97642 June 2015 Research Report Crime, Violence, and Community-Based Prevention in Honduras Justice, Security and Development Series Louis-Alexandre Berg Marlon Carranza The Justice, Security and Development Series This research report is part of a series on Justice, Security and Development, produced with the generous support of the Bank- Netherlands Partnership Program (BNPP). The series presents the findings and critical reflections of a three-year work program aimed at improving development approaches to justice and security stresses in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Drawing from reviews of current scholarship, in-depth field research, and engagement with development programs, the papers in the series seek to identify the key challenges and obstacles to effective development, and propose ways to re-frame the challenges and solutions as a basis for more effective development programs. The framing paper for this series, Justice and Institutional Change in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings: Re-Framing the Challenges and Solutions, presents the rationale, organizing logic and conclusions of this work. © 2015 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street NW Washington DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet: www.worldbank.org Disclaimer This work is a product of the staff of The World Bank with external contributions. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this work do not necessarily reflect the views of The World Bank, its Board of Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. 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Contact Details Justice and Rule of Law Governance Global Practice The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 USA worldbank.org/justice | justdevelopment@worldbank.org Cover Photo: Angels Maso/The World Bank 2 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Research Report June 2015 Crime, Violence, and Community-Based Prevention in Honduras Justice, Security and Development Series Louis-Alexandre Berg Marlon Carranza Table of Contents Acknowledgments...................................................................................................................IV About the Authors...................................................................................................................IV Executive Summary.................................................................................................................. V 1. Introduction.......................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS........................................................................................................................................ 2 1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY......................................................................................................................................... 4 2. The Evolution of Violent Crime in Honduran Neighborhoods......................................... 6 2.1 NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TRENDS................................................................................................................ 7 2.2 EVOLVING ACTORS: YOUTH GANGS, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND VIGILANTE GROUPS.......................................... 10 2.3 THE SHIFTING GEOGRAPHIES OF VIOLENCE AND FEAR......................................................................................... 12 2.4 EVOLVING FORMS OF VIOLENCE............................................................................................................................... 13 3. Preventing Violence within Communities: Coercion and Collective Action............. 18 3.1 COMMUNITY CONTEXT: DISORDER, CONTROL, AND COHESION......................................................................... 20 3.2 COERCIVE CONTROL BY INFORMAL ARMED ACTORS............................................................................................. 21 3.3 COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE ACTION........................................................................................................................... 23 3.4 COLLECTIVE MEASURES OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION.............................................................................................. 23 4. Conditions for Community-Based Prevention................................................................. 29 4.1 FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS.......................................................... 30 4.2 THE VARYING ROLES OF COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS .......................................................................................... 32 4.3 RISK FACTORS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION ................................................................................................ 37 5. Navigating the Institutional and Political Context........................................................... 43 5.1 MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE FROM COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES............................................................................. 43 5.2 NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION: THE POLICE, THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, AND BEYOND ....................................................................................................................... 45 5.3 EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND SCHOOL-BASED PREVENTION AND THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY NETWORKS ......................................................................................................... 47 5.3.1 Responding to Domestic Violence...................................................................................................................... 47 5.3.2 School-Based Drug Prevention........................................................................................................................... 48 6. Conclusion and Entry Points............................................................................................. 50 Annex: Neighborhood Selection Methodology and Data.........................................................54 References............................................................................................................................... 62 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS III Acknowledgments This report was undertaken in support of the World Bank funded Safer Municipalities Project, which aims to sup- port Honduras by improving the capacity of national, municipal and community actors for violence prevention. The researchers who took part in the field work, Ana Mejia, Jaime Irias and Misael Castro conducted the interviews and focus groups and contributed observations, ideas and knowledge that shaped the report. The authors wish to thank the following people for their support: the personnel managing the Safer Municipalities Project at the Institituto de Desarollo Comunitario Agua y Saneamiento, Fondo Hondureno de Inversion Social (IDECOAS-FHIS), especially Zunilda Martell and Oscar Mandujano; World Bank staff Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet, Margarita Puerto Gomez, Marcelo Jorge Fabre, Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, Giuseppe Zampaglione, Martin Ochoa, Deborah Isser, Bernard Harborne, Doug Porter, Joan Serra-Hoffman and Lorena Cohan. Nancy Guerra of the University of Delaware also provided valuable input early on. The authors wish to extend their gratitude to those within the municipalities who facilitated the research, including Mayors Leopoldo Crivelli of Choloma, Alexander Lopez of El Progreso, and Carlos Aguilar of La Ceiba, as well as Roberto Zelaya, Gustavo Urbina, Rosario de Arias, and Jovany Izaguirre. The authors express special thanks to the community members who took the time to participate in the focus group discussions and interviews. This report was peer reviewed by Jose Miguel Cruz, Andres Villaveces, Rodrigo Serrano-Berthet and Bernard Harborne. About the Authors Louis-Alexandre Berg is a Research Fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and a Justice and Conflict Specialist in the World Bank’s Justice, Rights and Public Safety Practice. He has conducted extensive field research on local dynamics of crime and violence and on the politics of security and justice system reform in conflict-affected countries. He previously served as a Rule of Law Adviser at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), an adviser to the U.S. Institute of Peace’s Security Sector Governance Program and a consultant to the United Nations Development Program. He holds a Ph.D. in Government from Georgetown University, an M.P.A. from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, and a B.A. from Brown University. Marlon Carranza is completing a PhD in cultural anthropology at the University of Florida. He was previously the Coordinator of the University Institute of Public Opinion (IUDOP) at the Central American University Jose Simeon Canas (UCA) in El Salvador. He has conducted research on youth violence and gangs in Central America and is the co-author of Maras y Pandillas en Centroamerica, 2002-2006, as well as several book chapters and reports. He has contributed to the design of public policy to prevent youth violence as the coordinator of several technical committees on gangs, and as a consultant for the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, USAID, and several United Nations agencies. IV CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Executive Summary Violent crime has emerged as a growing development challenge, affecting large segments of societies and taking a severe toll on economic development. In many high crime environments, weak institutions, fiscal constraints, and political resistance have undermined the effectiveness of development programs and threatened their sustainability. The World Bank has begun to confront this challenge. Building upon successful experiences, it has expanded its support to crime prevention through an approach that balances criminal justice and law enforcement with efforts to address the factors associated with violence and its prevention. The country of Honduras is the most violent in the world as measured by its homicide rate, which reached 90.4 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012 (UNODC 2013). Yet levels of violence vary across time and space. In 2012, 65 percent of homicides occurred in 5 percent of urban municipalities, and within those areas, they were further concentrated in a small number of “hotspot” neighborhoods. Understanding why some neighborhoods in Honduras are more affected than others can point the way toward effective prevention approaches. This report presents the findings of a study of crime dynamics and prevention practices focused around a comparison of nine neighborhoods in three of the most violent cities in Honduras: La Ceiba, El Progreso, and Choloma. The research revealed that although the transnational drug trade, economic downturn, and political crisis have deepened the country’s vulnerability, some neighborhoods have successfully prevented crime. Drawing from extensive qualitative research in these neighborhoods, the study identified practices that communities pursue to prevent violence through collective responses. It also examined the characteristics of communities, societal factors, and institutional context that have enabled or constrained these responses. The research points to measures that can be built upon, scaled up and tested through future research and programming to strengthen community-based crime prevention. It illustrates how deep examination of the dynamics of insecurity—and the ways communities manage it—can inform efforts to improve public safety in violence-prone countries. THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAN NEIGHBORHOODS A combination of transnational and national forces in Honduras has contributed to sharply rising crime rates since 2006. The shift in the transnational drug trade into the country has fueled a change in the nature and structure of criminal groups, while economic instability and political conflict have increased the vulnerability of Honduran society to these changes. As a result, homicide rates have climbed sharply in recent years. In northern Honduras, these trends have contributed to a change in the nature of crime as it is experienced by urban residents. Neighborhood-based youth gangs have declined as new groups have emerged to contest control over drug transit routes. Crimes, which include widespread homicide, drug trafficking, extortion, assault, robbery, and domestic violence, are today more often conducted anonymously than when neighborhood gangs were the primary perpetrators. This shifting landscape has generated widespread fear and uncertainty regarding where and when violence will take place and who will perpetrate it. Yet many residents nonetheless perceive their own neighborhoods to be safe, even in areas with high homicide rates. This variation points to the highly localized nature of crime and suggests that some communities have prevented crime from taking hold in their neighborhoods. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY V PREVENTING VIOLENCE WITHIN COMMUNITIES: COERCION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION The study identified two distinct forms of violence prevention in vulnerable neighborhoods. In some communities with relatively low homicide rates, armed groups have pushed out their competitors and achieved a level of control that inhibits violence. The identity of these groups varies, from known criminal gangs to secretive vigilante groups and organized crime networks. Although residents of these neighborhoods sometimes report a greater sense of safety due to fewer homicides, they also point to ways in which violence and insecurity persist as other crimes, such as extortion, assault, and robbery, remain widespread. In other communities with low levels of violence, residents have taken actions to prevent incidents of crime and minimize the conditions that might allow violence to thrive. Residents organize collective measures to address a range of problems, including violence prevention. These forms of violence prevention, summarized in figure 1, are remarkably low cost and relatively simple to organize. Figure 1. Community Crime Prevention Actions Monitoring Suspicious People Reduce Risk Factors Banning the Sale of Alcohol LOWER Managing Public Spaces Limit Opportunities for Crime CRIME RATES Resolving Community Disputes Supporting Victims of Deepen Collective Action Domestic Violence THE CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION The ability of communities to organize collective prevention measures depends on the extent of fragmentation or integration within the neighborhood. While community associations are present in most urban neighborhoods in Honduras, they tend to be highly fragmented. Individuals frequently know only members of their own group and rarely collaborate across groups for community-wide action. In some neighborhoods, however, dense interpersonal ties between these associations, along with a shared identity and norms, facilitate community- wide collaboration. These attributes provide the foundation for the organization, interpersonal knowledge, and communication that facilitate collective responses to violence. Although neighborhood associations thus form the building blocks of effective violence prevention, their role and impact vary. Yet strengthening and integrating community groups can enable effective violence prevention. Community-level capacity for violence prevention also reflects a broader range of societal factors and the institutional context. Urban migration, unemployment, and the lack of access to education weaken community organization and shared identity. The prevalence of drugs, guns, and organized crime creates a climate of fear and inhibits collective action. Unreliable access to basic services from the municipal and national governments—due to a combination of polarized politics, weak institutional capacity, and limited resources—constrains community VI CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS efforts because of the challenges involved in securing basic resources or protection from the state. As people lack trust in state authority and community leaders to address widespread insecurity, they become less willing to participate in community organization and more willing to rely on alternative sources of authority, including protection by criminal armed actors. Figure 2.  Conditions for Community-Based Prevention Community Organization Patronato Churches Fragmented Primary School Cohesive Community Sports Teams Community Informal Leaders Sparse Women’s Groups Dense Internal Internal Ties Community Risk Factors Ties Rapid Migration Weak Strong Unemployment Community Community Access to Education Identity Identity Drug Consumption Proximity to Drug Routes Access to Firearms History of Vigilantism Some communities have nonetheless succeeded in securing resources through a combination of effective organization, persistence, and the ability to pursue multiple channels to municipal and national government. The research pointed to changes in municipal governance, such as improved data, planning, and financing systems, that have created more favorable environments for community prevention in some places. Yet the research also found that proactive support by community networks remains essential even in the presence of more effective state institutions. Based on these findings, the following areas can serve as entry points for further investment and research in support for violence prevention in Honduras and elsewhere. Invest in community organizations by incorporating efforts to deepen inter-group ties, community identity, and shared norms into interventions, while encouraging communities to organize collective measures to prevent violence. Target specific risk factors—especially drug and alcohol consumption, the prevalence of firearms, and the limited access to secondary education—that constrain community organization and deepen the effects of other risk dynamics and that can be addressed through focused community-, municipal-, and national- level intervention. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VII Strengthen municipal-level planning and response, focusing on systems to collect and analyze data on crime, population, and service-delivery needs; municipal financing systems; inclusive planning processes to prioritize responses; and the monitoring of outcomes. Explore opportunities for police and justice sector reform. The research found widespread support for reform despite the deep challenges. Efforts to understand the constraints, facilitate policy dialogue, and measure results could help drive reform efforts. Municipal governments could explore neighborhood-level responses, learning from pilot community policing, local mediation, and alternative dispute-resolution initiatives. Build the evidence base. Data collection and analysis facilitates crime prevention by identifying the nature of crime, its causes and actors, and the impact of different approaches. Data collection processes should be strengthened and used more systematically by municipal and national governments to plan responses and monitor impact. VIII CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS “All processes of violence have diverse causes and are dynamic, they are not static, they are constantly evolving, therefore the ways to overcome them must also continually evolve.” —Municipal Official, Choloma, Honduras 1. Introduction 1.1 OVERVIEW causes of crime and the capacity to prevent it vary Honduras is considered one of the most dangerous considerably. The overall crime rate in Honduras countries in the world. Its homicide rate reached has increased dramatically over time, doubling 90.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012, the between 2006 and 2011. Yet violence is highly highest in the world (UNODC 2013). The impacts concentrated geographically, with 65 percent of of this violence have grown increasingly broad, homicides occurring in only 5 percent of urban affecting a large swath of the population and taking municipalities in 2013 (UNAH-IUDPAS 2014). The a severe toll on economic development. The annual Departments of Cortes, Atlántida, and Yoro on the cost of violence in the country has been estimated northern coast reported homicide rates for 2013 of to be as high as 10 percent of GDP, or nearly 133.3, 115.1, and 105.3 per 100,000 inhabitants, US$900 million (World Bank 2010, 31). Despite respectively, while other regions have a homicide consensus on the need to reduce crime, however, rate as low as 20 (UNAH-IUDPAS 2014). Within the disagreement remains on the most effective means most affected cities, violence is concentrated in of achieving this goal (Pine 2008; Cruz 2010). While specific “hotspots,” with stark differences between the emphasis on repression and law enforcement neighborhoods that appear similar demographically, has increasingly been complemented by preventive socially, and economically. approaches, evidence is scarce regarding the nature of crime at the local level or the impact of different The research conducted for this study examined this approaches to combatting it. Within this context, variation to shed light on the approaches that have in 2012, the Government of Honduras launched successfully prevented crime in violence-prone cities. the Safer Municipalities Program (Municipios más The study found that neighborhood characteristics Seguros), with financial and technical support from affect the presence and intensity of violent crime, the World Bank and other donors. The program aims and that communities with certain capabilities have to strengthen policy coordination while boosting successfully prevented crime even in the most violent the capacity of national institutions and municipal surroundings. In these neighborhoods, community governments to plan and manage crime prevention organizations cut across neighborhood subgroups to programs. A central component of this program foster shared identity and facilitate communication, is to build the evidence base needed to plan and enabling residents to organize collective responses evaluate prevention programming. to violence. Densely tied community organizations thus mediate the effects of broader social, economic, This report sheds light on the changing nature of and demographic pressures. At the same time, the crime in Honduran cities and the means that have presence and impact of densely tied community been effective in preventing it, focusing on the role organizations depends on how these trends have of communities and municipalities. Differences in played out in particular neighborhoods, as well as violence over time and space suggest that both the on the features of the urban political economy. Since INTRODUCTION 1 communities depend on municipal and national (e.g., educational attainment, unemployment), institutions, the political economy that shapes the family relationship (e.g., family size), community distribution of resources and determines patterns (e.g., poor urban infrastructure, weak community of authority and control affects opportunities for organization, social norms), and society (e.g., community-level prevention. Prevailing modes economic inequality, unemployment, migration and of governance in Honduras tend to constrain urbanization, the prevalence of drugs and firearms) neighborhood-level prevention efforts, but the puts people at risk for violence or protects them from success of some communities points to ways in experiencing or perpetrating it (Dahlberg and Krug which municipal and state governments can facilitate 2002; Bronfenbrenner 1979). Rather than any one prevention efforts through targeted improvements in factor causing or preventing crime, it is understood governance, management, and planning. that the accumulation of risk and protective factors increases or decreases the likelihood of involvement The report is laid out as follows. After a brief in it, and that factors at various levels interact in description of the analytical framework and re- complex ways (Moser and McIlwaine 2006). These search methodology employed for the study, the findings have been applied to the design of crime second chapter describes the trends behind rising prevention policy through efforts to identify the most homicide rates that have contributed to shifts in salient risk factors at different levels of analysis— the actors involved and the nature of crimes, and individual, family, community, and society—and how communities have experienced these changes. design interventions to address them (IDB 2012; The third chapter presents findings that explain Krug et al. 2002; Moser and Shrader 1999; Welsh the variation in violence between neighborhoods. and Farrington 2010). It describes two distinct means through which communities achieve lower levels of violence, In the Latin American context, most research on one facilitated by collective action on the part of violent crime has focused on individual or societal- community members and the other achieved by level factors (Briceño-León 2005; World Bank 2010). informal armed groups that control territory and Yet emerging research has increasingly demonstrated eliminate rivals. The fourth chapter identifies the the importance of the features of the urban social community-level factors that enable or constrain context at the community level (Moura and Neto collective responses to crime, highlighting the 2015; Imbusch, Misse, and Carrion 2011; Villarreal fragmentation or integration that exists between and Silva 2006). Chapter 2 explores the macro-level community organizations. The fifth chapter explores factors that have fueled an evolution in the nature of the political and institutional environment that crime in Honduras and then turns to a focused exam- shapes a community’s ability to avert violence. ination of community-level influences. It describes The report concludes by identifying ways in which how these structural changes interact with factors efforts to strengthen national- and municipal-level at the neighborhood and individual levels and how policy making can be directed toward more effective they have been experienced by urban residents. prevention approaches. To explain variation in crime rates across neigh- borhoods, this study particularly draws from 1.2 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS research on neighborhood and community-level In analyzing the dynamics that drive violence in factors that affect the risk of involvement in crime. Honduras and shape local capacities for prevention, Criminology research in North America and Europe this study draws from three broad strands of research. has demonstrated that crime tends to concentrate First, it draws on research on the factors associated in geographic “hot spots,” and that efforts to target with risk among individuals, communities, or societies crime have been effective (Groff, Weisburd, and Yang that are afflicted by high levels of crime.1 This “social- 2010; Braga and Weisburd 2010). One explanation ecological model” considers how the complex for these findings, known as routine activity theory, interplay between factors involving the individual examines how patterns of individual behavior 1 For an overview of this literature that cuts across criminology, sociology, economics, and public health as applied to the Latin American context, see Imbusch, Misse, and Carrion (2011); Briceño-León, Villaveces, and Concha-Eastman (2008); Winton (2004); and World Bank (2010). 