Background/Acknowledgements

The Government of Turkey and the World Bank are working in partnership on a program of technical assistance that aims to identify and mitigate the impact of Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTPs) on Turkish hosting communities. This paper was written by Holly Benner, Arzu Uraz, Joanna de Berry, and William Wise-\nman of the World Bank, with valuable contributions from Zeynep Darendeliler and Elif Yukseker. The paper was produced under the guidance of Johannes Zutt (World Bank Country Director, Turkey) and Mariam Sherman (Director for Operations, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, World Bank). Funding for the work was available under the “Turkey Regional Development and Vulnerability” Program co-led by the Social Development and Urban Development teams of the World Bank and financed by SIDA.
Today, global leaders face the greatest movement of peoples since World War II—nearly 60 million are displaced as refugees or internally displaced around the world. Forced displacement situations are often protracted and unresolved; only 126,800 refugees were able to return to their home countries in 2014—the lowest number in 31 years. With no end in sight to the conflicts producing the largest refugee flows, it is increasingly clear that humanitarian responses must be paired with development interventions that can begin to respond to the scope, long-term nature, and socioeconomic impacts of this global crisis.

Turkey now hosts the largest refugee population in the world (see Figure 1). The Government of Turkey (GoT) estimates the total number of registered Syrians under Temporary Protection (SuTPs) at 2,225,147.1, 2 Facing a record influx of displaced, the GoT is setting a global precedent for a refugee response with two unique features:

(i) A non-camp approach. Only 12 percent of the total number of SuTPs are living in tents and temporary shelters;3 the rest are settled in urban areas, where they seek their own accommodation and work opportunities.

(ii) A government-financed approach. By September 2015, the GoT had spent an estimated $7.6 billion on its response to Syrian refugees.

The GoT’s non-camp approach was driven by the scale of the crisis. As a result, the GoT’s approach diverges from the way in which hosting countries commonly respond to refugee situations—by directing refugees into camps supported by humanitarian agencies. Experience shows that when refugees are supported in becoming socially and economically self-reliant, and given freedom of movement and protection, they are more likely to contribute economically to their host country. They are also more likely to be able to undertake a successful return process. Integrating support for refugees into mainstream government service provision can be more cost effective and sustainable than setting up parallel delivery channels. However, this approach also creates challenges for both SuTP and hosting communities, which include socioeconomic pressures such as deficits in housing and service delivery, joblessness, and the potential for social tensions.

The objective of this policy brief is to collate existing publicly available material on the situation of SuTPs

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2 The largest concentrations of refugees are in Istanbul (20 percent of the total refugee population), and the southern provinces of Gaziantep (14 percent), Hatay (12 percent) and Sanliurfa (10 percent). Fifty one percent of all refugees are children under 18 years of age (AFAD, 2013).


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Figure 1. Major refugee-hosting countries
in Turkey and to summarize: (i) the strategy and principles of Turkey’s unique response to its displacement crisis; (ii) the challenges in managing the socioeconomic dimensions of displacement; and (iii) remaining critical policy issues and the road ahead for Turkey, as well as implications for other countries’ refugee response efforts.

1. Turkey’s Response to the Syrian Displacement Crisis—Strategy and Principles

The GoT defined its response to the arrival of refugees from Syria through the 2013 “6458: Law on Foreigners and International Protection,” which defined a Temporary Protection (TP) regime for the Syrian refugees. The TP Regulation was prepared pursuant to Article 91 and put into force on 22 October 2014. It sets out how TP status is issued and the specific provisions for admission, registration and exit while under temporary protection in Turkey. It also outlines the rights and responsibilities of those under temporary protection; regulates the TP identification process; services to be provided to persons under TP; and outlines the coordination between national, local and international agencies involved in the response. The TP extends to all Syrian refugees whether or not they are registered.

Turkey’s response to the crisis also includes much more than the government-led legal framework and support. It involves many acts of individual kindness at the local level, whereby Turkish families and civil society organizations have made donations and extended help to their new Syrian neighbors. One survey (HUGO, 2014) across a large sample in 18 provinces indicates that 31 percent of Turkish respondents had made a personal financial contribution in support of Syrian refugees.

