

# Forced Displacement and Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa

## An Economic Inquiry

*Philip Verwimp*  
*Jean-Francois Maystadt*



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## Abstract

Most reports on refugees deal with the immediate needs of displaced people. This paper seeks to go beyond the emergency phase and explore the challenges surrounding protracted refugee situations. The paper examines the refugee situation in Sub-Saharan Africa from a long-term angle, from the perspective of refugees' own agency as well as from the perspective of the host community. The paper aims to shed light on the economic lives of refugees in their host communities. Starting with an overview of the situation of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa, the paper draws on

findings from the literature to debunk some entrenched beliefs about refugees. The discussion of refugee crises in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda draws some lessons. The decision to return is discussed and it is argued that the decision depends on the socioeconomic condition in the host country versus the country of refuge, integration versus return policies in place, the individual set of skills of each refugee, and his or her subjective perception of the political climate in both countries.

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# Forced Displacement and Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Economic Inquiry

Philip Verwimp\* and Jean-Francois Maystadt\*\*

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**JEL:** O15, O12, J15, F51

\*Associate Professor in Development Economics, Université Libre de Bruxelles

\*\*Senior Lecturer in Development Economics, Lancaster University and LICOS, KU Leuven.

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## 1. Introduction

Postel et al. (2015) disagree with the perception that the massive inflow of refugees that the European Union witnessed in 2015 should be qualified as the worst refugee crisis since World War II. European policy makers however seem to be led by it. Despite the unprecedented media attention such population movements have attracted, this phenomenon only constitutes the “tip of the iceberg”. The overwhelming majority of displaced people are hosted in developing countries, either as Internally Displaced People (IDPs) or as refugees in countries usually neighboring conflict zones. The objective of this paper is to shed light on these – often invisible – millions of displaced people with a particular focus on those hosted in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Most reports on refugees deal with their immediate needs and are written from an emergency perspective. These needs are real and need to be addressed. The economic life of refugees, their impact on the host community, and the longer-term consequences of life as a refugee are much less researched and understood. Once the emergency situation is somewhat stabilized, refugees seem to vanish from the attention of researchers or donor agencies. We will document in this report that such disinterest/negligence is unjustified.

There is an argument to be made that many difficulties for refugees even start to appear only after the emergency phase. Of course, violence may be reduced or even absent, but after the emergency donor aid is reduced a lot or even stopped; local authorities (often not happy with the presence of refugees) take over from the aid agencies; the status of “refugee” is not always recognized by the host government; the few resources that refugees have taken with them while fleeing, have dried up; the government of the country of origin does not always want the refugees to come back; children may not be allowed to attend school; and so on.

Hence, this paper wants to go beyond the emergency phase and look at refugees from a longer-term angle, from the perspective of their own agency as well as from the perspective of the host community. The paper is written by two development economists, not by emergency specialists, nutritionists or medical doctors. In this report we want to answer five important questions about the plight of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA):

- (i) How many refugees/IDPs are there in SSA, where are they located, and how has this picture change over the past two decades?
- (ii) What are their core demographic and socioeconomic characteristics?
- (iii) How are they poor (along which dimensions) and does this differ from more mainstream characterizations of poverty?
- (iv) How do refugees/IDPs affect the poverty status of the hosting communities?
- (v) What are key policy entry points to reduce poverty?

The structure of the paper is the following: we first give an overview of recent trends and key figures concerning refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section three deals with the composition of the refugee population and their economic activities. Section four analyses the impact of refugees on host country and host societies. And in section five we ask ourselves what happens when refugees return to their home community. The sections will be illustrated by case-studies from Uganda, Rwanda/Congo, Kenya, Tanzania and Burundi. In the final section we draw policy conclusions. The paper is nurtured by the literature on the economics of refugee situations in general, and in sections four and five in particular by the own academic work of the authors on refugee situations in Central/East Africa.

## **2. Forced Displacement in Key Figures**


### **2.1. Recent Trends into Perspectives**

So-called forced migrants or displaced people cover a wide range of realities, going from those moving to protect themselves against violence or political repression, those targeted by government-sponsored resettlement programs or those displaced due to natural disasters or changes in weather patterns. Mingling all these categories together would give a distorted view on this complex reality. Even the term ‘forced’ may be misleading. People who decide to leave their home due e.g. to the occurrence of war or of natural disasters make important decisions whether to move, but also when, where, how and with whom to move (Turton, 2006). Refugees are defined as “individuals recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute, individuals granted complementary forms of protection, and those enjoying temporary protection (UNHCR 2014).” Internally Displaced People are defined as “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border.” (UNHCR 2014: 39). In this paper, we focus on those who are recognized as, namely refugees and internally displaced people as a result of armed conflicts or situations of generalized violence.

The share of refugees originating from SSA has remained relatively stable over the last two decades, at a stock of approximately 3 million to 3.5 million refugees. It represents about 30 percent of the total number of refugees in the world. A large increase occurred in 1993 and 1994, resulting from political instability in the Great Lakes region (Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, see Prunier 2009). Since then, the number of refugees broadly decreased, in particular during the 2000s. As illustrated in Figure 1, a more worrying trend over the more recent years is the rise in the number of refugees from SSA both in absolute and relative terms (despite the large increase in the Middle east and North Africa region due to the fall of authoritarian regimes and the resulting regime transitions). The number of refugees increased from about 2.7 million in 2008 to about 3.7 million in 2013. The corresponding share increased from 25

to 32 percent (see Table A1 in appendix). The total number of internally displaced people (IDP) outnumbers the stock of refugees in SSA and in the world but overall has followed a similar trend compared to the number of refugees (by country of origin).<sup>1</sup> Major civil wars in Central Africa mainly explained the peak in 1993 and 1994 and the increase at the end of the 1990s.

**Figure 1. Refugee population by origin, 1990-2013**




Note: Authors' aggregation based on UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014. Data from 2007 to 2013 include people in refugee-like situations. Persons in refugee-like situations include "groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to refugees but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained" (UNHCR 2014: 39).

Refugees in Africa seem to have mainly remained in Africa. Although SSA also hosts refugees from other regions, the closeness of the 'blue' and 'red' lines in Figure 2 -representing the number of refugees originating from and hosted in SSA - is an indication that most refugees cross borders within Africa. A majority of flows outside SSA is certainly going either to North Africa or to the Middle East, or the reverse. The lack of systematic bilateral data for refugees between countries in Sub-Saharan countries limits our ability to understand the nature of the flows within SSA. However, the fact the two lines closely match each other at least until 2005 in Figure 2 indicates that most refugees from SSA remain in Africa. That is not very surprising given that most refugees are known to be hosted in developing countries and in neighboring countries. As pointed by the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees

<sup>1</sup> Based on Table A1, no interpretation can be given to the changes in the number of UNHCR-assisted IDPs before and after 2007. Many changes in classification make the aggregated numbers difficult to compare overtime. The rise observed in Figure 2 is likely to be due to the increased awareness from UNHCR of the importance of IDPs.

(UNHCR, 2014), developing countries hosted 10.1 million refugees or 86 percent of the world's refugees. Contrary to what has been sometimes claimed in popular media, refugees are not “invading” the higher-income countries. Actually, SSA has been hosting more refugees than sending them since 1990. The divergence of trends occurring in 2005 is certainly related to large inflows of refugees from North Africa and the Middle East. The second peak in 2011 corresponds to the uprisings that spread across several Arab countries (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen), and the recent one in 2013 to the large outflows of refugees from Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

**Figure 2. Refugees and Internally Displaced People in SSA, 1990-2013**




Note: Refugee data are from the UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014. Refugee data from 2007 to 2013 include people in refugee-like situations (see note, Figure 1). Due to changes in classification and estimation methodology in a number of countries, 2007 figures are not fully comparable with pre-2007 figures (see also footnote 1).

Gathering data on internally displaced people is much more challenging since most existing data on IDPs are incomplete or unreliable. We only found reliable approximations from the International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) between 2003 and 2013. According to IDMC, there were about 12.5 million internally displaced people in SSA at the end of 2013 (IDMC 2014), more than one third of the total number of IDPs and more than tripling the number of refugees in SSA. Although the number of IDPs in SSA is the highest since 2007, the share of IDPs in SSA has been decreasing from 53% in 2003.

Before 2003 (even up to 2008), the number of IDPs in SSA data can be aggregated based on Center for Systematic Peace (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/>). While variations in the number of IDPs in SSA seems to follow largely the number of refugees originating from SSA countries (see Figure A1), the total number of IDPs varies widely depending on the source used. Data at the country level remain also too limited to allow for identifying clear geographical patterns that would emerge overtime. Data provided by UNHCR should also be handled with care since they only constitute a share of the total number of IDPs and the rise observed overtime in Figure 3 is at least partly driven by the increased involvement of UNHCR in providing protection and support towards these vulnerable groups. As can be seen from Figure 3, the UNHCR-assisted IDP represents only a share (though increasing) of the total number of IDPs, going from about 10% in 2003 to about 70% in 2011 (about 60% in 2013). Beyond calling for more systematic and disaggregated data collection on IDPs, such a data overview suggests that at least over the recent years, the number of IDPs in SSA outnumbers the number of refugees by a factor of 3 to 4. The vulnerability of the Internally Displaced People in SSA has certainly been overlooked for too long, but the increased support provided by UNHCR is an encouraging but challenging sign in that respect.

