There is growing recognition that access to good jobs is an important driver of social cohesion. Although the economic dimensions of labor market outcomes are relatively well documented, evidence on the link between social cohesion and jobs is still surprisingly scarce. This paper, based on an earlier background report for the WDR 2013, presents empirical evidence for pathways between labor market outcomes and social cohesion. The findings indicate that formal employment is associated with a range of social outcomes and behaviors that are typically associated with higher levels of social cohesion. However, there are also indications that this relationship varies across dimensions of social wellbeing. In particular, social interactions and political activism among those in regular employment can either improve the quality of aggregate institutions or deepen existing social divides.

There is growing recognition that access to good jobs is an important driver of social cohesion. The World Bank’s 2013 World Development Report on Jobs discusses the link between jobs and social cohesion as one of the three central pillars of its multidimensional framework, in addition to living standards and productivity (World Bank 2013, henceforth WDR). In a similar vein, the OECD, in its recent flagship report on social cohesion, argues that labor market outcomes are critical determinants of social stability, both because they influence the level and distribution of labor earnings and because jobs are critical loci of social interactions (OECD 2011).

Although the economic dimensions of labor market outcomes are relatively well documented, evidence on the connection between jobs and social cohesion is still surprisingly scarce. Sociologists have traditionally discussed social cohesion as a wider concept that is related, but in no way limited to class and status divides grounded in occupational categories (Norton and de Haan 2012). Recent research on social cohesion by economists has also focused on wider societal outcomes, such
as levels of trust, civic attitudes, or the quality of political institutions (Knack and Keefer 1995, 1997; Easterly and Levine 1997; Rodrik 1999; Easterly et al. 2006). However, few of these studies have specifically analyzed how behaviors and interactions that relate to social cohesion vary along with people’s employment situations.

This paper, based on an earlier background report for the WDR 2013 on Jobs (Wietzke and McLeod 2012), seeks to fill this gap by discussing possible pathways between jobs and social cohesion. Following the WDR and the OECD recent report on the subject, I distinguish between a narrower and a broader definition of social cohesion. The narrower definition focuses on the capacity of societies and groups to peacefully manage possible collective action problems (WDR 2013, 127ff; Woolcock 2011). This involves a concern with subjective outcomes, such as trust and wellbeing, as well as ‘bridging’ professional relations that enable individuals and groups to communicate and collaborate across potentially divisive social and ethnic lines. The wider definition includes notions of social inclusion and mobility (OECD 2011; Club de Madrid 2009). This definition addresses concerns about social and political institutions that limit equal participation in the labor market (Silver 1994; Hills et al. 2007). The two definitions are linked because a fair distribution of social and economic opportunities is often identified as a primary source of peaceful relations between relevant social groups in modern capitalist societies (de Barros et al. 2009; Collier et al. 2003).

This paper integrates recent cross-disciplinary literature on these different dimensions of social cohesion in three steps. After a brief review of earlier writing on labor markets and social cohesion, I first discuss social barriers that limit the access to and mobility within the labor market. Following the long tradition of sociological and economic research on the subject, I focus on obstacles to mobility that are related to class and social background and on group-level and neighborhood interactions that are often linked to experiences of social exclusion and the breakdown of peaceful group relations.

In the next step, I discuss the potentially transformative functions of jobs. The WDR and the OECD’s report on social cohesion both note that jobs can contribute to social cohesion by generating social relationships and identities across potentially divisive social and ethnic boundaries (WDR 2013, 126ff; OECD 2011, 154). The workplace and markets often offer opportunities for social interactions that extend beyond narrow voluntary contacts in people’s neighborhoods or civic associations (Kilroy 2012; Mutz and Mondak 2006). Jobs can also contribute to important non-monetary dimensions of social development that are increasingly targeted by policy makers, such as life satisfaction or social and institutional spillovers (OECD 2011; WDR 2013, 85f). I focus on differences in life satisfaction across individuals of different employment status and on possible wellbeing spillovers that reduce differences between groups with uneven attachment to the labor market.
The last step discusses possible political threats to social cohesion. Political scientists and economists have traditionally been concerned that collective action problems and resulting lower levels of political organization among the unemployed may lead to very deep political differences across groups in the labor market (Lindbeck and Snower 2002; Olson 1982). These differences may lead to more permanent divides if groups with better attachment to the labor market use their superior social and political contacts to promote policies of worker protection over costlier employment policies that facilitate the entry of outsiders into the labor markets (King and Rueda 2008; Rueda 2005, 2006). From a social cohesion perspective, this raises a challenge for policy makers to implement policies that protect the interests of both labor market ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Only integrated policies that directly address the root causes of uneven skills distribution and mobility prospects are likely to reap the full benefits of the potential transformative functions of jobs.

The review finds relatively convincing evidence for many of the postulated pathways between social cohesion and labor markets. For instance, research on intergenerational mobility suggests that parents’ occupational background is of decreasing importance as a determinant of economic opportunity (though there are contrasting results for other dimensions of family background, such as education or income). Similarly, ethnographic and survey research on work-related interactions provides strong illustrative examples that shared interests and interactions in the workplace can help bridge social divides.

However, there is less evidence that these separate effects combine to produce more cohesive societies at an aggregate level. Typically, the transitions from individual work-related experiences to the quality of aggregate social relations are mediated by a multitude of wider social and economic influences. These results suggest that from a social cohesion perspective, individual work-related experiences are most likely best studied in conjunction with aggregate social wellbeing outcomes and institutions. A purely micro-level analysis based on the individual wellbeing effects of jobs alone may overlook aggregate outcomes and interactions that are crucial for understanding why some societies manage to maintain high levels of social cohesion and others do not.

