM, PFM) completed in five states, using trainers trained by Skills for South Sudan.	US\$5.3 million
		- Induction training of LGB officers completed in five states.	US\$1 million
		- GATC supported to deliver continued PFM training to civil servants in Juba.	US\$4.5 million
		- Experimental state-level capacity-building projects in tax, ID cards, and HRM systems were implemented in ten states.	US\$3.6 million
		- A diaspora human resources recruitment database and website created at the MoLPSHRD—but was not approved for publication.	US\$0.4 million
		- State the MoPS offices were constructed in five states to house staff, records, and payroll systems.	US\$2 million

Years	Title, <i>Donor</i>	Results	Approximate Budget
2007–2011	Local Government Recovery Programme (LGRP) <i>Mult-donor, UNDP-implemented</i>	The LGRP was conceived by the LGB to restore local government systems. It trained local government trainers from every county in the country, assisted with budgeting, and supported various meetings of county staff.	US\$6.3 million
2013–2018	Local Governance and Service Delivery Project (LOGOSEED) <i>World Bank/Denmark, Netherlands, Norway</i>	The Project Development Objective of LGSDP is “to improve local governance and service delivery in participating counties in South Sudan.” Key results to be achieved include (a) more inclusive and participatory local planning, implementation, and accountability processes that also address local drivers of conflict; (b) improved county government functionality and capacities through ‘learning by doing’; (c) a more predictable and transparent system of transfers to county governments; and (d) expanded access to services in counties covered by the project.	US\$98.5 million
3 - Single-Donor Projects Single-donor funds have also been an important source of public sector finance, particularly for USAID.			

Years	Title, <i>Donor</i>	Results	Approximate Budget
2006–2013	Strengthening Core Economic Governance Institutions (CORE-I) <i>USAID</i>	<p>Following the signature of the CPA, the CORE-I project was launched by USAID with the following objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Support meaningful participation of the SPLM in the Government of National Unity. - Strengthen the institutional structures of a transparent and accountable GoSS and the institutional structure of the Bank of Southern Sudan. - Strengthen key ministries in the three areas. <p>After a midterm review and significant contextual changes, the project objectives were modified in 2010:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improve the decision-making process and communication capacity within the GoSS. - Implement sound PFM policies, legislation, and processes in a transparent and accountable manner. - Strengthen the policies and capacity of the Bank of South Sudan. - Develop a legal drafting process and a legal and regulatory framework for the government that facilitate good governance and democratic processes. - Build the government's capacity to manage its oil resources. <p>CORE-I provided the day-to-day embedded technical support in the MoFEP, BSS, Ministry of Petroleum, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Cabinet Affairs, and Office of the President to support the functioning of basic government administrative systems. Notably, the project supported the implementation of an IFMIS used for budget planning, payments, and financial reporting and supported the new GoSS with its first independent sale of oil.</p>	US\$92.7 million
2013–2015 closed	Strengthening Core Economic Governance Institutions II (CORE-II) <i>USAID</i>	<p>CORE II targeted macroeconomic stability, capacity and sustainability within the Ministry of Finance, BSS, and the Ministry of Petroleum, Mining, and Industry.</p> <p>The project provided tax and budgeting support to all 10 states and had a permanent regional presence outside of Juba in Wau, Western Bahr el Ghazal, serving the three states of Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Warrap, and Western Bahr el Ghazal.</p>	

Years	Title, <i>Donor</i>	Results	Approximate Budget
		The project was suspended shortly after becoming operational.	
2013–2018 Suspended in 2014	Project for Good Governance in the Republic of South Sudan (PROGRESS) <i>USAID</i>	PROGRESS supported key government institutions at national and state levels to strengthen executive policy and decision-making processes. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Presidency and Ministry of Cabinet Affairs - Ministry of Justice and NLA - MoLPSHRD - State-level counterparts in Jonglei, NGB, Upper Nile 	
Since 2005	Government of India	Training of 232 GoSS staff since 2005 in IT, English, Public Administration.	
Planned for 2007–2015 Suspended in 2013	Decentralization and Accountability <i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)</i>	Following passage of the 2009 Local Government Act, GIZ supported a policy framework, strategy, and action plan for implementation. At the subnational level, participatory development plans and strategic objectives were drafted and local peace and conflict assessments carried out. The project is currently in a re-alignment exercise. ¹²³	€24 million
2007–2012	Capacity Building for Poverty Reduction and Good Governance Project <i>AfDB</i>	Project constructed the HRTC. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Building erected outside Juba as support for the MoLPSHRD's training mission - Training of more than 1,200 GRSS and state officials in planning and budgeting 	US\$15 million for activities in Sudan and South Sudan
2007 onwards	<i>Government of Kenya, Kenya School of Government</i>	Trained 686 government officials in Kenya and 135 in Juba in leadership and management, project and strategic planning, and management.	
2008–2010	SEADGOSS <i>DFID, Implemented by Skills for South Sudan</i>	Developed framework of a national curriculum, trained 50 national trainers, and built capacity of national and state civil servants and legislators. The trainers trained under this project remain a reference at the state-level for national capacity building.	£3.3 million

¹²³ https://www.giz.de/projektdaten/index.action?request_locale=en_EN#?region=3&countries=SS

Years	Title, Donor	Results	Approximate Budget
2008–2013	Regional Public Sector Training <i>Canada, with the University of South Africa and Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA)</i>	Trained 340 in leadership and management, governance, and diplomacy; trained 258 in public administration, PFM, communication, justice and security; trained 308 in local government, diplomacy, intergovernmental coordination. PALAMA and Capacity Building Unit partnership began in 2008 to transform Capacity Building Unit into an MDI.	C\$1.74 million
2006–2009	Project for Improvement of Basic Skills and Vocational Training in Southern Sudan (SAVOT) <i>Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA)</i>	Constructed a vocational training center in Juba and provided vocational training. The project has worked with nine training agencies including the Multi Training Center, providing training to 1,793 individuals. Including workshops and training-on-training, services have been provided to a total of 2,655 people, 40 percent of which are women.	
2010–2012	Rapid Capacity Placement Initiative ¹²⁴ <i>UNDP/Canada</i>	105 UN volunteer specialists, including 16 women, were recruited and deployed into government institutions in all 10 states, providing support within host ministries and state governments.	C\$10 million
2011 forward	IGAD Initiative for Capacity Enhancement in South Sudan ¹²⁵ <i>UNDP coordinating; bilaterals contributing</i>	Deployed 200 civil servants (Kenya: 80, Ethiopia: 60, Uganda: 60) to provide mentoring and coaching to counterparts in South Sudan for 2 years ¹²⁶	

¹²⁴ <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb%5Ccipo.nsf/projEn/A034995001>

¹²⁵ See: http://subweb.djis.dk/graphics/Publications/Policybriefs%202011/PB-Civil-Servant-South-Sudan_web.pdf

¹²⁶ http://subweb.djis.dk/graphics/Publications/Policybriefs%202011/PB-Civil-Servant-South-Sudan_web.pdf;

http://www.undp.org/content/south_sudan/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/successstories/regional---civil-servants-support-south-sudan-in-statebuilding-e/

Years	Title, Donor	Results	Approximate Budget
2012–2016	Strengthening Economic Governance (SEG) <i>DFID</i> <i>Funding to CBTF, IMF, and World Bank</i>	To enable ministries and key institutions in South Sudan (MoLPShRD, MoFEP, National Bureau of Statistic) to strengthen their knowledge, skills, and systems, and their ability to improve policies and decision making. This will assist the GoSS to acquire the technical capacity necessary to improve governance and strengthen the country's economy. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Extension funding for CBTF (now closed) - IMF - economic management, particularly in the Bank of South Sudan and capacity building and policy making in MoFEP, and NBS. - World Bank High Frequency South Sudan Survey (HFSSS) 	£7 million
2013–2017	Budget Strengthening Initiative <i>DFID, implemented by Overseas Development Institute</i>	ODI's Budget Strengthening Initiative has promoted effective, transparent, and accountable budget policies, processes, and systems since 2010. This has included particular work on overall PFM strategy, aid coordination planning and budgeting, and sector-related PFM. In particular, this project has strengthened the budget planning cycle between ministries and MoFEP, focusing on results-based budget planning.	£4.8 million
2012–2017	<i>IGAD Civil Service Program, Implemented by UNDP</i>	Planned provision of 1000 technical experts: public administration, agriculture, infrastructure, energy development, health, education and local government.	Costs estimated at US\$90 million annually ^a African Union
2014–	<i>World Bank IDCBP</i>	Pipeline project with initial activities carried out under project preparation advance. As currently designed, the project's two main components focus on (a) the rollout of SSEPS II and operationalization of the MoLPShRD HRTC and (b) core PFM functions in MoFEP. Re-appraisal is expected in the fall of 2016.	US\$20 million (pipeline)

Years	Title, Donor	Results	Approximate Budget
2012–2017	<i>South Sudan State and Peace Building Fund Strengthening Core Government Functions for Resource Dependence</i>	The project consists of three components: (a) Establishing Basic Capacity (US\$1.98 million): Provision of technical assistance to build the capacity of the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining to execute its core functions. (b) Fiscal Policy Administration (US\$1.05 million): Provision of technical advice to the MoFEP to establish an independent macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework, taking into account the challenges of extreme oil dependence. (c) Strengthening Accountability Functions of NLA (US\$230,000): Provision of technical assistance to the Economy, Development and Finance Committee (EDFC) and Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of NLA aimed at building their capacity to carry out their accountability functions for the use of oil resources.	US\$3.26 million
Various	Government of Egypt	Trained 25 people on labor administration. Ended in 2010.	
	Government of Uganda	Provided exchange program for interacting with counterparts, some training at Makerere University. Started in 2006, ended in 2010.	
	United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)	Trained 105 in vocational teaching, IT, English, training of trainers, and management. Started in 2009, ended in 2009.	
	International Labour Organization (ILO)	Trained 59 in labor administration and law, organized exchange program in Kenya, developed vocational training policy in 2011.	