The GoT’s Response

To operationalize the TP guidelines, different Turkish ministries have completed the subsidiary legal arrangements to implement the measures. These guarantee registered SuTPs access to health care, education, social services, and the labor market. Psychosocial support and rehabilitation services are also prioritized for groups with special needs, such as children, women, and the elderly. Those holding a TP identification card can secure access to electricity, water, communication services and are able to open bank accounts. Some of these remain subject to approval. For example, regulating access to the labor market through work permits is being discussed with the Council of Ministers.

A cross-sectoral collaboration has been established among Turkish ministries in order to respond to the diverse needs of the SuTPs. The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD) coordinates the emergency response, with the involvement of the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Health, Education, Agriculture and Forestry, Transportation, Family and Social Policies, Labor, Social Security and Finance; the Turkish Armed Forces; the Presidency of Religious Affairs; the Turkish Red Crescent Society; and the Undersecretary of Customs. Since the Law on Foreigners and International Protection came into force in April 2014, the Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) has become the sole institution responsible for protection and asylum issues. The recent nomination of a chief advisor to the Prime Minister on SuTP response is bolstering the coordination needed for a comprehensive inter-agency response.

The GoT has also continuously adapted to the changing nature of the crisis and the needs of SuTP communities already residing in Turkey. Authorities have, for example, shifted from emergency response to long-term planning. While organizations such as AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent Society were initially tasked
with SuTP reception and assistance, a broader set of agencies are now involved in managing a more holistic and long-term approach.

In an effort toward more strategic planning, the GoT has also increasingly involved international organizations and civil society groups with experience in protracted refugee response settings (İcduygu, 2015, p. 9). For example, in 2015 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) cooperated closely with the Turkish authorities to build DGMM’s capacity and to develop a new asylum system. While UNHCR will continue to work on case management, it will start a phased handover of registration and refugee status determination fully to DGMM. Community-based organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have provided invaluable local-level support for SuTPs, including setting up community centers and offering legal advice, translation services, and psychosocial care.

The GoT has utilized innovative technologies in tracking SuTP movements and trends. Turkey has just finished registering almost all of the SuTPs with biometric data. This registration was conducted under the coordination of DGMM. To support the registration process, a “Temporary Protection Module” was launched on 30 November 2015 in the GöçNet system to consolidate all biometric data on SuTP into one data base, facilitating access to the information by different ministries. AFAD has developed an electronic-based aid distribution system—Elektronik Yardım Dağıtım Sistemi (EYDAS)—that matches SuTPs in need with those providing assistance, so as to facilitate a speedy response.

### Camp policies

The GoT has also taken a progressive approach to the relatively limited number of SuTPs (over 250,000) residing in 25 camps across 10 provinces in Turkey (see Map 1).4 The camps are all managed and financed by Turkey through AFAD. While AFAD utilized UNHCR camp guidelines, the GoT designed its own approach.

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The camps are staffed by Turkish government employees, with some NGO involvement in supporting roles. When the first waves of Syrians began arriving in Turkey, within 24 hours the Turkish government had set up an emergency tent camp for them in southern Hatay Province. Moreover, in less than four years, the Turkish government has shouldered the financial and management responsibility of 25 camps in provinces along its 500-mile border with Syria. The camps aim to offer a better standard of shelter and services and have been recognized for their cleanliness, safety, maintenance, power lines, schools, and other services and amenities (McClelland, 2014). UNCHR has declared the Turkish-led and Turkish-financed camp management as “emergency response of a consistently high standard” (UNHCR, 2015). However, there are growing concerns regarding the finances and support needed to sustain the camps at the same standard of quality and services.

AFAD has also established a Disaster Management System (AFKEN) which allows all the camps and temporary disaster centers to be managed, standardized, and monitored in one holistic system that is GIS-based. Through AFKEN, the GoT can monitor the capacity status of the camps, integrate with MERNIS (the centralized population management system), and manage aid distribution, supply stocks, and personnel.

Recognizing the potential challenges faced by SuTPs residing in the camps, AFAD has also taken measures to improve SuTP self-sufficiency and quality of life. The GoT has ensured that Syrians are represented by their own community leaders within the camps and in discussions with camp managers. Syrian teachers are hired in camp-run schools. Electronic food vouchers, or e-cards, are being distributed to simplify life for SuTPs and enable them to go into shops and buy food.