A related lesson is the relatively tentative nature of much of the evidence on the outcomes of social relations around jobs. Research on the economic consequences of jobs traditionally struggles with well-known selection problems as better-skilled or more motivated people may select into better jobs. These problems are typically magnified in the analyses of social interactions and network effects that tend to dominate the recent debate literature on jobs and social cohesion. To this point, relatively few studies have been able to address these endogeneity issues conclusively. Therefore, the review closes on a cautiously optimistic note: although there are strong indications that jobs can have the postulated positive consequences for social cohesion, a more careful analysis is required to substantiate these claims with robust evidence.
Previous Debates on Labor Markets and Social Cohesion

Previous scholarship has taken various approaches to the interaction between social cohesion and labor markets. First, what I call the ‘social atomization’ view has focused on the processes of labor market stratification and social segregation that undermine individual opportunities and mobility experiences. This view highlights the potentially divisive effects of increased professional specialization and the division of labor. Other contributions emphasize the potentially positive consequences of work-related interactions and identities, including the type of ‘bridging’ social relationships that are now emphasized in policy debates on social cohesion and jobs as well as political and institutional solutions for conflict resolution, which are often linked to more inclusive labor market and social protection policies.

Sociological research on work relations has traditionally been dominated by the social atomization view. Marx famously predicted that workers who were solely in command of their labor would inevitably rise to secure a larger share of the economic surplus. Marx’s ideas of societies that are divided between economically determined classes continue to play an important role in the work of some contemporary analysts of capitalist relations and politics (Wright 1979, 1997). Durkheim and Weber, often considered the founders of ‘modern sociology’, also struggled with the question of how functionally integrated societies could maintain their internal coherence through the capitalist transformation. Weber (1978), in particular, noted that the rise of capitalist relations would undermine traditional socio-political orders, replacing them with new orders of social stratification and rational-legalistic systems of bureaucratic rule (for an overview of classical sociological literature, see Norton and de Haan 2012).

More recent sociological work has elaborated the atomization argument against the background of increased international economic integration and rising wage inequalities (Norton and De Haan 2012). A large body of literature on ‘social exclusion’ in Europe has argued that macro-economic transformations, such as slowing economic growth and a shift away from manual work, would diminish the economic opportunities of lower-skilled workers and undermine formal and informal systems of solidarity (Silver 1994; Castells 1996; Paugam 1996; Byrne 1999; Hills et al. 2002; Alphonse et al. 2008). In the United States and Latin America, similar arguments have been made in the context of growing trends toward residential and racial segregation around deprived inner-city neighborhoods (Wilson 1987; Borjas 1995; Anderson 1999; Caldeira 2000; Katzman et al. 2004; Loury 2002).

More positive arguments about the consequences of jobs have emerged in the context of recent research on social interactions and networks. The large literature on social capital that began to dominate international debates on social development in the 1990s has traditionally considered the link between jobs and social outcomes to be a two-way relationship. People’s access to jobs (and other economic and
social outcomes) is determined by their social background and by their network of friends and contacts (Granovetter 1973, 1974; Bourdieu 1984, 1986; Coleman 1988). However, contacts and interactions in the workplace can also generate trust and ‘bridging’ social ties that help people collaborate across potentially divisive ethnic and social boundaries (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Varshney 2002; Kilroy 2012; WDR 2013, 126ff).

Cross-country studies have suggested that these types of social relations can contribute to improved outcomes at the aggregate level. Key proxies of peaceful social relations, such as average levels of self-reported trust, or ‘civic attitudes’, are typically robustly and positively correlated with national growth rates and stability (Putnam 1993; Knack and Keefer 1997; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Delhey and Newton 2003; Easterly et al. 2006). The instrumental variables used in these studies further suggest that the extent of trust, civicism, or social capital in a society is related to initial levels of fractionalization between ethnic groups and to historical inequalities and middle class sizes (Easterly and Levine 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; Rodrik 1999; Easterly 2001; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Easterly et al. 2006; Larsen 2007).

Though these studies do not typically account directly for labor market outcomes, some evidence on the link between jobs and social cohesion can be obtained from research on social and labor market policies. In political science, a large comparative body of literature on welfare state regimes and capital-labor relations argues that higher levels of equality and social cohesion in countries such as Sweden or Denmark are explained by historically less confrontational relations between workers and employers. These successes have been attributed to more effective institutions for the mediation of employers’ and workers’ interests and to more generous social protection policies that redistribute the benefits of growth between winners and losers of economic reform (Esping-Andersen 1990; Lindert 2004; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Larsen 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Huber and Stephens 2012). More recently, a widely noted contribution by Acemoglu et al. (2012) describes variations in social cohesion and labor relations as equilibrium outcomes of the international division of labor. According to the authors, Scandinavian societies are able to maintain their more ‘cuddly’ forms of capitalism by free-riding on technological innovations generated by nations (such as the United States or the United Kingdom) with more liberal and competitive labor markets.

However, as this review illustrates, the flip side of these more collaborative arrangements is that advanced levels of welfare state development and worker protection can co-exist with very deep divides within the working-age population. On the one hand, collective bargaining over work conditions and social policies can lead to higher levels of social cohesion if institutions and policies are put in place to share the benefits of economic growth, even with groups that have weaker links to the labor market. On the other hand, the negotiation of employment conditions can
result in deep divides if those in protected positions prioritize their interests in job security over the broader goal of ensuring wide participation in the labor market.

Links between Jobs and Social Cohesion Discussed in this Paper

Though the literature has documented many potential connections between labor markets and social cohesion, systematic evidence on these interactions is often surprisingly scarce. Detailed links between individual-level work histories and macroeconomic labor market trends are obviously difficult to establish. Most studies of social development have thus treated labor market dynamics as an influence that operates in the background without rigorous exploration of their precise effects on social outcomes. Similarly, at the micro level, many recent advances in research design that enable analysts to identify the causal effects of work on household economic welfare have not yet translated into the dimensions of interest in the context of social cohesion. For example, panel surveys, which provide increasingly robust information about the role of jobs for individual trajectories into and out of poverty, only infrequently report social indicators such as trust or social and political activities. This situation has made it difficult to link work-related experiences to individual behaviors and attitudes that are normally associated with higher levels of social cohesion.