Note: a. See: http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/julyhls/pdf12/south_sudan_au_brochure.pdf.

Annex 4: Composition of the Civil Service: Detailed Analysis

The following detailed analysis is summarized in Section 3.3.

Number of staff and distribution between tiers of government

Estimating the number of staff in South Sudan requires putting together data from multiple sources, as there is currently no single budget or single payroll system that gives a complete picture public employment across sectors and tiers of the government. According to the FY15/16 Approved Budget, the national budget provides for 347,018 central government and 118,023 state government employees (a total of 465,041 government personnel).¹²⁷ This includes employees servicing in the military, organized forces and civilian civil service. States have the ability to hire additional staff paid for through block grants or own-source revenue, but given that copies of state budgets are not widely available, it is difficult to estimate the number of additional staff planned for at this level. County personnel are not reflected in the national budget and limited access to county budgets makes it difficult to estimate the number of staff planned for at this level. Thus, it is expected that subnational employment is higher than reflected in national budgets.

Public employment has increased since 2005 when the GoSS administration first formed. Figure 4.1(a) reflects the number and distribution of civil servants and organized forces between the central government and 10 states in 2005 after the CANS and CCSS administration were merged (data does not include national military). According to the civil service survey completed at the time, the total number of staff was approximately 62,172—though not all civil servants returned survey forms and so the total number is likely to have been somewhat higher.¹²⁸ During this initial period, state government employees outnumbered those assigned to the central government, with Central Equatoria, the regional capital, having the highest number of public employees. The 2005 JAM report proposed keeping central and state governments relatively lean, with the bulk of staff in service delivery functions at the county level.¹²⁹ While it predicted the necessity of a “large amount of recruitment to meet the needs of the various levels of government,” the JAM also envisioned a cap on employment at 100,000.¹³⁰

According to approved national budgets, by FY12/13, government employment in the civil service and organized forces had increased well beyond the proposed JAM ceiling to 163,000, and by FY15/16 the figure had increased to 169,842, with substantial additional

¹²⁷ State government employees refers to ‘state transfers’ in the *Staffing levels, salaries and allowances chapter* of the Approved Budget book


¹²⁸ Report on the Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel in Southern Sudan, GOSS Civil Service Agency (April 2006)

¹²⁹ See JAM Volume III (2005) page 25; Srivastava and Blum (forthcoming)

¹³⁰ See JAM Volume III (2005) page 25 JAM; Srivastava and Blum (forthcoming)

subnational staff not reflected in national budgets.¹³¹ This expansion was funded by growing public revenue from oil resources.¹³² As reflected Figure 4.1(b), employment has increased across tiers of the government (though as noted above, data from the FY15/16 budget only provides a partial picture of subnational employment); with civilian and organized forces in central government increasing from 1,102 in 2005 to 51,819 in FY15/16.

Figure A4.1. Number and Geographic Distribution of Civil Servants and Organized Forces (2005–2006 and 2015–2016)



Source: Report on the Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel in Southern Sudan, GoSS Civil Service Agency (April 2006)¹³³ and FY15/16 Approved Budget Book.

Note: Includes organized but excludes military forces

Distribution of staff between sectors

Though the main focus of this note is on the civil service, a key feature of government employment has been the relatively high number of staff allocated to security functions, including Defense, National Security Service, Veterans Affairs, and the Organized Forces (Police, Prisons, Wildlife, and Fire Services). According to the FY15/16 Approved Budget, security sector salaries make up roughly 47 percent of national government expenditures and 76 percent of the national wage bill (see Figure 4.2).¹³⁴ Just over 85 percent of central and state government employees are engaged in security-related functions, as compared to 7 percent of

¹³¹ FY15/16 Approved Budget Book.

¹³² Initially, South Sudan experienced relatively abundant (but volatile) revenue from oil resources. At independence, public expenditure reached levels well above the East African region: over US\$300 per capita, as compared to US\$100 or less in Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Ethiopia. Yet as noted above, oil revenue declined with the shutdown in production during FY12/13 and again as a result of the civil conflict and falling oil prices in the subsequent fiscal years.

¹³³ As noted in the report, “The survey covered all serving public service personnel in the classified grades, including in the organized services (police, wildlife, prison, and fire services), and personnel seconded to nongovernmental organizations by the CANS, initially established in 1996 as an organ of the SPLM, and the CCSS. Personnel at all three levels of government – ministries and central agencies, states, and counties – were surveyed.”

¹³⁴ Includes Defense, National Security Service, Veterans Affairs, Police, Prisons, Wildlife, and Fire Services.

staff engaged in the education sector and 2 percent in health (see Figure 4.3).¹³⁵ These figures only capture subnational staff being paid through conditional salary transfers. State and county governments hire additional staff using own-source revenue and block transfers, but it is difficult to estimate the number or how they are allocated between sectors.

Table A4.1. Public Sector Employment and Wage Bill (FY15/16)

	Total Public Sector Employment as of 2015– 2016^c	Share of Public Sector Employment/Population (%)^e	Wage Bill as % of Total Public Expenditures (FY15/16)
South Sudan Total	465,041	4.3	61.4
Military^a	295,199	2.7	34.1
Organized Forces^b	104,224	1.0	12.5
Civilian	65,618	0.6	14.8
Average SSA		3.8 (o/w 3.2 civilian)	33.4 ^d

Note: a. ‘Military’ = Defense, National Security Service, Veterans Affairs; b. Organized Forces = Police, Prisons, Wildlife, and Fire Services.

c. Includes national staff serving in national government or transferred to subnational governments.


e Assuming a total population of 10.8 million (as per World Development Indicators) for South Sudan for 2012.

[#] 45.7 percent average for FY06–12/13; d. average for the years 2000–2008.

For SSA: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2010/tnm1015.pdf> - Figures refer to ‘General Government’.

For South Sudan: 2015/16 Budget Book Approved Budget Tables.

Figure A4.2. Distribution of Public Employees between Security and Non-security



Source: 2015/16 Budget Book Approved Budget Tables.

¹³⁵ Calculations based on FY15/16 Approved Budget Book.


*‘Military’ = Defense, National Security Service, Veterans Affairs; Organized forces = Police, Prisons, Wildlife, and Fire Services|. ** Includes national staff serving in national government or transferred to subnational governments. *** Assuming a total population of 10.8 million (as per World Development Indicators) for South Sudan for 2012.

With regard to the current (civilian) civil service, there are two sources of information about the distribution of employment between sectors: the FY15/16 Approved Budget and payroll records. According to the FY15/16 Approved Budget, Ministry of Higher Education, Technology and Science; MoFEP; the Judiciary of South Sudan; and the Ministry of General Education show the highest levels of employment. During 2015, the MoLPSHRD rolled out an upgraded SSEPS II. By February 2016, about 80 percent of civilian central government MDAs had been enrolled in SSPES II—a key MDA still missing was Ministry of Education.¹³⁶ According to this data, Ministry of Health shows the highest level of staffing; followed by Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting; Ministry of Justice. The South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and the South Sudan Urban Water Corporation also have relatively higher levels of staff than other MDAs.

With regard to the civilian civil service at subnational levels, state-level budgets are generally unavailable and payroll data from SSPES II is incomplete with some key agencies not fully enrolled making comparisons of distribution of staff between sectors difficult. Figure 4.5 reflects the distribution of county staff between health, education, and public administration for the 17 counties fully enrolled in SSEPS II. When the new system was rolled out, staff not assigned to service delivery functions (that is, health and education) were mapped to public administration, which helps to explain the relatively high number of staff in this category. The relatively low number of staff mapped to the health sector may be related to the fact that humanitarian assistance and NGOs provide a large share of health services in South Sudan. Education is handled more directly by the state (see Chapter 5 on health).

¹³⁶ Payroll data accessed in February 2016 does not include the following non-security sector MDAs which are present in the national budget: Fiscal Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission; Electricity Corporation National Communications Authority; General Education and Instruction; Higher Education, Science and Technology; Drug and Food Control Authority; Agriculture and Forestry; Agriculture Bank; Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; National Elections Commission; Council of States; National Constitution Review Commission; Parliamentary Service Commission; Judiciary of South Sudan.

Figure A4.3. Comparison of Number of Civilian Staff on Country Payroll for Health, Education, and Public Administration



Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: Sample of 17 counties for which health, education, and public administration staff were enrolled in SSEPS II as of November 2015.

Distribution of staff between grade levels ('Size of the professional cadre')


In South Sudan, the professional cadre of civil servants appears relatively small compared to the cadre of 'unskilled' support staff and takes up a relatively smaller share of the wage bill. However, data constraints make it difficult to understand the full picture. In principle, the professional cadre is made up of public offices in grades 1 through 7; with grades 8 through 17 making up support staff. In practice, there is evidence to suggest that grading has not been carried out systematically so as to ensure a consistent match between the responsibilities associated with a grade level and the experience and qualifications of staff.¹³⁷ For example, there are grade 10 accountants and drivers, as well as grade 15 cleaners and nurses. This makes it difficult to interpret data on the distribution of staff between grades and the size of the professional cadre of civil servants in South Sudan.

Figure 4.6 reflects the distribution of central government civil servants between grades as captured by payroll data from February 2016. On the one hand, the data presented in Figure 4.6 do not reflect the 'missing middle' typical in many fragile or postconflict environments. On the

¹³⁷For example, grading during the merger of the CANS and CCSS administrations was reportedly haphazard and random with 'frequent self-appointments to high-level positions regardless of qualifications.' See Srivastava and Blum, South Sudan Case Study, page 20.

other hand, if grading has been less than systematic, the data may not accurately reflect the actual distribution of skills across the civilian civil service.

