

# THE GLOBAL FACILITY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION AND RECOVERY

**IEG**

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP

**GLOBAL PROGRAM REVIEW****Volume 6 Issue 2**

# THE WORLD BANK GROUP

## ***WORKING FOR A WORLD FREE OF POVERTY***

The World Bank Group consists of five institutions—the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Development Association (IDA), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Its mission is to fight poverty for lasting results and to help people help themselves and their environment by providing resources, sharing knowledge, building capacity, and forging partnerships in the public and private sectors.

# THE INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP

## ***IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT RESULTS THROUGH EXCELLENCE IN EVALUATION***

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) is an independent unit within the World Bank Group. It reports directly to the Board of Executive Directors, which oversees IEG's work through its Committee on Development Effectiveness. IEG is charged with evaluating the activities of the World Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Development Association), the work of the International Finance Corporation in private sector development, and the guarantee projects and services of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.

The goals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of the Bank Group's work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. It also improves Bank Group work by identifying and disseminating the lessons learned from experience and by framing recommendations drawn from evaluation findings.

Cover Photo: Major disaster risk reduction investments--river bank lining and protection against flood damage and slope terracing against landslides; Itaipava, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

*Photo by Roy Gilbert*

## **Global Program Review**

# **The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery**

**September 24, 2012**  
**Country, Corporate, and Global Evaluations**

©2012 Independent Evaluation Group, The World Bank Group  
1818 H Street NW  
Washington DC 20433  
Telephone: 202-458-4497  
Internet: <http://www.globalevaluations.org>  
E-mail: [grpp@worldbank.org](mailto:grpp@worldbank.org)

All rights reserved

This volume is a product of the staff of the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank Group. It is part of an ongoing series that reviews global and regional partnership programs in which the World Bank is engaged as one of the partners. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent.

IEG does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of IEG concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

### **Rights and Permissions**

The material in this publication is copyrighted. IEG encourages the dissemination of its work and permits these reviews to be copied or otherwise transmitted, with appropriate credit given to IEG as the authoring body.

How to cite this report:

IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2012. "Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery." Global Program Review Vol. 6, Issue 2.

ISBN-13: 978-1-60244-224-5  
ISBN-10: 1-60244-224-X

Independent Evaluation Group  
Strategy, Learning, and Communication  
E-mail: [grpp@worldbank.org](mailto:grpp@worldbank.org)  
Telephone: 202-458-4497

Printed on Recycled Paper

**IEG Mission: Improving Development Results Through Excellence in Evaluation**

The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank annually reviews a number of global and regional partnership programs (GRPPs) in which the Bank is a partner, in accordance with a mandate from the Bank's Executive Board in September 2004. The three main purposes are (a) to help improve the relevance and the effectiveness of the programs being reviewed, (b) to identify and disseminate lessons of broader application to other programs, and (c) to contribute to the development of standards, guidelines, and good practices for evaluating GRPPs. IEG does not, as a matter of policy, recommend the continuation or discontinuation of any programs being reviewed.

A standard global or regional program review (GPR) is a *review* and not a full-fledged *evaluation*. The preparation of a standard GPR is contingent on a recently completed evaluation of the program, typically commissioned by the governing body of the program. Each GPR assesses the independence and quality of that evaluation; provides a second opinion on the effectiveness of the program, based on the evaluation; assesses the performance of the World Bank as a partner in the program; and draws lessons for the Bank's engagement in GRPPs more generally. The GPR does not formally rate these overall measures of performance.

Assessing the independence and quality of GRPP evaluations is an important aspect of GPRs in order to foster high-quality evaluation methodology and practice more uniformly across Bank-supported GRPPs. Providing a "second opinion" on the effectiveness of the program includes validating the major findings of the GRPP evaluation. Assessing the performance of the World Bank as a partner in the program provides accountability to the Bank's Executive Board.

In selecting programs for review, preference is given to (a) those that are innovative, large, or complex; (b) those in which the Bank is sufficiently engaged to warrant a GPR; (c) those that are relevant to upcoming IEG sector studies; (d) those for which the Executive Directors or Bank management have requested reviews; and (e) those that are likely to generate important lessons. IEG also aims for a representative distribution of GPRs across sectors in each fiscal year.

A GPR seeks to add value to the program and to the World Bank beyond what is contained in the external evaluation, while also drawing upon IEG's experience in reviewing a growing number of programs. It reports on key program developments since the evaluation was completed, including the progress in implementing the recommendations of the evaluation.

A GPR involves a desk review of key documents, consultations with key stakeholders, and a mission to the program management unit (secretariat) of the program if this is located outside the World Bank or Washington, DC. Key stakeholders include the Bank's representative on the governing body of the program, the Bank's task team leader (if separate from the Bank's representative), the program chair, the head of the secretariat, other program partners (at the governance and implementing levels), and other Bank operational staff involved with the program. The writer of a GPR may also consult with the person(s) who conducted the evaluation of the GRPP.

Each GPR is subject to internal and external peer review and IEG management approval. Once cleared internally, the GPR is reviewed by the responsible Bank department and the secretariat of the program being reviewed. Comments received are taken into account in finalizing the document, and the formal management response from the program is attached to the final report. After the document has been distributed to the Bank's Board of Executive Directors, it is disclosed to the public on IEG's external website.



# Contents

<b>Abbreviations and Acronyms .....</b>	<b>vii</b>
<b>Preface.....</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>Program at a Glance: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery .....</b>	<b>xi</b>
<b>Key Bank Staff Responsible during Period under Review.....</b>	<b>xiii</b>
<b>Glossary .....</b>	<b>xv</b>
<b>Summary.....</b>	<b>xvii</b>
<b>1. Program Objectives, Activities, Governance, and Financing .....</b>	<b>1</b>
Origin and Objectives.....	1
GFDRR Activities .....	4
Governance.....	8
Financing.....	11
<b>2. The 2010 External Evaluation of GFDRR.....</b>	<b>13</b>
Background to the Evaluation by Universalia.....	13
The Independence of the External Evaluation .....	13
The Quality of the External Evaluation .....	14
Findings, Recommendations, and Program Responses to the Evaluation.....	16
Other Recent Evaluations of Disaster Risk Reduction .....	19
<b>3. The Effectiveness of GFDRR .....</b>	<b>21</b>
Relevance .....	21
Supply-Side Relevance.....	21
Demand-Side Relevance.....	23
Vertical Relevance.....	24
Horizontal Relevance.....	26
Relevance of the Design .....	28
Efficacy.....	28
Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) .....	29
Selection of Activities and Progress toward Outputs .....	30
Achievement of Objectives.....	38
Impacts on the World Bank .....	44
Efficiency.....	44
Resource Mobilization.....	44
Administrative Costs .....	46
Financial Reporting .....	46
Cost-Effectiveness of Individual Activities.....	48
<b>4. Governance, Management, and Sustainability .....</b>	<b>49</b>
Legitimacy and Efficiency.....	49
Accountability.....	51
Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of interest.....	53
Host Arrangements .....	55
Sustainability .....	56

<b>5. Bank Performance as a Partner .....</b>	<b>58</b>
Bank Performance at the Global/Program Level .....	58
Bank Performance at the Country Level.....	61
Oversight .....	62
Risk Management.....	62
Engagement Strategy .....	63
<b>6. Lessons .....</b>	<b>64</b>
For GFDRR.....	64
For the World Bank .....	65
<b>References .....</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>Annex A. Review Framework for Global Program Reviews.....</b>	<b>71</b>
<b>Annex B. Timeline of GFDRR and Related Events .....</b>	<b>80</b>
<b>Annex C. GFDRR Governance.....</b>	<b>83</b>
<b>Annex D. Recommendations of the 2010 Evaluation of GFDRR .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>Annex E. GFDRR: Sources and Uses of Funds.....</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>Annex F. Some Results of Country-Level GFDRR Activities and Impacts on the World Bank .....</b>	<b>94</b>
<b>Annex G. GFDRR's Dollar Breakdown .....</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Annex H. Methodological Notes on IEG's Review of DRR in Country Strategies.....</b>	<b>102</b>
<b>Annex I. Persons Consulted for this GPR .....</b>	<b>106</b>
<b>Annex J. GFDRR Response to IEG's Global Program Review .....</b>	<b>109</b>

## **Boxes**

Box 1. GFDRR Activities .....	5
Box 2. Partnering to Strengthen Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability in the Face of Adversity .....	22
Box 3. Trying to Mainstream “Mainstreaming” .....	23
Box 4. UNDP's Role in Disaster Risk Reduction.....	27
Box 5. Monitoring, Evaluation, and the GFDRR Results Framework .....	30

## **Figures**

Figure 1. GFDRR Organizational Chart, 2012 .....	10
Figure 2. Donor Contributions to GFDRR, FY2007–12 .....	11
Figure 3. GFDRR Expenditures/Disbursements, FY2007–12 .....	12
Figure 4. World Bank Lending for Disaster Assistance, FY1984–2011 .....	25
Figure 5. References to Disasters in Countries' Strategies.....	41



## Tables

Table 1. Goals, Objectives, and Activities of United Nations' DRR Initiatives .....	2
Table 2. GFDRR Priority and Donor-Earmarked Countries, by Region .....	7
Table 3. The Evolution of GFDRR's Governance Structures .....	9
Table 4. Findings and Recommendations of the External Evaluation of GFDRR .....	17
Table 5. Eight Other Recent Evaluations of DRR .....	19
Table 6. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Commitments and Disbursements by Type of Activity, FY2007–12.....	32
Table 7. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements by Type and Level of Activity, FY2007–12.....	33
Table 8. GFDRR, Track II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements by Region and Priority Countries, FY2007–12.....	35
Table 9. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements by Region and Bank VPU, FY2007–12 .....	36
Table 10. GFDRR Disbursements for Climate Change Activities, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU, by Type and Level of Activity, FY2007–12 .....	37
Table 11. Results Chain Elements of 10 Selected GFDRR Activities .....	39
Table 12. GFDRR Resource Mobilization, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU, Trust Fund Pledges, Contributions, Commitments, and Disbursements, FY2007-12.....	45
Table 13. GFDRR, Administrative Costs, FY2007–12 .....	47
Table 14. The GFDRR Global Partnership: Members and Observers of the GFDRR Consultative Group as of July 2012.....	50
Table 15. Working Relationships between Three Sets of External and Internal Programs Operating in the Same Functional Area.....	59
Table A-1. Assessing the Independence and Quality of the Evaluation.....	71
Table A-2. Providing a Second Opinion on the Effectiveness of the Program .....	72
Table A-3. Providing a Second Opinion on the Governance, Management, and Sustainability of the Program.....	75
Table A-4. Assessing the Bank's Performance as a Partner in the Program .....	77
Table A-5. Common GRPP Activities.....	79
Table E-1. Annual Donor Contributions to GFDRR, FY2007–12 .....	87
Table E-2. Total Donor Contributions to GFDRR, FY2007–12 .....	88
Table E-3. GFDRR Expenditures/Disbursements .....	89
Table E-4. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements, by Type of Activity, FY2007–12 .....	90
Table E-5. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements by Country, FY2007–12...	91



## Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States
AFR	Sub-Saharan Africa
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development (World Bank)
ASEAN	Association of South Eastern Asian Nations
AUC	African Union Commission
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BB	World Bank's Administrative Budget
BETF	Bank-Executed Trust Fund Grants
BMZ	(German) Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CAPRA	Central America Probabilistic Risk Assessment
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CAT-DDO	Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option
CCA	Climate Change Adaptation
CDEMA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
CG	Consultative Group (GFDRR)
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy (World Bank)
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEC	Development Economics Vice Presidency (World Bank)
DECDG	Development Data Group in the Development Economics Vice Presidency (World Bank)
DFID	(UK) Department for International Development
DGF	Development Grant Facility (World Bank)
DMF	Disaster Management Facility (World Bank)
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EAP	East Asia and the Pacific
EC/EU	European Commission/European Union
ECA	Europe and Central Asia
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FEU	Finance, Economics, and Urban Department (World Bank)
FY	Fiscal Year
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GIZ	(German) International Development Agency
GPR	Global Program Review
GRM	Grant Reporting and Monitoring (World Bank)
GRPP	Global and/or Regional Partnership Program
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action
HMU	Hazard Management Unit (World Bank)
IAD	Internal Audit Department (World Bank)
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IRP	International Recovery Platform
ISDR	International Strategy for Disaster Reduction system
LCR	Latin America and the Caribbean
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDG	Millennium Development Goal

MDTF	Multidonor Trust Fund
MNA	Middle East and North Africa
NAPA	National Adaptation Programs/Plans of Action
NGI	Norwegian Geotechnical Institute
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECS	Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
OPCS	Operations Policy and Country Services (World Bank)
PARIS21	Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century
PDNA	Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBMS	Results-Based Management System
RCDRR	Regional Center for Disaster Risk Reduction
RETF	Recipient-Executed Trust Fund (World Bank)
RMC	Results Management Council (GFDRR)
SAP	Systeme, Anwendungen und Produkte in der Datenverarbeitung (commonly used acronym for the Bank's corporate accounting and information system)
SAR	South Asia
SC	Steering Committee (GFDRR)
SDN	Sustainable Development Network (World Bank)
SDV	Social Development Department (World Bank)
SEGOM	Oil, Gas, and Mining Policy Division in the Sustainable Energy Department
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SOPAC	Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission
SRFF	Standby Recovery Financing Facility (Alternative name of GFDRR's Track III)
TAG	Technical Advisory Group
TFSCB	Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building
TRE	Treasury Vice Presidency (World Bank)
TTL	Task Team Leader (World Bank)
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP-BCPR	United Nations Development Program – Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
VPU	Vice Presidential Unit (World Bank)
WBI	World Bank Institute

## **Fiscal Year of Program**

July 1 – June 30

All dollar amounts in this document are United States dollars unless otherwise indicated.

Director-General, Evaluation	: Ms. Caroline Heider
Senior Manager, IEGCS	: Mr. Ali Khadr
Global Programs Coordinator	: Mr. Chris Gerrard
Task Managers	: Mr. Roy Gilbert and Ms. Anna Aghumian

## Preface

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) was established in September 2006, as a Bank-supported partnership of donor and recipient countries and international organizations to further reduce the risks from natural disasters and promote international and regional cooperation to lessen the vulnerability of low- and middle-income countries. GFDRR is one of the 120 global and regional partnership programs currently supported by the Bank. Like 40 percent of these programs, GFDRR is housed within the headquarters of the World Bank in Washington, DC.

In December 2008, the GFDRR Consultative Group (CG), the program's governing body, commissioned an external evaluation of GFDRR. Carrying out such an evaluation every 3–5 years is a requirement for programs receiving more than \$300,000 in funding from the Bank's Development Grant Facility (DGF) and for programs receiving more than \$5 million in trust funds, both of which criteria applied to GFDRR. The present Global Program Review (GPR) reviews the independence and the quality of the evaluation, provides a second opinion on the effectiveness of GFDRR based on the evaluation, assesses the Bank's performance as a partner in the program, and draws lessons for the future operation of GFDRR and the Bank's engagement in global and regional partnership programs (GRPPs) more generally. This GPR is part of Independent Evaluation Group's (IEG) regular work program of reviewing Bank-supported GRPPs to contribute to improving the independence and quality of their evaluations and to enhancing the relevance and effectiveness of the programs themselves.

IEG chose GFDRR for review at this time because it has received substantial funding from both the DGF and donor trust funds, and was recently subjected to an external evaluation. GFDRR has been the second largest recipient of DGF grants among new programs established in the last 10 years — receiving \$28.5 million from FY2007–12. IEG hopes that the GPR can help the Bank's urban family and climate change teams learn from the GFDRR experience as the Bank enhances and updates its own development assistance approaches to preventing and recovering from natural disasters, and to adapting to climate change.

This review follows IEG's Guidelines for GPRs (Annex A of this report). It is based upon a desk review of the 2010 external evaluation, GFDRR program documents and financial statements, and websites of the program itself, its partners, and clients. Through face-to-face and telephone interviews, IEG discussed GFDRR performance with program staff, Bank staff who work with GFDRR, and representatives of key donors and partners. For these purposes, the GPR fielded missions to Geneva, Berlin, Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Brussels, London, and Brasilia during September–October 2011.

IEG gratefully acknowledges all those who made their time available for interviews and provided useful information and insights into the program. IEG appreciates the serious attention given by all participants to its inquiries. In particular, IEG would like to thank the management and staff of GFDRR itself for cooperating with this review through meetings and contacts with the GPR team, and GFDRR's timely responses to IEG's requests for information and documents. The complete list of people consulted by IEG can be found in Annex I of this report.

Following IEG's normal procedures, copies of the draft GPR has been sent to GFDRR, to the Bank's Finance, Economics, and Urban Department in which GFDRR is located, and to other World Bank units that have responsibility for the Bank's involvement with global programs more generally. Their comments have been taken into account in finalizing the GPR. The formal comments received from GFDRR are attached as Annex J.

## Program at a Glance: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

<b>Start date</b>	September 2006 — the first meeting of the Consultative Group, held in Washington, DC,
<b>Missions</b> (from the Partnership Charter, 2006 and 2010)	<p>(1) To mainstream disaster reduction and climate change adaptation in country development strategies, such as poverty reduction strategies (PRSs), country assistance strategies (CASSs), United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), and National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs), to reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards.</p> <p>(2) To foster and strengthen global and regional cooperation among various stakeholders under the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system, such as low- and middle-income country governments, international financial institutions (IFIs), UN agencies, research and academic institutions, intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), and the private sector, to leverage country systems and programs in disaster reduction and recovery.</p>
<b>Development Objectives</b> (from the GFDRR Results Framework, October 2010)	<p>(1) To expand, strengthen, and deepen global and regional partnerships for supporting national disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation.</p> <p>(2) To contribute towards mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation as key elements of sustainable development in priority countries.</p> <p>(3) To assist post-disaster countries in achieving efficient, effective, and resilient disaster recovery, while promoting and leveraging greater disaster risk reduction.</p>
<b>Business Lines</b> (from the Partnership Charter 2006 and 2010, and the GFDRR website)	<p><b>Track I:</b> Support to the ISDR System through the ISDR Secretariat — to enhance global and regional advocacy, partnerships, and knowledge management for mainstreaming disaster reduction.</p> <p><b>Track II:</b> Support to countries for mainstreaming disaster reduction in development — to provide ex ante support to enhance investments in risk reduction and risk transfer mechanisms, as well as disaster management planning to low- and middle-income countries.</p> <p><b>Track III:</b> Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF) — to support primarily low-income countries for accelerated disaster recovery.</p> <p><b>African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States – European Union (ACP-EU) Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program</b> — to support the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of Countries in their efforts to prevent, mitigate, and prepare for natural hazards</p>
<b>Activities</b> (from the GFDRR Partnership Strategy, 2009–2012)	<p><b>Capacity building:</b> Developing effective institutional, governance, legislative, and financing frameworks for disaster risk reduction and mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in sectoral development strategies.</p> <p><b>Tools and methodologies:</b> Developing new tools, practical approaches, and other instruments for disaster reduction and recovery.</p> <p><b>Knowledge sharing and generation:</b> Developing and sharing evidence-based disaster risk reduction actions; making an economic case for disaster risk reduction; and documenting and disseminating good practices on mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and formulating risk reduction strategies.</p>

<b>World Bank Group Contributions</b>	<p>The World Bank's DGF provided grants of \$5.0 million a year to UNISDR from FY2007–10, and \$4.25 million a year in FY2011–12 to implement Track I activities of GFDRR.</p> <p>The Bank also contributed \$3.50 million from the Bank's administrative budget during FY2007–12, of which \$1.45 million came from the Global Expert Teams Initiative in FY2009–12, and \$229,000 from the DGF to help finance the external evaluation in FY2010.</p>
<b>Other Donor Contributions</b>	<p>Twenty donors contributed \$226.5 million to Bank-administered trust funds for GFDRR during FY2007–12, of which \$158.0 million was for GFDRR Track II, \$29.5 million for Track III, and \$39.1 million for the ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program. The top seven donors (EU Commission, Sweden, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Norway) contributed three-quarters of the funding.</p>
<b>Location</b>	<p>World Bank headquarters, Washington, DC.</p> <p>GFDRR has been a unit, headed by the program manager, in the Finance, Economics and Urban Department (FEU) of the Sustainable Development Network (SDN) of the World Bank.</p>
<b>Website</b>	<a href="http://www.gfdr.org">www.gfdr.org</a>
<b>Governance and Management</b>	<p>GFDRR is governed by a multi-stakeholder CG, comprised of the following members:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• World Bank</li> <li>• Donors contributing at least \$3 million over a three-year period</li> <li>• Chair of the ISDR system</li> <li>• Chair of the Results Management Council (RMC)</li> <li>• Developing country governments contributing at least \$500,000 over a three-year period</li> <li>• Developing country governments invited by the CG to participate as noncontributing members on a two-year, staggered-rotational basis</li> </ul> <p>The CG currently includes representatives of 17 contributing countries, three contributing multilateral organizations, UNISDR, six noncontributing country members, and two permanent observers — the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and UN Development Program–Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR). In addition, GFDRR welcomes other stakeholders to attend as observers. (See Annex D.)</p> <p>The CG is chaired by the World Bank Vice President for Sustainable Development and co-chaired by one other donor member selected by the CG for a one-year term as co-chair.</p> <p>GFDRR has also been supported by a RMC comprising a World Bank Director, the Director of the ISDR Secretariat, the program manager of the GFDRR Secretariat, five representatives of GFDRR stakeholders, and five prominent experts from regions or areas of expertise. The individuals in the latter two categories are appointed by the chair and co-chair of the CG.</p> <p>UNISDR does not have a governing body. The head of UNISDR (the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General) reports directly to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs.</p>
<b>Latest Program-Level Evaluation</b>	<p>Universalia Management Group, <i>Evaluation of the World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)</i>, January 2010.</p>



## Key Bank Staff Responsible during Period under Review

Position	Person	Period
Program Manager, GFDRR	Saroj Jha Francis Ghesquiere	September 2006 – January 2012 May 2012 – present
Director, Transport and Urban Department	Maryvonne Plessis-Fraissard	September 2003 – December 2006
Director, Finance, Economics and Urban Department (FEU)	Abha Joshi-Ghani (Acting) Laszlo Lovei Zoubida Allaoua	January 2007 – June 2007 July 2007 – June 2008 May 2009 – present
Vice President, Infrastructure	Katherine Sierra	August 2004 – December 2006
Vice President, Sustainable Development Network (SDN)	Katherine Sierra Inger Anderson Rachel Kyte	January 2006 – June 2010 July 2010 – September 2011 September 2011 – present
Director, Trust Fund Operations	Arif Zulfikar	June 1999 – 2008
Director, Global Programs and Partnerships	Margret Thalwitz, Director	May 2004 – 2008
Director, Global Partnership and Trust Fund Operations	Junhui Wu, Director Michael Koch	March 2009 – December 2011 December 2011 – present



## Glossary

<b>Climate change</b>	A change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods. (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) definition.)
<b>Disaster</b>	A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic, or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope if limited to using its own resources. Disasters are often described as a result of the combination of: the exposure to a hazard; the conditions of vulnerability that are present; and insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope with the potential negative consequences.
<b>Disaster Risk</b>	The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets, and services, which could occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time period. Disaster risk is a function of hazard, exposure, and vulnerability. Disaster risk is normally expressed as the probability of loss of life, or destroyed or damaged assets in a given period of time.
<b>Disaster Risk Management (DRM)</b>	The systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies, and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.
<b>Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)</b>	The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, including reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.
<b>Hazard</b>	A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity, or condition that may cause loss of life, injury, or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage. The hazards of concern to disaster risk reduction as stated in footnote 3 of the Hyogo Framework are "... hazards of natural origin and related environmental and technological hazards and risks." Such hazards arise from a variety of geological, meteorological, hydrological, oceanic, biological, and technological sources, sometimes acting in combination.
<b>Early Warning System</b>	The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities, and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.
<b>Mitigation</b>	The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters. Mitigation measures encompass engineering techniques and hazard-resistant construction as well as improved environmental policies and public awareness.

<b>Preparedness</b>	The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent, or current hazard events or conditions.
<b>Prevention</b>	The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters. Prevention (i.e., disaster prevention) expresses the concept and intention to completely avoid potential adverse impacts through action taken in advance. Very often the complete avoidance of losses is not feasible and the task transforms to that of mitigation. Partly for this reason, the terms prevention and mitigation are sometimes used interchangeably in casual use.
<b>Recovery</b>	The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods, and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.
<b>Relief / Response</b>	The provision of emergency services and public assistance during, or immediately after, a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety, and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. Disaster response is predominantly focused on immediate and short-term needs and is sometimes called “disaster relief.”
<b>Resilience / Resilient</b>	The ability of a system, community, or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to, and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.
<b>Risk</b>	The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences.
<b>Risk Management</b>	The systematic approach and practice of managing uncertainty to minimize potential harm and loss. Risk management comprises risk assessment and analysis, and the implementation of strategies and specific actions to control, reduce, and transfer risks. Risk management comprises risk assessment and analysis, and the implementation of strategies and specific actions to control, reduce, and transfer risks.
<b>Vulnerability</b>	The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system, or asset that make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard. Vulnerability may arise from various physical, social, economic, and environmental factors.

Source: UNISDR Terminology on DRR – [www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology](http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology).

## Summary

### Program Objectives, Activities, Governance, and Financing

1. GFDRR was established in September 2006 as a global partnership of the World Bank, UN agencies and bilateral donors, located in World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC. Its missions are (a) to mainstream disaster reduction and climate change adaptation (CCA) in country development strategies, and (b) to foster and strengthen global and regional cooperation among various stakeholders under the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system.

2. GFDRR supports the implementation of the UN 2005–2015 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). This international agreement in relation to disaster risk reduction (DRR) arose from a 168-nation UN conference held in Kyoto, Japan, in 2005. The key player for coordinating the implementation of HFA is the UNISDR bureau with headquarters in Geneva and eight regional offices worldwide. Another UN agency with operational responsibility for UN disaster-related work is the UNDP-BCPR. These two UN agencies and GFDRR have complementary goals, creating potential for collaboration among the three organizations, but also calling for care in monitoring the risk of overlapping work among them and other DRR actors. UNISDR was a founding partner of GFDRR and UNDP-BCPR became a permanent observer to GFDRR in 2008.

3. At the beginning, GFDRR's Partnership Charter specified a work program consisting of three tracks of activities, which still form the basic structure followed by the program today, along with the ACP-EU program that started in FY2012:

- **Track I (about 23 percent of all expenditures through June 2012): Support to the ISDR system through the ISDR Secretariat (UNISDR)** — to enhance global and regional advocacy, partnerships, and knowledge management for disaster reduction. All Track I activities are implemented by UNISDR and financed by an annual grant from the Bank's DGF to UNISDR.
- **Track II (about 61 percent of all expenditures): Support to countries for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction in development** — to provide ex ante support to enhance investments in risk reduction and risk transfer mechanisms, as well as disaster management planning to low- and middle-income countries. Track II activities are administered by the GFDRR Secretariat and financed by donor trust funds established at the World Bank for this purpose.
- **Track III (about 15 percent of all expenditures): Standby Recovery Financing Facility** — to support sustainable recovery in high-risk, low- and middle-income countries. Track III activities are also administered by the GFDRR Secretariat and financed by donor trust funds.
- **ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program (less than 1 percent of program expenditures)** — to help the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of countries address prevention, mitigation, and preparedness to natural hazards in four

priority areas. These activities are administered by the GFDRR Secretariat and financed by the EU Commission.

4. The GFDRR Partnership Charter initially envisaged Tracks I, II, and III activities in all low- and middle-income countries vulnerable to disasters, which remains the case for Tracks I and III. To enhance the impact of Track II activities, however, the program's governing body (the CG) decided in November 2008 to target 80 percent of Track II funding in 20 priority countries — mostly low-income countries selected both for their high vulnerability to natural hazards and for low economic resilience to cope with disaster impacts — and to systemize and deepen GFDRR engagement in 11 donor-earmarked countries, utilizing single-donor trust funds made available by the concerned donors for this purpose.

5. The GFDRR Partnership Strategy 2009–2012 identified three generic types of activities that the program undertakes, which cut across all three Tracks, namely: (a) capacity building, (b) tools and methodology, and (c) knowledge sharing and generation.

6. GFDRR's governance structure has evolved considerably since the program was founded, although the main governing body was, and remains, the CG. Originally conceived to have 20 members altogether, this now has 20 contributing members, seven noncontributing members, two permanent observers, and 20 other observers who attend open sessions of the CG. Also foreseen at inception were a strong Steering Committee (SC) of Director-level Bank representatives to oversee GFDRR's work and budget, and a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) of 10 prominent experts to advise on technical, quality, and monitoring issues. The SC never convened for lack of a quorum and the CG took over its responsibilities in 2007. The CG also replaced the TAG in 2007 with a Results Management Council of 12 technical experts to ensure the quality, relevance, and impact of GFDRR activities.

7. As originally conceived, the GFDRR Secretariat remains charged with administering GFDRR's work program and directly implementing some of its activities. Some Track II and III activities are also implemented by the Bank's regional operations and some by grant recipients. Located in the FEU Department of the World Bank, the Secretariat has a core of full-time staff — 17 at this writing — plus about 20 consultants.

8. The DGF has provided annual grants totaling \$28.5 million to UNISDR from FY2007–12 to implement GFDRR's Track I activities, and the Bank contributed \$3.5 million during FY2007–12 from its administrative budget. Twenty donors have contributed \$226.5 million to Bank-administered trust funds for GFDRR from FY2007–12, of which \$158.0 million was for Track II, \$29.5 million for Track III, and \$39.1 million for ACP-EU. The top seven donors (EU Commission, Sweden, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Norway) have contributed three-quarters of this funding. The original design of the program also foresaw funding from private sources as well (both nonprofit and commercial), but this has yet to materialize.

9. The GFDRR Secretariat has spent \$109.3 million during FY2007–12 (through the end of June 2012). Of this, 69 percent has been spent on Track II, 17 percent on Track III, 0.5 percent on ACP-EU, and 14 percent on administration. The DGF contributed \$28.5 million to Track I, for total expenditures of \$137.8 million over the first six years.

## The External Evaluation

10. In compliance with both DGF and trust fund requirements for periodic external evaluations, the GFDRR Secretariat contracted with the Canadian firm Universalia to carry out such an evaluation during 2009. Notwithstanding some shortcomings in organizational independence, IEG found that the evaluation was behaviorally independent and free from conflicts of interest. The evaluation findings in relation to GFDRR's performance were mostly positive, but some were highly critical, providing further evidence of behavioral independence. IEG agrees with all but two of the 12 major findings of the evaluation.

11. The external evaluation had four key strengths: (1) highlighting the need for more information about GFDRR activities; (2) carrying out on-the-ground observations of GFDRR-supported activities in four countries; (3) pointing out the weaknesses of GFDRR's monitoring & evaluation (M&E) systems; and (4) being highly appreciated by several current CG members. Four shortcomings were: (a) the limited amount of time provided to the consultants to design the evaluation; (b) a lack of baseline references against which to measure GFDRR's performance; (c) insufficient attention to GFDRR financial management and reporting; and (d) unclear treatment of the role and activities of UNISDR.

12. GFDRR's website states that "the evaluation has made several useful recommendations which are being implemented by the Secretariat of GFDRR," but provides no details. IEG found that GFDRR has adopted seven of the 13 recommendations, and has not adopted three recommendations. There is insufficient evidence either way for two recommendations, and the final recommendation was not for GFDRR, itself.

13. The external evaluation was one of nine recent evaluations of GFDRR and its DRR development partners. Three other evaluations of GFDRR itself found the program's performance satisfactory overall. Four evaluations of UNISDR all refer to the bureau's ill-defined mandate and lack of regular budget as undermining its performance. While IEG has not verified the findings of the seven other evaluations in detail, it has reviewed their reports in order to compare their findings with those of the Universalia evaluation in order to triangulate the conclusions arising from this GPR.

## Relevance of Objectives and Program Design

14. IEG found the supply-side and the demand-side relevance of GFDRR's objectives to be substantial and high, respectively. There exists a strong international consensus, supported by both donor and recipient countries, in favor of incorporating DRR into sustainable development, as evidenced by the 2005 HFA, and reaffirmed more recently at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in December 2011. However, among the stakeholders interviewed, IEG found some different understandings of what GFDRR's objective of *mainstreaming* DRR and CCA actually means. IEG suggests that GFDRR provide a clear definition of what it understands by mainstreaming.

15. IEG also found substantial evidence for vertical and horizontal relevance. Locating the GFDRR program inside the World Bank has allowed a flat-budget Bank to expand its DRR work through greater provision of country-level technical assistance to client countries and

through increased focus on pre-disaster risk reduction. This has also enabled donors to extend the reach of their DRR activities through funding, while leaving the administration to the GFDRR Secretariat. While GFDRR is active in a field with many players, including UNISDR, UNDP, and the IFRC, there is plenty of scope to divide up the labor. GFDRR's comparative advantage is in providing technical and financial assistance that is integrated with the World Bank's country operations. GFDRR benefits from the Bank's ready access to Ministries of Finance and Development Planning, thereby facilitating the incorporation of DRR considerations into a policy dialogue at governments' highest levels of decision making. It also benefits from the presence of country-level Bank staff to adequately supervise this technical and financial support.

16. GFDRR made a strong case at inception for addressing DRR as a priority, and for strengthening global and regional partnerships to support DRR. Formulating a well-articulated program logic or theory of change would substantially improve its relevance of design. Its current results framework, developed after the 2010 external evaluation, is also a work in progress, which should better connect activities, outputs, and outcomes to program objectives. The GFDRR Secretariat has instituted a results-based management system to improve program monitoring.

### **Efficacy: The Achievement of Expected Outputs and Objectives**

17. A detailed analysis of the program's expenditures and grant disbursements during its first six years reveals that GFDRR has been first and foremost a capacity-building program, which has accounted for 81 percent of project commitments and 74 percent of disbursements administered by the GFDRR Secretariat. Like the other 20 or so GRPPs located in the World Bank that are providing country-level technical assistance, GFDRR is mostly supporting the provision of national public goods in relation to disaster preparedness, prevention, and recovery. GFDRR is also supporting the provision of global public goods in terms of knowledge sharing and generation, which accounted for 15 percent of project commitments and 20 percent of disbursements during the period, as well as the development of tools and methodologies, which accounted for 5 percent of project commitments and 6 percent of disbursements.

18. Of the \$65.9 million that GFDRR spent on capacity building during FY2007–12, roughly 19 percent was spent on strategic planning, 43 percent on institutional and human capacity development, 10 percent on post-disaster needs assessments, 3 percent on specific training courses, and 25 percent on support to Bank lending operations — in the form of Bank-executed trust funds for preparation and supervision (13 percent) or recipient-executed trust funds for financing for Bank investment projects (12 percent). That is, \$16.5 million of trust fund disbursements — equivalent to 16 percent of GFDRR's total trust fund disbursements during the period — were used to support 35 Bank investment operations. This is roughly the same percentage that Bank-executed trust funds are now contributing to the Bank's overall administrative budget.

19. Geographically, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific have been the largest recipients of Track II, III, and ACP-EU support. Slightly more than half (51 percent) of Track II country-level disbursements have gone to



priority core countries, compared to the target of 80 percent, and 12 percent of Track II disbursements have gone to donor-earmarked countries. An additional 11 percent of Track II disbursements have gone to “hotspot” countries that are not priority or donor-earmarked countries, and 26 percent to other countries (none of the above categories). “Hotspot” countries are 36 countries identified in the 2005 study, *Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis*, in which more than half of the country’s Gross Domestic Product is at risk from two or more hazards.

20. The World Bank’s regional operations have been responsible for implementing (or supervising the implementation of) more than half (54 percent) of GFDRR activities by disbursements, and the GFDRR Secretariat itself for most of the remaining activities. The Bank’s Regional DRM Coordinators play a major role in selecting activities in their regions to submit for GFDRR financing. It would appear that these requests for GFDRR support are closely related to client demand as reflected in the Bank’s CASs. An IEG analysis found that 88 percent of GFDRR client countries, accounting for 89 percent of GFDRR country-level disbursements, had references to disaster risk reduction in their most recent CASs or Interim Strategy Notes. This is higher than the share of all Bank clients (75 percent) that have disaster-sensitive CASs. This is one of the strongest linkages that IEG has so far observed among its GPRs between GRPP-supported activities and the Bank’s country operations.

21. In terms of achieving GFDRR’s first mission — mainstreaming DRR and CCA into poverty reduction strategies (PRSs), CASs, United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), and National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs) — there has been both a quantitative and a qualitative improvement in the way in which the Bank’s CASs have treated disaster risk issues, and a clear shift toward risk reduction in Bank-supported investment projects since 2006. The Bank’s Regional DRM Coordinators assert that GFDRR has elevated DRR to a new level of operationalization in the Bank through systematically focusing on ex ante risk reduction. Attributing these changes only, or even primarily, to GFDRR is not, however, a straightforward matter.

22. In terms of achieving its second mission — more global and regional cooperation over DRR — GFDRR has provided the opportunity for the Bank to cooperate with regional agencies with which the Bank works little, such as the Association of South Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ACP group of countries, and the African Union Commission (AUC). The partnership has also brought together actors from both the humanitarian side of DRR, such as the IFRC, and the sustainable development side, such as the European Union. GFDRR has also reached out to the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development for close cooperation, although these have not become governance partners as envisaged in 2006. The Islamic Development Bank has become one of GFDRR’s latest governance partners.

23. The Bank’s Regional DRM Coordinators assert that GFDRR has also played a key role in catalyzing and sustaining an active knowledge community of practice in the area of disaster risk reduction in the World Bank. This community has in turn fostered strong and effective communications and learning channels for rapid sharing of lessons across countries, regions, and sectors. GFDRR’s connections with external organizations and think tanks have also brought some of their latest thinking to the Bank’s policy advice and investments.