In light of these limitations, the evidence for this paper primarily comes from research that has explored narrower aspects of the relationships between jobs and social cohesion. In sociology and economics, there is now a large and increasingly rigorous body of scholarship that provides estimates of social and economic barriers to social inclusion and mobility in and around labor markets. Other survey-based and ethnographic research has analyzed how the widely used indicators of social cohesion, such as trust, civic associations, and subjective wellbeing, vary along with employment status. Although these studies do not typically permit claims that work causes differences in social outcomes, they provide a first indication of how experiences and behaviors related to social cohesion differ across relevant groups in the labor market.

For the purpose of this review, a useful starting point is a simplified framework of the interaction between social and political institutions and labor market outcomes (Figure 1). Starting from the ‘social atomization’ view in sociology, I first discuss the social processes that influence selection into the labor market. The evidence reviewed here concentrates on the rich interdisciplinary literature on occupational and earnings mobility and on group- and location-specific influences, such as residential and social segregation. These processes relate primarily to the broader inclusion-centered definition of social cohesion used in this paper. However, there are also theoretical reasons to argue that unfair social barriers to work can facilitate conflict and the breakdown of peaceful group relations.
The next section discusses the potential positive consequences of jobs for social cohesion. Drawing on literature on social capital, I argue that once people are in work, associations and interactions made in and around the workplace can contribute to social cohesion by forging ties across otherwise divisive social or ethnic barriers. I discuss these outcomes using survey- and ethnography-based studies of social associations and relations of trust shared by members of the work force and evidence on the relevance of these experiences for inter-group and inter-ethnic relations. Other positive effects of jobs reviewed in the article include work-related life satisfaction. Among policy makers, subjective wellbeing is increasingly considered to be a central indicator for non-monetary dimensions of economic and social development (OECD 2011, 55ff; Dolan and Metcalfe 2012). I discuss differences in subjective wellbeing between the employed and unemployed as well as possible social interactions and spillovers that influence the likelihood that experiences of joblessness will translate into conflict.

The third step seeks to identify the consequences of labor market segmentation and work-related interactions for the negotiation of employment and social policies. Following the literature on ‘insider politics’, I focus on the possibility that people in more secure jobs use their superior social relations to advance their own interests of worker protection. The evidence reviewed includes micro-level data on the political
attitudes and preferences of the employed and unemployed as well as a comparative analysis of labor market policies. The section concludes by discussing social protection and employment policies that help overcome deeper social barriers to equal participation in the labor market.

Social Institutions and Unequal Access to Jobs

Within the framework outlined above, the first link is from social institutions to jobs. In the language of economics, this link works primarily through the uneven selection of individuals into different sections of the labor market. Some workers, because of their disadvantaged background, face a lower likelihood of permanent employment or upward mobility in the labor market. The key mechanisms involved are class- or identity-related inequalities in human capital endowments and career trajectories as well as identities and behaviors associated with group- and location-based processes of social segregation.

Occupational Mobility

From the social atomization perspective of classical sociology, there is a long tradition of linking class background to individual mobility experiences. In particular, the Weberian tradition in sociology has related class and status background to differences in individual ‘life chances’. These status-related opportunities are manifest in the skills and human capital that different status groups bring to the labor market and in the broadly similar earning expectations, levels of security, chances of advancement, and relations of control and autonomy that are observable within certain categories of occupations (Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; Breen and Rottman 1995; Grusky and Weeden 2006, 2007). Conceptually, this association between class-related endowments and individual outcomes works in similar ways as in the growing economic literature on opportunity equality (Sen 1985; Roemer 1998; Bourguignon 2006): ‘In both cases emphasis is placed on the opportunities that a given set of endowments affords, thus leaving open the possibility that such opportunities may be exercised or realized in different ways (depending on preferences or “luck”)’ (Grusky and Kanbur 2006, 17).

Economists, though they are typically less concerned with notions of class, also recognize that socially inscribed status roles and identities can influence social and economic outcomes. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have argued that social identities, including how people view themselves and others, can have an important effect on individual behaviors and opportunities. They suggest that the incorporation of socially prescribed identities and behaviors into the utility function helps explain a range of outcomes that contribute to inequality and stratification, such as gender
discrimination or the economics of social exclusion and poverty. Loury (2002) has argued in the context of racial inequality that stereotypes about Afro-Americans not only influence employers’ attitudes toward black applicants but also alter the behavior and expectations of Afro-American workers themselves. These arguments receive some support from experimental studies, which show that members of disadvantaged groups generally perform less well when they are primed about relevant social identities (Steele and Aronson 1995; Steele 1997).

The strongest evidence about the role of social background for occupational opportunities is found in the cross-disciplinary literature on intergenerational mobility. In sociology, there is a large and diverse body of literature for industrialized countries that documents often substantial parent-child correlations along ordinal social status categories or discrete occupational classes (see, for example, Blau and Duncan 1967; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Grusky and Di Prete 1990; for earlier reviews of this literature, see Bertaux and Thompson 1997; Morgan et al. 2006). Because one’s parental background is not freely chosen, these studies can argue with relatively strong credibility that systematic correlations between father-son pairs reflect an unfair disadvantage associated with family circumstances. In economics, there are equally large bodies of research on economic mobility and opportunity equality. These studies variably document family-related differences in the education and human capital of children and young workers (for overviews, see World Bank 2006; Bourguignon et al. 2007a, 2007b) and in the earnings expectations of young workers (Roemer 2002; Ferreira and Veloso 2003; Bowles et al. 2005; Azevedo and Bouillion 2009).

Analysts have made important progress in overcoming methodological objections to the study of intergenerational mobility. For example, concerns that changing incomes over the life cycle introduce measurement error in the estimation of father-son correlations are now routinely addressed in the literature on earnings mobility (Ferreira and Veloso 2006; Azevedo and Bouillion 2009). However, for a variety of reasons, the mobility literature still faces some limitations in documenting specific links between labor markets and individual opportunities. Sociologists have often treated occupational class as a mostly nominal construct, with less attention paid to the operationalization and empirical tests of the concept. This approach has contributed to the segmentation of the field, which often makes it difficult to compare and evaluate results across studies (Grusky and Kanbur 2006; Morgan et al. 2006). Economists, in contrast, have typically studied questions of status and social mobility in the broader dimension of income. This more general framework provides only limited insights into mobility trajectories for specific occupational classes (Bowles et al. 2005; for exceptions, see Bossuroy and Cogneau 2008; WDR 2013, 136).