Figure A4.4. Distribution of Civilian Central Government Civil Servants across Grades



Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: Reflects civilian civil servants enrolled in SSEPS II electronic payroll system as of February 2016; Fiscal Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission; Electricity Corporation; National Communications Authority; General Education and Instruction; Higher Education, Science and Technology; Drug and Food Control Authority; Agriculture and Forestry; Agriculture Bank; Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; National Elections Commission; Council of States; National Constitution Review Commission; Parliamentary Service Commission; Judiciary of South Sudan have not been enrolled in SSPES II; data does not include Organized Forces (data from Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Conservation includes only Directorate of Tourism and Directorate of Administration & Finance Wildlife Directorate).


In addition to a division into grades (which are linked to eligible salary levels), civil servants are also divided into two ‘classifications.’ The professional cadre of public officers is known as ‘classified staff’—positions include, for example, director general, inspector, human resource officer, IT officer, clerk, store keeper, and receptionist. Unclassified positions include drivers, mechanics, messengers, and cleaners. One would expect this typology to be linked to grading, but this seems not to be the case. Within the payroll, ‘classified’ versus ‘unclassified’ seems to be more accurately and consistently applied than the grading system—though there are inconsistencies.

According to payroll data, 61 percent of civilian public officers in central government are classified and make up 71 percent of the wage bill; 38 percent are unclassified and make up 27 percent of the wage bill (the remaining 1 percent are ‘constitutional post holders’).¹³⁸ For the

¹³⁸ Constitutional post holders are generally graded as classified staff, though not in all cases. For this calculation, all constitutional post holders were treated as ‘professional’ staff.

subnational level, available payroll data for a sample of four states shows the distribution between classified (55 percent) and unclassified (45 percent) staff to be more even.¹³⁹ Similarly, payroll data from a sample of 17 counties enrolled in SSEPS II indicates that 52 percent of staff are classified with the remaining 48 unclassified.¹⁴⁰ This does suggest a somewhat high share of ‘unclassified staff’, that is, of overemployment. However, it also indicates that there should be rather sufficient professional-level staff overall to operate a public administration and publicly led service delivery.

Figure A4.5. Central Government Civilian Servants by Employment Classification




Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: Reflects civilian civil servants enrolled in SSEPS II electronic payroll system as of February 2016; Fiscal Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission; Electricity Corporation; National Communications Authority; General Education and Instruction; Higher Education, Science and Technology; Drug and Food Control Authority; Agriculture and Forestry; Agriculture Bank; Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; National Elections Commission; Council of States; National Constitution Review Commission; Parliamentary Service Commission; Judiciary of South Sudan have not been enrolled in SSPEs II; data does not include Organized Forces (data from Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Conservation includes only Directorate of Tourism and Directorate of Administration & Finance Wildlife Directorate

¹³⁹ SSEPS II has been rolled out to four states: Central Equatoria (46 percent of MDAs reporting); Eastern Equatoria (100 percent of MDAs reporting); Warrap (86 percent of MDAs reporting); and Western Bahr el Ghazal (96 percent of MDAs reporting).

¹⁴⁰ Data from SSEPS II for November 2015; the sample includes counties reporting their entire payroll through SSEPS II: Budi, Ikwoto, Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North, Kapoeta South, Lopa, Magwi, Torit, Gogrial East, Gogrial West, Tonj East, Tonj North, Tonj South, Twic, Jur River, Raga, Wau counties.

Figure A4.6. State and Country Government Civilian Civil Servants by Classification



Source: MoLPASHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: State data include Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Warrap and Western Bahr el Ghazal staff enrolled in SSEPS II as of November 2015; County sample includes Juba, Budi, Gogrial East, Ikwoto, Jur River, Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North, Kapoeta South, Lainya, Lopa, Magwi, Morobo, Raga, Terekeka, Tonj East, Tonj North, Tonj South, Torit, Twic, Wau, Yei River.

Qualifications and relative experience of staff

Data on qualifications and skills remains extremely constrained. The most recent survey of public servants and organized forces was that carried out in 2005 (the *Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel*). Given the expansion of the public service and ongoing capacity-building efforts, this is unlikely to provide an up-to-date reflection of qualifications and experience, but can provide a useful baseline against which later and much more partial findings can be compared. In late 2015, the MoLPASHRD initiated a Skills Assessment covering a total of 616 respondents from the MoLPASHRD, MoRB, MoE, and MoH at the national level and state level.¹⁴¹ A draft report was completed in April 2016 and provides a more up-to-date picture of a small sample of civil servants, with results discussed further below.

A further consideration is that central government agencies have not established records of staff credentials. In part, this is related to the fact that many South Sudanese have been trained in other countries. As a result, public officers may hold academic or professional qualifications that are not uniform or easy to verify. Within the civilian public service, MoLPASHRD developed an excel-based HRIS with assistance from USAID to capture information from paper records. In 2013, the ministry piloted an upgraded HRIS system with support from the CBTF. This was

¹⁴¹ States covered by the survey include Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes.

rolled out to select ministries to record basic information such as date and place of birth, as well as degrees or other credentials held.¹⁴² Other ministries have also initiated sector-specific HRISs. An EMIS has been rolled out to the education sector. The Ministry of Health has also begun development of an HRIS system, which has been rolled out to five states—this data is analyzed in Chapter 5 on health. Notably, neither system has been implemented in close coordination with MoLPSHRD.

With regard to educational attainment, the 2005 Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel found that 42.5 percent of civil servants had attained early education only; 29 percent reached secondary or post-secondary education; 6 percent had a university degree (23 percent did not specify educational attainment).¹⁴³ The central government had the highest ratio of graduates to non-graduates. Though there are some indications that qualifications have improved over the past decade, data for different points in time is unavailable or not fully comparable.

The 2015 Skills Audit sample was composed of directors general, directors, deputy directors, assistant directors, inspectors, HR officers, head teachers, engineers, IT officers, and nurses. Of this group, 98 percent of respondents had completed secondary school; 21 percent had a BA and 3 percent had a MA. Educational attainment was somewhat higher at the national level, with 100 percent of central government respondents completing secondary school; 34 percent had a BA, 10 percent a MA, and 2 percent held PhDs. The Skills Audit also collected data on the highest professional qualification obtained relevant to civil servants' current post: 25 percent of respondents had no professional qualifications at all and 5.3 percent had non-relevant professional qualifications; 52 percent of respondents had obtained basic relevant qualifications and 17 percent had relevant higher qualifications.

With regard to language skills, a key challenge for capacity development has been the switch from Arabic to English as the main language of the government. A key implication for the civil service has been a need to distinguish between gaps in technical versus language skills (for example, a certified accountant who could not read government documents in English). The 2005 survey found that roughly 60 percent of central government employees had 'good' or 'excellent' English speaking and writing skills. English skills varied for employees of state government administrations from 18 percent (Northern Bahr el Ghazal) to 48 percent (Western Equatoria).¹⁴⁴ Those serving in the CCSS or Khartoum administration were more likely

¹⁴² Initially eight computers were provided as part of CBTF funding, though all but one have been damaged or stolen. Further, as of early 2016, the HRIS system faces IT challenges which make it difficult to access or analyze the underlying data; resolving these issues requires IT support from the firm which originally designed the system, but resources to do so are unavailable.

¹⁴³ Includes civilian and organized forces. Excludes army. Page 36

¹⁴⁴ See Report on the Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel in Southern Sudan (2006) and World Bank (2014).

to be fluent in Arabic than English. Some efforts have been made to invest in language training through the ‘Skills for Sudan’ effort in the late 2000s.

With regard to job experience, a majority of staff have been recruited within the past decade; while roughly 20 percent of staff in the national government and 30 percent of staff at the subnational government have been in post for over 10 years.¹⁴⁵ Payroll records from 2015 include data on the date of appointment for 69 percent of central government civil servants (see Figure 4.9), that is, for 31 percent the length of service remains unclear.¹⁴⁶ The distribution of appointments since 2005 suggests a mixed length of experience. Interactions with individual civil servants with a period of service reaching back to the 1980s and 1990s suggests that there was a more organized system in place at the time in the locations where they worked, but the relevance of this legacy is now limited.

The 2016 Skills Audit also collected data on years of service. It found that 5 percent of respondents from the *national* ministries surveyed had been in their current position for less than a year; 41 percent for 1–5 years; 33 percent for 6–10 years; and 21 for more than 10 years. It also found that nearly 6 percent of respondents across levels of the government were serving in their role in an acting capacity.¹⁴⁷ Two-thirds of national government respondents had no work experience outside of the public sector, though 21 percent had worked with another ministry.


At the *state level*, the 2016 Skills Audit found that 12 percent of respondents had been serving in their current position for less than a year, 35 percent for 1–5 years, 22 percent for 6–10 years, and 32 percent for more than 10 years. The distribution by state is reflected in Figure 4.10. With regard to previous work experience, only 17 percent of those surveyed had worked outside of the public sector and 60 percent had only worked for their current ministry.

¹⁴⁵ Based on data available and reflecting a date of appointment.

¹⁴⁶ A key caveat on these figures is that date of employment reflects the date on which an official appointment letter was attached to the employee’s HR file; given delays issuing and receiving such letters, this is not always the same month or year that staff were hired into the civil service.

¹⁴⁷ See Skills Audit, page 32.


Figure A4.7. SSEPS II Data on Civilian Central Government Employees by Official Year of Appointment



Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: Reflects civilian civil servants enrolled in SSEPS II electronic payroll system as of February 2016; Fiscal Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission; Electricity Corporation; National Communications Authority; General Education and Instruction; Higher Education, Science and Technology; Drug and Food Control Authority; Agriculture and Forestry; Agriculture Bank; Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation; National Elections Commission; Council of States; National Constitution Review Commission; Parliamentary Service Commission; Judiciary of South Sudan have not been enrolled in SSPES II; data does not include Organized Forces (data from Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Conservation includes only Directorate of Tourism and Directorate of Administration & Finance Wildlife Directorate)..