**Figure 3. Refugees and Internally Displaced People in SSA, 2003-2013**



Source: Note: Refugee data are from the UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014. Refugee data from 2007 to 2013 include people in refugee-like situations (see note, Figure 1). The annual number of IDPs is collected from the IDMC (2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) annual reviews.




## 2.2. Hotspots in Sub-Saharan Africa

Within Sub-Saharan Africa, conflicts in Central Africa and the Great Lakes and in particular the Rwandan genocide caused the number of refugees to peak in 1994. Since then, the number of refugees originating from that region has stabilized at around 1 million people, about half of them escaping violence in the Democratic Republic Congo (Turner 2007, Gambino 2011, Stearns 2011, Maystadt et al. 2014). Since the mid-1990s, Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa are the main source of refugees and are driving the increase over the recent years. The Greater Horn of Africa has been the center of increased violence intensity, potentially fueled by extreme weather shocks, in Somalia (Maystadt and Ecker 2014, O'Loughlin et al. 2012), as well as in North and South Sudan (Maystadt et al. 2015). Precise and systematic data per country are missing for IDPs. For instance, it was only in the latest IDMC annual overview (IDMC 2014) that the number of 3,300,000 IDPs was reported to be produced by the Nigerian government. Nonetheless, the IDP hotspots in SSA follow similar patterns compared to the refugee-source countries. At the end of 2013, IDMC (2014) reported four countries with more than one million IDPs, the Democratic Republic of Congo (2,963,700), Nigeria (3,300,000), North Sudan (2,426,700), and Somalia (1,000,000). Ten years earlier, DRC and Sudan had 3,000,000 and 4,000,000 IDPs, respectively. Since then, they had the unfortunate record to host the largest number of IDPs in SSA. Countries like Uganda, Liberia, and the Central African Republic also accounted as those countries regularly reporting relatively high numbers of IDPs.

On a more positive note, the number of refugees from Southern and Western Africa has strongly decreased, since conflicts occurring in Angola (Ziemke 2012), Sierra Leone (Richard 1996), Liberia (Nero 2008) and Mozambique (Bruck 2001) at the beginning of the 1990s have been settled or have significantly decreased in intensity. Such a trend is also observed for the number of IDPs.

**Figure 4. Refugee population by origin in SSA, 1990-2013**



Note: Authors' aggregation based on UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014.

**Table 1. Hotspots in SSA: Major source countries**

<b>Top 10 by origin, based on 1990</b>				
<b>Origin</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2013</b>
Mozambique	1,247,992	30	131	56
Liberia	735,689	266,930	70,129	17,576
Sudan	523,998	494,363	387,288	649,331
Somalia	470,174	475,655	770,154	1,121,738
Angola	407,760	433,760	134,858	10,297
Rwanda	361,322	119,056	115,524	83,937
Burundi	191,622	568,084	84,064	72,652
Chad	184,806	54,962	53,733	48,644
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	67,423	371,713	476,693	499,541
Senegal	60,006	11,088	16,267	19,884
<b>Top 10 by origin, based on 2013</b>				
<b>Origin</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2013</b>
Somalia	470,174	475,655	770,154	1,121,738
Sudan	523,998	494,363	387,288	649,331
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	67,423	371,713	476,693	499,541
Eritrea	43	376,851	222,460	308,022
Central African Rep.	100	139	164,905	252,865
Mali	1	364	3,663	152,864
South Sudan				114,467
Côte d'Ivoire	2	773	41,758	85,729
Rwanda	361,322	119,056	115,524	83,937
Burundi	191,622	568,084	84,064	72,652

Note: Authors' aggregation based on UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014.

The importance of Eastern Africa and in particular the Horn of Africa is further exemplified when looking at the countries that recorded the largest refugee outflows (Table 1). In 2013, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea accounted for about one third (close to one million) of the total number of refugees from SSA. They were the sources of the highest numbers of refugees in 2013, together with the Democratic Republic of Congo (499,541), the Central African Republic (252,865) or Mali (152,862). On the contrary the number of refugees have decreased sharply in Southern Africa (namely from Angola, Mozambique) and Western Africa (namely from Angola, Senegal, Sierra Leone).

The rise of Eastern Africa as a main hotspot in terms of origin contrasts very much with the situation prevailing 20 years ago. In 1990, Sudan (including present South Sudan) and Somalia were hosting a decent share of refugees (about 1.8 million, see Table 2). This shift is worrisome and followed the increased vulnerability to weather shocks and the related (and unrelated) rise of violence observed in the Horn of Africa (O'Loughlin et al. 2012, Maystadt and Ecker 2014; Maystadt et al. 2015). That said, Ethiopia and Kenya remain among the countries hosting the largest number of refugees between 1990 and 2013. Almost one million refugees were hosted in these countries in 2013. Although the flows are not necessarily corresponding (refugees from Sudan and Somalia also fled to Chad and South Sudan), the equivalent outflows from Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea point again to the regional nature of the refugees flows. Similar regional patterns are observed in other parts of SSA. In Central Africa, the Republic of Tanzania has also been a refugee hub, hosting between 883,250 refugees in 1994 (mainly from Burundi and Rwanda) and 102,099 refugees in 2013 (mainly from Burundi, DRC, and to a lesser extent, Somalia). Again, most refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo moved to neighboring countries (on the Eastern side), like e.g. Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania or Uganda. In Western Africa, most Malian refugees recently moved to Mauritania (31,400), Burkina Faso (15,700) and Niger (11,000).

**Table 2. Major host countries in SSA**

<b>Top 10 by asylum, based on 1990</b>				
	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2013</b>
Sudan*	1,031,050	414,928	178,308	159,857
Malawi	926,725	3,900	5,740	5,796
Ethiopia	773,764	197,959	154,295	433,936
Somalia	460,000	558	1,937	2,425
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	416,435	332,509	166,336	113,362
Guinea	325,000	427,206	14,113	8,560
Côte d'Ivoire	272,281	120,691	26,218	2,980
Burundi				

	268,403	27,136	29,365	45,490
United Rep. of Tanzania	265,184	680,862	109,286	102,099
Zimbabwe	190,950	4,127	4,435	6,389

Top 10 by asylum, based on 2013				
	1990	2000	2010	2013
Kenya	14,249	206,106	402,905	534,938
Chad		17,692	347,939	434,479
Ethiopia	773,764	197,959	154,295	433,936
Uganda	145,718	236,622	135,801	220,555
Sudan*	1,031,050	414,928	178,308	159,857
Cameroon	49,876	43,680	104,275	114,753
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	416,435	332,509	166,336	113,362
United Rep. of Tanzania	265,184	680,862	109,286	102,099
Mauritania	60,000	350	26,717	92,767
Rwanda	23,601	28,398	55,398	73,349

Note: Authors' aggregation based on UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014.\* denotes that the data on Sudan would be inflated (e.g. 35,529 in 2013) if people in refugee-like situations were included in the figures (see notes, Figure 1).

Naturally, the ranking of the countries hosting most refugees is a bit distorted since refugees are more likely to flee to neighboring countries. Large (and for most, landlocked) countries, like e.g. the Republic Democratic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan are likely to share borders with more conflict-prone countries and to host many refugees, while being themselves affected by social unrest and be a source of a fair amount of refugees. As can be seen from Table 3, a different pattern may be obtained while weighting such figures by either the size or the population of the hosting countries. That is particularly the case when weighting by the size for countries like DRC, or Tanzania. On the contrary, smaller countries like Burundi, Rwanda, or Djibouti ranked at the top in terms of number of refugees hosted per inhabitant.