2 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS lead to the salience of certain locations—malls, that operate within communities play an especially movie theatres, and other public spaces—in which important role in mediating structural factors. Yet perpetrators and victims tend to cluster (Sherman, the specific forms of collective action and informal Gartin, and Buerger 1989; Cohen and Felson 1979). social control—and how they differ from those This approach has tended to focus on “micro- found in North America and Europe—have not been level” spaces and does not account for why entire explored in depth. Collective efficacy manifests in neighborhoods or communities tend to be more a range of actions that are shaped by the cultural, violent than others.2 A second approach focuses on historical, and social context. Both the specific features of the physical environment that affect the measures and the conditions that enable them may cost and benefit of perpetrating crime by facilitating differ significantly in the Honduran context from surveillance or deterring criminal acts (Clarke 1997, those that have been found in more developed 2008). This theory has been applied, including countries and even in other parts of Latin America. in Latin America, through an approach known as Through qualitative research within communities, Crime Prevention through Environmental Design this study explores these variations and how they (CPTED), which looks for changes in the physical play out in the Honduran context, as a basis for environment, such as street lighting, that might formulating hypotheses to be tested through further reduce opportunities for crime (Eck 2006). Although research and programming. Chapter 3 explores the such approaches have been quite effective, research particular forms of informal social control exercised suggests that changes in the physical environment at the neighborhood level, while Chapter 4 explores may actually be proxies for underlying characteristics the community characteristics that enable them. of the community (Welsh and Farrington 2010). The study also draws from a third body of work that Another approach to explaining local-level variation, situates the capacity of communities to prevent or known as social disorganization theory, focuses on mitigate violence within the urban political economy. the characteristics of the community that shape Violent crime, state responses, and the ability of opportunities for crime and facilitate prevention communities to respond reflect the changing nature (Bursik 1988; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Sampson of relations between political decision makers, and Groves 1989; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). economic elites, and local leaders (Agostini et al. Dense internal ties, interpersonal trust, and shared 2007). Research in North America has found that expectations enable community members to activate communities that can mobilize resources outside shared norms through informal social control referred the community—from government, businesses, to as “collective efficacy” (Sampson, Raudenbush, and private networks—tend to be more effective and Earls 1997; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; in community-based crime prevention (Bursik and Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001). Grasmick 1993; Sampson 2012). In countries where Communities with dense internal ties have also the authority of the state is weaker, the urban demonstrated greater resilience to violence and the political economy affects crime in other ways. Some ability to prevent crime from taking root even after cities in these contexts have struggled to keep up facing episodes of violence (Norris et al. 2008). These with changing trade flows, urban migration, and the community characteristics are in turn influenced growth of illicit economies, resulting in significant by structural factors, such as poverty, residential variation in the provision of public goods like security instability, and racial and ethnic heterogeneity, that across time and space (Rodgers 2009). Varying vary across neighborhoods. responses to violent crime by national, state, and municipal governments reflect the nature of political The community characteristics explored in the alliances, economic interests, and community latter strand of research are especially relevant to organizations (Moncada 2013; Gutierrez Sanin et al. understanding neighborhood-level variations in 2009; Arias 2013). In shaping policy responses, these violent crime in Honduras. Given the weakness of features of the political economy affect the degree to state institutions, local social and political networks which personnel and resources for law enforcement 2 Studies of “hot spots” emphasize that since crime tends to cluster in micro-areas within neighborhoods, targeting at that level is more efficient than focusing on neighborhoods (see Groff, Weisburd, and Yang (2010)). However, such approaches may be less feasible in Honduras for reasons discussed below. INTRODUCTION 3 and crime prevention are present or accessible levels of violence.4 Neighborhoods in Honduras are for a given community. Varying state response has geographically defined areas that are recognized also resulted in urban areas in which formal state by municipal governments as the basic unit for authority is barely present and in which criminal the delivery of services and infrastructure. In each armed actors have gained authority through various neighborhood, the research team examined forms of coercion, accommodation, and legitima- residents’ perceptions of violence and crime, the tion with communities, businesses, and political nature of community organization, the presence entities (Lemanski 2006; Rodgers 2006; Penglase of government institutions, and the experience of 2009). Studies of the Brazilian favelas (slums), for residents in preventing or responding to incidents instance, reveal that organized criminal groups have of violence. The research thus examined how established and enforced certain types of predictable community-level characteristics shaped the way order, in part by establishing themselves as brokers residents responded to violent crime in their areas. between communities and political elites (Penglase 2009; Arias 2004). The ways in which the political and institutional context shapes opportunities for Selection of Neighborhoods crime and community-based prevention in Honduran The study compared three neighborhoods in each neighborhoods are explored in Chapter 5. municipality with higher and lower levels of violence. Neighborhoods were selected following a two- In sum, the study explores how community-level step process. First, neighborhoods across each factors affect the incidence of crime and the capacity municipality were ranked according to demographic to prevent it in the urban neighborhoods of the and socioeconomic data, including population size,5 Northern Coast of Honduras. Through qualitative energy consumption (as a proxy for income level),6 research, it examines how various risk factors and the presence of primary and secondary schools,7 interact; how specific forms of informal social to define a set of comparable neighborhoods in control protect against the risk of crime; how certain terms of basic risk factors for violent crime.8 For community characteristics enable prevention at the each municipality, neighborhoods at the bottom neighborhood level; and how the features of the two quartiles of energy consumption, of medium institutional landscape and political economy shape population size (between 200 and 1,500 households), community-level efforts to prevent violent crime. and with a primary school were pre-selected through this process. Next, three of these neighborhoods were chosen from each municipality based on their 1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY level of violence as measured by their homicide The research was conducted in three municipalities rates:9 one with above average levels of violence, of Honduras, La Ceiba, El Progreso, and Choloma, another with low levels of violence, and a third with in April–August 2013. These cities have among a significant reduction in homicides during the past the highest homicide rates, at 140.7, 132.3, and four years. Additional criteria included the feasibility 68.7 homicides per 100,000 people, respectively, of conducting research as well as a basic level of in 2013,3 and were also chosen for the World community organization to ensure comparability.10 Bank’s Safer Municipalities Program. The core of To protect the participants in the study, the names of the analysis involved a structured comparison of the selected neighborhoods have been withheld from nine neighborhoods, including three from each this report. (See Annex 1 for data and selection results.) municipality, with similar characteristics but different 3 UNAH/IUPDAS (2014). 4 Neighborhoods in Honduras are administratively defined geographic territories with a leadership structure and territorial boundaries. 5 Data provided by municipal governments, based on the number of households. 6 As a proxy for income level, energy consumption data was collected from the Empresa Nacional de Energia Electrica (ENEE). 7 Based on official registries from the Ministry of Education. 8 Few other reliable data were available disaggregated by neighborhood. 9 Homicide was the only statistic reliably reported and disaggregated at the neighborhood level. Data were verified by the National Violence Observatory of the University of Honduras. 10 For each neighborhood, a brief questionnaire on community organization was administered to municipal government officials to ensure a basic level of community organization. 4 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Data Collection research team conducted participant observation, The methodology used in the data collection and through extensive time in the neighborhoods over a analysis was primarily qualitative, including 27 focus six month period to observe types of violence and group discussions (three in each neighborhood) and dynamics of informal social control. 55 semi-structured interviews, for a total of roughly 250 respondents. In each neighborhood, one focus In addition to interviews, focus groups and obser- group was conducted with adult women, another vation, the research drew from a variety of sup- with adult men, and another with youth aged 16–25, plementary data sources. Municipal- and national- both male and female. Interviews were conducted level data provided the basis for the selection of with neighborhood leaders and with victims of crime. neighborhoods and served to confirm observed Participants were selected through a three-stage patterns of crime and service delivery. The team also “snowball” technique, starting with community consulted reports and secondary sources that are leaders, who referred other leaders of community cited throughout the report. organizations (including sports teams, churches, women’s groups, youth groups, etc.), who in turn each referred additional individuals. Contributions and Limitations The research enabled an in-depth exploration of The research applied four types of methods to how communities experienced and responded to explore multiple facets of community life. First, the violent crime in their neighborhoods. The structured focus group discussions employed a “social mapping comparison of neighborhoods with higher and process,” followed by semi-structured discussion. lower levels of violence enabled the research team Through participatory techniques, participants to identify distinct ways that communities manage “mapped” the community organizations, leaders, violence and to demonstrate how specific conditions and actors present in a given neighborhood, their and practices within communities contribute to roles in fueling or preventing violence, and the lower and higher violence levels. The small number links between them and with government officials. of neighborhoods and non-random selection does They also discussed the particular forms of violence not allow for causal attribution. Given the insecurity and risk factors that affected them. Second, “case- in these communities, the research team selected process tracking” interviews were conducted with areas where they could operate without significant individuals who had been victims of a violent crime security risk to themselves or community residents. or conflict, including gender-based violence, theft, The three municipalities selected for the study are assault, or an interpersonal dispute with neighbors, not necessarily representative of cities in Honduras to explore how individuals reacted after the incident or elsewhere, thus raising questions of external and how community organizations, leaders, and validity. Nonetheless, the high levels of violence state institutions responded. Third, interviews were make them particularly relevant, and identifying ways conducted with neighborhood leaders to provide in which communities within such contexts succeed context and detail on the historical evolution, in preventing crime is especially valuable. The institutional presence, and social and political combination of comparison and extensive qualitative dynamics in the community, and with municipal research provided rich nuance regarding how crime officials and public figures outside the commu- has evolved and how communities have responded. nities on the dynamics within the municipality and It also pointed to specific practices and approaches the relationship between communities, municipal that can be built upon, scaled up, and tested through governments, and national authorities. Finally, the further research. INTRODUCTION 5 2. The Evolution of Violent Crime in Honduran Neighborhoods The nature of violence in Honduras has evolved that weakened the capacity of the state to respond. considerably over the past decade. The most obvious The resulting changes in criminal activity have altered shift—the sharp rise in homicide rates from 32 per the intensity and the nature of insecurity experienced 100,000 inhabitants in 2004 to 90.4 per 100,000 in by urban residents. 2012 (UNODC 2013)—masks other changes in the nature of criminal actors and the types of crimes Although crime has evolved in the last decade, this that are most commonly experienced. This section evolution has been neither linear nor consistent. A lays out these changes and the broader trends that clear finding from the qualitative research is that have fueled them, drawing from country-level data the nature of crime and insecurity vary across time as well as perceptions of residents of the selected and space—even within a given neighborhood— neighborhoods. The growth of crime can be resulting in uncertainty that exacerbates perceptions understood in the context of several risk factors that of insecurity. Understanding this landscape and its have worsened during this period, including poverty, internal variations sheds light on the experience of unemployment, urban migration, and shifts in the residents, as well as the possibilities for violence transnational drug trade, along with a political crisis prevention. Figure 3.  Homicide Rates in Central America and Mexico, 2000–2012 100.0 Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 90.0 80.0 70.0 El Salvador 60.0 Guatemala 50.0 40.0 Honduras 30.0 Nicaragua 20.0 Mexico 10.0 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Source: UNODC (2013). 6 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS 2.1 NATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL TRENDS percent in 2007 to 66.2 percent in 2012, while youth A combination of transnational and national-level unemployment increased from 4.9 to 8.2 percent in forces has contributed to rising homicide rates in the same period (World Bank 2014). Honduras has Honduras since 2006. The shift of the transnational also maintained one of the highest levels of income drug trade into Honduras has fueled a change inequality in Latin America. in the nature and structure of criminal groups, as neighborhood gangs have declined relative to larger Urbanization and migration further increased the organized crime groups. Economic crisis, institutional vulnerability of Honduran cities to violent crime. weakness, and political conflict have deepened the During the 1980s and 1990s the creation of dozens vulnerability of Honduran society. These trends have of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) accelerated urban produced changes in both the intensity and the migration, especially around the industrial city of San nature of crime experienced in urban neighborhoods. Pedro Sula in the north (Kerssen 2013). Some cities struggled to maintain the infrastructure necessary Long vulnerable to the influence of external forces, to cater to the growing population, leading to Honduras was particularly affected by the global uneven access to services. In the city of Choloma, economic crisis in the late 2000s. The second-largest the EPZs fueled a 78 percent population increase country in Central America, its economy has been between 1988 and 2010, with 44.3 percent of the driven largely by international investment since the current population originating from other parts of 19th century. Today, with a population of nearly 8 the country.11 El Progreso shifted from a center for million people and a GDP of US$18.4 billion, Honduras agricultural workers in the nearby banana plantations is considered a lower-middle-income country. Its to an industrial center and trade route from the coast economy has shifted from reliance on agricultural to San Pedro Sula. These cities have formed pockets exports toward services and manufacturing exports, of high unemployment—especially among youth which now account for roughly 55 and 30 percent and other new entrants to the job market—since of GDP, respectively, while agriculture accounts for opportunities do not equal the demand from new only 14 percent (World Bank 2014). Yet it remains migrants. Limited labor market opportunities have vulnerable to global trends and suffered acutely also driven a steady stream of emigration, which has following the 2008 crisis. The percentage of the contributed to the vulnerability of individual youth population living in poverty increased from 58.3 who lack parental supervision. Figure 4.  Youth Unemployment and Homicide Rates, 2000–2012 12 100.0 Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 90.0 10 80.0 (% of total labor force ages 15-24) 70.0 8 Youth Unemployment 60.0 Youth Unemployment 6 50.0 (WDI) 40.0 Homicides Rates 4 30.0 (UNODC) 2 20.0 10.0 0 0.0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Source: World Development Indicators; UNODC (2013). 11 Based on projections by the Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas of the Government of Honduras. THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAN NEIGHBORHOODS 7 Youth gangs first appeared in the 1980s in poor members. Homicide rates initially declined from 56 urban communities. The transition from military to per 100,000 in 2002 to 34 in 2003 and 32 in 2004; civilian rule along with rapid urbanization fueled the since 2005, however, they have climbed steadily. rise of small, disconnected groups that conducted Following these repressive measures, gangs appear such minor criminal activities as vandalism, robberies, to have altered their organization, becoming less and assaults (Castro and Carranza 2001, 238). In the visible in public spaces and spreading from the mid-1990s, the mass deportation of Hondurans capital of Tegucigalpa to other parts of the country. from the United States fueled the emergence of the Contact with other criminal groups while in prison transnational maras (gangs), led by gang members also led to new links to organized crime (Farah 2012). from Los Angeles who exported their style and organization to countries around the region. By the The combination of rapid urbanization, economic late 1990s, most gangs in Honduras were affiliated crisis, and the proliferation of youth gangs deepened with either the Mara Salvatrucha (MS) or the 18th the country’s vulnerability to a geographic shift in the Street Gang (Barrio 18) (Mateo 2011). Yet the maras transnational drug trade. Increased pressures by law remained largely decentralized, with local cells enforcement in the Caribbean and Mexico, along rooted in individual neighborhoods and motivated with competition between trafficking networks, by a combination of peer pressure, identity, small- pushed smuggling routes out of those regions and scale crime, and control over turf (Cruz 2007). into Central America, as shown in figure 4 (UNODC 2012). Honduras now serves as the primary transit The gang phenomenon evolved in the 2000s country for cocaine shipments from South America in response to policy changes by the Honduran to the United States (ONDCP 2012). The U.S. State government. During the presidency of Ricardo Department has estimated that as much as 87 Maduro in 2002–06, through a series of measures percent of all cocaine smuggling flights departing known as mano dura (strong hand) the government South America first land in Honduras (U.S. State adopted an approach of zero tolerance for gang Department 2013). As shown in figure 5, the areas of activity, including through repression by the police the country with the highest homicide rates lie near and the military. For example, the reform of article transit routes that run along the Honduran coast and 332 of the penal code (the so called anti-gang law) into Guatemala. Of the cities included in this study, established the crime of “illicit association,” which La Ceiba lies in an especially strategic position along allowed for the mass incarceration of alleged gang the coast, where planes and speedboats land ashore. Figure 5.  Number of Primary Cocaine Movements Destined for or Interdicted in Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico, 2000–2011. 800 700 Number of movements detected 600 500 Central America 400 Mexico 300 Caribbean 200 100 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Source: UNODC (2012). 8 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Figure 6.  Cocaine Trafficking Routes and Homicide Rates in Honduras Source: UNODC (2013); UNAH-IUDPAS (2014). Choloma and El Progreso sit along the route between In the face of these challenges, policy responses San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa, which represent have continued to evolve. Following years of prefer- important internal markets. In 2013, the three cities ence for mano dura policies in the 2000s, the gov- had the highest homicide rates after Tegucigalpa ernment gradually began to move toward greater and San Pedro Sula (UNAH-IUDPAS 2014). attention to prevention, particularly at the municipal level. In 2012, the Honduran government adopted The society’s vulnerability to these changes deep- the Safer Municipalities Program, which called for ened as a result of political conflict. In June 2009, an integrated approach to fighting violence, and President Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup appointed a Secretary of State for Security in charge d’état following political tension over his efforts of prevention efforts. It also announced several mea- to lift presidential term limits. The coup paralyzed sures aimed at reforming the police and criminal state institutions for months and led to a fiscal crisis justice system, including a vetting process for the as external donors suspended aid disbursements police. At the local level, some municipalities have (Bosworth 2010). The events also fueled deep sought to strengthen their response by providing polarization between supporters of the left-leaning resources to the police and through planning pro- Liberal and right-leaning National parties, which cesses supported by external donors.12 Implemen- has manifested itself in local political divisions. The tation of these efforts has been mixed, however, events created an opportunity for organized crime and policy makers—especially those at the national networks to expand their influence while weakening level—continue to express a preference for repres- already fragile state security forces and municipal sive approaches. Moreover, few of these efforts have government institutions. so far been grounded in a clear understanding of the changing dynamics of crime at the local level. 12 Several municipalities, including La Ceiba and Choloma, completed a “Local Coexistence and Citizen Security Plan” (Plan Local de Convivencia y Serguridad Ciudadana) in 2012, with support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAN NEIGHBORHOODS 9 2.2 EVOLVING ACTORS: YOUTH GANGS, Here in the downtown area, some people charge ORGANIZED CRIME, AND VIGILANTE GROUPS “war taxes.” But those groups do not include any From the perspective of residents of urban neighbor- members of maras (gangs). They charge war taxes in hoods, a visible change has occurred in the nature the name of a mara, and sometimes the actual mem- of criminal groups, notably the declining influence bers of the mara find out that they are using their of youth gangs (maras) and the increased presence name, but they may have nothing to do with them. of groups involved in transnational organized crime. (Community leader, La Ceiba) Two distinct narratives emerged from the field research regarding the causes of this evolution: Some people attribute this change to the cooptation the gangs were either eliminated or transformed of the traditional maras by drug cartels that operate into something different. As studies of high crime in the area. Cartels have established control over areas in other developing countries have found, in larger segments of territory to manage smuggling the context of weak state institutions and in areas and local sales, and gang members have either at the “margins of the state,” “law and other state joined the cartels or act at their behest in distributing practices are colonized by other forms of regulation drugs within communities. Several police and that emanate from the pressing need of population” municipal officials confirmed this shift, claiming that (Das and Poole 2004; Hansen and Stepputat 2001). some neighborhoods formerly controlled by gangs The combination of increased vulnerability, weak are now run by drug cartels that control several state institutions, and shifts in transnational crime neighborhoods at once. As one resident explained: has led to changes at the neighborhood level in the nature of the criminal actors, leaving local authority Here, we can see that there is a strong presence and regulation increasingly under contest. of a cartel. I don’t know what it’s called, but they operate through the gangs that grew up within Many of the residents who participated in the this neighborhood. All of the gangs are part of this study described a shift in the structure and activity group. The cartels have succeeded in converting the of criminal groups. While the maras were involved gangs into their drug distribution arm. (Community primarily in local forms of violent crime and motivated leader, Choloma) by a mix of collective identity and peer pressure, residents have more recently observed an increasing People also claim, although less frequently, that gang level of organization and involvement in more members have been eliminated from their neighbor- lucrative economic activity.13 Although certain forms hoods. The disappearance of gangs is attributed of extortion—known locally as impuesto de guerra to three inter-related phenomena. In some cases, (war tax)—have long been carried out by gangs, cartels and organized crime groups seeking to extortion now involves larger scales and greater control the sale and transit of drugs forced gangs sophistication. Other organized criminal activities, either to join them or to flee their neighborhoods, such as drug trafficking and sicariato (contract while killing those who did not cooperate. As the killing), have also become more common and new groups face competition from rivals, they may visible. Unlike in the past, however, these activities themselves be eliminated or coopted, leading to are conducted mostly anonymously rather than frequent shifts in the dominant criminal groups in by recognized neighborhood groups; as a result, many neighborhoods. community members are no longer certain whether those involved are gang members. One interviewee A new style of organized crime has emerged, they claimed that although people commonly refer to control and maintain a certain order, but then a those involved in crime as “mareros” (members of new group becomes powerful and establishes maras), they should stop doing so since they are control over a certain block for drug trafficking, no longer “en las esquinas” (on the street corners) and eventually they achieve power over all of it. the way maras used to be. A resident of La Ceiba (Community leader, Choloma) claimed that most of those involved are actually not gang members but other groups entirely: 13 On the structure and motives of gangs in the past, see Cruz (2010, 379, 398); and Aguilar and Carranza (2008). 