GFDRR's technical, financial, and human resources have created space for opening up a productive dialogue in the Bank on ex-ante disaster risk reduction and on more effective and sustainable post-disaster recovery and reconstruction.

## **Efficiency**

24. GFDRR has experienced rapid growth since 2006 in response to evident demand from developing countries. Annual program commitments have grown from \$6.4 million in FY2007 to \$42.2 million in FY2012, and annual disbursements from \$5.2 million in FY2008 to \$35.3 million in FY2012. However, cumulative disbursements were only 45.4 percent of total paid-in donor contributions as of June 30, 2012. The program should provide its donors with a detailed analysis of the reasons for the unused contributions, in addition to commitment or implementation delays, such as the multi-year nature of the commitments, the timing of commitments (near the end of each fiscal year, for example), or simply a period of continuing growth of the program during which disbursements inevitably lag behind commitments.

25. The administrative costs of the GFDRR Secretariat as a share of total expenditures administered by the Secretariat (i.e. not including Track I) have declined steadily as the program has grown. At 11.3 percent in 2012 and 14.1 percent over the entire period, these are comparable to other technical assistance and investment programs that IEG has reviewed.

26. IEG did not encounter any evidence of financial mismanagement or misuse of funds. However, financial and operational reporting needs improvement. Part of the weak reporting which IEG observed can also be attributed to the World Bank as host of the GFDRR Secretariat. While the Bank has been improving its resource management and accounting systems for Bank-administered trust funds over the last few years, it has not yet established consistent institution-wide standards for GRPP management units located in the Bank. Bank management is aware of these deficiencies and is addressing them under the ongoing trust fund reform process.

## **Governance, Management, and Sustainability**

27. GFDRR has a stakeholder model of governance with four international and regional organizations, 15 donor agencies, and eight developing country members on its governing body, the CG. GFDRR also welcomes more than 20 observers to attend the open sessions of the CG. The inclusion of developing country members in the CG has enhanced GFDRR's legitimacy, but the growth of the CG appears to have hindered its efficiency. The CG is currently deliberating various governance options to achieve an appropriate balance between the two.

28. The key accountability question faced by GFDRR concerns the roles and responsibilities of the CG in the governance of the program. Taking the Partnership Charter at face value, GFDRR was initially set up as a partnership program with shared governance in which members have shared responsibility for programmatic oversight and shared accountability for results. In reality, the Bank appears to be assuming the lion's share of the oversight and accountability.

29. IEG found a very close identification of GFDRR with the World Bank, in contrast with some other GRPPs located in the Bank which have developed brands that are more distinct from the Bank. Indeed, many stakeholders whom IEG interviewed, as well as the 2010 external evaluation, referred to the program as the “World Bank GFDRR” and viewed GFDRR activities as World Bank activities.

30. From the point of view of the Bank, GFDRR acts both as a global partnership program and as the institutional home (or anchor) for DRM practice in the Bank. The new title of the GFDRR manager as “Manager, Disaster Risk Management and Head of the GFDRR Secretariat” reflects this dual role. Even though GFDRR’s donors seem to be content with this situation, there is still a need to transparently identify and manage the potential conflicts of interest that could arise from the multiple roles that the Bank plays in GFDRR, and the dual roles that the Secretariat plays. It would be good to clarify for what issues the GFDRR manager is accountable to his World Bank line manager and to CG members, respectively.

31. These findings provide additional evidence to support IEG’s recent recommendation that the Bank should formulate and adopt a formal policy for hosting the management units of GRPPs inside the Bank (IEG 2011b, p. xxi).

32. Although the HFA will expire in 2015, the government of Japan has offered to the UN to host a conference on disaster reduction in 2015 which would consider and approve a possible successor arrangement. In addition, UNISDR recently issued a nine-page discussion paper entitled, “Towards a Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Reduction,” that calls for ideas that might spell out the form that a successor framework might eventually take (UNISDR 2012). The 12th meeting of the CG in April 2012 discussed a roadmap for the development of its 2013–16 Partnership Strategy, to be informed by the post-2015 HFA and the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) agreements.

33. The imminent expiration of the HFA and the growing momentum for climate change adaptation provide a good opportunity for GFDRR’s members to consider how to continue working together in the context of GFDRR. Working in partnership has definite advantages in pooling funds, building consensus and momentum on a topic, and making sure that the activities are worthwhile. To realize all these benefits, the governance roles of the CG need to be clarified and strengthened. To make the CG’s work more efficient, it may be advisable to create a smaller executive committee to work more closely with the Secretariat in between CG meetings.

## **Bank Performance as a Partner**

34. The Bank has played many roles in GFDRR as founder, as chair of the CG, as a financial contributor through DGF grants and the Bank’s administrative budget, as trustee of the donor trust funds for Tracks II and III, as host of the Secretariat, and as implementing agency of regional and country-level activities.

35. As *founder*, the Bank mobilized extensive financial support for GFDRR among bilateral donors in particular, but was less successful in bringing about the participation of regional development banks and the commercial private sector, as originally conceived. As a

*donor*, the Bank has contributed \$28.5 million to UNISDR from FY2007–12, thereby partnering with the larger effort to mainstream disaster risk reduction under the ISDR system.

36. As *trustee* of the donor trust funds for Tracks II and III, the Bank’s performance has been comparable to that for other trust-funded programs. As *host* of the GFDRR Secretariat, the Bank has provided many excellent support services to GFDRR, but is still in the process of improving its resource management and accounting systems for Bank-administered trust funds to facilitate more efficient financial and operational reporting.

37. As the *implementing agency* of GFDRR work at the country level, the Bank has brought four decades of experience in disaster-related assistance. The Bank’s Regional DRM Coordinators have liaised closely with the GFDRR Secretariat and appear to have been effective in channeling country-level demands for DRR assistance to GFDRR. As the world’s leading development finance institution, the Bank has provided an effective platform for incorporating risk reduction, not only into International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association (IDA)-supported investments, but also into substantially larger government investment programs.

38. As *chair of the CG*, the Bank’s oversight of GFDRR has been substantial. While the GFDRR manager has had day-to-day managerial responsibility, the FEU Director has exercised overall oversight with regard to the global partnership agenda, GFDRR staffing, annual deliverables, quality control of flagship programs, and trust fund fiduciary requirements.

## Lessons

39. IEG’s review of GFDRR and of its external evaluation leads to the following lessons learned for GFDRR and for the World Bank.

### FOR GFDRR

- ***The GFDRR experience shows the need for clear and coherent program objectives at the outset.*** While the objectives formulated at the program’s inception have remained relevant in most respects, different stakeholders have had different understandings of what “mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation” actually means. GFDRR’s original mission statements could also have provided a clearer mandate for its Track III activities aimed at assisting recovery in post-disaster situations.
- ***GFDRR has successfully mobilized sizeable donor trust funds to enable the World Bank’s regional operations to expand their country-level technical assistance activities in DRR and CCA to build greater resilience into economic development.*** As a global program, GFDRR needs to continue to calibrate its support at the national and local levels, where nearly all DRR action takes place, with support for global and regional public goods (such as global knowledge and regional coordination).
- ***Being active in a field with many players, GFDRR’s comparative advantage in relation to the other actors in this field is in providing technical and financial assistance***

that is integrated with the World Bank's country operations, and in drawing upon the Bank's long experience in disaster-related assistance. It can also play an important role in improving country-level coordination and collaboration among the various development partners, including UNISDR and UNDP-BCPR.

- ***GFDRR could further improve its financial and operational reporting to effectively assess progress, to communicate the results it has achieved, and to take the necessary actions to improve performance.*** GFDRR needs more rigorous systems for reporting its work plans, for selecting activities, for monitoring their implementation, and for assessing their results at completion.
- ***Private sector involvement in the governance and financing of GFDRR, foreseen at the outset, has not materialized to date.*** GFDRR needs to develop a strategy, like its civil society partnership strategy, for commercial private sector participation in its work consistent with private sector interests and motivations. DRR should be of direct interest both to commercial enterprises operating in vulnerable areas and to nonprofit groups keen to partner with DRR efforts led by the public sector. A fully engaged private sector is necessary for successfully incorporating DRR into sustainable development.
- ***The CG needs to decide whether Tracks II and III of GFDRR are intended to be a global partnership program with shared governance.*** Is the governing body intended to be a collaborative body with shared responsibility for programmatic oversight and shared accountability for results? Or is it intended to be primarily a consultative body that provides some strategic direction to the program, but in which the Bank is primarily responsible for oversight and accountable for results?

#### FOR THE WORLD BANK

- ***Track I has not been an integral part of GFDRR.*** The Bank's sponsoring department and the DGF Council could have considered alternative ways of partnering with an autonomous agency such as UNISDR. Either the DGF grant could have been given to UNISDR in support of UNISDR's own program of activities without placing them under the rubric of GFDRR, or the grant could have been channeled through GFDRR as part of a two-step process, first to the GFDRR Secretariat and then to UNISDR like a recipient-executed trust fund grant.
- ***While generally satisfactory, the Bank's performance as host of the GFDRR Secretariat could be strengthened in some specific areas.*** The Bank needs to continue to improve its resource management and accounting systems to facilitate better financial and operational reporting by GRPPs located in the Bank. The Bank could also provide more support in setting up effective M&E systems. This review provides additional evidence to support IEG's recent recommendation that the Bank should develop a formal policy for hosting the management units of GRPPs in the Bank.



# 1. Program Objectives, Activities, Governance, and Financing

## Origin and Objectives

1.1 The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) was established in September 2006 as a global partnership of the World Bank, United Nations (UN) agencies and bilateral donors, located in the World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC. Its missions are (a) to mainstream disaster reduction and climate change adaptation in country development strategies, and (b) to foster and strengthen global and regional cooperation among various stakeholders under the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system (GFDRR 2010a, p. 2).

1.2 GFDRR was conceived to support the implementation of the United Nations 2005–2015 Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) entitled “Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters,” the international agreement on the subject, which came out of a 168-nation, conference held in Kyoto, Japan in 2005. The strategic goals of the HFA are to integrate disaster risk considerations into development policies and programs, to strengthen relevant organizations at all levels, and to systematically incorporate risk reduction into countries’ preparedness, response, and recovery programs (UNISDR 2005a, pp. 3–4, and Table 1). Thus, the HFA was a global call for *disaster risk reduction* (DRR), which is extensively cited in GFDRR work. DRR is defined as the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters, the definition used in this Global Program Review (GPR).<sup>1</sup>

1.3 A contemporaneous Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) evaluation, *Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development* (2006), recommended that the Bank give more attention to planning ahead before disasters occurred and to reducing long-term vulnerability in countries at highest risk. While the Bank had established a Disaster Management Facility (DMF) in its Urban Department in 1998 (which later became the Hazard Management Unit, HMU), and while the Bank had been involved in disaster-related assistance for several decades, often on a very large scale, most of this assistance had focused on post-disaster reconstruction as opposed to disaster risk reduction per se. The establishment of GFDRR, and the absorption of the HMU into GFDRR, was intended to put more of the Bank’s focus on country-level technical assistance for pre-disaster risk reduction while continuing to support post-disaster reconstruction and recovery with the Bank’s lending program.

1.4 Coordinating the implementation of the HFA and its associated DRR is the responsibility of the Geneva-based ISDR Secretariat (UNISDR)<sup>2</sup> (Table 1). This bureau has

---

1. [www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology](http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology). According to this definition, DRR includes reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.

2. UNISDR has its headquarters in Geneva, and eight regional and subregional offices where half its 90 staff work (in Kenya, Panama, Egypt, Thailand, Japan, Fiji, Belgium, and Kazakhstan). It has annual expenditures of around \$25 million funded by donors’ voluntary contributions, half of which comes from the Bank (the largest contributor), Sweden, and the Republic of Korea.

**Table 1. Goals, Objectives, and Activities of United Nations' DRR Initiatives**

	<i>United Nations Development Program - Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR)</i>	<i>UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)</i>	<i>Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)</i>
<i>Dates</i>	Since 1998	Since 1999	2005–2015
<i>Goals</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Take UN operational responsibility for natural disaster mitigation, prevention, and preparedness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Become UN focal point for its system for the coordination of DRR</li> <li>• Ensure synergies among disaster reduction activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrate DRR into sustainable development policies and planning</li> <li>• Strengthen capacities to build resilience to hazards</li> <li>• Incorporate DRR into emergency preparedness, response, and recovery programs</li> </ul>
<i>Objectives and Activities</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Assist countries to develop institutions, policies, and laws for DRR</li> <li>• Analyze, prevent, and manage climate change risks</li> <li>• Integrate CCA and DRR into national development plans</li> <li>• Implement community-level disaster preparedness</li> <li>• Promote DRR gender analysis</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apply DRR to climate change adaptation</li> <li>• Increase investments for DRR</li> <li>• Build disaster-resilient cities, schools, and hospitals</li> <li>• Strengthen the international system for DRR</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensure DRR is a national and a local priority with a strong institutional basis for implementation</li> <li>• Identify, assess, and monitor disaster risks</li> <li>• Use knowledge, innovation, and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all levels</li> <li>• Reduce the underlying risk factors</li> <li>• Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels</li> </ul>

*Sources:*

(a) [www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus\\_areas/climate\\_disaster\\_risk\\_reduction\\_and\\_recovery/introduction.html](http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/climate_disaster_risk_reduction_and_recovery/introduction.html);

(b) [www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/mandate](http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/mandate); and

(c) [www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037](http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/1037).

been the UN focal point for coordinating DRR since 2001, through UN General Assembly Resolution 56/195. The same resolution gave the United Nations' *operational responsibility* for DRR to the United Nations Development Programme's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR). These two UN agencies and GFDRR, itself, have complementary aims and objectives, creating potential for collaboration among the three initiatives.

1.5 Both UNISDR and UNDP-BCPR became founding partners of GFDRR, along with the World Bank and bilateral donors, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland (GFDRR 2007, p. 34). Initially, 20 possible partners were foreseen, including representatives of regional development banks and private organizations who have yet to sign up (World Bank and UNISDR 2006). The partnership now has 26 members and 23 observers, with the addition of more bilateral and multilateral donors and recipient country partners.



1.6 At the outset, the GFDRR Partnership Charter established two missions for the program, each with DRR at its heart:<sup>3</sup>

- **Mission 1:** To mainstream disaster reduction and climate change adaptation (CCA) in country development strategies, such as poverty reduction strategies (PRSS) and country assistance strategies (CASs), United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs), and National Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs), to reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards. At the national and local levels, it also includes other sectoral development strategies that low- or middle-income countries may undertake to alleviate poverty and address sustainable growth.
- **Mission 2:** To foster and strengthen global and regional cooperation among various stakeholders under the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system, such as low- and middle-income country governments, international financial institutions (IFIs), UN agencies, research and academic institutions, intergovernmental organizations, civil society organizations (CSOs), and the private sector; and to leverage country systems and programs in disaster reduction and recovery. It promotes global and regional partnerships in (i) developing new tools, practical approaches and other instruments for disaster reduction and recovery, (ii) fostering an enabling environment at the country level that can generate greater investment in disaster mitigation practices within a sustainable legal, policy, financial, and regulatory framework, (iii) facilitating knowledge sharing in reducing disaster risks and sustainable disaster recovery, and (iv) creating adaptive capacities for limiting the impact of climate change. (GFDRR 2010a, p. 2)

1.7 The October 28, 2010, version of the GFDRR Results Framework, approved by GFDRR's governing body, the Consultative Group (CG), has translated these mission statements into three developmental objectives, as follows:

- **Objective 1:** To expand, strengthen, and deepen global and regional partnerships for supporting national disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation.
- **Objective 2:** To contribute towards mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation as key elements of sustainable development in priority countries.
- **Objective 3:** To assist post-disaster countries in achieving efficient, effective, and resilient disaster recovery, while promoting and leveraging greater disaster risk reduction.

1.8 Comparing the two mission statements with the three objectives, IEG suggests revisiting the mission statements to provide a clearer reference to objective 3 on assisting recovery in post-disaster countries. While subsequent parts of the Partnership Charter (notably paragraphs 18–21) describe GFDRR's post-disaster recovery activities, GFDRR would benefit from a well-articulated mission statement for its important recovery work.

---

3. These mission statements were part of the original Partnership Charter of January 2007 and are retained in the current version of the Charter revised in 2010.

Both references to “recovery” in the Charter’s second mission statement only refer to developing new tools and facilitating knowledge sharing about sustainable disaster recovery in the context of promoting global and regional partnerships, not by directly assisting the recovery efforts themselves.

## **GFDRR Activities<sup>4</sup>**

1.9 At the beginning, GFDRR’s Partnership Charter specified a work program consisting of three tracks of activities, currently called “service lines” on the GFDRR website. These still form the basic structure followed by the program today (GFDRR 2010a, pp. 3–7), along with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group States – European Union (ACP-EU) program that started in FY2012. The Charter does not describe the activities, or categories of activities, that will be conducted in each of Tracks I, II, or III. The information reported in this GPR about the activities under each track is taken from GFDRR Annual Reports, the 2009–2012 Partnership Strategy, and the website.

1.10 ***Track I activities (about 23 percent of program expenditures through June 2012): Support to the ISDR System through the ISDR Secretariat*** — to enhance global and regional advocacy, partnerships, and knowledge management for disaster reduction. Track I activities reported on the GFDRR website include global advocacy, regional policy dialogue, and capacity development (Box 1). Two of the largest Track I activities have been:

- UNISDR regional advocacy and outreach capacity enhanced in all regions (\$900,000), approved July 2006
- Support capacity development of regional economic communities in Africa for linking CCA and DRR (\$639,800), approved January 2010.

Track I activities aim to contribute to achieving stronger global and regional partnerships and cooperation — program results intended by GFDRR’s Mission 2/Objective 1. The activities are implemented by UNISDR and financed by an annual grant from the World Bank’s Development Grant Facility (DGF). Although these funds flow directly from the DGF to UNISDR, and not through the GFDRR Secretariat, the DGF does not release the funds until a GFDRR manager approves UNISDR’s annual work program for Track I. This work program is divided into regional components and developed in consultation with the six Regional Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Coordinators in the Bank.

1.11 ***Track II activities (about 61 percent of program expenditures): Support to countries for mainstreaming disaster reduction in development*** — to provide ex-ante technical and financial support to enhance investments in risk reduction and risk transfer mechanisms, as well as disaster management planning in low- and middle-income countries. Track II activities reported on the GFDRR website include a range of activities from priority country programs to the European Union’s DRR program for the ACP group of countries.

---

4. GFDRR’s Partnership Charter uses the term “activities” to explain the contents of GFDRR’s three-track, work program, but does not describe them, or provide examples of the types of activities to be pursued by the program. The Charter focuses instead upon the processing of these “activities.” It does not explicitly describe or explain, among other things, what they will be, what outputs they are expected to produce, from where they will originate, how they will be approved, or how they will be coordinated and implemented.

## **Box 1. GFDRR Activities**

### **Track I – Global and Regional Partnerships**

- Global advocacy
- Regional policy dialogue and capacity development

### **Track II – Mainstreaming DRR and CCA**

- Priority country programs
- Integrating DRM and CCA in development planning
- Capacity development and training
- Disaster risk financing and insurance
- Strengthening weather and climate information and decision-support systems
- Knowledge development and learning
- South-South cooperation
- Data for resilience – the GFDRR Labs
- Climate change adaptation

### **Track III – Sustainable Recovery**

- Technical Assistance Fund
  - Quick Reaction Team and Standby Recovery Team
  - Damage, loss, and needs assessment – tools and methodology
  - Training
  - Post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA)
- Callable Fund

### **ACP-EU – Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program**

- Window 1 – Regional/sub-regional cooperation to advance country-level DRR agendas
- Window 2 – Technical assistance for DRR and CCA policy development and implementation
- Window 3 – Technical assistance for rapid post-disaster recovery in ACP countries.

*Source:* Constructed by the IEG from the activities listed on the GFDRR website.

The six largest Track II activities approved during the first six years have been:

- Somalia: Drought Management and Livelihood Protection Project (\$5.1 million), approved September 2011
- Sub-Saharan Africa: Strengthening DRR and Adaptation Framework for Sustainable Poverty Reduction (\$3.0 million), approved June 2011
- Vietnam: Institutional Capacity and Consensus Building for DRR (\$2.05 million), approved June 2010
- DRM Lab (\$2.05 million), approved November 2010
- Indonesia: Mainstreaming DRR, Phase II (\$2.0 million), approved July 2010.

1.12 Track II activities aim to contribute to mainstreaming DRR and CCA in country-development strategies and sustainable development in priority countries — the intended results of GFDRR’s Mission 1/Objective 2. Country-level activities are integrated into the Bank’s country operations. Demand arises from policy and strategic dialogues between client governments and the Bank’s country teams, and is channeled through the six DRM Coordinators (one for each region) to the GFDRR Secretariat in the Bank’s Finance,

Economics, and Urban (FEU) Department. The GFDRR Secretariat allocates its available resources among priority countries according to criteria laid out in the Partnership Charter (GFDRR 2010a, p. 7). The Secretariat also undertakes some global-level activities and maintains working relationships with other development partners active in the field.

**1.13 Track III activities (about 15 percent of program expenditures): Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF)** — to support sustainable recovery in high-risk, low- and middle-income countries. Track III activities reported on the GFDRR website comprise two financing windows. The Technical Assistance Fund supports damage, loss, and needs assessment, and subsequent recovery and reconstruction planning. The Callable Fund provides speedy access to financial resources for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. The four largest Track III activities during the first six years have been:

- Bangladesh: Emergency Cyclone Recovery and Restoration Project (\$3.0 million), approved March 2008
- Jamaica: Early Recovery and Disaster Risk Reduction after Hurricane Gustav (\$1.8 million), approved July 2010
- Horn of Africa Drought Response (\$1.0 million), approved December 2011
- Myanmar: Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery in the Aftermath of Cyclone Nargis (\$885,000), approved May 2008.

Track III activities are funded by donor contributions and implemented by GFDRR, itself, the World Bank's regional operations, or recipient countries. Track III activities aim to be of assistance to countries' post-disaster recovery — the intended result of GFDRR's Objective 3.

**1.14 ACP-EU Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program (less than 1 percent of program expenditures).** Started in FY2012, the main objective is to help ACP countries address prevention, mitigation, and preparedness to natural hazards in four priority areas: (a) mainstreaming of DRR; (b) risk identification and assessment; (c) early warning systems and communication on DRR; and (d) risk transfer and integration of DRR into post-disaster recovery. This program has three windows that are similar to Tracks I, II, and III for GFDRR overall (Box 1).

**1.15 Scope of GFDRR activities — 20 priority and 11 donor-earmarked countries:** At the outset, the GFDRR Partnership Charter foresaw program activities from **Tracks I, II, and III** in “low- and middle-income countries<sup>5</sup> that are at most risk to mainstream disaster reduction in national development strategies.” (GFDRR 2010a, p. 1). This focus on disaster hotspot countries remains the case for **Track I** activities with their global and regional reach, and for **Track III** activities for which all low- and middle-income, *post-disaster* countries are eligible. To enhance the impact of **Track II** activities, however, the 5th GFDRR CG meeting in November 2008 requested the GFDRR Secretariat to concentrate 80 percent of Track II funding upon 20 priority countries (Table 2). These are mostly low-income countries selected both for their high

---

5. Low-income countries are defined as those eligible for International Development Association (IDA) assistance and middle-income countries as those eligible for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) assistance.

**Table 2. GFDRR Priority and Donor-Earmarked Countries, by Region**

World Bank Region	Priority Countries	Donor-Earmarked Countries	Disaster Hotspot Countries <sup>a</sup>
Sub-Saharan Africa	Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Togo		South Africa
East Asia and the Pacific	Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vietnam	Mongolia, Lao PDR, Philippines, Vanuatu	China, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam
Europe and Central Asia	Kyrgyz Republic		Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania, Turkey, Uzbekistan,
Latin America and the Caribbean	Haiti, Panama	Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala,	Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela
Middle East and North Africa	Djibouti, Republic of Yemen		Iran, Jordan, Tunisia
South Asia	Nepal	Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka	Bangladesh

Source: [www.gfdr.org/gfdr/node/156](http://www.gfdr.org/gfdr/node/156) and Dille et al. (2005).

a. The 36 disaster hotspot countries are those in which more than half of the country's Gross Domestic Product is at risk from two or more hazards (Dilly et al., 2005, *Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis*).

vulnerability to natural hazards and for low economic resilience to cope with disaster impacts, including anticipated climate change and variability. The 5th CG meeting also asked GFDRR to systemize and deepen its engagement in 11 donor-earmarked countries, utilizing single-donor, trust funds made available by the concerned donors for this purpose (GFDRR 2009, p. v).

1.16 The GFDRR Partnership Strategy 2009–2012 identified three generic types of activities that the program undertakes, which cut across all three Tracks:

- (a) **Capacity building:** Developing effective institutional, governance, legislative, and financing frameworks for DRR and mainstreaming DRR in sectoral development strategies.
- (b) **Tools and methodologies:** Developing new tools, practical approaches, and other instruments for disaster reduction and recovery.
- (c) **Knowledge sharing and generation:** Developing and sharing evidence-based DRR actions; making an economic case for DRR; and documenting and disseminating good practices on mainstreaming DRR and formulating risk reduction strategies.

## Governance

1.17 The governance of GFDRR has evolved considerably since the program was founded in 2006, although the main governing body of GFDRR was, and remains, the CG (Table 3). According to the GFDRR Partnership Charter, the CG is responsible for (a) defining GFDRR long-term policies and strategies; (b) adopting GFDRR's multi-year results framework; (c) adopting procedures for approval and operational guidelines; (d) approving the countries, regions, themes and work program for Track II; (e) sharing DRR experiences; (f) facilitating overall coordination of GFDRR activities; (g) confirming donor pledges and mobilizing additional resources; (h) nominating Results Management Council (RMC) members; (i) supervising and guiding GFDRR; and (j) approving and amending the GFDRR Charter (GFDRR 2010a, pp. 8–9).

1.18 Originally, a governing body of 20 members had been envisaged for the partnership, representing donor and recipient countries — who have taken major roles — as well as international organizations, regional development banks, the commercial private sector and charities — whose participation has not materialized (World Bank and UNISDR 2006, p. 23). A 2007 amendment to the Charter added more beneficiary countries in response to a quality-at-entry review by the Bank's Quality Assurance Group that found the governing body to be donor-dominated with inadequate representation from developing countries. While more inclusive, the 2007 Partnership Charter limited membership on the governing body to developing countries who made financial contributions to the program of at least \$500,000 over three consecutive years (Table 3). The 2008–2009 list of CG members included only three beneficiary countries.

1.19 The 9th CG meeting in 2010 revised the Charter once again to add more beneficiary countries to the governing body. The new Charter allowed the participation of six more developing and recipient countries as noncontributing members on a two-year, staggered rotation basis upon invitation by the CG. Today, the CG has 20 contributing members, UNISDR, six noncontributing members, two permanent observers (IFRC and UNDP-BCPR), and 20 other observers.<sup>6</sup> The Program's Partnership Charter and its Partnership Strategy for 2009–2012 continues to underscore the importance of partnering with the private sector, but leaving the modes of the private sector's involvement unspecified.

1.20 The original design foresaw, in addition to the CG, the creation of a Steering Committee (SC) — perhaps inspired by the model of a Sector Board within the Bank — to be chaired by the Bank's Director for Urban Development and including regional sector directors, the Director of Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) and the Director of UNISDR to approve GFDRR's budget and work program and review and monitor their implementation (World Bank and UNISDR 2006, pp. 23–24). For lack of quorum, the SC did not convene and its intended oversight responsibilities were formally assumed by the CG in 2007.

---

6. UNDP and IFRC have taken part in CG meetings as permanent observers since 2008 and 2009, respectively. Other observers are typically (a) former contributing members whose three-year contributions have expired, (b) developing countries whose two-year terms have finished, or (c) others who are attending the CG to familiarize themselves with the GFDRR in order to be able to take an informed decision about joining. The Partnership Charter has not reflected this since it only makes reference to donors and partners.

**Table 3. The Evolution of GFDRR's Governance Structures**

	Consultative Group (CG)	Steering Committee (SC)	Technical Advisory Group (TAG)
September 2006 (initially planned according to DGF Partnership Review Note and first draft of Partnership Charter in January 2007)	<p><b>Composition:</b> Donors, UNISDR, TAG experts selected by CG, contributing beneficiary countries <sup>a</sup></p> <p><b>Key Functions:</b> Provide strategic direction, facilitate donor coordination, resource mobilization, review GFDRR's performance, nominate members of SC and TAG</p> <p><b>Reporting line:</b> Reports to Management Oversight Board of ISDR system</p>	<p><b>Composition:</b> Directors of World Bank Regions and OPCS; UNISDR Director; up to 10 representatives of intergovernmental organizations, private sector, foundations, etc., appointed by CG Chair and Co-Chair. Chair: World Bank Director of FEU Department</p> <p><b>Key functions:</b> Approve work program and budget, review Secretariat's performance, and oversee TAG</p> <p><b>Reporting Line:</b> Reports to CG</p>	<p><b>Composition:</b> Up to 10 prominent experts from regions or areas of expertise appointed by Chair and Co-Chair of CG for two years</p> <p><b>Key Functions:</b> Ensure quality and relevance of program activities</p> <p><b>Reporting line:</b> Advises SC and CG</p>
2007	<p><b>Consultative Group (CG)</b></p> <p><b>Composition:</b> World Bank Vice President (Chair), UNISDR, Chair of RMC, donors contributing at least \$3 million over three consecutive years, beneficiary countries contributing at least \$500,000 over three consecutive years</p> <p><b>Functions:</b> Strategic direction, adopting results framework, approving project approval procedures and operating guidelines, resource mobilization</p> <p><b>Reporting line:</b> Self-governing</p>	<p><b>Results Management Council (RMC)</b> (replaced SC and TAG)</p> <p><b>Composition:</b> World Bank FEU Director, UNISDR Director, Head of GFDRR Secretariat, five representative from CSOs, private sector, foundations, etc., appointed by the Chair of CG for two years; five prominent experts appointed by Chair and Co-Chair of CG</p> <p><b>Functions:</b> Technical guidance and advice on results framework; reviewing GFDRR strategy; ensuring quality of GFDRR activities</p> <p><b>Reporting line:</b> CG and GFDRR Secretariat.</p>	
2008 and 2009	UNDP-BCPR and the IFRC joined CG as permanent observers		
2010	Additional beneficiary countries were added to participate as noncontributing members on two-year, staggered rotation basis upon CG invitation		

Source: GFDRR Partnership Charters, 2006 to 2010.


a. The initial document gave the following breakdown of the 20 partners: four representatives of donor governments (four largest contributors to the facility); chair of UNISDR or his nominee; four representatives of World Bank client countries (two largest IBRD and IDA borrowers, measured as percent of Gross National Product, determined on a two-year basis); two representatives of the private sector/charities/foundations/trusts (two largest contributors to the Facility); three representatives of Regional Development Banks; five representatives of international organizations (industries/academic/professional networks); and the World Bank (chair). World Bank and UNISDR 2006, page 23.

1.21 Also foreseen and not implemented was a TAG consisting of experts and professionals drawn from developed and developing countries to advise on technical, quality, and monitoring issues. In 2007, these functions were taken on by a new RMC of 12 technical experts to ensure “the quality and relevance and impact of the GFDRR-financed activities.”

The RMC's responsibilities include: (a) providing technical guidance and advice to the GFDRR Secretariat on establishing DRR results framework; (b) reviewing and commenting on GFDRR strategy and annual work programs prior to CG presentation; (c) contributing to evaluation of impacts of annual work programs through *ex post* evaluation of selected activities; (d) building capacity to sustain and replicate the work of GFDRR; and (e) performing other functions as requested by GFDRR Secretariat (GFDRR 2010a, pp. 10–11). The Charter also requires the RMC to meet in person twice a year.

1.22 As originally conceived, the GFDRR Secretariat remains charged with administering GFDRR's work program and implementing some of its activities. The Secretariat is located in the FEU Department of the World Bank at its headquarters in Washington, DC. It has a core of full-time staff — 17 at this writing — plus about 20 consultants, organized in five teams (Figure 1). According to the GFDRR Partnership Charter, the Secretariat “carries out the mission of the GFDRR and manages its day-to-day operations.” Its responsibilities include: (a) screening and evaluating proposals for GFDRR assistance under Tracks I, II, and III; (b) proposing the GFDRR's annual work program and financing plan or budget; (c) administering and delivering Track II and III activities; (e) monitoring the implementation of Track I, II, and III activities; (f) maintaining an effective relationship with GFDRR partners and stakeholders; (g) supporting CG fund-raising efforts for GFDRR; (h) identifying proposals that may contribute to achieving GFDRR's objectives; (i) publishing an annual report of all activities — GFDRR financed and others — contributing to achieving GFDRR's objectives; and (j) providing secretariat services to the CG and RMC and others indicated by the CG (GFDRR 2010a, pp. 11–12).

**Figure 1. GFDRR Organizational Chart, 2012**



Source: GFDRR Secretariat




## Financing

1.23 The World Bank's DGF provided annual grants of \$5.0 million to the UNISDR during FY2007–10, and \$4.25 million in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 to implement the Track I activities of GFDRR. The DGF grant was allocated for the first three years through Window 2 (the short-term funding window) and thereafter through Window 1 (the long-term funding window). The DGF grant has covered about 20 percent of the budget of the UNISDR. The Bank has also contributed \$3.50 million to GFDRR from the Bank's administrative budget from FY2007–12. Of this, \$1.45 million came from the Global Expert Teams Initiative and \$229,000 from the DGF to help finance the external evaluation in FY2010.

1.24 Twenty donors have contributed \$226.5 million to Bank-administered trust funds for GFDRR from FY2007–12, in two, three-year replenishment cycles. Of this, \$158.0 million was for Track II, \$29.5 million for Track III, and \$39.1 million for ACP-EU (Figure 2). The top seven donors (EU Commission, Sweden, Australia, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Norway) have contributed three-quarters of this funding. The original design of the program also foresaw funding from private sources as well (both nonprofit and commercial), but this has yet to materialize.

1.25 The GFDRR Secretariat has spent \$109.3 million during FY2007–12 (through the end of June 2012). Of this 69 percent has been spent on Track II, 17 percent on Track III, 0.5 percent on ACP-EU, and 14 percent on administration (Figure 3). Year-by year, spending

**Figure 2. Donor Contributions to GFDRR, FY2007–12 (US\$ millions)**




Source: World Bank data downloaded from the Bank's corporate accounting system on July 18, 2012. See Annex Table E -2.

on Track II activities has increased the most, especially in fiscal years 2009 and 2012 — the end-years of GFDRR’s first two replenishment cycles. Spending on Track III activities has also increased significantly, although slowing down in the FY2012.

1.26 The DGF contributed \$28.5 million to Track I (as a grant to the UNISDR), for total GFDRR expenditures of \$137.8 million over the first six years. With expenditures of \$32.2 million in FY2011 and \$41.3 million in FY2012, GFDRR is now one of the largest global and regional partnership programs (GRPPs) providing technical assistance in which the World Bank is involved. It is the second largest technical assistance program located in the World Bank (after the Water and Sanitation Program), and twice the size of the Cities Alliance, the other major technical assistance program located in the Bank’s urban anchor.

**Figure 3. GFDRR Expenditures/Disbursements, FY2007–12 (US\$ millions)**



Source: World Bank data from the Bank's corporate accounting system. See Annex Table E -3(b).

Note: GFDRR also disbursed \$561,000 in 2012 for the ACP-EU program which began in that year.

## 2. The 2010 External Evaluation of GFDRR

### Background to the Evaluation by Universalialia

2.1 In compliance with DGF requirements that grant recipients commission an external evaluation every three to five years, GFDRR contracted with the Canadian firm Universalialia to carry out such an evaluation during 2009. This chapter reviews the independence and quality of that evaluation.

2.2 Universalialia staff told IEG that they had learned about the job and the call for bids through *UN Development Business*, where the World Bank routinely publishes its procurement notices. The consultants made their proposal and were shortlisted and selected by the GFDRR Secretariat. During this process, their contacts were with a GFDRR staff member who acted as the point person for setting up and supervising the job. In these selection processes, as well as in the subsequent conduct of the evaluation, the consultants had little operational contact with the GFDRR manager and none at all with the CG or the RMC. They did, of course, interview individuals from these bodies in person or by telephone to collect data for the evaluation itself.

2.3 Under a tight deadline, to ensure that preliminary findings would be available for the fall-2009 meeting of the CG, the evaluation consultants prepared an inception report that was quickly approved by the GFDRR Secretariat. The consultants then embarked upon interviewing the GFDRR team in Washington, DC, and began collecting data about the program. They also launched a survey of Bank task team leaders in charge of projects with GFDRR financing, but had to abandon this due to a very low response rate — less than 10 percent. They fielded missions to Jakarta, Antananarivo, Kathmandu, and Port-au-Prince — locations of their choice — to evaluate the implementation and results of GFDRR activities in the respective countries. So-called “virtual field missions” — that did not involve country visits — were carried out for Djibouti, Ghana, and Malawi as well. To gather data, the consultants conducted phone interviews with those responsible for the GFDRR activities in those places.

2.4 The consultants presented a draft final report to the GFDRR Secretariat. They had one meeting with GFDRR staff to discuss the evaluation findings. Minor revisions took care of the feedback they received. After submitting the final draft by mail to the Secretariat in February 2010, the consultants’ assignment was complete and their contact with GFDRR ceased. The two volumes of the evaluation document have been publicly disclosed (without the management response) on GFDRR’s website: [gfdrr.org/gfdrr/evaluation](http://gfdrr.org/gfdrr/evaluation).

### The Independence of the External Evaluation

2.5 The evaluation was contracted in accordance with Bank guidelines for hiring consultants and financed mainly from a supplementary grant of \$229,000 provided by the DGF. The GFDRR Secretariat had to act as the agent of the CG in commissioning and contracting the evaluation, since the CG had no independent means to do so. ***Organizational independence*** would have been enhanced if the CG had itself approved the terms of reference, made the final selection of the evaluation team, and received the final report independently of the GFDRR Secretariat, except for providing the Secretariat with the opportunity to review the final report for factual errors.