**Table 3. Weighted ranking of host countries in SSA (top 20 in SSA)**

Number of refugees, 2013		Refugees to 1,000 inhabitants		Refugees to 1,000 km <sup>2</sup>	
Kenya	534,938	Chad	33.88	Rwanda	2,897.11
Chad	434,479	Djibouti	22.93	Burundi	1,680.58
Ethiopia	433,936	South Sudan	20.32	Djibouti	919.76
South Sudan	229,587	Liberia	12.40	Kenya	914.79
Uganda	220,555	Kenya	12.06	Uganda	910.04
Sudan	159,857	Congo, Rep. of	11.47	Gambia	882.36
Cameroon	114,753	Rwanda	6.23	Liberia	553.04
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	113,362	Uganda	5.87	Ethiopia	383.53
United Rep. of Tanzania	102,099	Gambia	5.17	Togo	359.88
Rwanda	73,349	Cameroon	5.16	South Sudan	355.23
South Africa	65,881	Guinea-Bissau	5.01	Chad	340.92
Niger	57,661	Ethiopia	4.61	Guinea-Bissau	250.24
Liberia	53,253	Burundi	4.48	Cameroon	245.04
Congo	51,037	Sudan	4.21	Congo, Rep. of	148.69
Burundi	45,490	Niger	3.23	United Rep. of Tanzania	107.95
Burkina Faso	29,234	Central African Rep.	3.10	Burkina Faso	106.02
Angola	23,783	Togo	3.02	Sudan	84.76
Zambia	23,594	United Rep. of Tanzania	2.07	Ghana	77.91
Togo	20,613	Burkina Faso	1.73	Senegal	72.14
Djibouti	20,015	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	1.68	South Africa	53.91

Source: Authors' presentation based on UNHCR (2014). We drop countries with a number of refugees lower than 100 like Madagascar (12), Lesotho (30), Cape Verde (-), Comoros (-), Equatorial Guinea (-), Mauritius (-), Sao Tome and Principe (-). A dash (-) means that the value is zero or not available (UNHCR 2014).

### **2.3. The Challenges of Protracted Refugee Situations in Sub-Saharan Africa**

At the global level, about 54% (i.e. about 6.3 million) refugees were in protracted refugee situation by the end of 2013 (UNHCR 2014).<sup>2</sup> As reported by Kreibaum (2016), the number of protracted refugee situations has increased from 22 in 1990 to 30 in 2008. These protracted situations in Africa have been characterized by Crisp (2003) as in most of the cases: i) peripherally located with poor security, unfavorable climatic conditions, and economical and political marginalized; ii) concentrating people with special needs like e.g. children and women (see Section 3); and iii) lacking basic human rights, including those covered by the provision of the 1951 refugee convention.


Another distinct feature of refugees in SSA is that they are mostly hosted in organized camps. While in developing countries around one third of refugees are hosted in camps, the share raises to about 40 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 5).<sup>3</sup> The percentage of 76 percent in Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa stresses again the pressing situation in this part of the world. While camps have been recognized as posing serious challenges (Jacobsen and Crisp 1998), it is quite striking to observe that this organizational feature is not as spread in other regions of the world as in SSA. At best, only 28, 25 and 15 percent refugees are hosted in planned/managed camps in Asia, Americas, and the MENA region, respectively. Such figures are based on the most recent year available (2013) and may change significantly following the large inflows of Syrian refugees into Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey. Nonetheless, the differences are sufficiently striking to believe that this is a distinct feature of refugee hosting in SSA.

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<sup>2</sup> UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as “one in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country” (2012: 23).

<sup>3</sup> The figures are based on refugees (including those in refugee-like situation). Persons in refugee-like situations include “groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of origin and who face protection risks similar to refugees but for whom refugee status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained” (UNHCR 2014: 39). The number of refugees and people in refugee-like situation for which demographic data is available does not necessarily equal the total number of refugees. However, for SSA, there is little difference between the two. We also restrict the number of refugees to those whose accommodation is known by the UNHCR (approximately 19% in the world and 8% for SSA).

**Figure 5. Share of refugees hosted in camps, 2013**



Source: Authors' presentation based on UNHCR Global Trends 2013 (UNHCR 2014).


In summary, investigating the recent trends in forced displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa points to the regional nature of this displacement, emphasizing the unfortunate increase in refugee movements in Eastern Africa over the most recent years. Such regional emphasis also takes some distance from the widespread view that refugees are mainly moving to Europe or other developed countries. In 2013, about 3.7 million refugees originated from SSA but about 5.6 million were hosted there. Most refugees from SSA remain in Africa. Refugees are mainly hosted in camps in peripheral and poor areas. The next sections will explore how refugees and hosting communities are affected by such forced displacement.

### 3. Refugees as Agents of Their Own Destiny

#### 3.1 The Composition of Africa's Refugee Population and Its Consequences

One of the first elements that catch the eye in Figure 6 is the difference in the composition of the refugee population in Africa compared to the rest of the world. The share of children and women among refugees is higher in Africa than elsewhere, in particular East and West Africa stand out here. This is, at least partly, a consequence of Africa's younger, general population, but other forces could be at work as well, e.g. higher mortality of adult males in Africa or adult males staying behind or being separated from the rest of the household. It does mean however that, relative to other areas, more attention should be going to the needs and capacities of women and children in Africa. This means, for example, adaption of and increased supply of schooling and health services.

**Figure 6. The composition of refugees by age and gender, 2013**



Source: Note: UNHCR statistics (UNHCR 2014). Asia excludes Australia, Japan and New Zealand. Americas exclude Canada and the United States. These percentages have been calculated by country when demographic data are available for at least 30% of the total. With a higher threshold of 50% (below which UNHCR suspect the data would not be nationally representative), the shares would be identical with two exceptions: The share of female refugees would increase from 41 to 43 percent in Asia (basically including figures available at 47% from India) and from 39 to 43% for the Americas (including figures available at 44% for Ecuador).

As Verwimp and Van Bavel (2005) report, the immediate or short-term effects of forced displacement and camp residence are well-studied. Analysis of the health situation of displaced populations indicates excess mortality, especially among children under age five (Médecins Sans Frontières - MSF, 2003). In a survey held among former UNITA members (900 households, 6,599 family members) in refugee camps, MSF found malnutrition, fever or malaria, and war or violence as the three most frequently reported



causes of death. The Danish Epidemiology Science Centre (1999) found severe malnutrition and high mortality in a survey of 422 refugee children in Guinea-Bissau. They report higher malnutrition and higher mortality for children living in a non-camp setting, compared to children living in a camp. The Goma epidemiology group (1995) found high prevalence of child mortality as well as acute malnutrition among children in refugee camps in Eastern Zaire, especially in female headed households. The magnitude of the difference between 'normal' mortality in the country under study, in the absence of conflict and the mortality in a refugee camp, depends on several parameters: the health infrastructure in the country as well as in the camp, the food available to camp and non-camp residents, the frequency of visits by nurses or doctors, the intensity of the conflict (e.g. attacks on camps), and so on. Thus, the results are highly dependent on the context. For example, Singh et al (2005) do not find a difference in under 5 mortality among refugee versus non-refugee households in western Uganda and South Sudan, whereas Verwimp and Van Bavel (2005) find higher child mortality and fertility among Rwanda refugees in Congo versus Rwandan women who did not become a refugee. When general living conditions in one's residence or home area are worse compared to a camp environment, e.g. because health services are available in the latter, mortality may also be lower in the camp.

The strong presence of children in Africa's refugee population implies that we should also look at the potential long-term effects of forced displacement on survivors. Given the composition of the refugee population, such long-term effects will be more important in Africa compared to elsewhere. Few studies have followed children exposed to forced displacement over a long time to directly infer the long-term effects of forced displacement, in particular on health, education and labor market participation. Most studies of the long term effects of conflict use an indicator of exposure to violent conflict, but few of them have forced displacement as one of the indicators. There is however a very well established literature (see Currie and Vogl, 2013 for an overview) on the long-term consequences of deprivation in early childhood which can be applied to the situation of refugees. If young children between the ages of 0 to 3 years old are exposed to malnutrition, disease, stress and violence during episodes of forced displacement, then, this literature shows that this deprivation will have negative long-term effects. The literature is particularly large for Sub-Saharan Africa, with solid evidence from countries as diverse as Burundi (Bundervoet et al. 2009), Cote d'Ivoire (Minoiu and Shemyakina 2012), Eritrea (Akresh et al. 2012b), Nigeria (Akresh et al. 2012a), Rwanda (Akresh et al. 2011), Uganda (Blattman and Annan (2010) and Zimbabwe (Alderman et al. 2006).

In effect, forced displacement is one of the channels through which violent conflict exercises its impact on the civil population. Verwimp and Van Bavel (2013) demonstrate that forced displacement reduces the probability to finish primary schooling in Burundi. These authors find that the frequency of forced displacement and the length of stay in a displacement camp matter for school completion. Being uprooted from one's village because of ongoing or imminent violence proves to be disruptive for one's school career to the extent that it decreases the probability to complete primary schooling, in particular in the event of several disruptions, when it happens several times. The magnitude of the effect of the length of stay in a displacement camp is smaller than the occurrence of disruption, but remains statistically significantly different from zero. The coefficient of the interaction between gender and forced displacement is positive and statistically significant, meaning that displacement reduces the

gender-gap in school completion. When they test the effect of the three channels of violence (exposure to battles, forced displacement and duration of stay in a camp), all three exercise a negative and statistically significant effect on the completion of primary schooling. The probability to complete primary schooling declines by 8 percentage points as a result of exposure to conflict in its province of residence, with 6 percentage points for every instance of forced displacement and with 2 percentage points per year spent in a displacement camp. Importantly, the interaction effects of the alternative conflict measures with gender aggravate the completion chances for girls from poor households. Thus, these measures show that the displacement channel through which the conflict operates affects girls from poor and non-poor households differently: displacement reduces the gender-gap for the latter but widens it for the former.