Another problem is the difficulty of linking individual mobility experiences to aggregate labor market developments. In advanced economies such as the United
States, a number of longer-term studies have suggested that the importance of class-based advantage decreased during the period of relatively steady post-war growth (Featherman and Hauser 1978) and diminished even in the more volatile decades of the 1970s and 1980s (Hout 1988; Grusky and Di Pretre 1990). These studies also suggest that returns to experience and schooling increased during the same period for men, but less so for women. However, these claims are usually not based on systematic analysis of the interaction between individual mobility trajectories and specific labor market dynamics or policies. Outside advanced economies, the evidence is even more limited because the data series on mobility trajectories are typically too short to permit meaningful comparisons with macro-economic changes (Azevedo and Bouillon 2009).

A more general concern for the purpose of this paper is that it is often not clear how unfair limitations to individual mobility influence the more narrowly defined aspects of social cohesion, such as inter-group relations. On the one hand, it is notable that countries with less conflictual social relations, such as the Nordic nations or Canada, typically emerge in international comparisons as the societies with the highest levels of mobility (Azevedo and Bouillon 2009, Figure 2). Evidence and theoretical reasoning from developed and developing countries further suggests that low prospects for upward mobility increase the risk of crime or violent conflict (see below and Collier et al. 2003) and that populations generally object more strongly to perceived inequalities in opportunity equality than to inequalities in outcomes (Gaviria 2007).

On the other hand, casual observation suggests that there are many instances in which societies can maintain high levels of social stability, even in the face of very persistent disadvantages for certain groups. For example, people who feel that they are currently disadvantaged may express strong support for existing institutional arrangements if they perceive (mistakenly or correctly) strong chances for their own future upward mobility (Hirschman 1973; Piketty 1995; Benabou and Ok 2001). In other cases, individual responses to limited mobility prospects are influenced by other social interactions and contexts. These additional influences are only incompletely captured by purely household-specific estimates of intergenerational mobility and thus require more complex analysis that also takes into account the presence of intervening social institutions. The following paragraphs and the section on subjective wellbeing below discuss more evidence on these contextual influences.

Social Segregation

Although social limits to occupational mobility have been seen as the primary threat to social cohesion in the earlier sociological literature, more recent contributions have focused on the processes of social and residential segregation. Typically, these studies make more direct claims about the breakdown of peaceful group relations than the literature on occupational mobility. The sociologist Wilson
observed in the late 1980s that the concentration of impoverished disadvantaged black families in deprived inner-city neighborhoods in the United States increasingly led to a breakdown of social ties and interactions across ethnic and status divides (Wilson 1987). According to Wilson, these segregation processes helped perpetuate racial and economic inequalities because they led to a loss of social role models, social isolation, and a tendency for inner-city youth to engage in ‘deviant’ behavior, such as school dropping out, joblessness, or drug abuse.  

Subsequent research illustrated how these experiences of social isolation undermine social relations and cohesion. For example, a study that followed youths in poor urban neighborhoods in Ecuador over time found that those involved with violent gangs had joined ‘because they were searching for the support, trust, and cohesion—social capital—that they maintained their families did not provide, as well as because of the lack of opportunities in the local context’ (Moser 2009, as cited in WDR 2013, 132f). Similar evidence has been presented for youths in the United States, where a street code based on demonstrations of individual strength and the ability to ‘command respect’ from others emerged as ‘a cultural adaptation to a profound lack of faith in the police and the judicial system’ (Anderson 1999, 34).

Processes of residential and social segregation involve social transformations that reach well beyond the economic processes typically studied in the context of labor market analysis. Notwithstanding this broader focus, there are some indications that social segregation has direct impacts on labor market outcomes. In developed economies, a number of studies have illustrated that living in deprived neighborhoods is associated with much more frequent and more extended experiences of unemployment and education and earnings (Borjas 1995; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; van Ham and Manley 2010). In Latin America, a large body of literature argues that rising unemployment rates and the widespread loss of manufacturing jobs in the formal sector during the structural adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s contributed to social and residential segregation, with consequences similar to those described for developed countries (Caldeira 2000; Fadda et al. 2000; Baker 2001; Katzman et al. 2004; Katzman and Retamoso 2007).

In other developing regions, the rich literature on community development and social capital also suggests that social interactions and associations can vary across entire communities in ways that directly influence individual economic and professional prospects. Individuals in better-connected communities are often embedded in the type of ‘bridging’ social relations that provide access to insurance, information on jobs and commercial opportunities, or mutual learning (see below; Udry and Conley 2004; Minten and Barrett 2008; Vasilaky 2010). This is in contrast to poorer communities, where social associations tend to be of the ‘strong’ or ‘binding type’ (in other words, they tend to undermine individual initiative and rarely provide contacts for jobs or insurance outside the immediate community; Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Barrett 2005).
However, although this literature often provides compelling illustrations of the social costs of the spatial concentration of poverty, it typically cannot show that segregation has negative impacts beyond individual- or household-level sources of disadvantage. In particular, the causal identification of the consequences of local peer group interactions has been very difficult due to the possibility of self-selection of disadvantaged and lower-skilled households into impoverished communities and networks (Aaronson 1998; Evans et al. 1992). Other problems concern the difficulty of distinguishing effects of peer group interactions from other contextual influences that are shared by all members of a local group or community (Manski 1993, 2000; Durlauf and Young 2001; Durlauf 2006).