Figure A4.8. Skills Audit Data on Years Served in Current Positions for Select State Ministries




Source: MoLPSHRD Skills Audit (draft 2016).

Note: Data from a sample of 518 from 7 state government employees in the following state ministries: SMOLPSHRD, SMORB, SMOE and SMOH. States sampled include Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes.

With regard to age, the 2005 *Survey of Serving Public Service Personnel* found that roughly 42 percent of government employees in the civil service and organized forces at the national and state level were in the ages 16–35 years. It found that 3 percent were 60 years or older—that is, at or past retirement age with the bulk of these in the organized forces, health, or education. The report estimated that 14 percent of government personnel surveyed at the time would be at retirement age by 2016. More recent data from SSEPS II is significantly constrained as 34 percent of records do not contain an accurate birth date; records without birth dates are more likely to reflect older staff who do not have an updated national identification card; and SSEPS II only covers civilian staff. Of the civil servants in central government with a birth date in their records, 49 percent are 39 years old or younger; 8 percent are 60 or older (and so above the retirement age).

The 2016 Skills Audit found that 38 percent of respondents from national ministries were 39 years of age or younger; it found that 34 percent were at or beyond the retirement age. For the state ministries covered in the 2016 Skills Audit, 10 percent were between 30 and 39 years, 28 percent between 40 and 49 years, 23 percent between 50 and 59 years, and 34 percent were 60 years or older.¹⁴⁸ Figure 4.12 reflects the distribution by state. **Thus, this most recent, but also small-scale assessment indicates a (potentially) substantial problem with employment of ‘over age’ staff.**

Figure A4.9. SSEPS II Data on Age of Civilian Central Government Civil Servants




Source: MoLPSHRD - SSEPS II.

Note: Reflects civilian civil servants enrolled in SSEPS II electronic payroll system as of February 2016; Fiscal Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission; Electricity Corporation; National Communications Authority; General Education and Instruction; Higher Education, Science and Technology; Drug and Food Control Authority; Agriculture and Forestry; Agriculture Bank; Foreign

¹⁴⁸ Five percent of those surveyed were below 21 years of age.

Affairs and International Cooperation; National Elections Commission; Council of States; National Constitution Review Commission; Parliamentary Service Commission; Judiciary of South Sudan have not been enrolled in SSPEs II; data does not include Organized Forces (data from Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Conservation includes only Directorate of Tourism and Directorate of Administration & Finance Wildlife Directorate).

Figure A4.10. Skills Audit Data on Age of Civil Servants for Selected State Ministries



Source: MoLPSHRD Skills Audit (draft 2016).

Note: Data from a sample of 518 from 7 state government employees in the following state ministries: SMOLPSHRD, SMORB, SMOE, and SMOH. States sampled include Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Northern Bahr El Ghazal Western Bahr El Ghazal, Warrap, and Lakes.

Table A4.2. List of Abbreviations for Figures in Annex 4

LEGEND			
MDA	Abbreviation	MDA	Abbreviation
Bureau of Community Security Arms Control	BCSA	Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation	MOWRI
Commission for Refugee Affairs	CRA	National Audit Chamber	NAC
Local Government Board	LGB	National Bureau of Standards	NBStand
Ministry of Cabinet Affairs	MOCA	National Bureau of Statistics	NBStat
Ministry of Youth Culture and Sport	MOYCS	National Employees of Justice Chamber	NEJC
Ministry of Electricity and Dams	MOED	National Legislative Assembly	NLA
Ministry of Environment	MOEnv	National Petroleum and Gas Commission	NPGC
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	MoFEP	Office of the President RSS	OPRSS
Ministry of Gender Child and Social Welfare	MOGCSW	South Sudan Anticorruption Commission	SSAC
Ministry of Health	MoH	South Sudan Ascension of East Africa Community	SSAEAC
Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning	MOHP	South Sudan Civil Service Commission	SSCSC
Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	MOHA	South Sudan DDR Commission	SSDDRC
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting	MoIB	South Sudan HIV AIDS Commission	SSHIVC
Ministry of Infrastructure	MoI	South Sudan Human Rights Commission	SSHRC
Ministry of Justice	MOJ	South Sudan Investment Authority	SSIA
Ministry of Labor	MOL	South Sudan Lands Commission	SSLC
Ministry of Livestock Fisheries and Industry	MOLFI	South Sudan Law Review Commission	SSLRC
Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs	MOP	South Sudan Peace Commission	SSPC
Ministry of Petroleum and Mining	MOPM	South Sudan Public Grievances Chamber	SSPGC
Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development	MoPSHRD	South Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund	SSRDF
Ministry of Roads and Bridges	MoRB	South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission	SSRRC
Ministry of Telecommunication and Postal Services	MOTPS	South Sudan Urban Water Corporation	SSUWC
Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife Conservation	MOTWC	South Sudan War Disabled Orphans and Widows Commission	SSWDOWC
Ministry of Trade Investment and Industry	MOTII		

Annex 5. Overview of University System in South Sudan

Public universities rely heavily on government funding and have very limited budget of their own or other sources of funding and income. This has affected them negatively with regard to not even affording payment of operational costs of the institutions. In May 2016, all lecturers across the state universities went on strike because of nonpayment of salaries and allowances for over three months. The lecturers were then given a salary equivalent to a month and asked to resume work. Many have been demoralized and have quit the universities. The nonpayment of salaries are a reflection of the fiscal challenges the country is faced with following the December 2013 conflict.

In the assessment of academic staff and current status of South Sudan universities undertaken by the Ministry of Education in 2012, the report identified the challenges facing the universities as follows:

- (a) There was an acute shortage of qualified academic staff in all the disciplines in the five public universities. As a result, the universities have been compelled to hire retired civil servants or use part-time staff whose qualifications to teach at the university at most times is questionable.
- (b) All the universities suffered the legacy of mass expansion in higher education which took place under the National Salvation Government of Sudan, with the exception of the University of Rumbek and Dr. John Garang Memorial University of Science and Technology. This led to the stretching of a small pool of qualified academic staff to serve in many institutions; lack of funding to match expansion; recruitment of unqualified staff; acceptance of weak students to fill up universities by lowering admission level and production of low-quality graduates (proficient only in Arabic).
- (c) The legacy of using Arabic as the medium of education is still lingering in the three Universities of Juba, Bahr el Ghazal, and Upper Nile. Some academic staff are unable to teach in English and many students are unable to learn English. This has led to confrontations between the students and administration.
- (d) Contact hours in the universities are very high, as much as over 3 hours per week. This makes the total number of credits for the award of a degree too high, thus not in conformity with international standards. There is also a disparity in the total number of credits among disciplines in the same college/faculty, resulting in high contact hours per week for some students and lower ones for others.

- (e) All universities have no budget allocated for teaching, research library. All libraries are dependent on donations of books, resulting in some acquisitions that are irrelevant to the academic programs.
- (f) All universities do not have programs for academic advising, career guidance, and counselling of students
- (g) All universities lack sufficient infrastructure—lecture halls, laboratories; student and staff accommodation, staff offices and so on.

Overall, the report recommends a complete reform of the existing systems to achieve international standards and produce the right quality of students who will contribute to the future pool of public and civil servants for the country.

So far, there are two postgraduate colleges in the University of Juba—the Center for Peace and Development Studies and the SPS. The SPS, which was opened more recently focuses on building the capacity of civil servants in various public administration and policy areas. As the country considers embarking on the public sector reform agenda, the school could potentially be an important contributor toward achieving the requisite results. Below is detailed case study of the school.

In addition to the state universities, South Sudan witnessed a mushrooming and proliferation of private universities in 2009 and by 2010, there were about 36 private universities.¹⁴⁹ The Higher Education Act 2012, provides for the establishment of private and foreign institutions of higher education. In 2012, the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology commissioned a study of these universities to assess whether they satisfy the conditions of providing education in the country. The study revealed that none of the private universities qualified for registration with General Directorate of Private and Foreign Higher Education. A ministerial order was issued to close all of them with the exception of two, that is, St. Mary's College in Juba and Mikese College in Yambio. These had the physical infrastructure and the relevant requirements for a higher learning institution.¹⁵⁰ While the active private universities are relatively few, they have contributed to increasing the pool of trained and certified South Sudanese. These also have affiliation to other universities outside South Sudan, for instance, the Catholic University of East Africa.

Table A5.1. Current Private Institutions of Higher Learning in South Sudan

No .	Name	Year Est.	Location	Accreditation Status ^a
1.	Bridge University	2010	Juba	Shifted to university

¹⁴⁹ Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (2012).

¹⁵⁰ Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (2012).

				status (Closed)
2.	The Catholic Health Institute	2010	Wau	Letter of no objection ^b (Closed)
3.	The New Generation University College	2009	Juba	Letter of no objection (Closed)
4.	Agape Christian University of Science and Technology	2009	Juba	Letter of no objection (Closed)
5.	Legal Study Center	2010	Juba	Letter of no objection (Closed)
6.	Pan African University	2009	Juba	Shifting to university status (Closed)
7.	Institute of Management Studies	2009	Juba	Letter of no objection (Closed)
8.	Ras University of Juba	2009	Juba	Not known (Closed)
9.	Christian Leadership Institute of Sudan	2009	Yei	Not known (Closed)
10.	The Catholic University of South Sudan	2009	Juba	Letter of no objection and accredited with affiliation to Catholic University of East Africa.
11.	The South Sudan Christian University of Science and Technology	2009	Juba	Letter of no objection (Closed)
12.	Supiri Institute of Management and Information Tech	—	Juba	Closed
13.	Nile Institute of Technology	—		Closed
14.	Hippo Engineering Institute	—	Juba	Closed
15.	Cambridge International College	—	Juba	Closed
16.	African Population Institute	—	Juba	Closed
17.	Agape Christian University	—	Juba	Closed
18.	St. Mary College	2010	Juba	Accredited and Operating
19.	Mikese College	2010	Yambio	Accredited and Operating

Source: Government of South Sudan Strategic Capacity Building Study, 2010;

http://www.southsudaninfo.com/Private_Universities_not_maintaining_standards_closed; accessed on June 6, 2016; Interview Benjamin Gabriel Apai, Director General for Training and External Relations, Ministry of Higher Education.