Implications of the GoT’s Response

The two key characteristics of the Turkish response—a non-camp, government-financed approach—strongly differentiate it from many refugee-hosting countries, where the tendency is to direct refugees into camps supported by external humanitarian agencies. This approach is increasingly recognized as having significant limitations, especially for longer-term development prospects (UNHCR, 2014b). Integrating support for refugees into mainstream government service provision can be more cost effective than setting up large-scale camps and parallel humanitarian service delivery channels. This is particularly true in the case of situations of protracted displacement. This approach also offers the potential benefit of more broadly building the capacity of national and local institutions.

Emerging global evidence increasingly shows that giving refugees the freedom to live outside of camp settings, providing opportunities for social and economic self-reliance, and protecting rights is more likely to result in economic benefits for host countries (UNHCR 2014b). Refugees who are self-sufficient are also more likely to be able to undertake a successful and sustainable return process to their home countries, when the situation allows (World Bank, 2015b).

Indeed, preliminary observations of the impact SuTPs have on the Turkish economy show some potential positive trends. Syrians arriving with assets have invested in Turkey: in 2014, 1,222 out of 4,249 foreign-owned businesses in Turkey were established by Syrians. In Gaziantep, Mersin, and Hatay, 122 Syrian-owned companies were registered in 2013, and the estimated initial capital invested in these companies was TL 39 million (Brookings Institution and USAK, 2013). Syrians have also started up (mainly unregistered) microenterprises, particularly cafes and restaurants.

Further gains come from the expansion of local markets in areas with high SuTP concentration; receipt of remittances from within Syria during the early years of the conflict; and the benefits of government SuTP expenditures for local suppliers and SuTPs’ labor contribution.

Nevertheless, the strains of hosting SuTPs are felt especially in cities in the southeast of Turkey. Tensions from Turkish communities relate to competition over jobs, rising rent prices, strains on municipal services and infrastructure, and cultural differences with SuTPs. Perception surveys show mixed attitudes—Turkish families recognize the humanitarian imperative to respond to SuTPs and show much generosity toward them; yet they are also deeply concerned about the social consequences of the presence of SuTPs in their communities.
2. Socioeconomic Pressures of Displacement: Turkey’s Approach, Lessons Learned, and Challenges

The key challenge facing the GoT is to mitigate the potential negative impacts of hosting SuTPs while building on the positive contributions refugees can make. The following section provides an assessment of the GoT’s response and continuing challenges in managing the socioeconomic dimensions of displacement. This includes a focus on the most common issues faced by both displaced and host communities in a development-oriented response effort, including income, welfare, and employment; pressures on housing and services; and social tensions/community relations (see Figure 3).

In each of these areas, the GoT has complex decisions ahead on whether and how to extend benefits and increase investments for both SuTP and host communities.

Socioeconomic Challenges, Lessons, and Considerations Moving Forward

Income and employment. Surveys consistently show that SuTPs in southeast Turkey have been relying on savings, selling assets (for example, jewelry), and remittances as their greatest source of household income. However, as these assets and savings are depleted, there is increasing demand for employment opportunities (STL, 2014; IMC, 2014). Data on current employment rates among SuTPs is sparse. One survey suggested that the rates of refugee households having at least one working member were 61 percent of refugees in Urfa; 16 percent in Hatay; and 30 percent in Kilis (STL, 2014).

As noted above, Turkey passed additional legal guidelines for foreigners under temporary protection in October 2014 that provides SuTPs access to the labor market. However, secondary legislation for operationalizing formal access to the labor market by issuing work permits is awaiting approval by the Council of Ministers. In absence of this, only SuTPs with residence permits can apply for work permits. Work permits are difficult to obtain. To date 6,858 Syrians have been granted work permits. Therefore, SuTPs mainly work in the informal sector and in low-skill jobs such as seasonal agricultural work, construction, manufacturing or textiles, and waste picking and sorting. Some have also been absorbed into the service industry.

While SuTPs were initially concentrated in Turkey’s southeastern provinces, the search for better livelihood opportunities has been a key factor in their spread across the country, mostly to areas of seasonal agricultural work or metropolitan cities. An assessment in Istanbul found that the majority had arrived in the last six months, suggesting that the flow may be increasing (IMC/ASAM, 2014).