To date, the most robust evidence is provided by studies that use government interventions into residential choices as ‘quasi-experiments’ to identify the effect of neighborhoods on individual outcomes. A recent study of a Swedish government program that randomly assigned refugees to areas with different degrees of job availability found that individuals placed in areas with fewer work opportunities had lower employment levels, which often persisted almost a decade after the intervention (Aslund et al. 2010). The authors find that doubling the number of jobs in the initial location is associated with a 2.9-percentage-point higher employment probability nine years after the program. Evaluations of the widely cited US-based ‘Moving to Opportunity Program’ showed that families from deprived inner-city neighborhoods who were randomly allocated vouchers to move to non-poor census tracts had lower adult unemployment rates (Rosenbaum and Harris 2001, 338), reduced adolescent arrests for violent crimes (Ludwig et al. 2001), and a lower prevalence of injuries or personal crimes after the intervention (Katz et al. 2001).

However, it is important to note that the evidence available so far is limited to families that used the vouchers, making it difficult to extrapolate findings to the broader population of the poor (Durlauf 2006, 161). Moreover, the results from these quasi-experiments are not always fully consistent. For example, another study of the Moving to Opportunity Program by Katz et al. (2001) found no effect on adult employment rates, earnings, or welfare usage, although there were other positive effects on health and behavioral outcomes for children and adults. Overall, the literature should be read as providing suggestive evidence that processes of residential segregation add to inequalities and exclusion in and around the labor market. However, in most cases, more rigorous research is needed to identify the robustness and precise magnitude of these impacts.

The Transitional Role of Jobs

The second link under the framework in Figure 1 involves pathways from jobs to social cohesion. Once people are in work, jobs can play an important transformative
function for social development outcomes. The next paragraphs discuss these transformative functions by reviewing the evidence on the impact of work-place interactions on ‘bridging’ social relationships. In addition, I examine the association between jobs and subjective wellbeing and the social and policy contexts that influence this link.

Jobs and Social Interactions

There is rich anecdotal evidence from the literature on political partisanship and ethnic conflict that interactions in the workplace can bridge social divides. These arguments are typically based on the idea that the atomizing effects of social identities and segregation are less severe in the workplace than in the choice of neighborhoods or social associations (Mutz and Mondak 2006, 141; Kilroy 2012). Because people typically have fewer opportunities to choose their co-workers and because business relations are often entered due to economic necessity, jobs can provide the opportunity to encounter people of very different ethnic and social backgrounds (WDR 2013, 126).

The strongest potential to overcome social barriers in and around jobs may arise from the type of social and civic associations highlighted in the literature on social capital (Granovetter 1973, 1974; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). An analysis of a large sample of responses from the World Values Survey data by Wietzke and McLeod (2012) finds that across countries at different income levels, those in work and more autonomous jobs generally participate in more associations. Related survey analysis also provides support for the hypothesis that workplaces involve greater exposure to people of dissimilar perspectives or race than do family relations or social activities (see Mutz and Martin 2001 and Mutz and Mondak 2006 for the United States and Kilroy 2011 for Trinidad and Tobago). Several of these studies also show the positive effects of workplace interactions on political tolerance and dialogue (Banaszak and Leighley 1991; Mutz and Mondak 2006). However the results from these articles should only be considered indicative because they are based on simple cross-sectional correlations that cannot account for the possible selection of more socially enterprising individuals into better jobs and social networks. Another more robust analysis of Indonesian survey data that tracked people’s level of community participation over time found that men and women who became unemployed between 2000 and 2007 were less likely to be involved in community activities (controlling for personal attributes). In some locations, this result was observed in spite of a general increase in community activities, indicating that individual and household effects of unemployment can influence personal social outcomes independent of social and community contexts (Giles et al. 2012).

Anecdotal evidence and ethnographic studies suggest that professional and commercial interactions can reduce the risk of conflicts between groups that usually
entertain tense relations (Dani et al. 1999; Pickering 2006; Kilroy 2012). A widely
cited study by Varshney (2002) finds that the economic interdependence of
Muslims and Hindus through business organizations, trade unions, political
parties, and professional associations helped avert outbreaks of ethnic violence in
some Indian cities, whereas ethnic riots were more frequent in less interdependent
cities. Survey research from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia found that the workplace constituted the most important
area for inter-ethnic cooperation, ahead of neighborhoods and local social associa-
tions (Dani et al. 1999; Pickering 2006; WDR 2013, 15). Other examples of busi-
ness relations between Greeks and Turks during the war in Cyprus or smuggling
between Kosovo-Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians suggest that professional interests can
trump ethnic antagonisms, even in the most hostile political environments (Kilroy
2012, 9).15

While most of these examples are individually compelling, the evidence reviewed
here comes with several caveats. Although participation in professional interactions
may not be entirely voluntary, the majority of studies reviewed here do not address
the possibility of selection bias. For example, in the majority of papers reviewed, it is
not possible to determine whether the reported positive consequences of profes-
sional interactions are truly the result of work-related associations or whether particu-
larly trusting or ‘socially enterprising’ individuals have selected into relevant
networks.

At a more fundamental level, the literature on work-related interactions typically
fails to address the possibility that wider societal benefits of work-related interac-
tions are undermined by more basic processes of social stratification and segrega-
tion. If access to jobs is highly unequal, the positive effects of work-based contacts
are likely to differ across groups with uneven attachment to the labor market.
Whether these positive effects are shared evenly across groups depends on the
extent of interdependencies between groups with higher and lower levels of labor
market participation. In the worst case, work-related interactions may deepen
divides between labor market insiders and outsiders without positive consequences
for the distribution of opportunities or the extent of social segregation (see below).

Another problem is that it is not always clear whether social relations formed in
the workplace really have the potential to alter the nature of social relations to the
extent argued in the literature. Social identities are usually multifaceted, and pro-
fessional roles are complemented by multiple other sources of identification.16
Whether identities and collaborative attitudes formed in the workplace spill over
into these alternative social domains is questionable (Kilroy 2012). A related diffi-
culty is that it is often unclear whether trusting relationships and friendships
created at work cause people to modify attitudes toward the entire group to which
their colleagues belong. Studies that ask respondents about their levels of trust do
not typically distinguish between generalized trust and views toward specific
groups. This makes it much more difficult to assess whether and to what extent feel-
ings of trust and association generated in the work place spill over into more peace-
ful group interactions at the aggregate level (Delhey et al. 2011; Kilroy 2012).