Note: a. Accreditation refers to a process of control and guarantee of the quality of higher education, through which, as a result of inspection and/of assessment or of both, one recognizes that an institution or its programs satisfy minimum standards.

b. Letter of no objection refers to prior approval to start laying the ground for operations as due diligence is being undertaken. Should results not be favorable following the due diligence, then accreditation is not awarded.

Annex 6. Recruitment: Evolution of Recruitment Board and Overview of Regulatory Framework

Evolution of the Civil Service Recruitment Board

Initially, in June 2006 a CSC was established, modeled on the example of other CSCs in the East Africa region. Its mandate covered the civilian civil service. However, it lacked the political influence to put a check on irregularities in the hiring and selection process. In July 2008, the CSC functions were moved to the MoLPSHRD.

The Civil Service Recruitment Board, which sits under the MoLPSHRD, was established on November 20, 2008 and charged with the responsibility of overseeing all civil service recruitment. The initial activities of the Board included drafting of a recruitment policy, which was completed in 2009, the same year the mandate of the Board came to force. A manual to give guidance on recruitment procedures was also approved by the Council of Ministers and distributed to the government ministries and establishment officers who double the work of human resource managers in the MDAs. The establishment officers were taken through orientation on the procedures of recruitment within public service.

The Board was established as a five-member entity with a secretariat of three members. Currently, only the Chair and the Secretary of the Board are the ones remaining—the other three members left. The current structure has the Board reporting independently to the Minister of LPSHRD through the Chair. The Chair assumes the position of Director General, the Secretary is at Director level with three Grade 9 staff including two IT personnel. Between 2008 and 2012, there were monthly Board meetings. However, following the departure of some of the Board members, the meetings stopped being conducted because of lack of quorum. The Board faces enormous challenges ranging from limited political support to having no office space to run the recruitment processes and house the Board Secretariat. The Board has budget to hire staff but no space or furniture to seat them.

The 2016 Draft Civil Service Selection and Recruitment Manual is under preparation, and identifies steps to be followed in the recruitment process. According to these regulations all vacant positions from the various MDAs should be submitted to the Recruitment Board and budget checked to ascertain the availability of funds. Once the budget lines for the positions are confirmed, TORs should be drafted by the respective MDAs and sent to the Board. The Recruitment Board would then prepare and advertise the post. Once the applications are collected, the Recruitment Board convenes a committee of three to five members depending on the number of applicants per position. Long-listing is done according to TORs and the qualifications. A candidate is then selected to a short list from a minimum of three applicants and a maximum of five applicants. The list is submitted to the Chair of the Board, who after

confirmation of due process, submits the short list to the Undersecretary and Minister within the MoLPSHRD.

An approval letter would then be drafted for the recruitment process to commence. The committee then designs an oral and written interview guide, selects the days for interviews, notifies the short-listed applicants and conducts the interviews. Scoring is done by averaging scores of individual panelists. Based on these results, the Chair of the panel would submit a report to the Chair of the Recruitment Board to verify that due process was followed. Once this has been ascertained, the Chair of the Recruitment Board writes a cover letter to the MoLPSHRD with a list of the successful interviewees recommending their appointments. The MoLPSHRD provides this list to the concerned MDAs. A personnel file, Form 40 would then be submitted to HRM for provisionary appointments and entered into the payroll. This is followed through by a permanent appointment following a successful probation period (ranges from 12 months and more depending on performance).

Recent discussion with key stakeholders highlight serious concerns about the extent to which the selection processes applied by MDAs are aligned with these regulations. Findings from interviews with officials from the Directorate of HRD and HRM indicated a high disregard for the national norms and standards for recruitment. According to the Secretary of the Recruitment Board, poor management at the MDA level affects the compliance with recruitment procedures. HR officials sometimes get bulldozed by Heads of Units, Ministers or Undersecretaries to hire without following the due process. This results in individuals being hired without the right qualifications since little screening is done at the MDA level, affecting performance. It is common practice to find compromises entered into to hire relatives, friends, and tribal affiliations of officials in the different MDAs into grades without due consideration for the requisite requirements.

The 2016 Draft Civil Service Selection and Recruitment Manual, currently under preparation, envisions a central role for the Board in recruitment including participation in all hiring decisions. It is another effort to strengthen the MoPSLHRD's influence over recruitment procedures and to effect a more meritocratic process. It closely mirrors previous processes which have been quite rigorous on paper, but not been followed in practice. A key question going forward may be how the MoLPSHRD can adopt international or regional best practices (as foreseen in the draft manual), but adapt these models to the political-institutional realities in South Sudan so that they have a practical impact on the ground. For example, current draft regulations may be overambitious in providing for recruitment board involvement in every hiring process from start to finish—which is ambitious for a small Board, especially if hiring happens in 'waves' rather than continuously, for example, once the hiring freeze is officially lifted.

Civil Service Act 2011 (Legislation)

The South Sudan Civil Service Act 2011 provides for the regulation and governance of the Civil Service of the GoSS. It includes the following provisions:

- **Section 28 (1)** states that recruitment or promotion is a procedure through which a selected person is appointed to a vacant post in the Civil Service, for the performance of the duties of a civil servant, official, or employee.
- **Section 28 (2)** states that recruitment or promotion shall be exclusively dependent upon the applicant's suitability for the post and shall not be decided on grounds of race, creed, sex, or religion, unless specified otherwise by the constitution, relevant government policy on gender, or any other law.
- **Section 28 (4)** states that appointment whether by recruitment or promotion shall only occur after the decision by the relevant Head of unit that recruitment or promotion of staff to a vacant post is necessary. For a post to be filled it must be vacant, have funds allocated to it in the budget, and be in the approved nominal roll.
- **Section 31 (1)** states that, where the selection is opened to competitive promotion across the civil service or recruitment from outside the civil service, the selection process shall take into account the principles of freedom to apply, equal conditions and opportunities for all applicants, and fair procedures.
- **Section 32** sets out the selection criteria in descending order of importance in all promotion, recruitment, and selection processes. The criteria are as below:
 - Year of experience in the post (or its equivalent) to be filled or service in the SPLA;
 - Satisfactory reference or another assessment of past performance (for example, service in the SPLM/SPLA);
 - Relevant education (as appropriate to the post to be filled);
 - Gender balance;
 - Functional literacy in English;
 - Geographic balance; and
 - Computer literacy

Under relevant education specified above, key areas of consideration in descending order are: University/higher institute degree; Diploma; vocational training; secondary school certificate; primary and informal training.

- **Section 33(1)** states that, no appointment, promotion, or terms of service for any appointments at any levels above grade 2 shall be effective before the issuance of a formal letter of clearances and appointments by the Ministry of Public Service.
- **Section 33 (4)** notes that before a formal letter of appointment is issued, the Ministry of Public Service shall verify whether the selection process has followed the approved selection criteria or not. The Internal Audit section of the MoFEP shall be served with a copy of the letter of appointment

Manual of Public Service Procedure 2007 (Public Service Procedure)

The Manual of Public Service Procedure 2007 sets out the overall administration and public service policies and procedures of the GoSS. It includes the following provisions:

(a) Guiding Principles:

Section 1.(2) (i) provides that recruitment, appointments, or promotion should only take place after a careful assessment of the need to employ or promote such permanent or contract staff has been made, and deemed to be absolutely necessary.

Subsection 2.2 stipulates that, where possible, vacancies should be filled by internal departmental transfer or promotion. Where no suitable candidate(s) is available, all vacant posts must be advertised through available public media.

Subsection 2.4 provides that, recruitment will be related solely to the applicant's suitability for the post and will not be influenced by race, creed, sex, or religion, unless specified otherwise by the relevant laws in force.

(b) Selection and Appointments:

Subsection 1.3.5 indicates that promotions and appointment to the post of Secretary General, Undersecretary, and other special category positions will be subject to special requirements or qualifications, experience, and suitability for variety of assignments.

These positions will be appointed by the president of the Republic of South Sudan after recommendations by the ministerial subcommittee for the appointment and promotion of super grade posts of the GoSS under the Chairmanship of the Minister of LPSHRD.

Subsection 3.6 further notes that appointments to ordinary super grade posts shall be made by the approval of the Council of Ministers of the GRSS—upon recommendation of the ministerial

subcommittee for appointment and promotion working in consultation with the concerned ministries.

In subsection 3.8, appointments to the positions of administrative and professional staff are the responsibility of the concerned ministries/institutions subject to endorsement by the MoLPSHRD. The endorsement will be confirmed based on whether the concerned ministry or institution followed the procedures and criteria for selection.

(c) Intra-ministerial Recruitment Board:

Before the appointment, and where the vacancy can be filled through internal promotion, a ministry appointment board must be formed to undertake the selection process. The board shall be chaired by a senior staff member of a grade above the post being filled.

Subsection 3.10 of the manual stipulates that selection will be confirmed by the concerned minister and the undersecretary or head of department who will forward the papers to the MoLPSHRD for final approval of the appointment.

In case of recruitment and appointment of new employees, subsection 3.12 provides that the ministry or departmental recruitment board will conduct interviews of short-listed candidates derived from an evaluation of responses to advertisements, provided by the labor department or a list provided in the context of demobilization of the SPLA. The departmental recruitment board is usually composed of three to five persons of whom at least one is a knowledgeable person from outside the recruiting institution.