### **3.2 Refugees Are Economically (Very) Active**

The day-to-day life of many refugees is very different from the images of humanitarian assistance that all of us watch on television. The latter is in fact only an accurate depiction of refugee-life when a crisis or emergency is ongoing, as in cases of a large or sudden influx of refugees in make-shift camps close to a border. Once the emergency phase is over, most refugees cannot or do not want to return home for an extended period of time. Inevitably, but also luckily they become part of the local economy, to the extent that host country and donor agency regulations allow it. According to Betts et al. (2013) agencies, researchers and policy makers have not adequately captured the nature of the economic activities displayed by refugees. And, as a result, agencies and policy makers have failed to tap in to the economic potential of refugees.

In effect, many refugees have entrepreneurial skills, entertain active trading networks, act as brokers between refugees and the economic operators in the country of origin, set up systems to receive transfers from family members and so on. Betts et al. (2013) document such entrepreneurial activity and refugee networks in Uganda among Congolese, Rwandese, Somali and South-Sudanese refugees, even to the extent to speak of real 'refugee economies', a term coined by Betts et al.

Ronny, a Ugandan crop wholesale trader in Hoima who spoke with the Oxford team about his business, and the dense interactions he frequently observes (in Kyangwali) between Ugandan buyers and refugee farmers, says that

*"Since 1998, I have been buying crops from Kyangwali settlement. During the harvest season, I visit Kyangwali frequently...Last year, I think I bought 500 tons of maize and beans from Kyangwali...I re-sell these crops to many people. Inside Uganda, I sell to traders in Kampala, Arua, Gulu, and Nebbi...Outside Uganda, I sell maize to traders in Tanzania and South Sudan. I have 20 regular customers in Tanzania and 10 in South Sudan...My main trading crop is maize and 60% of my maize stock is from Kyangwali. In Hoima, there are many traders who buy crops from refugees like me."*

Next to trade, Uganda businesses also employ refugees and visa-versa, refugee businesses employ Ugandans. The finding that refugees actually create jobs runs counter to popular image, but makes clear that, at least in this setting, they contribute to and create economic activity, rather than being aid-dependent.

Revealingly, in Betts et al.'s (2013) survey of refugees in Uganda, 96% of all interviewed households in the capital and 70% outside the capital said they owned and used a mobile phone. They use this mobile phone to communicate with customers and suppliers, to get market information and to transfer money. Half of the urban refugees and 11% of rural refugees also have access to the Internet.

#### 4. Refugees As a Burden?

As pointed in Section 2, most refugees in SSA are hosted in neighboring countries. Most of these hosting countries are likely among the least developed countries. It has been argued that these refugees may constitute an additional burden in terms of economic development in hosting countries (Mabiso et al. 2014). UNHCR (2014: 17) implicitly recognizes that potential burden by suggesting that the ratio of the size of the country's hosted refugee population to its average income level can provide a proxy measure of the burden of hosting refugees. SSA counts 13 out of the 20 countries hosting the larger number of refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) in the world.<sup>4</sup> While such figures stress that SSA hosts a fair share of the refugees in the world and underline that refugee flows are mainly a South-South phenomenon, we shed doubt on this view of refugees described as a burden. We even argue in Section 6 that such representation is not conducive to the right policy framework in refugee-hosting areas.

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<sup>4</sup> The other major host countries per USD GDP are all developing countries, with Pakistan (1<sup>st</sup>), Jordan (8<sup>th</sup>), Bangladesh (9<sup>th</sup>), Yemen (10<sup>th</sup>), Iran (14<sup>th</sup>), Lebanon (17<sup>th</sup>), and India (20<sup>th</sup>). Figure A2 provides the top 10 ranking in the world. At a global level, we should note that in 2013 "the 40 countries with the largest number of refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per capita were all members of developing regions, and included 22 Least Developed Countries" (UNHCR 2014: 17). It should be noted that the way UNHCR computes that "potential burden" gives more weight to countries with very large population since  $Burden = \frac{Refugees}{GDP}$  is equivalent to

$$Burden = \frac{Refugees \cdot Pop}{GDP}$$

**Table 4 : Major refugee-hosting countries in SSA, 2013**


Total refugees		Refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP per capita)		Rank in the world (per 1 USD (PPP)
Kenya	534,938	Ethiopia	336.36	2
Chad	434,479	Kenya	295.11	3
Ethiopia	433,936	Chad	199.01	4
South Sudan	229,587	South Sudan	176.43	5
Uganda	220,555	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	153.38	6
Sudan	159,857	Uganda	151.80	7
Cameroon	114,753	Burundi	79.71	11
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	113,362	Liberia	78.85	12
United Rep. of Tanzania	102,099	Niger	74.51	13
Rwanda	73,349	Sudan	67.06	15
South Africa	65,881	United Rep. of Tanzania	63.33	16
Niger	57,661	Rwanda	52.67	18
Liberia	53,253	Cameroon	47.91	19
Congo	51,037	Central African Rep.	26.44	28
Burundi	45,490	Togo	18.99	29
Burkina Faso	29,234	Burkina Faso	18.61	30
Angola	23,783	Zambia	13.45	34
Zambia	23,594	Mali	11.78	37
Togo	20,613	Congo, Rep. of	11.35	38

Source: Authors' presentation based on UNHCR Global Trends 2013 (UNHCR 2014).

#### 4.1. Refugees and Hosts' Poverty: A Misleading Correlation

There is a clear and positive correlation between the number of refugees hosted in a country and its level of poverty. In Panel A of Figure 7, we plot the number of refugees and the percentage of people living below \$2 a day in developing countries between 1960 and 2008. Well, there is a clear and positive correlation between hosting refugees and poverty. The regression-equivalent correlation would show that doubling the number of refugees is associated with an increase by 3.2 percent in poverty in the hosting country. However, that only constitutes a broad correlation that may be explained by many omitted factors such as for example, the proximity to conflict-prone countries or the common changes in statistical capacity of UNHCR to record new refugees (rather than capturing a causal relationship). In other words, the fact refugees are hosted in poor countries is simply an artefact of refugees moving mainly to neighboring (poor) countries, not necessarily that refugees constitute a burden. Panel B of Figure 7 goes further in showing that such correlation almost disappears as soon as country fixed heterogeneity and common time changes are taken into account. In econometric terms, as soon as country and time fixed effects are included, the correlation is reduced by a factor of 3, becoming not significantly different from zero with 99 percent level of confidence. As underlined by Mabiso et al. (2014) in their analysis on the relationship between refugee hosting and food insecurity, it is difficult to know whether such a weakening of correlation is due to a lack of systematic evidence of the impact of refugees on hosting countries or the result of an aggregation problem. But in any case, it certainly sheds light on the limits of simple cross-country comparisons in revealing anything meaningful on the potential effects of refugees on the hosting communities.

**Figure 7: Correlation between hosting refugees and poverty, 1960-2008**



Note: Poverty is defined as the percent of the population living with less than \$2 a day (World Development Indicators database). The annual number of refugees in each country is given by the Center for Systematic Peace (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/>).

## **4.2. Lessons from Case Studies in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda**

Given the limits of cross-country comparisons, we present below three short case studies on the impact of protracted refugee situations on hosting communities. These case studies were not chosen based on a systematic review but they are sufficiently close to each other to allow for comparative learning. These case studies are also those emerging from a growing literature on the quantitative assessment of the impact of refugees on hosting communities (Mabiso et al. 2014).

### **Case Study #1: The protracted refugee situations in Tanzania**

Tanzania has been known as a refugee-hosting country for long due to its peaceful history and its location surrounded by conflict-affected countries (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Mozambique). The first president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, welcomed most of refugees as a sign of pan-African solidarity in the post-independence periods from many African nations. For example, in 1972, refugees fled from Burundi and were directed towards, what is called now, the “old settlements”. The Tanzanian policy with respect to refugees radically changed in the 1990s when more than one million refugees from Burundi (1993), Rwanda (1994) and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997-1998) moved to Western Tanzania, i.e. in the regions of Kagera and Kigoma. As documented by Rutinwa (2002), regulation moved from an “open-door” policy promoting local integration to a “no more refugees” policy promoting repatriation in the country of origin. In addition to the lack of mobility outside of refugee camps, that shift in policy translated into more restrictions on the integration of refugees into their hosting communities and the declared intention to favor repatriation. The most obvious consequence of that policy change is the forced return of about 600,000 refugees to Rwanda in 1996. The number of refugees from Burundi strongly decreased in 2000 to reach a number of about 70,000 refugees in 2004.