**Jobs and Subjective Wellbeing**

Another increasingly widely investigated dimension of social development in the
recent policy literature is subjective wellbeing (henceforth SWB; see also OECD
2011, 55ff; Dolan and Metcalfe 2012). Earlier psychological research suggests that
job satisfaction and financial security related to regular employment can be an im-
portant source of wellbeing (for an overview, see Diener et al. 1999, 293). These
psychological outcomes also typically emerge as important correlates of other di-
mensions of social cohesion in individual and cross-national research. For example,
personal self-esteem, trust, and social capital are usually strongly associated to SWB
in international survey data (Kahneman 1999; Helliwell and Putnam 2004;
Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Larsen 2007).

From the perspective of this review, SWB is particularly useful for summarizing
the non-economic costs of uneven participation in the labor market. In high-
income countries, there is a large body of literature that documents the often con-
siderable differences in life satisfaction among the employed, the unemployed, and
people in temporary jobs. One of the earliest studies on the subject found that the
experience of joblessness in Britain ‘depressed well-being more than any other
single characteristic, including important negative ones such as divorce and separa-
tion’ (Clark and Oswald 1994). Subsequent research also shows that these effects
are typically robust to the inclusion of controls for income. This finding supports
the often-noted claim that unemployment also affects individual wellbeing through
non-monetary channels, such as the loss of positive psychological rewards from
work or the sense of exclusion from work-related interactions (for overviews and evi-
There are also fairly robust indications for this part of the world that the causal link
flows from unemployment to SWB. For instance, research conducted on German
panel data suggests that the same individuals experience considerable reductions in
life satisfaction when they lose their jobs (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998;
Frey 2008, 47). Dawson and Veliziotis (2013) use a similar panel design for the
United Kingdom and find large differences in self-reported wellbeing between per-
manent and temporary employees that appear to be explained by less satisfaction
with job security for the latter group.

Outside the group of advanced industrial societies, the trends are largely consis-
tent in emerging economies with more evolved labor markets. Estimates on a
pooled sample of survey respondents from Latin America show a clear and unam-
biguous effect of unemployment on reported life satisfaction, even when a range of
personal and household attributes are accounted for (Graham and Pettinato 2002; Graham 2008). However, these findings are based on simple correlations. More robust evidence has been presented for Russia by Eggers et al. (2006). They find that the effect of personal unemployment on life satisfaction is four times worse than experiencing a divorce. Because this study is based on longitudinal data, it can also account for initial levels of life satisfaction, thus mitigating some concerns about unobserved personal characteristics that often plague cross-sectional survey analyses of SWB.

Despite the relative robustness of these effects at the individual level, there are many and often little understood contextual influences that can affect how individual experiences of work and unemployment translate into social cohesion outcomes at the aggregate level. A well-known result from the cross-country literature on life satisfaction is that average SWB does not improve with marginal increases in income once a certain level of material wellbeing has been attained (Easterlin 1974; Easterlin et al. 2010; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). This finding suggests that the described non-economic effects of unemployment in countries with more formalized labor markets may not apply in the same way in lower-income nations with endemic poverty and a high incidence of informal and subsistence labor. For example, the aforementioned correlation analysis of World Values Survey data by Wietzke and McLeod (2012) finds that the negative wellbeing effect of unemployment drops quite considerably as one moves from high- and middle-income nations to lower-income countries, accounting for the usual range of controls regularly used in the literature (such as income, education, age, or family status). These results are consistent with a large body of economic research that suggests that the primary channel out of poverty in low-income nations is a transition from informal or agricultural work into more rewarding forms of wage employment (for overviews, see; Azevedo et al. 2012; WDR 2013).

Beyond these economic influences, social contexts also matter. There is relatively strong evidence that the social interactions and segregation processes described above also influence how individuals perceive experiences of unemployment. Work by Stutzer and Lalive (2004) finds that the unemployed suffer greater losses to wellbeing in communities that display lower levels of tolerance toward welfare recipients. At the same time, several other studies suggest that the relative wellbeing losses of unemployment tend to be lower in segregated communities with higher unemployment (this holds for the United Kingdom, see Clark and Oswald 1994; for Russia, see Eggers et al. 2006). Although these processes remain little understood, they indicate that the social interactions associated with extreme segregation also mediate how individual experiences in and around the labor market translate into personal social preferences. In some cases, extreme segregation and the concentration of peer-group interactions within relatively harmonious communities can actually limit the social comparisons across social and status groups that are
normally expected to increase the likelihood of conflict. However, these outcomes are clearly not desirable because they are accompanied by deep latent group divides.

Other research suggests that the levels of wellbeing of the unemployed may be affected by spillovers and institutional and policy contexts. For example, cross-country comparisons by Wietzke (2012) show that nations with relatively protected labor markets and large relative wellbeing differences between the employed and unemployed often have higher absolute levels of life satisfaction for those not in work. In a similar vein, a descriptive analysis of wellbeing levels by Di Tella et al. (2003) documents that although increases in unemployment benefits in Europe from 1975 to 1992 did not narrow the differences in reported happiness between the unemployed and the employed, absolute levels of wellbeing rose for both groups (Di Tella et al. 2003). These results suggest that social and policy-induced wellbeing spillovers could explain why even countries with relatively large differences between labor market groups often experience high levels of social stability over time (provided the consequences for absolute wellbeing are sufficiently strong to ‘offset’ the negative consequences of social comparisons). However, these are early results, and more detailed and rigorous analysis is needed to better understand the social mechanisms and interactions involved.

Insider – Outsider Politics

In light of the preceding discussion, a central question for the link between jobs and social cohesion is how societies create the environments for positive interactions and spillovers that improve the wellbeing of all groups in society. Economic and labor market institutions clearly matter in this context. Economic theory suggests that societies with more inclusive institutions are generally better able to absorb conflicts between winners and losers of economic and political transformations (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Alesina and Drazan 1991). This finding is supported by several empirical studies documenting that societies with stronger institutions and better inter-group relations experience fewer and shorter economic crises (Rodrik 1999; Easterly et al. 2006) or crises that are, at least, not more severe than in otherwise comparable countries (Fortezza and Rama 2006). These more stable conditions have obvious advantages for all groups of society that will benefit from the absence of economic insecurity and volatility.