In addition to that, subsection 3.16 of the Manual of Public Service Procedures prescribes that all new employees must undergo the induction course or program before taking over posts. And, subsection 3.16 states that new employees must initially serve on probation for a period of three (3) to twelve (12) months depending on the levels of positions filled in the unit/institution. Where necessary, the probationary period may be extended for a further period as directed by the respective supervisor in consultation with the head of relevant department/unit.

Civil Service Grading

The following table sets out the policy with regard to matching civil servants with their respective grade levels in South Sudan.

Table A6.1. Civil Service Grading in South Sudan

Grade	Grade Category	Examples of Title or Post
Special	Leadership	Secretary General; Clerk to Assembly; Undersecretary of Ministry; Specialist Expert

1		Executive Director of Commission; Director General of Directorate of Ministry; Specialist Expert, for example, medical surgeons, senior specialized teachers, any other civil servants that have done exceptional services to the people of Southern Sudan.
2		Director of Department of Ministry Department/Commission/Specialist Experts
3		1st Deputy Director of Department of Ministry/Commission/Specialist Experts
4	Super Grade	Deputy Director/Specialist Experts of Civil institution
5		Assistant Director/Chief Technical Officer/Expert of Civil institution
6		Assistant Chief Technical Officer/Expert of Civil institution or Department
7	Administrative and Professional	Senior Inspector/Senior Technical Officer/Senior IT Professional
8		Inspector/Technical Officer; IT Professional
9		Assistant Inspector/Assistant Technical Officer/Graduate Entry
10	Para-Professional and Technical	Head Staff Clerk; Head Accountant; Chief Cashier; Chief Store Keeper
12		Senior Clerk/Medical Assistant, Computer Operator/Secretary
14		Secretary/Radio Technician/Sanitary Overseers/Artisans/Clerk/Book Keeper, Secretary Secondary School leaver
11	Skilled Worker	Senior Technician; Senior Bookkeeper; Land Officer; Veterinary Assistant; Certified Artisan; Head Driver; Head Mechanic
13		Driver, Mechanic, Artisan, Plumber, Fitter, and so on.
15		Assistant Fitter, Mechanic, Driver (3rd Class)/Mason/technician
16	Unskilled Worker	Messenger, Cleaner, Unskilled Laborer/Apprentice
17		Unskilled Laborer

Source: Civil Service Act, 2011.

Annex 7: Training: Strengthening the Skills of Civil Servants in South Sudan

University of Juba, School of Public Service

Establishment. The SPS of the University of Juba was established on November 4, 2014 after approval by the University of Juba Dean's board. The establishment of an in-country institution to spearhead capacity development in public administration followed a 2011 Council of Ministers Resolution to establish an Institute of Public Administration. At that time, Patricia Powers Thomson, the founding Director of the SPS submitted a proposal discussing the merits of an NGO and Public Service Academy which was later refined into a call of action in consultation with the Ebony Center's Development Policy Forum, a leading national think tank, for the establishment of the SPS. In 2014, a Board of Advisors was established to finalize the school's formation. The SPS began offering classes during the 2015–2016 academic year.

With regard to accreditation, during the inception and design stages of the structure of the School, 20 of the best schools in public service in the world were benchmarked. The School is currently undergoing an international accreditation process to enhance linkages with other schools. There is usefulness in promoting study trips to the region, that is, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan and support visiting scholars to the school, there is strong emphasis on this to promote visibility. Within South Sudan, the School hopes to create avenues for financial aid, endowments, and funding for students.

Rationale for establishment. From the perspective of the SPS leadership, the international development community's approach to capacity building in South Sudan had been constrained by a focus on short-term trainings that failed to address the underlying issues affecting the South Sudan public service. The SPS was established with the belief that a critical mass of well-trained public service personnel nurtured over the long term would create a solid foundation upon which other capacity-building efforts could be layered. The School of Public Service hopes to achieve this goal by pursuing a course of learning that captures the depth and intensity required to develop skills that can change mindsets and create transformational leadership.

Management arrangements. The SPS is a public institution that is a part of the University of Juba and is situated at the Customs Campus. With a central location, the campus sits on an expansive stretch that also houses the School of Law and the University library. The faculty building constructed with funding from the Norwegian Government is a modern structure with facilities, lecture rooms, and offices, fully equipped to create a conducive learning and working environment for the students and the staff. Electricity is delivered through solar power.

Salaries of the faculty and other operational costs are catered for by the government. The School's Director is in charge of the day-to-day management of the school focusing both on the academic and administrative functions. The Director reports to the University Administration as

well as a Board of Trustees that provide oversight and strategic direction. As of February 2016, staffing at the school comprised of eight academic staff and three administrative staff.¹⁵¹

Programs, faculty, and student enrollment. For the 2015–2016 academic year, the School is offering a two-year Master’s degree in Public Administration.¹⁵² There are also plans in place to roll out certificate courses and other customized courses over time. Eventually, the school aims to establish an undergraduate program.

The Master’s Degree is a two-year program with at least 40 credit hours per a semester. The program is designed for professionals already employed by the public sector, NGOs, development partners, or the private sector; 65 percent of MA candidates are civil servants; 19 percent employed by NGOs and international organizations; and 15 percent by the private sector. Enrollment for 2015–2016 stood at 51. By training mid-career professionals, the SPS enrolls those in a position to apply transformational skills in their day-to-day work

Box A7.1. MA Program Courses

Semester 1

- Introduction to Development
- Leadership Fundamentals
- Strategic Planning
- Fiscal Management in the Public Sector
- Program Evaluation/Research Methods

Semester 2

- Procurement and Contracting
- Managing People and Teams (HR Management)
- Project Design and Management
- Ethics and Public Service
- Communications in the Public Sector

Semester 3

- Conflict Management
- Fundamentals of Capacity Building
- Quantitative Analysis and Public Policy
- Local Government
- Working Group Management

¹⁵¹ School of Public Service Factsheet; http://www.sps-uofjuba.org/wp-content/uploads/SPS_-Fact_Sheet_Feb-2016.pdf

¹⁵² School of Public Service 2016/17 Brochure; http://www.sps-uofjuba.org/wp-content/uploads/SPS_Bi-Fold_Jan-2016.pdf

Semester 4

- Policy Analysis and Decision Making
- Leadership in Development Context
- Public Institutions
- Economics for Public Sector Management
- Research / Consulting Projects

Source: <http://sps-uofjuba.org/academics/mpa-program/>

Courses cover a range of material (see Box A7.1). The MA program targets skills for managing and leading people and processes as well as using data to make evidence-based decisions.¹⁵³ Courses are offered during the day for those who are available, as well as in the evening for those with full-time jobs. Courses are administered through seminars, group work case studies, and plenary. The classes have not more than 33 students each. In 2017, it was anticipated that applicants would double and in the event, the School will take up to 60 students and run two tracks simultaneously. The School leadership has noted improvement in students' communications, presentations, and critique skills; as they tackle business problems and real problem/issues affecting their lives.

The SPS has vast experience in public policy and administration; 80 percent of full-time staff at the SPS are South Sudanese; as of February 2016 this included eight faculty members and three administrative staff. Faculty have degrees from well-regarded international universities including Harvard, Oxford, Stanford, and Syracuse (Maxwell).

Furthermore, the University of Juba is leading the establishment of a transformational leadership institute that will focus on enhancing women's leadership skills while providing life skills, basic numeracy, and literacy training in English where possible and in the local languages of South Sudan. This presents a good partnership opportunity for the School with respect to reaching to women in public service.

Fees and financing. A full tuition for the Masters in Public Administration for the pilot year was SSP 6000 per year. Tuition this upcoming year will be SSP 12,000 per year (US\$200 per year and US\$400 per year respectively, at the exchange rate of 30). The majority of students are self-funded, though some scholarships are available for NGO candidates sponsored by USAID's SUCCESS project. Table A7.1 sets out the SPS annual operating costs, which amounted to SSP 1.9 million in early 2016 (though may now have changed because of inflation).

Table A7.1. University of Juba Operating Costs (SSP)

Salaries	214,094
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¹⁵³ http://www.sps-uofjuba.org/wp-content/uploads/SPS_-Fact_Sheet_Feb-2016.pdf

Operating	1,724,148
Total	1,938,242

Source: Interview with SPS director, February 2–15.

Partnerships and accreditation arrangements. Partnerships with the University of Juba and development partners have enabled a smooth transition for the School into the newly constructed university campus. The funds for the construction of the Law School building, where the School is located, came from Norway and the United States. In 2016, USAID’s SUCCESS project run by Democracy International provided scholarships covering tuition and materials for students working with civil society/NGOs in the pilot year of the MPA.

The leadership of SPS has expressed openness to partnerships with other training institutions inside the country that share a complementary vision in supporting public administration capacity development such as the MoLPSHRD HRTC.

MoLPSHRD HRTC

The HRTC was established by MoLPSHRD between 2009 and 2013, but has not been fully operationalized. While still part of Sudan, public servants in the Khartoum administration received in-service training in clerical and secretarial work through the South Sudan Multi Training Center (MTC).¹⁵⁴ As set out in Chapter 3, with the signing of the CPA, the government grappled with the challenges of forming a civil service composed of former CCSS and CANS staff. It was felt that an in-service training center should be revived to support the capacity development of this new public service. In addition, the establishment of a centralized institute under the MoPSLHRD was seen as an avenue for coordinating the ad hoc training taking place in the county. The newly independent region saw an influx of uncoordinated and haphazard training initiatives. In particular, the lack of adherence to a Master Curriculum in development partner training was seen to be at cross-purposes with the formation of a unified system for public administration in the country.