10 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS In other neighborhoods, people attribute the decline of the community-level mesas. Their function was to of gang presence to government repression that serve as an observer or to report crimes, but it was a resulted in the incarceration, killing, or disappearance very risky job. (Community leader, El Progreso) of gang members. The “Zero Tolerance” policy and criminal code reforms pursued under the Many members of the mesas were targeted and government of President Maduro put tremendous killed, as a resident of Choloma recalled: pressure on the gangs, leading to the arrest and detention of 1,148 youth in 2003 alone. Local human I was involved [in the Mesas de Seguridad rights activists reported numerous killings through Ciudadana], but I didn’t really want to commit myself drive-by shootings, as well as massive killings of completely. My friend got involved in it, he thought gang members in prisons. The nongovernmental it would bring him a certain status, from being close organization (NGO) Casa Alianza reported a total to the police, the organization, the committee, the of 3,091 such killings between 1998 and 2006 (Casa oath, to the point that he lived at the police station. Alianza Honduras 2006; Bruneau, Dammert, and And when a police chief arrived he put on a hood and Skinner 2011), and several cases reached the Inter- went out with them, but since he was small everyone American Court of Human Rights.14 Reported killings could identify him. Months later, my friend was found continued beyond the end of the explicit mano dura dead... Since their educational level was lacking, they policies. mostly served as informants and many patronatos in those days were killed. (Community leader, Choloma) Other residents trace the disappearance of gangs to the rise of vigilante groups. During the Maduro Although the mesas were eventually abandoned, government, so-called Comites de Seguridad (Secu- vigilante groups remain active in some places, with rity Committees) formed autonomously in many varying effects. Official support to these groups neighborhoods, as residents sought to monitor gang ended, but some residents claim that they still activity and respond—often violently—on their own. operate in their neighborhoods, with varying Although not an official policy, local officials often levels of support. Some of the mesas evolved into provided tacit support to these initiatives. Under “community patrols,” in which community members the government of President Zelaya (2006–09), act as informal “police.” Some of these patrols have the government sought to rein in these groups even received weapons and training from the police, and formalize community participation in local leading to direct confrontation with gangs and security through an initiative known as the Mesas numerous deaths. Residents of some neighborhoods de Seguridad Ciudadana (Citizen Security Tables). nonetheless view these groups positively, as in one Actively promoted by the national police and neighborhood in Choloma where residents attribute some local governments, the initiative recruited an improvement in safety to the presence of a group community leaders to participate in the fight against that remains active in “eliminating” criminals. In other crime. Although the idea of the mesas was to focus areas, as in one neighborhood in La Ceiba, vigilante on prevention, in practice their primary role was to groups are viewed as another violent criminal provide information to the police to facilitate investi- group. Nonetheless, in many neighborhoods, at gation and enforcement, as one resident explained: least tacit support for these groups was widespread, as residents struggle to stay safe in the face of It was common to create Comites de Vigilancia (vigi- widespread violence and an ever shifting landscape lance committees). They established a committee. It of local armed groups. was an armed group that patrolled the community during the day and the night. The group was armed, What we saw is that people were dying, I don’t know and if they saw something out of the ordinary they whether the people who were dying were the bad would capture them on their own… But then, three ones… Some say they have eliminated those who go or four years ago they created the famous Mesas around assaulting, but I don’t know if that’s the case. de Seguridad, and the presidents of the patronatos (Woman, Choloma) [community leadership boards] formed a major part 14 For example, in the case “Pacheco Teruel and others versus the State of Honduras,” the court declared responsibility to the state in the death of 107 inmates at the San Pedro Sula Prison on May 17, 2004, during a fire. THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAN NEIGHBORHOODS 11 When I arrived here in 1999, that street over there, limits, and people knew who they were and how which is the main street, was full of gang members, to live with them. The way to stay safe was to but then they were controlled, I won’t say how know which gang controlled specific territories. they controlled them but now there are very few. Now, different types of criminal actors and forms (Community leader, Choloma) of violence have emerged but without a clear face. Since people no longer know what to expect in terms The research thus pointed to a proliferation of of violence, they face greater difficulty in managing armed groups and a change in their nature, from the it (Rodgers 2006). In this climate of uncertainty, the predominance of youth gangs to a shifting landscape only way to stay safe when leaving one’s immediate of gangs, organized crime, and vigilante groups. The neighborhood is through individual measures, as identity of these groups and the linkages between one resident described: them remain murky and continue to evolve. As explored further below, these groups sometimes Among the measures I take with my children is not overlap, for example, as vigilante groups become to walk around with a fancy cellphone, not to walk in involved in criminal activity or organized crime the street too late, avoid the temptation of walking groups eliminate rival criminals. This rapid evolution around with anything ostentatious so that people and fragmentation itself contributes to insecurity, think you don’t have anything. (Man, Choloma) as residents are increasingly unsure of the identity of armed groups. As the criminal landscape has Generalized uncertainty may also stem from the changed, it has changed the way crime is experienced changing geographic concentration of violence even by the residents of urban neighborhoods. within neighborhoods. Consistent with research in other countries, violence appears to cluster not only in certain neighborhoods but in specific “hotspots” 2.3 THE SHIFTING GEOGRAPHIES OF within these neighborhoods (Groff, Weisburd, and VIOLENCE AND FEAR Yang 2010). In one neighborhood in El Progreso, Changes in the nature of criminal actors have con- for instance, residents recognize that crime occurs tributed to a pervasive sense of uncertainty and fear, primarily around the main street that connects the although some residents still feel safe in their own neighborhood with the downtown area or close neighborhoods or blocks. As maras have become to the public high school on its border, but these less prevalent, the visible forms of extortion and the “hotspots” change over time. There is also some turf battles that accounted for many homicides have confusion regarding where neighborhoods start also declined. The evolving forms of criminal activity and end; although barrios (wards or sections) and no longer require gang members to be permanently colonias (neighborhoods) are formally recognized, and visibly present in neighborhoods they control; their boundaries sometimes shift in the absence of rather, crime has become more anonymous, and reliable land registries and as a consequence of rapid the actors involved frequently change. Although population growth. people can still identify territories controlled by the maras where they maintain their traditional rules and The effects of this shifting crime landscape extend practices, the size of these areas has decreased. beyond the effects of violence itself, with implictions Instead, people more commonly attribute violent for neighborhood reputations. Even where they crime to unknown individuals who come to their report that violence has declined, residents still feel neighborhoods from “outside” or from “the commu- its repercussions. Inhabitants of neighborhoods that nities around us.” As one resident put it: are perceived as violent often lie about their place of residence to avoid discrimination when seeking Although robberies are against people here, people employment or other opportunities. Taxis and buses come from elsewhere, from other neighborhoods, refuse to enter these neighborhoods or charge they sometimes walk around armed and one can’t higher fares, and commercial distributors avoid oppose them. (Youth, El Progreso) delivering food to neighborhood convenience stores and other businesses. Even as the geography of vio- The difficulty in discerning exactly where violence lence evolves, its effects remain after changes occur. is coming from contributes to a profound sense of uncertainty and fear. When the maras were present, At the same time, even amid pervasive insecurity and they operated in accordance with visible territorial its consequences, many residents reported feeling 12 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS secure in their own neighborhoods or blocks, despite turf battles between gangs that led to the deaths of the violence all around them. As one resident put it: both gang members and innocent people caught in the cross fire. In most neighborhoods, this type Look, I feel quite safe and secure in my sector over of homicide has all but disappeared. As a Choloma there, really good, but these areas here are much resident said: more dangerous, there is a lot of insecurity. (Woman, Choloma) There are no longer massacres committed during the clash of two groups [MS and 18th Street], when This perception stems in part from the geographic one is attempting to remove the other one from a concentration of violence even within neighborhoods, specific territory. (Community leader, Choloma) but it also appears to be linked to other factors. Many respondents even in violent neighborhoods— According to residents, homicides appear to be more especially youth—claimed that in Honduras, the key commonly planned in advance and involve contract to feeling secure is to know and to be known by others killers (sicariato). Rather than taking place within the in the community. As Donna Goldstein found in her neighborhood for all to see, they usually occur else- research on Brazilian slums, residents of particular where, as victims are taken from their houses to be communities “feel secure within the boundaries killed in uninhabited areas and their bodies later of certain kinds of relationships” (Goldstein 2003). dumped in other neighborhoods. The motives of In some places, the feeling of safety extends these planned murders vary considerably, including beyond the immediate subcommunity to the entire everything from organized crime and drugs to neighborhood. How some communities achieve this interpersonal disputes or social or political conflicts. is the subject of the next chapter. Community residents perceive that the profile of perpetrators has also evolved into more professional and trained killers. Another common perception 2.4 EVOLVING FORMS OF VIOLENCE is that targeted killings often involve elements of Along with the evolution of criminal groups, the types military or police units, as one resident related: of violent crime experienced in urban communities have also evolved. As the drug trade has generated They captured a man in Choloma, he was a police new opportunities for economic gain, violent crime officer and a member of the Cobras [special police appears to be driven less by turf battles linked to unit]. They arrested him, and suspected that he gang identity. Homicides have evolved from visible participated in at least 50 assassinations as a hired gang violence to hired killings with unknown motives killer. But how did they not capture him until he and perpetrators. The local sale and consumption had committed 50 assassinations? Why didn’t they of drugs have increased substantially, while a wide detain him after three or five? They detained him, range of economic crimes, from extortion to assault but the question was whom he has been working for. and robbery, has become more common. This (Community leader, El Progreso) section outlines the changes in the nature of violence experienced in urban communities over the past five Official data, although limited, appear to confirm years. The findings are based on the perception and this trend. According to an analysis by the University experience of residents who participated in the study of Honduras National Violence Observatory, of the and are corroborated through other data sources homicides in 2013 that were assigned a motive in when possible. media reports, 64 percent were related to sicariato or organized crime, while 13 percent were associated with assault and robbery, 8 percent with interpersonal Homicides disputes, and 6 percent with gangs.15 The Honduran Homicides remain the most dramatic and visible form National Police assigned motives to only 30 percent of violent crime in Honduras, but they have evolved of homicides in 2013, but of those, 44 percent were in form and motivation over the past five years. In related to sicariato or settling scores, 22 percent the past, homicides most commonly resulted from to interpersonal disputes, and 3 percent to an 15 The analysis found that 1,698 homicide cases were assigned motives out of 3,446 reported in the media and out of a total of 6,757 homicides committed in 2013. See UNAH-IUDPAS (2014). THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAN NEIGHBORHOODS 13 association with gangs.16 Human rights organizations in the kindergarten when there are classes, and have reported on a large number of killings that this frightens people. It’s a bad influence on the target people on account of their social or political community. (Woman, La Ceiba) activities. For example, the country’s National Human Rights Commission reported in 2013 that lawyers Residents further noted that young people are most have been targeted,17 and human rights reports from directly affected. High schools are increasingly used Honduras’ Aguán Valley reported systematic killings for drug distribution, due to the potential for access and forced disappearances of local leaders.18 A 2012 to a large market, reduced costs, and higher profit. UNESCO report condemned the systematic killing Respondents claimed that children as young as 10 of journalists in Honduras.19 Most of these murders years old were known to be using drugs in their appear to be highly organized and conducted by communities, and that consumption affects both hired killers. Although the motives vary, the level of boys and girls, contrary to what it is often believed. A organization and the use of hired killers appear to school teacher explained how girls in the sixth grade have increased. have been targeted by drug dealers: I have a situation now with a girl in the sixth grade… Drug Consumption and Trafficking I thought this girl was naive, but they are being A widespread perception emerged from the inter- seduced with drugs… Finally, the girl came to me to views and focus groups that the sale and consum- ask for help because she did it once and wants to ption of drugs have increased significantly in the get out, but now they’re threatening her. (Teacher, cities of Honduras’ northern coast. This perception El Progreso) is consistent with recent survey research: according to a 2011 United Nations Development Programme The local consumption and sale of drugs are asso- (UNDP) survey, 66 percent of Hondurans identified ciated with an increase in larger-scale drug transit drug consumption as the primary security problem through the cities and neighborhoods. People under- at the neighborhood level, with alcohol and stand that their geographic position along drug inhalants reported to be the most commonly abused transit routes fuels drug consumption, especially in substances, followed by marijuana and cocaine. In La Ceiba, where criminal groups compete for control many of the neighborhoods included in this study, of neighborhoods along the coast with strategic residents noted that cocaine has become more value for the drug trade. In all three cities, municipal prevalent and that the consumption of marijuana authorities claim that some communities are has become more widespread than alcohol. They completely coopted by organized groups involved also observed that the sale and consumption of in the drug business. As discussed further below, drugs have become increasingly visible. In addition increased trafficking is also associated with a variety to the locations traditionally known as distribution of other forms of criminal violence. points (such as billiard halls, for example), they see that other types of businesses openly sell drugs, including barber shops, convenience stores, and Extortion and “War Taxes” other establishments. Drug users no longer hide The collection of “war taxes” and other forms of their consumption and use it in crowded areas. One extortion are pervasive across communities. There resident summarized this perception: are multiple forms of this crime, ranging from the periodic extortion of local businesses to threats They take drugs in public places, they smoke in the made by cell phone. The targets also vary; some- health center when there are medical consultations, times it seems that anyone can be a victim of ex- 16 Ibid. Given the low number of homicides assigned motives, this data should be treated with caution. 17 Comisionado Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, “Estado General de los Derechos Humanos en Honduras” 2013, available at: http://app.conadeh.hn/Anual2013/intro.html. See also report by the Colombian NGO InsightCrime, available at: http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/report-highlights-lawyers-honduras. 18 See Council on Hemispheric Affairs, “Honduran Killing Fields: Repression Continues against Campesinos in Bajo Aguán Valley,” June 6, 2013, available at http://www.coha.org/honduran-killing-fields-repression-continues-against-campesinos-in-bajo-aguan-valley/. 19 See UNESCO, “The Safety of Journalists and The Danger of Impunity: Report by the Director-General” (Paris: UNESCO, 2012), available at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/FED/Safety%20Report%20by%20DG%202012.pdf. 14 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS tortion, while in other cases, people believe that only reports of extortion.20 Although residents reported small and medium-sized businesses are targeted. a temporary drop in certain forms of extortion as a The following accounts were echoed in accounts result of this task force, other forms, especially those across neighborhoods. carried out by small-scale groups, remain pervasive. Now they are calling us to ask for war taxes. Just yesterday they called to more of my neighbors Assault and Robbery randomly. We are now prepared when we hear Robberies are a daily reality in Honduras. Residents a strange voice to hang up. They have called my report that they hear of robberies almost every neighbor and me five times… Three weeks ago I was day and in nearly every neighborhood, involving with my mother and they told me they were asking varying levels of organizations and amounts of loss. her daughter for 300 lempiras of war tax [US$15] and These incidents range from pickpocketing to bank if they don’t pay, heads are going to roll. And I asked robberies, from residential to street robberies, did she pay? Yes, they drove a Prada, they were well- from assaults with knives to attacks with powerful dressed. She had to run away. (Woman, El Progreso) weapons, and from incidents that cause no physical harm to those resulting in mass killings. Urban Most of the time they commit their crimes, they do residents feel that robbery can happen everywhere, it up there, there were some that were captured that and that no neighborhood, home, or business is were assaulting the milk trucks, the soda trucks… completely safe. According to official data, the (Man, El Progreso) prevalence of robberies in Honduras has increased dramatically over the past decade, from 33.2 per The accounts above reveal two distinct modalities 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 to 276.3 per 100,000 of extortion, although they constantly evolve as in 2011 (UNDP 2013, 57).21 The following example actors change and authorities respond. The first is illustrates the impact on communities. an organized approach, using anonymous calls, intimidation, and the collection of a specific amount A couple of months ago, here in the school they of money. In these cases, the amount collected came to assault the teachers. One thief came. They ranges from L 300 to L 600 (US$15–$30), and the were in a meeting with the teachers and they came perpetrators appear to be structured and well to assault them. This was a Saturday that they had resourced—or at least well dressed. The second a meeting, and the same week on Monday they modality involves people who operate in the made an anonymous phone call in which they said streets and primarily target trucks with commercial that they had to give them money, and if they didn’t products, although these efforts are also sometimes give them money they would come to kill everyone organized by local gangs. Business owners in certain in the school. The teachers and the students from neighborhoods also report being targeted by local this neighborhood were so concerned that they gangs to collect “protection money.” In almost all closed the school and there were no classes since neighborhoods, wealthy and poor alike, residents the parents were frightened. (Man, El Progreso) report experience with some form of extortion. The forms and consequences of robberies vary Official data on extortion are unreliable, as most widely. According to residents interviewed for this victims do not report it to the police. Still, the threat study, certain tactics appear to be common, includ- was deemed pervasive enough that the Honduran ing the use of a gun to intimidate the victim, and the government created a special National Anti- use of a bicycle to intercept the victims and escape Extortion Task Force in 2013, comprising vetted after the assault. Victims report losing cash as well personnel from the Public Ministry, the National as cell phones or laptops. The effects of robberies Police, the Armed Forces, and the National Office are felt both by the victims and by witnesses, who of Investigations and Intelligence. From January are often threatened to ensure they do not provide to December 2013, the task force received 1,960 information to the police. A high proportion of 20 See Jessica Figueroa, “Se reduce número de denuncias por extorsión” La Prensa, April 2, 2014, available at http://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/632188-96/se-reduce-n%C3%BAmero-de-denuncias-por-extorsi%C3%B3n. 21 The data are drawn from official crime statistics, which are likely to be underreported. THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAN NEIGHBORHOODS 15 robberies involve violence; according to a 2012 persists that it is a private problem, and few women survey, 67 percent of all robberies reported involved were willing to discuss it openly. Nonetheless, inter- violence (UNDP 2013, 62). In some cases they spin views with victims of domestic violence, along with out of control, especially those that involve drugs or women’s focus group discussions, revealed several alcohol. The following account of one of the many insights regarding its nature and consequences.22 incidents reported during the study illustrates the types of consequences involved. The experiences of victims interviewed for the study varied widely. All of the victims interviewed were I was trying to help my father. They were assaulting women who ranged in age from 24 to 55 years old him and I went toward them and told them not to hit with a diversity of income levels and educational him because he was a senior, and one of them came attainment. The victims were all literate and several and took out a 9 millimeter and shot me in the chest. had completed secondary school. They reported In this moment I felt like a hot coal went through my a range of experiences, from isolated incidents to body, but I didn’t worry about it and I went to pick living with sustained violence for nearly 10 years. up my father who had been beaten. They hit me in Most victims described a process of increasing the head with the 9 millimeter and then I fell on the aggressiveness and decreasing respect on the part ground. I didn’t know I was injured, but when I fell, I of their spouses, starting from positive experiences couldn’t get up. It was at this moment that I touched in the first stages of dating and marriage to the blood and realized that I had been shot. But the deteriorating behavior as their partners became guys left because my father had a gun and he shot increasingly violent. The victims were mostly unclear at them… The next day a friend told me to leave the about the reasons for this change, but some saw hospital because those guys wanted to eliminate an increase in aggression after their first child, and me, without my owing anything, but they didn’t want many associated the violence with drug or alcohol to leave a trace. (Man, La Ceiba) consumption or with multiple cases of infidelity. As one victim related: Robberies are so widespread that it is difficult to dis- cern any clear trends, other than that they happen All marriages start off well. As time passed and I everywhere. They also appear impossible to deter, became pregnant, there were frequent telephone since even when people decide to report them, the messages and calls from women, and he was always authorities rarely take any action in response. The out in the street. My son was born and that really prevalence of robbery fosters a perception that it is changed the situation. He spent three days drinking a normal part of daily life; when people are asked in the street, I couldn’t ask him where he was coming whether their community is insecure, they tend to from or where he was going; if I asked him it was a think of crimes other than thefts. In a place where problem. He told me not to ask and would curse at homicides, targeted killing, and drug trafficking me. (Woman, El Progreso) occur daily and organized crime is widespread, rob- beries seem like a minimal problem. The cases involved a wide range of forms of vio- lence, including death threats, physical violence, psychological violence, verbal abuse, kidnapping, Domestic violence and stalking, some of which brought the victims close Cases of domestic violence were reported in all to death. One victim described how her husband, a the neighborhoods visited for the study. Almost all police officer, used his gun to threaten her and her involved physical abuse. Women’s organizations children. Another woman was almost thrown out of report a rising number of cases of femicide, amount- a moving car as she argued with her husband about ing to 2,851 cases between 2005 and 2013 at a rate his infidelities. Another victim described how the that increased steadily every year. Yet community psychological violence was so intense when her hus- members rarely spoke about domestic violence as a band was in the house that she and her children could form of violence unless specifically asked. The notion not speak or even look him in the eyes since that could lead to an episode of aggression or violence. 22 A total of eight in-depth interviews with victims of domestic violence and nine focus groups with women were conducted. The majority of victims interviewed had subsequently separated from their husbands. 16 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Most victims emphasized the economic conse- fueling migration to the United States.23 Focus group quences of domestic violence. They described how participants linked such cases to a range of negative drug consumption and infidelity drained household consequences for children, who lacked parental finances, leading to extreme poverty, debt, and supervision and suffered emotionally. Other victims malnourishment, in addition to the stress directly succeeded in obtaining child support payments after related to the violence. Many women cited economic reporting the crime. Yet even for those who reported pressures stemming from these developments the offense, this benefit did not come automatically. as the ultimate reason for their decision to leave As discussed further below, the outcome of their their husbands. The situation was so dire for some cases depended on the combined support of commu- women that they felt forced to leave the country, nity networks and effective institutions responses. 23 See Jaime Septién, “Aumentan las Deportaciones de Estados Unidos a Honduras, Muchas de Ellas son Mujeres,” Aleteia, May 13, 2014, available at http://www.aleteia.org/es/politica/articulo/aumentan-las-deportaciones-de-estados-unidos-a-honduras-muchas-de-ellas-son- mujeres-5216847951560704. THE EVOLUTION OF VIOLENT CRIME IN HONDURAN NEIGHBORHOODS 17 3. Preventing Violence within Communities: Coercion and Collective Action Visitors to Honduras quickly realize that violence is This study goes beyond identifying the risk factors not distributed uniformly across the country, within associated with violence in Honduras by examining municipalities, or even within neighborhoods. This community capacity to prevent violence and mitigate section explores this variation at the neighborhood its effects. These capacities constitute “resilience level, to address the question of why some neigh- factors” that mitigate societal and individual-level borhoods are more violent than others. It focuses on risks (Dahlberg and Krug 2002). While the risk factors processes within neighborhoods through which local described above have exacerbated communities’ actors confront violent crime in the absence of state vulnerability to violent crime (World Bank 2010), par- presence, by means of “informal” forms of social ticularly along Honduras’ northern coast, they do not control. The research revealed two dramatically dif- account for variations at the neighborhood level. As ferent forms of crime prevention, one imposed by shown in figure 7, comparing neighborhoods in the lective responses by communities. three cities included in this study by average income level reveals that the poorest communities are not Figure 7.  Homicides and Monthly Energy Consumption by Neighborhood, Annual Average 2009–12 1400 Homicides per 100,000, Annual Avg 2009-2012 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 Average Monthly Energy Consumption (kwh) Choloma La Ceiba El Progreso Source: UNAH-IUDPAS; Government of Honduras. 