The flip side is that many of the positive consequences of work-based interactions can deepen social differences if they interact with existing economic divides and segregation processes. Political scientists and economists have long been concerned that collective action problems and the resulting lower levels of political organization among the unemployed facilitate the emergence of policies that favor the
interests of labor market ‘insiders’ over those of ‘outsiders’ (see, for instance, Olson 1982; Lindbeck and Snower 2002; Rueda 2005, 2006). These ‘insider’ politics can be reinforced if the described positive effects of work-related interactions interact with existing segregation processes. Psychological rewards and social capital associated with workplace interactions may only benefit those who already have better economic opportunities. This phenomenon not only increases differences between the employed and unemployed but also potentially undermines successful collective action across groups with uneven access to the labor market.

Micro data provide some indicative support for these processes. The aforementioned correlation analysis by Wietzke and McLeod (2012) indicates that people who derive positive experiences and self-esteem from their work are more likely to engage constructively with public institutions. The authors document that those in work are more likely to participate in demonstrations or to sign petitions. These results hold across a wide sample of nations, even though the estimates are less robust in lower-income countries. People in higher-quality jobs also tend to be more politically active in all sub-samples, except in low-income countries.

Other contributions suggest that lower levels of political activism among the unemployed also accompany political attitudes that can undermine support for political institutions. A cross-country correlation analysis of World Value Survey data by Altindag and Mocan (2010) documents that the unemployed tend to hold more negative views about democracy and stronger preferences for rogue leaders. The authors also find that high and sustained rates of unemployment undermine collective trust in democracy. The results are based on simple cross-sectional correlations only. However, the findings are broadly consistent with earlier research on electoral behavior, which suggests that support for incumbent representatives declines with deteriorating personal economic conditions (Markus 1988; Nannestad and Paldam 1997) and weaker macro-economic outlooks in a constituency (Kramer 1971; Stigler 1973).

There are indications that these uneven levels of political engagement also accompany the insider-outsider differences over labor market policies that are often discussed in the political economy literature. Contrary to conventional political economy models, which tend to assume that labor and social democratic movements share a common concern with unemployment, workers are often deeply divided over labor market policies. Survey responses by labor market outsiders, who are defined by the insecurity of their work contracts, indicate a stronger preferences for employment generating ‘active’ labor market policies, such as public employment centers and administration, labor market training, or subsidized employment. This is in contrast to labor market insiders, defined by the security of their contracts, who tend to prefer stronger measures of worker protection and lower tax spending on employment policies (Rueda 2005, 2006). Other studies based on larger...
samples of countries suggest that lower-skilled members of the work force tend to report stronger support for government redistribution (Blanchflower and Freeman 1997; Corneo and Gruner 2002; Cramer and Kaufman 2011; Haggard et al. 2013).

Cross-country comparisons of labor market policies suggest that these differences in behaviors and political preferences are reflected in actual political outcomes. Even among social democratic or labor-dominated governments, there are well-documented examples of policies that favor the protection of the interests of labor market insiders over active employment-generating policies (Rueda 2005, 2006; Shayo 2009). These outcomes are attributed to higher levels of political activism and stronger aversion to costlier employment-generating policies among the former group (Rueda 2005, 2006). In addition, outsider-friendly policies often fail to materialize because of the existence of social associations and alliances outside of the labor market.26

In the literature on social exclusion, similar arguments have been made about social policies toward low-skilled, temporary workers. In particular ‘workfare’ programs designed to restrict access to social benefits and to push recipients into the labor market are often blamed for the perpetuation of precarious low-paid work relations because these interventions have the potential to interrupt individual employment histories and skills acquisition (McKnight 2002; King and Rueda 2008, 279). This can result in a ‘reserve army’ of workers in low-cost, flexible, and temporary jobs who meet the low-cost labor needs of the economy but do not enjoy the prospects for upward mobility of more advantaged groups (Byrne 1999; King and Rueda 2008).

The practical lessons that result from these observations usually return full circle to the root causes of low inclusion and mobility in the labor market. Constructive long-term strategies should limit the risk of individuals entering low-paid and insecure work or help low-skilled temporary workers move from low-paying and often subsidized jobs into standard forms of employment (McKnight 2002, 117; King and Rueda 2008; OECD 2011). Other effective interventions seek to offset the limits to upward mobility by ensuring higher minimum skills standards and better educational services for children from disadvantaged backgrounds (McKnight 2002, 117).

Conclusion

Policy makers increasingly recognize that well-functioning labor markets are an important precondition for peaceful social relations (WDR 2013; OECD 2011). However, until now, there has been surprisingly little comparative analysis of how jobs influence personal experiences and interactions around social cohesion. This article has sought to fill this gap by reviewing international evidence on the link between jobs and individual wellbeing and behaviors.

The literature reviewed suggests that the relationship between jobs and social cohesion is best studied as a two-way relationship. On the one hand, there is
relatively robust evidence that social institutions and identities related to class or family background can limit opportunities and mobility in the labor market. This can undermine social cohesion by weakening social inclusion and increasing inequalities in the distribution of the benefits of work. On the other hand, there are many reasons to suspect that jobs can have the positive transformative consequences for social relations that have been postulated in recent high-profile policy publications on social cohesion. In particular, jobs emerge as important correlates of a range of outcomes that are typically associated with social cohesion, such as subjective wellbeing, social associations, or personal levels of social and political activism.

Despite the many individually compelling examples of how jobs can influence social cohesion, this review has revealed at least two caveats that undermine the optimism about the transformative role of jobs that is implicit in reports such as the WDR. The first is the complexity of the social processes and institutions that determine how individual work-related experiences translate into interactions and spillovers between groups with uneven attachment to the labor market. In particular, highly segmented labor markets increase the risk that work-related interactions and collective action may exacerbate divides between labor market ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Although some of the social institutions behind these social barriers are probably more difficult to change, other responses will require more complex interventions that reach beyond the narrowly defined labor market reforms to address more fundamental differences in the distribution of skills and social advantages.