2.6 Notwithstanding these shortcomings in organizational independence, IEG found that the evaluation was ***behaviorally independent***. IEG learned of no interference by the GFDRR Secretariat or the CG in the design and implementation of the evaluation that unexpected changes in the scope and direction of the work, for example, might portend. Behavioral independence was also helped by having one member of the Secretariat staff act as the professional point person for the evaluation consultants. This enabled ready access and agile communications for the evaluation, without the risk to independence that intense involvement of GFDRR team leaders and management might have involved. Having a wide range of findings in the final report — mostly positive, but some highly critical — also points to the consultants’ independence in the exercise of their evaluative judgments. Furthermore, IEG learned that the consultants needed to make only minor changes and corrections to the initial findings of their draft final report, following the GFDRR Secretariat’s review and discussion of it.

2.7 IEG encountered no evidence pointing to ***possible conflicts of interest*** that might have undermined the independence and objectivity of the consultants’ evaluative assessments. The consulting firm had no prior or ongoing association with GFDRR. It could base the work on its prior experience of satisfactory external evaluations of a number of Bank-supported GRPPs, including the *Cities Alliance*. The evaluation team included senior staff and shareholders of the firm, with prior experiences of evaluating global programs, including its president.

## The Quality of the External Evaluation

2.8 The external evaluation had four key ***strengths***: (a) highlighting the need for more information about GFDRR activities; (b) carrying out on-the-ground observations of GFDRR activities in four countries; (c) pointing out the weaknesses of GFDRR’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems; and (d) being highly appreciated by several current CG members.

2.9 Information gaps about GFDRR activities led the external evaluation to correctly provide qualifications to many of its findings. At the micro level of individual GFDRR activities, for instance, the consultants came up against a shortage of data. The final report noted a “lack of sufficient information for a clear analysis of projects” and that “overall, progress reports do not provide sufficient or relevant details and no evaluation report is available.” (Universalialia 2010a, p. 6). The evaluation also candidly recognized that many GFDRR activities — at the time of the evaluation in 2009 — were still underway and had not generated data showing the links between the resources used and the outputs or outcomes produced (Universalialia 2010a, p. 23). The external evaluation called for a “new vision” for GFDRR beyond implementing what it called “in essence, a collection of pilot projects” (Universalialia 2010a, p. iv). Indeed, some donors told IEG that GFDRR, itself, focused too much on the “nitty gritty,” losing sight of the strategic dimensions of DRR. Even so, they felt that the external evaluation paid too little attention to the performance of individual (“nitty gritty”) GFDRR activities. That left much evaluation terrain uncovered, but not through the fault of the evaluators.

2.10 The consultants’ field missions to four countries — Indonesia, Nepal, Madagascar, and Haiti — yielded insights into how DRR mainstreaming efforts varied across countries and regions. In a large client country, such as Indonesia, the evaluation found that Bank personnel involved in GFDRR worked actively to reach out to other donors. In Haiti, a small country but one facing a large donor response to a massive disaster, the evaluation

consultants reported much attention to coordination and harmonization of DRR activities by GFDRR. In contrast, the evaluation learned that project stakeholders in Madagascar saw GFDRR work to be more like a stand-alone Bank project rather than a coordinated effort by several donors to reinforce existing DRR structures in that country (Universalialia 2010a, p. 16). Similar problems were noted in Nepal. Such findings led to what the consultants called an uneven pattern of DRR harmonization, and suggestions that GFDRR needed to give more attention to the weakest countries, while helping to deploy to them the knowledge and resources of more experienced countries — such as Indonesia from this group. With two of the consultant’s 13 recommendations (Table 4) calling for GFDRR to develop the means and to take the leadership for achieving greater donor harmonization in DRR work, the external evaluation is clearly pointing to weaknesses existing in this area.

2.11 The weaknesses of GFDRR’s M&E, and the need to strengthen it were appropriately highlighted by the evaluation. It called for GFDRR to require “end-of-project” reporting to assess performance along the lines of the Bank’s Implementation Completion and Results Reports. The consultants called for this to help instill a stronger project-completion culture within GFDRR. (Universalialia 2010a, p. 27).<sup>7</sup>

2.12 Most donors interviewed by IEG were satisfied with the technical quality of the independent evaluation. Two donors even said that they would consider inviting the consultants of GFDRR’s external evaluation to make proposals if the need for similar work arose for these donors themselves. One donor, however, explicitly ruled out such a possibility.

2.13 IEG found four key *shortcomings* in the external evaluation: (a) the limited amount of time provided to the consultants to design the evaluation; (b) the lack of baseline references and benchmarks against which to measure GFDRR’s performance; (c) insufficient attention to GFDRR financial management and reporting; and (d) unclear treatment of the role and activities of UNISDR.

2.14 The terms of reference, again following normal practice, required the consultants to prepare an inception report that would contain *their* design for the work, with the freedom to choose the topics and countries upon which to focus the evaluation. The main constraint upon the quality of the design of the external evaluation was the very limited time that the consultants were given to prepare the inception report — just three weeks.

2.15 The external evaluation did not consider baseline activity of DRR prior to GFDRR (up to FY2007). As for any project or program, an evaluation of GFDRR needs to compare the most recent results of the program with those that had already been achieved *before* the program — in other words, against a baseline. Evidence of a good, recent result by itself is not an assurance of satisfactory performance. For that, we need to know that the recent (good) result was even better than those already achieved at the baseline. The external

---

7. According to the World Bank’s *Trust Fund Handbook*, only recipient-executed, trust fund grants (RETFs) in excess of \$5 million require the preparation of an Implementation Completion and Results Report at project closing. Thus far, the GFDRR has only approved one such grant for \$5.1 million to Somalia in September 2011. RETFs between \$1 and 5 million require a simpler Implementation Completion Memorandum. RETFs of less than \$1 million require a grant completion report in the Bank’s Grant Reporting and Monitoring (GRM) system. Bank-executed trust fund grants (BETFs) require a progress or completion report in the GRM system.

evaluation overlooked the baseline when, for example, it reported that “some \$150 million of housing-related Bank lending to Indonesia now incorporates DRR principles as a result of the intervention of GFDRR-supported staff in the Indonesia country office.” (Universalia 2010a, p. 30). To be a valid and positive evaluation finding, this must assume that DRR principles had not been applied beforehand in Indonesia — which is not the case for that country where DRR has already been mainstreamed over an extended period.<sup>8</sup> As previously noted by several members of the GFDRR team, the external evaluation characterized GFDRR as a “new area of development cooperation” (Universalia 2010a, p. 36) even though the World Bank (Figure 4 in Chapter 3), UN, and other donors have long been involved in DRR-related activities — another example of misreading the baseline. The external evaluation nevertheless hints at a baseline when it reports a need for “*greater* awareness of DRR as a cross-cutting issue” (Universalia 2010a, p. 20), although inviting the unasked question “*greater* than what?” which a knowledge of the baseline would have helped answer.

2.16 The external evaluation did not undertake a thorough assessment of the global program’s financial management and reporting. It did not review GFDRR’s trust fund commitments and disbursements in relation to its resource mobilization, or its progress reporting of spending at the individual activity level. These important matters are taken up in Chapter 3 of this GPR. By treating program finances as one of the “other factors” to review (after program objectives, design, and M&E), the evaluation terms of reference did not direct the consultants to emphasize this aspect (Universalia 2010b, p. 22).

2.17 The external evaluation’s treatment of UNISDR does little to clarify its complex relationship to GFDRR. The evaluation treats GFDRR as if it were an external entity to UNISDR, whereas GFDRR is in fact a partnership to which UNISDR belongs (Universalia 2010a, p. 13). The external evaluation’s reference to “GFDRR’s second-hand role” in implementing Track I does not recognize UNISDR as the *sole* executing agency for GFDRR’s Track I activities (Universalia 2010a, p. 27), none of which is executed by the GFDRR Secretariat. Finally, by finding that “GFDRR has increased the resources available to disaster prone areas via the UNISDR,” the external evaluation does not appear to recognize that UNISDR’s Track I activities were intended to be at the global and regional levels only, and not at the national (or local) level of the disaster prone areas themselves (Universalia 2010a, p. 13).

## Findings, Recommendations, and Program Responses to the Evaluation

2.18 The external evaluation reported 22 findings, which this GPR has consolidated into 12 major findings in Table 4, below. The external evaluation made 13 recommendations, also listed in Table 4 (Universalia 2010a, pp. 38–44).

2.19 This GPR agrees with all but two of the (consolidated) findings of the external evaluation. Finding (b) is too general and inadequately supported by the evidence assembled.

---

8. As far back as 1985, for instance, a Bank loan of \$156 million, financing the Kedung Ombo Multipurpose Dam and Irrigation Project, included \$7.2 million for a flood forecasting and monitoring center, a major DRR investment (World Bank report no. 5346). Also in the case of Indonesia, the external evaluation does not consider examples of bilateral donor work on DRR, such as the 1992 Indonesia Hazard Mitigation Strategy prepared with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

**Table 4. Findings and Recommendations of the External Evaluation of GFDRR**

Consolidated Findings	Recommendations	
(a) Most donors, partners, and national-level stakeholders view GFDRR's contributions to DRR positively, but there is apprehension about unclear GFDRR and UN players' roles.	1. GFDRR should continue to pursue a proactive campaign of fund raising with international partners, including consideration of mutually supporting activities with other multilateral development banks.	Adopted. GFDRR continues to pursue increased fund raising.
(b) GFDRR has made a contribution to increase the resilience of nations to respond to natural disasters and the impact of climate change, with evidence of recipient countries beginning to integrate knowledge and capacity that GFDRR has provided.	2. GFDRR should develop a more formalized means of coordination across the network of multilateral development banks (MDBs), with the view to the eventual promulgation of more common and harmonized approaches.	Adopted. MDBs are becoming implementing partners, but not governance partners.
(c) There is mixed, but tending to positive, evidence that GFDRR has contributed to the strengthening of DRR in World Bank country operations. (Ch. 3 of this GPR)	3. GFDRR should, in any expanded environment and with specific reference to its 20 priority countries (Ch.1 of this GPR), take a leadership role [in DRR] in promoting donor and development bank coordination and harmonization.	Not adopted. Evidence of coordination mixed: stronger with donors, weaker with development banks.
(d) GFDRR overall staffing resources do not always meet the growing and changing needs.	4. In planning for the next project cycle, GFDRR should consider giving special attention to new programming designed to strengthen national coordinative capacity.	Insufficient evidence either way.
(e) While its results-based management system contains a number of state-of-the-art elements to support reporting for results, its day-to-day relevance is hampered by uneven project reporting in which core indicators, a conceptual advance, have not taken root.	5. GFDRR should develop standardized and results-based reporting templates so as to regularize, streamline, and focus the cyclical reporting that is inherent in modern project management.	Adopted. Through GFDRR's on-going work on results framework.
(f) While few GFDRR projects are completed [as of Jan 2010], there is no plan for post-project monitoring.	6. GFDRR should develop and circulate more formalized selection criteria [for choosing which activities to support].	Not adopted. Formal selection criteria still wanting.
(g) To date [Jan. 2010], GFDRR has yet to develop an on-going evaluation plan.	7. GFDRR should develop a multifaceted training program for headquarters and field personnel.	Adopted.
(h) In spite of its short lifespan, there is evidence that GFDRR has been able to leverage additional investment to support DRR-related activities, including investment by the World Bank itself.	8. Assuming a substantial increase in the overall size and scope of the GFDRR portfolio, GFDRR will need to considerably increase its personnel both at headquarters and in the field.	Adopted. GFDRR continues to pursue expansion of staffing.
(i) Even at this early stage [as of Jan 2010], there is evidence that GFDRR programming has supported capacity building among existing institutions, and also contributed to establishing new ones. (Ch. 3 of this GPR)	9. The World Bank, at Headquarters especially, should review the level of resources and their regional distribution that have been allocated to the mainstreaming of DRR.	Not a recommendation for GFDRR itself to adopt.
(j) GFDRR has a broad range of highly resourced tools and services to strengthen the institutional capacity and at the national level, all of which appear to be of good quality, and some state-of-the-art-practices.	10. GFDRR should develop a more rigorous multi-year strategic plan that includes a broad-based results and performance indicator framework.	Adopted. Through the 2009-2011 Partnership Strategy.

Consolidated Findings	Recommendations	
(k) Track III tools, including PDNA, constitute very valuable instruments not available elsewhere.	11. GFDRR should develop a more hierarchical approach to its set of performance indicators.	Adopted. Through GFDRR's on-going work on results framework.
(l) There is a risk that some of the contributions that GFDRR has made may not be sustainable over the longer term.	12. GFDRR should develop a multi-year evaluation plan.	Not adopted. Evaluation plan yet to be developed.
	13. GFDRR should engage with UNISDR in a dialogue about how to clarify what appear to be some ambiguities with regard to their individual functions.	Insufficient evidence either way.

Source: (Universalia 2010a, pp. 38–44).

Nations' resilience to natural disasters should have been measured from (at least a sample of) worldwide empirical evidence of reduced disaster losses and damages attributable to GFDRR activities, which was not systematically discussed by the external evaluation. IEG also does not agree with finding (k) that Track III tools are *not* available elsewhere. Post-disaster assessments are commonly prepared by governments themselves, by other donors, and even by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). IEG's evaluation of the Bank's disaster-related assistance noted in 2006 that the Asian Development Bank routinely launched post-disaster assessments following natural disaster events (IEG 2006a, p. 106).<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, needs assessments following disasters have been a requirement of Bank policy at least since 1984.<sup>10</sup>

2.20 The GPR agrees with all but three of the external evaluation's recommendations. Recommendations (1) and (8) both call for a larger scale of GFDRR operations. GFDRR has experienced rapid growth since its first CG meeting in September 2006 in response to evident client demand. Total donor contributions to the Bank-administered trust funds supporting Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU totaled \$226.5 million by June 30, 2012. Annual program commitments have grown from \$6.4 million in FY2007 to \$46.7 million in FY2012, and annual disbursements from \$5.2 million in FY2008 to \$35.3 million in FY2012. (See Table 12 in Chapter 3.) However, cumulative disbursements were only 45.4 percent of total paid-in contributions as of June 30, 2012. Both the evaluation and this review have also identified some deficiencies in program monitoring and reporting that need to be addressed. While there are some legitimate reasons why disbursements have lagged behind contributions to this extent, improved monitoring and reporting (which is underway) would also clarify this.

2.21 From its review of GFDRR actions following the external evaluation, IEG considers that GFDRR has adopted 7 of the 13 recommendations. Three have not been adopted. Two

9. However, the European Commission, the United Nations, and the World Bank signed a "Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning" in September 2008, committing their respective organizations to a common platform for partnership and action in response to natural disaster- and conflict-related crises. This led to the development of a new agreed-upon "Guide to Multi-Stakeholder Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA)" in October 2009, based on experience with various existing tools and methodologies, including the damage and loss assessment (DaLA) methodology developed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, which has been commonly used by the World Bank.

10. World Bank, July 1984, Operational Policy Note No. 10.07 "Guidelines for Bank Participation in Reconstruction Projects after Disasters."



lack sufficient evidence either way and another is not a recommendation for GFDRR itself to adopt (Table 4). GFDRR's website [www.gfdr.org/gfdr/evaluation](http://www.gfdr.org/gfdr/evaluation) informs that, "The evaluation has made several useful recommendations which are being implemented by the Secretariat of GFDRR" but provides no details.

## Other Recent Evaluations of Disaster Risk Reduction

2.22 The External Evaluation of GFDRR is, at this writing, one of nine recent evaluations of GFDRR and its DRR development partners, most of which were ongoing at the time of Universalis's evaluation and delivered in the past two to three years. While IEG has not verified the findings of the eight other evaluations in detail, it has reviewed their reports in order to compare their findings with those of the Universalis evaluation in order to triangulate the conclusions arising from this GPR (Table 5).

2.23 Three evaluations of GFDRR, itself, have found the program's performance satisfactory overall. Four evaluations of UNISDR, implementer of Track I activities and GFDRR partner, have mixed findings. These all refer, however, to an ill-defined mandate and a lack of budget undermining the agency's performance in achieving and communicating its results. The self-evaluation of the work of UNDP-BCPR recommended administrative actions by the bureau to focus more directly upon DRR and to speed country-level response to demands for assistance.

**Table 5. Eight Other Recent Evaluations of DRR**

<p><b>(1) Jan. 2005 UN Evaluation of UNISDR:</b></p> <p>Carried out over a three-month period in 2005, this external evaluation reviewed the performance of UNISDR as executing agency of the HFA. It recommended that UNISDR continue to be the HFA implementing agency, but that UNISDR needed to choose a narrow, clearly defined, and realistic range of strategic tasks. UNISDR should provide value-added at the country level through enhanced intra- and inter-regional networking. Major structural reform of UNISDR is needed to focus upon two key functions, namely policy analysis and communication-information. This should be in conjunction with a reform of its governance to ensure that UNISDR can be held accountable for its work and focus upon its strategic plan and functions (UNISDR 2005b).</p>
<p><b>(2) Feb. 2010 UNISDR Self-Evaluation of UNISDR:</b></p> <p>Carried out by Dalberg Global Development Advisors. UNISDR is relevant as a champion of DRR, but is not mandated explicitly to lead the HFA system that lacks strategic guidance. Thus UNISDR's coordination performance has been mixed. There is good performance in raising awareness of DRR, and in mainstreaming DRR into the climate change debate. Work planning and implementation is inefficient and cost plans are not closely linked to resource mobilization efforts, both outcomes partly due to unpredictable funding. It produced many, often supply-driven publications, whose practical applications and quality vary. (This evaluation made no reference to GFDRR or to the Track I activities UNISDR implements on behalf of GFDRR.) (Dalberg 2010)</p>
<p><b>(3) Dec 2010 UNDP Self-Evaluation of Its Contribution to DRR:</b></p> <p>Over the past 10 years UNDP has worked in 50, high-risk countries, helping them prepare for natural disasters. The evaluation found that UNDP's strategies linking poverty reduction, sustainable development, and DRR are not implemented. National ownership of UNDP's programs is essential for DRR success. UNDP has been successful at micro-level, short-term recovery activities, but with a loss of focus on DRR. Recommendations included: (a) UNDP focus strategically on risk reduction and vulnerability; (b) risk reduction strategy should more directly address climate change; (c) UNDP should minimize micro, short-term recovery activities that do not strengthen national capacities; and (d) administrative processes should allow country offices to respond more rapidly for more effective programming (UNDP 2010).</p>

**(4) Feb. 2011 UK Department for International Development (DFID) Multilateral Aid Review of GFDRR:**

GFDRR is relevant to UK development policies, with its alignment with poverty reduction. While GFDRR results in mainstreaming DRR appear satisfactory, it is difficult to fully assess them. Strategic and performance management is weak. Quality of in-country programs is variable and sometimes weak. Financial management is helped by rules-based allocations and accountability, but actual allocations are not always transparent. Cost and value-consciousness performance is satisfactory. Partnership behavior is satisfactory with stakeholder involvement through the CG. GFDRR is clearly answerable to the World Bank and donors. Positive change for the future is likely. The overall rating is satisfactory (DFID 2011).

**(5) Feb. 2011 DFID Multilateral Aid Review of UNISDR:**

UNISDR's contribution to UK development objectives was weak, UNISDR's focus was on the national rather than its mandated global and regional levels. Support for CCA is satisfactory. There is a lack of focus upon poor countries. Activities' contributions to results were unsatisfactory. Reporting lacks a clear line of site from its mandate to its activities, not taking into account earlier recommendations. Financial management was undermined by its lack of long-term financing. Transparency has been served by its accounts that are publicly available on the Web. Communications with donors have been opaque. The likelihood of positive change is uncertain, given UNISDR's past lack of responses and findings of earlier evaluations. (DFID cut funding to UNISDR in 2011.) (DFID 2011)

**(6) Sept. 2011 Danish Assessment of GFDRR's DRR:**

GFDRR performs well on core aspects such as: strategic communication; dialogue with donors; lean organization; innovative approaches; and a tight focus upon 20 priority countries. But GFDRR needs a more programmatic approach to better document impacts of its activities that cover a range of small and disjointed projects. Overlap with the mandate of UNISDR continues to be a problem. Results framework and M&E are off to a good start but have become overly detailed and technically sophisticated to the point of not being understood by all donors. Progress has been made in integrating DRR into development policies, but not fully integrated into strategic dialogues with governments and internally within the World Bank (NORDECO 2011b).

**(7) Sept. 2011 Danish Assessment of UNISDR's DRR:**

UNISDR has made considerable achievements in conceptualizing DRR and creating space for local-global dialogue on DRR and supported efforts to integrate DRR knowledge and practice into development and climate change strategies and debates. But UNISDR has a broad and unfocused mandate that is difficult to translate into immediate action. The task is made more difficult by UNISDR's weak implementation mechanism. UNISDR is not doing well communicating who they are, why they exist, what role they have as compared to other actors, and which Secretariat-specific results they are aiming to achieve. Although UNISDR has a clear global and regional mandate, whereas GFDRR has a national mandate, there is an overlap (NORDECO 2011a).

**(8) March 2012 Australian Multilateral Assessment of GFDRR:**

GFDRR results on poverty and sustainable development are in line with its mandate and Australia's own aid priorities. But the program's results framework remains broad and unable to demonstrate clear and tangible outcomes. Reporting focuses upon the breadth of its activities rather than results, and could provide more information about where GFDRR is heading and why. GFDRR's management needs to devote more time to reporting on GFDRR progress at country and program levels. Mainstreaming climate change adaptation across a greater proportion of its portfolio efforts could be fast-tracked. GFDRR has contributed strongly to the multilateral development system in general. Its working relationship with UNISDR should be more transparent and results better reported. The organizational behavior of GFDRR is satisfactory, but the growth of the CG to 47 members might undermine decision-making, which may need streamlining. The standards of the World Bank as manager of GFDRR for procurement and cost-benefit analysis, brings cost effectiveness to GFDRR. GFDRR's partnership behavior is strong at all levels. Its transparency, through documentation and its website is very strong. Oversight, financial, fraud and integrity systems all fall within the World Bank's high standard frameworks (AusAID 2012).

### 3. The Effectiveness of GFDRR

3.1 This chapter presents a second opinion of IEG on the effectiveness of GFDRR since the program's inception in September 2006, based on the 2010 external evaluation and on program developments since then. The chapter covers (a) the relevance of the program's objectives and design, (b) the efficacy of the program in achieving its objectives through a results chain of delivering relevant outputs from the activities it supports, and (c) the extent to which the program has been managed efficiently in terms of costs. This GPR finds GFDRR's objectives to be relevant in most respects. The relevance of the design of GFDRR would have been stronger if it had incorporated a program logic linking the program's activities and their outputs to the achievement of its objectives. Putting in place an effective M&E system to report the concrete results of program activities has also been a work in progress. Based on the currently available evidence, GFDRR's overall progress in achieving its objectives as stated in Missions 1 and 2 has been good.

#### Relevance

3.2 In its reviews of Bank-supported GRPPs, IEG assesses the relevance of a program's objectives along five dimensions:

- **Supply-side relevance** — the existence of an international consensus that global/regional collective action is required
- **Demand-side relevance** — consistency with the needs, priorities, and strategies of beneficiary countries and groups
- **Vertical relevance** — consistency with the subsidiarity principle, namely, the most appropriate level (global, regional, national, or local) at which particular activities should be carried out in terms of filling gaps, efficient delivery, and responsiveness to the needs of beneficiaries
- **Horizontal relevance** — the absence of alternative sources of supply of the same goods and services
- **Relevance of the design** — the extent to which the articulated strategies and priority activities of the program are appropriate for achieving its objectives

#### SUPPLY-SIDE RELEVANCE

3.3 As far as DRR is concerned, the supply-side relevance of GFDRR is *substantial*. There exists a strong international consensus in favor of incorporating DRR into sustainable development, as evidenced by the HFA. Although HFA will expire in 2015, the government of Japan has offered to the United Nations to host a conference on disaster reduction in 2015 which would consider and approve a possible successor arrangement. In addition, UNISDR recently issued a nine-page discussion paper entitled, "Towards a Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Reduction," that calls for ideas that might spell out the form that a successor framework to HFA might eventually take (UNISDR 2012). The 12th meeting of the GFDRR CG in April 2012 discussed a roadmap for the development of its 2013–16 Partnership Strategy, to be informed by post-2015 HFA and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreements.

3.4 Outside the HFA, international consensus over DRR was reinforced by the outcome document from the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in December 2011. This included mutual commitments to building resilience to natural disasters into economic development — for the first time in four such forums (previously held in Rome, Paris, and Accra) (Box 2).

**Box 2. Partnering to Strengthen Resilience and Reduce Vulnerability in the Face of Adversity**

We must ensure that development strategies and programmes prioritize the building of resilience among people and societies at risk from shocks, especially in highly vulnerable settings, such as small island developing states. Investing in resilience and risk reduction increases the value and sustainability of our development efforts. To this end:

- (a) Developing countries will lead in integrating resilience to shocks and measures for disaster management within their own policies and strategies.
- (b) Responding to the needs articulated by developing countries, we will work together to invest in shock resistant infrastructure and social protection systems for at-risk communities. In addition, we will increase the resources, planning, and skills for disaster management at the national and regional levels.

*Source:* Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation, Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic Of Korea, 29 November to 1 December 2011, p. 8.

3.5 More than through formal agreements, the global consensus about the importance of DRR has arisen from the continuing disastrous impacts worldwide of natural events such as floods, storms, tsunamis, and earthquakes in disrupting economies, ravaging livelihoods, and taking lives. The international disaster database ([www.emdat.be/](http://www.emdat.be/)) has reported between 400–450 such events affecting 200–250 million people per annum in recent years. Heightened awareness of the impacts of disasters, as images of dramatic disaster events are instantly disseminated and replayed by the media worldwide, helps to forge the consensus of the need for DRR. Although difficult to assess accurately (and perhaps less newsworthy), the economic costs of disasters through destroyed infrastructure and other assets and through lost income can be significant. Helping reduce such costs would be a relevant contribution that GFDRR's support for DRR can make.

3.6 There is also a growing consensus too about the need for CCA to attenuate the effects of rising sea levels flooding coastal cities and changing patterns of precipitation harming agriculture. Although CCA is on GFDRR's agenda, the program addresses it on a smaller scale than DRR.

3.7 However, IEG did not find a common understanding among stakeholders interviewed for this GPR of what GFDRR's objective of *mainstreaming* DRR and CCA actually means (Box 3). Each of the four understandings in this box has somewhat different implications for policy and the GFDRR's results framework. IEG suggests that GFDRR provide a clear definition of what it understands by mainstreaming, such as the first definition in Box 3, and its implications for GFDRR's strategic direction and performance indicators. This particular definition views DRR as a cross-cutting theme like environment, gender, and urban

development. To be effective, however, DRR requires an institutional home in a development organization like the Bank. GFDRR has become that institutional home in the Bank.

3.8 As stated in Chapter 1, IEG also suggests strengthening GFDRR's two mission statements to provide a clearer reference to objective 3 on assisting recovery in post-disaster countries. GFDRR could do this by building upon the ideas elaborated in GFDRR's results framework, but without going so far as giving the program an emergency response function. IEG evaluations have found that emergency relief operations are beyond the scope of Bank-supported operations and that post-disaster haste leads to poor preparation and implementation delays, so that an operation that started out as such can no longer be considered as an *emergency* response (IEG 2006a).

### Box 3. Trying to Mainstream “Mainstreaming”

Although GFDRR stakeholders interviewed by IEG agree that GFDRR should try to *mainstream* DRR and CCA into development programs and strategies, they had different interpretations of what *mainstreaming* actually meant. Some understood *mainstreaming* as making DRR and CCA into separate lines of business, a new *main-stream* of the economy, like a sector. For others, *mainstreaming* meant integrating DRR and CCA into existing lines of business and sectors. Yet stakeholders still believed that, in referring to *mainstreaming*, they were all pursuing the same goal. For this GPR, IEG tried to unravel these different, and sometimes conflicting interpretations, as summarized below:

<i>Definitions</i>	<i>Main Users</i>	<i>Policy Implications</i>	<i>Performance Indicators</i>
1. Incorporating or integrating DRR and CCA considerations into all aspects of development, as appropriate.	IEG in this GPR and about half the GFDRR donors interviewed by IEG.	DRR and CCA should be elements of economic activities across all sectors (like environmental considerations).	Resilience of investments to disasters. (Perhaps “invisible” in the investments themselves with routine and seamless incorporation).
2. Incorporating DRR and CCA into more donor assistance and investment	About one third of donors.	More DRR and CCA considerations in donor assistance (“ <i>leveraging</i> ”).	Share of donor assistance incorporating DRR and CCA considerations.
3. Making DRR and CCA themselves each into a separate line of business like an economic sector.	A few donors.	DRR and CCA should each be addressed through sector specific policies and programs.	Creation of separate DRR/-CCA institutions: e.g. (a) ministry; (b) national development plan pillar.
4. The widespread application of DRR and CCA through local government and civil society actions.	Representatives of CSOs and the IFRC.	Work closely with NGOs and local governments as agents for disseminating DRR and CCA awareness on the ground.	Share of all local governments aware of DRR and CCA and share with active participation by civil society.

Source: IEG.

Note: “mainstreaming” is not part of UNISDR glossary of disaster terminology: [www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology](http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology).

## DEMAND-SIDE RELEVANCE

3.9 Demand-side relevance is *high*, since GFDRR's objectives are consistent with country and subnational demands for reducing disaster risks to development. An expression of this demand at the country-level is the adherence of 168 countries that have signed up to the HFA, of which 133 carried out the HFA review process, and 82 have shared their interim

reports.<sup>11</sup> Another indicator of demand-side relevance is the increased number of developing countries — 19 at this writing — that are members or observers in the CG, GFDRR’s governing body (Annex C). The Bank’s Regional DRM Coordinators also report growing demand from client countries for donor support for disaster risk reduction activities. Disaster events like the Japanese earthquake and tsunami in 2011 show that these can have catastrophic impacts in developed countries, too. Thus interest in DRR is found in all vulnerable countries irrespective of their levels of economic development.

3.10 GFDRR’s objectives are also well aligned with several World Bank policies and strategies guiding the Bank’s support to client countries in sectors and themes related to DRR:

- Bank Operational Policy 8.00 on “Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies,” (March 2007) authorizes the Bank to provide rapid responses to requests for urgent assistance in the wake of natural or man-made crises or disasters.
- The Bank’s 2008 climate change strategy, *Development and Climate Change: A Strategic Framework for the World Bank Group*, commits the World Bank Group to “establish stronger operational links between climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction, when appropriate.” (World Bank 2008, p. 13).
- One of the five business lines in the Bank’s 2010 urban and local government strategy, *Systems of Cities: Harnessing Urbanization for Growth and Poverty Alleviation*, is entitled “The Urban Environment, Climate Change and Disaster Management.” (World Bank 2010, pp. x and 33).
- The Bank’s 2012 environment strategy, *Toward a Green, Clean, and Resilient World for All*, commits the World Bank Group, in its approach to disaster risk management, “to work with clients to assess how to minimize the damage of natural disasters in terms of loss of life and structural damage.” (World Bank, 2012, p. 64).

## VERTICAL RELEVANCE

3.11 The vertical relevance of GFDRR objectives is *substantial*. Locating the GFDRR program inside the World Bank has allowed a flat-budget Bank to retain and even expand its DRR work through greater provision of country-level, technical assistance to client countries and through increased focus on pre-disaster risk reduction. Donors also told IEG that contributing to GFDRR enabled them to extend the reach of the DRR activities that they fund, while leaving the administrative side of the work to the GFDRR Secretariat located in the Bank.


3.12 Through financing reconstruction operations in particular, World Bank lending has supported countries’ natural disaster recovery and prevention efforts on a large scale for more than four decades — the Bank’s earliest disaster reconstruction lending being to Peru for earthquake reconstruction and to Bangladesh for cyclone recovery in 1970 and 1971, respectively (IEG 2006a). The Bank lent \$26.3 billion for 528 disaster-related projects between 1984 and 2005, and another \$22.5 billion for 241 projects between 2006 and 2011 (Figure 4). While DRR,

---

11. UNISDR [www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/hfa/overview.html](http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/hfa/overview.html).

formerly known as *disaster mitigation*, has been part of Bank disaster-related lending since at least 1984 when the Bank first formalized policy guidelines specifically for disaster-related lending, most of the early Bank lending was for assisting recovery through post-disaster physical reconstruction. The establishment of GFDRR in 2006 built upon earlier Bank efforts to internally institutionalize its own assistance in this area — notably the establishment of the DMF in 1998, which later become the HMU.

**Figure 4. World Bank Lending for Disaster Assistance, FY1984–2011**



Source: World Bank databases; Operations Portal.

3.13 Although GFDRR is a *global* program dedicated to incorporating DRR into country-level, development strategies and investments, GFDRR's objectives explicitly recognize that DRR has public good characteristics at all levels of development. These range from the global and regional levels where GFDRR (and UNISDR) work toward disseminating a greater awareness of DRR's importance in development down to the local level where urban municipalities incorporate DRR directly. IEG heard from stakeholders that GFDRR could do more at the subnational level — whether through municipalities, local communities, or the private sector — to incorporate DRR into the *practice* of sustainable development at this level. This would not necessarily be through direct GFDRR interventions, but through GFDRR support to private and subnational agencies with proven excellence in the actual application of DRR, whose experience could be shared with their peers in other countries and regions. Examples of relevant support along these lines would be through DRR-sensitive, land-use planning and building codes by local municipalities and DRR-sensitive, investment programs that might be commercially rewarding to private enterprises operating in vulnerable areas. Such activities would be directly related to GFDRR's DRR mandate, considerably enhancing its vertical relevance.

## HORIZONTAL RELEVANCE

3.14 The horizontal relevance of GFDRR’s objectives is less evident at first glance because GFDRR is active in a field with many players with similar objectives, and therefore, with the risk of overlapping efforts.<sup>12</sup> Among international organizations, UNISDR, UNDP, and IFRC all have their own DRR goals and work programs, as does the Bank itself. Bilateral donors too, including all those who fund GFDRR, have DRR programs of their own, sometimes on a very large scale when recovery investment is also involved, as it was after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti. Private operators — ranging from large corporations to NGOs — are also active in DRR work (UNISDR 2008). As the external evaluation found, the risk of duplication of work increases when local beneficiaries are unsure about the DRR roles and responsibilities of GFDRR and other players (Universalis 2010a, p. 150).

3.15 In terms of Bank-supported global programs themselves, the Bank was a prime mover in establishing the ProVention Consortium in 2000, six years before GFDRR, with a similar objective to GFDRR’s second mission statement of forging partnerships to promote policy, practice, and sharing knowledge to reduce disaster risks. Initially located in the Urban Development Department of the Bank, the ProVention Secretariat moved to IFRC in Geneva in 2003. ProVention was mainly a knowledge and advocacy network supporting research and regional-level capacity building, while GFDRR acquired a country-level, technical assistance component. Nonetheless, there was some overlap between the two programs while they co-existed during 2006–2009 — until ProVention closed in 2009.<sup>13</sup>

3.16 Overlap of work among UNISDR, UNDP-BCPR, and GFDRR persists. In theory, UNISDR is supposed to work at the global and regional levels, while GFDRR focuses on the country level. A recent evaluation noted, however, that: “there is in practice quite a bit of overlap between the work of the two organizations.” (NORDECO 2011a, p. 2). For this GPR, IEG noted examples of UNISDR doing *country*-level work (strengthening *country* DRR expertise in Chile, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay for instance) and GFDRR doing *regional* work (disaster risk management in the Sub-Saharan Africa *region*, for instance). UNDP-BCPR’s mission of transforming UNDP into a global leader on crisis prevention and recovery overlaps in part with GFDRR’s mission (Table 1 in Chapter 1 and Box 4). UNISDR, UNDP-BCPR, and GFDRR donors all come from the same pool, meaning that the three programs are competing for funding, too.

---

12. The Partnership Charter explicitly recognizes this: “In particular, country-specific activities are undertaken only if the GFDRR Secretariat is satisfied that the proposed activity does not conflict with programs or activities being undertaken by the World Bank Group, the UNISDR system, other GFDRR donor partners or, to the extent that this is easily verifiable, by other donors, UN agencies, and other stakeholders outside of the GFDRR.” (GFDRR 2010a p.7).

13. An IEG GPR of the ProVention Consortium found it had made progress in achieving the stated objectives of forging partnerships, promoting policy, improving practice, and sharing knowledge to reduce disaster risks, but that it was too early to assess final outcomes (IEG 2006b). The ProVention Consortium was renowned for commissioning the disaster “hotspots” study that strongly influenced later work in the DRR field (Dilley et al. 2005). Funding problems, weak governance and management structures, and overlap with GFDRR led the ProVention Consortium to close down and cease operations in May 2009.



#### **Box 4. UNDP's Role in Disaster Risk Reduction**

The overlap of GFDRR and UNDP objectives and activities in DRR and the coordination of their activities was discussed at length at the 5th CG meeting held on November 13–14, 2008. A proposal was adopted to deal with potential duplication of the two parties' work. It was agreed that a UNDP representative would, henceforth, participate in GFDRR-CG meetings regularly as a permanent observer. Both UNDP as well as IFRC representatives are now part of the CG as permanent observers, although the Partnership Charter has not reflected this since it only makes reference to donors and partners.

UNDP supports HFA through its global mainstreaming initiative, global risk identification program, and climate risk management program. UNDP is an implementing partner in the ISDR system and serves on the ISDR Management Oversight Board. The UN General Assembly gave a mandate to UNDP in 1998 to assist countries to prevent and prepare for disasters. UNDP's strategic plans have included disaster reduction activities since 2000. UNDP's 2000 multi-year funding framework already included "mainstreaming disaster reduction into national capacity building, including policy making, planning, and investment," as one of its main objectives.