18 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS necessarily the most violent and that considerable by the militarization of the state has strengthened variation occurs in the lower-middle-income neigh- this narrative and deepened the legitimacy of local borhoods that are at the highest risk.24 Nor do other coercion as a legitimate form of justice and security. factors associated with violence, such as population size or access to education or other basic services, account for variations in homicide rates at the neigh- Two Forms of Violence Prevention borhood level.25 Even among neighborhoods with an accumulation of risk factors, the level of violence Two neighborhoods with low homicide rates in varies significantly. El Progreso illustrate the distinct forms of violence prevention. One neighborhood was The qualitative research conducted in the nine established by agricultural workers with jobs in communities with varying levels of violent crime the nearby banana plantations. Community revealed a disparity in the ways communities leaders, who have been present since its respond to the widespread risk of violence. For those communities with lower levels of violence, two broad founding, have fostered community-wide patterns emerged. Consistent with research on organization. Residents share a neighborhood “collective efficacy” summarized above (see Section identity, describing each other as “warm, 1.1), in some neighborhoods, community members humble people, who are ready to collaborate.” exercised “informal social control” through their own They have adopted their own crime prevention collective measures. The basic principles of informal measures, from rehabilitating public spaces to control were remarkably similar to other experiences banning the sale of alcohol, and boast that in North and South America (Sampson 2012; gangs have never been present in their Moura and Neto 2015). Yet the particular forms of collective action and social control practiced by neighborhood. The other was constructed in these communities are quite distinct to the social the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch and settled and institutional context. by migrants. Plagued by poverty, limited ties between residents, and an absence of shared In other communities, low levels of violence reflected identity, the neighborhood came under the the control of a single criminal armed group that control of a notorious criminal group. succeeded in eliminating rivals. Such groups Monitoring by this group prevents certain reduced crime to varying extents, from keeping the forms of violence—no outsider can enter neighborhood totally safe to eliminating rival drug traffickers while allowing other forms of violent crime without permission, for example—but it to thrive. This form of informal control is broadly conducts extortion and crime within and consistent with findings from studies of crime-affected outside the neighborhood. urban areas in South America, where in the absence of an effective presence of the state, alternative forms of order emerge (Das and Poole 2004; Penglase Focusing on community-level responses and the 2009; Arias 2004). In contrast, this research suggests context that shapes them is particularly relevant for that in Honduras, a wide range of alternative forms understanding violence and the means to prevent it of governance exist across communities and many in the urban neighborhoods of Honduras. Given the armed groups have no interest in enhancing public limited—and sometimes abusive—presence of state order or interacting with state authorities. Moreover, institutions such as the police, justice system, residents the control of these groups is often legitimated by a of urban neighborhoods must look elsewhere for widely shared narrative that the state has collapsed, assistance in preventing or mitigating crime. When particularly the justice system, and the only possibility they are rooted in community organization, these local of justice in these neighborhoods is in the hands of forms of prevention may serve as essential building local armed groups. The 2009 coup d’état followed blocks to prevention approaches that are sustainable 24 Income proxied by energy consumption. 25 Based on the authors’ analysis of available data at the municipal level. PREVENTING VIOLENCE WITHIN COMMUNITIES: COERCION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 19 in the Honduran context. This study identifies the local vigilante groups as the most powerful actors in particular forms that collective efficacy can take their communities. Some residents are willing to rely even in these environments of low institutional on whatever actors emerge to establish the control capacity and limited resources. Yet in many cases, necessary to minimize the crime and violence they communities have become victim to more coercive experience on a daily basis. Yet as the two quotations forms of control which must also be understood in below indicate, the extent to which these actors crafting crime prevention strategies. The remainder actually reduce violence varies considerably. of this section lays out these distinct forms of violence prevention and how they operate in practice. The The state has lost total control, it lost its function of following two sections explore the characteristics of regulating, of promoting cohesion. Now others are neighborhoods and municipalities that contribute to controlling, and those that control, since they help these variations in ways communities confront and me live with a little more security, well I support manage violence. them. (Man, Choloma) Look, I don’t think [security] will improve, this is my 3.1 COMMUNITY CONTEXT: point of view. I don’t think it will improve because the DISORDER, CONTROL, AND COHESION problem is that organized crime has taken control of Understanding how violence is prevented and this country. (Man, La Ceiba) managed from the perspective of violence-prone communities requires examining the concepts of Violence in the public imagination also emerges disorder, control, and cohesion as they are defined from the state’s failure to promote cohesion among by the residents of those neighborhoods. First, the members of society. The political conflict that has concept of disorder emerged through the interviews simmered since the 2009 crisis has resulted in the and focus group discussions as an informal way of polarization of society. These tensions have trickled talking about crime and violence. It may be that down to communities, where social fragmentation residents avoid the words “violence” and “crime,” has contributed to the increase in violence. To since they sound too strong, too revealing, or too prevent violence, residents of affected communities straightforward. The term disorder (desorden) also ultimately require the establishment of some level of links violent crime with other aspects of economic cohesion to enable them to act collectively against and political crisis, as well as the limited capacity of the common threat. As is explored below, cohesion the state. People therefore tend to use this term as a has become increasingly difficult to achieve. In its way of describing their reality. absence, they rely on other forms of control. I: How would you describe the level of insecurity in You know that this topic of prevention, or of improving your community? the security situation in Choloma and in Honduras, can’t only be addressed through prevention, but R: Before we could go out, now we can’t go out the state must fulfill its role of control and cohesion. because there is always some disorder. (Woman, La (Community leader, Choloma) Ceiba) The two forms of violence prevention in urban R: Sometimes he wants to use offensive words, but neighborhoods reflect these conceptions of control I tell him: well, if you want to create disorder here, and cohesion in the face of widespread disorder. you’d better go back to where you came from. One form relies on coercion and violence by criminal (Woman, El Progreso) and vigilante groups to control the most visible forms of violence, while allowing other forms of Understanding violent crime as a crisis of disorder violent crime to persist. The other relies on cohesion implies the need for greater control through the among community members to respond collectively establishment of authority where it is absent. The based on shared expectations and organization. vast majority of respondents expressed the belief The remainder of this section describes these two that the state has lost control of what is happening in mechanisms and then outlines the practices of col- the country, particularly with regard to public safety. lective forms of violence prevention and how they Many people identify organized crime groups or operate in Honduran cities. 20 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS 3.2 COERCIVE CONTROL Two variants of this form of control emerged from the BY INFORMAL ARMED ACTORS research, one exercised by known criminal groups In some neighborhoods with lower homicide rates, and another exercised by vigilante groups (although armed groups have achieved a level of control that the two variants sometimes overlap when vigilante limits some forms of violence. The identity of these groups become involved in criminal activities). A groups varies from known gangs to secretive vigilante case that illustrates the former mode of control is the groups and organized crime networks. Those that San Jorge neighborhood in El Progreso.26 Although successfully push out or eliminate rivals sometimes this neighborhood is known as one of the most create a partial sense of security as a result of the dangerous in the city, official homicide rates there absence of turf wars. In some areas, these groups dropped to among the lowest in the city in 2011–13 also protect residents of their neighborhoods from (UNAH-IUPDAS 2014). It is widely understood that robberies, assault, and other forms of crime, as des- one of the city’s largest criminal groups—known as the cribed by one resident: San Jorge group—operates from the neighborhood and that outsiders are rarely allowed in. Within the In these areas if someone is assaulted, they go to community, however, residents are largely kept safe. them (the organized crime group), and they respond much more quickly than the police. These people are in the community, when I worked there it was rare The Research Team’s Experience that they would steal cellphones, that they would with Coercive Control assault, or that there would be shootings in the bus. (Man, Choloma) While driving to visit a municipal project site in Choloma, the research team had to pass In the most extreme cases, a criminal group has through a neighborhood with a reputation for achieved such a strong level of control over the neighborhood that no stranger can enter it without violence. A young man standing with a cell- the group’s permission. Visitors must seek permission phone at the main entrance to the neighbor- from the group’s leader and are monitored throughout hood watched the vehicle as it entered. After their stays. Thieves or smugglers who are not part driving several meters, another young man on of the dominant group are forced out. Meanwhile, a bicycle saw us and moved behind us into the many neighborhood residents—especially youth— middle of the street. He started to make sym- are recruited into the group and maintain its structure bols with his hands (not the traditional symbols and hierarchy. Even children are put to work as from the MS or 18th Street maras) to send a “banderas” (flags) who stay in the street to monitor incoming traffic and identify newcomers. message to someone else. After a brief visit to an adjacent neighborhood, as we drove back They are involving young children, from 9 to 12 years, through the neighborhood the young man on involving them as banderas. They are the ones who the bicycle followed us to the highway, while walk around in the street and when they see an the man at the entrance was talking on his cell- unrecognized car they send an alert that the car has phone while looking at us. entered. The chiefs find out. If this person knows the procedure he must lower the windows if he has dark- ened windows and they ask him where he is going. And if they tell, several people accompany him to An example of the second variant was observed the house and ask at the house if the person is there in a neighborhood in Choloma with low levels of that they are visiting. It is total control of the neigh- homicides. The research found that unlike some low- borhood by the gang through the children. violence communities, this neighborhood also had (Community leader, Choloma) low levels of community organization, since most 26 San Jorge was not included as one of the communities selected for the study, but its situation is well known and described by several municipal officials and residents of other communities. PREVENTING VIOLENCE WITHIN COMMUNITIES: COERCION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 21 adult residents work long days in the factories and This form of control also leads to greater insecurity have little time for community activities. Residents on the margins of neighborhoods, as groups explained that several years ago, an armed vigilante seek to expand their control over drug trafficking group killed many of the gang members who were routes, sources of extortion, and other revenue operating in the neighborhood. Ever since, the opportunities. The resulting battles over territory frequent homicides that were attributed to gang differ from the turf battles that previously occurred warfare have ceased. Although it was unclear to what between maras. Criminal groups now seek to control extent the vigilante group was still active during the entire sections of drug transit routes rather than research, no other group had emerged to replace individual neighborhoods. As a result, larger zones the gangs. As one resident described: of control have been established in some cities, creating areas where turf fights are rare and residents What accounts for our community being safe is that feel a greater sense of security. Where confrontations there is a group of men called “the X men.” It is a over territory do occur, however, they may result in group that takes care of the community. If they hear large numbers of homicides. that there is a criminal, first they call him out, and then they might kill him. (Woman, Choloma) A new form of organized crime has arisen from there. They control, maintaining a certain level of order, but The effects of these forms of control vary, but then there is a group that becomes more powerful they generally involve violent coercion and often and establishes its control. The approach that “I fuel other forms of crime. Although residents would control this block to sell drugs” is over. They sometimes report a greater sense of safety due to are now consolidating various areas. Supposedly it’s a reduction in visible homicides, they also point a single group. (Community leader, Choloma) to ways in which violence and insecurity persist. Dominant armed groups that focus on large-scale Coercive control also leads to other pernicious drug trafficking sometimes combat petty crime that effects, including in undermining community organi- affects neighborhood residents, to prevent the rise zation and fueling a vicious cycle of violence and of competitors or to build local support. In other criminal control. Residents report a fear of taking neighborhoods where one group has achieved actions in the community’s interest that might control, homicides decline but other crimes continue threaten the dominant group. Where crime persists unabated. Residents suggest that some criminal despite control by one group, they must resort to groups tolerate assault, robbery, and other crimes individual coping strategies, such as staying home by smaller groups as long as they do not threaten at night or leaving cellphones at home. As one their control of the drug trade. In some places, local Choloma resident noted, “It is complicated here gangs that previously formed part of the maras have because when people want to organize, there are been co-opted into drug trafficking organizations other people who see it differently and as a result to assist with local transit, but they also continue people live in fear.” In some neighborhoods, criminal their traditional activities of extortion, assault, and groups have exerted influence over community robbery. Moreover, even where they reduce crime, leaders and even set rules on acceptable behavior the form of control exercised by these groups can be within the neighborhood. Many people perceive that especially violent, as described below. organized crime is likely to fuel further violence in the future, both at the community level and more If “Jose” robs my cellphone and I go to the police, broadly. For these residents, there is little hope that they won’t do anything, but if I go to the group I violence can be reduced in the near term. mentioned, within minutes Jose will get a good beating, and will be assaulted and will pay in terms This country is as if it’s upside down. The bad guys of teeth knocked out. So the people know that they have taken power and we must become their will respond, and the population goes looking for subjects. To bring control to the neighborhood is this type of feeling of safety and in general this type difficult since we know each other but through fear. of group is not a threat to people…here in the Lopez (Man, El Progreso) neighborhood due to this group. It’s a very peaceful area for going out at night and during the day. Look, I don’t think [security] will improve, this is my (Woman, Choloma) point of view. I don’t think it will improve because the problem is that organized crime has taken control of this country. (Man, La Ceiba) 22 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS 3.3 COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE ACTION People with greater economic resources or con- In other communities with low levels of violence, the nections to the authorities tend to play a central research team observed a very different environment. role in these networks. Although they may not be In these neighborhoods, residents themselves have in formal positions of authority, as a result of strong taken actions to prevent violence and minimize the community norms they are expected to contribute conditions that might allow it to thrive. The specific their resources. For example, the neighbor with a actions varied, but in all cases they required a high car provides transportation, the one with a business level of organization, interpersonal knowledge, and donates a food basket, the one with medical skills communication among community residents that provides assistance in cases of health emergencies, facilitated collective responses. This form of violence and so forth. The examples in the text box below go prevention is consistent with the notion of “collective far beyond dealing with violence, but they are crucial efficacy,” defined by the enactment of shared foundations for violence prevention in sending a norms for social control, but the types of norms, the message to the community that it is possible to do practices that emerge, and the characteristics that good despite the widespread crime, violence, and enable them are particular to the Honduran context. other problems surrounding them. The high level of community organization in these The foundation for community collective action can communities can be illustrated through the example be summarized with a phrase that was repeated in of one neighborhood in El Progreso, where commu- these neighborhoods: “we all know each other.” nity groups facilitate daily forms of collective action. For the residents of these neighborhoods, knowing As described by one community member, with the their neighbors is the key to taking action to prevent help of the patronatos, residents have established violence. They can quickly identify people who are their own form of social control through constant not from the community, they know whom to contact monitoring and an efficient strategy for communica- in case of an emergency, and they know with whom tion and response. to talk when young people behave inappropriately. This knowledge transcends the religious and poli- The leaders have divided us by sector. In the tical beliefs that divide many communities, thus patronato there are leaders for the lower zone of enabling forms of collective action beyond those the neighborhood, for the central zone, and for found in other neighborhoods. the upper zone and that way we stay informed on what is happening in the different sectors of the Collective action in these neighborhoods serves as neighborhood. Based on respect for this unity, the foundation for a form of order that is distinct whenever there are problems, whether they are from the coercive order in neighborhoods where one natural disasters or violence, we find out and try to armed group dominates. Based on shared norms, be supportive among neighbors. If one neighbor had interpersonal knowledge, communication, and a problem between neighbors, we are supportive. community-wide organization, community leaders Along with our patronato, if there is a death with and residents collectively exercise sufficient social limited financial resources, we pursue the issue with control to prevent violence. The types of actions and the municipal government. (Community leader, their functions in preventing violence are laid out in El Progreso) the next section, and the characteristics that enable these actions are explored in the one that follows. This kind of organization enables various forms of The most striking feature of these forms of violence mutual assistance and solidarity on a range of issues, prevention is that they are remarkably low cost, including the prevention of violence. Collective simple, and effective in preventing violence. responses to shared problems arise on a daily basis, as neighbors assist each other with day-to-day challenges. Most of these actions are spontaneous, 3.4 COLLECTIVE MEASURES OF triggered by illness, accidents, economic difficulties, VIOLENCE PREVENTION or disputes between neighbors. Yet they are based The research identified several collective measures on and reinforce a set of relationships and networks that low-violence communities employ to prevent that bring different segments of the community violence. All of these actions originate from within together, enabling community-wide actions that the community and involve community leaders, resi- go far beyond assistance to individual neighbors. dents, and resources. Many of these actions are PREVENTING VIOLENCE WITHIN COMMUNITIES: COERCION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 23 Everyday Examples of Community Actions We are united neighbors when there is a necessity, we assist each other among ourselves. In the entire community we don’t all know each other, but on each street we get along well… One of the things that brings us together is when a neighbor is sick and we are all ready to assist one another. (Community leader, Choloma) Two or three years ago, my grandparent had an accident and the neighbors from across the street came to help without being asked. My mother came to where they had the accident and the neighbor was with them. The neighbor stayed there in the house with us, they are good neighbors and trustworthy. (Woman, El Progreso) When the neighbor nearby has problems we all get together and if he needs money, we all contribute. Of course we are going to go. We have to help our neighbor so that he is better off. (Man, El Progreso) We get along very well… In fact I am a bit tired because the neighbor had a problem last night, well not directly him, but the neighbor that is in the back went out late to work and there was not transportation so we served as a telephone and I called the neighbor who has a car and he came from the brewery by foot. (Man, Choloma) In front of my house there was a guy with a tank of propane gas who cut his finger. So all of the neighbors ran to see what they could do for him, and one neighbor who had a car took him to the hospital. There they put back the finger, they fixed him up and they left him with something. He healed because all of the neighbors came to see what they could do, and one neighbor who was a nurse told us what we had to do. (Youth, El Progreso) quite simple and involve little or no cost, while others of crisis. As community members become involved in involve slightly more local organization and resources, regular activities, the networks and communication but they all require ongoing communication and that enable collective action deepen, leaving them interpersonal knowledge between residents. Overall, ready to quickly and effectively respond when their effects can be remarkably effective. violence threatens the community. These three functions, along with the primary forces of violence These community actions fulfill three basic functions prevention, are summarized in figure 8. that combine to reduce the risk of violence. The first, consistent with literature and practice on violence prevention, involves indirectly preventing violence by Monitoring and Reacting to Suspicious Activity reducing risk factors at the individual or community One of the most effective ways for communities to levels (Krug et al. 2002). Community actions help prevent violent crime is through monitoring sus- youth to find jobs, education, or constructive leisure picious activity and responding through community activities, reduce the presence of alcohol or firearms, networks. The research team heard several examples improve physical spaces in the community, or resolve in which neighbors saw someone suspicious and conflicts before they escalate. Second, they limit reported it to others, leading to immediate responses opportunities for criminal groups to operate or take that prevented break-ins, assaults, and other crimes. root in a given community. By identifying criminals The response can involve simply inquiring what the and constraining their operations, they directly person is doing to seeking assistance from the police prevent incidents of crime and criminal actors from or other authorities, usually through community taking control. Third, they reinforce the community leaders with contacts in the municipalities. This form organization that facilitates collective action in times of community action fulfills the function of limiting 24 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Figure 8. Community Crime Prevention Actions and their Functions Monitoring Suspicious People Reduce Risk Factors Banning the Sale of Alcohol LOWER Managing Public Spaces Limit Opportunities for Crime CRIME Resolving Community Disputes RATES Supporting Victims of Deepen Collective Action Domestic Violence opportunities for criminals to operate while creating America (Briceño-León, Villaveces, and Concha- an inhospitable environment for armed groups to Eastman 2008). Residents of Honduran communities settle and organize operations. note an additional twist. Most studies attribute these effects to the reduction in an individual-level Although this form of violence prevention is relatively risk factor—alcohol consumption exacerbates the simple and requires little formal organization, it does escalation of disputes and can turn ordinary conflicts require a high level of interpersonal knowledge into homicides. Participants in this study noted this and communication. Such knowledge enables effect, but identified an additional function. They residents to identify potential threats, while active explained that in Honduras, the bars and billiard communication networks allow them to respond halls where alcohol is consumed also tend to serve quickly. In many communities, women play a central as centers for the distribution of drugs, including role in this process, given their dense personal marijuana, cocaine, and crack. In addition to networks within the neighborhoods and their reducing consumption, closing such establishments presence in their homes throughout the day. As the limits the presence of criminals and armed actors in resident of a relatively safe neighborhood in Choloma their neighborhoods. describes, this form of monitoring contributes to a general feeling of safety in one’s neighborhood. In contrast to alcohol control measures in other contexts, the initiatives observed through this study They talk about assaults and everything but on my were driven, organized, and enforced from within street, they have never assaulted me, nor have they neighborhoods, most often with little support from assaulted others because we get along well and we municipal authorities. In each case, neighborhood all keep watch there. (Woman, Choloma) residents decided themselves to close bars and billiard halls and to limit the sale of alcohol in local shops. With support from neighborhood residents, Banning the Sale of Alcohol the members of the patronato used their authority Many low-violence communities cited efforts to to force local businesses to comply. The president ban the sale of alcohol in their neighborhoods as a of the patronato in one neighborhood in Choloma crucial measure for preventing violence. This finding proudly recounted how she personally went to talk is consistent with studies that show a correlation with the owner of the bar to enforce the decision and between the targeted control of alcohol sales and described the impact on community safety. a reduction in homicide rates, including in Latin PREVENTING VIOLENCE WITHIN COMMUNITIES: COERCION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 25 Here, there are no bars or billiard halls. It has been streetlamps and bridges also eliminates situational years since they haven’t permitted them, they left opportunities for crime. Second, these actions can quickly after the decision was taken. When there reduce the risk that youth become involved in crime are billiard halls selling alcoholic beverages in a through the creation of recreational spaces that community, people from other areas come and the provide alternative opportunities to violence. One crime begins to organize. But here, I know that I can respondent summarized these two effects: meet 10 guys from our community, and I won’t be afraid. This is because the leaders did not permit bars Where I live, or rather seven blocks in front of me, and billiard halls. (Community leader, El Progreso) there used to be a vacant lot where they used to assault a lot and they would end up in that lot. So they Although closing a bar or a billiard hall might seem agreed to present a project and built a football field. like a modest action, it serves as a clear demonstration Another one is that they had broken a streetlamp of the community organization needed for collective and they looked for my father and he came and got responses to violence and further deepens that a ladder and fixed the lamp. Sometimes there is a organization. Given the likely opposition