Reviewing the literature and based on fieldwork semi-structured interviews, Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) summarize the main reported impacts through the labor and good markets, the health sector, the change in infrastructure (mainly road networks) as well as the reported environmental degradation and security concerns. The most often heralded concern about refugees is the spread of disease. Consequently, Baez (2011) studied the impact of the Rwandese refugees on children’s height. He finds adverse impacts over one year after the refugee inflows on children’s height, together with the incidence of infectious diseases and under-five mortality. Mabiso et al. (2014) extend this analysis to several years after refugees repatriated. They do not find evidence of long-lasting impacts. This result hypothesizes the existence of catch-up processes among children within puberty. The health consequences seem to be rather short-lived at the times of the refugee presence. The limited impact on health outcomes is also in line with qualitative evidence reporting health services to have improved following the refugee inflows in Tanzania (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014).

Berry (2008) also report environmental damages due to accelerated deforestation and the depletion of soil nutrient availability for agricultural crops. That was particularly the case in the region of Karagwe that hosted refugees from Rwanda. Since then, increased awareness has led aid agencies to implement programs to reduce the environmental damages around other refugee camps (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014). Over the years following the refugee inflows from Burundi and Rwanda, increased insecurity was reported in the refugee-hosting areas. Whether refugees are directly involved in such increase in violence is debatable (Jacobsen 2000, Rutinwa and Kamanga 2003) but it is hardly deniable that the inflows of refugees went along the cross-border spread of weapons and an increase in crime (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014).

According to Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) and Maystadt and Duranton (2014), more persistent impact is to be expected from the economic transformation in the hosting economies. Comparing the change in household socio-economic outcomes before and after the refugees arrive from Burundi and Rwanda in the region of Kagera, Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) use econometric methods and find an aggregate positive impact on the local economy but with significant distributional effects (depending on the initial occupation of the households). Their results show that doubling the presence of refugees would increase real consumption per adult equivalent by about 8 percent. The aggregated impact can certainly be explained by the increased market size due to the increased demand from international workers, Tanzanian migrants attracted by new job opportunities provided by the humanitarian actors, and by the refugees that exchange a significant share of what they freely receive (mainly maize) outside of the camps to diversify their diet (estimated between 75% by Whitaker 1999 and 20% by the World Food Program and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 1998). The significant increase in local market size provided market access and opportunities for farmers to liquidate their surplus. Such a surge in demand was further met by an increase in production through the use of refugees as cheap labor and land expansion. Naturally, the impact is not necessarily evenly distributed among the local hosts. That is seminally stated by Chambers (1986: 245) in his qualitative analysis: “In rural refugee-affected areas, the better-off and more visible hosts usually gain from the presence of refugees and from refugee programs. In contrast, the poorer among the hosts can be hidden losers ... The poorer hosts can lose from competition for food, work, wages, services and common property resources”. Such statement from 1986 strongly anticipates some of the findings on the impact of refugees in the 1990s on the hosting population in Western Tanzania. Whitaker (2002: 355) provides qualitative evidence that “hosts who already had access to resources, education or power, were better poised to exploit the positive opportunities of the refugee situation. Meanwhile, hosts who were disadvantaged in the local socio-economic structure struggled to maintain access to even the most basic resources and thus became more marginalized.” Maystadt and Verwimp (2014) quantify this distributional effect by showing that despite a positive aggregated impact, agricultural workers benefited the least given fiercer competition on the labor markets and surge in food prices. Despite the reported business boom around the refugee camps (Whitaker 1999, Maystadt and Verwimp 2014), they also indicate that existing petty businesses were driving out of the market due to fiercer competition following the entry of larger-scale entrepreneurs coming from other regions. Alix-Garcia et al. (2012) also point to such dynamics in the nonfarm sector. While in the short-run, the negative consequences in terms of health damages (Baez 2011) and in terms of surge in food prices (Alix-Garcia and Saah 2010) are likely to constitute major

sources of concerns. Overtime, local producers have adjusted to increase land expansion and food production. As a result, agricultural production was reported to have doubled close to refugee camps (Maystadt and Verwimp 2014). Maystadt and Duranton (2014) even found that refugee-hosting population may benefit from the refugee presence more than 10 years after most refugees left. They attribute that long-term increase in welfare among the hosting population to road investment, initially made to serve refugee camps.

Despite the positive impact of refugees on the hosting economy, repatriation was largely favored in Tanzania during the 1990s. Only the remaining Burundi refugees (about 50,000) were resettled in other camps from the regions of Kagera to Kigoma in 2009 when the last camp (Lukole in Ngara district) was closed in the region of Kagera. The consequences of the forced repatriation of Rwanda refugees illustrate the problems induced when the transition is badly prepared. The resulting market contraction and the abandonment of the humanitarian sector even created some form of resentment against the international aid agencies among the local population in the district of Karagwe, given the legitimate feeling that local people had been given up by aid as soon as refugees repatriated to Rwanda. At least, at the time of the closure of the last camp in the region of Kagera, the aid workers from UNHCR and other organizations were aware of the challenge of the transition for the hosting population and seeks to coordinate with development actors such as the United National Development Programs or local NGOs to support the hosting population in the district of Ngara. Nevertheless, the limited resources remained a major constraint on that effort and sheds light on the institutional constraints existing to scale up such positive efforts of coordination.

### **Case Study #2: The protracted refugee situations in Kenya**

Dealing with refugees remains a relatively novel phenomenon in Kenya. It was not until the early 1990s that Kenya witnessed massive refugee influxes from Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia (Banki 2004). Prior to that period however, Kenya had a reputation for having generous refugee policies, which allowed the successful integration of a number of refugees from Mozambique, Uganda and Rwanda (Banki 2004). However, with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of new refugees from neighboring countries during the 1990s, the responsibility for the care of the refugees shifted from the Government of Kenya's (GoK) to the international community, leaving the more inclusive policies that were prevailing before 1991. In contrast, the GoK's current refugee policy imposes all refugees to live in camps, inhibiting them to integrate within the host country and significantly restricting their livelihood opportunities outside the camps. As a result, most refugees are almost completely dependent on goods and services distributed by relief organizations within the camp perimeter.

The two most prominent refugee camps in Kenya are the Dadaab complex and the Kakuma camp. The Dadaab refugee complex (which comprises of the Ifo, Dagahaley, Hagadera camps) was erected between October 1991 and June 1992 following a civil war in Somalia that culminated with the fall of the Somali government in 1991. Over the past two decades, the camps have been host to successive waves of refugees from Somalia as a result of various crises. As of 2009, the Dadaab refugee complex hosted approximately 300,000 refugees, while the recent famine and civil conflict in Somalia increased that number to 470,000 refugees, which is far superior to the camps' capacity of 90,000.



The Kakuma refugee camp was established in 1992 in response to the inflow of 23,000 Sudanese refugees (Jamal 2000). The camp is now home to over 100,000 refugees from South Sudan, Burundi, Ethiopia, Somalia, and the DRC (UNHCR, 2012). The ongoing unrest in South Sudan is likely to exacerbate the refugee situation in the upcoming year. Moreover, the restrictions imposed by the government on refugee movement and employment makes the Kakuma population completely dependent on assistance provided by international organizations present on the field (Jamal 2000)

The evidence on the impact of refugees in Kenya is quite limited. However, the Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology (NORDECO 2010) provides a detailed description, backed by sound descriptive statistics, on the impact of Dadaab refugee camps on host communities. Despite the very different structure of the local economy, mainly driven by pastoralist livelihoods, a pattern somewhat similar to the Tanzanian case is observed. According to NORDECO (2010), the aggregated economic impact is positive. It is estimated that about USD 3 million annual income accrues to the host community thanks to livestock and milk sales to the refugee camps. Trade and employment opportunities have also been reported around Dadaab camps in Kenya. The total economic benefits, including through savings on food purchases (including through purchases from refugees), income accruing to local contractors from assignments for the United Nations or Non-Governmental Organizations or support for host communities, “using 2010 as a reference year, are [estimated to be] around USD 14 million annually. On a per capita basis this equates to around 25% of average annual per capita income in North Eastern province”. This estimation corresponds to a back-on-the-envelope approximation but it gives a sense of the major benefits to the local population. Similar to the Tanzanian case, the presence of the Dadaab refugee camps is reported to have improved the provision of local public goods such as the frequency and reach of transport services and the availability of health and social services. NORDECO also observed environmental degradation around the Dadaab camps<sup>5</sup> but spatially restricted in an area of inherently low resource value. It seems that environmental support programs have helped limiting the collection of firewood by refugees and providing alternative fuel sources (Milner and Loescher 2004).