UNDP has supported programs in risk reduction and recovery in more than 50, high-risk and disaster-affected countries during 2004–2009. Over the same period, 119 countries received disaster recovery and prevention assistance (through both core and noncore resources). Out of the total of nearly \$20 billion spent by UNDP during the 2004–2009 period, about \$866 million (4 percent) went to disaster prevention and recovery. The overall spending on DRR activities has grown from \$52 million in 2004 to \$186 million in 2009. The highest spending (core and noncore resources) was in the Asia and Pacific region.

However, UNDP faces a problem of sustainability of its DRR program. In the 2004–2009 period, core resources comprised only 14 percent of the total funds raised for disaster prevention and recovery activities (UNDP evaluation, p. 46). Also their programs in the majority of countries (about 80 countries) are small, not exceeding one million US dollars each.

Of the total, 55 percent of UNDP's funds for disaster prevention and recovery are spent at the local and community levels and only 26 percent at the national level.

UNDP's self-evaluation criticized the program for the lack of proactivity in forging strategic partnerships and playing a central role in coordinating DRR-related activities at the national level despite its strategic role in DRR in many developing countries. South-South cooperation, which is a GFDRR initiative, is considered by UNDP (it is included in their recent multi-year Strategic Plan) as an important entry point for UNDP's contribution to the global partnership in the area.

*Source:* UNDP 2010.

3.17 With so much DRR work to do worldwide, there is plenty of scope for several players to divide up the labor, as long as roles are differentiated and comparative advantages are clear. GFDRR's comparative advantage, in relation to the other actors in this field, is in providing technical and financial assistance that is integrated with the World Bank's country operations. GFDRR benefits from the Bank's ready access to Ministries of Finance and Development Planning, thereby facilitating the integration of DRR considerations into a dialogue at governments' highest levels of decision making. It also benefits from the presence of country-level, Bank staff to adequately supervise this technical and financial support, and provides donors with a new avenue for channeling financial resources to countries for DRM programs. The Bank's Regional DRM Coordinators also assert that, by

being fully integrated into the Bank's country operations while also maintaining working relationships with other development partners, GFDRR has helped improve country-level coordination and collaboration among the various development partners, including with UNISDR and UNDP-BCPR. GFDRR has also supported risk-financing strategies that have not been taken up by other players.

## **RELEVANCE OF THE DESIGN**

3.18 GFDRR was designed with three tracks, the first of which has been implemented by UNISDR and the other two administered by the GFDRR Secretariat itself. GFDRR made a strong case at inception for addressing DRR as a priority, and for strengthening global and regional partnerships to support DRR. But beyond its three tracks, GFDRR did not clearly articulate the types of activities the program would pursue, identify their likely outputs, or how these outputs were expected to lead to the achievement of the program's objectives. GFDRR's use of broad categories such as "technical assistance," "capacity building," and "risk financing," to describe activities without specifying exactly what has been involved and what outputs have been expected has not helped stakeholders and others understand exactly what GFDRR does (and has done well). It has also left open the question as to whether GFDRR's activities have been the best ones for achieving the program's objectives.

3.19 The absence of a well-articulated program logic or theory of change at inception has been a common feature of many, otherwise highly relevant global partnership programs in which the Bank has been involved (IEG 2011a and IEG 2011b). Articulating such a program logic remains a work in progress for GFDRR. Recognizing DRR as a cross-cutting theme, like environment and gender, within which activities in different economic sectors need to be identified and prioritized, would be a good start in overcoming this shortcoming.<sup>14</sup>

## **Efficacy**

3.20 This section reviews the extent to which GFDRR has achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives. For this, IEG looked at the progress of GFDRR activities, their outputs and their outcomes in contributing to the achievement of the program's objectives. Linking these together through an explicit results chain (or framework) with theories behind the linkages and empirical evidence of their occurrence would constitute an assessment of the efficacy. While GFDRR is currently closer to having such a framework, GFDRR's descriptions of its activities, their outputs, and how these link to achieving program objectives have some way to go to meet the standard of clarity required for a complete assessment of efficacy.<sup>15</sup>

---

14. Commenting on an earlier draft of this report, World Bank management has responded that a clearly articulated understanding of how to manage disaster risk in developing countries did not exist when GFDRR was established in 2006. The response also noted that research on DRM practices in developing countries is improving, but it is still scarce. Generating a theory-based results chain should possibly be an objective for GFDRR for the next five years of work, but not a basis for assessing its relevance of design.

15. The External Evaluation of GFDRR referred to a more general lack of data impeding the assessment of efficacy: "The challenge for GFDRR, and for an evaluation at this time, is that many of the activities and

## MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

3.21 Monitoring and evaluation systems should serve three main purposes: (a) to assess the progress in implementing individual activities, (b) to facilitate a cumulative assessment of the program's performance in achieving its objectives, and (c) to enhance policy dialogue by identifying issues that require policy responses and other solutions beyond the scope of individual activities. GFDRR did not have an M&E system built in from the beginning — a shortcoming common to most GRPPs. Following this pattern, GFDRR's 2010 external evaluation found that GFDRR lacked the tools for efficient M&E and recommended that the program invest more in this area as it expands (Universalia 2010a, p. iii and p. 42). In a quick response, GFDRR drafted a new results framework to present to the 8th CG meeting in Kyoto in May 2010 and for peer review within the Bank. The 9th CG meeting in October 2010 approved a revised version, shorter and covering intermediate outcomes as the CG had requested. Despite this, some CG members interviewed by IEG still considered this results framework to be too complex, having too many indicators and a somewhat verbose narrative.

3.22 GFDRR also instituted a results-based management system (RBMS), accessible to all Bank staff on the Bank's intranet. Grant disbursement data are now uploaded to the RBMS on a monthly basis, which are also available, per World Bank trust fund practice, to registered donors through the Donor Center in the World Bank's Client Connection. GFDRR now requires task team leaders (TTLs) to submit semi-annual progress reports against expected outputs and outcomes in the "implementation results" section of the RBMS and to submit project completion reports to the Secretariat within six months of project completion. The Secretariat then reviews these and uploads the final reports to the relevant grant page on the RBMS.

3.23 Thus, GFDRR is evolving from a small start-up to an increasingly mature organization. New management practices are being put in place to address previously identified weaknesses. Its reporting requirements are perhaps more stringent than those for Bank-administered trust funds in general. Nonetheless, the latest formulation of GFDRR's results framework still shows some shortcomings. So far, the current framework highlights the need to monitor the final program outcomes. The next stage should seek to identify the program's activities themselves, to monitor their implementation and the outputs they produce, and to monitor how these outputs are helping to achieve the program's objectives. Box 5 contains a number of comments and suggestions for strengthening M&E within GFDRR's results framework to help provide the program with a more useful management tool.

---

projects underway do not yet generate data that helps to understand the link between uses of resources and the outputs or outcomes produced." (Universalia 2010a, p. 23)

### **Box 5. Monitoring, Evaluation, and the GFDRR Results Framework (of October 28, 2010)**

#### **SIX M&E SHORTCOMINGS THAT GFDRR'S CURRENT RESULTS FRAMEWORK STILL NEEDS TO ADDRESS**

1. Limited to the level of goals, objectives and outcomes; no reference to activities and outputs.
2. Performance indicators not built into a logical results chain of inputs, outputs, and outcomes.
3. Little or no explanation as to how project outputs help achieve program objectives.
4. Too many outcome indicators, most of which are not readily measureable.
5. Data collection on outcome indicators and its sources not identified.
6. Baseline data not provided; how baselines will be identified not indicated.

#### **EIGHT M&E FEATURES TO BUILD INTO A STRENGTHENED GFDRR RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

1. Identify program activities and their outputs that lead to achieving objectives through a results chain.
2. Ensure that outcomes can be attributed to activities through logical sequencing in a results chain.
3. Ensure that the designs of activities have output indicators before they are approved.
4. Identify just a few — maybe five to 10 — easily measured outcome indicators for which data are readily available.
5. Set modest outcome targets compatible with what technical assistance can realistically achieve.
6. Use straightforward language easily understood in the same way by all users.
7. Generate routine and regular, publicly accessible progress reports.
8. Ultimately, try to coordinate data collection with other actors (UNISDR, UNDP-BCPR) and with national systems.

*Source: IEG.*

### **SELECTION OF ACTIVITIES AND PROGRESS TOWARD OUTPUTS**

3.24 GFDRR's Annual Reports list annual expenditures for Tracks I, II, and III, as well as secretariat administrative costs. They also report cumulative trust fund commitments and disbursements for Tracks II and III by World Bank region. But they do not report disbursements for individual activities or for groups of activities, such as capacity building, tools and methodologies, or knowledge sharing and generation.

3.25 The GFDRR website provides the complete portfolio of approved projects along with a brief description of each project, the applicable World Bank region, the recipient country or countries, the sector focus, the approved amount, and the approval date. Each of the generic types of activities listed in Box 1 in Chapter 1 is described on a separate webpage, and some of these webpages, such as that for PDNA, provide a list of the respective projects. But once again, there is no information on disbursements for individual activities or groups of activities.

3.26 Therefore, to obtain information on what GFDRR has been spending its Tracks II, III, and now ACP-EU resources, by type of activity, by country, and by implementing agency (whether the GFDRR Secretariat or the Bank's regional operations), IEG has extracted this information from GFDRR's RBMS and internal databases in the World Bank. IEG reviewed

the objectives of the 244 projects that had some commitments and/or disbursements in fiscal years 2007–12, and classified the activities into the three generic types of program activities identified in the GFDRR Partnership Strategy 2009–2012:

- (a) **Capacity building:** Developing effective institutional, governance, legislative, and financing frameworks for disaster risk reduction and mainstreaming DRR in sectoral development strategies.
- (b) **Tools and methodologies:** Developing new tools, practical approaches, and other instruments for disaster reduction and recovery.
- (c) **Knowledge sharing and generation:** Developing and sharing evidence-based DRR actions; making an economic case for DRR; and documenting and disseminating good practices on mainstreaming DRR and formulating risk reduction strategies. (GFDRR 2009, pp. 8–9)

3.27 This analysis reveals that GFDRR has been first and foremost a capacity building program, whose activities in this area have accounted for 81 percent of the project commitments and 74 percent of the disbursements administered by the GFDRR Secretariat (Table 6). Thus, like the other 20 or so GRPPs located in the World Bank that are providing country-level, technical assistance (IEG 2011b, p. 7), GFDRR is mostly supporting the provision of national public goods in relation to disaster preparedness, prevention, and recovery. Like those other programs, GFDRR is also supporting the provision of global public goods in terms of knowledge sharing and generation, which accounted for 15 percent of project commitments and 20 percent of disbursements during the period, as well as the development of tools and methodologies, which accounted for 5 percent of project commitments and 6 percent of disbursements.

3.28 Of the \$65.9 million that GFDRR spent on capacity building during FY2007–12, 19 percent was disbursed on strategic planning, 43 percent on institutional and human capacity development, 10 percent on post-disaster needs assessments, 3 percent on specific training courses, and 25 percent on support to Bank lending operations — in the form of Bank-executed trust funds for preparation and supervision (13 percent), or recipient-executed trust funds for financing for Bank investment projects (12 percent).<sup>16</sup> That is, \$16.5 million of trust fund disbursements — equivalent to 16 percent of GFDRR’s total trust fund disbursements during the period — were used to support 35 Bank investment operations.

3.29 More than a third of these projects (13 out of 35) were in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional operational staff assert that GFDRR has markedly contributed to the Region’s current operation portfolio (Annex F). Examples cited include three new policy operations supporting DRM policies under preparation in Colombia; the Flood Risk Management Project in the City of Barranquilla, Colombia, where a \$150,000 grant from GFDRR enabled the Bank to sustain a policy dialogue for two years leading up to the project;

---

16. GFDRR is providing the majority of the recipient-executed financing in the case of one project — \$5.1 million for the Drought Management and Livelihood Protection Project in Somalia (approved September 2011) — and RETF cofinancing for IBRD, IDA, or Global Environment Facility (GEF)-financed projects in five other cases. The Somalia project represents a significant scaling up of GFDRR support for Bank investment projects.

**Table 6. GFDRR, Tracks II, III and ACP-EU Commitments and Disbursements by Type of Activity, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**

Type of Activity	No. of Activities	Commitments	Minimum Size	Maximum Size	Disbursements
<i><b>Capacity Building</b></i>					
Capacity Development	67	48,889	50	2,700	28,316
Strategic Planning	29	20,716	32	3,025	12,319
Support for Bank Lending					
Preparation & Supervision	32	17,418	70	3,042	8,790
RETF Projects & Cofinancing	6	9,765	1,000	5,100	7,698
PDNAs	28	4,331	55	685	6,500
Training	11	2,686	29	887	2,291
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>103,805</b>			<b>65,915</b>
<i><b>Tools and Methodologies</b></i>					
Toolkits/Handbooks	10	3,522	39	1,318	3,308
DRM Lab	1	2,050	2,050	2,050	1,975
Databases	2	250	250	250	456
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5,822</b>		<b>3,618</b>	<b>5,739</b>
<i><b>Knowledge Sharing and Generation</b></i>					
Studies	42	15,717	25	1,500	13,303
Conferences	10	2,185	50	600	3,499
South/South Cooperation	5	1,419	144	495	1,003
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>19,320</b>			<b>17,805</b>
<b>Total Activities</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>128,948</b>			<b>89,459</b>
Non-Administrative Anchor Activities <sup>a</sup>					4,114
External Evaluation					357
Administration					15,411
<b>Grand Total</b>					<b>109,341</b>

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR and World Bank data.

a. These are primarily knowledge management and capacity building activities.

and small GFDRR grants leading to large investment projects in Dominica, Grenada, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

3.30 Fifty-six percent of GFDRR disbursements were spent on country-level activities, 22 percent on regional or sub-regional activities, and 22 percent on global activities (Table 7). The proportion of Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU expenditures on global and regional activities is somewhat surprising, given the division of labor that was agreed upon between UNISDR and the GFDRR Secretariat — the former to focus on global and regional activities, and the latter on country-level activities. Two possible explanations are, first, that two-thirds of the Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU global activities have been for knowledge sharing and generation and for developing tools and methodologies; and second, that many of the regional activities have been sub-regional in nature — for example, in East Africa, the Pacific Islands, Central Asia,

**Table 7. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements by Type and Level of Activity, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**

Level of Activity	Global		Regional		Country		Total
Type of Activity	No.	US\$ '000	No.	US\$ '000	No.	US\$ '000	US\$ '000
<b>Capacity Building</b>							
Capacity Development	5	3,920	15	7,205	47	17,191	28,316
Strategic Planning	1	45	14	6,397	14	5,878	12,319
Support for Bank Lending							
Preparation & Supervision			2	319	30	8,472	8,790
RETF Projects & Cofinancing					6	7,698	7,698
PDNAs	1	975	1	100	26	5,425	6,500
Training	6	1,757	2	65	3	469	2,291
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6,697</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>14,085</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>45,132</b>	<b>65,915</b>
<b>Tools and Methodologies</b>							
Toolkits/Handbooks	7	2,810	3	499			3,308
DRM Lab	1	1,975					1,975
Databases	2	456					456
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>5,241</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>499</b>			<b>5,739</b>
<b>Knowledge Sharing and Generation</b>							
Studies	11	4,561	12	4,420	19	4,321	13,303
Conferences	5	2,539	3	476	2	484	3,499
South/South Cooperation	3	853	2	150			1,003
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7,954</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>5,046</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>4,805</b>	<b>17,805</b>
<b>Total Activities</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>19,892</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>19,630</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>49,937</b>	<b>89,459</b>
Non-Administrative Anchor Activities <sup>a</sup>		4,114					4,114
External Evaluation		357					357
Administration		15,411					15,411
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>39,774</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>19,630</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>49,937</b>	<b>109,341</b>

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR and World Bank data.

a. These are primarily knowledge management and capacity building activities.

Southeastern Europe and the Balkans, the Caribbean, and Central America. Although organized at the sub-regional level for reasons of efficiency, these activities are still largely country-focused.

3.31 Each year, UNISDR has prepared a work plan of Track I activities and an annual report for approval by the GFDRR CG (GFDRR 2010a, p. 4). IEG's review of these documents for FY07–11 found that most planned and actual UNISDR activities, within their broad headings under this track, appeared to relate to GFDRR's mandate. However, these UNISDR reports also show a declining share of Track I going to global activities from 36 percent of the total in FY07 to 16 percent in FY11. Thus, as observed by other previous evaluations and as noted earlier (para. 3.17), this GPR also finds some overlap of activities between UNISDR and the GFDRR Secretariat, at least in terms of their levels.

3.32 Geographically, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and East Asia and the Pacific have been the largest recipients of Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU support (Table 8). Slightly more than half (51 percent) of Track II country-level disbursements have gone to priority core countries (compared to the target of 80 percent) and 12 percent of Track II disbursements have gone to donor-earmarked countries. An additional 11 percent of Track II disbursements have gone to “hotspot” countries that are not priority or donor-earmarked countries, and 26 percent to other countries (none of the above categories).

3.33 The term, “hotspot” countries, comes from the 2005 study by Dilly et al, *Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis*, commissioned by the ProVention Consortium. This study presented data on the risks of mortality and economic losses associated with six types of major natural disasters. The study determined the prevalence of these natural disasters using a common geospatial unit of reference in all countries. Then the report ranked countries in terms of their vulnerability to natural disasters in order to influence risk mitigation investments.

3.34 A greater share (43 percent) of Track III disbursements, for which all low- and middle-income countries are eligible, has gone to donor-earmarked countries, presumably in response to disasters in those countries. All in all, this shows a program that is focusing slightly more than half of its DRR mainstreaming efforts on its 20 priority core countries, selected both for their high vulnerability to natural hazards and for low economic resilience to cope with disaster impacts including anticipated climate change and variability. However, in its global knowledge work, the program should continue to draw more upon relevant DRR experiences in all countries — especially those regarded as “champions” (such as Turkey and Mexico) — and other examples of global good practices.

3.35 The World Bank’s regional Vice Presidential units (VPUs) have been responsible for implementing (or supervising the implementation of) more than half (54 percent) of GFDRR activities by disbursements (Table 9). Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and East Asia have implemented the largest share. Most of the remaining activities have been implemented by the GFDRR Secretariat itself. A very small share has been implemented by other Sustainable Development Network (SDN) departments or central VPUs.

3.36 Although only 7 percent of GFDRR’s country and regional-level disbursements have gone to the Middle East and North Africa Region, the Bank’s regional operational staff assert that GFDRR has (a) financed a range of country-level programs in the MNA region since 2007 which have increased resilience to disasters, (b) raised the status of the DRM with the Bank’s client countries, (c) fostered a solid partnership for risk reduction with international donors; (d) provided rapid technical, financial, and human resources when disasters hit in Yemen (2008) and Djibouti (2011); and (e) made a strong contribution to fostering regional collaboration for DRM. Hazards risk assessments have been completed or are ongoing in Algeria, Djibouti, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Yemen; flood recovery projects have been launched in Yemen and Djibouti; and inter-ministerial cooperation necessary for dealing effectively with cross-cutting DRM-related issues has been enhanced in Algeria, Djibouti, Morocco, and Yemen, (Annex F).

3.37 Like other GRPPs supported by multi-donor trust funds, GFDRR has the potential to foster greater policy coherence among donors, and bring together what would otherwise be



**Table 8. GFDRR, Track II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements by Region and Priority Countries, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**

World Bank Region	Administration	Track II	Track III	ACP-EU	Total
Sub-Saharan Africa		15,452	2,802	335	18,589
East Asia and the Pacific		13,114	3,306	52	16,472
Europe and Central Asia		2,474	93		2,567
Latin American and the Caribbean		14,346	3,600	58	18,003
Middle East and North Africa		4,816	3	117	4,936
South Asia		4,246	4,752		8,998
Global Activities	15,411	20,550	3,812		39,774
<b>Total Activities</b>	<b>15,411</b>	<b>74,999</b>	<b>18,370</b>	<b>561</b>	<b>109,341</b>
<b>Country-Level Disbursements to:</b>					
Priority Core Countries <sup>a</sup>		20,992	2,778	186	23,957
Donor-Earmarked Non-Core Countries <sup>a</sup>		4,986	5,516		10,502
"Hotspot" Countries <sup>b</sup>		19,679	9,215	174	35,292
None-of-the-Above Countries		10,774	1,825	282	8,360
Total Country-Level Disbursements <sup>c</sup>		41,183	12,922	525	54,631
Disbursements to Region-Wide Activities		13,265	1,636	36	14,937
Disbursements to Global Activities	15,411	20,550	3,812		39,774
<b>Total Disbursements</b>	<b>15,411</b>	<b>74,999</b>	<b>18,370</b>	<b>561</b>	<b>109,341</b>
<b>Share of Country-Level Activities</b>					
Priority Core Countries		51.0%	21.5%	35.4%	43.9%
Donor-Earmarked Non-Core Countries		12.1%	42.7%		19.2%
"Hotspot" Countries		47.8%	71.3%	11.0%	53.0%
None-of-the-Above Countries		26.2%	14.1%	53.6%	23.6%

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR and World Bank data. See Annex Table E-5 for detailed country information.

a. See Table 2 in Chapter 1 for a list of priority, donor-earmarked, and hotspot countries.

b. The 36 "hotspot" countries are those in which more than half of the country's Gross Domestic Product is at risk from two or more hazards (Dilly et al. 2005). These disbursement amounts include the four priority core countries and the six donor-earmarked countries that are also hotspot countries.

c. These subtotals do not double count the ten hotspot countries that are also GFDRR priority or donor-earmarked countries.

piecemeal aid contributions. This pooling has the potential to ease burdens on governments dealing with multiple donors by consolidating such interactions within the context of the Bank's country operations. But GFDRR has provided little information or evidence in its Annual Reports or on its website about what is happening on the ground in recipient countries in this respect. What is the country-level partner environment like? Who is driving the agenda — the countries or the external development partners? Which other stakeholders are involved?

3.38 The World Bank's Regional DRM Coordinators who work with GFDRR play a major role in choosing activities in their regions to submit for GFDRR financing. Notably, an IEG analysis of the Bank's CASs and Interim Strategy Notes (where

**Table 9. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements by Region and Bank VPU, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**

<i>Bank VPU:</i>	Regional and Country-Level Activities						Global Activities	Total	Share of Total
	AFR	EAP	ECA	LCR	MNA	SAR			
Regional VPUs									
AFRVP	14,867							14,867	13.6%
EAPVP		12,642					790	13,432	12.3%
ECAVP			2,128				616	2,745	2.5%
LCRVP				14,348			182	14,531	13.3%
MNAVVP					4,445			4,445	4.1%
SARVP						8,051	423	8,474	7.7%
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>14,867</b>	<b>12,642</b>	<b>2,128</b>	<b>14,348</b>	<b>4,445</b>	<b>8,051</b>	<b>2,011</b>	<b>58,493</b>	<b>53.5%</b>
Network VPUs									
HDNVP							8	8	0.01%
PRMVP							30	30	0.03%
SDNVP/ARD	37							37	0.03%
SDNVP/FEU	93						80	172	0.16%
SDNVP/GFDRR	3,484	3,731	439	3,291	491	947	37,511	49,895	45.6%
SDNVP/SDV		99		314				413	0.38%
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>3,613</b>	<b>3,830</b>	<b>439</b>	<b>3,605</b>	<b>491</b>	<b>947</b>	<b>37,731</b>	<b>50,657</b>	<b>46.2%</b>
Central VPUs									
DECVP							69	69	0.06%
TREVP/BDM	109			50				159	0.14%
WBIVP							65	65	0.06%
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>109</b>			<b>50</b>			<b>135</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>0.27%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>18,589</b>	<b>16,472</b>	<b>2,567</b>	<b>18,003</b>	<b>4,936</b>	<b>8,998</b>	<b>39,774</b>	<b>109,341</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>Share of Total</b>	<b>16.9%</b>	<b>15.0%</b>	<b>2.3%</b>	<b>16.4%</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>8.2%</b>	<b>36.6%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR and World Bank data.

AFR = Sub-Saharan Africa; EAP = East Asia and the Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia

HDN = Human Development Network; SDN = Sustainable Development Network; ARD = Agriculture and Rural Development; FEU = Finance, Economics and Urban Development; SDV = Social Development

DEC = Development Economics; PRM = Poverty Reduction and Economic Management; TRE = Treasury; WBI = World Bank Institute.

there is no fully developed CAS), shows that GFDRR resources are generally being allocated to those countries with “disaster-sensitive” CASs and Interim Strategy Notes: 53 out of 60 GFDRR client countries (88 percent), accounting for 89 percent of GFDRR country-level disbursements, had references to disaster risk reduction in their most recent CASs or Interim Strategy Notes (Annex Table E-5).<sup>17</sup> This is higher than the share of all Bank clients

17. This excludes the subregional activities (such as for the Pacific Islands, Central Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean) from the analysis.

(75 percent) that have disaster-sensitive CASs. It would appear that requests for GFDRR support are closely related to client demand as reflected in the Bank's CASs. This is one of the strongest linkages that IEG has so far observed among its GPRs between GRPP-supported activities and the Bank's country operations.

3.39 GFDRR's activities in CCA have thus far been relatively few and small, accounting for just 14 percent of all activities and 8 percent of disbursements (Table 10). The external evaluation coverage of GFDRR's CCA activities was limited to a list of seven desk-reviewed, CCA activities in an Appendix without evaluative comment (Universalia 2010b, pp. 12–17). Nevertheless, GFDRR has recently assembled a series of Climate Risk and Adaptation Country Profiles posted on its website.<sup>18</sup> These 12-page brochures provide an overview of the country itself, its climate, and disaster risk profiles, and notes on existing government CCA frameworks and “adaptation gaps.” Being in one place, these can provide a useful source for users who want a quick, one-stop introduction to the CCA background of a particular country. In addition to the “print summaries,” the dynamic “dashboards” allow users to explore the links in real time. To continue to be useful, however, these will require continuous updating and more careful attention to quality. These include several charts without date references, for instance. A few profiles are incomplete, and some without CCA content. Drought, the most important CCA-related event for Senegal, is not mentioned in that country's profile. While the website, itself, announces that a series of 49 profiles are available, IEG only found 31 posted. The overall impression is one of work-in-progress, with the need for more quality control and attention to updating. GFDRR should be better placed to carry out this work now that it has a full-time, climate change specialist on its staff,

**Table 10. GFDRR Disbursements for Climate Change Activities, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU, by Type and Level of Activity, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**

	Global		Regional		Country		Total
	No. of Activities	US\$ '000	No. of Activities	US\$ '000	No. of Activities	US\$ '000	
Capacity Development	2	513	2	900	7	1,285	2,698
Studies	3	798	3	831	4	991	2,621
Strategy Planning			2	1,820	1	63	1,884
Support for Bank Lending							
Preparation & Supervision			2	319	4	425	744
RETF Projects & Cofinancing					2	56	56
Training	1	187					187
Databases	1	174					174
<b>Sub-total (climate change activities)</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1,672</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>3,870</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>2,821</b>	<b>8,363</b>
<b>Total (all GFDRR activities)</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>39,774</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>19,630</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>49,937</b>	<b>109,341</b>
<b>Share of GFDRR Total</b>		<b>4.2%</b>		<b>19.7%</b>		<b>5.6%</b>	<b>7.6%</b>

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR and World Bank data.

18. [http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/home.cfm?page=country\\_profile&CCCode=](http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCCode=)

and a senior adaptation specialist and external experts are being engaged to provide adequate quality control.

3.40 Overall, GFDRR is representative of the findings in IEG's recent evaluation of the World Bank's trust fund portfolio (IEG 2011a). Donor contributions to GFDRR are not adding to overall official development assistance because most donor countries allocate money to trust funds from a fixed aid budget. But GFDRR is making it possible for donors to earmark funds for DRR to target countries, to tap into the Bank's capacity to supervise such activities in these countries, and to exercise some strategic direction and oversight of the overall program. For the Bank, GFDRR is adding welcome resources to its country programs when faced with a flat administrative budget. As noted earlier in this GPR, about 16 percent of GFDRR's trust fund disbursements have supported preparation, supervision, or cofinancing of 35 Bank investment operations — roughly the same percentage share that Bank-executed trust funds are now contributing to the Bank's overall administrative budget.

3.41 Although this GPR has been able to establish and review patterns of GFDRR program activities using internal World Bank data, it was not possible to do the same for the outputs and outcomes of these activities. GFDRR still needs to systematically report the expected and actual outputs of its activities — essential elements of a logical results chain that will enable GFDRR to apply M&E to its work. Pending more systematic data, Table 11 provides anecdotal examples — from the GFDRR website and internal Bank databases — of GFDRR activities and their outputs to illustrate what still needs to be incorporated into GFDRR's results framework. These examples are offered as guidance to GFDRR as it continues its work on the program's results framework. They are not intended, at this time, to offer a definitive assessment of the chosen activities, for which there is insufficient information for their rigorous evaluation.

## ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES

3.42 For assessing the achievement of objectives, this GPR takes the FY2001–06 period as the baseline against which to compare the GFDRR results and performance during the FY2007–11 period of the program's operation. The FY2001–06 period is an appropriate baseline, since it is immediately prior to the establishment of GFDRR. This was when pre-GFDRR DRR activities were pursued by the ProVention Consortium and the Hazard Management Team of Bank staff. For the remainder of this GPR, the “pre-GFDRR” period refers to FY2001–06 and the “post-GFDRR” period refers to FY2007–11.

3.43 ***Mission 1: Mainstreaming DRR and CCA into PRSs, CASs, UNDAFs, and NAPAs.*** Using as indicators the incorporation of DRR and CCA perspectives into the four country strategy documents cited by this objective, only the CASs, showed significant evidence of possible GFDRR impact in terms of their attention to disasters (Figure 5). Altogether 75 percent of *post*-GFDRR CASs addressed disasters — significantly higher than the 43 percent share of *pre*-GFDRR CASs. The Bank's Regional DRM Coordinators also assert that there has also been a qualitative improvement in the way in which more recent CASs have treated disaster risk issues. They describe how GFDRR has assisted the country teams to base their CASs on better DRM analytical work, leading to more coherent treatment of disaster risk in the background and context sections, and in some cases to the Bank and the client agreeing on strategies and actions that the Bank

**Table 11. Results Chain Elements of 10 Selected GFDRR Activities**

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Basic Data</i>	<i>Intended Outputs</i>	<i>Actual Outputs</i>	<i>Link to Achieving GFDRR Objectives</i>
<b>Capacity Building</b>				
<i>Guatemala: Development of scientific information to promote municipal planning to reduce disaster risks</i>	2008–11 \$730,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reliable vulnerability and risk maps at the local level</li> <li>Disaster emergency response plans</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Risk maps/land-use plans for urban areas of 12 municipalities</li> <li>Updated building code for Guatemala</li> <li>Building code now applies to all new construction in the country</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Risk maps make municipalities stronger institutional partners for DRR</li> <li>DRR institutionalized at the national and local levels through new building code</li> </ul>
<i>Philippines: Supporting local government capacity to manage natural disaster risks</i>	2008–12 \$1,150,000	Strengthened capacities of local Philippine institutions for reducing vulnerability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National disaster risk financing strategy in 2010</li> <li>Agreement with World Bank for \$500 million policy loan with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (CAT-DDO)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Department of Interior and Local Government has adopted a local government DRR capacity building program that is being scaled up with government resources over the next five years.</li> </ul>
<i>RETf Somalia: Drought management and livelihood protection project</i>	2012–13 \$5.1 million contribution to \$9.0 million total cost	Short-term delivery of emergency livelihood support (incl. cash-for-work of 15,000 beneficiaries; and crop or livestock inputs to 35,000	Not yet known: activity ongoing	Weak: project linkage to GFDRR mandate of promoting DRR absent
<i>Turkey: Disaster mitigation and preparedness technical assistance in support of World Bank Seismic risk mitigation project</i>	2009–12 \$400,000 (BETF support to Bank lending operation)	Istanbul's better preparedness for a potential earthquake	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Countrywide prioritized list of seismic mitigation investments</li> <li>Recommendations for strengthening national capacity for disaster risk management</li> </ul>	Uncertain: need for more evidence of attribution of how an activity with intended local level outputs ended up having national level outputs
<b>Tools and Methodologies</b>				
<i>Handbook: "Cities and flooding: a guide to integrated urban flood management for the 21st Century"</i>	2012 \$90,000	Practical technical guidance to key policy/decision-makers and technical specialists in cities in developing countries on how to manage the risk of floods	No systematic evidence yet upon its use by intended clients	Potentially strong linkage to incorporating DRR at the country level


<i>Activity</i>	<i>Basic Data</i>	<i>Intended Outputs</i>	<i>Actual Outputs</i>	<i>Link to Achieving GFDRR Objectives</i>
<i>Handbook: "Safer homes, stronger communities: a handbook for reconstructing after natural disasters"</i>	2010 \$618,000	Guidance to policy-makers, project managers, and World Bank staff in making decisions on how to reconstruct disaster-affected housing and communities	No systematic evidence yet reported upon its use by intended clients	Weak: Lack of linkage to DRR; linkage to resilient disaster recovery at country level not clearly articulated
<i>DRM Lab: Open data for resilience initiative; understanding risk community</i>	2010– [end-date not reported] \$2.1 million	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of science, technology, and innovation to empower DRR decision-makers in the developing world</li> <li>• Partnerships and communities that utilize open data and open source technology for DRR decision-making</li> </ul>	www.haitidata.org and www.understandrisk.org websites are operational, but there is no systematic evidence yet upon their use by intended clients. Science and technology inputs may not best be served by open-source sites with the out-of-date and inactive blogs that these have	If used, there is a potential linkage to GFDRR's mandate of incorporating DRR at country level. Partnerships may be strengthened too, but not at the global and regional levels intended by GFDRR — maybe GFDRR program partnership objectives and scope could be extended to local and community levels too
<b>Knowledge Sharing and Generation</b>				
<i>Study: Pacific catastrophe risk pool feasibility study</i>	2009–12 \$1,000,000	Assessment of exposure of the Pacific island countries to catastrophic losses and their capacity to meet those losses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk models and risk profiles can now be generated for the participating countries</li> <li>• Pacific Risk Information System</li> </ul>	DRR strengthened by new data and assessment capabilities newly acquired by small countries, thanks to activity.
<i>South-South Cooperation: Grant for women's leadership &amp; partnerships for local implementation of (HFA)</i>	2010–12 \$300,000	Polymakers and practitioners from India, Guatemala, and Honduras brought together	Exchanges between Guatemala and Honduras, substantial training of new community leaders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak: by itself, bringing stakeholders together with exchanges is not evidenced incorporating DRR</li> <li>• Potential for global partnership development if India: Guatemala/Honduras connection activated</li> </ul>
<i>South-South Cooperation: City-to-city sharing initiative for developing countries</i>	2010 \$450,000	Polymakers in three cities exchanging DRR practices through land use planning and local-level disaster management	No systematic evidence yet reported	Weak: no impact of activity upon GFDRR's <u>country</u> -level mandate intended — pointing to need to extend GFDRR program objectives and scope to subnational and municipal levels

Source: Constructed by IEG from GFDRR website and internal Bank databases.

subsequently supports. For example, only Nicaragua and Honduras out of the seven Central American countries, all of which are affected by adverse natural events, had meaningful discussions of DRR aspects in their CASs before 2006. All seven Central American countries have had meaningful treatment in their CASs since 2006.

3.44 The other three strategy documents cited in GFDRR's mission statement do not show evidence of increased attention to disasters (Figure 5). UNDAFs and NAPAs have given slightly more attention to disasters since 2006, but not to a statistically significant degree. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) have had fewer references to disasters since 2006, but the difference is also not statistically significant. The opportunity for GFDRR and World Bank regional staff to directly influence Bank teams preparing CAS and PRSP documents evidently makes these country strategies the ones most likely to be influenced by GFDRR — however without the intended results in the case of PRSPs.

**Figure 5. References to Disasters in Countries' Strategies**



Source: IEG. See Annex H.

CAS = World Bank Country Assistance Strategy; UNDAF = United Nations Development Assistance Framework; NAPA = National Adaptation Programme of Action; PRSP = Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

Note: Results are considered to be statistically significant when  $p \leq 5\%$  (the example of CASs. Higher p values (in the other three cases) point to a greater likelihood of the observed differences being due to chance, as per the Student's t test. For CASs, PRSPs, and NAPAs, IEG reviewed all strategy documents issued during 2001-2011. For the numerous UNDAFs, for which a consolidated database was not readily available, IEG analyzed a simple random sample of 47 documents drawn from the total of 156 issued during the 2001-2011 period. See Annex H for details.

UNDAFs, NAPAs, and PRSPs already had large majorities addressing disasters before 2006: 75 percent, 83 percent, and 90 percent, respectively. This being the case, it raises the question as to why GFDRR should have adopted a mission to “mainstream” disaster reduction into country strategy documents that were already replete with references to it.

3.45 Moving beyond CASs to Bank-supported investment projects, IEG’s recent climate change evaluation found that there has been a clear shift toward risk reduction in Bank-supported disaster projects in recent years (IEG 2012). Comparing 90 disaster investment projects during FY2008–10 to a set of 528 disaster projects during FY1984–2007 shows a significant increase in the number of projects that support risk reduction activities. The share of projects with hard risk reduction increased from 28 percent to 40 percent and those with some soft risk reduction, exposure reduction, hydromet support, or financial risk management increased from 20 percent to 42 percent — both large increases, but still a minority of projects. There is also evidence of significant incorporation of disaster risk reduction into non-dedicated disaster projects. Mostly this has been through drainage and flood protection in water sector projects that focus on water supply and sanitation or through irrigation, drainage, or other works integrated into agriculture and rural development projects. Most exposure reduction and resettlement has been in urban water projects, most warning systems have been for cyclone or flood-related projects, and most financial risk management mechanisms have been safety nets or micro-insurance for agriculture or drought-oriented projects.