of business sewage pipe that is always causing problems, so we owners, enforcing the ban requires widespread all go to that block and fix the sewage. And once a community support. The members of the patronatos pipe was broken so we changed it and cleaned up also forego a source of personal revenue, since the block. (Woman, Choloma) according to municipal law, every bar and billiard hall requires their authorization and some of them A third effect of such efforts emerges not from the sell this authorization for personal profit. Whatever space itself but from the process of reclaiming and their motivation, these actions reveal the ability of managing it, which helps to deepen community neighborhood residents to achieve consensus and organization. Lacking a budget for such activities, leaders to act concretely in their interest. patronatos must typically rely on members of the community to contribute their money, labor, and It is not possible from this study to determine time. Such participation helps to strengthen com- whether the alcohol bans caused a reduction in munity organization; as one resident of El Progreso violence or merely indicated a level of organization described, “people live well, the vacant lots are that reduced crime in other ways. It may be that clean, other lots that the patronato has, they send banning alcohol in a single community has no impact us to clean them.” It also ensures that the spaces on crime, and a ban may even be counterproductive become a focal point for community organization if young people must go elsewhere to find alcohol. and facilitates further action. Once the initial work Nonetheless, these bans serve as a clear signal of a is complete, community members must maintain community’s capacity to organize collectively and are the field or community center and resolve disputes clearly associated with lower levels of crime. At the around its use. In one neighborhood that lacked very least, they plainly illustrate the types of actions sufficient organization, a football (soccer) field that and organization found in low-violence communities. was rehabilitated by the municipal government— without community involvement—was used as a point for drug distribution and consumption, and Organizing and Maintaining Public Spaces residents saw it as a source of violence. As one In explaining low levels of crime, residents frequently resident of this neighborhood noted, “The football pointed to collective measures to rehabilitate pu- field is being used by youth to smoke drugs—they blic space. They described different forms of this build things but the community itself destroys action, from cleaning up vacant lots to maintaining them.” In another neighborhood, residents not only local infrastructure and building public spaces for built a football field themselves, they also created recreational activity. According to residents, these a system to ensure that all residents—including actions serve three different functions. First they women and children—could use it. The residents directly prevent crime by limiting the presence and proudly explained: activities of criminals. Since abandoned spaces are often used for selling drugs or for assaults, You can see the women going around, which provides keeping such spaces clean can minimize the pos- an activity now that it is lit up—we all cooperated to sibility that criminals use them to conduct illicit illuminate the field.” (Woman, Choloma) activities. Maintaining public infrastructure such as 26 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Resolving Community Disputes abusive situations and prevent future violence. By Disputes between neighbors occur frequently and demonstrating that such cases can be resolved, these sometimes escalate toward interpersonal violence. actions further generate confidence among commu- The most common cases involved disputes over nity members and strengthen community networks. property and trespassing, as well as interpersonal, Community responses also facilitate response by the family, and neighbor disputes such as fights between police and justice system. children and noisy neighbors. In the absence of legitimate mechanisms for resolving such disputes, many of them fester while undermining residents’ An Unresolved Community Dispute confidence in their community or state leaders. In other cases, they lead to violence. The capability A dispute in La Ceiba illustrates both the within communities to resolve such disputes thus difficult of resolving such cases and the role of reduces violence directly by preventing escalation community organizations in doing so. One and indirectly by enhancing communities’ trust in resident, “Don Carlos,” lived next to the community leaders. “Lopez” family, which he considered problem- atic because of their frequent late night parties. In most neighborhoods, community disputes are rarely resolved and reports to authorities never One day, Don Carlos lost two chickens and followed up. Most often, they are simply abandoned someone told the Lopez family that Don Carlos over time, leading to uncertainty about the possibility thought they had stolen them. The Lopez that they might reemerge. In such cases, neighbors family threatened him by telling him that they simply counsel residents to “leave everything in were friends with gang members and that he God’s hands.” would receive a visit. Although Don Carlos reported the threat to the state prosecutor, the Residents who receive support from neighbors and neighbors never responded to the citation and community members are more likely to resolve their cases, whether through the formal justice no enforcement action was taken. In the end, system or through informal mechanisms. Residents the problem was resolved after the family was of one community described how the president of persuaded to join a Pentecostal church and the patronato frequently mediates disputes, ran- ended the late night parties. ging from noise complaints to land disputes, without recourse to state institutions. For those who refer their cases to state institutions, support The support of neighbors and community networks from neighbors and community members can lead facilitates the decision by victims to take action to to a better outcome and ensure that the outcomes end abusive situations. Several victims described are enforced. For example, in Choloma, a woman how they took their first step after neighbors noticed reported to municipal authorities that her neighbors that violence was occurring and encouraged them to were raising pigs in their yard against municipal act. Others found their community networks to be ordinance. The municipal health office eventually eager sources of advice and emotional support. For intervened and ordered the neighbor to remove women who remained undecided about reporting— the pigs, but the support of other neighbors helped whether due to lack of knowledge or as a result of to ensure that the dispute was resolved amicably. psychological abuse—friends, relatives, neighbors, Neighbors also put pressure on the neighbor in ques- and colleagues were instrumental in persuading tion to remove the pig and implement the order. them to report their cases to the authorities. One woman recounted that although her mother advised her not to report the crime, she took action after Responding to Domestic Violence colleagues who had witnessed the violence advised The support of communities in responding to inci- her to do so. Another victim described the support dents of domestic violence has a tremendous impact, from her neighbors: both on those involved and on the community at large. Interviews with victims revealed the ways in I had a friend, whom I trusted, that I would tell things, which community networks enabled them to end and also a neighbor. I would tell them, would vent PREVENTING VIOLENCE WITHIN COMMUNITIES: COERCION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 27 bitterly, I cried because sometimes I didn’t even have to report the crime and attend court hearings. Others any milk to give my daughters… All of my neighbors pointed to assistance by community members in would ask me “what’s happening Maria,” they would caring for children or taking care of other duties. say “what is happening? Raise your head, you are Women’s rights organizations also play an important young. Look, the truth is that you can’t be like that. role, as in the case of El Movimiento de Mujeres de Look, leave, you’re not going to destroy your home. la Colonia Lopez Arellano (MOMUCLA) in Choloma, This man is not right for you, Maria.” And from which provides information and encourages victims there they would tell me I had to think hard about it. to take action. In all of the cases recorded through (Woman, Choloma) this study in which women succeeded in leaving abu- sive situations, the support of community networks For women who choose to report domestic violence, proved to be crucial. As one victim described: community networks facilitate the judicial process. Neighbors help to protect victims from further abuse, My neighbors served as witnesses for how he serve as witnesses in court, and help attend to the mistreated me. He kept on abusing me until they needs of victims. In one case, a victim described how gave me the Community Center to live in and they community leaders granted her the use of the com- gave me clothing to wash so I could maintain my munity center to live in, provided her with clothing, children. I didn’t work outside, but I stayed working and found her work in the neighborhood to allow her in the neighborhood so that I could be with my to support her children. Another victim described daughter. (Woman, Choloma) how her employer allowed her to take paid time off 28 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS 4. Conditions for Community-Based Prevention The ability of some communities to prevent crime sports teams, and youth and women’s groups. Yet through collective measures is rooted in the charac- the same type of association can either strengthen teristics of life in those neighborhoods. This section integration or contribute to fragmentation. The examines these characteristics to explain why some impact of these groups reflects, in part, the condi- communities succeed in using collective measures to tions they face. Such factors as urban migration, the prevent violence and others do not. In comparing presence of economic opportunities, and the prev- more organized communities with those under the alence of drugs, alcohol, and firearms constrain or control of armed groups or with higher levels of vio- facilitate community integration. At the same time, lence, the clearest variation emerged in the extent the research revealed that effective leaders, with suf- of fragmentation or integration between groups and ficient support, can sometimes transcend the condi- individuals within the neighborhood. As described tions they face and foster the integration necessary above, collective prevention measures require inter- for collective crime prevention. personal knowledge, frequent communication, and shared values and identity. These characteristics are Understanding these factors and how they interact is most evident in neighborhoods with a high level of central to designing effective prevention strategies integration between subgroups. In neighborhoods at the neighborhood level. Although some low- with higher levels of violence or control by armed violence communities in Honduras developed their groups, fragmentation between community groups capabilities for violence prevention over long periods results in more limited ties, communication, and of time, others appear to have evolved relatively shared values across the community. quickly and lowered crime levels in short timeframes. Recent interventions that have deliberately sought The fragmentation or integration within a given to address community fragmentation have shown neighborhood depends, in turn, on the leaders, promising results. The findings from this research associations, and individuals there, as well as on suggest that the capacity to organize and sustain broader social and economic factors. Most urban collective prevention measures can be built at neighborhoods in Honduras possess similar asso- three levels: by working to integrate the community ciations, including a patronato, churches, schools, through the development of shared norms, values, Figure 9. Community Characteristics and Capability for Prevention Fragmented Community Community Organization Integrated Community Sparse Weak Dense Strong Internal Community Internal Community Ties Identity Community Risk Factors Ties Identity CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION 29 and ties; by strengthening the associations and (neighborhoods), and in each one a community lead- leaders that contribute to community integration; ership board known as the patronato is elected and and by addressing the broader social and economic recognized as the official liaison to municipal gov- risk factors that shape the conditions they face. ernment. In most neighborhoods, residents also join Community organization, in turn, provides a foun- churches, sports teams, parents associations, and dation upon which other community-level prevention sometimes youth and women’s groups, which consti- efforts can build. tute the bedrock of civic life within neighborhoods. A closer look reveals that in many neighborhoods, The findings in this section are drawn primarily these associations are highly fragmented, play little from a series of “social mapping” exercises, as well or no role in community life, and rarely cooperate as interviews with victims of violence. In separate to strengthen ties across the neighborhood. In some focus groups with men, women, and youth in each neighborhoods, however, dense ties between these neighborhood, participants were asked to iden- associations facilitate a strong community identity tify the individuals, organizations, and institutions and community-wide collaboration. These attributes that benefit the community, as well as those that provide the foundation for the organization, interper- fuel violence and other social problems. They were sonal knowledge, and communication that facilitates then asked to trace the connections between them, collective responses to violence. describing how they relate to each other and how they address specific forms of violence. In addition, Looking across the three cities included in the study, interviews were conducted with victims of violence a comparison of the neighborhoods at the highest who described the role played by community orga- risk of violence appears to confirm the relationship nizations in responding to incidents of crime and vio- between community organization and violence. lence as well as disputes. These methods revealed Figure 10 displays the “community organization a striking contrast between integrated communities score” for neighborhoods in the bottom half of the with dense internal networks and neighborhoods socioeconomic spectrum. The score is based on a with sparse internal ties, along with a spectrum of survey of municipal officials in each city who were neighborhoods in between. asked about the presence and activity of common forms of community association (see Annex 1) in each neighborhood. The results show that a higher 4.1 FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION OF community organization appears to be correlated COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS with lower homicide rates. This relatively superficial At first glance, Honduran neighborhoods appear to survey does not tell the whole story, however. A be rich in community organization. Every Honduran deeper look into the neighborhoods revealed that city is divided into recognized barrios and colonias more important than the presence of community Figure 10. Homicide Rate and Community Organization by Neighborhood 600 500 Homicide Rate per 100,000 400 300 200 100 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 -100 Community Organization Score 30 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS associations was the way that they function, and in patronato nor other community leaders exercise a particular, the ties and collaboration between them. community organizing role, few alternatives exist to ensure the provision of services and facilitate the In most urban neighborhoods in Honduras, increas- neighborhood’s connection to the state. ing fragmentation between individuals and associa- tions has weakened community identity and inhib- Amid this fragmentation, some communities stand ited collective action. Urban migration, the erosion out in the existence of dense ties and shared identity of traditional practices, a decline in neighborhood- that promote interaction between community mem- wide cultural activities, and the proliferation of bers. The neighborhood of Esperanza de Jesus in churches—every neighborhood contains several El Progreso illustrates this level of integration. The Protestant and Catholic churches—have weakened sense of shared history, narrated by one community connections between residents. Lacking a common leader in the text box, was expressed in interviews identity or neighborhood-wide networks, individuals and focus groups by many neighborhood residents. know only members of their own church or organi- This community identity has helped to foster a high zation and rarely collaborate with others. This trend level of interpersonal knowledge and a sense of could be observed most starkly in the neighbor- belonging that facilitates community-wide actions. hoods of Choloma with the highest proportion of internal migrants, but it is present to some extent in most urban neighborhoods. History of a Low-Violence Neighborhood, El Progreso Very few of the inhabitants are natives, they don’t The Colonia Esperanza de Jesus was founded carry on activities and customs that emerged in this city. We see that families come and those who are on February 17, 1981… At the beginning born from these families have none of this tradition, around 100 families came, and then the num- there is an uprooting with respect to the municipality, ber gradually increased. We located ourselves there is no commitment to resolve problems in the here the 17th at 5 a.m. We came, having al- neighborhood, in the city, much less in the country. ready organized the patronato, which I was a (Man, Choloma) part of as secretary… When we arrived, they started to set up property boundaries, streets, Although social fragmentation appears to be a intersections, but only measurements and ev- defining feature of urban life around the world, in Honduras its effects are particularly pernicious. erything. In this community there is a large Sociologists have pointed to the rise of social number of people from the banana plantations distance and the absence of a common culture as who lived in this area… We are now around phenomena inherent to contemporary urban society 400 families in this community. We started with (Day 2006). Various identities and occupations around 15 families that came to live here, there pull people away from communal space in their was don Moncho Zelaya who has passed away, geographically defined neighborhoods toward don Braulio Pérez who has also passed away, other forms of community. Individuals typically see don Santos Aguilar, who has also passed away, themselves as belonging to multiple communities, for example, one’s church, family, Facebook friends, don Jesús Delcid who is my brother, and my etc. (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). The practical pro- father named Jesús who has also passed away. blem for Hondurans is that geographically defined These were the first families that settled here. neighborhoods (barrios and colonias) still have responsibility for organizing the delivery of services and managing everyday problems. The patronatos, The narrative in the text box not only provides an in coordination with the municipality, are responsible account of the community’s history, it also highlights for ensuring the provision of electricity, water, the strong community identity felt by one of its sewage, and security and for serving as the liaison oldest residents. Several residents emphasized that between individual citizens and the state. In the the community’s origin has shaped the characteristics absence of a visible or constant police presence, and values that hold sway in the community (most community associations also play a crucial role in original residents had worked in the nearby banana preventing and mitigating crime. When neither the plantation). They emphasized that the original CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION 31 residents were all hardworking people and that the These characteristics, including a sense of commu- value of hard work has been transmitted through nity identity, shared values, and dense internal ties, the generations. Leaving aside the veracity of this can evolve over time even within a neighborhood. version of their history, the existence of a common The next section describes how the particular forms narrative that is shared throughout the community of association interact with broader social and eco- and across generations is remarkable, especially in nomic conditions to shape the level of integration or contrast to many other neighborhoods. The belief fragmentation in a given neighborhood. that most residents are willing to collaborate and support each other was common to many of the communities with lower levels of violence. The 4.2 THE VARYING ROLES OF sense of shared identity, often rooted in the history COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS of a community or its response to a crisis, provides Effective and integrative community associations a basis for collaboration by creating a foundation form the building blocks of successful violence pre- of common values. The fact that this identity is vention in Honduran neighborhoods. Yet although shared across the community generates the belief virtually all urban neighborhoods in Honduras have that working together across subgroups within the community associations, including the patronato, neighborhood can bring benefits to the community churches, schools, and youth and women’s groups, as a whole. that look quite similar across neighborhoods when viewed from the outside, similar types of organiza- These are very generous people, and when some- tions can play very different roles. Moreover, orga- one is working on a project, people are ready to nizations are not static; their roles sometimes reflect work. And La Esperanza has this advantage over historical circumstances and broader social forces, any other community. If someone has organized a and they sometimes reflect the traits and motivation project, people say let’s do it. Here the people are of individual leaders. Herein lies a core challenge for warm, humble people, who are ready to collaborate. community-based violence prevention: despite the (Community leader, El Progreso) often negative examples of how community lead- ers and organizations act in practice, for collective Another feature common to low-violence commu- violence prevention to succeed, people need to nities is the presence of dense ties between com- believe that community associations can play a ben- munity associations and individuals. Residents not eficial role and that supporting them can bring ben- only pointed to multiple leaders and associations, efits. On the other hand, the fact that such associa- they also described how many of them overlap. tions are prevalent in most neighborhoods ensures For instance, the members of the patronato are that opportunities exist to strengthen prevention also involved in one or more churches and maintain by enabling them to serve as forces for community close personal ties to the school principal and the integration. This section outlines the most common parents association. Unlike in most communities forms of community organization and their roles in where the proliferation of churches has contributed affecting community integration. to fragmentation between residents, in less violent neighborhoods, different churches collaborate on community festivals and other joint activities. As the The Patronatos quotation below illustrates, various organizations— In most Honduran cities, the most widely recognized in this case, the parents association and the community leaders are the patronatos. Elected every patronato—frequently cooperate and strengthen the two years by each barrio and colonia, they serve as neighborhood-wide ties that facilitate prevention. the official representatives of the neighborhood to the municipal government. They generally consist of We have to work with the parents association 6–10 members, including a president, vice president, because they organize trips, festivals, and other secretary, and treasurer, but the president tends to activities. For example, recently for the dia del be the most active. In theory, patronatos serve as a indio they organized activities: yuca con chicharon, community leadership body, as the focal point for pastelitos, chichas, tamales. All of us ate because all community activities, and as a means to mobilize of us had to collaborate. (Woman, Choloma) resources for community needs from among the residents and from the municipal government. 32 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Table 1.   