Compared to the Tanzanian case, two main differences emerge. Less emphasis is given to the distributional effect of the refugee inflows on the hosting communities, while less pressure on prices is observed around the Dadaab refugee camps. Both differences may actually be related to the dominance of pastoralist livelihoods. First, on the distributional dimension, NORDECO (2010) did not point to a similar substitution effect between unskilled labor or refugees. In a pastoralist environment, the low-middle-income group and the poor are those primarily engaged in selling their products to refugee camps. Second, contrary to Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010) for Tanzania, “the price of basic commodities such as maize, rice, wheat, sugar and cooking oil is [reported to be] at least 20% lower in camps than in other towns in arid and semi-arid parts of Kenya. The main reasons are the re-sale of WFP [World Food Program] rations, access to free food by locals registered as refugees and illegal imports via Somalia” (NORDECO 2010: 9). Another possible explanation reported by Maystadt and Duranton (2014) in the Tanzanian case, is the importance of transport services in pushing the price of traded goods down. Although focusing more on the urban function of the refugee camps and the social transformation underpinned in the hosting society, Jansen (2011) also reports similar trading activities and wealth

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<sup>5</sup> Nonetheless, such a degradation is acknowledged by NORDECO (2010) to be difficult to distinguish from general trend prevailing the region.

effects around the Kakuma refugee camp. While pointing to potential frictions between the disproportionate support received by refugees and the hosts, he also concludes about the existence of overall benefits in terms of trade and employment opportunities brought by refugees to the local Turkana community, stressing that “most locals believe they would be far worse off without the refugees” (Jansen 2009: 2 ).

Despite the apparent benefits to the local economies, the UNHCR’s involvement in Kenya extends mostly to the resettlement of refugees to a third country and repatriation. In 2011 for instance, close to 8,700 refugee cases were admitted for resettlement in North America and Europe, while only 111 refugees were repatriated voluntarily to mainly Somalia and South Sudan (UNHCR, 2011). Of course, the precarious security conditions in Somalia and South Sudan precludes any attempts for mass voluntary repatriation from the UNHCR. Most, if not all, local integration of refugees occurs outside the framework of international organizations given the policy environment around the camps. Refugees living outside the camps, although still restricted in their movements given their illegal status, are dispersed amongst the local population and can participate in the informal sector (Banki 2004). However, they cannot benefit from legal protection, public services or pursue any activity that requires a legal status (Banki 2004). Somalis and Ethiopians who share a common cultural background and history with Kenyans have generally been successful at integrating with the local population in contrast with the Sudanese (Banki 2004).

### **Case Study #3: Protracted refugee situations in Uganda**

A large number of internally displaced people emerged from the 20-year civil war (1986-2006) between the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA, led by Josef Kony) and the Ugandan government. As a result, more than 1.8 million people (about 6% of the national population) are reported to have been displaced in 2005 (IDMC 2008), resulting in about 220 registered camps by 2006. Many displaced people were hosted in camps (in particular in the Acholi region of Northern Uganda, together with areas in Lira and Katakwi districts) as a means of protecting households from direct attacks from the warring parties (Adelman et al. 2012, Fiala 2009). By 2007, repatriation was voluntary but then, IDPs were encouraged to leave by closing camp or from the pressure from landowners in which IDPs were settled (Bozzoli et al. 2012). By November 2010, more than 90% of the displaced people had returned home, with only 182,000 people still residing in camps or transit sites (IDMC 2010).

Although Uganda was the source of a large number of refugees (about 58,820 refugees in 1990), the country has also hosted a large number of refugees. The number increased from about 145,718 for the same year of 1990 to about 220,555 refugees in 2013. Uganda became the fifth largest refugee-hosting country in SSA. Refugees originated mainly from the Democratic Republic of Congo (172,650 in 2013), Somalia (23,570) and South Sudan (16,980). In their study of the Nakivale and Kyangwali settlements, Betts et al. (2014) stress the economic interdependencies between the local population and the refugees. Local hosts even enter into settlements to make purchases from refugees, while refugees are employed in agricultural activities (growing maize, beans, sorghum, cassava and potatoes), attracting Ugandan middlemen and crop traders into the settlement markets. Refugees also purchase consumption goods such as food, charcoal, candles, stationary, and mobile phone credits, as well as production inputs from local businesses. Their analysis provides evidence that refugees in Uganda do make positive

contributions to the local communities. More than other studies, this analysis points to the transfer of physical and human capital by refugees as an important source of benefits for the local economies.

Interestingly, Kreibaum (2016) provides a more quantitative approach to the issue by assessing the impact of an increase in the presence of Congolese refugees on the hosting population in the Southern and Western parts of Uganda. The results indicate a positive-although small in magnitude- impact on the hosts' welfare (consumption per adult equivalent) but with distributional effects. Those depending on wage income and transfers experienced a deterioration in welfare, suggesting labor substitutability with rural landless workers. That seems to constitute a commonality with the Tanzanian case study. In addition, increase in the provision of private education services are also found, which is consistent with the move to the so-called self-reliance strategy in Uganda (see below). A major contribution of this paper is to contrast these results to the Ugandan households' perceptions in local communities. Conditional on assuming a common trend (that could not be tested with the available data), people are found to perceive their living conditions as having worsened off in areas with a higher number of refugees. These findings on perceptions echo Dryden-Peterson and Hovil's (2003) observation of tensions between the refugees and the local hosts, since Ugandan nationals often perceive refugees as being better off than they are.

Compared to the two other case studies (Kenya and Tanzania), the Ugandan government also hosted refugees in planned settlements but moved in 1999 towards a self-reliance strategy (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003).<sup>6</sup> Such a strategy has meant making small plots available for the refugees to use, but also to integrate the services (education, health, ...) provided to the refugees into regular government structures and policies and in so doing to move "from relief to development" (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003: 8). That may explain some of the results reported above. However, it is still very difficult to distinguish market-based from non-market factors (e.g. Ugandan reforms). Also, the implementation of the self-reliance strategy was not necessarily optimal. As pointed by Kaiser (2006) and Werker (2007), a strategy to promote local integration would require allowing refugees to further interact on the good and the labor markets and relaxing or removing refugee movement restrictions.

#### **4.3. Some Key Findings from Case Studies**

The above case studies point to an emerging body of the literature that seeks to quantify the impact of refugees in protracted situation on the hosting economies (Alix-Garcia and Saah 2010; Baez, 2011; Betts et al. 2014; Maystadt and Verwimp, 2014; Maystadt and Duranton 2014; NORDECO 2010; Kreibaum 2016). Although that literature is still in its infancy, we can seek to draw a few lessons, even if these lessons can also serve as further hypotheses to be tested.

First, the three case studies underline the importance of market mechanisms. Previous literature was very much focused on the health, environmental, and security consequences of hosting refugees. These concerns still rank as first priorities when refugees cross borders. But the understanding of protracted refugee situations requires paying much more attention to the interactions between refugees and their

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<sup>6</sup> As pointed by Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2003), de facto local integration has been a common occurrence, well before 1999.

hosts. In that respect, the impact through the goods and labor markets help to understand the distributional consequences of population shocks. In short, labor substitutes to refugees (e.g. landless or agricultural workers in Tanzania and Uganda) and net food buyers are more likely to suffer from population shocks, at least in the short run. A transition from relief to development, as formulated e.g. by the self-reliance strategy in Uganda, calls for strengthening the coping strategies for the households. That would mean strengthening the asset-based capacity and the human capital endowments of the local hosts and in particular among the poor. Increasing land availability, securing property rights, and fostering agricultural productivity can also help in countervailing food price pressures, more likely to hurt the poor. Too little is also known about the potential benefits of safety-net policies targeted at the poor of the host community.

Second, the importance of local public goods such as roads, education and health services are also illustrated in all three case studies. While road infrastructure has been found to be a catalyst for local economic development, integrating education and health services provided to refugees and local communities should have promising potential. The transition at times of repatriation (or resettlement) has often been difficult in that respect. Improving health and education services in hosting communities would also help to close the gap between negative perceptions and positive outcome changes, revealed in some of our case studies. In that respect, too little research has been proposed to understand how social constructs such as mistrust or tensions have been altered by large population shocks.

Third, with the exception of the Ugandan case study, repatriation is often the preferred policy option for governments. Well, clear evaluations of the costs and benefits of repatriation compared to local integration (and resettlement) would help policy-makers to guide their action. It should go hand-in-hand with the above desire to objectivize the local hosts' perceptions. In terms of policy, too little is known about the efficiency of particular interventions to promote successful local integration. For instance, Mabiso et al. (2014) document the knowledge gap with respect to interventions such as conditional or unconditional cash, voucher, or food transfers, or their combination, in protracted refugee situations.