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6 Refugees report that the transaction costs of these remittances from Syria are increasing with the deterioration of mobile phone networks and banking systems.

7 The binding Article titled ‘Access to Labor Market’ of the Temporary Protection Regulation provides legal guarantee for the right to work as an indispensable element of social life. It has the provision that all SuTP, whose registration procedures have been completed and who have been granted a Temporary Protection ID Card, can apply to the Ministry of Labor and Social Security to obtain working permits in sectors, business lines and geographical areas to be determined by the Council of Ministers.
There are reports of SuTPs working under exploitative conditions in the informal sector; these include long hours, unsafe conditions, lack of guaranteed payment, and low wages. One survey states that average wages for refugees were TL 5.6/day in Hatay and TL 14/day in Urfa (STL, 2013); another gives the average monthly income from employment for refugees in Gaziantep as TL 406/month (IMC, 2014). The current net minimum wage in Turkey is TL 1000.54/month.8

Since their displacement from Syria, there have been significant changes in SuTP labor force participation trends. Without work permits, few are able to gain formal employment in their previous professions. In addition to legal status, lack of Turkish language skills poses another primary barrier to entering the labor market. Refugees often experience humiliation over lowering their job positions and being unable to carry on a previous profession (SREO, 2013).

Access to employment is also a potential flashpoint between SuTPs and Turkish host communities. One survey of Turkish workers who were newly unemployed found that, depending on location, between 40 and 100 percent of those who had lost their jobs attributed it to the presence of Syrians and increased competition in the labor market (ORSAM, 2015a). Another survey found that 56 percent of Turkish respondents felt that “Syrians take our jobs” (HUGO, 2014).9 Tensions seem to particularly center on wage levels. The influx of Syrians into the labor market has apparently driven down wages for both Syrians and Turks.

The full impact of the presence of Syrian refugees on the labor market has yet to be analyzed. Three studies point to some positive trends: (i) Syrians may be filling an unmet need for unskilled labor rather than displacing the labor force (ORSAM, 2015a); (ii) the presence of Syrians may have a tempering effect on the immigration of Turkish nationals to the refugee hosting areas, which mitigates changes in the labor market (IZA, 2015); and (iii) there is widespread displacement in the informal labor market of Turkish informal workers by SuTP informal workers—women are particularly affected. However the outcomes of this displacement are seen to be generally positive for Turkish workers with greater formalization of jobs, extended time in education, and increase in average wages (Del Carpio, Wagner, and Tribe, 2015). Nevertheless, the widespread perception and experience of Turkish workers seems to indicate increased competition over jobs and a lowering of wages. Further investigation is required on this issue.

**Education.** The GoT has put forth an enormous effort to provide education options for SuTPs. The Turkish approach to school provision for SuTPs has taken three main forms: (i) integrating Syrian children into the Turkish education system; (ii) allowing community-based education (CBE) programs run from within the Syrian community; there is a range of curriculum used in these CBEs, with the most popular being the Libyan curriculum and religious education (Refugee Studies Centre, 2014); and (iii) facilitating Syrian children to attend SuTP-designated temporary education centers (TECs), which are supervised by the Ministry of Education (MoNE). These have Turkish senior administration but are staffed by Syrian teachers, with education provided through a modified version of the Syrian curriculum developed by the Syrian Commission of Education under the Syrian Interim Ministry of Education. Some TECs have been instituted by setting up a double-shift arrangement in Turkish school buildings, while others operate in municipal buildings or in the camps.

MoNE estimates that there are 589,500 school-age Syrian children in Turkey and that up to 250,000 Syrian children are enrolled in school; an additional 137,650 plan to be enrolled by the end of the 2015–2016 school year (a rise in enrollment rate from around 40 percent to 60 percent). MoNE has asked all provincial directorates to register Syrian children of preschool and first-year primary school age in the Turkish schools, though this will take time. MoNE is therefore planning to open an additional 60 temporary education centers to address immediate capacity constraints, using the temporary education centers as a interim solution. MoNE has also begun to provide Turkish preparatory courses at public education centers (Halk Egitim Merkezi) to facilitate the transition of Syrian children into Turkish schools. Increasing access to the Turkish systems will be formalized through a MoNE Circular currently under preparation.