Forms and Effects of Community Association PROTECTIVE CAPABILITIES Fragmented Communities Cohesive Communities Sparse Weak Dense Strong Internal Ties Shared Identity Internal Ties Shared Identity Play multiple roles, connect community Mobilize municipal resources but exert little organizations, mobilize community community leadership Patronato resources, deal with armed actors/ alternative authorities Promote constructive norms, organize Lack of cooperation between churches weakens community ties Churches community projects, resolve disputes, create social structure for youth Promote constructive norms, opportunities Teachers uninterested, corrupt, abusive, or ill-equipped to deal with challenges Primary School for youth, integrated community networks, forum for activities Promote constructive norms, keep youth Coaches fail to promote constructive values, facilitating involvement in drugs, alcohol Sports Teams away from crime, bring community together around sports Fuel conflict, lead youth into crime Informal Leaders Organize at-risk youth, serve as role models Act as repository of community knowledge, Changing role weakens backbone of community life Women’s Groups organize community events, monitor suspicious activity In practice, patronatos serve primarily as a liaison between the neighborhood and the municipal gov- school, or improving water, electricity, and sewage ernment, and most play a limited leadership role facilities. Although they may be beneficial, these within their communities. Since all requests for small-scale projects rarely affect community dynamics services and infrastructure must be channeled and many do not last. The following description through the patronatos, they tend to spend most captures the sentiment of many people regarding a of their time seeking resources from municipal relatively effective patronato. authorities. The most successful patronatos are those with the best connections to those authorities. At We don’t really see much of what the patronato does. the same time, most patronatos make little effort to What the patronato does, the rain undoes. They organize their neighborhoods. As one resident put have built many small bridges. They built someone it, “the patronatos don’t have the capacity to bring a house near the bridge. The patronato tries to solve people together, they are closer to the municipal problems for people who actually have their houses government than to the community.” In the absence flooded… Sewage and all that was managed by the of strong ties to the members of their communities, patronato as was the community hall and the day they lack knowledge of community needs, and their care… What happens is that these are things that requests to government focus on immediate and we can’t really see, because the field is built and visible needs, such as resurfacing unpaved roads, then destroyed, these are things that get done and repairing bridges, expanding the neighborhood undone.” (Man, El Progreso) CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION 33 In a few communities, the members of the patro- in some places facilitated violence prevention, but natos go beyond securing resources to exerting it has also contributed to community fragmentation. leadership and addressing community problems. These patronatos resolve interpersonal disputes As the most common space for formal social inter- and organize activities that contribute to violence action, churches often play a central role in violence prevention. In such cases, the individuals who lead prevention. They promote shared identity, organize the patronato tend to play multiple roles, often community projects, and facilitate actions directed serving as leaders in churches, schools, or youth at preventing violence. According to residents, chur- groups, naturally bringing these groups together ches promote values and social norms conducive and coordinating community-wide activities. As des- to preventing violence, such as tolerance, honesty, cribed in the following example, such patronatos respect, and communication. They pointed to the play a critically important role in mobilizing the re- churches and their leaders as the “moral compass” sources for violence prevention and in facilitating the of the community in “teaching right and wrong.” collective action to manage them. Church leaders advise on addressing cases of violence, resolve disputes, and work as counselors The youth worked together with the patronatos and in “growth groups.” Several women interviewed succeeded in building a sports field. They produced said that they sought help from these counselors for a document about how the youth from the three cases of domestic violence. Some churches allow communities would manage it for their teams. And their space to be used by the community for violence recently they requested support from the mayor to prevention initiatives. illuminate the field, and now they have lighting. Now they play until 11 p.m., and those are communities I think that the church tries to address all of the risk that are now very safe. (Community leader, Choloma) factors. For example, addiction and drugs, since most are youth, the church tries to rehabilitate In communities with a strong presence of criminal these young people. With regard to infidelity, the armed actors, patronatos must also develop strate- church always insists that couples should remain gies to deal with them. One common approach is to loyal because when there is a lack of morals, it is the negotiate with the dominant group to obtain permis- church that takes it on. (Adults, La Ceiba) sion to operate and thus preserve space for commu- nity organization. Yet this task has become more diffi- Churches contribute to building values in our cult in the context of the shifts in the nature of armed children, because when I couldn’t communicate groups and where the criminal actors do not live in well with my children, at the church I learned how to the neighborhood. Nonetheless, the research found listen to them and how to get them to listen to me. that some patronatos approach criminal groups to (Woman, La Ceiba) voice their concerns and seek ways to minimize risk and harm to the community. In some cases, commu- Churches play an especially important role for nity leaders have actually mediated between victims youth. Several churches maintain programs aimed and armed groups. For example, when a member of at offering young people constructive alternatives to one community had his computer stolen, the victim violence, including for gang members and criminals asked the patronato to ask the local criminal group seeking a way out. In his research in El Progreso, Jon to use its networks to recover the computer, since Wolseth found that youth draw on the moral power people have recovered stolen goods this way. Effec- of churches to avoid violence. Protestant churches tive patronatos can mitigate the effects of violent have been especially successful in drawing youth crime even in the presence of armed groups. away from violent groups, since conversion entails commitments such as a prohibition on drinking, drug use, dancing, and sexual licentiousness (Wolseth The Churches 2011). Membership in these churches alters youths’ The most common experience with community orga- social structure and reduces their exposure to nizations in urban neighborhoods occurs in churches. risks of violence, as they no longer spend time on As a result of the rapid growth in the evangelical street corners or in bars where they are exposed to movement, multiple churches are present even in shootings. As one resident recalled: the most dangerous neighborhoods. This growth has 34 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS I have a son that used to take drugs. Recently, he con- organizations, and residents provided accounts verted and he brought other young people and they consistent with those findings (Thornberry, Moore, are now very punctual and regular at church, and this and Christenson 1985; Jarjoura 1993). Residents also enables the others to do it too. (Woman, El Progreso) expressed the belief that schools instill social values and norms that help to prevent youth involvement Yet churches also contribute to fragmentation. Every in violence and crime. In the context of widespread urban neighborhood contains several churches, and poverty, lack of education, and migration, many individuals tend to participate in their own church parents recognize that they are unable to instill activities but rarely communicate with members such values in their children, and schools teach their of other churches. The emphasis of most churches children what they themselves cannot. on affiliation—and the hostility of some to other denominations—limits the benefits that accrue Primary and secondary schools provide an to the community. Few churches address social opportunity to youth, so that instead of getting into problems beyond their own membership, nor do they drugs or crime, they give them the opportunity to cooperate with other churches. Churches sometimes study. (Youth, El Progreso) reinforce feelings of marginalization among youth by failing to integrate those who already feel excluded Sometimes [the schools] are what influence us a lot, from school, job opportunities, and community life. because there is no education at home, and if we As a result, while they may promote positive values don’t bring this education from the home, at least among their members, they sometimes undermine we are partially formed in school. (Youth, Choloma) the community integration necessary for violence prevention. In a few of the neighborhoods examined Schools also play a role beyond individual students for the study, church leaders have made efforts to in projecting values and facilitating collective action. collaborate with other churches and community Primary schools serve as a hub for coordinating and associations; most situations, however, are similar to integrating various community associations and the one described by this Choloma resident: social networks across the community. For example, they organize community festivals in coordination Community groups are quite fractured due to the with the parents association and the patronato, or churches… Often those who participate in one invite parents and community members to school church communicate among themselves, but there activities. Below, the principal of a school in a low- is little communication with other churches… violence neighborhood describes the school’s Ultimately they may collaborate among their own impact beyond its walls in involving the community faithful, but when it comes to a community problem in its projects and in contributing to activities that they have lost the ability to respond, as when the involve other groups. gangs invade the community and the churches don’t communicate with each other. (Community We reforested areas in the community. We have held leader, Choloma) sports, social, and cultural events. On the protection of natural resources, we recently participated in work with plastics making murals, internal and external, Primary Schools that we presented in the Casa de la Cultura. All of Neighborhood primary schools can serve as a these activities were conducted inside and outside space for community-wide interaction and as a of the school, and also through the municipality… At forum for promoting values that enable violence times, [the patronato] comes to ask us that we send prevention. Their impact can be felt at two levels— children to award prizes and medals for [community on individual youth and children, as well as on the festivals such as] palo encebado, carrera de cinta, la overall community—in strengthening cohesion and coronacion de la reina de las flores… We communi- enabling collective action. cate with the mothers so that they can gather with the community. (School director, El Progreso) At the individual level, schools can protect children and youth from exposure to risk factors. Several The impact of schools on both levels varies, however. studies have found a correlation between drop- Not all directors or teachers have the desire or ping out of school and incorporation into criminal creativity to work beyond their walls. Young people CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION 35 interviewed for the study emphasized that some Sports teams can be source of violence, however, teachers do not deserve to serve as role models and if leaders fail to foster constructive values or if the pointed to examples of teachers seen as corrupt, team members are involved with alcohol, drugs, or disrespectful, or tainted by scandals ranging from crime. Most volunteer coaches receive little or no drug abuse to asking money for grades and sexual training to enable them to work with at-risk youth abuse. Well-intentioned teachers do not always and may not even involve those most at risk of find that the members of the patronatos are willing participating in violence. Many neighborhood sports to collaborate or that the parents are interested teams also struggle with access to fields, uniforms, in getting involved. As illustrated below, parents and equipment. Successful sports teams require are sometimes themselves young adults in difficult support from various actors to help secure space situations, and teachers are ill-equipped to overcome and resources and to ensure that they promote the resulting challenges. constructive values. The problem is that there are parents who are 14 The patronato is working in coordination with sports years old. They are in the process of being educated, to illuminate the fields of Bellavista and Las Lomas. so who will educate their children? We explored this The patronato took care of the administration, and issue in classes. We brought people from the health now they have this benefit that there is no time limit center to speak with them. We wanted to organize on playing, if they want to play until dawn they can. “schools for parents” but not everyone comes. (Community leader, Choloma) Remember that many children who come are under the supervision of their grandparents, the parents Last Sunday they had a tournament that ended at are working or are in the United States and the 8 p.m., the patronato organized the illumination grandparents don’t have authority over the children. of the field, as well as the small field and the play- We have also lost authority over the tender years, ground for the kids. The patronato turns on and off where the educator was like a parent. Now we exer- the lights, sometimes it’s 10 p.m. and they are play- cise the work of the parent but in a restricted way. ing because it’s well lit. Because of this, I tell you (Teacher, El Progreso) it’s a healthy neighborhood, you can see people all around, while you go to other neighborhoods and it is scary to enter at 8 p.m. (Man, Choloma) Sports Teams Sports are central to neighborhood life in Honduras and frequently turned to as a violence prevention Community Leaders activity. Like other community associations, their Leadership within communities is often exercised by value in preventing violence varies. According informal leaders with no official position. Residents of to many residents, sports draw youth away from most low-violence neighborhoods point to individuals violence by keeping them busy while instilling values who organize activities for children and youth or who such as discipline, communication, and teamwork. resolve disputes between residents. Most of these In nearly every neighborhood, individuals volunteer activities involve sports, but in some neighborhoods, their time coaching soccer and basketball teams informal leaders provide material resources, advice, for neighborhood youth. Community leaders and and other benefits to their communities. The leaders municipal officials often prioritize the construction who tend to be most respected do not operate with of sports facilities for community-based violence any economic interest and often without any formal prevention, both because of the potential to involve organizational structure. Because their motivation youth and because they serve as visible symbols of appears to be primarily moral, they become neighborhood transformation. important examples in the community, as illustrated in the following example. I think it has helped to have the football fields next to the hills, and even more that they put light reflec- The person I really admire is a 70-year-old man, he is tors so that some people are playing and others are so active. They say he prefers seeing young people watching, instead of thinking of going to drink or fishing with him in a river or whatever, rather than smoke, it’s better that they go play or watch football, seeing them involved with drugs. So you can see him and this results in the community not being violent. with a ton of kids behind him, my younger brother (Woman, Choloma) is one of them, and they spend the whole day with 36 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS them instead of not doing anything. He is like a singing and dancing so that they participate and feel father to them. (Man, La Ceiba) motivated, but the women enjoy coming more than the men. (Woman, El Progreso) Although many informal leaders benefit commu- nities, others contribute to violence by fostering Although women have traditionally served as the conflict and fragmentation or leading youth into drugs backbone of community life, their increasing partici- and crime. In many neighborhoods, residents lament pation in the labor force has undermined this tradi- the absence of positive leaders and the ample space tional role. As a result, the shared identity and inter- for youth to be influenced by members of gangs or personal knowledge that they helped to maintain has images in the media. As one resident put it, “for a gradually eroded. Women’s associations have taken young person to get involved in crime, somebody on valuable roles, including in advocating for wom- would have had to teach him or tell him about it.” en’s issues, but they have generally not filled this gap Residents find that many adults provide negative in community integration. To be sure, their impact on role models in their involvement in illicit activities gender-based violence has deepened, especially as or their failure to foster values that prevent crime. younger women become more aware and willing to In the absence of positive leadership, youth seek to act, as described below. Nonetheless, women’s asso- join peer groups from neighboring communities that ciations have been less involved in maintaining and lead them into negative behavior. integrating community-wide networks. There are many people who join, for example, with My mother told me not to report because it could other neighborhoods up there, where there are many be dangerous. But I continued with the process until bad people. Sometimes new young people come to reaching the end at which point they gave him a sep- the neighborhood, and since there is no one with aration order from my family and my house. (Woman, whom to join they start to join those bad friendships, La Ceiba) and from there the influence begins over them and they start to harm the community. (Woman, La Ceiba) 4.3 RISK FACTORS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION Women’s Groups Although community associations can enhance This section would not be complete without high- capability for violence prevention, their role is often lighting the role of women as community leaders. shaped by broader social and economic factors. The Women serve as part of formal associations, inclu- study revealed how the conditions that facilitate or ding as presidents of the patronatos, women’s rights inhibit collective prevention measures reflect such groups, and parents associations, and their daily factors. In discussing common risk factors such as contributions to community life are remarkable. the lack of economic and educational opportunities, Women tend to be most active in organizing and the rising drug trade, the presence of firearms, and participating in community activities, from festivals urban migration, residents of urban communities to social welfare programs, and provide the majority pointed to their effects not only on the individual of the time and energy necessary to make them risk of involvement in crime, but also on community- happen. Their dense social networks enable violence level dynamics. These factors create a climate prevention activities, such as monitoring crime, iden- of fear, undermine community organization and tifying at-risk youth, and promoting values. Women’s shared identity, and inhibit collective action. The associations help to prevent gender-based violence absence of educational or basic services undermines by raising awareness and supporting victims. confidence in state authority and weakens the role of community leaders. As people come to feel Most [women] get involved in preparing food and that violence can be prevented only by individual in gift giving. Here we also have help with school responses, they become less willing to participate in feeding, and when there are social activities and we community-level solutions and more willing to rely don’t want people to spend money, we ask Dona on alternative sources of authority and protection. Moncha and her right hands. They make enchiladas At the same time, community-level conditions can for everyone, and that way we don’t spend too much. mediate the effects of individual or societal-level risk Also, for Mother’s Day, we do various activities, factors by either mitigating the effects of widespread we put the members of the parents association to poverty, unemployment, and urban migration or by CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION 37 exacerbating their effects on individuals in a given to strengthen community associations or by trying neighborhood. Focusing on the community level to shift the structural conditions that shape them. can thus elucidate how the complex interactions Although some of these conditions may be difficult between these factors drive violent crime at the to affect in the short term, changes over time might neighborhood level. enable more sustained and effective violence pre- vention efforts. The study thus points to the effects of macro-level conditions on violence that are poorly understood, with implications for violence prevention efforts. The Urban Migration qualitative research pointed to specific ways in which Many of the most violent neighborhoods contain these conditions shape the risk of violence by either a large share of recent migrants. Despite certain affecting the level of community integration or frag- neighborhoods’ reputation for violence, proximity mentation, or interacting with community organiza- to labor opportunities and access to cheap housing tion to mitigate or exacerbate risk. A summary of the continue to fuel a steady stream of new and transi- main findings, presented as a series of hypotheses tory residents. Residents discussed how migration which could be tested through further research, is can contribute to the risk of violence if it exacer- presented in Table 2. The findings suggest that the bates competition over job opportunities and fuels conditions for community-based prevention can be unemployment. Rapid urban migration also shapes supported at different levels, either by directly trying the conditions for community-based prevention by Table 2.   Hypotheses Regarding Community-Level Effects of Known Risk Factors RISK FACTORS Fragmented Communities Cohesive Communities Sparse Weak Dense Strong Internal Ties Shared Identity Internal Ties Shared Identity Undermines shared identity and Migration/Stability of Stable residency fuels neighborhood interpersonal knowledge; weakens Residency identity and interpersonal knowledge confidence in state Few job opportunities lead to individual Job opportunities provide involvement in crime; allows crime and drug Economic Opportunities alternatives to crime trade to take root in neighborhoods Limited access to secondary education fuels Primary schools serve as visible presence of youths’ turning to crime and undermines Access to Education state and focal point for community life confidence in formal authorities Risk that disputes escalate; violence to buy Lower drug consumption reduces fear and drugs; fear of taking action Drug Consumption enables community-focused action Opportunities for involvement in drug trade; Geography/Proximity to Distance from drug routes limits risk of competition for control over neighborhoods; Drug Routes presence of armed groups widespread fear Risk that crime and disputes escalate; widespread fear; individual rather than Access to Firearms Lower risk of individual violence or fear collective response Cycle of retaliation and homicide; commodification of justice and human life; Absence of vigilante groups allows space delegitimization of History of Vigilantism for community mobilization state institutions. 38 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS weakening community ties. Residents of neighbor- tors to increase the risk of violence for individuals hoods with a high proportion of migrants expressed and communities. As several respondents pointed little sense of belonging or identity tied to their out, drugs fuel violence by motivating individuals to neighborhood, inhibiting collection actions and con- steal money to buy them or because disputes, cel- tributing to a culture of individual survival that down- ebrations, and crimes can escalate toward violence plays social responsibility. Residents come to feel when individuals are under the influence. It was also that “if nobody cared about me, why should I care common to hear that drug consumption triggers about others,” which lowers their inhibitions to par- domestic violence. Drug consumption thus increases ticipating in criminal activity. In some cases, mobil- the risk that any conflict within the neighborhood will ity also fuels violence between newcomers and prior turn violent and that innocent bystanders may be residents. The absence of shared identity limits the harmed, as one resident explained: ability of the community to address these tensions, as described by a young person from Choloma: I think they should eliminate drugs, vice, and weap- ons. For example, when people walk around under Violence is also when someone new arrives in the the influence of drugs and alcohol and have parties neighborhood and they start to humiliate him/her here, they start firing in the air, which is dangerous. for being new, if he/she comes with other things that (Youth, La Ceiba) are not common in the community like with another style, or a different accent. They get together and The prevalence of drug consumption also affects start to laugh, because this is what you see mostly neighborhood-level conditions by contributing to a here, because they start to make fun of him/her. climate of fear and mistrust of authorities. Although (Youth, Choloma) people generally support stronger measures to con- trol drug consumption, the fear surrounding drugs Rapid urban migration further creates the condi- undermines any response. People observe that mea- tions for violence at the community level through sures taken so far have not had any impact and have the inconsistent access to services experienced in in some cases led to more problems, as criminal many neighborhoods, which weakens confidence groups react violently to efforts to curb consump- in the state. Internal migration in Honduras often tion. As one respondent stated, “the more drugs and focuses on tax-free zones, which fuel a large number alcohol are prohibited, the most consumption there of migrants in search of jobs while generating low will be…more consumption and deaths.” People revenue for the cities that house them.27 The munici- therefore tend to remain silent when they see people pality of Choloma, home to several tax-free zones, consuming or selling drugs and simply stay away has especially struggled to manage the services and from them rather than report or prevent their activi- infrastructure needs associated with a rapidly grow- ties. This attitude is further reinforced in communities ing population. Municipalities that receive migrants where a transient population, high unemployment, become highly segregated in terms of access to and a lack of confidence in the state inhibit collective infrastructure and services, with neighborhoods with action. The unwillingness or inability of community a high migrant population—and often the highest members to address consumption among individual need—least served. Residents of these neighbor- youth and children enables drug use to expand, fuel- hoods exhibit low confidence in the state and in ing a vicious cycle. The example below epitomizes members of the patronato; as a result, they are more the situation in many communities, where no one is willing to trust alternative leaders who provide basic available to address specific cases of drug use. security, including armed actors. There is a girl whose mother goes to work and the girl stays alone. Over there is a place where older Drug Consumption and Trafficking people meet, and then another girl arrives, and she The consumption of drugs, which appears to be on feels bored of waiting so she doesn’t go to school the rise overall, similarly interacts with other fac- instead she goes to the house where they do illicit things. (Woman, El Progreso) 27 The International Labour Organization (ILO) at the United Nations has constantly pointed out how these industries take advantage of the lax labor legislation of specific countries to weaken some basic labor rights, such as the right to organize, and also to avoid paying overtime or to discredit the need for health services. They also avoid paying health care, child care, or other benefits, putting further strain on municipalities to provide these services. CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION 39 Geographic Proximity to Drug Transit Routes by the presence of drugs, organized crime networks, The three municipalities included in the study all lie and proximity to the drug trade. These perceptions along the main corridor for drug trafficking through are consistent with previous research in Honduras Honduras, and La Ceiba sits on a major landing that has pointed to specific pathways through which point for drugs transiting by boat or air. This proxim- poverty shapes the life histories of those who are ity expands opportunities for individual involvement considering involvement in criminal activities (Castro in the drug trade and shapes neighborhood-level and Carranza 2001). People described how the link dynamics. The presence of armed groups fuels wide- between poverty, drug trafficking, and crime runs spread fear among residents of taking any action in two directions. As violence negatively affects a that might threaten the group and undermines their particular neighborhood, the turn to criminal activity confidence that the state might respond. As a result, becomes increasingly attractive, creating a vicious they must keep authorities at arm’s length and rely cycle fueled by the combination of unemployment on the armed group to resolve problems. and drugs. A resident of La Ceiba, which has been hit hard by a slowdown in tourism linked to the rise All of this violence is a result of drugs, I’m telling you in crime, observed: honestly, all of it is a result of drug trafficking. The damage from this small group of people is affecting We’re finished in Honduras because supposedly all Honduras. Unfortunately, as a result of being tourists won’t come. I heard some countries have located in this corridor we have become affected. prohibited their entry into Honduras, I think it was (Man, La Ceiba) Panama or France. Now they won’t enter and this will bring more poverty. (Man, La Ceiba) In addition to inhibiting prevention efforts, the drug trade directly fuels neighborhood-level violence. Re- Widespread poverty and unemployment also affect sidents recognize that along the major drug routes, neighborhood-level conditions. People consumed both small-scale traffickers and highly organized with searching for basic resources are less likely to groups compete for control of strategic locations or participate in community activities. Several teachers large swaths of territory and engage in other types of pointed to another effect of poverty: it forces chil- crime. As one respondent explained: dren to work long hours, thus undermining their psy- chological development while limiting their partici- There was a criminal group here in the community pation in constructive activities.28 Yet neither poverty called Los Toritos. They were involved in narco-traf- nor unemployment alone contribute to crime; rather, ficking, and they robbed and killed until they had they interact with other conditions to shape the indi- drugs, and stole the money and the drugs. They were vidual and neighborhood-level risks. a family, from Olancho. Eventually they were killed. It happened close to el Bodegon de la Ceramica in a gun fight, they killed there two of the brothers, and Access to Education later they killed the others. (Man, La Ceiba). The incentive to join criminal activity also depends on access to education, especially at the secondary level. In all the municipalities selected for this research, Poverty and Unemployment primary education (first–sixth grades) is well covered, Economic conditions were often cited as the root as most neighborhoods have their own primary of everything that is wrong in the country, including school. Access to secondary or higher education, crime, but residents also revealed how these problems however, is extremely limited. Although secondary contribute to violence in particular ways. Most school enrollment hovers around 73 percent at the respondents pointed to the individual-level effects national level, in some urban areas those numbers of poverty in driving people, especially youth, to are much lower. Only two public secondary schools participate in crime. Their decisions depend, however, exist in El Progreso, three in Choloma, and five in La on the presence of opportunities for crime, fueled Ceiba. All of these schools are severely overcrowded, 28 A report by the international organization Covenant House provides further details on how this problem is linked to poverty and to the economic crisis in the country. See Covenant House, “El Trabajo Infantil en Honduras: Diagnóstico Situacional de Algunas de las Peores Formas de Trabajo Infantil en el País” (New York/Tegucigalpa: Covenant House/Casa Alienza, 2011). 