In parallel with the establishment of the HRTC, as discussed in Section 3.6, the CBTF supported the development of a Master Curriculum, finalized in 2012. The intention was to teach this curriculum at the HRTC, and use it as a mechanism to coordinate training offered to national and subnational civil servants. With this objective, the MoLPSHRD selected a total of 55 civil servants, 5 from each of the 10 states and 5 from national institutions that were then taken to Nairobi in 2005 for a 3-month training. A number of these civil servants have become instrumental in leading MoLPSHRD efforts at different levels to undertake its mandate. The HRD directorate intends to update the current master curriculum, merge it with the curriculum developed with support from the Regional Capacity Building (RCB) program. In the future, the

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Director of HRD, MoLPSHRD.

HRD aims to focus on delivering long, intensive trainings that will have sustainable impact on the performance of the South Sudan Civil Service.

The HRTC sits under the MoLPSHRD Directorate of HRD. Overall responsibility for the center sits with the Director General HRD; in principle a director for training and a director of the center are also appointed and report to the Director General. Recruitment and deployment of staff to the HRTC has not commenced due to lack of funding. In the interim, staff of the Directorate of HRD have undertaken tasks at the HRTC.

Between 2005 and 2013, the MoLPSHRD received support from development projects including Skills for South Sudan; LICUS; CABIHRD-World Bank; MDTF; CBTF; and Kenya School of Government. A key trilateral partnership was the RCB project. The RCB project was a partnership project initiated with funding from the CIDA designed to support capacity development in postconflict countries through peer support, institution building, and training. The aim of this 5-year project was to build the capacity of the MDIs of Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan to improve public service practice and service delivery. Critically, civil conflict in 2013 and subsequent return to violence in July 2016 has greatly reduced donor support to the MoLPSHRD capacity-building efforts, including the HRTC.

It was initially envisioned to establish an MDI at the national level and one training center in each of South Sudan's 10 states. With the support of the AfDB, construction of an HRTC facility was completed in 2013, just outside of Juba. It included the infrastructure for Internet connectivity and was equipped with computers. There are no dormitory or dining facilities. A constraint on operationalizing training at HRTC has been the absence of vehicles and fuel to transport civil servants from Juba to the center. A borehole to provide water was constructed with the support of the World Bank IDCBP in 2014. Though the facility was not initially damaged by the 2013 civil conflict, it has since been looted and is no longer functional. Training facilities were also constructed in state capitals, but information about whether they have been used for their intended purpose or have been damaged by ongoing conflict is unavailable.

The HRTC facility has been used as a venue for training delivered by partners. In 2014, through an MOU signed by Kenya and South Sudan, the Kenya School of Government agreed to provide courses at HRTC. KSG would provide faculty to teach, as long as MoLPSHRD covered the operational expenses of holding classes. Given the period of austerity, the Ministry has not consistently been able to provide fuel for transportation to the center, fuel to run the generator, or meals to trainees.

With support from the IDCBP, operational costs were covered for a period in 2015, enabling 836 staff to receive in-service training on a range of topics including Supervisory Skills Development; Electronic Records Management; Public Relations and Customer Care; Performance Appraisal; Public Financial Management; Secretariat Management; Conducting

meetings/Writing minutes; Report writing skills; Change management for effective reforms for senior managers; Human resource management. Importantly, stakeholders from the MoLPSHRD have expressed frustration that the material taught is not well adapted to the South Sudanese context nor necessarily contributing to a more needs-driven approach to training. Going forward, the MoLPSHRD is interested to directly provide training to its civil servants rather than rely on external actors.

Government Accountancy Training Center

Establishment. The GATC was established in 1978 as an RATC to support the administration and development needs of the then self-governing regional government of the Southern Region of Sudan. The southern regional government was established as result of the Addis Ababa 1972 peace agreement signed between representatives of the Sudan Government and the South Sudan Liberation Movement.¹⁵⁵

The RATC was born out of the need to train accountants and public finance professionals from the Southern region to work in public departments and agencies including public enterprises and other parastatals in Southern Sudan. During this period, there was regional-centric curriculum designed for students that had completed secondary school. After completing training at the center, they would then join the civil service at various government institutions. In 1982, when the second Sudanese civil war broke out, training at the RATC came to a halt.

The center started being revived more than 20 years later following the signing of the 2005 CPA. It was renamed the GATC to reflect the new status of the region as a semiautonomous state. Within this new context, the intention was for the center to reassume its previous mandate and to deliver training for civil servants in Southern Sudan in the areas of Accountancy and PFM.

The facility was established as a directorate within the MoFEP. It was renovated and refurbished to commence its functions as the PFM capacity development arm of the ministry. The center is located centrally in Juba, within easy reach of the ministries complex. It has learning facilities consisting of five classrooms, one large conference hall, and a computer laboratory. Despite some investments, the facilities remain in need of further rehabilitation and equipment.

Rationale for revitalization. As a result of over two decades of war, South Sudan was faced with a huge challenge of transforming a workforce that is an amalgamation of civil servants from various background across the capacity spectrum, some with extensive knowledge and experience in the Sudan PFM systems, others straight from the fighting fields with very limited experience in civil service work and others that fall somewhere in the middle. Faced with this

¹⁵⁵ UN Peacemaker; *1972 Addis Ababa Agreement*, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/SD_720312_Addis%20Ababa%20Agreement%20on%20the%20Problem%20of%20South%20Sudan.pdf

challenge, the MoFEP sought to revive the institution as a center for transformation of the human resource at its disposal into public accountants and finance officers who are well conversant with applicable standards to support administrative and financial management needs of public institutions.

Management arrangements and funding. The governance structure at GATC remains inadequate due to an undefined and complex arrangement with the MoFEP.¹⁵⁶ Channels of communication between the parent ministry and GATC are not clear and aspects critical for GATC to operate effectively including an organizational structure, the recruitment of qualified staff to run the center and train students, and sufficient budget for operations have not been prioritized in a context of scarce resources for civilian functions. As for some other areas, there is a mismatch between the policy vision and actual prioritizations. A new Director General for the center was appointed in 2013, signaling some greater commitment toward achieving a revival of the center.

Course, curriculum, and accreditation arrangements. Since its reopening, the GATC has not directly delivered any training and GATC staff do not have experience in designing curriculum.¹⁵⁷ Instead, in the first few years after the reopening, the facility was used as a venue to host trainings for civil servants funded by development partners. These trainings were typically short, one to four weeks in duration with externally designed curricula, administered by external consultants. These series of short-term trainings have further contributed to a disjointed atmosphere at GATC relative to its mandate to lead the capacity-building agenda for PFM for civil servants in South Sudan.

While initial trainings were short term and exclusively delivered by external consultants, a second round of support (funded by the CBTF) focused on very ambitious professional accountancy training in ACCA and CIPS. Results were poor, as students lacked the prerequisites to succeed in the training. In addition, professionalization was difficult, as the required on-the-job hours could not be done in South Sudan (as there were no ACCA accountants to provide mentoring).

Table A7.2. CBTF-II Training at GATC

Number of Civil Servants Trained	Course Description
75	CIPS professional training program
88	ACCA professional training program
1,113	14 PFM short course training programs

¹⁵⁶ GATC Report 2015.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with the GATC Training Director.

Number of Civil Servants Trained	Course Description
40	Short course training for states
7	Training of trainers

Source: CBTF-II evaluation.

In the years after the reopening of the GATC, the staff were not engaged in any way in the trainings or in the delivery of the courses run by external entities although according to the GATC training director, international consultants did struggle when explaining concepts to students and it would have been more effective to engage local tutors capable of translating into local Arabic and applying the concepts to the realities of South Sudan.

In response to these initial experiences, and under new leadership, more recently the GATC has sought to actually itself design and roll out longer-term courses of at least 9 months focusing on day program teaching, while still relying on development partner funding to support this process.

From within the institution, a process was started to develop a curriculum in collaboration with the School of Management Sciences at the University of Juba and with the support of the World Bank IDCB project. The aim was to design a curriculum that is adaptive to the unique characteristics of the civil service base in South Sudan targeting the Accounts and Budget Officers in PFM and Procurement units within the civil service. The work on curriculum development continues as the leadership at the GATC has sought to add key components to the training such as the English for Finance course to address the problems associated with the use of English as the primary tutoring language which a significant proportion of civil servants are not proficient in.

The curriculum development process will also take into account the fact that the GATC unlike the RATC does not train students from universities, they train civil servants already hired and working in the public service. As part of the strategy, once established and fully functioning, the GATC seeks accreditation internationally to become globally competitive as an institution of PFM training.

Staffing. As per the structure outlined by the MoFEP, the staffing at the GATC, which is a directorate under the ministry, is comprised of a Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director, and clerical staff. The leadership at the GATC have a minimum qualification of a Bachelor's degree. A proportion of current staff are above the retirement age.

The debilitating economic crisis has led to the loss in value of the South Sudan currency. As a result, the government salaries have shrunk drastically. This is a demotivating factor for the qualified staff at the GATC, who when presented with other options may have chosen to leave the civil service. As such, it is not clear if all the positions at the GATC currently remain filled.

Students and enrollment. According to the GATC director, most of the training participants to date have been from the states and the criteria for participation have been set by the development partners which funding the training. These do not reflect the GATC strategic direction or interests.

Fees and financing: All trainings conducted at the GATC are supposed to be free of charge for civil servants and the departments where they are employed. However with the insufficient support received from the MoFEP for running the GATC, development partners have had to cover the training costs while the facilities of the center were provided for free, save for operation costs such as fuel for the generator.

Partnerships and nature of engagement: The GATC has hosted numerous trainings designed and funded by various partners of the MoFEP; however only as a training facility, not as a lead capacity-building institution for the civil service. Typically, partnerships are arranged with the MoFEP directorate of training as the primary government counterpart and this limits the ability of the GATC to engage directly with partners.

The GATC's experience reflects the struggle to establish or reestablish functioning national training institutions which are critical to the longer-term capacity of the public service, and the reproduction and renewal of capacities over time. During the early postconflict years, neither development partners nor the government had a clear vision or strategy for how to revive the institution; and training was only delivered ad hoc and without laying a foundation for the institution itself. This was followed by an overambitious attempt to bring ACCA training to South Sudan; which again did not involve an institutional anchoring. Building on these lessons and with a new leadership appointed in 2013, attention has begun to be channeled toward re-developing the GATC as an institution. However, this process has been slowed and disrupted by renewed conflict.