3.46 The Bank’s Regional DRM Coordinators assert that GFDRR has elevated DRR to a new level of operationalization in the Bank through systematically focusing on ex ante risk reduction and risk financing investments. Attributing the changes in the attention of country strategies and Bank-supported investment projects to DRR and CCA issues only, or even primarily to GFDRR, however, is not a straightforward matter. While the period 2008–10 follows the adoption of the Hyogo Framework in 2005, the IEG evaluation of 2006, and the creation of GFDRR in 2006, it is also possible that a general shift in international awareness of the importance of risk reduction measures — reinforced by the South Asia tsunami of 2004, one of the worst disaster events in history — has been the driving force behind the institutional developments noted here and the observed change in behavior in the Bank.

3.47 Routine GFDRR reporting in its Annual Reports and on its website has also not adequately explained how the program works at the country level through clearly describing its activities with governments and other stakeholders, either individually or across the board. There may be explanations for the growing attention to DRR and CCA, other than actions by GFDRR itself. The external evaluation noted, for example, that “in many instances, at the country level, either (a) the scale of GFDRR current initiatives is quite small in comparison to the totality of the work of other donors/lenders in the DRR field; or (b) there are many other actors involved in DRR-related work.” (Universalia 2010a, p. 6). Other actors interviewed by IEG, including CG members themselves, cited not only the graphic images of disaster-related devastation transmitted instantly around the world, but also the examples set by “champion” DRR governments — citing Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey, and Mexico, as examples.



3.48 ***Mission 2: More Global and Regional Cooperation over DRR.*** Just by attracting donors, the United Nations, and other stakeholders together in the DRR business, the GFDRR partnership itself has contributed to the achievement of this objective. For the World Bank, GFDRR has provided the opportunity to cooperate with agencies with which the Bank works little, such as the Association of South Eastern Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ACP group of countries, and the African Union Commission (AUC). The partnership has also brought together actors from both the humanitarian side of DRR, such as the IFRC, and the sustainable development side, such as the EU. For UN partners, notably UNISDR and UNDP-BCPR, a seat on GFDRR's governing body helped put them on an equal footing with other partners, including the Bank. Partners' engagement in cooperation was driven in part by the Bank's financing possibilities and its strong track record in disaster-related assistance. This has brought more credibility to their own work — a good reason for cooperation. The cooperation is not always acknowledged by others, however. A recent evaluation of UNISDR, for instance, barely mentions GFDRR (Dalberg 2010).

3.49 GFDRR has established implementing partnerships with regional institutions and initiatives such as the Applied Geoscience and Technology Division of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SOPAC); the Arab Academy for Science, Technology and Maritime Transport; the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center; the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Climate Prediction and Applications Center; the International Recovery Platform (IRP); the Joint Research Center of the European Commission; the South Asia Disaster Management Center; the Middle East Technical University ; and the Norwegian Technical Institute (NGI). GFDRR has also reached out to the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank for close cooperation, although these have not become governance partners as envisaged in 2006. The Islamic Development Bank has become one of GFDRR's latest governance partners.

3.50 Beyond its formal objective of global and regional cooperation, GFDRR is now devoting more attention to stimulating more cooperation at the local level, particularly among central government agencies, local municipalities, and CSOs. GFDRR is developing a program of collaboration with the Bank's Social Development Department to this effect. A CSO Partnership Consultation paper was also discussed at the 11th CG meeting in Jakarta in November 2011, followed by a three-day consultation workshop with CSOs in Washington, DC, in February 2012. This led to the presentation of a strategy document to the 12th CG meeting in April 2012 in Washington DC. CG members debated and reached a consensus to guide GFDRR in this area.

3.51 Most DRR activities take place locally, requiring local action by municipalities, local communities, and the private sector. It is only when the scale of a disaster is beyond the capacity of local actors to respond that intermediate-level or national governments become involved, or when the scale is beyond the capacity of the country to respond that international actors become involved. Therefore, effective DRM requires a decentralized approach, and an appropriate division of labor between national, intermediate, and local levels of government. The best DRR efforts can unravel if all players do not collaborate and cooperate effectively at the local level.

3.52 Wisely, GFDRR's Charter did not expect the program to foster global and regional cooperation over CCA. CCA has its own distinct institutional architecture built around the United

Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. As noted earlier in this GPR, GFDRR's activities in this area have been relatively few.

## **IMPACTS ON THE WORLD BANK**

3.53 The mobilization of trust fund resources by GFDRR has enabled the Bank to engage in more DRR activities, and to employ additional staff and consultants to prepare and supervise Bank lending operations as well as implement GFDRR activities. It is clear that GFDRR resources have made it possible for the Bank to offer different forms of technical assistance and capacity building beyond the traditional World Bank response, and to respond more quickly to requests from national governments for post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. It is also clear that GFDRR's broad partnership goes beyond what the Bank and other key partners would likely have formed bilaterally with each other — a valuable contribution of a global partnership program.

3.54 In terms of internal, cross-departmental collaboration, GFDRR has helped the Bank improve its own performance in reaching across sectoral and thematic interests represented by large autonomous departments. GFDRR has enabled different parts of the Bank to reach out to other stakeholders in disaster-related activities and to develop partnerships at the global and regional levels. Moreover, GFDRR provides a mechanism for collaboration across sectors. For instance, Bank staff from its Finance and Agriculture departments formed a strong engagement through a GFDRR-supported agricultural insurance project.

3.55 The Bank's Regional DRM Coordinators assert that GFDRR has also played a key role in catalyzing and sustaining an active knowledge community of practice in the area of disaster risk reduction in the Bank. This community has in turn fostered strong and effective communications and learning channels for rapid sharing of lessons across countries, regions, and sectors. GFDRR's connections with external organizations and think tanks have also brought some of their latest thinking to the Bank's policy advice and investments. GFDRR's technical, financial and human resources have created space for opening up a productive dialogue in the Bank on ex-ante disaster risk reduction and on more effective and sustainable post-disaster recovery and reconstruction.

## **Efficiency**

3.56 Efficiency refers to the extent to which the program uses its resources and other inputs economically to produce outputs and outcomes. Several dimensions are discussed here, including (a) resource mobilization, (b) administrative costs, (c) financial reporting, and (d) the cost-effectiveness of individual activities.

## **RESOURCE MOBILIZATION**

3.57 At the launch of GFDRR, program funding and spending were expected on a very large scale, on the order of \$200 million spending per year over FY2006–16 period (World Bank and UNISDR 2006, p. 29). Although the program has grown rapidly in response to evident demand from developing countries, these initial expectations have not been realized.

The most that GFDRR has so far been spent in one year (2012) has been \$41.3 million, including the DGF grant of \$4.25 million from the Bank to UNISDR.

3.58 Nonetheless, the program has mobilized pledges of \$278.4 million since 2006 to Bank-administered trust funds supporting Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU, and received paid-in contributions of \$226.5 million as of June 30, 2012. Annual trust fund commitments have grown from \$6.4 million in FY2007 to \$46.7 million in FY2012, and annual disbursements from \$5.2 million in FY2008 to \$35.3 million in FY2012 (Table 12).

3.59 The program has an informal triennial replenishment cycle. Pledges were largest in fiscal years 2007 and 2010 and tapered off in the following two years, respectively. Then paid-in contributions as a share of pledges rose from FY2007–09, and again from FY2010–12. The program is expecting a new wave of pledges in FY2013.

3.60 The efficiency with which GFDRR has used these resources can be measured first by the share of paid in contributions that are committed to program activities. This share was consistently above 80 percent during the first five years — a relatively high level in the light of Bank guidelines that programs only make commitments *after* donor contributions have

**Table 12. GFDRR Resource Mobilization, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU, Trust Fund Pledges, Contributions, Commitments and Disbursements, FY2007-12 (US\$ thousands)**

Annual	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012 Preliminary	Total
Donor Pledges <sup>a</sup>	39,505	19,931	3,784	146,144	51,844	17,218	278,426
Donor Contributions Received	4,210	33,590	17,073	32,284	47,373	91,944	226,475
Program Commitments <sup>b</sup>	6,420	30,347	11,485	28,366	35,378	42,193	154,189
Program Disbursements <sup>b</sup>	628	5,197	14,937	20,621	26,070	35,340	102,792
<b>Cumulative, 2007 to 2012</b>							
Pledges <sup>a</sup>	39,505	59,436	63,220	209,364	261,208	278,426	
Contributions	4,210	37,802	54,875	87,160	134,531	226,475	
Commitments <sup>b</sup>	6,420	36,767	48,252	76,618	111,996	154,189	
Disbursements <sup>b</sup>	628	5,824	20,762	41,383	67,452	102,792	
<b>Selected (Cumulative) Ratios</b>							
Contributions/Pledges	10.7%	63.6%	86.8%	41.6%	51.5%	81.3%	
Commitments/Contributions	152.5%	97.3%	87.9%	87.9%	83.2%	68.1%	
Disbursements/Commitments	9.8%	15.8%	43.0%	54.0%	60.2%	66.7%	
Disbursements/Contributions	14.9%	15.4%	37.8%	47.5%	50.1%	45.4%	

Source: GFDRR Annual Reports and World Bank data.

a. Annual and cumulative donor pledges can change from those reported in other publications due to exchange rate fluctuations, depending on the reporting period.

b. Trust fund grants to countries and other recipients are recorded as commitments in the fiscal year in which the commitments are approved, and disbursements in the fiscal year in which they are spent. Non-grant expenditures are both commitments and disbursements in the fiscal year in which they occur.

been paid into the trust fund.<sup>19</sup> But this fell to 68.1 percent at the end of FY2012, probably because of the large, initial contribution of \$39.1 million that the EU Commission gave for the ACP-EU program in FY2012.

3.61 A second measure of efficiency is the share of committed funds that GFDRR has disbursed. This amount has risen steadily during the first six years to 66.7 percent at the end of FY2012. Nonetheless, this still means that only 45.4 percent of paid-in contributions have been disbursed. One reason for the unused contributions has been the multi-year commitments (up to three years in many cases) that GFDRR has made to some individual activities. The program should provide its donors with a detailed analysis of the reasons for the unused contributions. In addition to commitment or implementation delays, these might include the timing of commitments (near the end of each fiscal year, for example), the multi-year nature of the commitments, or simply a period of continuing growth of the program during which disbursements inevitably lag behind commitments.

### **ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS**

3.62 The administrative costs of the GFDRR Secretariat as a share of total expenditures administered by the Secretariat (i.e. not including Track I) have declined steadily as the program has grown (Table 13). At 11.3 percent in 2012 and 14.0 percent over the entire period, these are comparable to other technical assistance and investment programs that IEG has reviewed (IEG 2011b, p. 41). However, about \$7.6 million of administrative costs have been classified under Program Activities in the GFDRR Annual Reports. (See Annex Table E-3 (a) and (b).)<sup>20</sup> Other year-to-year differences between the two sets of data in Annex Table E-3 can be attributed to the fact that GFDRR's Annual Reports record disbursements as "actual disbursements made and contracts already entered into the Bank's corporate accounting system, known as SAP." Actual disbursements have been about \$6.2 million less through FY2012.

### **FINANCIAL REPORTING**

3.63 In preparing this GPR, IEG has come across a number of cases where financial reporting has been inaccurate, inconsistent, or misleading.<sup>21</sup> By way of example, the financial information posted on the GFDRR homepage can easily be misunderstood (Annex G). The reported amount of "pledges received" of \$332 million includes, for example, the

---

19. Such a rule means that trust funds committed should not be more than 100 percent of paid-in contributions at the close of each fiscal year. Outstanding balances are routinely invested by the Bank to provide financial returns to the program while they are not being used. Programs are allowed, but not advised to make commitments based on promissory notes or donor contributions receivable, and the line manager at the Director level has to approve commitments based on promissory notes or contributions receivable. See World Bank Group, Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships, "Donor Funding Risk and Currency Risk in Trust Fund Programs: Guidance for TTLs and Program Managers," February 2011.

20. These activities have related mainly to governance meetings, operational and results monitoring and evaluation, and communications.

21. The 2010 evaluation of GFDRR had also found financial reporting to be weak. "The implication of uneven recordkeeping is that the GFDRR in fact does not have a complete set of records on which to base a full assessment of its effectiveness or its relevance, let alone its efficiency." (Universalia 2010a, p. 27).

**Table 13. GFDRR, Administrative Costs, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Prelim. 2012	Total
<b>Program Activities</b>							
Track I	5,147	4,853	5,000	5,000	4,250	4,250	28,500
Track II	342	3,063	11,490	14,717	18,227	27,160	74,999
Track III	-	415	2,350	4,397	6,052	5,157	18,370
ACP-EU	-	-	-	-	-	561	561
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>5,489</b>	<b>8,331</b>	<b>18,839</b>	<b>24,114</b>	<b>28,529</b>	<b>37,127</b>	<b>122,430</b>
<b>Administrative Costs</b>	<b>419</b>	<b>1,881</b>	<b>2,153</b>	<b>3,056</b>	<b>3,698</b>	<b>4,203</b>	<b>15,411</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,910</b>	<b>10,212</b>	<b>20,992</b>	<b>27,170</b>	<b>32,227</b>	<b>41,330</b>	<b>137,841</b>
<b>Administrative Costs (% of total)</b>							
Including Track I	7.1%	18.4%	10.3%	11.2%	11.5%	10.2%	11.2%
Excluding Track I	55.2%	35.1%	13.5%	13.8%	13.2%	11.3%	14.1%

Source: World Bank data from the Bank's corporate accounting system known as SAP, consistent with the other financial tables in this report.

\$28.5 million of DGF grants from the World Bank to UNISDR. This is a cash grant from the Bank's DGF to UNISDR, not a donor pledge to Bank-administered trust funds supporting Tracks II, III, or ACP-EU.

3.64 Clicking on the link, “How is Every Dollar Spent?” on GFDRR's home-page, the information provided is misleading. In common usage, “spending” generally refers to actual expenditures or disbursements spent. According to GFDRR's own Annual Reports, the percentage shares of program expenditures on Tracks I, II, and III during GFDRR's first five years of operation (2007–11) were 26 percent, 59 percent, and 15 percent, respectively, not the 17 percent, 69 percent, and 14 percent figures reported on the webpage. The percentage shares of activities within Tracks II and III, reported on this same webpage, appear to be indicative targets, not actual dollars spent. As reported earlier, only 51 percent of Track II disbursements have been spent on priority core countries through FY2012, not 80 percent as reported, and only 34 percent of Track III disbursements have gone to PDNAs, not 60 percent (Annex Table E-4). Some of the links on this webpage, such as those for PDNAs and Risk Financing, provide lists of approved projects, but once again no disbursements information. Other links simply provide generic descriptions of activities under each heading without spending data related to them.

3.65 GFDRR's annual reports have not been more informative than the program website. Like many reports of this type, these have included (until 2010 at least) a cumulative list of all projects approved since GFDRR's start up. Each project comes with its own “total cost” whose accuracy is called into question through triangulation. For example, the 2010 Annual Report cited the total cost of the Mainstreaming Disaster Reduction in Mali project (approved September 2010) as \$5.0 million — GFDRR's largest commitment to that time — while GFDRR's website only reported a commitment of \$1.4 million.

3.66 IEG did not encounter any evidence of financial mismanagement or misuse of funds. However, financial and operational reporting needs improvement. Part of the weak reporting

that IEG observed can also be attributed to the World Bank as host of the GFDRR Secretariat. While the Bank has been improving its resource management and accounting systems for Bank-administered trust funds over the last few years, it has not yet established consistent, institution-wide standards for GRPP management units located in the Bank. Bank management is aware of these deficiencies and is addressing them under the ongoing trust fund reform process.

### **COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIVITIES**

3.67 GFDRR's efficiency or cost-effectiveness in implementing individual activities cannot be assessed for lack of sufficient input and output data on individual activities. GFDRR has now completed about 100 activities out of 240 initiated. Various categories of financial resources spent (staff time, consultants, travel, etc.) are obtainable from internal Bank databases for individual activities, but their cost effectiveness or the efficiency cannot be properly assessed without information on outputs. The external evaluation also highlighted this shortcoming in noting: "The challenge for the GFDRR, and for an evaluation at this time, is that many of the activities and projects underway do not yet generate data that helps to understand the link between uses of resources and the outputs or outcomes produced." (Universalia 2010a, p. 23).

3.68 According to the Bank's *Trust Fund Handbook*, the following reports are supposed to be filed in the Grant Reporting and Monitoring system upon closing:

- For BETFs, a progress or completion report
- For RETF grants of less than \$1 million, a grant completion report
- For RETF grants between \$1 and 5 million, an Implementation Completion Memorandum
- For RETF grants of more than \$5 million, an Implementation Completion and Results Report

3.69 However, IEG's recent evaluation of the Bank's trust fund portfolio found that the Bank's GRM system is an ineffective reporting and management tool (IEG 2011a, pp. 59–60). GRM reports and Implementation Completion Memorandums lack a results focus and hinder accountability. VPUs have developed different and inconsistent rules for when to use the system. Compliance in submitting GRM reports is low and is not consistently enforced by operational VPUs. Completed reports are not made available through the Bank's operations portal, or on program websites like that of GFDRR, but are filed in a parallel system. For this GPR, IEG reviewed all the reporting for all eight GFDRR, RETF grants that have closed, finding that three GRM reports had not been filed and were listed as overdue. Only two of the remaining five GRM reports provided clear information on the activities and their achievements. None clearly stated who was the recipient of the RETF grant. Much broader and deeper coverage is needed to constitute an adequate results focus along the lines outlined in Box 5.

## 4. Governance, Management, and Sustainability

4.1 Good governance is both a means and an end. Both how and whether the governance of a program help it achieve its objectives are important. Therefore, IEG has developed a framework for assessing the performance of governing bodies and their management units based on compliance with six generally accepted principles of good governance: legitimacy, accountability, responsibility, efficiency, transparency, and fairness.<sup>22</sup> GRPPs that involve United Nations' agencies and the World Bank are by definition international, public sector organizations and should live up to such standards in the use of taxpayer resources.<sup>23</sup>

### LEGITIMACY AND EFFICIENCY

4.2 **Legitimacy** refers to the way governmental and managerial authority is exercised in relation to those with a legitimate interest in the program — including shareholders, other stakeholders, implementers, beneficiaries, and the community at large. The initial legitimacy of a program typically depends on the reputation of the founding partners. Continued legitimacy then depends both on getting other (donor and beneficiary) partners to join and on demonstrating positive results. The issue of legitimacy goes beyond simple representation on the governing body to examine the effectiveness of this representation as well as the other ways in which stakeholders who are not represented on the governing body can express their interests in the program meaningfully and effectively. Because most GRPPs are involved in channeling development assistance to developing countries, it is particularly important that the latter voices can be effectively expressed and taken into account.

4.3 **Efficiency** of governance refers to the effectiveness with which the program carries out its governance function without sacrificing quality. Large and frequently changing governing bodies can impair efficient decision making. As programs grow and evolve, their governance and management arrangements may become more extended and complex, and hence less adequate and efficient. This can lead their boards to perform their governance functions less efficiently, to confusion between governance and management roles, or to a mismatch in the size of the program and the resources allocated to governance.

4.4 Like 80 percent of the GRPPs in which the Bank is involved, GFD RR has a stakeholder model of governance (IEG 2011b, p. 49). As a result of the revisions to the Charter and decisions by the CG at the 9th CG meeting in 2010, the CG now has 20 contributing members, seven noncontributing members, two permanent observers, and 20

---

22. These principles are adapted from the *OECD Principles of Corporate Governance* (2004). Although other similar statements of such principles exist at the national level, these are the only set of corporate governance principles on which there is clear international consensus. Many governance functions for the for-profit, private sector, as laid out in the OECD Principles, translate directly into equivalent functions for GRPPs (as well as for other public sector organizations, NGOs, and foundations). The key differences for GRPPs are the absence of tradable shares, the need to establish legitimacy on a basis other than shareholder rights, and the greater need for transparency in the use of public sector resources in achieving public policy goals.

23. Following the evaluation terms of reference, the 2010 external evaluation of GFD RR did not address the governance of the program. Rather the evaluation focused on some of the functions of the management of the program, such as efficient use of resources (including human and financial), and the quality of the reporting of the results.

other observers (Table 14). Theory suggests that shareholder models of governance (in which membership is limited to financial contributors) may be more efficient, but at some cost to legitimacy because of the absence of direct representation from beneficiaries. Stakeholder models may be more legitimate, but at some cost to efficiency if the number of participants representing diverse interests becomes too large. Direct representation does not necessarily translate into effective voice; noncontributing stakeholders may be able to express their interests more effectively in other ways. Many programs have deliberately established two-tier governance structures (comprising annual general meetings and executive bodies) to improve the efficiency of their governance. The real question is whether the governing bodies and management units are legitimately and effectively performing their designated functions.

**Table 14. The GFDRR Global Partnership: Members and Observers of the GFDRR Consultative Group as of July 2012**

	Developed and Developing Countries	International and Regional Organizations
Contributing members <sup>a</sup>	(17) Australia; Austria, Brazil, Denmark; Germany; Italy; Japan; Luxembourg; Netherlands; Nigeria; Norway; South Korea; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; United States; United Kingdom	(3) ACP Secretariat; European Union; World Bank
Noncontributing members	(6) Bangladesh; Haiti; Malawi; Solomon Islands; Togo; Yemen	
Other members		(1) UNISDR
Permanent observers		(2) IFRC; UNDP-BCPR
Other observers	(18) Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, France, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Vietnam	(2) Arab Academy, Islamic Development Bank

Source: GFDRR Secretariat. See also Annex D.

a. To be a contributing member, donors are required to contribute at least \$3 million over three consecutive years, and beneficiary countries at least \$500,000 over three consecutive years.

b. Noncontributing members are invited by the CG to serve on a two-year, staggered rotation basis.

4.5 The enlarged CG has increased GFDRR's legitimacy by incorporating developing country members and making it more representative of GFDRR recipient countries. All members (contributing and noncontributing) have an equal voice at CG meetings. Observers are welcome to attend the "open" sessions of the CG. Only members attend the "members only" sessions during which the CG typically discusses policy, governance, and future directions of the program.

4.6 However, IEG heard from some long-standing partners that the CG's decision making had become less efficient with its current complement of 27 members and 22 observers. Although not the view of all CG members, they thought that the CG had been more agile with the fewer and more active partners shortly after GFDRR was founded. They also felt that the rules of selection of the CG members needed to be simplified and harmonized to ensure more continuity of membership and to improve the CG's institutional memory. One of



GFDRR's major donors, Australia, also expressed a similar concern in its recent assessment of GFDRR that the large CG might impair effective decision making (AusAID 2012).

4.7 To date, the CG has met semi-annually to address its main responsibilities, including identifying priority countries, facilitating overall coordination, and adopting GFDRR's results framework. It has been less active in defining GFDRR policies and adopting project approval procedures and operational guidelines. Its meetings have been planned to coincide with international DRR-related conferences, including UNISDR's global events. While this saves costs and promotes networking, it also limits the time available for discussion. The consensus approach to decision making with such a large membership can also be very time consuming.

4.8 The CG is aware of the need to balance its legitimacy and efficiency in decision making. It has been deliberating various governance options since its 11th meeting in Jakarta in November 2011. The outgoing and current co-chairs of the CG (Australia and the Netherlands) presented three options to improve GFDRR's governance at the 12th CG meeting in Washington in April 2012 — more proactive co-chairs, formal working groups, or informal work streams. Based on the experience of other GRPPs that have experienced a substantial growth in membership, GFDRR might consider establishing a two-tier governance structure with an executive committee in order to achieve a better balance between legitimacy and efficiency.

## ACCOUNTABILITY

4.9 **Accountability** concerns the extent to which an organization makes, accepts, and fulfills its commitments along the chain of command and control, in this case starting from the CG and going down to the Secretariat and its management team, World Bank task team leaders, and implementers on the ground. Accountability is enhanced when the roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated in a program charter, memorandum of understanding, or partnership agreement. There may also be mutual accountability at various steps in the reporting chain. Stakeholder participation in the formulation of these agreements and their public disclosure also strengthens the accountability of program governance.

4.10 GFDRR had a very dynamic and active manager for its Secretariat during its first six years. His hands-on style served it well in many respects, particularly in terms of putting GFDRR "on the map." Along with the Bank's DRM Coordinators who work with the program, GFDRR has become the first port of call for Bank staff seeking DRR advice. Six members of the GFDRR staff are also currently part of World Bank's Global Experts Team. To sustain this solid advisory role, the Secretariat team should maintain highly qualified and experienced DRR experts to meet the demands from clients.

4.11 The key accountability question faced by GFDRR concerns the roles and responsibilities of the CG. Is this intended to be a collaborative governing body with shared responsibility for programmatic oversight and shared accountability for results? Or is it intended to be primarily a consultative body that provides some strategic direction to the program, but in which the World Bank makes the important governance and management decisions and is primarily accountable for results? The enumerated functions of the CG as laid out in the Partnership Charter (para. 1.17 above) suggest that it was intended to be a

collaborative governing body. The weight of the evidence in this chapter suggests otherwise, even though it has been conducting regular, semi-annual meetings.<sup>24</sup>

4.12 To begin with, financial reporting has not been sufficient for the CG to exercise programmatic oversight. A recent audit by the Bank's Internal Audit Department also concluded the program's governance and management controls "need improvement." The audit found that close coordination between the Secretariat and the Bank's regional operations, the active identification of clients' needs, and the rapid assignment of funds in response to client requests had contributed to the partnership's success. But the program needed to clarify the scope of the Secretariat's authority to approve new projects without seeking guidance from the CG,<sup>25</sup> and to strengthen the supervision of projects by the Bank's regional operational staff. The report recommended that the Secretariat work with the CG to define the specific circumstances in which guidance from the CG would be expected in the future, and that the Secretariat work with the Bank's Regional VPUs to ensure more timely and higher quality progress reports of ongoing and completed projects. GFDRR management has committed to putting in place an improved and systematic monitoring mechanism by January 2013.

4.13 The CG has not been a governing body for the review and approval of the DGF-funded activities implemented by UNISDR under Track I. UNISDR has submitted annual work plans for review and approval to the GFDRR program manager, but not to the CG.<sup>26</sup> UNISDR has given intermittent reports of its activities to the CG — according to the CG minutes, at the 3rd, 6th, and 7th meetings of the CG — but not since the 7th meeting in Sweden in October 2009.<sup>27</sup> The recent Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) review also found that, while GFDRR has demonstrated effective capacity to enhance international coordination around the HFA, it "had difficulty in demonstrating value from the US\$28 million it has allocated to its Track I work with UNISDR. There is a need for the working relationship between GFDRR and UNISDR to be more transparent and for results from the collaboration to be reported on." (AusAID 2012, p.111)

4.14 The accountability of the RMC — in providing technical guidance "to ensure the quality, relevance, and impact of GFDRR activities" — has not been clear. According to the Partnership Charter and earlier (2009) versions of GFDRR's organizational chart, the RMC reported to the CG. In practice, and according to more recent versions of the organization chart

---

24. It is clear that the World Bank, as host of GFDRR and administrator of the donor trust funds contributed to GFDRR, has fiduciary oversight and responsibility to ensure that the funds are used for the intended purposes. Programmatic oversight and accountability for results is a different matter.

25. That is, other GRPPs located in the Bank typically require the program to seek explicit approval from the program's governing body for commitments above a certain size. Such has not been the case for GFDRR.

26. This is contrary to the Partnership Charter (GFDRR 2010a, p. 4.) The annual DGF grants have been channeled directly from the DGF to UNISDR, and not through the GFDRR Secretariat. However, the DGF has not released these funds until the GFDRR manager has approved UNISDR's annual work program. The work program has been divided into regional components and developed in consultation with the six Regional DRM Coordinators in the Bank.

27. Commenting on an earlier draft of this report, Bank management agreed that the CG should be regularly informed of UNISDR's Track I activities, since the DGF views these as an integral part of the DGF-supported GFDRR partnership.

(Figure 1 in Chapter 1), the RMC seems to be reporting informally to the GFDRR program manager. The RMC does not provide regular annual or progress reports to anybody. In spite of its responsibility to “contribute to the evaluation of the impact of the GFDRR annual work program,” the RMC made no substantive input into GFDRR’s external evaluation beyond two telephone interviews.<sup>28</sup> The minutes of recent RMC meetings — in Washington, Kyoto, and Alexandria — also show that the RMC has focused more upon previewing GFDRR’s funding priorities, which is a CG mandate.

4.15 GFDRR is aware that the RMC is not functioning effectively. The GFDRR Secretariat presented a proposal to the 10th meeting of the CG in May 2011 to change the RMC’s membership to include M&E experts who could contribute directly to assuring the quality of GFDRR’s work. At its 11th meeting in November 2011, the CG unanimously decided to allow the RMC to lapse its term, pending further governance discussions by the CG on the overall governance structure of GFDRR. A revision of the RMC’s roles and responsibilities could help make these more realistic and in line with members’ time constraints. The experience with other GRPPs indicates that small advisory bodies (five to six members) are more effective if their members are selected for their technical expertise, have a clear set of responsibilities which avoid overlap or duplication with other governance and management bodies, and have specific reporting requirements (Universalia 2010c).

#### TRANSPARENCY, FAIRNESS, AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

4.16 **Transparency** concerns the extent to which a program’s decision making, reporting, and evaluation processes are open and freely available to the general public, subject to confidentiality requirements of human resource management. **Fairness** concerns the extent to which partners and participants, similarly situated, have equal opportunity to influence the program and to receive benefits from the program. Fairness can be impeded not only by structures and processes, but also by language, technical, and legal barriers. A **conflict of interest** occurs when one’s ability to exercise judgment in one role is impaired by one’s obligation in another role or by the existence of an interest. (World Bank 2007).

4.17 **Transparency.** The program’s website is accessible and contains the key documents of the program, including the Partnership Charter, the 2009–12 Partnership Strategy, annual reports, the portfolio of approved projects along with a short summary of each, minutes of CG meetings, detailed information about the Results Based Management system, and the most recent external evaluation. Lack of transparency seems to have been an issue in the communication between the RMC on the one hand and the CG and the Secretariat on the other.

4.18 As already mentioned in previous chapters, the most significant shortcomings are the absence of information on project disbursements and the absence of completion reports posted on the program’s website — to show the progress of the projects during implementation and what they have achieved at completion. The best example that IEG has so far observed of a program providing transparency of project commitments and disbursements on its website has been the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and

---

28. IEG received no input from the RMC into this GPR either. In spite of help of the GFDRR Secretariat, IEG was unable to contact the RMC to pursue its inquiries.

Malaria. With today's information technology, it should be possible for Bank-hosted programs like GFDRR to provide a similar degree of transparency.

4.19 The extent to which GFDRR trust fund resources have been used to prepare, supervise, or provide cofinancing for risk-reducing and post-disaster Bank investment projects in at-risk countries has not been openly acknowledged in GFDRR Annual Reports or on the website.<sup>29</sup> This fact is important because it represents a significant shift, in the current flat-budget environment in the Bank, in the use of donor trust funds by GRPPs located in the Bank. Previously, programs like Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, and the Water and Sanitation Program used to emphasize the fact that they were only using donor trust funds for strategic and knowledge management purposes — upstream or downstream of the Bank's project cycle — and not for preparation or supervision of Bank investment projects.

4.20 **Fairness.** As explained in Chapter 1, GFDRR has focused its Track II support on 20 priority countries since 2008, selected both for their high vulnerability to natural hazards and for low economic resilience to cope with disaster impacts, and on 11 donor-earmarked countries, utilizing single-donor trust funds made available by the concerned donors for this purpose. All low- and middle-income countries are eligible for support from GFDRR Tracks I and III. As reported earlier, GFDRR seems largely to be succeeding in focusing its Track II support on its priority core countries and using its Track III support to respond to disasters that occur in any low- and middle-income countries. However, about one-quarter of total country-level disbursements have been for countries that are neither priority countries, donor-earmarked, nor hotspots.

4.21 The World Bank's DRM Coordinators who work with GFDRR play a major role in choosing activities in their regions to submit for GFDRR financing. Also as reported earlier, GFDRR support appears to be closely related to client demand as reflected in the Bank's CASs: 88 percent of GFDRR client countries, accounting for 89 percent of GFDRR country-level disbursements, had references to disaster risk reduction in their most recent CASs or Interim Strategy Notes.

4.22 **Conflicts of interest:** The Partnership Charter acknowledges a potential conflict of interest between developing countries serving on the CG and receiving GFDRR assistance. The Charter states that contributing \$500,000 over a three-year period (as required to be a contributing member of the CG) does not restrict a country's eligibility to receive GFDRR assistance, "provided that appropriate conflict of interest protocols are followed" (GFDRR 2010a, p. 8). However, it is unclear what the protocol has been for managing such potential conflicts and the extent to which this protocol has been followed. IEG could not find any references in the minutes of any CG meetings to the identification and management of conflicts of interest.

---

29. Commenting on an earlier draft of this report, GFDRR management says that this has been openly acknowledged in CG meetings and deeply appreciated by donors and recipient countries alike. GFDRR funds have been used to leverage IBRD/IDA resources for DRM investments.

4.23 Another potential conflict of interest arises because UNISDR is both a permanent member of the GFDRR CG and the implementer of GFDRR's Track I activities. This could make UNISDR an approver, reviewer, and overseer of its own work program. In practice, though, the GFDRR manager plays the major role in approving and overseeing UNISDR's Track I work. Stakeholders interviewed by IEG did not express much concern or even awareness of this conflict of interest. This GPR notes that if Track I activities had been an integral part of the GFDRR program, then the CG would have had the opportunity to address these conflicts of interest addressed formally and transparently.

## **HOST ARRANGEMENTS**

4.24 Like 40 percent of the GRPPs in which the World Bank is involved, the GFDRR Secretariat is physically located inside the World Bank. Programs generally find that the benefits of being located in an existing organization outweigh the costs of a separate independent location, particularly for small programs. Benefits include the host's human resource systems, recruitment, financial management, procurement, communications, legal support, access to information and knowledge databases, and, in the case of international organizations, the privileges and immunities associated with employment. The three principal costs that have emerged from earlier IEG's reviews are (a) the need to transparently identify and manage the conflicts of interest inherent in host arrangements; (b) the "two masters" problem, in which the head of the program management unit reports to both the governing body of the program and the line management in the host organization; and (c) the threat of "organizational capture" by the host organization (IEG 2011b, p. 61).

4.25 IEG found that there is a very close identification of GFDRR with the World Bank, in contrast with some other GRPPs located in the Bank, such as the Cities Alliance and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, both of which have developed a brand that is more distinct from the Bank. Indeed, many stakeholders whom IEG interviewed, as well as the 2010 external evaluation, referred to the program as the "World Bank GFDRR" and viewed GFDRR activities as World Bank activities. Secretariat staff also tended to introduce themselves as regular Bank staff.

4.26 IEG found that GFDRR's donors seem to be content with this situation. They are supporting GFDRR financially at the present time precisely because its activities are so integrated with the Bank's country operations. They regard this as GFDRR's comparative advantage relative to other development partners active in the field (para. 3.18). Contributing to GFDRR has enabled the donors to extend the reach of their own support for DRR through funding while leaving the administration to the GFDRR Secretariat.

4.27 From the point of view of the Bank, GFDRR acts both as a global partnership program and as the institutional home (or anchor) for DRM practice in the Bank, responsible for leading the integration of DRR considerations into all aspects of the Bank's work, as appropriate. The new title of the GFDRR manager as "Manager, Disaster Risk Management and Head of the GFDRR Secretariat" reflects this dual role. However, there is still a need to transparently identify and manage the potential conflicts of interest that could arise from the multiple roles that the Bank plays in GFDRR, and the dual roles that the Secretariat plays. Having "two masters" may not be much of an issue as long as the Bank and the other CG

members have a common approach to integrating DRR into recipient countries' development strategies and investments. It would still be good to clarify for what issues the GFDRR manager is accountable to his World Bank line manager and to CG members, respectively. It would better to agree today, when host-member relationships are so positive, how to resolve any conflicts that might arise in the future.

4.28 These findings provide additional evidence to support IEG's recent recommendation that the Bank should develop a formal policy for hosting the management units of GRPPs inside the Bank (IEG 2011b, p. xxi). An internal working group convened by the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships Vice Presidency recently confirmed that the Bank does not currently have a clear policy in this regard, or even a definition of "host" at the present time, even though some program secretariats have been located in the Bank since the 1970s.

## SUSTAINABILITY

4.29 Sustainability has two aspects: (a) the sustainability of the program and (b) the sustainability of the benefits arising from the program's activities. The sustainability of a program depends not only on its ability to raise donor financing, but also on its legitimacy, the continued relevance of its objectives and strategies, and its ability to demonstrate results. The sustainability of the benefits depends not only on the sustainability of the program itself, but also on the complementary activities of its donor partners and on the strengthening of institutional and human resource capacity in beneficiary countries to sustain the benefits.

4.30 However much DRR and CCA have been incorporated into country development strategies, there is no doubt that much more will have to be done until DRR and CCA become fully embedded into all sustainable development. For this reason alone, the demand for DRR and CCA work is likely to be sustained for the foreseeable future. This demand will be further stimulated by the search for a better understanding of the links of both DRR and CCA to sustainable development, and how to best develop and implement activities that can operationalize them. For future success on the DRR side where GFDRR has been most active, interventions will have to be justified by a solid theoretical framework that explains why and how the proposed linkages should work. All this is likely to be in a context of natural disaster events striking more heavily as urbanization and economic prosperity increase — pointing to GFDRR being in what might be called a growth industry.

4.31 On the other hand, its original program design harnesses GFDRR closely to the HFA, due to expire in 2015 as planned. At this writing, we do not know exactly what, if anything, will replace HFA. The government of Japan has offered to host the Third World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015 at which a successor agreement to HFA would be sought.<sup>30</sup> In addition, UNISDR recently issued a nine-page discussion paper entitled, "Towards a Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Reduction" that calls for ideas that might spell out the form that a successor framework might eventually take (UNISDR 2012). The

---

30. November 9, 2011 statement by Japan's ambassador to the United Nations to an (unspecified) UN committee in New York. [www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/news/v.php?id=23439](http://www.preventionweb.net/english/professional/news/v.php?id=23439)

12th CG meeting in April 2012 discussed a roadmap for the development of its 2013–16 Partnership Strategy, to be informed by the post-2015 HFA and MDG agreements.