40 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS running multiple shifts per day. Students in Choloma percent of homicides in 2013 were committed with a and El Progreso are forced to commute outside of firearm. Honduran law permits individuals to own up the city to San Pedro Sula due to the lack of seats for to five weapons, and regulations on carrying weapons them in the high schools in their own cities, and the are rarely enforced. Weapons are commonly used for costs are often prohibitive. Beyond public schools, intimidation not only in robberies but also in cases of vocational and technical schools are at least partially domestic violence and disputes between neighbors. private and require fees and equipment purchases Residents also pointed to frequent news reports of that some students cannot afford. Students who private security guards being killed as a result of struggle to access secondary education are more attempts to steal their weapons. likely to become involved in crime, as one resident explained: Now they don’t walk around as they did before, when you could walk around with your gun visible We have seen many children who finished sixth on your pants and nobody would say anything. Now grade with major sacrifices but could not get into they would kill you for it. (Man, La Ceiba) secondary school due to their situations, nor did they have the option of going to vocational training. What You do not observe guns on the street, but inside they try to do is to look for a job, and if not, they seek houses. Or maybe they are on the street but under to join whatever group is forming or is in the margins shirts. There are guns in the billiard halls. There you of the community. (Community leader, El Progreso) see any kind of people, that is risky. You see AK47s and 9 millimeters. (Youth, Choloma) Limited access to education also contributes to community-level risks of violence by undermining The pervasive presence of firearms also inhibits residents’ confidence in the state. Although most collective responsibility and community action by communities have their own primary school, commu- contributing to widespread fear. Several respondents nity leaders often emphasize that their schools were described seeing people in public with their guns established through their own initiative, with limited visible, contributing to a sense of powerlessness assistance from the state, and that the government among members of the community because it sends does little to maintain them. The government’s inad- a message of criminal groups’ total power, impunity, equate involvement in the primary schools and the and control. Rumors that criminal groups are storing limited presence of secondary schools reinforce the large arsenals in their homes, fueled by reported perception that communities are on their own and incidents of police confiscating those arsenals, cannot count on the support of their authorities. On further contributes to this fear. The prevalence of the other hand, where communities do manage to firearms thus undermines trust and communication organize, building a school can reinforce internal ties. between neighbors, inhibits efforts to work together Leaders in more organized communities recounted to prevent violence, and contributes to greater how the residents contributed the materials and reliance on individual rather than collective measures labor to build the school, while the municipality pro- for enhancing individual safety. In interviews, several vided only a few gallons of paint and some roofing crime victims described how they decided to buy materials and the state covers only teachers’ salaries, a gun after being victimized, especially if they had which often go unpaid. As one leader described: reported the crime, due to the fear of retaliation by a criminal group. Many individuals mentioned You see this beautiful school? It is not because the owning at least one gun as the only means to protect government came to set it up. I built this school here, themselves and their families. Although people it’s not in such bad shape but it’s due to the sacrifice are cautious and keep them hidden, respondents of the parents association and the community. (Com- indicated that under extreme circumstances, they munity leader, Choloma) would use them. After [the assault] what I did was that I bought a Access to Firearms weapon to defend myself on my own, since they told The prevalence of weapons similarly increases the risk me they would kill them, so I said: I will need to kill and severity of violence. According to the University also. (Man, La Ceiba) of Honduras National Violence Observatory, 83.3 CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION 41 History of Vigilantism suggests that contract killing is an important driver The long experience of Honduran communities with of increased homicides, in addition to gang violence vigilantism as a way to confront insecurity has con- and organized crime. tributed to the expansion of violence as it has taken on new forms. Rooted in the narrative that the state The increasingly widespread practice of hired killing is unable to provide justice, the system of sicariato, results in a vicious cycle that undermines collective or hired/contract killing, has become commonplace violence prevention. Justice and human life are seen in some communities and fueled an increase in as commodities that anyone with sufficient means homicides. Hired killers are widely available, and the can purchase, even on an individual basis. This price is sufficiently affordable that anyone who claims practice is also consistent with the privatization of to be a victim can hire a sicario to resolve a dispute security for much of the population, which reinforces or redress a crime. According to one respondent, the belief that the state is incapable of guaranteeing although the system of hired killing is not new, it justice and safety. Yet although users of this practice had previously been used predominantly by elites appear to achieve a sense of security, it is clear from but is now a common practice within communities. particular narratives and experiences with hired The danger of this system is obvious, since any killing that it increases the risk for all involved, as it dispute, conflict, or threat can justify the use of this leads directly to retaliation, blackmail, and extortion, system and lead to homicide. Indeed, the research which deepens the cycle of violence. 42 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS 5. Navigating the Institutional and Political Context The evolution of violence and the capacity to pre- 5.1 MUNICIPAL GOVERNANCE FROM vent it also depend on communities’ relationships COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES to municipal and national government institutions. Although for most urban residents relationships with Community leaders rely on these institutions to the state are channeled through their patronatos, secure resources and to address challenges (such these community leaders are themselves embedded as organized crime) that they cannot resolve on in a broader system of municipal governance that their own. The institutional context also shapes the shapes their role and impact on community life. As opportunities for criminal actors to establish and the official liaisons to the municipal government, the maintain their authority in certain neighborhoods. members of the patronato (usually the president) are The interactions between communities, municipal responsible for bringing all requests for infrastructure governments, and national institutions thus shape improvements or for access to water, electricity, or the “local orders” that govern how violence arises, other services to the municipal government. In the is managed, and can be prevented. In Honduras, cities examined for this research, once a request is the political and institutional context mostly creates approved by the mayor, it is put on a list of pending obstacles for crime prevention, as the combination projects until the municipal government finds the of polarized politics, weak institutional capacity, and resources to fund it. In the absence of sufficient limited resources creates an environment in which budget to cover projects or any planning processes services are unreliable and institutional actors tend to prioritize them, projects are typically funded to extract rather than to serve. Most communities only after long delays, and the city governments struggle to secure the resources that could enhance rarely find the resources to cover projects in their crime prevention activities, and people tend to mis- entirety. Instead, municipalities typically provide trust state institutions. Yet the research also sheds some materials—often purchased through favored light on how some communities succeed in build- contracting arrangements—while the community ing effective networks with municipal and national must cover the labor, equipment, and remaining authorities and in securing resources that enable materials to complete the project. As a result, the them to enhance their own crime prevention efforts. provision of infrastructure and services by the These experiences further point to specific municipal municipal government often appears arbitrary, policies and practices, such as planning, outreach, insufficient, and unpredictable. In addition, since and transparency, which facilitate community-based neighborhood residents have few alternative prevention measures. As examples below demon- means through which to make requests or register strate, the proactive support of community networks grievances, the members of the patronatos retain remains essential to crime prevention, but improve- significant discretion over the management of ments in municipal governance can help. requests and the delivery of municipal resources, and many use their positions to extract resources for Drawing from interviews with community members, personal gain. As one patronato president noted: leaders, and municipal officials, this section outlines how the political and institutional context shapes Since I am the president [of the patronato] I exercise community-level responses. It describes the prevail- more than others because I say so. If we have to ing order and identifies variations that have facilitated make a request, only I draft it and then I send it to the prevention efforts. Highlighting both the institutional secretary and only then he does it or sends it back. constraints and examples of effective service delivery I am the only contact with the municipality, even by municipal and state institutions reveals avenues personnel from the school can’t go directly to the for strengthening violence prevention efforts. municipality, they must go through me.” (Community leader, Choloma) NAVIGATING THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 43 These local-level processes are themselves shaped We make an agreement and put in 50 percent by a system of governance that is highly centralized, because the engineer told me they would provide 50 with limited authority or resources allocated to percent, of course they won’t give us money but they municipalities. Although Honduras began to will give us sand, machinery, fuel, the gravin, and decentralize certain authorities with the 1990 Law everything necessary and we put in the cement and of Municipalities, the law has been only partially the labor. But now we haven’t received a response, implemented. Pledges by the central government to we are hoping that in the coming months now that it’s increase the municipal share of revenue from 5 to 20 time for politics (elections), we will have a response. percent by 2017 and to 40 percent by 2038 have not (Community leader, Choloma) been fulfilled (World Bank 2013, 32). Transfers have been repeatedly delayed and politicized, especially From the perception of residents of urban in the polarized political context following the 2009 neighborhoods, the system produces small and coup. In the absence of steady financing, municipal often incomplete infrastructure projects that do not governments often rely on short-term loans from resolve basic needs for water, sanitation, education, private banks to finance recurrent spending, with or health, let alone more complex requirements high interest rates that divert spending from other like violence prevention. Residents of every purposes. Plans to delegate authority over service neighborhood can recall examples of half-completed delivery functions beyond solid waste management, sewage pipes and bridges and other stories of small- regulation of public spaces, and local infrastructure and large-scale corruption that are etched into their have also stalled, resulting in a patchwork of collective consciousness and shape their relationship arrangements between municipal, national, and pri- to the state. As in the case described below, such vate entities governing water, sewage, electricity, incidents can fuel violence by fomenting conflict and education, and other basic services (Vargas 2011, creating the conditions for violence to take root. 66). Municipalities end up shouldering the costs for most infrastructure inputs while retaining limited The presidents of the patronatos used to sell [pub- influence over the delivery of services. licly owned] properties and kept the money… They began to sell the properties once, again and again, In the absence of sufficient resources or clear lines until the point that there were properties with up to of authority, the system responds to political four titles, up to three or four owners… Now we don’t pressure and generates opportunities for corruption. have a school, and this is the result of these dishon- Especially in the environment of deep political est actors, of the first patronatos. They didn’t bother polarization since the 2009 political crisis, municipal leaving property for a park, for a football field, for governments play a deeply political role. Mayors a church, for a health center, for a school, for a day and their governments mobilize votes for their care. (Community leader, La Ceiba). parties, and the patronato’s role as liaison to neighborhoods places it in a unique position to The difficulty in accessing state resources also fuels support this task. Given the absence of planning or violence by weakening confidence in the state. basic data systems—none of the three cities included When it is unable to meet community requests in the study had access to a complete property or carry out initiatives that require resources, registry or cadastre that could provide a basis for equipment, or expertise, the patronato’s credibility allocating resources—investments in neighborhoods declines. As one patronato president lamented, tend to reflect the patronato members’ loyalty and when they go back to the community to ask for effectiveness in mobilizing supporters. Recognizing support, “people are bothered because they say this reality, many neighborhoods select patronatos you are just going to steal from them, they criticize based on their political connections to the mayor’s you, and they won’t participate” (Community leader, party rather than their organizational capacity within La Ceiba). The loss of credibility not only affects the the community. Even where resources do not follow patronato president’s prospects for reelection, it also political imperatives, they are sometimes diverted strengthens other actors who seek to establish their for other reasons, for example, when the members authority. Neighbors turn to informal leaders—some of the patronato collude with municipal officials for of whom are linked to criminal networks—to resolve personal benefit. One patronato president des- disputes, confront criminals, and seek resources and cribed the process for planning a project as follows: benefits. In some neighborhoods, armed groups 44 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS have even taken over positions in the patronato In some cases, changes in municipal governance and serve as their community’s official leaders and have facilitated community initiatives. Some munici- representatives. pal governments have taken steps to strengthen financing and planning systems or to increase rev- When the patronato has the most credibility is when enue and strengthen their service delivery. The he has an adequate response. When he has what he most prominent example affecting security were needs to solve the problems, when you are in the the so-called “security taxes” (tazas de seguridad) midst of conflict, that is when people believe in you, adopted by several municipal governments (World but when we come and convene the people and tell Bank 2013, 40). Involving revenue contribution and them we are going to do this project and we start oversight by the private sector and civil society, to organize it and go to the municipality, when we the taxes funded municipal collaboration with the don’t receive a response, that is when our credibility police, including such initiatives as municipal crime begins to decline. (Community leader, Choloma) and grievance hotlines, equipment purchases, and joint crime analysis, as well as the rehabilitation of In some neighborhoods, however, patronatos have public spaces. Although in some cases they merely succeeded in securing resources and earning the funded ad hoc requests for equipment by the police, support of their communities. Integrated community in the most successful cases, these measures were associations and dense ties within the neighborhood embedded within a broader set of reforms of munici- foster downward accountability and promote pal governance. In the municipality of Puerto Cortes, responsiveness by the patronato. When they are which initiated the tax, a decade of reforms involving embedded in community networks, the patronatos successive mayors led to increased revenue mobili- tend to be more committed to delivering results, and zation, improved data collection and planning, and residents have greater knowledge of their activities. agreements with the local private sector. The homi- Even in these neighborhoods, access to political cide rate dropped from 109 to 88 per 100,000 inhab- networks and personal connections to municipal itants between 2010 and 2012.29 Yet these efforts authorities remain crucial to securing resources. As ran into obstacles when the national government one patronato president explained, “For things to decided to centralize the security tax in 2011, dem- go forward you need to latch on to a member of onstrating that even well-organized municipal efforts parliament, or to someone who is not a politician depend on the national institutional context (World but is friends with the mayor” (Community leader, Bank 2013, 40). La Ceiba). In integrated communities, however, patronatos more often use these connections for community benefit rather than personal gain. 5.2 NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND Another patronato president explained how this COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION: THE POLICE, works in practice: THE JUSTICE SYSTEM, AND BEYOND National-level institutions also affect community- These bridges are works that we, with pride, com- based crime prevention both directly and indirectly. pleted with the help of the community, since the National agencies such as the police and justice labor we put in ourselves through our own activity, system, as well as schools, health care facilities, and this is also the biggest contribution from the and job creation and crime prevention programs municipality which, through the FHIS [Honduran nominally operate at the neighborhood level. From Social Investment Fund], also built the first classroom the perspective of most urban residents included that we requested. Since we were doing the school, in this study, however, national institutions were and I was working in the municipality, I told the mayor noted primarily for their absence. In interviews and who happened to be from the National party that it focus group discussions, the presence of the central would be great if they could put in a classroom since state was most often reduced to schools, with other we needed it. (President of the patronato, Choloma) services ostensibly provided by the state, such as health, job, or housing programs, rarely mentioned. 29 As of 2013, the rates once again increased to previous levels. See UNAH-IUDPAS, Observatorio Nacional de la Violencia. Data available at http://iudpas.org/observatorio. NAVIGATING THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 45 Residents reported little direct experience with the problems once in a while, even the police from the police and justice system, and those experiences nearby station don’t come.” (Man, El Progreso) mostly reinforced their lack of confidence—and sometimes contributed to insecurity and fear. Discussions and interviews yielded a more nuanced perception of the police, in which residents expressed Not only does the limited police presence enable both a desire for greater police presence and a fear criminal activity, low confidence in the police can of retaliation if they called upon them. Many respon- also inhibit collective crime prevention measures. dents saw more police as a priority for reducing vio- Respondents across communities expressed the lence and called for the construction of new police belief that they were more likely to receive assistance stations and more frequent patrols in their neighbor- from informal armed groups than from law enforce- hoods. One interviewee from La Ceiba credited the ment or other state officials. This limited credibility establishment of a police station between two neigh- contributes to the sense that no one can help—nei- borhoods with improving public safety, since “crime ther the state nor the patronato—and that only they groups from above do not come down to the com- on their own can protect themselves against crime. munity anymore.” At the same time, the vast major- This attitude can quickly translate into support for ity of the victims of assault and robbery interviewed criminal groups. for this study chose not to report the crimes to the police. This decision appeared to be based on a The perception of national authorities as it relates combination of a lack of confidence—victims do not to violence emerged most commonly through dis- believe that they will receive a response—and a fear cussions regarding the police. On the surface, these of retaliation. The widespread perception that police discussions echoed the low level of confidence in officers are linked to crime fuels the impression that the police that is common throughout the region reports to the police may be leaked to criminals, and especially pronounced in Honduras. A survey and the consequence could be dangerous. As one conducted in 2013 by Cid Gallup Latinoamerica in respondent described is response to extortion: Central America found that Hondurans have the lowest confidence in the police in the region, with I: Did you formally report the crime to the authorities? 84 percent of the population expressing little or no confidence in the police, and 18 percent express- R: No, I was afraid. I was afraid of those who were ing the belief that the police are mainly responsible supposedly arrested. I prefer paying to reporting. for crime.30 A 2012 Latin American Public Opinion Then I feel more relaxed, I don’t go around thinking Project (LAPOP) survey found that the police have why did I report, they will arrest them and investigate the worst trust among government institutions, them and I will have problems, while if I pay my mind even though they are among the institutions citizens will be at ease and I would be in a healthy and safe are most likely to have encountered directly (Perez atmosphere. (Man, Choloma) 2013). Several high-profile cases of abuse and crimi- nal activity by the police, followed by stalled reform Other elements of the criminal justice system appear efforts, have reinforced these perceptions.31 Within even less relevant from the perspective of reducing neighborhoods, the most common complaint was that violence. According to the 2012 LAPOP survey, the police rarely—if ever—respond to calls for help. trust is higher in the justice system than the police, with 37 percent of respondents expressing trust in “The security problem is that even the police are the justice system compared to 29 percent for the corrupt. Here there is a police station nearby that is police. In reality, however, residents of affected located in the neighborhood…and when there are neighborhoods rarely encounter the state justice 30 Cid-Gallup, 2013, available at: https://www.cidgallup.com/es/virtual-library/download/21-los-centroamericanos-se-preocupan-mas-por- el-crimen-callejero-. 31 In the most prominent case, four police officers were convicted for the October 2011 murder of the son of Julieta Castellanos, the rector of the National University of Honduras. The Commission for the Reform of Public Security, established in the aftermath of the murder to overhaul the police, Attorney General, and the judicial branch, along with an initiative to vet and remove corrupt police officers, has largely stalled and not produced any significant reforms. See Adriana Beltran and Geoff Thale, “Police Reform in Honduras: Stalled Efforts and the Need to Weed out Corruption” (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2013). 