The other caveat is the relatively tentative nature of much of the evidence on which claims of the positive effects of jobs are based. Rigorous analysis of the social interactions to which many of the positive effects of work are attributed is notoriously difficult because of the potential selection problems and other contextual influences involved. These problems are amplified because many of the advances in the design of studies and surveys that are used to document the positive effects of work on economic outcomes have not (yet) spilled over into the analysis of non-monetary dimensions of jobs. Against this background, future analytical progress will depend, to a large extent, on the more routine integration of social cohesion indicators in the monitoring of labor market outcomes. In other contexts, more complex research designs will be required that integrate careful political economy analysis at the aggregate level with detailed study of individual-level interactions in the workplace and other relevant social contexts.

Notes

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1. Workers and employees in protected long-term contracts are typically defined as ‘insiders’; individuals in non-permanent jobs are defined as ‘outsiders’. However, the literature is divided over the precise definitions (Lindbeck and Snower 2002).


3. Theoretical models have variably explained these outcomes to partisan politics and class-related distributive bargaining between capital and labor (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990; Lindert 2004; Huber and Stephens 2012) or to the functional responses of employers to changing demands for skills and security (Hall and Soskice 2001).

4. Grusky and Kanbur (2006) go on to note that a class-analytical lens may help to resolve many analytical challenges of poverty and inequality analysis that have arisen in the wake of the recent literature on capabilities and multidimensional wellbeing, including the possibility of summarizing multiple personal attributes in a single measure of social or occupational class (Grusky and Weeden 2007).

5. More precisely, this is typically done by estimating least-squares regression of sons’ earnings on fathers’ earnings controlling for the ages of both generations or by constructing measures of permanent income for fathers and sons (Ferreira and Veloso 2006; Azevedo and Bouillon 2009).

6. There are, of course, exceptions. See, for instance, Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996).

7. This happens mostly for operational reasons. However, it may also have to do with the traditional preference of economists for income-based measures of inequality (Grusky and Kanbur 2006).

8. Wilson’s work on urban poverty triggered a large cross-disciplinary literature on the social consequences of residential segregation. This research has provided additional qualitative case studies and quantitative evaluations of the effects of social isolation on social relations, education, and the economic opportunities of residents of deprived neighborhoods (see below; Evans et al. 1992; Borjas 1995; Anderson 1999; Durlauf and Young 2001; Loury 2002). The literature on social exclusion has also associated the breakdown of social relations with processes of residential segregation.

9. In the language of class analysis, concerns about social segregation often accompany a shift in focus from conventional class categories based on occupational categorization alone to alternative social attributes, such as low education, dysfunctional family structures, and social exclusion (this is generally summarized under the broader term ‘underclass’; see, for example, Grusky and Kanbur 2006, 14).

10. Most of these studies document neighbourhood effects in interactions with racial inequalities.

11. Other case studies document community-level social costs of economic downsizing in more recent time periods. See, for example, Dudwick (2012) and WDR (2013, 132f).

12. Ludwig et al. (2001) found a reduction in arrest rates of 30 to 50 percent.

13. As with SWB, the effect of unemployment gradually declines from high- to low-income countries, but it is still borderline significant in the poorest nations. Similar results are reported for job quality and autonomy.

14. Note, however, that this study could not account for possible time-variant personal attributes that may simultaneously influence respondents’ employment status and their social relations. Examples are illness or other short-term economic shocks.

15. Economists have long recognized that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of conflict (for an overview, see Kilroy 2012).

16. Moreover, work-related identities are of decreasing importance in many advanced industrial societies (Grusky and Kanbur 2006).

17. The authors also find that an index that summarizes people’s self-assessments of their work as involving manual or cognitive and routine or creative tasks and their degree of independence at work does not predict life satisfaction in low-income countries.

18. The authors approximate these norms through local support for a national referendum about the reduction of unemployment benefits. The study accounts for possible local interactions between labor market outcomes and work norms with the help of regional fixed effects.
19. This may also involve the fact that high unemployment rates tend to reduce the subjective well-being of people with and without work simultaneously (Di Tella et al. 2001; Eggers et al. 2006).

20. Although it is based on non-experimental data, this study mitigates endogeneity concerns through instrumental variable estimates and by linking personal wellbeing to national policy contexts that are not under the control of individual respondents. Wietzke and McLeod (2012) also find that absolute levels of wellbeing of the unemployed follow similar cross-sectional trends when mapped against an index of the stringency of labor laws, though there are clear and stable differences compared with those out of work. They also speculate that weaker social protection policies and high unemployment often lead to a heightened sense of insecurity among the unemployed as well as those in work.

21. The authors hypothesize that this result has to do with the reduction of the financial risks of unemployment for people in and out of work.

22. The recent review of literature on labor regulations conducted for the WDR 2013 concludes that, outside of extreme scenarios of excessive regulation or de-regulation, the efficiency enhancing and undermining effects of labor market institutions can be found side by side (Freeman 2008, 2009; OECD 2011; World Bank 2013, 26).

23. Reviews of labor market policies provide some indications that this is indeed the case. In most countries, labor market regulations disproportionally benefit young males to the detriment of other more vulnerable groups (Lindbeck and Snower 2002; OECD 2011; WDR 2013). Similar evidence is found by Heckman and Pages (2000) for Latin America, where job security provisions are comparatively costly (OECD 2011, 162), and by Botero et al. (2004) at the cross-national level.

24. However, Wietzke and McLeod (2012) find no systematic associations between employment status and self-expressed confidence in the government and democratic institutions.

25. These results are based on the 1996 Eurobarometer survey.

26. In particular, religious beliefs, rural background, and nationalistic identities have been shown to reduce political positioning around work or status lines (Kaufman 2009; Shayo 2009; Haggard et al. 2013). Insider-outsider differences are often reduced when the vulnerability of labor market insiders increases due to regulatory reform or rising unemployment rates (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rueda 2006, 388f).

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