## **5. Upon Return to the Home Country**

### **5.1. Shall We Return?**

No matter how long a refugee crisis or situation, and indeed some of them last several decades, refugees or their offspring often express a desire to return to their home country. In the case of off-spring this can even be when they have never lived in the country of origin of their parents. Objective as well as subjective reasons can contribute to their willingness to return. Among the 'objective' reasons we qualify (i) the uncertainty of the status of refugee: some countries never award full rights of citizenship to refugees or can take these rights away on an arbitrary basis. That uncertainty results in the inability of refugees to own property, to make long-term investments and more in general plan their economic future. One of the consequences of such policies is the continued dependence on aid of refugees, even when residing in the host country for many years. (ii) The second 'objective' reason are changing circumstances in the country of origin. A new government may be in power, a peace agreement signed that includes reconciliation and return of refugees, even up to the point of an active return policy, for

example to attract highly qualified persons. More ‘subjective’ reasons also play a role, such as nostalgia, the feeling not being at home in the host country, being of feeling discriminated on the labor market, or wanting one’s offspring to be raised in the home country. Hence, a return decision is determined by the sum of these factors, whereby each refugee and its household make their calculation whether or not to return. Bozzoli, Bruck and Muhumuza (2011) find that conflict negatively affects individuals’ expectation of the economic situation in Northern Uganda. Figure 8 conceptualizes the return decision. We integrate objective and subjective reasons in the decision making process, the situation at the host site and at the place or origin, a set of background characteristics and skills as well as return and integration policies.

**Figure 8: Conceptual framework on the determinants of the decision to return to the country of origin**



Source: Authors’ own construction.

## 5.2 Case Studies from Central-Africa

#### **Case Study #4 The lack of political will for enhancing return of Rwandese refugees**

Some governments dissuade refugees to return to the country of origin and invoke political as well as economic reasons for that. In the '70s and '80s Rwandan exiles in Uganda and Tanzania who were expelled from the country decades earlier were told that Rwanda had no land available to re-settle them. Unresolved refugee questions, such as the lack of an agreement to return, combined with difficult or changing conditions in the host country, can propel refugees to return to their country by force. Even up to the point at attempting to overthrow the government (or its successor) that expelled them. In the Rwandan case, such unresolved refugee questions contributed to civil war and genocide. The unresolved refugee issue in Eastern DRC was further fed by changing asylum policies in former Zaire. In neighboring Zaire, under the regime of President Mobutu, the citizenship rights of the Banyarwanda (Rwandan exiles living for decades in Zaire/Congo) were granted in 1971 but were taken away again in 1981 as a reaction against perceived influence of former Rwandans in the administration. The mass refugee influx of Rwandans in Zaire/Congo after the genocide changes the balance of power. As in Uganda, unresolved refugee, settlement, land ownership and citizenship questions formed fertile ground for the formation of alliances between groups of different ethnic origin that would eventually fuel a large-scale multinational war on Congolese soil, of which the overthrow of the Mobutu regime was one consequence.

Few attempts were made at the political level to create conditions, both within Zaire and in Rwanda that would have made possible a successful organized repatriation (Boutroue 1998). Initiatives within a multilateral framework were hampered by an international environment characterized by rivalries and a relative indifference to the refugee crisis (Boutroue 1998). In addition, both UNHCR and Zairean authorities were reluctant of being implicated in any political discussions: the Zairean did not want to be perceived as being politically associated with the Hutu refugees, while the UNHCR mandate was to remain politically neutral (Pottier 1996). Conditions in Rwanda remained too unstable for refugees to return because of reports of human rights violation, land and housing appropriation and internal recolonization (Pottier 1996).

By the end of 1996, the relentless attacks on refugee camps by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL), a rebel group opposed to Mobutu's regime in Zaire, triggered the mass reverse migration of more than half a million of refugees back to Rwanda while thousands escaped westward in Zaire (Lischer 2005:83), thereby ending the presence of Rwandan refugee organized camps in Zaire.

Given UNHCR's restricted mandate, the organization's role in the refugee crisis was limited to humanitarian relief operations, which at times, proved to be a failure. In the early stages of the crisis, UNHCR and partnering NGOs were quickly overwhelmed by the magnitude of the refugee influx. In addition to the lack of resources, aid workers had to deal with an important cholera epidemic that swept through the camps which resulted in 50,000 deaths. UNHCR's humanitarian involvement also came under great criticism for allegedly perpetuating instability in the region by providing food and services to camps which also harbored Hutu soldiers and militants (Mills 2002). Büscher and Vlassenroot (2010) also point to a more subtle increase in local conflicts through increased grievances with respect to the 'dollarization' (increased in land and house prices), of the local economy that mainly benefited the established local elite. Meanwhile, UNHCR's attempt to address the refugee situation in Zaire was

significantly hampered by the lack of cooperation between of the RPF regime in Rwanda and the refugee camp leaders for creating right conditions for repatriation.

Although voluntary repatriation seems to be the preferred solution by governments and international organizations to address the crisis of refugees in most countries in Africa (Mills 2002), this case study highlights a fundamental factor that determines the viability of this solution. Peaceful organized repatriation cannot be achieved without the political will of the main actors involved, while the state of origin has the ultimate obligation to provide just conditions of return. Essentially, the conditions that relate to land and property restoration, financial compensation, trials, security and the respect of basic human rights.

#### **Case Study #5: The return of refugees to Burundi**

In Burundi, former exiles from the 1972 and 1993 episodes of large-scale political violence and genocide began to return to the country by the end of the civil war (from 2000-2002 onwards). The civil war in Burundi can large be described as a struggle for control over the state, first between the Tutsi army (who were in control of the state) and Hutu rebel groups, and later between fractions of the Hutu rebels once they entered the political process. Burundi has a constitution with a lot of regional and ethnic checks and balances, often referred to as consociationalism, but the system over government is currently under threat as a result of a nationwide victory of one of the former rebel groups (CNDD-FDD) in the latest presidential and parliamentary elections. Since the end of the civil war several hundred thousand refugees have returned to Burundi, causing land disputes between current and former occupants.

Verwimp and Munoz-Mora (2013) studied the welfare of returnees to Burundi in comparison with their neighbors who were not expelled. They found (i) that a former refugee household consumes on average 7% less compared to a non-refugee household and (ii) that it takes 8 to 10 years after return before the welfare of a former refugee household is at the same level of its non-refugee neighbor. Key data are reported in Table 5, where formerly displaced households are over-represented among the very poor.

**Table 5: the welfare of returnees (formerly displaced) and non-displaced households in Burundi**

Forced Displacement	Level of Poverty			Totals
	Very poor	Poor	Non- Poor	
Never	1104 50.67	492 22.58	583 26.76	<b>2179</b> 100%
At least once	2533 56.03	983 21.74	1005 22.23	<b>4521</b> 100%
<i>Total</i>	<b>3637</b> 54.28	<b>1475</b> 22.01	<b>1588</b> 23.70	<b>6700</b> 100%

**Notes** – Pearson Chi Square (2)= 20.96 [p-value=0.000] Data source: Core Welfare Survey for Burundi (2006).

#### **5.3 Some Key Findings from Case Studies**

Kondylis (2008) evaluated the policy of Imidugudu in Rwanda by which returnee households were housed in new villages where they received land and inputs. Her results show that for the group of returnees that moved into imidugudu, who received more land than they would have otherwise, the program had a positive asset effect on their agricultural production. Nevertheless, this group experienced lower returns to inputs than the group of returnees who were not in the imidugudu program. She suggests that the episode of displacement may have lowered the returnees' level of know-how, but also that the imidugudu policy did not allow for transfer of skills between stayers and returnees, probably due to remaining ethnic and political tensions.

This resonates with the Burundi case where the land constraint is also causing a lot of tensions between returnees and stayers. The question whether or not the welfare of formerly displaced will improve after their return to the home country is entirely empirical and can only be answered on a case-by-case basis. It is worth noting that panel data on (former) refugees before, during and after displacement is lacking, due to the difficulty of tracking displaced and formerly displaced households. What is clear from the Verwimp & Munoz-Mora study is that the plight of (former) refugees does not end upon return. Once returned they face the political and economic legacy of the home country, including (in the case of Burundi) land scarcity and land disputes.

Liz Alden Wily (2009) in that respect argues that post-conflict economies should seize the opportunity to reform the land tenure system, rather than attempting to reconstitute the land to previous owners. Not only were land disputes often one of the underlying issues causing the broader conflict, but mismanagement of land in the post-conflict setting may sow the seed for renewed conflict, at least at the local level, if not nationwide. This is of course highly correlated with the agrarian nature of countries involved in conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. This again calls for a robust evaluation study of land reforms in post-conflict economies, in particular in cases with a large population of returnees.

## **6. Conclusions**

It has become common in the development policy debate to call for better linking humanitarian activities to development actions. That is not new, but, in a policy debate, one needs to specify how to do that. This paper leads to some specific conclusions that constitute calls for further research or concrete action.