Inside the camps, school enrollment rates have been high (around 86 percent), but much lower outside the camps. Recent enrollment rate increases can be tied to GoT efforts to open up more places within the Turkish education system. Yet several challenges persist in increasing SuTP enrollment, sustaining attendance,

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8 For the period of July 1, 2015 – December 31, 2015.
9 This rose to 69 percent in the border regions.
and ensuring quality instruction. The most pressing include: (i) the high degree of mobility of the SuTP population, which results in school dropout; (ii) high levels of psychosocial trauma, which disrupts concentration; (iii) difficulties in retaining Syrian teachers—most are unable to register for work permits and are paid modest stipends; (iv) the lack of quality control of services provided through CBE; and (v) overcrowding, damage, and disruption to Turkish schools where double shifts are in place. In addition, there is a large unmet demand for the provision of vocational, remedial, and higher education among SuTP adolescents (Refugee Studies Centre, 2014).

**Housing and municipal services.** Outside the camps, the initial wave of Syrians were put up in host households, building upon their existing social, cultural, or economic networks in Turkey. Over time this pattern has changed, with new arrivals increasingly finding their own places to live; many who had originally lived with host families have moved into their own accommodation (Ozden, 2013; STL, 2014).

The most extensive assessment of refugees living outside of camps (AFAD, 2013) found that 75 percent of SuTPs live in houses or flats, while 25 percent live in informal settlements or makeshift arrangements. Most of those who live in houses or flats rent these units (STL, 2014). One survey from Gaziantep suggested that refugees are on average paying TL 178/month in rent. There is a widespread perception that rental prices have almost doubled in provinces along the border and housing has become scarcer due to high demand. Some areas of the southeast were experiencing a housing shortage prior to the refugee crisis.

Even before the arrival of SuTPs, Turkey experienced rising housing costs (both rent and utilities) at the lower end of the housing spectrum. There is a projected housing supply lag of an estimated nine years, and rent/utilities share of household expenditures has increased by over 10 percent over the last few years for the lowest deciles of the income spectrum. The pressures on housing and municipal services introduced by SuTPs have likely had a sharp impact on low-income Turkish households (World Bank, 2015a, 2015b). Mayors in host communities in the country’s southeast now highlight the growing number of street children, the inadequacy of housing supply, the strain on municipal services, and the need for improved infrastructure services and social safety nets.

The quality of the housing stock utilized by refugees has also been raised as a concern, with one rapid assessment reporting that only 25 percent of respondents have access to heating and only 35 percent have easy access to toilets and shower facilities (Alliance 2015, 2014). Another survey suggested that 84 percent of refugee families surveyed in Hatay, Urfa, and Kilis live in a single-room dwelling (STL, 2014). AFAD (2013) figures put the number of people per dwelling at 8.6 people per unit, with 32 percent of dwellings housing more than one family and the average dwelling size being 2.1 rooms, all of which suggests significant overcrowding.

While there are legal difficulties in property ownership, the SuTP population has access to formal rent contracts under the TP regime. However, there are anecdotal reports of some exploitation occurring; for example, stories of landlords demanding that SuTPs make six-month cash rent payments in advance, and evicting them on short notice. Some Syrian refugees have reported being discriminated against by landlords who refuse them as tenants on grounds of their large family size, perceived noisiness, and cultural practices. However some Turkish families have conversely complained that they find it harder to find a rental property because landlords can make cash more readily from Syrians, who are prepared to fit larger numbers of people into smaller spaces.

**Health.** Under the TP regime, registered SuTPs are entitled to free health care at Turkish facilities from their initial day of arrival in Turkey. A number of World Health Organization (WHO) and Ministry of Health (MoH) assessments in southern Turkey in 2014 illustrate the strong effort of the MoH to provide SuTPs with free access to all health services. As of October 2014, about 250,000 Syrian refugees received inpatient care;
more than 200,000 patients were operated on; almost 150,000 births occurred; and over 6 million consultations took place (3RP, n.d.). Refugees in the community receive free primary and inpatient health services. Increasing numbers of non-registered refugees can access emergency care, after which they need to register in order to obtain further health support. As a result, clinics and hospitals in affected areas report an additional patient load of 30 to 40 percent. Local hospitals have been enlarged and equipped to cover the current and most acute needs. The GoT has also developed information campaigns, including communication materials in Arabic on disease prevention and available health care services.