4.32 The ongoing demand for DRR is likely to help ensure that some agreement will be reached to replace HFA. The need for DRR, itself, will not expire in 2015, but the precise form an agreement would take, its objectives, and the agencies responsible for its implementation cannot be predicted at this time. This uncertainty poses a strategic and operational challenge to GFDRR.

4.33 The imminent expiration of the HFA and the growing momentum for climate change adaptation provide a good opportunity for GFDRR's members to consider how to continue working together in the context of GFDRR. The first issue that they should address (which is already ongoing) is the roles and responsibility of CG in the governance of the program. Taking the Partnership Charter at face value, GFDRR was initially set up as a partnership program with shared governance in which members have shared responsibility for programmatic oversight and shared accountability for results. In reality, the Bank appears to be assuming the lion's share of the oversight and accountability. Working in partnership has definite advantages in pooling funds, building consensus and momentum on a topic, and making sure that the activities are worthwhile. To realize all these benefits, the governance roles of the CG need to be clarified and strengthened. To make the CG's work more efficient, it may be advisable to create a smaller executive committee to work more closely with the Secretariat in between CG meetings.

## 5. Bank Performance as a Partner

5.1 The Bank has played multiple roles in GFDRR as founder, as chair of the CG, as a financial contributor through DGF grants and the Bank's administrative budget, as trustee of the donor trust funds for Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU, as host of the Secretariat, and as implementing agency of regional and country-level activities. World Bank staff outside the GFDRR Secretariat are responsible for implementing or supervising more than half of GFDRR activities (by value of disbursements) (Table 9 in Chapter 3).

### Bank Performance at the Global/Program Level

5.2 *As founder*, the Bank mobilized extensive support for GFDRR among bilateral donors in particular. The founding meeting of the CG in September 2006 included representatives of 14 donors and 8 international and regional organizations. The Bank has been less successful in bringing about the participation of regional development banks and the commercial private sector in the governance of the program, as originally conceived. It also appears to have given little attention to its pre-GFDRR relationship with UNISDR as a high-level representative on ISDR's Management Oversight Board.<sup>31</sup>

5.3 The Bank's sponsoring department (then the Transport and Urban Department, TUD) stated in the original Partnership Review Note that GFDRR would "build on the work of the ProVention Consortium, which made a substantive contribution to improving global awareness and knowledge of hazards, vulnerabilities, and associated risks through systematic documentation of lessons from disaster recovery projects and action research in hazard risk management."<sup>32</sup> GFDRR would now put this knowledge into practice in assisting high-risk countries in incorporating hazard risk management into their development strategies.

5.4 *As a donor*, the Bank has contributed \$28.5 million to GFDRR from FY2007–12 in the form of annual DGF grants to UNISDR to implement GFDRR's Track I activities. The sponsoring department at the time (TUD) proposed in the original Partnership Review Note to the DGF Council to include UNISDR as part of the GFDRR partnership rather than supporting UNISDR directly outside of GFDRR. Why TUD proposed to support UNISDR in this way, under the rubric of GFDRR, is not clear from the original documentation surrounding GFDRR.

5.5 It is not uncommon for the World Bank to be involved in two programs operating in the same area with similar objectives, one of which is located outside the Bank and the other inside. Other examples are (a) the Partnership for Statistics for Development in the 21st Century (PARIS21) and Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building (TFSCB), and (b) the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Multidonor Trust Fund (MDTF) for EITI (Table 15). Similar to UNISDR, PARIS21 and EITI have been more engaged in

---

31. IEG found, for instance, no reference to the Bank's role on ISDR's Management Oversight Board in GFDRR documentation, or to how this would be reconciled with the Bank's partnership with UNISDR in GFDRR.

32. IEG's own review of the ProVention Consortium, published in June 2006 just before the creation of GFDRR, also had positive findings.



**Table 15. Working Relationships between Three Sets of External and Internal Programs Operating in the Same Functional Area**

	International Program	Bank-Hosted Program
	<b>Partnership for Statistics for Development in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century (PARIS21)</b>	<b>Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building (TFSCB)</b>
Start Date	1999	1999
Location	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris	DECDG (Development Data Group in the Development Economics Vice Presidency)
Objectives	To support developing countries to design and implement National Statistical Development Strategies	Working with PARIS21, to support the preparation of National Statistical Development Strategies
Governance	The OECD/DAC Chairperson and DECDG Director are full voting members of both governing bodies. The OECD/DAC Chairperson chairs the PARIS21 Board and the DECDG Director chairs the TFSCB Consultative Group. The Director of the Ethiopia Central Statistics Agency co-chairs both governing bodies.	
Financing	The DGF provided \$1.25 million in FY01–02, and Window 1 grants averaging \$4.12 million a year from FY06–11.	Six donors contributed \$46 million to the Bank-administered trust fund from FY1999–2010.
	<b>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)</b>	<b>Multidonor Trust Fund (MDTF) for EITI</b>
Start Date	June 2003	August 2004
Location	Independent legal entity in Oslo	SEGOM (Oil, Gas, and Mining Policy Division in the Sustainable Energy Department)
Objectives	To increase transparency over payments and revenues in the extractive industries in countries heavily dependent on these resources	To provide financial support to countries seeking to implement, or considering implementation of, the EITI Principles and Criteria
Governance	A Memorandum of Understanding between the two programs provides for cooperation in carrying out activities conducive to achieving the EITI Principles and Criteria. The chair of EITI is an observer on the MDTF-EITI Management Committee, and the chair of the Management Committee (SEGOM Sector Manager) is an observer on the EITI Board.	
Financing	Twelve donors provided \$30.8 million to the Bank-administered trust fund from FY2005–10. The DGF provided Window 2 grants of \$1.1 million from FY2005–07. These were distributed directly from the DGF Secretariat to NGOs helping countries implement EITI Principles, on the recommendation of the MDTF-EITI Secretariat.	
	<b>UNISDR</b>	<b>GFDRR</b>
Start Date	2000	September 2006
Location	United Nations, Geneva	FEU (Finance, Economics, and Urban Department)
Objectives	To serve as the focal point in the UN system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among disaster reduction activities	To contribute to increasing human security and prosperity through comprehensive national disaster risk reduction programs in client countries
Governance	UNISDR does not have a governing body. The Director of UNISDR (the Special Representative of the Secretary-General) reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. The Director is also a full voting member of the GFDRR Consultative Group. The FEU Director chairs the GFDRR Consultative Group when the SDN Vice President is unable to attend.	
Financing	The DGF provided grants of \$5.0 million a year to UNISDR from FY2007–10, and \$4.25 million in FY2011–12, to implement Track I activities of GFDRR. Twenty donors contributed \$226.5 million to the Bank-administered GFDRR trust fund from FY2007–12 to implement Track II, III, and ACP-EU activities.	

Source: Constructed by IEG.

knowledge networking and advocacy. Similar to GFDRR, TFSCB, and MDTF-EITI have been providing country-level, technical assistance in support of the common objectives of both programs, respectively. The DGF grants have provided direct, long-term support to PARIS21 and supplementary support to MDTF-EITI. The relationships between the two sets of programs have been more transparent and less ambiguous than in the case of UNISDR and GFDRR. Something similar to these interlocking governance arrangements might be considered for GFDRR and UNISDR as DGF support for UNISDR terminates in FY2013.

5.6 It appears that giving \$5.0 million annually to UNISDR was intended to demonstrate that the Bank aimed to be a partner in the larger effort to mainstream DRR, and not a competitor with existing initiatives in relation to DRR. This also helped meet the DGF leveraging requirement of 15 percent after factoring in the donor contributions to Bank-administered trust funds supporting GFDRR.<sup>33</sup> But both objectives could have been accomplished more transparently by explicitly recognizing UNISDR as a program in its own right — which it clearly is — and contributing the DGF grants to UNISDR without claiming that this was part of the GFDRR program. The annual DGF grants have represented less than 20 percent of the total UNISDR budget, which is close to the DGF’s 15 percent target.

5.7 Another alternative would have been to channel the DGF grants to UNISDR through the GFDRR Secretariat as part of a two-step process, first to the Secretariat and then to UNISDR, like a recipient-executed trust fund grant. Based on the evidence in the previous chapter, this would have enhanced the integrity of GFDRR compared to the alternative that was adopted, and brought the utilization of these grants under the oversight and accountability of the GFDRR CG.<sup>34</sup> This would also have established a better-defined boundary for the program, and ultimately for its evaluation. For lack of this, Track I activities were not included in the 2010 external evaluation of GFDRR, nor covered extensively in this GPR.

5.8 *As trustee* of the donor trust funds for Tracks II and III, the Bank has followed its standard procedure for all trust funds. It negotiated and signed administration agreements with each donor, held the donors’ cash contributions in trust until disbursed by the GFDRR Secretariat, invested the surplus funds conservatively comingled with all other trust funds, transferred funds to other Bank units responsible for BETF activities, and helped to negotiate grant agreements with recipients in the case of RETFs. The Bank’s performance in the case of the GFDRR trust funds has been comparable to that for other trust-funded programs. GFDRR’s problems with accountability have been very similar to the issues identified in IEG’s recent evaluation of the use and management of trust funds at the World Bank. This

---

33. This is one of the eight eligibility requirements for DGF grants. “Any single grant to a recipient should generally not exceed 15 percent of expected funding over the life of Bank funding to a given program, or over the 3-year plan period, whichever is shorter.” World Bank’s Operational Policy 8.45, Annex A.

34. Commenting on an earlier draft of this report, Bank management has asserted that DGF grants are required to be extended to legal entities external to the Bank to foster partnerships and to serve as leverage to attract additional donors to those partnerships. However, the “Rules for the Sources of Funding for Global Programs and Partnerships,” issued by the Bank’s Strategy, Finance and Risk Management Vice Presidency in December 2003 do not prohibit such a two-step process for extending grants to external entities, which has historically been the case for a number of DGF programs located in the Bank. See also IEG 2011b, pp. 88–89.

evaluation found that the Bank's accountabilities for the trust funds it manages are generally weaker than for IBRD/IDA and Bank budget-financed activities because the Bank and donors have agreed to parallel allocation, approval, and business processes for quality assurance, supervision, and results reporting (IEG 2011a).

5.9 *As host* of the GFDRR Secretariat in Washington, DC, the Bank has provided a number of systems and support services to GFDRR, including communications, recruitment and other human resource systems, legal support, access to information and knowledge databases, and the privileges and immunities associated with employment in the World Bank. Being located in the World Bank has also provided GFDRR with ready access to regional operational staff for preparing, implementing, or supervising the implementation of regional and country-level activities. Like other GRPPs located in the Bank, the program is required to use the Bank's resource management and accounting systems. While the Bank has been improving these systems for Bank-administered trust funds over the last few years to facilitate more efficient financial and operational reporting, it has not yet established consistent standards for GRPP management units located in the Bank. Nor has the Bank provided adequate support or advice to trust-funded programs in setting up good M&E systems. Bank management is aware of these deficiencies and is addressing them under the ongoing trust fund reform process.

## **Bank Performance at the Country Level**

5.10 As the *implementing agency* of GFDRR work at the country level, the Bank brings four decades of experience in disaster-related assistance, often on a very large scale (Figure 4 in Chapter 3). The Bank's Regional DRM Coordinators have liaised closely with GFDRR. Through assembling local requests and proposals, the DRM Coordinators appear to have been effective in channeling country-level demands for DRR assistance to GFDRR. For its part, GFDRR has been responsive to requests that have in fact brought additional funding to the Bank's country operations. Bank task teams highly appreciate GFDRR funding because it allows them to engage in activities that would otherwise not be feasible. They consider GFDRR decision making on funding requests to be efficient because requests are prescreened at the level of the program manager and DRM Coordinator.

5.11 Through its networks of country operational linkages, especially through Bank country directors based in country offices, the Bank has helped GFDRR reach out to country programs both on the Bank and government sides. In this way, the Bank provided effective channels for GFDRR to gauge the country-level demand for DRR activities.

5.12 As the world's leading development finance institution, the Bank has provided an effective platform for incorporating risk reduction, not only into IBRD or IDA-supported investments, but also into substantially larger government investment programs. The Bank's Regional DRM coordinators also assert that the Bank, with its access to high-level government officials in the Ministry of Finance and other ministries, and GFDRR, with its technical advice and financial resources, have together facilitated improved donor coordination at the country level, and improved government relations after PDNAs.

5.13 Donors interviewed for this review highlighted the technical expertise that the Bank is bringing to GFDRR through its long and broad experience in DRR-related work worldwide. All donors interviewed by IEG felt that the Bank's participation helped ensure the quality and relevance of GFDRR's country-level work.

## Oversight

5.14 The Bank exercises its oversight of GFDRR mostly through the Director of FEU, who has been the chair the CG (when the SDN Vice President has been unable to attend) as well as the supervising line manager for the GFDRR Secretariat. The FEU Director has exercised overall oversight with regard to the global partnership agenda, GFDRR staffing, annual deliverables, quality control of flagship programs, and trust fund fiduciary requirements.

5.15 However, the Bank's oversight could have paid more attention to GFDRR's financial and operational reporting. The Bank should ensure that GFDRR fully and accurately informs the CG, stakeholders and the general public about its finances, with accurate reports of donor contributions on the revenue side and more detailed accounts of financial resources committed and disbursed on the expenditure side. In addition, holding to the standards of its own project reporting, Bank oversight should ensure informative reporting (within the public domain) about the implementation status and completion of GFDRR's activities. Bank performance has not lived up to the more intense Bank oversight foreseen at the outset, but dropped soon afterwards, through the initial idea of a Steering Committee composed of directors of World Bank regions and OPCS to approve GFDRR's budget and work program, and to review and monitor their implementation.

## Risk Management

5.16 The risks to the Bank arise from the multiple roles that the Bank plays in GFDRR and the very close identification of the Bank with GFDRR. Therefore, essentially any risks to the program are also risks to the Bank.

5.17 The key risks to the Bank appear to be the following:

- **Development effectiveness risks** that GFDRR will fail to achieve its objectives. So far, overall progress in achieving its objectives, as stated in Missions 1 and 2, has been satisfactory.
- **Fiduciary risks** that donor trust funds will be misused or unaccounted for. IEG did not encounter any evidence of financial mismanagement or misuse of resources.
- **Reputational risks** that the Bank will be associated with other failures of the partnership, or even the failures of other members of the partnership. The program's financial and operating reporting needs improvement to mitigate this risk.
- **Governance and management risks** that accountability is not clear, accepted, or fulfilled along the chain of command and control in the organization. Chapter 4 identified a number of issues in this respect.

5.18 The World Bank has three channels through which it can mitigate these risks: (a) as the line manager (the FEU Director) providing day-to-day oversight of the GFDRR manager of the Secretariat, (b) through the CG working with the other partners on the CG, and (c) as the host organization providing human resource, legal, peer review, and other services to the Secretariat. All parties to the partnership should contribute to mitigating these risks while coming together to achieve collective objectives that they can achieve more effectively by working together.

## **Engagement Strategy**

5.19 The DGF Council has recently recommended funding for UNISDR for just one more year at the reduced level of \$2.25 million for FY2013, after which one of the key features of the GFDRR partnership, Track I as originally designed, will disappear. This, and the imminent expiration of the HFA provide a good opportunity for the Bank to review the full range of its engagement with GFDRR and its partners — whether business as usual for Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU, or with some adjustments.

5.20 To begin with, the need for disaster-related assistance is likely to continue to grow for all the reasons mentioned in this review. There remains an international consensus on the need for collective action in this area, and there remains significant demand from the Bank's client countries. Both the Bank and GFDRR have certain comparative advantages to offer. Some key strategic questions are:

- What volume of resources the Bank and its partners should attempt to mobilize for GFDRR for the next three years.
- How best to incorporate DRR concerns into all the different economic sectors, each with its own sectoral idiosyncrasies, that drive sustainable development.
- How best to coordinate and integrate the DRM and CCA agendas, such as anticipatory adaptation measures in DRM.
- How best to reach down to the local level of municipalities and communities where most direct DRR action takes place.
- How to encourage greater private sector participation in DRM.
- How to work most effectively with other development partners at the country level, enhancing collaboration while monitoring the risks of overlap.
- What priority actions the Bank should take to strengthen M&E at all levels for DRR and CCA.

5.21 The findings of this review provide additional evidence to support IEG's recent recommendation (IEG 2011b, p. xxi) that the Bank should have an explicit engagement strategy for each GRPP in which it is involved, including:

- The expected roles of the Bank in the program at both the global and country levels
- The expected linkages of the program's activities to Bank's country operations
- How the risks to the Bank's participation will be identified and managed.

## 6. Lessons

6.1 There exists a strong international consensus, supported by both donor and recipient countries, in favor of incorporating DRR into sustainable development, as evidenced by the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action, and reaffirmed at the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in December 2011. Locating the GFDRR program inside the World Bank has allowed a flat-budget Bank to expand its DRR work through greater provision of country-level technical assistance to client countries and through increased focus on pre-disaster risk reduction. This has also enabled donors to extend the reach of their DRR activities through funding, while leaving the administration to the GFDRR Secretariat.

6.2 GFDRR has grown rapidly since 2006 in response to evident client demand from developing countries. Working closely with the GFDRR Secretariat, the Bank's DRM Coordinators have been effective in channeling country-level demands for DRR assistance to GFDRR. There has been both a quantitative and qualitative improvement in the way in which the Bank's country assistance strategies have addressed disaster risk issues, and a clear shift toward disaster risk reduction in Bank-supported investment projects since 2006.

6.3 IEG's review of GFDRR and its external evaluation leads to the following lessons learned for GFDRR and for the World Bank:

### For GFDRR

- ***The GFDRR experience shows the need for clear and coherent program objectives at the outset.*** While the objectives formulated at the program's inception have remained relevant in most respects, different stakeholders have had different understandings of what "mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation" actually means. GFDRR's original mission statements could also have provided a clearer mandate for its Track III activities aimed at assisting recovery in post-disaster situations.
- ***GFDRR has successfully mobilized sizeable donor trust funds to enable the World Bank's regional operations to expand their country-level technical assistance activities in DRR and CCA to build greater resilience into economic development.*** As a global program, GFDRR needs to continue to calibrate its support at the national and local levels, where nearly all DRR action takes place, with support for global and regional public goods (such as global knowledge and regional coordination).
- ***Being active in a field with many players, GFDRR's comparative advantage in relation to the other actors in this field is in providing technical and financial assistance that is integrated with the World Bank's country operations, and in drawing upon the Bank's long experience in disaster-related assistance. It can also play an important role in improving country-level coordination and collaboration among the various development partners, including UNISDR and UNDP-BCPR.***
- ***GFDRR could further improve its financial and operational reporting to effectively assess progress, to communicate the results it has achieved, and to take the***

***necessary actions to improve performance.*** GFDRR needs more rigorous systems for reporting its work plans, for selecting activities, for monitoring their implementation, and for assessing their results at completion.

- ***Private sector involvement in the governance and financing of GFDRR, foreseen at the outset, has not materialized to date.*** GFDRR needs to develop a strategy, like its civil society partnership strategy, for commercial private sector participation in its work consistent with private sector interests and motivations. DRR should be of direct interest both to commercial enterprises operating in vulnerable areas and to nonprofit groups keen to partner with DRR efforts led by the public sector. A fully engaged private sector is necessary for successfully incorporating DRR into sustainable development.
- ***The CG needs to decide whether Tracks II and III of GFDRR are intended to be a global partnership program with shared governance.*** Is the governing body intended to be a collaborative body with shared responsibility for programmatic oversight and shared accountability for results? Or is it intended to be primarily a consultative body that provides some strategic direction to the program, but in which the Bank is primarily responsible for oversight and accountable for results?

## **For the World Bank**

- ***Track I has not been an integral part of GFDRR.*** The Bank's sponsoring department and the DGF Council could have considered alternative ways of partnering with an autonomous agency such as UNISDR. Either the DGF grant could have been given to UNISDR in support of UNISDR's own program of activities without placing them under the rubric of GFDRR, or the grant could have been channeled through GFDRR as part of a two-step process, first to the GFDRR Secretariat and then to UNISDR like a recipient-executed trust fund grant.
- ***While generally satisfactory, the Bank's performance as host of the GFDRR Secretariat could be strengthened in some specific areas.*** The Bank needs to continue to improve its resource management and accounting systems to facilitate better financial and operational reporting by GRPPs located in the Bank. The Bank could also provide more support in setting up effective M&E systems. This review provides additional evidence to support IEG's recent recommendation that the Bank should develop a formal policy for hosting the management units of GRPPs in the Bank.





## References

- AusAID (Australian AID). 2012. Australian Multilateral Assessment, March 2012.
- Christoplos, Ian; Yasemin Aysan; and Alexandra Galperin. 2005. External Evaluation of the International Secretariat of the International Secretariat for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) Geneva, June 2005.
- Cities Alliance. 2010. 2010 Annual Report: An Alliance in Transition Washington, DC, Cities Alliance.
- Dalberg Global Development Advisors. 2010 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) Secretariat Evaluation Geneva, UNISDR Final Report. February 02, 2010.
- DFID. 2011. Multilateral Aid Review: Assessment for the United Nation's International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR). London, United Kingdom Department for International Development. February 2011. [www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/mar/ISDR.pdf](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/mar/ISDR.pdf).
- Dilley, Maxx; Robert Chen; Margaret Arnold; Uwe Deichmann; and Arthur Lerner-Lam 2005 Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis Washington, DC, Hazard Management Team. Disaster Risk Management Series #5.
- GEF (Global Environment Facility) 2010 Annual Report 2010 Washington DC, GEF.
- GFDRR. 2009. GFDRR Partnership Strategy 2009–2012: Reducing Disaster Risks for Sustainable Development, Washington, DC, 2009.
- . 2010a. Partnership Charter: Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Washington DC. World Bank/UNISDR May 2010. (Although dated 2010, this document was adopted by the GFDRR Consultative Group on February 23, 2007, thus serving as the initial charter of GFDRR).
- . 2010b. Integrating Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Adaptation into the Fight Against Poverty: Annual Report 2010 Washington, DC, GFDRR.
- . 2010c. Natural Hazards, Unnatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention Washington, DC, The World Bank.
- . 2011a. Disaster Risk Programs for Priority Countries 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Washington DC, GFDRR..
- . 2010b. Building Resilience to Disasters — Delivering Results: Annual Report 2011 Washington DC, GFDRR.
- Gilbert, Roy and Alcira Kreimer. 1999. Learning from the World Bank's Experience of Natural Disaster Related Assistance Washington, DC. Disaster Management Facility of the World Bank.
- Guhar-Sapir, Debby; Femke Voss; and Regina Below 2011 Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2010: The numbers and trends Louvain, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 2011.
- IEG (Independent Evaluation Group) of the World Bank. 2006a. Hazards of Nature, Risks to Development: An IEG Evaluation of World Bank Assistance for Natural Disasters Washington, DC.
- . 2006b. The Provention Consortium Washington, DC. IEG Global Program Review, Volume 1 Issue 1. June 28, 2006.

- . 2007. The Cities Alliance Washington, DC, IEG Global Program Review, Volume 1. Issue 3. June 28, 2007.
- . 2011a. IEG (Independent Evaluation Group) of the World Bank. *Trust Fund Support for Development: An Evaluation of the World Bank's Trust Fund Portfolio*.
- . 2011b. IEG (Independent Evaluation Group) of the World Bank. *The World Bank's Involvement in Global and Regional Partnership Programs: An Independent Assessment*.
- . 2012. *Adapting to Climate Change: Assessing World Bank Group Experience. Phase III of the World Bank Group and Climate Change*.
- NORDECO (Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology). 2011a. Assessment of past and ongoing Danish multilateral and bilateral support to Disaster Risk Reduction and guidance to the DRM implementation in the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action for 2010–2015. Copenhagen, Synthesis Report, September 2011.
- . 2011b. Assessment of past and ongoing Danish multilateral and bilateral support to Disaster Risk Reduction and guidance to the DRM implementation in the Strategy for Danish Humanitarian Action for 2010–2015. Copenhagen, Multilateral Sub-Report, September 2011.
- UNDG (United Nations Development Group). 2009. Integrating Disaster Risk into the CCA and UNDAF: A Guide for Country Teams Geneva, United Nations.
- UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 2008. Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities, and Adaptation in Developing Countries.
- UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction) 2005a. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters Kobe. World Conference on Disaster Reduction 18–22 January 2005 Kobe, Hyogo, Japan.
- . 2008. Private Sector Activities in Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons Learned. Bonn, December 2008.
- . 2011. 2011 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva.
- . 2012. Towards a Post-2015 Framework for Disaster Reduction. Geneva.
- UNDP Evaluation Office Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery: Reducing Vulnerabilities New York, December 2010.
- Universal Management Group. 2010a. Evaluation of the World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), volume I – Final Evaluation Report. January 2010.
- . 2010b. Evaluation of the World Bank Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), volume II – Appendices. January 2010.
- . 2010c. ESMAP Technical Advisory Group Review: Final Report. March 2010.
- World Bank. 2007. “Identifying and Addressing Partnership Conflicts of Interest in Global Programs and Partnerships.” Global Programs and Partnerships Guidance Note for Bank staff, Washington, DC.
- . 2008. *Development and Climate Change: A Strategic Framework for the World Bank Group*. Washington, DC.
- . 2010. *Systems of Cities: Harnessing Urbanization for Growth & Poverty Alleviation – The World Bank Urban & Local Government Strategy*. Washington, DC.
- . 2012. *Toward a Green, Clean, and Resilient World for All: A World Bank Group Environment Strategy, 2012–2022*. Washington, DC.

World Bank and UNISDR. 2006. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery: a Partnership for Mainstreaming Disaster Mitigation in Poverty Reduction Strategies. Washington, DC, The World Bank.

World Bank and United Nations. 2010. *Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention*. Washington, DC.



## Annex A. Review Framework for Global Program Reviews

Note: This evaluation framework is a general framework that has been designed to cover the wide range of Global and Regional Partnership Programs (GRPPs) in which the World Bank is involved, encompassing knowledge and advocacy networks, technical assistance programs, and investment programs. It is not expected that every global program review will cover every question in these tables in detail.

**Table A-1. Assessing the Independence and Quality of the Evaluation**

Evaluation Questions	
<b>1. Evaluation process</b>	
To what extent was the GRPP evaluation independent of the management of the program, according to the following criteria:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Organizational independence?</li> <li>• Behavioral independence?</li> <li>• Protection from outside interference?</li> <li>• Avoidance of conflicts of interest?</li> </ul>	
<b>2. Monitoring and evaluation framework of the program</b>	
To what extent does the program have an effective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework with:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clear and coherent objectives and strategies that give focus and direction to the program?</li> <li>• An expected results chain or logical framework?</li> <li>• Measurable output and outcome indicators that meet the monitoring and reporting needs of the governing body and management of the program?</li> <li>• Systematic and regular processes for collecting and managing data?</li> <li>• Feedback processes to facilitate decision making and learning?</li> </ul>	
To what extent did the program's M&E framework contribute to the evaluation's assessment of the efficacy and efficiency of the program? If not, what were these assessments based on?	
What is the overall quality of the design, implementation, and use of the program's M&E framework?	
<b>3. Evaluation approach and scope</b>	
To what extent did the evaluation team have a clear terms of reference and a sufficient budget to meet the TOR?	
To what extent was the evaluation objectives-based and evidence-based?	
To what extent did the evaluation use a results-based framework? Was this constructed by the program or by the evaluators?	
To what extent did the evaluation address:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevance</li> <li>• Efficacy</li> <li>• Efficiency or cost-effectiveness</li> <li>• Financial management and resource mobilization</li> <li>• Governance and management</li> <li>• Sustainability of the program and its benefits</li> </ul>	
<b>4. Evaluation instruments</b>	
To what extent did the evaluation utilize the following instruments, beyond document reviews and interviews with key stakeholders:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Literature review</li> <li>• Site visits and for what purpose — for interviewing implementers/beneficiaries, or for observing activities being implemented or completed</li> <li>• Case studies</li> <li>• Structured surveys and of whom</li> <li>• Other</li> </ul>	

Evaluation Questions
<p><b>5. Evaluation feedback</b></p> <p>Has the governing body or management unit provided a formal response to the evaluation that is available on the program's website?</p> <p>What have been the major impacts of the evaluation on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The objectives, strategies, design, or scale of the program?</li> <li>• The governance, management, and financing of the program?</li> <li>• The monitoring and evaluation framework of the program?</li> <li>• Other?</li> </ul>

**Table A-2. Providing a Second Opinion on the Effectiveness of the Program**

Evaluation Criteria and Questions
<p><b>Relevance:</b> The extent to which the objectives and design of the program are consistent with (a) current global/regional challenges and concerns in a particular development sector and (b) the needs and priorities of beneficiary countries and groups.</p>
<p><b>1. Supply-side relevance: The existence of an international consensus that global/regional collective action is required.</b></p> <p>To what extent does the program reflect an international consensus on the need for collective action to address a global/regional concern that can only be addressed, or addressed more efficiently, by donors pooling their financial and other resources together?</p> <p>How has this consensus or agreement been expressed — for example, in terms of (a) an international convention, (b) an international conference, (c) a program of action, or (d) an agreement on formal standards and approaches? To what extent have the key players in the field signed onto the agreement, and how has this changed over time?</p> <p>To what extent has there been agreement not only on the need for action, but also on the definition of the problem being addressed, on priorities, and on strategies for action?</p> <p>Was the program initially donor-driven — started by a handful of donors with little consultation with developing countries? If so, to what extent has the program succeeded in attracting broader international support?</p>
<p><b>2. Demand-side relevance: Alignment with beneficiary needs, priorities, and strategies.</b></p> <p>To what extent are the objectives consistent with the needs, priorities, and strategies of beneficiary countries as articulated in the countries' own Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and in donors' strategies such as the World Bank Country Assistance Strategies (CASs), and the United Nations (UN) Development Assistance Frameworks?</p> <p>To what extent has the voice of developing and transition countries been expressed in the international consensus underlying the program?</p> <p>What has been the role of beneficiary countries in the design, governance, and implementation of the program?</p> <p>To what extent do the interests of donor and beneficiary countries coincide?</p>
<p><b>3. Vertical relevance: Consistency with the subsidiarity principle.</b></p> <p>To what extent is the program providing global or regional public goods as opposed to national or local public goods, or even private goods? If the program is not providing global or regional public goods, then what is the rationale for organizing the partnership?</p> <p>To what extent are the activities of the program being carried out at the most appropriate level — global, regional, national, or local — in terms of efficiency and responsiveness to the needs of beneficiaries?</p> <p>To what extent are the activities of the program competing with or substituting for activities that individual donors or countries could do more efficiently by themselves? If so, what is the value added of the partnership over and above the activities of the individual donor partners?</p>

Evaluation Criteria and Questions
<p><b>4. Horizontal relevance: The absence of alternative sources of supply.</b></p> <p>To what extent is the program competing with other programs or entities that are providing similar goods and services? If so:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What is the comparative advantage, value added, or core competency of the program relative to these other programs or entities?</li> <li>• To what extent is the program providing additional funding, advocacy, or technical capacity that is otherwise unavailable to meet the program's objectives?</li> </ul> <p>Are there alternative or more efficient ways in which the program's goods and services could be provided, such as by the private sector under regular market conditions?</p>
<p><b>5. Relevance of the design of the program</b></p> <p>To what extent does the program have a well-articulated theory of change, an expected results chain, or logical framework, along with assumptions, indicating how the program's strategies and priority activities are expected to lead to the achievement of the program's objectives?</p> <p>What are the major strategies and priority activities of the program:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge, advocacy and standard-setting networks?</li> <li>• Financing country and local-level, technical assistance?</li> <li>• Financing investments to deliver national, regional, or global public goods? (See Table A-5.)</li> </ul> <p>To what extent are these strategies and priority activities appropriate for achieving the program's objectives?</p> <p>To what extent are the underlying assumptions valid?</p> <p>For programs providing global or regional public goods, is the design of the program consistent with the way in which the individual efforts of the partners contribute to the collective outcome for the program as a whole — whether "best shot," "summation," or "weakest link?"</p>
<p><b>Efficacy:</b> The extent to which the program has achieved, or is expected to achieve, its objectives, taking into account their relative importance.</p>
<p><b>6. Progress of activities and outputs</b></p> <p>What sets of activities did the program initiate during the review period? Which activities have been completed? What outputs have been produced?</p> <p>What constraints — both internal and external — did the program face in implementing these activities? How did the program overcome these constraints in order to complete the activities successfully?</p> <p>What has been the quality of these goods and services (outputs) produced? Which activities were the most/least effective in contributing to the achievement of the program's objectives, and why?</p> <p>To what extent have there been outputs (and outcomes) that can be uniquely attributed to the partnership itself — such as the scale of, or joint activities made possible by, its organizational setup as a GRPP, or its institutional linkages to a host organization?</p>
<p><b>7. Linkages to country or local-level activities</b></p> <p>What underlying and enabling conditions — or linkages — are necessary for the effective implementation of the program's activities and the achievement of the program's objectives at the country or local levels?</p> <p>What has the program done to establish or facilitate the establishment of such linkages? To what extent are these linkages in place, operational, and effective?</p> <p>How are the program's country-level activities related to or integrated with those of other local, national, and international actors in the same area? To what extent has the program contributed to increased coherence of efforts among these actors at the country level?</p> <p>To what extent has the program positively influenced the strategies and activities of these other actors? To what extent have these other actors influenced the strategies and activities of the program?</p>

Evaluation Criteria and Questions
<p><b>8. Achievement of outcomes and objectives</b></p> <p>To what extent have the intended outcomes and stated objectives of the program been achieved, or satisfactory progress been made towards achieving them, given the stage and maturity of the program?</p> <p>Are there any implicit objectives that are well understood and agreed upon by the partners and to which the program should also be held accountable? To what extent have these been achieved?</p> <p>To what extent have there been any positive, unintended outcomes of the program that have been convincingly documented?</p> <p>What factors (internal and external) are influencing the achievement or nonachievement of these outcomes and objectives?</p> <p>How have the program's objectives, strategies, and activities evolved in response to (a) learning from experience and (b) emerging risks and opportunities?</p>
<p><b>Efficiency or cost-effectiveness:</b></p> <p><b>Efficiency:</b> The extent to which the program has converted or is expected to convert its resources/inputs (such as funds, expertise, time, etc.) economically into results.</p> <p><b>Cost-effectiveness:</b> The extent to which the program has achieved or is expected to achieve its results at a lower cost compared with alternatives.</p>
<p><b>9. Financial management</b></p> <p>Are there any issues that have emerged during the course of the review in relation to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The quality of financial management and accounting?</li> <li>• The methods, criteria, and processes for allocating funds among different activities of the program?</li> </ul> <p>Are financial reporting and auditing arrangements satisfactory, particularly from the perspective of donors?</p> <p>Do the recorded categories of expenditures facilitate adequate monitoring and attribution of costs to activities and results?</p> <p>Has the program taken sufficient measures to identify financial risk (such as unfulfilled pledges from donors or future commitments to beneficiaries) and formulated strategies for dealing with these risks?</p>
<p><b>10. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness</b></p> <p>To what extent have the program's activities been conducted and outputs achieved in an efficient or cost-effective way, in comparison with alternatives?</p> <p>How do activity costs compare with benchmarks from similar programs or activities (to the extent that these are available)?</p> <p>Have there been any obvious cases of inefficiency or wasted resources?</p> <p>Administrative costs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Are the overhead costs of governing and managing the program reasonable and appropriate in relation to the objectives and activities of the program?</li> <li>• How do administrative costs compare with benchmarks from similar programs or activities?</li> </ul> <p>Allocating resources:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are the processes and criteria that have been established for allocating financial resources (including grants) to various program activities?</li> <li>• How have these evolved over time in response to new objectives or priorities?</li> <li>• To what extent have these been applied consistently?</li> <li>• How effective and efficient are they?</li> </ul>



Evaluation Criteria and Questions
<p><b>11. Resource mobilization</b></p> <p>To what extent has the program succeeded in raising financial resources commensurate with its objectives? And from what sources — the Bank, bilateral donors, foundations, etc.?</p> <p>To what extent has the program succeeded in diversifying its funding beyond a small number of donors?</p> <p>To what extent have the sources of funding for the program (including the degree of core vs. restricted funding) affected, positively or negatively:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The strategic focus of the program?</li> <li>• The outputs and outcomes of the program?</li> <li>• The governance and management of the program?</li> <li>• The sustainability of the program?</li> </ul>
<p><b>12. Efficiency and cost-effectiveness from the donor and beneficiary perspectives</b></p> <p>How do the benefits and costs of delivering the development assistance through the GRPP compare with those of traditional development assistance programs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For donors — has delivering the development assistance through the GRPP reduced donor costs by harmonizing efforts among donors or by reducing overlapping work (such as through joint supervision, monitoring, and evaluation)?</li> <li>• For beneficiary countries — has receiving the development assistance through the GRPP increased or decreased the transactions costs compared with traditional bilateral or multilateral programs?</li> </ul>

**Table A-3. Providing a Second Opinion on the Governance, Management, and Sustainability of the Program**

Evaluation Criteria and Questions
<p><b>Governance and management:</b></p> <p><b>Governance:</b> The structures, functions, processes, and organizational traditions that have been put in place within the context of a program's authorizing environment to ensure that the program is run in such a way that it achieves its objectives in an effective and transparent manner.</p> <p><b>Management:</b> The day-to-day operation of the program within the context of the strategies, policies, processes, and procedures that have been established by the governing body. Whereas governance is concerned with "doing the right thing," management is concerned with "doing things right."</p>
<p><b>1. Legitimacy and efficiency</b></p> <p>To what extent do the governance and management structures and practices permit and facilitate:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legitimacy: The effective participation and voice of the different categories of stakeholders in the major governance and management decisions, taking into account their respective roles and relative importance.</li> <li>• Efficiency: Efficient governance processes and decision making without sacrificing quality.</li> </ul> <p>To what extent, if any, is the program's efficiency of governance being sacrificed in order to achieve greater legitimacy or vice-versa?</p>
<p><b>2. Accountability and responsibility</b></p> <p>To what extent do the governance and management structures and practices ensure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Accountability: The extent to which accountability is defined, accepted, and exercised along the chain of command and control within a program, starting with the annual general meeting of the members or parties at the top and going down to the executive board, the chief executive officer, task team leaders, implementers, and in some cases, to the beneficiaries of the program?</li> </ul>

Evaluation Criteria and Questions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Responsibility: The extent to which the program accepts and exercises responsibility to stakeholders who are not directly involved in the governance of the program and who are not part of the direct chain of accountability in the implementation of the program?</li> </ul>
<p><b>3. Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of Interest</b></p> <p>To what extent do the governance and management policies and procedures ensure:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Transparency: The extent to which a program's decision making, reporting, and evaluation processes are open and freely available to the general public?</li> <li>Fairness: The extent to which partners and participants, similarly situated, have equal opportunity to influence the program and to receive benefits from the program?</li> </ul> <p>To what extent is the program identifying and managing potential conflicts of interest transparently, particularly in its partnerships with NGOs and the commercial private sector?</p>
<p><b>4. Programs located in host organizations</b></p> <p>Why is the program located where it is? What are the benefits and costs of this location?</p> <p>To what extent is the program dealing with or mitigating the three major costs associated with host arrangements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identifying and managing the conflicts of interest inherent in host arrangements</li> <li>The "two masters" problem</li> <li>The threat of "organizational capture"</li> </ul> <p>Has the program recently changed its location? Is it considering such changes in the future? Was this part of the original program design (e.g. nurturing the program in a host organization and then spinning it off after reaching a certain degree of maturity)?</p> <p>What have been, or likely will be, the impacts of changing the location on the effectiveness and sustainability of the program?</p>
<p><b>Sustainability, risk, and strategy for devolution or exit:</b></p> <p><b>Sustainability:</b> When applied to a <b>program</b>, itself, the extent to which the program is likely to continue its operational activities over time. When applied to the <b>activities of a program</b>, the extent to which the benefits arising from these activities are likely to continue after the activities have been completed.</p> <p><b>Devolution or exit strategy:</b> A proactive strategy to change the design of a program, to devolve some of its implementation responsibilities, to reduce dependency on external funding, or to phase out the program on the grounds that it has achieved its objectives or that its current design is no longer the best way to sustain the results which the program has achieved.</p>
<p><b>5. Sustainability of the program</b></p> <p>What is the overall "health of the partnership"?</p> <p>What are the principal strengths of the program such as (a) adequate financial resources, (b) well focused objectives, (c) a well-tested theory of change, (d) an inclusive membership involving all the major actors in its field, and (e) legitimate and effective governance and management?</p> <p>What are the principal threats to the sustainability of the program, such as (a) difficulty in mobilizing financial resources, (b) failure to keep the program's objectives or design relevant in a changing global context, (c) competition from other sources of supply, (d) difficulty in demonstrating results, or (e) issues in relation to governance and management?</p> <p>What actions is the program taking to enhance its sustainability?</p>

Evaluation Criteria and Questions
<p><b>6. Sustainability of the benefits of the program's activities</b></p> <p>What is the explicit or implicit theory of sustainability underlying the program?</p> <p>How does the program expect that the benefits arising from its activities will be sustained in the future after its activities have been completed? What are the assumptions underlying this theory of sustainability?</p> <p>What are the expected roles and activities of other actors in this process, including the complementary activities of donor partners, and the capacity, ownership, and commitment of country-level actors and beneficiaries?</p> <p>What activities is the program or its donor partners undertaking today to enhance sustainability of benefits, such as strengthening the institutional and human resource capacity of beneficiaries?</p>
<p><b>7. Scaling up, replicability, devolution and exit strategy</b></p> <p>What criteria and processes has the program established to scale up, replicate, or devolve its activities and to define potential exit strategies?</p> <p>To what extent are these being effectively applied with demonstrated results?</p> <p>Are there signs that the program is overstretched within and across countries?</p> <p>What is the readiness of participating countries to take responsibility for the devolved activities of the program without major external support?</p> <p>What evidence is there that devolved activities will be supported within national, public financial accounts and systems?</p>

**Table A-4. Assessing the Bank's Performance as a Partner in the Program**

Evaluation Questions
<p><b>1. Relevance of the program to the Bank and vice versa</b></p> <p>What is the rationale for the Bank's involvement in the program?</p> <p>What is the Bank contributing to the program, and what does the Bank expect to get out of the program — for itself or for its client countries?</p> <p>How do the objectives and design of the program relate to the Bank's own strategic priorities, as stated in its sector, regional, and country assistance strategies?</p> <p>What is the program contributing to the achievement or evolution of the Bank's strategic priorities?</p>
<p><b>2. Bank's performance at the global/regional level</b></p> <p>What comparative advantages does the Bank bring to the program at the global/regional level — for example, global reach, convening power, and mobilizing financial resources?</p> <p>To what extent is the Bank playing up to these comparative advantages?</p> <p>To what extent is the Bank's presence as a partner in the program catalyzing other resources and partners for the program?</p>
<p><b>3. Bank's performance at the country level</b></p> <p>What comparative advantages does the Bank bring to the program at the country level — for example, multi-sector capacity, analytical expertise, and country-level presence and knowledge?</p> <p>To what extent is the Bank playing up to these comparative advantages?</p> <p>To what extent has the Bank's country operations established linkages to the GRPP, where appropriate, to enhance the effectiveness of both?</p>

**4. Oversight.**

To what extent is the Bank exercising effective oversight of its involvement in the program, as appropriate, whether the program is located inside or outside the Bank?