Over the last two decades, the share of refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa has remained relatively stable but most changes have occurred within Africa. While positive trends have recently been observed in Southern and Western Africa, the recent surge in refugees originating from Eastern Africa is a worrying development. These refugees appear to be particularly vulnerable to shocks in complex emergencies, having to face the unfortunate experiences of both recurrent insecurity and weather shocks. Seeking to enhance resilience to climate-induced conflict in the Horn of Africa should constitute a first priority that goes far beyond the issue of refugee protection. Calderone et al. (2014) provide some policy options.

The vulnerability of refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa is exacerbated by the dominance of protracted and organized refugee situations, together with larger shares of young children and women among the



displaced populations. The medical and economic literature is sufficiently rich to call for urgent action targeted towards the critical periods in early life (the first 1000 days, augmented by the gestation period *in utero*, see Almond and Currie 2011; Alderman et al. 2014, Black et al. 2014, and Buhta et al. 2014). Ruel and Alderman (2013) suggest that nutrition-sensitive programs that combine early child development (e.g. maternal and child nutrition intervention, psychological stimulation and responsive parenting) and nutrition interventions could lead to substantial gains in cost, efficiency, and effectiveness. But long-term impact evaluation studies of such interventions in a refugee setting are lacking. In particular, refugee camps may involve important delivery challenges<sup>7</sup> but also opportunities in terms of cost effectiveness (delivery to a dense population with entry registration and a centralized administration in place). Refugee protection often understood from a legal perspective should also incorporate evidence-based options to enhance the resilience of refugees.

The report also underlines the agency of refugees towards improving their livelihoods. Refugees are not passive agents, exclusively dependent on external interventions. Local markets and trading activities play an essential role in reducing poverty among refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similarly, markets constitute an essential driver of the expected impact on the hosting population. Though important, the usual focus on legal protection, health, environmental and security issues is too limited. Understanding protracted refugee situation requires paying much more attention to the interactions between refugees and their hosts. The economic functions endorsed by refugees (labor substitutable to who? Net buyer or net seller of what? Skill and monetary transfers from and to where?), the ability to adopt coping strategies among the hosts (assets, occupation, ...) and the transformative presence of the humanitarian sector seem also to explain to a large extent why positive and negative impacts are not evenly distributed among the hosting population.

A transition from relief to development calls for strengthening the asset-based capacity and the human capital endowments of the local hosts and in particular among the poor. In that respect, the provision of local public goods seems to be key. While road infrastructure has been found to be a catalyst for local economic development, integrating education and health services provided to refugees and local communities should have promising potential.

The challenges for the local hosts in protracted refugee situations in Sub-Saharan Africa are intrinsically related to the conditions faced by returnees. Repatriation and local integration are indeed part of the same conundrum. Together with resettlement, they indeed constitute two of the solutions to protracted refugee situations proposed by UNHCR. Voluntary repatriation has often been favored by the international community and host governments since the 1990s. UNHCR has been therefore pro-active in providing repatriation assistance as well as employment opportunities to returnees. Well, the costs of ensuring favorable conditions for repatriation have often been underestimated, since returnees had sometimes faced unsafe and unfavorable situations, for instance, when previously occupied land had been taken over by others. Inversely, local integration has often been neglected as a possible solution. Beyond the political sensitivity of that option for the host country, the reasons may be related to the

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<sup>7</sup> As stressed by Crisp (2003), Section 2 recalls that protracted refugee situation are usually located in peripheral areas, with poor security, unfavorable climatic conditions, and economically and politically marginalization.

dichotomy between humanitarian action and development efforts and the lack of evidence on the impact of refugees on the hosting population. We do not claim that local integration is the optimal solution in all protracted cases. However, the reluctance to integrate refugees locally has precluded the opportunity to test local integration approaches that are fundamentally driven by the economic interactions between refugees and host communities. One also needs to overcome the institutional constraint for such approaches since local integration requires further coordination between the UNHCR and other institutions like UNDP, the World Bank, non-governmental organizations, development agencies, national and local governments. Overall, there is a dearth of evidence on the effectiveness of different policies in protracted refugee situations, but what appears to be clear is that refugees' capacities should be considered as an asset in the search for sustainable solutions to protracted refugee situations.

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## **Supplementary Appendix**



Table A1

**Refugee population by origin, 1960-2013 (end-year figures)**


Figures include people in refugee-like situations.

	1990*	1995	2000	2005	2010**	2013
<b>Origin</b>						
Total World	17,395,979	14,896,087	12,129,572	8,661,994	10,549,686	11,703,179
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	5,680,989	5,558,551	3,741,420	3,065,266	2,773,292	3,670,630
- Central Africa and Great Lakes	620,578	2,262,594	1,089,506	1,048,459	878,475	933,636
- East and Horn of Africa	2,583,784	1,582,992	1,504,938	1,386,481	1,518,092	2,336,848
- Southern Africa	1,671,196	373,294	436,669	229,282	161,689	33,367
- West Africa	805,431	1,339,671	710,307	401,044	215,036	366,779
MENA	1,383,333	1,068,910	867,005	799,327	1,993,712	3,149,994
Asia and Pacific	7,319,098	4,063,523	4,852,589	3,335,340	4,417,746	3,906,584
(excl. Australia, Japan, New Zealand)						
<b>Asylum</b>						
Total World	17,395,979	14,896,087	12,129,572	8,661,994	10,549,686	11,703,179
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	5,903,606	6,198,725	3,835,423	3,170,811	4,124,942	5,563,641
- Central Africa and Great Lakes	1,031,190	2,544,072	1,309,418	970,283	628,361	516,006
- East and Horn of Africa	2,502,387	1,560,684	1,099,092	1,047,379	1,241,098	2,038,958
- Southern Africa	1,311,168	246,577	317,888	228,637	146,162	135,542
- West Africa	814,486	1,385,031	709,802	325,125	168,334	242,348
MENA	244,375	462,361	399,223	599,387	1,940,987	2,630,787
Asia and Pacific	8,225,783	4,267,480	4,950,728	2,949,480	4,011,529	3,544,493
(excl. Australia, Japan, New Zealand)						
Americas (excl. North America)	1,194,874	93,858	37,851	37,749	373,867	381,949
Developed countries	2,169,013	4,401,927	3,370,739	2,574,225	2,063,460	2,249,002
<b>UNHCR-Assisted IDPs</b>						
Total World	3666400	4662200	5998501	6616791	21055500	31098400
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	88000	1344000	2309691	2479998	6154000	7301100
Asia & MENA	829400	1699100	1845194	1532307	9497800	16993000
Americas	-	8000	525000	2000000	3672100	5368100
(excl. North America)						
Developed countries	2749000	1611100	1318616	604486	1731600	1436200
<b>Total IDPs</b>						
Total World	20285000	17580000	19298000	19027800	25111000	N.A.

<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	8604000	5895000	7055000	5406100	5068000	N.A.
MENA	6230000	8000000	6675000	8592900	10892000	N.A.
Asia and Pacific	4325000	2405000	3392000	2128800	5490000	N.A.
(excl. Australia, Japan, New Zealand)						
Americas	1126000	1280000	2176000	2900000	3661000	N.A.
(excl. North America)						

Note: Refugee data are from the UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014. Refugee data from 2007 to 2013 include people in refugee-like situations (see note, Figure 1). IDP data from 1990 to 2008 are aggregated based on Center for Systematic Peace (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/>). As indicated in Figure A1, these data are much lower compared to those provided from 2003 by IDMC but provide a longer time series. UNHCR assisted-IDP are compiled based on several UNHCR (1995, 1996, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014) reports. UNHCR-assisted IDPs are only IDPs who are protected/assisted by UNHCR. These are also not necessarily representative of the entire IDP population in a given country. Many of the world's IDP situations are not covered by UNHCR and are thus not reflected. Since some adjustments could take place over time, we always use the figures from the last available report.


**Figure A1: Refugees and Internally Displaced People in SSA, 1990 and 2013**




Note: Refugee data are from the UNHCR statistical population online dataset, accessed in September 2014. Refugee data from 2007 to 2013 include people in refugee-like situations (see note, Figure 1). IDP data from 1990 to 2008 are aggregated based on Center for Systematic Peace (<http://www.systemicpeace.org/>). UNHCR assisted-IDP are compiled based on several UNHCR (1995, 1996, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014) reports. UNHCR-assisted IDPs are only IDPs who are protected/assisted by UNHCR. These are also not necessarily representative of the entire IDP population in a given country. Many of the world's IDP situations are not covered by UNHCR and are thus not reflected. Since some adjustments could take place over time, we always use the figures from the last available report.

**Figure A2: Refugees a burden for SSA?**

**Panel A: Not weighted by economic capacity**



**Panel B: Weighted by economic capacity**



Source: Authors' presentation based on UNHCR Global Trends 2013 (UNHCR 2014).