The GoT has also worked closely with the WHO and other international institutions to conduct regular mapping and needs assessments to improve SuTP access to essential health services. This has included quick response treatments as needed—for example, a vaccination campaign in Suruç district was organized following the influx of about 190,000 Syrian refugees. Along with the Turkish University of Gaziantep, WHO also completed the Refugee Doctor Adaptation Training (ReDAT) modules in Turkish and Arabic to help Syrian doctors understand Turkish standard operating procedures, treatment guidelines, and referral structures. Some Turkish users report facing increased wait times and overcrowding in health centers caused by SuTPs (Ozden, 2013). However, indications are that take-up of Turkish health care by SuTPs is still less than the full demand. There are reports, for example, that SuTPs are reluctant to access the free health care because of an inability to communicate their health concerns in Turkish and the need for a translator to accompany them to appointments. The GoT has worked to provide translators to assist in health care provision, but has not been able to fully meet the scale of demand. One survey states that only 60 percent of refugees outside camps are using the Turkish health services, and that 54 percent have difficulty accessing medication (AFAD, 2013). As of October 2015, all registered SuTPs have been assigned a foreign national ID number to enable additional access to medicines from all pharmacies contracted with the Turkish government health insurance provider (SGK). However, many Syrians continue to self-medicate or seek medical advice from those they know who were trusted medical practitioners in Syria.

Social tensions and vulnerabilities. Concerns about the impact of SuTPs have on communities, services, and security pervades the southeast of Turkey. These tensions seem to be most commonly articulated in concerns over increasing rents, decreasing wages, increasing job competition, longer waiting times for hospital services, and the rise of polygamy and crime (Brookings Institution and USAK, 2013; ORSAM, 2015a; HUGO, 2014). But how far these underlying concerns translate into active social tension is difficult to gauge. There have been several well-publicized incidents of violence between Syrians and Turks. There are also anecdotal reports of Syrian children being harassed, discriminated against, and bullied. However, surveys suggest that the majority of Syrians think they are well treated by their Turkish hosts; 66 percent of respondents in Gaziantep reported having a good or very good relationship with their hosting community (IMC, 2014). In another perception survey, only 20 percent of Syrian respondents reported having “social problems with Turks,” while 37 percent reported having good Turkish friends (SABR Center, 2015). Strikingly, only 25 percent reported feeling they were discriminated against in mainstream government service provision.

However, as the situation becomes more protracted, there are signs of increasing tensions and frustration. In a new survey from the German Marshall Fund (October 2015),12 81 percent of Turkish respondents reported that they “do not think Syrian immigrants integrate well.” When asked about Turkey’s policies toward SuTPs, 68 percent of respondents wanted more restrictive policies; 73 percent said the existing SuTPs should be asked to go home, whereas 17 percent said it depended on the circumstances, and only 8 percent said they should be offered legal status in Turkey. As of October 2015, the Ministry of Family and Social Policy had started preparations to launch a child protection program together with UNICEF. In addition, psychosocial assistance and family training programs have been offered to 25,000 SuTPs living in camps, and will be extended to SuTPs living in cities.

One factor that contributes to social tension is the lack of information regarding the benefits that SuTPs receive, which at times creates misunderstanding and

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12 Survey released in October 2015; see http://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/TurkeySurvey_2015_web1.pdf. The fieldwork was conducted via face-to-face interviews with 1,018 respondents from 16 selected provinces and 125 neighborhoods through a multi-stage stratified sampling scheme.
frustration. At the town or province level, SuTPs may have access to some social assistance and services provided by the governorate, the municipality, social solidarity foundations, and NGOs. These services vary across localities and may not extend to host communities. There is a need for a transparent framework and plan on SuTPs’ rights and entitlements that is coordinated with and communicated to host communities.