To what extent does the Bank's representative on the governing body have a clear, terms of reference?

To what extent has the Bank provided sufficient budgetary and staff support to exercise effective oversight?

To what extent have conflicts of interest among the Bank's roles in the program been identified and managed transparently?

**5. Risks and risk management**

To what extent have the risks to the World Bank associated with its involvement in the program been identified and been effectively managed, for example:

- Fiduciary risks: That the Bank's or others' funds will be misused or unaccounted for.
- Programmatic risks: That the program fails to implement its activities or achieve its objectives.
- Reputational risks: That the Bank will be associated with failures or errors of other members of the partnership.
- Conflict of interest risks: That conflicts of interest are not identified and managed transparently, particularly with NGO and commercial, private sector partners and participants.

**6. Disengagement strategy**

What are the Bank's current engagement and disengagement strategies in relation to the program?

To what extent are these strategies appropriate, for example, in relation to the following:

- The program's objectives, activities, and design
- The nature of the goods and services being provided
- The short or long-term nature of the issues being addressed
- The alignment with the Bank development priorities
- The Bank's roles in the program

To what extent is the Bank facilitating an effective, flexible, and transparent disengagement strategy for the program, as appropriate?

**Table A-5. Common GRPP Activities**

<b>Knowledge, Advocacy, and Standard-Setting Networks</b>	
1. Facilitating communication among practitioners in the sector	This includes providing a central point of contact and communication among practitioners who are working a sector or area of development to facilitate the sharing of analytical results. It might also include the financing of case studies and comparative studies.
2. Generating and disseminating information and knowledge	This comprises three related activities: (a) gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information, for example, on the evolving HIV/AIDS epidemic and responses to it, including epidemiological data collection and analysis, needs assessment, resource flows, and country readiness; (b) systematic assembly and dissemination of existing knowledge (not merely information) with respect to best practices in a sector on a global/regional basis; and (c) social scientific research to generate new knowledge in a sector or area of development.
3. Improving donor coordination	This should be an active process, not just the side effect of other program activities. This may involve resolving difficult interagency issues in order to improve alignment and efficiency in delivering development assistance.
4. Advocacy	This comprises proactive interaction with policymakers and decision makers concerning approaches to development in a sector, commonly in the context of global, regional, or country-level forums. This is intended to create reform conditions in developing countries, as distinct from physical and institutional investments in public goods, and is more proactive than generating and disseminating information and knowledge.
5. Implementing conventions, rules, or formal and informal standards and norms	Rules are generally formal. Standards can be formal or informal, and binding or nonbinding, but establishing standards involves more than simply advocating an approach to development in a sector. In general, there should be some costs associated with noncompliance with established rules and standards. Costs can come in many forms, including exposure to financial contagion, bad financial ratings by the International Monetary Fund and other rating agencies, with consequent impacts on access to private finance; lack of access to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) markets for failing to meet food safety standards, or even the consequences of failing to be seen as progressive in international circles.
<b>Financing Technical Assistance</b>	
6. Supporting national-level policy, institutional, and technical reforms	This is more directed to specific tasks than to advocacy. This represents concrete involvement in specific and ongoing policy, institutional, and technical reform processes in a sector, from deciding on a reform strategy to implementation of new policies and regulations in a sector. It is more than just conducting studies unless the studies are strategic in nature and specific to the reform issue in question.
7. Capacity strengthening and training	This refers to strengthening the capacity of human resources through proactive training (in courses or on the job), as well as collaborative work with the active involvement of developing-country partners.
8. Catalyzing public or private investments in the sector	This includes improving regulatory frameworks for private investment and implementing pilot investment projects.
<b>Financing Investments</b>	
9. Financing country-level investments to deliver national public goods	This refers primarily to physical and institutional investments of the type found in Bank loans and credits (more than the financing of studies), the benefits of which accrue primarily at the national level.
10. Financing country-level investments to deliver global/regional public goods	This refers primarily to physical and institutional investments of the type found in Bank loans and credits (more than the financing of studies) to deliver public goods such as conserving biodiversity of global significance and reducing emissions of ozone-depleting substances and carbon dioxide, the benefits of which accrue globally.
11. Financing global/regional investments to deliver global/regional public goods	This refers to financing research and development for new products and technologies. These are generally physical products or processes — the hardware as opposed to the software of development.

## Annex B. Timeline of GFDRR and Related Events

Date	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)	Other International Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Events
1998		The UN General Assembly gave a mandate to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1998 to assist countries to prevent and prepare for disasters.
2000		<p>The <b>International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)</b> was launched in 2000 by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly to build on the Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action and to succeed the International Decade for natural disaster reduction (1990–1999). It was established as an interagency framework and mechanism to serve as a focal point within the UN system with the mandate to promote public awareness and commitment, expand networks and partnerships, and improve knowledge about disaster causes and options for risk reduction.</p> <p>The General Assembly established two mechanisms for the implementation of ISDR — the Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) and the Inter-Agency Task force on Disaster Reduction. The Inter-Agency Secretariat is the focal point within the UN system for coordination of strategies and programs for disaster reduction. The Inter-Agency Task Force on Disaster Reduction was established as the main forum within the UN system for devising strategies and policies for the reduction of disaster risks and vulnerabilities.</p> <p>(February) The ProVention Consortium global program was established as a partnership between the World Bank, other International Financial Institutions, bilateral donor organizations, the insurance sector, the academic community, and civil society.</p>
2002		The World Summit on Sustainable Development adopted in 2002 the Johannesburg Plan of vulnerability, risk assessment, and disaster management as main targets by 2015.
2005		<p>(January) The UN General Assembly convened a World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. At the conference, 168 governments adopted a 10-year plan to make the world safer from natural hazards. International organizations, including the World Bank subscribed to follow the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) .</p> <p>(August) The First Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction held in Beijing, China. It adopted the Beijing Action for Disaster Risk Reduction, which encouraged the nations to develop a Plan of Action for HFA implementation and mechanisms for periodic review of the implementation of this plan.</p> <p>Provention launched "Natural Disaster Hotspots: A Global Risk Analysis" report.</p>

Date	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)	Other International Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Events
2006	<p>(September) The GFDRR global program is established by major donors, the UN, and the World Bank, as a partnership with a mission to mainstream DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA) in country development strategies by supporting a country-led and managed implementation of the HFA.</p> <p>The first donor consultation meeting held on September 26, 2006, agreed to have the Track II to focus on targeting primarily the 86 countries identified in the World Bank and Columbia University's Natural Disaster Hotspots Study [2005], plus island countries and fragile states that ought to pursue risk reduction in their development planning due to their adverse geo-economic settings.</p> <p>The World Bank Group approved the first Development Grant Facility (DGF) grant to support GFDRR.</p>	<p>Global Platform for DRR is established by the UN General Assembly resolution 61/198 as a successor mechanism of the Inter-Agency Task Force for Disaster Reduction, and, taking into account the implementation of the HFA. The Global Platform has the same mandate as the Inter-Agency Task Force for Disaster Reduction.</p>
2007	<p>(February) The Partnership Charter was adopted which established the GFDRR's governance and management structures.</p>	<p>(June) The first session of the <b>Global Platform on Disaster Reduction</b> took place in Geneva. It was a forum for member states and other stakeholders to assess progress made in the implementation of the HFA, enhance awareness of disaster risk reduction, share experiences and learn from good practice, identify remaining gaps, and identify actions to accelerate national and local implementation.</p> <p>(November) The 2nd <b>Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction</b> was held in Delhi, India. It reaffirmed the participating governments' commitment to the HFA and achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through the <b>Delhi Declaration on DRR</b>. This Declaration expanded on the biennial Conference as the Regional Platform with the participation of national governments, regional and sub-regional organizations, United Nations agencies, financial institutions, and other stakeholders, including civil society, scientific and technical organizations, the private sector and the media.</p>
2008	<p>GFDRR'S Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF) was launched.</p> <p>GFDRR South-South Cooperation Program was launched to encourage inter-country partnerships of southern governments and institutions for sharing more effective risk reduction solutions.</p> <p>(November) The 5<sup>th</sup> Consultative Group meeting in Copenhagen approved GFDRR's transition to "priority country" approach to enable a more a programmatic approach to disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation that is country-led and managed.</p>	

Date	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)	Other International Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Events
2009	<p>(June) The 6<sup>th</sup> Consultative Group (CG) meeting in Geneva:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Decided to invite six representatives of developing countries to join the CG in order to have a more inclusive governance of the program.</li> <li>- Endorsed the GFDRR Track II Priority Country and Donor-Earmarked Country fiscal envelop for the next three years (the World Bank fiscal years 2010–2012).</li> <li>- Adopted a medium term Global Partnership strategy for 2009–2012 identifying key priorities to be pursued.</li> </ul>	
2010	<p>GFDRR published the Economics of Disaster Risk reduction report; the “Safer Homes, Stronger Communities” report and the website.</p> <p>Piloted GFDRR labs.</p> <p>GFDRR initiated a comprehensive results-based M&amp;E approach and methodology for monitoring and management of progress in achieving its objectives adopted by the 8<sup>th</sup> CG in Kyoto (May).</p> <p>First external evaluation of GFDRR was carried out.</p>	<p>After consultations with the founding partners and donors in the latter half of 2009, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) had made a decision to close out ProVention , which contributed to the DRR sector for a decade.</p>
2011	<p>(May) The World Bank, GFDRR, and UNISDR, together with other partners, organized the World Reconstruction Conference, on May 10–13, 2011. The conference was held within the Third Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in Geneva, Switzerland.</p> <p>First Donor review of GFDRR – The UK Multilateral Aid Review.</p>	



## Annex C. GFDRR Governance

### The Consultative Group

The Consultative Group (CG) is the governing body of Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). According to the Partnership Charter, the CG is responsible for:

- (a) defining long-term policies and strategies of GFDRR;
- (b) adopting a multi-year, results framework by GFDRR;
- (c) adopting GFDRR project approving procedures;
- (d) determining common priorities and countries for the year and approving the work plan for Track II core funds;
- (e) sharing GFDRR knowledge and experience;
- (f) facilitating coordination across tracks of GFDRR activities;
- (g) confirming donor pledges and mobilizing additional resources;
- (h) nominating members of the Results Management Council (RMC);
- (i) establishing mechanisms to supervise and guide GFDRR between CG meetings;
- (j) unanimously approving and amending the GFDRR Charter (GFDRR 2010a, p. 9).

The members of the CG include:

- (1) World Bank
- (2) Donors contributing at least \$3,000,000 over three consecutive years
- (3) Chair of the ISDR system
- (4) Chair of GFDRR Results Management Council
- (5) Developing country governments contributing at least \$500,000 over three consecutive years.
- (6) Developing country governments invited by the CG (on a two-year staggered rotational basis)

The CG is chaired by the World Bank Vice President for Sustainable Development and co-chaired by one other donor member selected by the CG for a one-year term.

GFDRR also regularly invites the UNDP and the IFRC to attend CG meetings as observers, and welcomes other stakeholders to attend as observers. The following is the list of GFDRR members and observers based on pledges and contributions as of July 31, 2012.

### CG Members

#### Donors

ACP Secretariat  
Australia  
Brazil  
Denmark  
European Union  
Germany

Italy  
Japan  
Korea, Republic of  
Luxembourg  
Nigeria  
Norway

Spain  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
The Netherlands

United Kingdom  
United States  
World Bank

### **Other Members**

UNISDR

### **Invited Developing Country Members**

Yemen (2011-12)  
Malawi (2011-12)  
Bangladesh (2011-12)

Togo (2012-13)  
Solomon Islands (2012-13)  
Haiti (2012-13)

### **CG Observers**

Arab Academy  
Austria  
Belgium  
Canada (3-year contribution expired)  
China  
Colombia  
Egypt  
Finland  
France (donor contribution under  
\$3 million)  
India  
Indonesia

Ireland (donor contribution under  
\$3 million)  
Islamic Development Bank (pledge  
pending)  
Malaysia  
Mexico  
New Zealand  
Portugal  
Saudi Arabia (pledge pending)  
Senegal  
South Africa  
Vietnam

### **Invited Observers**

UNDP  
IFRC

## **The Results Management Council (RMC)**

GFDRR's RMC is an advisory body that is charged with ensuring the quality, relevance, and impact of GFDRR activities. It includes director-level representatives of the World Bank and UNISDR (as founding partners), the manager of the GFDRR Secretariat, and 10 members selected by the CG chair (five representing organizations and five as prominent experts).

According to the GFDRR charter, RMC responsibilities include: (a) providing technical guidance to all GFDRR activities and advising on a results framework for DRR; (b) reviewing GFDRR strategy prior to its presentation to the CG; (c) *ex post* evaluation of selected GFDRR activities; (d) leveraging local and regional networks to sustain and replicate GFDRR work; (e) other functions as requested by the CG from time to time.

The RMC Members in 2010–2012 were the following:

## ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES

**The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - East Asia Pacific.** Ms. Adelina Dwi Ekawati Kamal (Lina), Head of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division of the ASEAN Secretariat

**The Arab Academy for Science, Technology, and Maritime Transport– Middle East and North Africa.** His Excellency Dr. Mohamed Farghaly, President of the Arab Academy for Science, Technology, and Maritime Transport

**The Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA).** Mr. Jeremy Collymore, Executive Director of CDEMA

**The Pacific Islands Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC).** Mr. Mosese Sikivou is the Manager of the SOPAC Community Risk Program

**The Africa Union Commission (AUC).** Mr. Almami Dampha is a Gambian national and a Policy Officer for Forestry and Land Management, Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture at the African Union Commission

## EXPERT REPRESENTATIVES

**Amod Dixit.** General Secretary and Executive Director of the National Society for Earthquake Technology-Nepal — a natural hazard assessments and earthquake risk management expert

**Lorna Victoria.** Advisor of the Board of Directors of the Center for Disaster Preparedness, a regional resource center based in the Philippines that is dedicated to promoting Community-Based Disaster Risk Management — a community-level disaster preparedness, policy advocacy, capacity-building expert

**Murat Sungur Bursa.** Chief Executive Officer of the Zorlu Energy Group of Turkey, managing domestic and international energy investments — an expert in disaster preparedness, risk mitigation, reconstruction and recovery, climate change and geological disasters

**Roland Nussbaum.** Chief Executive Officer of an association referred to as Mission Risques Naturels between the French Federation of Insurances Companies and the Association of Insurance Mutuals— a risk financing, insurance risk management, community-based, disaster mitigation, capacity-building expert

**Kaoru Takara.** Professor and Vice Director at the Disaster Prevention Research Institute in Kyoto University, Japan — an expert in hydrology, water-related disasters, and applied statistics for extreme events

**Dr. Sawako Takeuchi.** Professor of Urban Engineering and Environment, Kyoto University and Ambassador and Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Japan — a risk reduction and poverty alleviation expert from Japan.

## **Annex D. Recommendations of the 2010 Evaluation of GFDRR**

1. GFDRR should continue to pursue a proactive campaign of fund raising with international partners, including consideration of mutually supporting activities with other multilateral development banks.
2. GFDRR should develop a more formalized means of coordination across the network of multilateral development banks, with the view to the eventual promulgation of more common and harmonized approaches.
3. GFDRR should, in any expanded environment and with specific reference to its 20 priority countries, take a leadership role [in DRR] in promoting donor and development bank coordination and harmonization.
4. In planning for the next project cycle, GFDRR should consider giving special attention to new programming designed to strengthen national coordinative capacity.
5. GFDRR should develop standardized and results-based reporting templates so as to regularize, streamline, and focus the cyclical reporting that is inherent in modern project management.
6. GFDRR should develop and circulate more formalized selection criteria.
7. GFDRR should develop a multifaceted training program for Headquarters and field personnel.
8. Assuming a substantial increase in the overall size and scope of the GFDRR portfolio, the GFDRR will need to considerably increase its personnel both at Headquarters and in the field.
9. The World Bank, at Headquarters especially, should review the level of resources and their regional distribution that have been allocated to the mainstreaming of DRR.
10. GFDRR should develop a more rigorous multi-year, strategic plan that includes a broad-based results and performance indicator framework.
11. GFDRR should develop a more hierarchical approach to its set of performance indicators.
12. GFDRR should develop a multi-year, evaluation plan.
13. GFDRR should engage with UNISDR in a dialogue about how to clarify what appear to be some ambiguities with regard to their individual functions.

## Annex E. GFDRR: Sources and Uses of Funds

**Table E-1. Annual Donor Contributions to GFDRR, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**  
(donor countries listed in descending order of total contributions)

Contributions	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total	Cumulative Pledges <sup>a</sup>	Share of Pledge
To Tracks II & III, and ACP-EU <sup>b</sup>									
EU Commission			332	874	1,597	44,331	47,135	83,717	56%
Sweden		3,637	2,467	7,258	9,122	9,717	32,201	32,201	100%
Australia	1,403	2,051	491	4,219	14,925	6,407	29,496	32,588	91%
United Kingdom	1,957	3,649	2,542	1,248	3,714	10,036	23,146	26,267	88%
Germany				8,602	2,703	1,314	12,619	18,736	67%
Japan		6,000			6,000		12,000	12,000	100%
Norway		2,951	803	3,096	2,359	1,358	10,567	10,567	100%
Spain		6,235				3,767	10,002	10,382	96%
Denmark		3,051	3,484	1,814		859	9,208	9,208	100%
Switzerland		2,936		1,627	500	1,825	6,888	6,888	100%
Luxembourg		1,397	3,270		1,262	914	6,843	6,843	100%
Italy				2,200	2,200	2,200	6,600	6,600	100%
Netherlands	850	174	933	725	1,151	2,632	6,465	7,993	81%
Canada		1,511	1,602				3,113	3,113	100%
United States						3,040	3,040	3,040	100%
Austria						2,499	2,499	2,499	100%
Brazil				50	1,488	203	1,741	1,741	100%
France			1,149	215	33	183	1,580	1,580	100%
Ireland				357	317	389	1,063	1,063	100%
Korea (South)						270	270	900	30%
Nigeria							0	500	0%
Subtotal (Tracks II & III, and ACP-EU)	4,210	33,590	17,073	32,284	47,373	91,944	226,475	278,426	81%
World Bank									
DGF (Track I)	5,147	4,853	5,000	5,000	4,250	4,250	28,500		
BB <sup>c</sup>	112	17	734	872	938	793	3,465		
Total	9,469	38,460	22,807	38,156	52,561	96,987	258,440		

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR Annual Reports for 2007 to 2011. Updated for fiscal year 2012 from the Bank's corporate accounting system on July 18, 2012.

EU = European Union; DGF = Development Grant Facility; BB = World Bank's Administrative Budget

a. The cumulative pledges amount can change from those reported in other publications due to exchange rate fluctuations depending on reporting period.

b. "ACP-EU" is the Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program for the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) financed by the European Union Commission.

c. Of these amounts, \$1.45 million came from the Global Expert Teams Initiative in FY2009–12, and \$229,000 from the DGF to help finance the external evaluation in FY2010.

**Table E-2. Total Donor Contributions to GFDRR, FY2007–12 (US\$ millions)**  
(donors listed in descending order of total contributions)

	Track 1	Track II	Track III	ACP-EU <sup>a</sup>	Total	Share of Total
EU Commission		3.6	4.5	39.1	47.1	18.5%
Sweden		25.5	6.7		32.2	12.6%
Australia		25.0	4.5		29.5	11.6%
World Bank <sup>b</sup>	28.5				28.5	11.2%
United Kingdom		23.1			23.1	9.1%
Germany		12.6			12.6	4.9%
Japan		12.0			12.0	4.7%
Norway		6.4	4.1		10.6	4.1%
Spain		10.0			10.0	3.9%
Denmark		7.2	2.0		9.2	3.6%
Luxembourg		6.1	0.8		6.9	2.7%
Italy		6.3	0.6		6.8	2.7%
Netherlands		6.6			6.6	2.6%
Switzerland		5.0	1.5		6.5	2.5%
Canada		3.1			3.1	1.2%
United States		3.0			3.0	1.2%
Austria			2.5		2.5	1.0%
Brazil			1.7		1.7	0.7%
France		1.6			1.6	0.6%
Ireland		0.5	0.5		1.1	0.4%
South Korea		0.3			0.3	0.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>28.5</b>	<b>158.0</b>	<b>29.5</b>	<b>39.1</b>	<b>255.0</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: Downloaded from the World Bank's corporate accounting system on July 18, 2012.

a. "ACP-EU" is the Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Program for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) financed by the European Union Commission.

b. These are the contributions from the World Bank's Development Grant Facility only. Another \$3.5 million came from the Bank's administrative budget (BB). (See Table E-1.)

**Table E-3. GFDRR Expenditures/Disbursements (US\$ thousands)****(a) As Reported in GFDRR Annual Reports, FY2007–12**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Prelim. 2012	Total
<b>Program Activities</b>							
Track I	5,147	4,853	5,000	5,000	4,250	4,250	28,550
Track II (Core) <sup>a</sup>	1,762	5,776	11,599	13,710	17,058	25,579	75,484
Track II (Non-Core) <sup>a</sup>		10	994	1,399	1,396	2,432	6,231
Track III <sup>a</sup>		910	2,062	4,341	6,030	5,065	18,408
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6,909</b>	<b>11,549</b>	<b>19,655</b>	<b>24,450</b>	<b>28,734</b>	<b>37,326</b>	<b>128,623</b>
<b>Administrative Costs</b>							
Staff Costs	225	977	601	870	1,247	1,832	5,752
Travel	92	282	115	265	267	280	1,301
Overhead	4	23	113	2	4	15	161
Other	26	241	128	34	69	85	583
<b>Subtotal<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>347</b>	<b>1,523</b>	<b>957</b>	<b>1,171</b>	<b>1,587</b>	<b>2,212</b>	<b>7,797</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,256</b>	<b>13,072</b>	<b>20,612</b>	<b>25,621</b>	<b>30,321</b>	<b>39,538</b>	<b>136,420</b>
<b>Administrative Costs (% of total)</b>							
Including Track I	4.8%	11.7%	4.6%	4.6%	5.2%	5.6%	6.1%
Excluding Track I	16.5%	18.5%	6.1%	5.7%	6.1%	6.7%	7.8%

Source: GFDRR Annual Reports.

a. GFDRR Annual Reports record Track II and III disbursements as "actual disbursements made and contracts already entered into the Bank's corporate accounting system, known as SAP." Those in Table (b) are actual disbursements only — about \$6.2 million less through FY2012. Track II (Non-Core) includes \$561,000 for the ACP-EU program in FY2012.

b. About \$7.6 million of administrative costs have been classified under Program Activities in GFDRR Annual Reports. These activities have related mainly to governance meetings, operational and results monitoring and evaluation, and communications.

**(b) From the World Bank's Corporate Accounting System, FY2007–12**

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Prelim. 2012	Total
<b>Program Activities</b>							
Track I	5,147	4,853	5,000	5,000	4,250	4,250	28,500
Track II	342	3,063	11,490	14,717	18,227	27,160	74,999
Track III	-	415	2,350	4,397	6,052	5,157	18,370
ACP-EU	-	-	-	-	-	561	561
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>5,489</b>	<b>8,331</b>	<b>18,839</b>	<b>24,114</b>	<b>28,529</b>	<b>37,127</b>	<b>122,430</b>
<b>Administrative Costs</b>	<b>419</b>	<b>1,881</b>	<b>2,153</b>	<b>3,056</b>	<b>3,698</b>	<b>4,203</b>	<b>15,411</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,910</b>	<b>10,212</b>	<b>20,992</b>	<b>27,170</b>	<b>32,227</b>	<b>41,330</b>	<b>137,841</b>
<b>Administrative Costs (% of total)</b>							
Including Track I	7.1%	18.4%	10.3%	11.2%	11.5%	10.2%	11.2%
Excluding Track I	55.2%	35.1%	13.5%	13.8%	13.2%	11.3%	14.1%

Source: World Bank data from the Bank's corporate accounting system known as SAP, consistent with the other financial tables in this report.

**Table E-4. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements, by Type of Activity, FY2007–12 (US\$ thousands)**

	No. of Activities	Global	Regional	Country	Total	Share of Track
<b>Track II</b>						
Capacity Development	57	3,171	6,649	14,520	24,340	32.5%
Studies	40	4,561	4,368	4,222	13,152	17.5%
Strategic Planning	24	45	5,342	4,960	10,347	13.8%
Support for Bank Lending						
Preparation and Supervision	30		319	7,777	8,096	10.8%
RETF Projects & Cofinancing	5			4,740	4,740	6.3%
Non-Administrative Anchor Activities		4,114			4,114	5.5%
Conferences	8	2,406	383	484	3,273	4.4%
DRM Lab	1	1,975			1,975	2.6%
Toolkits/Handbooks	7	1,436	499		1,934	2.6%
Training	4	1,176	37	185	1,212	1.8%
South/South Cooperation	5	853	150		1,003	1.3%
Databases	2	456			456	0.6%
External Evaluation		357			357	0.5%
<b>Track II Total</b>	<b>183</b>	<b>20,550</b>	<b>17,745</b>	<b>36,703</b>	<b>74,999</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>Track III</b>						
PDNAs	26	975	100	5,124	6,200	33.7%
Capacity Development	9	748	556	2,574	3,878	21.1%
Support for Bank Lending						
RETF Projects & Cofinancing	1			2,958	2,958	16.1%
Preparation and Supervision	2			695	695	3.8%
Strategic Planning	5		1,055	917	1,972	10.7%
Toolkits	3	1,374			1,374	7.5%
Training	6	581	29	451	1,061	5.8%
Conferences	1	133			133	0.7%
Studies	1			99	99	0.5%
<b>Track III Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>3,812</b>	<b>1,739</b>	<b>12,818</b>	<b>18,370</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>ACP-EU</b>						
PDNA	2			300	300	53.5%
Capacity Development	1			98	98	17.4%
Conferences	1		94		94	16.7%
Studies	1		52		52	9.3%
Training	1			17	17	3.1%
<b>ACP-EU Total</b>	<b>6</b>		<b>146</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>561</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Anchor Administration		15,411			15,411	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>39,774</b>	<b>19,630</b>	<b>49,937</b>	<b>109,341</b>	

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR and World Bank data.



**Table E-5. GFDRR, Tracks II, III, and ACP-EU Disbursements, FY2007–12, by Country (US\$ thousands)**

Region/Country	Adminis- tration	Track II	Track III	ACP-EU	Total	References to "Disaster"	
						2001–06 CASs	2007–11 CASs
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa Total</b>		<b>15,452</b>	<b>2,802</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>18,589</b>		
AFR Regional Activities		4,327	940	36	5,302		
Somalia		3,715			3,715	No	No
<b>**Mozambique</b>		<b>1,255</b>			<b>1,255</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Ethiopia		1,018		17	1,035	No	No
Senegal		512	424		935	Yes	Yes
Madagascar		711	168		878	No	Yes
Malawi		848			848	No	Yes
Seychelles		688			688	No CAS	Yes, ISN
Southern Africa		632			632		
<b>Ghana</b>		<b>551</b>			<b>551</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Eastern Africa		502	29		531		
Kenya			178	184	362	No	Yes
Namibia		71	252		323	No CAS	Yes, ISN
<b>Togo</b>		<b>237</b>	<b>58</b>		<b>295</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes, ISN</b>
<b>Burkina Faso</b>		<b>136</b>	<b>137</b>		<b>272</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Nigeria			170	98	268	No	Yes
Lesotho			167		167	No	No
Benin			155		155	No	Yes
Central African Republic		138			138	No	No
<b>Mali</b>		<b>74</b>			<b>74</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Uganda			69		69	Yes	Yes
<b>**South Africa</b>			<b>59</b>		<b>59</b>	<b>No CAS</b>	<b>No</b>
Swaziland		39			39	No CAS	Yes, ISN
<b>East Asia &amp; Pacific Total</b>		<b>13,114</b>	<b>3,306</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>16,472</b>		
EAP Regional Activities		3,861	556		4,417		
<b>**Indonesia</b>		<b>2,047</b>	<b>872</b>		<b>2,919</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>**Philippines</b>		<b>1,595</b>	<b>991</b>		<b>2,586</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Pacific Islands		1,854		52	1,906	No CAS	Yes
<b>**China</b>		<b>1,252</b>	<b>414</b>		<b>1,665</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No CAS</b>
<b>**Vietnam</b>		<b>1,117</b>			<b>1,117</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Lao PDR</b>		<b>920</b>	<b>52</b>		<b>973</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>**Mekong</b>		<b>240</b>	<b>125</b>		<b>365</b>		
<b>**Thailand</b>			<b>198</b>		<b>198</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Fiji		159			159	Yes	No CAS
Myanmar			99		99	No CAS	No CAS
Kiribati		58			58	Yes	Yes
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>		<b>11</b>			<b>11</b>	<b>Yes, ISN</b>	<b>Yes, CAS</b>

Region/Country	Adminis- tration	Track II	Track III	ACP-EU	Total	References to "Disaster"	
						2001-06 CASs	2007-11 CASs
<b>Europe &amp; Central Asia Total</b>		<b>2,474</b>	<b>93</b>		<b>2,567</b>		
ECA Regional Activities		615			615		
**Turkey		484			484	Yes	Yes
**South Eastern Europe		440			440		
**Albania		420			420	No	Yes
<b>**Central Asia</b>		<b>204</b>			<b>204</b>		
Armenia		150			150	Yes	Yes
Moldova		41	93		134	Yes	Yes
<b>**Kyrgyz Republic</b>		<b>119</b>			<b>119</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Latin America &amp; Caribbean Total</b>		<b>14,346</b>	<b>3,600</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>18,003</b>		
<b>**Haiti</b>		<b>5,287</b>	<b>946</b>		<b>6,233</b>	<b>Yes, ISN</b>	<b>Yes</b>
**Jamaica		213	2,033		2,245	Yes	Yes
<b>**Central America</b>		<b>1,779</b>	<b>171</b>		<b>1,950</b>		
LCR Regional Activities		1,559	73		1,632		
**Nicaragua		915			915	Yes	Yes
<b>**Colombia</b>		<b>805</b>			<b>805</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
**Bolivia		628	175		803	Yes	Yes
<b>**Ecuador</b>		<b>714</b>			<b>714</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No CAS</b>
**Peru		695			695	Yes	Yes
**OECS Countries		431			431	Yes	Yes
**Caribbean		228	100	58	386		
**Mexico		348			348	Yes	Yes
<b>Panama</b>		<b>270</b>			<b>270</b>		
Brazil		154	93		247	No	No
**Chile		118			118	No	Yes
**Uruguay		97			97	No	Yes
<b>**Costa Rica</b>		<b>59</b>			<b>59</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
**El Salvador		46			46	Yes	Yes
<b>**Guatemala</b>			<b>9</b>		<b>9</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Middle East &amp; North Africa Total</b>		<b>4,816</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>4,936</b>		
MNA Regional Activities		1,849			1,849		
<b>Yemen, Republic</b>		<b>1,545</b>			<b>1,545</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
**Morocco		1,008			1,008	No	Yes
<b>**Djibouti</b>		<b>282</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Saudi Arabia		133			133	No	No
<b>South Asia Total</b>		<b>4,246</b>	<b>4,752</b>		<b>8,998</b>		
<b>**Bangladesh</b>		<b>266</b>	<b>3,423</b>		<b>3,689</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>**Pakistan</b>		<b>439</b>	<b>978</b>		<b>1,417</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>Nepal</b>		<b>1,210</b>			<b>1,210</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes, ISN</b>
SAR Regional Activities		1,053	67		1,120		
**India		1,089			1,089	Yes	Yes
<b>Sri Lanka</b>		<b>187</b>	<b>63</b>		<b>250</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
Bhutan			222		222	Yes	Yes
<b>Global Activities</b>	<b>15,411</b>	<b>20,550</b>	<b>3,812</b>		<b>39,774</b>		

Region/Country	Adminis- tration	Track II	Track III	ACP-EU	Total
Priority Core Countries <sup>a</sup>		20,994	2,778	186	23,957
Donor Earmarked Non-Core Countries <sup>b</sup>		4,986	5,516		10,502
**Hot Spot Countries <sup>c</sup>		19,679	9,215	174	35,292
None of the Above Countries		10,774	1,825	282	8,360
<b>Country-Level Activities</b>		<b>41,183</b>	<b>12,922</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>54,631</b>
Region-Wide Activities		13,265	1,636	36	14,937
Global Activities	15,411	20,550	3,812		39,774
<b>Total Activities</b>	<b>15,411</b>	<b>74,999</b>	<b>18,370</b>	<b>561</b>	<b>109,341</b>
<b>Share of Country-Level Activities</b>					
Priority Core Countries		51.0%	21.5%	35.4%	43.9%
Donor Earmarked Non-Core Countries		12.1%	42.7%		19.2%
**Hot Spot Countries		47.8%	71.3%	11.0%	53.0%
None of the Above Countries		26.2%	14.1%	53.6%	23.6%

Source: Calculated by IEG from GFDRR and World Bank data.

a. See Table 2 in Chapter 1 for a list of priority, donor-earmarked, and hotspot countries.

b. The 36 “hotspot” countries are those in which more than half of the country’s Gross Domestic Product is at risk from two or more hazards (Dilly et al. 2005). These disbursement amounts include the four priority core countries and the six donor-earmarked countries that are also hotspot countries.

c. These subtotals do not double count the 10 hotspot countries that are also GFDRR priority or donor-earmarked countries.