English Language Training in South Sudan

Windle Trust International is a U.K.-based charity registered in 2002 with offices in Sudan, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. It was previously known as the Hugh Pilkington Charitable Trust and registered in Kenya in 1977. Windle Trust International was set up to support people in countries affected by conflict in Africa and invests in higher education and training through scholarship programs at universities and colleges in Africa and the United Kingdom to develop the knowledge and skills needed by young professionals to positively contribute to development of their communities and countries. Through this investment, Windle Trust aims to build their potential as future leaders in their field of expertise and to be positive role models in their communities. The Trust also engages in providing intensive English programs to improve proficiency in working in English.

In South Sudan, English is the official language as well as the medium of instruction from Primary 4. Apart from the formal institutions of instructions; Windle Trust is a primary English language training provider in the country. It has not only provided trainings to teachers but also to government officials in the Ministry of Justice, Finance and Economic Planning, Ministry of Labor, Public Service and Human Resources Development, LGB as well as to students¹⁵⁸. The trainings are delivered using the Common European Framework of Reference for Language (CEFR). The CEFR is an internationally recognized framework that describes six levels of language ability from A1 for beginners up to C2 for those who have mastered a language. The CEFR is used by organizations all over the world as a reliable benchmark of language ability. Since 2009 to date, Windle Trust has trained a total of about 616 government officials in English language with funding from CBTF and USAID (Winrock) mostly at the national with minimal coverage at the subnational level. The subnational level trainings were in Wau, Torit, Kuajok, Aweil, Bentiu.¹⁵⁹ See Annex 4 for a more detailed overview of Windle Trust.

Windle does an entry assessment covering reading, writing, and speaking, and then groups the learners as beginners, pre-intermediates, intermediates, and advanced. Learners are assessed regularly throughout the training, and take a test at the end of the six-month training; if their achievements (as demonstrated by their score) are not high enough, the learner is not allowed to advance to the next level of training. Each level is taught a minimum of 160 hours.¹⁶⁰

Through funding from Global Partnership for Education, Windle Trust supported the development of the English language policy to improve the teaching and learning of English in South Sudan's primary schools.¹⁶¹

Table A7.3. Training Infrastructure

State	Owner	Notes
National	MoLPSHRD	MoLPSHRD Human Resource Training Center The training center includes one classroom with a capacity of 30 students; one classroom with a capacity of 90 students; one computer classroom with a capacity of 16 students; and four large offices. The classrooms are air conditioned and contain new furniture including comfortable, modern desks and chairs. Additionally, the center includes a library (without materials yet), a kitchen, a dining area, parking, a new generator, and storage areas. The center is located in a new area of Juba (Rock City). To assist with transportation, the MoLPSHRD has a 30-seater bus to transport students between the main ministry offices and the training center (approximately 20-minute driving time).
National	MoLPSHRD	Vocational Skills Training Center

¹⁵⁸ Interview with David Masua, Programme Coordinator, Windle Trust International South Sudan Office.

¹⁵⁹ <https://windle.org.uk/mission>


¹⁶⁰ Interview with David Masua, Programme Coordinator, Windle Trust International South Sudan Office.

¹⁶¹ Interview with David Masua, Programme Coordinator, Windle Trust International South Sudan Office.

State	Owner	Notes
National	MoFEP	GATC
EES	MoLPSHRD	CBTF-financed MoPS building constructed with training hall.
WES	MoPS	A training hall has been constructed but is presently used as office space. The state has expressed willingness to repurpose the space for training if basic furnishing and repairs are made. CBTF constructed the MoPS building.
Jonglei	MoLG	Ministry of Local Government has a training hall. CBTF financed office construction at MoPS.
Warrap	MoF	CBTF supported MoF training hall – running on a cost-recovery basis now. CBTF also constructed a MoPS building.
Western Bahr el Ghazal	MoF and MoIC	Vocational Training Center Computer Lab exists. Ministry of Information and Communication has a Computer Lab. Ministry of Finance has a training hall. CBTF provided a MoPS building

Annex 8: Health

Figure A8.1. Approved Budget versus Outturn



Source: GRSS budget outturns (2006–2015), MoFEP.

Table A8.1. GRSS Budget and Outturn for HR Development (2011–2015)

		Total HRH (SSP)	Health Science Institutes		Medical Training and Professional Development	
			Salaries	Use of Goods and Services	Salaries	Use of Goods and Services
2011/2012	Budget	—	—	—	0	—
	Outturn	287,130	10,900	276,230	0	0
2012/2013	Budget	5,615,741	—	—	—	—
	Outturn	498,672	0	0	273,788	224,884
	% Execution	3.0	—	—	—	—
2013/2014	Budget	7,340,100	—	—	—	—
	Outturn	808,494	96,554	711,940	0	0
	% Execution	3.7	—	—	—	—
2014/2015	Budget	11,946,635	—	—	—	—
	Outturn	240,356	77,386	0	0	162,970
	% Execution	0.7	—	—	—	—
2015/2016	Budget	24,824,160	—	—	—	—

Source: MoFEP, GRSS Budget Books 2012–2016.

Table A8.2. Summary of Roles and Responsibilities in the Health Sector

National Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sets institutional framework • Develops national policies and guidelines for the provision of health care and related issues • Coordinates the activities of partners and other actors • Allocates resources between different levels of the health sector • Manages the national databases in the health sector, including the Health Management Information System and HRIS • Runs the three national Teaching Hospitals and Kiir Mayardit Women's Hospital • Oversees the State Ministries of Health and works in partnership with them to plan a way forward • Sits on the State Transfer Monitoring Committee to review performance by States, and depending on whether all conditions have been fulfilled, approves the next set of transfers
State Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implements national-level policies and guidelines • Provides oversight and support to County Health Departments in areas of planning, budgeting and health service delivery • Coordinates the activities of partners within the state and directly supervises their activities • Supports state and county hospitals and builds their capacity to manage resources and deliver services • Ensures all reporting from the state and its constituent counties is submitted accurately and on time • Manages staff working in the State Ministry of Health and state and county hospitals, oversees county payroll submissions
Local Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides health services to the people of the county, including implementation of national 'vertical' programs including malaria, HIV/AIDS, TB, and others • Manages Primary Healthcare Centres and Primary Healthcare Units to deliver quality health care services • Conducts outreach activities to communities • Supports the establishment of Boma Health Committees to assist with health promotion activities, oversight of the health status of the community and grassroots supervision of health facilities • Works with and coordinates the activities of the NGO working in the county under one of the three major primary health care projects (Integrated Service Delivery Project, HPF, and Rapid Results for Health Project) • Reports health indicators and human resource information to the respective national databases • Manages staff working in County Health Departments, Primary Healthcare Centres and Primary Healthcare Units all of whom must be recorded on the county payroll

Source: Ministry of Health (2014), State and Local Government Health Sector Planning, Budgeting and Reporting Guidelines for Fiscal Year 2014/15, Ministry of Health Republic of South Sudan

Note: Starting July 1, 2016, the HPF and the Integrated Service Delivery project will be merged into one 'HPF 2'.

Table A8.3. Education Systems in Countries Where South Sudanese Study

Country	Primary Education	Secondary Education	'Practicals'	University	Medical School Theory	Clinical Practice in Curriculum
South Sudan			No	3–6 years	6 years	18–24 months in addition to University
Sudan ^a	8 years of study (pupil ages: 6–13)	3 years of study (student ages: 14–16)	No	4–6 years	3 years	3 years
Kenya ^b	8 years of study (pupil ages: 6–13)	4 years of study (student ages: 14–17)	Yes	4–6 years	2–3 years	3 years
Uganda ^c	7 years of study (pupil ages: 6–12)	6 years of study ^d (student ages: 13–18)	Yes	3–6 years	2 years	3 years
Ethiopia ^e	6 years of study (pupil ages: 7–12)	6 years of study (student ages: 13–18)	Yes	3–6 years		

Note: a. <http://www.ibe.unesco.org/sites/default/files/Sudan.pdf>

b. <https://www.epnuffic.nl/en/publications/find-a-publication/education-system-kenya.pdf>

c. http://www.epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/EPDC%20NEP_Uganda.pdf

d. Four years of O level and two years of A level.

e. http://www.epdc.org/sites/default/files/documents/EPDC%20NEP_Ethiopia.pdf

Table A8.4. HRH Status in 2011 and Recruitment Needs Projections for Health Training Institutes by 2016


	Number of Category of Cadres	Number of Current Tutors	Total Required Number of the Tutors to be Recruited			Tutor Gaps Based on Basic Needs (2012–2016) ^a
			2012	2013	2014	
Juba	6	2	18	36	54	52
Maridi	6	5	18	36	54	49
Wau	6	0	18	36	54	54
Kwajok	6	0	18	36	54	54
Bor	6	0	18	36	54	54
Total Tutors for 5 Diploma Health Training Centers		7	90	180	270	263

	Number of Category of Cadres	Number of Current Tutors	Total Required Number of the Tutors to be Recruited			Tutor Gaps Based on Basic Needs (2012–2016) ^a
10 State HTIS	3 cadres in each school	0	90	180	270	270
Total Tutors for 10 Certificate Health Training Centers			90	180	270	270
Grand Total Tutors needed						533

Source: HSDP 2012–2016.


Note: a. Numbers of tutors for 2015 and 2016 remain the same as in 2014 since the same tutors will be used.

Figure A8.2. DPT2 Immunization Trends



Source: World Bank. Health Nutrition and Population Statistics Database.

Figure A8.3. Salary Gap Between NGO and Government-Paid Registered Nurse (SSP)



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