**Implications for GoT Policymaking**

A theme across these areas is the need for more reliable and extensive information on both SuTP and host community populations in order to provide a better-targeted and better-informed policy response. It is also clear that while each dimension—employment, education, health, housing, and municipal services—has distinct challenges and barriers to progress, there is a need for a more comprehensive integrated approach.

The GoT will also need to consider how to best invest in and support municipal leaders and institutions at the front line of the response effort. Local leadership will often have the best knowledge of community dynamics and challenges, and would benefit from being given sufficient space and support to design response efforts tailored to municipal-level needs. Channels for municipal authorities to inform national-level planning and policymaking based on lessons learned, progress, and evolving challenges would also be beneficial.

### For Turkey—Critical Policy Questions and the Road Ahead

As Turkey has incrementally shifted to longer-term planning and development-oriented response, the GoT remains committed to the principle of treating SuTPs as protected “guests” that will be well prepared to return home once the conflict in Syria ends. Three key policy questions should then guide next steps:

- How to mitigate the potential negative socioeconomic impact of the refugee presence on host communities?
- How to maximize the social and economic benefits of the refugee presence for host communities and the Turkish economy as a whole?
- How to support SuTPs to be self-reliant until they are able to return?

Based on the challenges and lessons outlined in Section 2, the following are key issues to address in managing socioeconomic pressures:

**Labor and Employment.** As the GoT moves ahead in considering work permits for SuTPs, the key policy questions are: (i) how to introduce the work permit system with maximum gains for the Turkish labor market; and (ii) how to mitigate any negative impacts on Turkish communities through strengthening systems to support vulnerable Turkish workers. Additional data and analysis are needed to quantify the skills among SuTPs, to understand what they bring to the Turkish labor market and the current and potential impact of SuTP workers on the Turkish labor force. Policy and legal measures are also needed to promote employment opportunities and to provide training and services to help SuTPs integrate into the Turkish labor market based on identified unmet demands.

**Education.** The initial policy question for the GoT in regards to education is whether to keep three systems in place for educating SuTP children (integration into Turkish schools, TECs, and CBE) or to prioritize one over another. This decision will have to be informed by the educational preferences among SuTPs that could continue to increase school enrollment rates. The GoT also needs to consider strengthening support mechanisms—such as Turkish language classes and psychosocial support—that facilitate SuTP children’s entry into the Turkish education system. Finally, more data is needed on the skills, capacity, and training demands for Syrian teachers that can lead to increased regular-
ization of their work and support for the young SuTP population.

Housing. To effectively address the challenges facing SuTPs and host communities in securing adequate housing, the GoT needs to quantify the current housing conditions of SuTPs, particularly the vulnerabilities associated with living in poor conditions. There also needs to be an in-depth assessment of the impact of SuTP housing and utility demand on Turkish communities as a baseline to design mitigation measures, including on housing affordability. The GoT could consider additional measures to respond to SuTP housing needs, such as vouchers, rental subsidies, and increased social housing to respond to availability and affordability concerns.

Municipal services. Turkish municipalities are bearing the brunt of the burden of the SuTP presence, with local institutions and communities at the front line of the SuTP response effort. A policy decision needs to be made on whether and how to give municipalities more financing and institutional support to extend their services in line with the population increases caused by SuTPs. Finally, enhanced coordination is needed between municipalities and NGOs that deliver services to SuTPs to maximize the effectiveness of support to SuTPs and host communities.

Health. The key policy question for the GoT is what is preventing the SuTP population from more fully accessing health care, with potential impacts on the health and well-being of both SuTPs and Turkish hosting communities. There is a need to strengthen support mechanisms—such as translators—that facilitate SuTPs’ access to Turkish health care. At present these support systems are being provided by NGOs, and are overwhelmed. There may also be more creative solutions regarding how the SuTPs approach their health care needs. These could include identifying Syrian health care professionals, their skills, and support needs to increase the quality and organization of health care provided informally from within the Syrian community. A directive issued by the Ministry of Health in November 2015 has already begun to extend health care services, including the establishment of secondary-level health centers that will provide outpatient, laboratory, radiology, emergency, and minor surgical operation services, as well as specialized health centers that provide mental health, physical therapy, and rehabilitation services. These centers are designed such that health care will be provided primarily by Syrian staff and will utilize GoT and NGO resources for service provision.