## Annex F. Some Results of Country-Level GFDRR Activities and Impacts on the World Bank

The following examples are based on information received from Regional Vice Presidential Units (VPUs), which have not necessarily been verified or validated by IEG.

AFR = Sub-Saharan Africa; EAP = East Asia and the Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LCR = Latin America and the Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; SAR = South Asia

From	Comment
AFR	<p>There are numerous examples in the Africa Region of how GFDRR contributions have increased resilience to respond to disasters and climate change, and where GFDRR support has led to core investments operations that support long-term disaster reduction.</p> <p>Country DRR plans for the nine GFDRR focus countries in Africa represent examples of how different stakeholders have cooperated in strengthening DRM at various levels and sectors. To formulate these plans, governments and other actors on DRR, including the Bank, conducted situation analyses of DRR progress to identify gaps that would need to be addressed in the DRM plan and identified areas where the Bank could provide additional assistance. Similar consultations have taken place during project preparation of investment lending that includes DRM components or activities.</p>
AFR	<p>In the Africa region, a substantial portion of GFDRR resources (almost 20%) have been used to prepare, supervise, or co-finance Bank lending operations. GFDRR resources facilitated the World Bank's efforts to respond quickly to the requests from national governments and offering different forms of capacity building or technical assistance beyond the traditional World Bank response. Technical assistance financed by GFDRR can be linked directly to many investment projects, either by enabling the dialogue with client governments (e.g. in Namibia) or to the major investments such as in Malawi or Senegal. In many cases, the Africa region might not have been able to respond as quickly to the governments' requests without rapidly available resources from GFDRR.</p> <p>GFDRR has enabled the Region to provide disaster monitoring and timely response to government requests, such as the Horn of Africa drought response. In this case, the country and sector management units across networks, and the DRM Team with GFDRR support facilitated the formulation of a Drought Response Strategy, backed by a \$1.8 billion package of short-, medium-, and long-term response, including \$250 million from the Crisis Response Window for multiple social and human development projects.</p>
EAP	<p>With GFDRR's help, the DRM agenda in EAP has been able to expand from being the realm of the National Disaster Management Organizations to putting it on the agenda of government parliaments and investment planning.</p> <p>On a broader level, GFDRR has significant successes of mainstreaming DRM, not only in the Bank's portfolio but in the client's investment planning. Many Governments are creating new, more resilient design standards and building codes in different sectors like education, transport, irrigation, urban planning, and others. GFDRR has been able to significantly raise awareness about the importance of DRM within the Bank.</p>
ECA	<p>GFDRR should be given credit for creating in the Bank an inter-regional global community of practice in the area of disaster risk reduction. The Bank has never before had such a strong "one-stop shop" and a repository of knowledge and practice on the DRM, or cross-sectoral cooperation as it exists now due to the work and outreach of the GFDRR Secretariat.</p>

From	Comment
LCR	<p>In the past, World Bank clients in LCR came to the Bank for support related to disaster response and in some cases for disaster mitigation (mostly flooding). During the past five years, GFDRR support has provided the platform for a significant change in the Bank's approach to DRM. Specifically, GFDRR support has enabled, among others:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development and provision of new tools and technologies for our clients' improved disaster risk management (Central America Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CAPRA), GeoNode)</li> <li>• Strengthening and qualitative improvement of Bank-financed DRM operations with better integration between investment and policy elements (Colombia's DRM reform and Country Disaster Risk Analysis).</li> <li>• Innovations on disaster risk financing (Mexico Multi-Catastrophe Bond, Costa Rica, Catastrophe Risk Transfer Vehicle, Colombia's inclusion of disaster risk in the Government's contingent liability analysis)</li> </ul>
LCR	<p>Almost 90% of the countries in the region in the Latin America and the Caribbean Region have benefited from GFDRR engagements. The benefits have been remarkable and have created sustained changes in several countries. GFDRR has provided financial and technical assistance resources to a diverse set of countries such as Bolivia and Mexico and the impact of the intervention has been equally important for these countries.</p> <p>Today with GFDRR assistance Central America has a Regional Policy in DRR endorsed by their Presidents. In Brazil, GFDRR is helping the development of DRM policies at federal, state, and municipal levels. GFDRR has been crucial to help coordinate a quick response for the rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts following major disasters in Jamaica, Peru, Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent. Overall, GFDRR has been indispensable for enabling a qualitative and quantitative change in the Bank's convening, financial and knowledge services on disaster risk management (DRM) to our clients.</p>
LCR	<p>Evidence exists in LCR that recipient countries are beginning to integrate knowledge and capacity that GFDRR has provided. Examples include Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, and El Salvador mentioned above. Additional examples would include GFDRR support for Guatemala territorial planning and building codes, and the safer cities work in Quito, Ecuador.</p> <p>GFDRR has been able to leverage additional investments to support disaster risk reduction in Colombia, Barranquilla, and the Eastern Caribbean.</p>
LCR	<p>The LCR operations portfolio of 2012 provides convincing evidence of additional disaster-related investments leveraged by GFDRR, although it is hard to sort out the attribution question.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three new policy operations supporting DRM policies that were identified with assistance from GFDRR are under preparation in Colombia.</li> <li>• In the case of the Barranquilla Flood Risk Management Project, currently under preparation (\$150 million of World Bank financing and up to \$600 million in total investments), a grant from GFDRR for \$150,000 enabled the World Bank to provide continued support (during 24 months) for a technical dialogue with the city of Barranquilla and the national government in Colombia that finally led the newly elected governments of Colombia and Barranquilla to request the Bank's support for the project in 2011.</li> <li>• In the Eastern Caribbean, a relatively small grant from GFDRR helped Grenada and Saint Vincent engage their largest ever financing package from the World Bank combining IDA, IDA regional, and Climate Investment Fund resources. Saint Lucia and Dominica will follow suit shortly with projects that are likely to be their largest ever projects financed by the World Bank.</li> </ul>
LCR	<p>GFDRR has played a critical role in catalyzing and sustaining an active knowledge community within the Bank. This community has helped to bring strong, effective, and fast communications and learning channels for fast sharing of lessons across countries and regions, in ways that are best practice. GFDRR's connections with external organizations and think tanks help them bring the latest thinking to the Bank's policy advice and investments.</p>

From	Comment
LCR	GFDRR has offered donors and development partners a new avenue for channeling financial resources for disaster risk management, facilitating an integration of disaster risk management into a dialogue with national governments' highest level of development decision making.
LCR	GFDRR support has enabled a more systematic inclusion of DRM in the Bank-client dialogue based on improved analytical work. In addition to the growing number of disaster-sensitive CASSs, there has also been a qualitative improvement in the way that the Bank treats disaster risk in these strategy papers. During the past five years, GFDRR has systematically supported LCR to base its CASSs on better DRM analytical work leading to much more coherent treatment of disaster risk in the background and context sections, and in some cases to agree with the client on strategies and measures that the Bank subsequently supports. In Central America, where all seven countries are affected by adverse natural events, only two of them, Nicaragua and Honduras, had meaningful discussions of disaster risk management aspects in the CAS before 2006. After 2006, all the countries including Belize have a much improved treatment of disaster risk management aspects in their CAS.
LCR	GFDRR has helped bring the disaster risk management dialogue to Ministries of Finance and Development Planning. Disaster management and mitigation were civil defense or humanitarian topics for decades. GFDRR has helped bring DRM onto the development agenda, although this is still a work in progress, through some of its knowledge and convening work, especially on the economics of disasters, and on disaster risk financing and insurance.
LCR	<p>GFDRR's support has provided the platform for a significant change in the Bank's approach to DRM, enabling, among others:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development and provision of new tools and technologies for our client's improved disaster risk management. GFDRR support made possible the development of the CAPRA tools and methodology. This work was led technically by the World Bank, but developed and piloted in partnership with the Inter-American Development Bank (co-financed more than \$2 million), the UNISDR, and the Central American Disaster Prevention and Management Center. CAPRA was initiated with the purpose of raising awareness of disaster risk among client countries by providing a set of tools that allow better understanding of risk associated with adverse natural events. The tools are now openly available to a growing user community (<a href="http://ecapra.org">ecapra.org</a>). A second phase of CAPRA has built local capacity and ownership through hands-on training in the methodology with successful results of high local ownership in various sectors and countries like: Costa Rica's water and sanitation sector with the leadership of Acueductos y Alcantarillado (AyA); earthquake risk analysis of El Salvador's health, education, and public sector building portfolios in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador; and Panama's work on risk evaluations for housing and territorial planning in the city of David. The CAPRA tools and methodologies are now being used also in Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Caribbean, Colombia, Chile, India, Nepal, Peru, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.</li> <li>• GeoNode is another innovation made possible with financing from and the partnerships created by GFDRR. GeoNode provides an open platform for the access, management, and publication of geospatial data. The tool is built upon mature and free open-source software and is designed to allow non-technical users to easily share their data and use it to create interactive maps. The tool is enabling Eastern Caribbean countries to collaborate and learn from each other and thereby improve their risk management practices. (See <a href="http://www.gfdr.org/gfdr/node/949">http://www.gfdr.org/gfdr/node/949</a>.) The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience under the Climate Investment Fund is now promoting the use of this tool on the basis of the experience in the Eastern Caribbean across its pilot programs.</li> <li>• Qualitative improvement of Bank financed DRM operations with better integration between investment and policy elements. Colombia's recent reforms on DRM is a good example of this. Although DRM as a policy priority in Colombia clearly predates GFDRR, GFDRR support to Colombia has enabled Colombia to take its disaster risk management approaches to a different level and improved inter-institutional coordination, policies, and regulations in the process. It has also enabled Colombia to take better advantage of services provided by the World Bank for disaster risk management through a coherent and</li> </ul>


From	Comment
	<p>integrated combination of financial, technical, and convening services. Most recently, a grant from GFDRR enabled the World Bank to respond to a request from the Ministry of Planning of Colombia, for a country-wide analysis of its disaster risk management system and institutions — a tool on par with the World Bank's Country Environment Analysis — which was subsequently developed by the World Bank in collaboration with Colombian institutions. This process has generated several policy reforms in Colombia. The resulting analysis was launched on June 24, 2012, in Colombia and is informing (in part) three new Development Policy Operations that will be presented to the World Bank Board of Directors in FY2013.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Innovations on disaster risk financing. Some examples include: GFDRR financed part of World Bank Treasury's work to enable the launch of the Mexico MultiCat Bond. Mexico is the first country in the World to successfully launch such a product. GFDRR has also supported disaster risk financing analytical work in Colombia that has led that country to explicitly include disaster risk in its analysis of contingent liabilities of the government (this is probably a global first). One output of the CAPRA work in Costa Rica has been collaboration with the National Institute of Insurers (INS in Spanish) to develop a Catastrophe Risk Transfer Vehicle that would enable risk transfer for the government's portfolio of public buildings and social housing.</li> </ul>
MNA	<p>GFDRR has had considerable impact on DRM practice in the Middle East and North Africa. Prior to 2007, when GFDRR was established, the Middle East and North Africa disaster-related work had been limited to financing post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. Since 2007, a range of country-level programs have been launched through GFDRR to increase resilience to disasters. These include activities aimed at improving information availability on disaster risks through assessments, developing the policy environment for risk reduction, strengthening regional support mechanisms, building capacities in risk reduction through trainings at the national and local levels and post-disaster recovery and reconstruction programs. Hazard risk assessments have been completed or are ongoing in Algeria, Djibouti, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen. Hazards risk assessments have been completed or are ongoing, and inter-ministerial steering committees on DRM have been set up under the Prime Minister's Office, in Djibouti, Yemen, Morocco, and Algeria. A real momentum has been building in the region for DRM.</p>
MNA	<p>GFDRR has (a) financed a range of country-level programs launched since 2007 which have increased resilience to disasters, (b) raised the status of the DRM agenda with Middle East and North Africa countries, (c) fostered a solid partnership for risk reduction with international donors; (d) provided key support once disasters hit, which allowed the mobilization of financing from the World Bank and other partners; and (e) made a strong contribution to fostering regional collaboration for DRM.</p>
MNA	<p>The following country examples provide convincing evidence of additional disaster-related investments leveraged by GFDRR:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Djibouti PDNA led to the mobilization of \$13.2 million funding through the IDA Crisis Response Window for three additional financing (packages) to address some short-to-medium terms drought impacts which have been prioritized by the government as follows: (a) employment and Human Capital Safety Net Project (\$5 million); (b) Rural Community Development &amp; Water Mobilization (\$3 million); and (c) Power Access and Diversification (\$5.2 million).</li> <li>• The Yemen PDNA following the Torrential Floods in Hadramout and Al-Mahara provided the basis for the development of a \$41 million Bank financed Yemen Flood Protection and Emergency Reconstruction project. The project was instrumental in supporting rehabilitation and rebuilding of critical damaged infrastructure.</li> <li>• In Morocco, due to GFDRR support, the Government is now looking to potential Bank financing for technical assistance on DRM — which would be the first case in the Middle East and North Africa Region.</li> </ul>

From	Comment
MNA	GFDRR has greatly contributed to (a) raising the status of the DRM agenda with our clients, while fostering a solid partnership for risk reduction with international donors, particularly UNDP and the EU; and (b) provided in record time key support once disasters hit, which allowed the mobilization of financing from the World Bank and other partners.
MNA	GFDRR has contributed to increased inter-ministerial collaboration at the national level, which is seen as essential to deal effectively with DRM related issues as demonstrated in the Morocco DRM country program. Today, thanks to GFDRR financial support provided since late 2008, a well-functioning, inter-ministerial committee on DRM exists in the country representing all key stakeholders, including the Ministry of Finance and Interior. This is chaired by the Ministry of General Affairs and Governance, under the Prime Minister's Office.
MNA	GFDRR has made a strong contribution to regional collaboration for DRM. Thanks to GFDRR, the Executive Work plan of the Islamic Strategy for Disaster risk Reduction and Management has been developed by GFDRR as requested by the 4th Islamic Conference of Environment Ministers in response to demand from Islamic countries. GFDRR has further enabled the establishment of the Regional Center for Disaster Risk Reduction (RCDRR) through its Track I service line. Based in Cairo, Egypt, the RCDRR is the first regional center of its kind with the mandate to serve Islamic states in building resilience to natural disasters.
MNA	Today, GFDRR continues to support RCDRR financially and technically through its Track II service line to enable it to gain the capacity and implement its programs with a focus on DRM policy, education, and technical expertise. RCDRR has offered online DRM courses since 2010. RCDRR also has a program to mainstream DRM modules in a variety of university courses. The University of Djibouti, Saana University, and RCDRR have plans in the pipeline to establish DRM courses and Master's degree programs. Overall, the region has made the most progress in developing of awareness-building initiatives, and there has been a significant amount of awareness-generating and capacity-building activities about risks in the region.
MNA	<p>Track III of GFDRR has provided technical, financial, and human resources in record time once disaster hit, as was the case in Yemen (in 2008) and in Djibouti (2011):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In Yemen, in response to torrential floods in the Governorates of Hadramout and Al-Mahara in 2008, the World Bank team undertook a Post Disaster Needs Assessment, funded by GFDRR, in partnership with UNDP, EU, and under the leadership of the Yemen Ministry of International Cooperation and Development, and Ministry of Public Works and Highways. The PDNA was the basis for the development of a Bank financed Yemen Flood Protection and Emergency Reconstruction project (\$41 million). The project was instrumental in supporting rehabilitation and rebuilding of critical damaged infrastructure. The PDNA catalyzed multi-sectoral national debate on DRM resulting in the launch of national, governorate, and capital-level risk probabilistic, and water management studies (\$1.4 million funded by GFDRR). These studies provided the basis for the design of comprehensive DRM planning and mitigation measures in the country.</li> <li>• In Djibouti, following a declaration of national emergency in 2011, the MNA DRM Team, with support from GFDRR, developed the first global drought PDNA, which facilitated the mobilization of \$13.2 million for short-term drought mitigation in the energy, social, and rural development sectors. The PDNA was instrumental in deepening the risk reduction dialogue across line Ministries in Djibouti, resulting in the establishment of a multi-sectoral national commitment to DRM, while enabling stronger partnership with the EU and UNDP in Djibouti, resulting in joint financing for risk reduction and climate change adaptation at the community level. The PDNA has also enabled the conceptualization of a technical South-South Cooperation between Djibouti, Kenya and Mozambique to work on emergency planning, meteorological data collection, and preparedness at the community level. The PDNA has become a common platform to mobilize funds for multi-sectoral risk reduction priorities. On the Bank side, the PDNA enabled the integration of risk reduction into sectoral priorities, while catalyzing stronger intra-regional south-south best practices exchanges. As a result of the PDNA the EU, UNDP, and Bank are now working on a common, multi-sectoral program on DRM.</li> </ul>




From	Comment
MNA	GFDRR has supported highly innovative work in Morocco, focusing on the “integrated” nature of risk management, in which the Bank has been assisting the Government in putting together an integrated risk management strategy encompassing the three prime sectors affecting the economic (budget) and social (communities) sectors: (a) commodity price volatility; (b) risks from natural hazards and; (c) risks in the agricultural sector.
SAR	With strong support from and resources provided by GFDRR, DRM in the South Asia region has evolved from exclusively post-disaster reconstruction engagement into a maturing portfolio of over \$1 billion in analytical and advisory services and lending activities addressing disaster risk in the region.
SAR	GFDRR has been instrumental in facilitating dialogue among internal and external clients on the importance of DRM as a development issue and has helped put the issue clearly on the map. In addition, Track III has provided highly appreciated financial and human resources in record time immediately after major disasters and has done much to gain credibility for the agenda with our clients. Financial support from GFDRR has also allowed the expansion of the core DRM team in SAR from three Bank staff, to include an additional seven country focal points that are key to coordinating and ensuring the quality of the DRM programs on the ground. Today, GFDRR is funding a series of catalytic activities aimed at improving the understanding of disaster risk in SAR, which are expected to leverage Bank lending operations across the region aimed at mitigating risk. The number and volume of DRM activities is expected to expand significantly in the next two fiscal years.

## Annex G. GFDRR's Dollar Breakdown


**GFDRR**
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery  
*Reducing Vulnerability to Natural Hazards*

[Home](#)
[RSS](#)
[Contact Us](#)

[About GFDRR](#)
[Global & Regional Partnership](#)
[Risk Reduction](#)
[Sustainable Recovery](#)
[Climate Change Adaptation](#)
[Knowledge Center](#)
[Donors](#)




GFDRR, in partnership with the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), held a Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) training course ... [Read More](#)

**POPULAR LINKS**


- About GFDRR
- Press Release: 2011 Annual Meeting
- GFDRR in the News
- GFDRR Annual Report 2010
- Partnership Strategy
- GFDRR Brochure
- List of Priority Countries

**GFDRR AT A GLANCE**




**Resources: Pledges Vs. Committed**  
Pledges Received: \$322 million  
Committed by GFDRR: \$142 million  
How is Every Dollar Spent?

[READ MORE](#)



**Country DRM Programs**  
DRM Programs and Adaptation Profiles

[READ MORE](#)




**Project Portfolio**  
Project Activity Details & Progress

[READ MORE](#)


**STAY IN THE LOOP**

Enter your E-mail address

[SUBMIT](#)


or follow us on Twitter 

**DONORS**




**THE NETHERLANDS**

[LEARN MORE](#)




**Disaster Recovery Update**




**Civil Society Partnership Consultation**

**RECENT PUBLICATIONS**



**Populations at Risk of Disaster: A Resettlement Guide**  
Pages: 157  
Size: 3.36 MB  
File Type: PDF

[DOWNLOAD](#)



**Preventive Resettlement of Populations at Risk of Disaster: Experiences from Latin America**  
Pages: 144  
Size: 9.96 MB  
File Type: PDF

[DOWNLOAD](#)

**UPCOMING EVENTS**

**International Forum on Satellite Earth Observation and Geo-Hazard Risks (ESA)**  
Sat, 2012-05-19-Wed, 2012-05-23  
Santorini , Greece

[MORE INFORMATION](#)

**11th Consultative Group Meeting**  
Thu, 2011-11-17-Fri, 2011-11-18  
Jakarta , Indonesia

[MORE INFORMATION](#)


**ASEAN Disaster Risk Financing & Insurance Forum (by invitation only)**  
Tue, 2011-11-08-Thu, 2011-11-10  
Jakarta , Indonesia

**Global DL-DAT**

Global Disaster Damage & Loss Database since 1972

**Useful Links**


- Press Release: European Union contributes to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
- Five Feet High and Rising: Cities and Flooding in the 21st Century
- Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention
- United Nations Disaster





**GFDRR**  
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

## GFDRR's Dollar Breakdown



Source: [www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/](http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/)

## Annex H. Methodological Notes on IEG's Review of DRR in Country Strategies

### World Bank's Disaster Assistance Portfolio Review

#### World Bank Disaster Assistance Portfolio, FY1985–2011 (annual)

Approval Fiscal Year	No. of Projects	Loan Amount (US\$ millions)	
		Current US\$	Constant 2011 US\$
1985	10	321	621
1985	14	560	1,045
1986	18	1,716	3,107
1987	24	1,353	2,396
1988	18	1,060	1,824
1989	21	1,053	1,751
1990	21	1,188	1,903
1991	22	2,214	3,418
1992	25	2,716	4,055
1993	27	2,754	4,027
1994	20	2,652	3,795
1995	18	1,427	2,001
1996	19	2,180	2,987
1997	20	1,805	2,430
1998	27	2,699	3,565
1999	41	2,985	3,892
2000	31	2,638	3,389
2001	45	3,246	4,082
2002	42	3,233	3,976
2003	31	2,075.	2,511
2004	17	405	480
2005	18	2,272	2,618
2006	30	1,638	1,826
2007	36	2,380	2,570
2008	46	2,293	2,405
2009	39	3,283	3,370
2010	44	4,469	4,505
2011	46	2,405	2,405
<b>Total</b>	<b>770</b>	<b>59,020</b>	<b>76,953</b>

### World Bank Disaster Assistance Portfolio, FY1985–2011, Selected Time Periods

Period	Number of Projects	Loan Amount (US\$ millions)	
		Current US\$	Constant 2011 US\$
<b>FY1985–1989</b>	105	5,742	10,743
<b>FY1990–1995</b>	133	12,951	19,199
<b>FY1996–2000</b>	138	12,307	16,264
<b>FY2001–2006</b>	183	12,869.18	15,493
<b>FY2007–2011</b>	211	14,830.17	15,255
<b>Total</b>	<b>770</b>	<b>59,020</b>	<b>76,953</b>

## Mainstreaming of Disaster Risk Reduction in Country Development Strategies

### WORLD BANK COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGIES AND COUNTRY PARTNERSHIP STRATEGIES (CAS/CPS)

There were 240 full Country Assistance Strategy and Country Partnership Strategy (CAS/CPS) documents in the World Bank's internal database for the FY2001–11 period. IEG excluded all Interim Strategy Notes and CAS/CPS progress reports. The keyword search using the Atlas TI software was carried out for references to “*disaster*,” “*climate change adaptation*,” and “*adaptation to climate change*” phrases.

CAS/CPS	References to “disaster”			
<i>Period</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Total</i>
Pre-GFDRR (FY01–06)	60	43%	81	<b>141</b>
GFDRR (FY07–11)	74	75%	25	<b>99</b>
<b>Total</b>				<b>240</b>

p<0.05

The two-tailed T test with equal variance indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the means of the two groups (pre-GFDRR and GFDRR) p<0.05 (p=4.38992 E-07).

CAS/CPS	References to “climate change adaptation”			
<i>Period</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Total</i>
Pre-GFDRR (FY01–06)	2	1.4%	139	141
GFDRR (FY07–11)	25	25%	74	99
<b>Total</b>				<b>240</b>

p<0.05

The two-tailed T-test with unequal variance indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between the means of the two groups, pre-GFDRR and GFDRR ( $p = 6.293 \text{ E-}07$ ).

### POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPERS (PRSP)

The search included only full PRSP documents and excluded interim PRSPs, annual progress reports, PRSP preparation status reports, etc. There were 105 full PRSP documents prepared in the FY2001–11 period available in the Bank's main database. These documents were reviewed for a reference to “*disaster*.”

PRSP	References to “disaster”			
Period	Yes	Percent	No	Total
Pre-GFDRR (FY01–06)	53	90%	6	59
GFDRR (FY07–11)	38	83%	8	46
<b>Total</b>				105

$p > 0.05$

The 2-tailed T-test indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the means of the two groups ( $p = 0.28$ ).

### UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK (UNDAFs)

IEG did not have access to a full database of UN Development Assistance Framework documents (UNDAFs), so the study had to draw on the compendium that was available on the external website of UNDP at [www.undg.org/?P=234](http://www.undg.org/?P=234).

There were 156 UNDAFs in the English language on the website for the period of 2001–11 (calendar year). Due to time constraints IEG did not go through all the UNDAFs and drew a random sample.

The size of the random sample was determined based on the following formulas:

$$\text{Sample Size} = Z^2 * P * (1-P) / C^2$$

$$\text{New Sample Size} = \text{Sample Size} / (1 + ((SS-1) / \text{Pop}))$$

Z = score associated with confidence level; for estimated confidence level of 90%,  $Z = 1.645$

P = percentage of UNDAFs that have reference to “disaster”; estimated about 50%,  $p = 0.5$

C = margin of error  $c = 0.1$

Pop = UNDAF population = 156

$$\text{Sample Size} = 1.645^2 * 0.5 (1-0.05) / 0.1^2 = 67.65$$

$$\text{New Sample Size} = 67.65 / (1 + ((67.65-1) / 156)) = 67.65 / 1.427 = 47.4$$

Thus, a random sample of 47 was drawn from the compendium of 156 UNDAFs.

References to “*disaster*” in the sample of UNDAFs:

<b>UNDAF</b>	<b>References to “disaster”</b>			
<b><i>Period</i></b>	<b><i>Yes</i></b>	<b><i>Percent</i></b>	<b><i>No</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
Pre-GFDRR (2001–11)	19	76%	6	25
GFDRR (2007–11)	20	91%	1	22
<b>Total</b>				47

p>0.05

The 2-tailed T test with unequal variance (unequal variance was used because the standard deviations between the two groups were very different) revealed that the difference between the means of two groups of UNDAFs (pre- and after-GFDRR) is not statistically significant ( $p = 0.055$ ).

#### **NATIONAL ADAPTATION PROGRAMMES OF ACTION (NAPA)**

There were 46 NAPAs found in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCSs) website at [unfccc.int/cooperation\\_support/least\\_developed\\_countries\\_portal/submitted\\_napas/items/4585.php](http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/submitted_napas/items/4585.php).

	<b>References to “disaster”</b>			
<b><i>Period</i></b>	<b><i>Yes*</i></b>	<b><i>Percent</i></b>	<b><i>No</i></b>	<b><i>Total</i></b>
Pre-GFDRR (FY01–11)	10	83%	2	12
GFDRR (FY07–11)	31	91%	3	34
<b>Total</b>				46

p>0.05

The 2-tailed T test with equal variance revealed that the difference between the means of two groups of NAPAs (pre-GFDRR and GFDRR) was not statistically significant ( $p = 0.464138$ )

## Annex I. Persons Consulted for this GPR

Name	Position	Organization
<b>Washington, DC, United States</b>		
Saroj Jha	Manager	GFDRR
Ayaz Parvez	Disaster Risk Management Specialist	GFDRR (Results Framework and M&E.)
Michel Matera	Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist	GFDRR (Coordinator Track II)
Prashant	Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist	GFDRR (Coordinator Track III)
Millen Vollen	Operations Officer	GFDRR (Climate Change Specialist)
Judy Ka-Luk Lai	Resource Management Analyst	SDNRM
Henrike Brecht	Disaster Risk Management Specialist	EASIN
Deepali Tewari	Senior Municipal Development Specialist	MNSUR (DRM Coordinator for MNA)
Alison Cave	Senior Urban Development Specialist	ECSS6 (DRM Coordinator for ECA)
Francis Ghesquiere	Program Manager	SASDU (former DRM Regional Coordinator for Latin America and the Caribbean)
Francis Muraya	Disaster Risk Management Specialist	AFTWR (former Coordinator of GFDRR Track I)
Olivier Mahul	Program Coordinator	FCMNB
Margaret Arnold	Senior Social Development Specialist	SDV
Dzung Minh Nguyen	Senior Auditor	IADVP
Hugues Agossou	Senior Auditor	IADVP
<b>Brasilia, Brazil</b>		
Makhtar Diop,	Country Director	World Bank Country Office
Joaquin Toro,	Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist	World Bank Country Office
Sóstenes Arruda de Macedo,	Director (current GFDRR-CG member).	General Coordination of International Actions Against Hunger (CGFOME), Ministry of External Relations, Brazil
Elter Nehemias Santos Barbosa	former Director (former GFDRR-CG member)	
<b>Canberra, Australia</b>		
Alan March, Chair of GFDRR Consultative Group	Assistant Director General, Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Branch	Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID)



Name	Position	Organization
<b>Geneva, Switzerland</b>		
Neil Buhne	Director, Geneva Liaison Office	United Nations Development Program – Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (UNDP-BCPR)
Maxx Dilley	Disaster Partnership Advisor	UNDP-BCPR
Margareta Wahlstrom	Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Disaster Risk Reduction	UNISDR
Helena Molin Valdes	Acting Director	
Marc Gordon	Head, Donor, and Business Partnerships	
Neil McFarlane	Coordinator, Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction	
Tom Hockley	Chief, Regional Support Unit	
Rahul Sengupta	Program Officer, Regional Offices Support and Coordination Unit	
Christel Rose.	Regional Coordination Unit	
Mohammed Mukhier	Head of Disaster Policy and Preparedness Department	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
<b>Berlin, Germany</b>		
Ms Kerstin Haehrmann	Head of Division of Emergency and Transition Aid	German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ)
Thomas Pesch	Minister Counselor, Joint Operations Staff	
Wolfgang Litz	Program Manager, Disaster Risk Management in Development Cooperation	International Development Agency (GIZ)
<b>Stockholm, Sweden</b>		
Per Byman	Team Director, Humanitarian Team	Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
Patrick Kratt	Deputy Head, Humanitarian Unit	
<b>Oslo, Norway</b>		
Arman Aadal	Senior Advisor, Section for Humanitarian Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Tom Eriksen	Senior Advisor	Multilateral Bank and Finance Section
Oddvar Kjekstad	Advisor to Managing Director	Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI)
<b>Copenhagen, Denmark</b>		
Martin Enghoff	Co-Director and Senior Consultant	Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Name	Position	Organization
<b>Brussels, Belgium</b>		
Claes Andersson	International Relations Officer, Stability Instrument Operations	European Commission
Antonio Pedro Santos de Oliveira	Program Manager	Infrastructure Development Collaboration Partnership Fund (DEVCO)
<b>London, United Kingdom</b>		
Tim Waites	Humanitarian and DRM Advisor, Humanitarian and Disaster Risk Team	Department for International Development (DFID)
Rosemarie Lindo	Deputy Program Manager, Humanitarian Response Team, Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department	DFID
David Peppiat	International Director	British Red Cross
Marcus Oxley	Chairman/Head of Secretariat	Global Network for Disaster Reduction
<b>Montréal, Canada</b>		
Marie Hélène Adrien	President and Team Leader of GFDRR Evaluation	Universalia

*Notes:*

AFTWR, EASIN, ECSS6, MNSUR, and SASDU are the units in the Bank's regional vice presidencies that are responsible for disaster risk reduction

SDNRM = Sustainable Development Network, Resource Management

SDV = Social Development Department in SDN

IADVP = Internal Audit Department

FCMNB = Non-Banking Institutions Unit in the Finance and Capital Markets Department of the Finance and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency

## Annex J. GFDRR Response to IEG's Global Program Review

### Overall Comments

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) Secretariat appreciates the diligence and professionalism of the task team in this Global Program Review (GPR) of GFDRR.

The GPR offers in-depth analysis and history of GFDRR and provides an independent perspective on its relevance, effectiveness, governance, and the Bank's role therein. This review comes after the very supportive evaluations of the program by two of its main Donors, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID). GFDRR intends to factor the GPR findings in the development of its future business strategy and in the preparation of the scope of the next external evaluation due in FY2013. The GPR is also helpful in the context of the new Global Partnership Strategy 2013–2016 of GFDRR currently under discussion for endorsement by its Consultative Group.

GFDRR appreciates IEG's observations on GFDRR's relevance, especially in paragraph 15 of the Summary that states, *inter alia*, "GFDRR's comparative advantage is in providing technical and financial assistance that is integrated with the World Bank's country operations... it also benefits from the presence of country-level Bank staff to adequately supervise this technical and financial support."

GFDRR also appreciates the GPR's description of the essential role the Bank plays in administering and participating in GRPPs as well as the challenges that this role represents: "As the implementing agency of GFDRR's work at the country level, the Bank has brought four decades of experience in disaster-related assistance. The Bank's Regional Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Coordinators have liaised closely with GFDRR and appear to have been effective in channeling country-level demands for DRR assistance to GFDRR." GFDRR also benefits from the Bank's convening role, which has resulted in a mutual synergy for the disaster-prone clients, the donors, and other stakeholders for the overall effective delivery of the DRM agenda.

### Specific Comments

**Governance and accountability:** GFDRR acknowledges the importance of continuing to refine governance arrangements, especially with regard to identifying efficiencies and clarifying responsibilities. It will continue to refine its governance structure under the guidance of its CG, especially to enhance its efficiency, while ensuring that changes add value and maintain the appropriate balance between accountability and authority.

**Resource management reporting:** The GPR notes some discrepancies between the WB and GFDRR's classification of administrative and operational costs. This comes largely from Governance, Results Management and Communication activities that fall somewhere

between the two classifications depending on the exact nature of the expenditure. GFDRR has taken note of the recommendation for more consistent financial reporting and communication, particularly in its outreach materials (i.e. Annual report, Website). It has already made adjustments to its FY2012 Annual Report based on these recommendations. In addition, GFDRR will work with the Bank to identify a better way to ensure the required level of granularity in this regard.

**Monitoring & evaluation:** GFDRR appreciates the GPR's evaluation of GFDRR's M&E system and takes note of the useful recommendations provided in Box 5. GFDRR is already working with the Bank to fully align its Results Framework and RBMS with Bank systems.

**Private sector involvement:** GFDRR has increasingly engaged with the Private Sector to strengthen global and regional cooperation as set out in the Partnership Charter. While deepening the engagement with the Private Sector is under active consideration, we would like to clarify that the Charter calls on GFDRR to seek complementarities and collaborations with the private sector, but not necessarily the involvement of the Private Sector in its governance and financing.

## **The Global Program Review Series**

The following reviews are available from IEG.

Volume #1, Issue #1: ProVenton Consortium

Issue #2: Medicines for Malaria Venture

Issue #3: Development Gateway Foundation

Issue #4: Cities Alliance

Volume #2, Issue #1: Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund

Issue #2: Association for the Development of Education in Africa

Issue #3: Population and Reproductive Health Capacity Building Program

Issue #4: International Land Coalition

Volume #3, Issue #1: Consultative Group to Assist the Poor

Issue #2: Global Development Network

Issue #3: Global Forum for Health Research

Issue #4: Global Invasive Species Program

Volume #4, Issue #1: Stop Tuberculosis Partnership

Issue #2: International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science, and Technology for Development

Issue #3: The Global Water Partnership

Volume #5, Issue #1: Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Issue #2: The Mesoamerican Biological Corridor

Issue #3: Marrakech Action Plan for Statistics, Partnership in Statistics for Development in the 21st Century, and Trust Fund for Statistical Capacity Building

Volume #6, Issue #1 The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and the World Bank's Engagement with the Global Fund

Issue #2 The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

Issue #3 The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility

The **Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)** was established in September 2006 as a global partnership of the World Bank, United Nations agencies and bilateral donors, located in World Bank headquarters in Washington DC. Its missions are (a) to mainstream disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation in country development strategies, and (b) to foster and strengthen global and regional cooperation in these areas under the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction system. The World Bank plays many roles in GFDRR as founder, chair of the governing body, financial contributor, trustee of the donor trust funds supporting the program, host of the GFDRR Secretariat, and implementing agency of regional and country-level activities.

GFDRR has grown rapidly since 2006 in response to evident demand from developing countries. Annual expenditures have grown from \$6 million in 2007 to \$41 million in 2012, making this one of the two largest technical assistance programs located in the World Bank. About three-quarters of its efforts have been spent helping countries build their own capacity in relation to disaster preparedness, prevention, and recovery, and about one-quarter enhancing global knowledge, tools, and methodologies in relation to disaster risk reduction. Associated with this growth have been a quantitative and a qualitative improvement in the way in which the Bank's country assistance strategies have addressed disaster risk issues, and a clear shift toward disaster risk reduction in Bank-supported investment projects since 2006.

Being active in a field with many players, GFDRR's comparative advantage is in providing technical and financial assistance that is integrated with the World Bank's country operations, and in drawing upon the Bank's long experience in disaster-related assistance. However, the program needs more rigorous systems for reporting its work plans, selecting activities, monitoring their implementation, and assessing their results at completion. The World Bank, as host of many global partnership programs, needs to develop a formal policy for hosting their management units in order to facilitate better financial and operational reporting, among other things.