Social cohesion. With such a large movement of people and changing dynamics at the community level, it is a testament to the Turkish people and the SuTP population that there have not been widespread issues with social tension, violence, and conflict. However, as the situation becomes more protracted and socio-economic pressures mount, investments should be made to promote continued tolerance and positive relations between SuTPs and Turkish hosts. A key issue is to improve communication to Turkish hosting communities regarding SuTP entitlements, as well as broader benefits and improvements to municipalities. Hosting communities need to see and experience benefits from SuTPs’ presence and from the programs that support them. Policies should be pursued and communicated that increase the living standards and situation of both refugees and hosts. There is also a need to work more systematically with security and justice institutions to ensure fair and nonviolent resolution to disputes when they emerge.

By hosting and supporting the largest refugee population in the world, the GoT is providing a “global good.” The effective management of the refugee crisis in Turkey reduces the potential for continued displacement to Europe and beyond, and avoids further insecurity and destabilization across borders. Recognizing the preventative power of a successful Turkish-managed response effort, international actors should scale up their support to the GoT to signal joint accountability. New international financing offered to Turkey should focus on supporting and supplementing what Turkey is already doing. The GoT’s response, which has strong potential for development gains, should be applauded and reinforced; there should not be a new debate on humanitarian response or a reversal of progress made in offering Syrian refugees unique protections, employment, and a non-camp and more sustainable approach to managing their lives in Turkey. That said, the UN and other humanitarian actors do have an important role to play in humanitarian and protection mandates, such as organizing SuTP resettlement and protecting those in transit. As the GoT considers additional national and international financing, this should also include support for strengthening data collection and technical engagement at the sectoral level alongside projects across sectors such as education, health, job creation and skills development, social protection and social cohesion, capacity building for municipal...
Lessons from Turkey—Implications for the International Response to Displacement

The forced displacement crisis poses a substantial threat to development progress globally. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) represent almost 1 percent of the global population and often (though not always) end up being among the poorest, most excluded, and most vulnerable. They are overwhelmingly hosted in developing countries, where they are often viewed as an additional burden on already stressed national systems and poverty reduction efforts. However, the Turkish experience also points to an alternative approach with the potential for the displaced to open new markets and trading opportunities, enhance a workforce, support national and local systems for service delivery, and energize private sector development and entrepreneurship.

The Turkish experience has the potential to inform and create invaluable lessons on several emerging principles in considering a more sustainable and development-oriented response that can maximize the benefits and minimize the socioeconomic risks of displacement:

- **Strengthening national and local institutions to respond to displacement crises.** The advantage of national ownership over a response to a displacement crisis is that it puts the hosting government in the driver’s seat and emphasizes strengthening existing national and local response efforts and institutions instead of introducing parallel external delivery channels. The Turkish example has the potential to illustrate how to implement this approach.

- **Maximizing refugees’ self-reliance.** The potential benefits of pursuing a non-camp approach include giving refugees the opportunity to secure their own homes, livelihoods, and services to maximize self-reliance during their displacement period and equipping refugees for a successful return home if and when conditions allow. The Turkish response to SuTPs is well placed to illustrate the longer-term challenges and impacts of this arrangement, including how to ensure notice and protection of the vulnerable who may not have the resources and assets to cope in this context.

- **Understanding socioeconomic pressures on host communities.** There is a need to recognize the socioeconomic pressures displacement puts on host communities, including across a range of key sectors—housing, employment and livelihoods, education, health, municipal services, and intercommunal relations; investments should be designed to relieve these pressures and ensure the spread of benefits to host communities. This will include lessons on how municipalities can be supported to deliver a refugee response.

- **Managing host–refugee tensions.** There is an opportunity to learn how to prevent social tensions through intercommunal interaction and trust building.

There is still significant effort and evidence needed to define a successful “development response” to the forced displacement crisis, despite calls for a new paradigm that would combine humanitarian and development efforts. What is clear is that the complexity, scale, and protracted nature of the crisis requires creative approaches that maximize the potential benefits and minimize the risks to countries bearing the hosting burden for the rest of the world. The May 2016 World Humanitarian Summit offer key forums in which to further such discussions. Lessons from Turkey’s unique hosting experience should figure centrally in defining the way forward.