46 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS system. When they do report crimes, perpetrators among some individuals to cooperate with police- are seldom apprehended, and fewer still are led initiatives like the Mesas de Seguridad, and convicted.32 As a woman in El Progreso lamented, the decisions by some victims to report crimes all “what the authorities do is they take cases, put them suggest that many residents of violent communities on paper and leave them there, there is no one who are willing to give the police a chance. This appears follows up to see if the case gets resolved… They to have occurred in cases of domestic violence, say there’s no time to go around looking at every which many victims do report. As discussed below, in case.” In some localities the court system is costly to some cases—notably those of domestic violence— access, as in Choloma, where residents must travel the police and criminal justice sector have played to the nearby city of San Pedro Sula to go to court. a constructive role, which shows it is possible for For small-scale disputes or violations, citizens can the situation to improve. These experiences shed go to the municipal “justice departments,” which light on some of the elements that would improve are mandated with enforcing local ordinances, and responsiveness and overcome the negative per- some municipalities have established municipal ception of these institutions. mediation services. For criminal matters, however, they must use the national justice system, though that system appears to be captured by powerful 5.3 EXAMPLES OF EFFECTIVE RESPONSE: individuals. As the following comment suggests, the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND widespread perception of corruption in the system SCHOOL-BASED PREVENTION AND undermines most people’s willingness to pursue THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY NETWORKS justice even when they can. Within this context, examples of effective response by state institutions to incidents of violent crime The violence is quite intense, and if we try to confront shed light on the types of solutions and institutional this with the authorities so that they help us, but the changes that could improve their responsiveness authorities themselves are linked to them, that is more broadly. This section focuses on two such where the problems come in. (Man, La Ceiba) examples, drawing from interviews with victims of crimes and their communities: responses to domestic Low confidence in these institutions undermines a violence and school-based drug prevention. These range of strategies aimed at preventing or mitigating examples highlight two crucial elements for an effec- violence. Residents of affected communities rarely tive response. First, community networks were instru- report criminal behavior and routinely decline to mental in encouraging and enabling victims to seek cooperate with police investigators or serve as assistance from authorities. Second, the response witnesses. They generally seek to stay as far away came from multiple agencies with overlapping and from the police as possible, and many prefer dealing complementary responses. These elements could be with criminal groups, especially when the members reinforced for a more successful response to violent of those groups are known within the community. crime more broadly. The lack of alternative recourse further deepens the feeling of helplessness and the fear of even working on prevention efforts. As one resident put it: 5.3.1 Responding to Domestic Violence The most striking examples of effective institutional If even the police don’t arrive in response to an response emerged in interviews with victims of incident of violence, how is a simple civilian supposed domestic violence. Several victims reported positive to intervene without risking his life? (Youth, Choloma) experiences and outcomes from reporting their cases to the authorities. They found that the police acted Nonetheless, the desire for a police and justice immediately, often arresting the offender within 24 response despite these perceptions suggests that hours or providing protective measures to the victim. the lack of confidence could be overcome. Repea- Cases were referred to specialized prosecutors and ted calls for more police presence, the willingness family courts. When they reached the court, the 32 In 2013, the prosecutor general admitted that only 20 percent of reported homicides are investigated. See http://www.elheraldo.hn/csp/ mediapool/sites/ElHeraldo/Pais/story.csp?cid=575652&sid=299&fid=214. NAVIGATING THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 47 core issues, including economic disputes, right of Human Rights Ombudsman provided an additional housing, and custody, were most often decided in avenue when the police were initially unresponsive their favor. Most importantly, victims recalled being due to influence by the perpetrator. treated with empathy, respect, and efficiency, attrib- uting a stark improvement in their personal security When I went the third time to report, there was a man to the support of these institutions, as described in named Sanchez who was a friend of his stepmother the following two quotations. and he didn’t want to take the report. I went at 7 in the evening and he sent me away and told me I felt confident because I spoke to the chief of the he was not taking any reports, and that it would be investigative police (DGIC). He asked me and I told better if I came during another shift because they him [what happened]. He patted me on the back know it perfectly. The next day I came back because and told me: don’t feel bad, we are going to help it had been 24 hours, and each time I went to the you here. They told me we are going to follow the prosecutor so that forensic medicine would examine procedure, and if he comes back to bother you, call me. Then I went to Human Rights to file a report, and us and we will arrest him. (Woman, El Progreso) they told me to go back to the police so that they could receive the report, and they finally received it. All of the positive feelings I have are due to them (Woman, El Progreso) [the women’s prosecutors]. As a woman, I feel secure that I can get married and if something happened Not all cases included in this study were resolved again I would report it. I feel that everything they told successfully. Some victims remained too afraid to me was very positive. (Woman, La Ceiba) report or found that their cases did not move through the system with sufficient urgency. Even when they Further examination reveals the importance of active received a favorable judgment, women described support from community networks and organiza- how men avoided support payments despite mul- tions. In the successful cases, neighbors, community tiple court dates and threats of imprisonment. The leaders, and colleagues provided crucial moral sup- support is often quite low—one woman reported port, encouraged victims to report, helped them find receiving L 600, or about US$30 per month—as some temporary housing and employment, and served men negotiate the payment down if they cede their as witnesses before the court. Employers allowed house or control over the children. Some men suc- victims to take paid time off to report the case and ceed in obstructing the judicial process through their attend hearings. Local NGOs and women’s groups connections, as described in the example above. provided information and counsel. Moreover, it may be that domestic violence cases are actually much easier to resolve than other criminal My colleagues at work, the moment when this cases, in part because the identity of the perpetrator person came to insult me, they would come out and is always known, suggesting that such problems are protect me, sometimes accompany me to my house. even deeper for other crimes. Nonetheless, the fact They always paid attention to my case. The support I that some cases were resolved successfully—through received from my colleagues was more than support, the combination of community support and overlap- they never asked me anything, it was sufficient for ping institutional responses—suggests that similar them to see my bruises, and the times they served as elements might facilitate improved responsiveness witnesses when he came to insult me, my colleagues in other areas. never asked me. (Woman, La Ceiba) Overlapping responses by multiple state institu- 5.3.2 School-Based Drug Prevention tions, each of which provided specialized assistance, The same elements, including active community also improved outcomes. In addition to the police, support combined with overlapping responses from specialized prosecutors and judges attended to municipal and national institutions, contributed to their needs. Women’s offices in the municipal gov- effective responses to drug consumption in primary ernments provided information and helped victims schools. As many teachers and parents related, pri- navigate the system. The police officers, judges, mary school students are increasingly at risk of drug and prosecutors who provided the services, in turn, use and recruitment into criminal groups. Schools relied extensively on community networks to ensure therefore have a critical role to play in prevention victims’ needs were met. In the following case, the by fostering positive norms and intervening in indi- 48 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS vidual cases. The following case illustrates a situa- low violence and vibrant community organization. tion in which school-based prevention played an The principal, a state official who was also embed- important role in the life of one student through the ded in community networks, succeeded in mobiliz- combination of community support and a thoughtful ing community members and school resources to response by a state official. encourage the girl to seek help. Yet although the teacher played a critical role, she lacked the exper- I have a situation now with a girl in the sixth grade… tise needed to respond to teen drug use or to the When I found out what had been happening, I held threats from criminal groups. The example therefore an emergency meeting on a Friday with the parents highlights where more coordinated services could association. I could not tell them specifically who was strengthen crime prevention efforts.33 involved due to security concerns, since by the end of the meeting and as soon as I stepped outside, In sum, where institutions responded effectively, they would kill me. So I only asked that they pay community actors helped to navigate the institu- attention to what their children are doing and who tional landscape, and multiple institutions responded is accompanying them to their homes… I think these to provide overlapping support. These experiences girls are naive, but they are being seduced with suggest that building on community capacity may be drugs… Finally, the girl came to me to ask for help necessary for the state to act effectively and that col- because she did it once and wants to get out, but now laboration between state agencies may be as impor- they’re threatening her. (School principal, El Progreso) tant as the role of each one. In this respect, munici- pal governments appeared to play a central role in This incident reveals both the power and limitation of serving as the link between individuals, communities, community support and state responses. The incident and national institutions. occurred in one of the communities with relatively 33 The CONVIDA program provides a promising model in the Honduran context, especially in Choloma. NAVIGATING THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 49 6. Conclusion and Entry Points Even in the midst of widespread crime and inse- ban the sale of alcohol, rehabilitate public spaces, curity, some urban communities in Honduras have and organize neighborhood youth. The conditions found ways to prevent violence. A comparison of that enable such actions are similar to those in other nine neighborhoods in three cities with high and contexts, including a strong sense of community low levels of violent crime revealed the strategies identity, dense interpersonal ties, and shared norms. that communities pursue, the capabilities required The research also highlighted the role of specifically to pursue them, and the conditions that facilitate Honduran forms of community associations—the them. By organizing collectively and building net- patronato, churches, primary schools, sports teams, works with municipal and national authorities, these and youth and women’s groups—but found that communities have prevented criminal groups from the ties between them facilitate crime prevention taking root in their neighborhoods. Understanding more than the associations themselves. Moreover, it their perspectives, as well as the difficulties they face showed how integrated community organization can and the ways they have managed them, sheds light deepen the impact and sustainability of prevention on the building blocks for effective and sustainable approaches that rely on changes in individual beha- approaches to prevent violence. vior or in the physical environment. The residents of these urban neighborhoods face Although the study shows that community-based numerous challenges. A combination of societal- crime prevention is feasible in Honduras, it also found level factors, including a shift in the transnational a prevailing trend toward the weakening of the con- drug trade, rising unemployment, the prevalence ditions that enable prevention and the emergence of drugs and firearms, and rapid urbanization, have of more violent forms of maintaining local order in deepened their vulnerability to violence. Competi- many neighborhoods. As a result of trends like urban tion between armed groups has increased at the migration and the shift in organized crime, com- local level, and the capacity of state institutions to munities have grown increasingly fragmented, fear confront these forces has degraded as a result of and uncertainty have increased, and neighborhood- the political crisis. Examination of how these fac- wide, collective efforts have become more difficult— tors play out within urban neighborhoods further and sometimes risky—to organize. In the absence revealed that the effects of some factors, including of a reliable state presence or trusted local leaders, drug trafficking and consumption, unemployment, local armed actors have successfully asserted their and limited access to secondary education, are authority. In some neighborhoods, dominant crimi- felt especially acutely as they shape incentives and nal or vigilante groups have achieved sufficient con- opportunities to participate in crime. trol to reduce certain forms of crime, but they also tend to tolerate crimes such as extortion, assaults, In some neighborhoods, residents have collectively and drug trafficking. In other neighborhoods, the organized measures that have reduced incidents of residents have nowhere to turn for support and must violence, alleviated some risk factors, and prevented face widespread crime and violence on their own. armed groups from achieving control. The findings are consistent with theories of “collective efficacy” The study also shed light on how the political and that focus on the role of informal social control within institutional context in Honduras affects commu- communities in preventing crime, but they also high- nity-level efforts. In general, a seemingly arbitrary light forms of collective action that are specific to and unpredictable system of local governance, Honduras. These measures range from informal combined with unreliable police, justice, and other efforts to monitor suspicious activity and resolve national institutions, constrain prevention efforts by neighborhood disputes to organized initiatives to limiting access to resources and services. This insti- 50 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS tutional reality has also weakened residents’ confi- and employment opportunities. Even positive exam- dence in the state and increased their readiness to ples of community-based prevention, such as school- rely on criminal armed actors to protect them. Yet the based drug prevention, highlighted how communi- residents of some neighborhoods have succeeded in ties need government financing for infrastructure and using their networks and connections to state officials services or for expertise to deal with complex issues to bolster prevention initiatives, demonstrating that such as drug consumption and organized crime. At it is possible to navigate even a challenging institu- the same time, the research found that especially in tional context. Changes in some municipalities that the context of state weakness, organized communi- have improved planning, revenue allocation, and ties can facilitate institutional responses by connect- transparency show how improvements in municipal ing residents to authorities, enhancing trust, and governance can enable prevention efforts. supporting victims. Community-based prevention can thus deepen the impact and sustainability of The research therefore points to approaches that can other prevention efforts. contribute to preventing violence in Honduras and to providing entry points for building on and expanding The research points to the following entry points for these approaches. It suggests three broad tactics further programming and research. for strengthening community-based prevention as a foundation for broader crime prevention efforts. Invest in community organization. Integrated and First, the research found that it is possible to organized communities constitute a foundation strengthen the type of community organization that for crime prevention at the local level. Although in enables prevention in relatively short periods of time some neighborhoods the type of organization that by promoting community identity, shared norms, facilitates prevention evolved over time, the research and ties between associations and individuals. Such found that in several neighborhoods this type of efforts directly reduce crime and enhance the impact organization improved significantly within only a few and sustainability of other programs. Second, it years. Interventions by local organizations, some with identified the factors that have weakened community external support, that have invested in strengthening capability for prevention, factors that, if alleviated, community organization, promoting shared identity over time could strengthen the foundation for and norms, forging links between associations, and prevention efforts. Third, it highlighted features facilitating collective measures that deepen com- of the institutional context at the municipal and munity organization have yielded significant effects national levels that could be addressed to facilitate in enabling prevention. Such efforts complement community-based prevention efforts. Each of these approaches that emphasize improvements in physi- approaches is elaborated on below. cal infrastructure or that focus on alleviating specific risk factors. A strong finding from the research is that The research also highlighted challenges that go other neighborhood-level approaches are unlikely to beyond the scope of neighborhood-level efforts and be sustained—and may even backfire—without the that complicate crime prevention. The factors driving community organization that can ensure that public violent crime in Honduras go far beyond what indi- spaces are managed effectively, resources are tar- vidual neighborhoods can handle, particularly the geted appropriately, and efforts are accepted and transnational drug trade, economic inequality, politi- sustained by neighborhood residents. Prevention cal polarization, and governance challenges. Vio- programs, whether supported by municipal, national, lence has become deeply entrenched, as evidenced or international actors, should thus routinely devote by the growing recourse to paid assassinations to resources and attention to strengthening and inte- settle disputes. Control of some neighborhoods by grating community organization. criminal armed groups is rarely going to be over- come by urban residents acting on their own. The Target risk factors that affect community capa- police, justice, and local governance systems remain bility for prevention, especially drug and alcohol unreliable, but reforms have been contested as a consumption, the prevalence of firearms, and result of competing visions and entrenched political the limited access to education. Although mul- polarization. Even organized communities can resist tiple factors interact to increase the risk of violent the onslaught of violent crime for only so long with- crime, the research found that certain elements out the support of responsive police and justice sys- appear to deepen the effects of other risk factors. tems, municipal resources, and access to education An increase in drug consumption, the prevalence of CONCLUSION AND ENTRY POINTS 51 firearms, and insufficient access to secondary edu- also faced deep political and organizational resis- cation exacerbate the effects of unemployment, tance, as well as competing visions for the most poverty, and urbanization by creating opportunities appropriate response. Nonetheless, the research for participation in violent crime. These factors also points to widespread support for reforming the directly undermine community-based prevention police and justice system from within communities, efforts by fueling widespread fear of acting collec- municipalities, and private sector actors. Building tively, limiting community interaction, and under- on local-level support, donors and partners should mining confidence in community leaders and state explore possible entry points for reform, identify the officials. Perhaps most importantly, these factors can constraints that have impeded reform, and work with be addressed more readily than deeply rooted fac- local actors to facilitate policy dialogue and discus- tors like poverty, unemployment, rapid urbanization, sion. In the meantime, municipal governments could and the transnational drug trade, including through explore approaches to improving the responsiveness neighborhood-level responses. Community-wide of the police and justice actors at the community efforts to prevent drug consumption and access to level, for example, by learning from pilot community firearms, especially among youth, along with policy policing programs or expanding local mediation and intervention aimed at increasing access to secondary alternative dispute-resolution programs in partner- schools, could address salient risk factors for crime ship with municipal and national justice actors. and build the foundation for other community-based prevention efforts. Build the evidence base. Since crime is constantly evolving over time and space, efforts to confront it Strengthen municipal-level planning and response. must evolve as well. Experience in other countries Strengthening core systems of municipal gover- has demonstrated the value of systematic data col- nance for revenue extraction, data collection, and lection and analysis to understand its nature, causes, urban design and planning can enable prevention and actors and to identify the elements that can be programs by building the necessary revenue and tackled by different actors and institutions. In Hon- evidence base, facilitating the targeted allocation of duras, data on crime, risk factors, and prevention resources, and enhancing citizen confidence. Experi- approaches remain limited and unreliable. Neighbor- ence from Latin American cities that have reduced hood-level data on the types of crime, risk factors, homicides suggests that such reforms were integral and conditions and practices elaborated here should to those successes. In particular, strengthening sys- be tested more systematically across neighborhoods tems for transparently collecting and analyzing data to determine their validity for prevention program- on violent crime, population, and service-delivery ming, and efforts to implement these approaches needs; developing inclusive planning processes to should be measured and evaluated. Municipal- and prioritize responses; and monitoring outcomes in national-level observatories could enhance the col- partnership with the local private sector and civil lection and monitoring of data on crime and risk society can lead to a visible impact on crime. factors, and regular surveys could examine the way that crime, risk and protective factors, and changing Explore opportunities for police and justice sector social, political, and economic conditions are experi- reform. The challenges facing the police and jus- enced by urban residents. Most importantly, system- tice system in Honduras point to the need for com- atic efforts by municipal and national governments prehensive organizational reforms to address weak to use such data to plan responses and monitor their performance and widespread corruption. Although outcomes could provide the foundation for more efforts so far have made some progress, they have effective evidence-based crime prevention. 52 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Annex: Neighborhood Selection Methodology and Data The neighborhoods included in the study were selected to enable a structured, focused comparison between three different categories of neighborhoods in each city: neighborhoods with high levels of violence, neighbor- hoods with low levels of violence, and neighborhoods that had previously experienced high violence followed by a visible decline. The neighborhoods were similar enough in most other categories to permit a controlled comparison. All had a medium population size (middle two quartiles) and an income level in the bottom two quartiles, and all were located in the urban sections of the municipality. All of the neighborhoods were required to have a minimum level of organization to permit comparisons of the type and nature of organization. A set of eligible neighborhoods that met these criteria was categorized by homicide rate, and the team con- ducted inquiries with municipal officials and community leaders as to the feasibility of conducting research in these communities, based on security considerations and any notable characteristics. One neighborhood from each category (low homicide rate, high homicide rate, and recent reduction in homicide rate) was selected in all three municipalities. The selection process coincided with the process of neighborhood selection for the Honduras Safer Municipali- ties Project, financed by the World Bank. The same data and indicators were collected in order to select treat- ment and control municipalities, all of which were to have similar socio-demographic characteristics, a basic level of community organization, a primary school, and a relatively high level of crime. The communities were assigned a score and ranked numerically based on a weighted total of points assigned for each indicator. The top 20 neighborhoods were deemed eligible and “clustered” geographically in order to maximize positive spill- over effects and expand impact to form between three and six eligible clusters of three neighborhoods each. One of these clusters was assigned to be the treatment, and the other cluster was assigned to be the control. The indicators used for the selection of the neighborhoods for the comparative study and the project are listed below, followed by a list of neighborhoods with data assigned. Note that due to the different objectives of the selection (structured comparison vs. treatment and control), the same neighborhoods were not selected for both the study and the project. The selected neighborhoods have not been listed to preserve the confidentiality of the community leaders and members interviewed for the study. • Homicide rate: This was used as the primary proxy for level of violent crime. Data were collected from the National Preventive Police and the National Violence Observatory for the period 2009–12. Although other crime and dispute data were collected from municipalities and the police, they were deemed to be too inconsistent and unreliable to be used. • Population: As a proxy for population size, data were collected from the municipal cadastre on the number of housing lots in each neighborhood. This proxy was required, since the last census was conducted in 2000 and some of the municipalities have experienced significant demographic shifts since then. • Income level: The most reliable indicator to measure neighborhood-level poverty in Honduras is house- hold energy consumption. Data on monthly electricity consumption per neighborhood from 2009 (the most recent available data) were collected from the national electrical company (Empresa Nacional de Energia Electrica, ENEE). Neighborhoods in the lowest quartile in terms of average electricity consumption were selected. 54 CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS • Presence of primary school: The school is an important community institution that can serve as the platform for a variety of prevention activities. Data on the presence of primary and secondary schools and numbers of students will be collected from the official registries of the Ministry of Education and cross checked with municipal officials. • Community organization: Data on community organization were provided by municipal authorities through a rapid assessment of the types of community organizations present and active in each neighborhood. Designated officials with experience working in communities were given questionnaires regarding the presence and activity of common community organizations (i.e., patronatos, water committees, parents associations, youth and women’s groups, and churches, among others); the management quality of these organizations; and the types of projects recently implemented or currently under implementation by these organizations. Only neighborhoods that met the other criteria were assigned community organization scores. • Prioritization by municipality for crime prevention: The municipal governments and civil society in two of the cities, Choloma and La Ceiba, had developed Municipal Citizen Security and Coexistence Plans, which included priority neighborhoods for prevention efforts. These neighborhoods had been selected based on homicide rates as well as peoples’ knowledge of “hot spot” areas of the city that needed attention. Although El Progreso did not have a written plan, municipal officials had their own list of priority neighborhoods. ANNEX: NEIGHBORHOOD SELECTION METHODOLOGY AND DATA 55 56 Prioritized Income Level No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Avg. No. of by Mu- Community (Monthly Presence Households CHOLOMA Homicides Homicides Homicides Homicides Homicides nicipality Organization Energy Con- of Primary (municipal 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009-2012 for Crime Score sumption in School cadastre) Prevention Kw, 2009) Lopez Arellano 26 34 29 39 32 Y 1653 172.6 Yes El Chaparro 13 4 16 4 9.25 Y 679 8 193.5 Yes El Centro 6 12 9 5 8 Y 265 14 223 Yes Concepción 1 9 2 5 4.25 Y 184 163.28 No Santa Fe 4 2 7 3 4 Y 809 17 157.36 Yes San Antonio 2 2 12 0 4 Y 210 6 185.21 No Exitos de Anach 1 9 2 4 0 3.75 Y 493 25 165.55 Yes Rubí 7 0 4 4 3.75 Y 383 5 141.23 No Las Torres 1 5 1 6 3.25 1504 16 135.25 Yes Victoria 1 0 4 8 3.25 1383 17 160.45 Yes Cocos del Norte 1 7 3 2 3.25 169 234.47 No Trincheras 0 3 3 7 3.25 Y 165 10 165.97 No Libertad de Anach 3 2 2 4 2.75 12 151.97 Yes CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Armando Gale 1 3 3 4 2.75 Y 315 15 158.28 Yes Ceden 4 5 2 0 2.75 Y 19 206 Yes Cerro Verde 2 2 4 2 2.5 958 17 208.05 Yes Primavera 4 3 1 2 2.5 302 10 196.84 Yes 11 de Abril 3 2 5 0 2.5 20 149.13 Yes Brisas Del Rio 4 1 2 2 2.25 338 6 No San francisco 1 0 6 2 2.25 201 22 152.09 No Las Cascadas 3 2 4 0 2.25 9 208.95 Yes El Kilometro 2 1 2 3 2 Y 26 No Jardines Del Campo 1 1 4 0 2 1.75 193.95 No Edilberto Zolano 0 1 6 0 1.75 Y 1333 18 121.8 No Canada 1 2 4 0 1.75 Y 213 16 220.46 Yes Las Pilas 1 4 2 0 1.75 202 16 135.61 Yes Profesionales 1 2 2 2 1.75 153 327.05 Yes Japón 0 3 3 0 1.5 Y 272 17 120.91 Yes Milenio 0 1 1 3 1.25 325 No Las Lomas 0 0 4 0 1.0 Y 228 168.39 Yes La Fortuna/Tuana 0 1 0 2 0.8 700 No Las Americas 1 0 0 2 0.8 Y 678 153.7 Yes Brisas Del Norte 0 0 0 3 0.8 500 22 104.27 No El Porvenir 0 0 3 0 0.8 Las Flores 0 0 3 0 0.8 Unidad 0 2 1 0 0.8 Y 143.72 Yes Crematorio Muni 0 0 0 2 0.5 No Manantial 0 0 0 2 0.5 166.61 No Sinaí 0 0 0 2 0.5 137.6 No Alianza 0 0 0 2 0.5 509 26 No La Granja 0 2 0 0 0.5 207 177.4 Yes INFOP 0 2 0 0 0.5 Y 151.67 Yes Los Almendros 0 1 0 0 0.3 Y 879 130.77 No Inez Carranza 1 0 0 0 0.3 Y 0 15 174.7 Yes ANNEX: NEIGHBORHOOD SELECTION METHODOLOGY AND DATA 57 58 Prioritized Income Level No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Avg. No. of by Mu- Community (Monthly Presence Households LA CEIBA Homicides Homicides Homicides Homicides Homicides nicipality Organization Energy Con- of Primary (municipal 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009-2012 for Crime Score sumption in School cadastre) Prevention Kw, 2009) Las Delicias 7 13 9 10 9.75 Y 1613 19 156.37 Yes El Confite 6 10 13 9 9.5 Y 1063 18 210.25 Yes Bonitillo 5 5 11 10 7.75 Y 128 10 167.49 Yes Pizzaty 5 6 8 11 7.5 Y 1777 21 193.89 Yes La Isla 2 8 10 9 7.25 Y 721 22 210.25 Yes El Centro 9 11 5 3 7 201 226.42 Yes Irias Navas 3 4 14 5 6.5 Y 608 9 189.35 Yes 1 de Mayo 1 2 8 7 4.5 Y 409 27 154.38 Yes Alvarado 6 1 4 6 4.25 712 15 186.46 Yes Solares Nuevos 6 3 3 4 4 779 200.50 Yes San Judas 1 5 2 8 4 Y 473 29 193.20 Yes Nueva Esperanza 1 9 1 5 4 No La Julia 2 2 6 4 3.5 610 204.15 No CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS Suyapa 3 4 4 3 3.5 1171 151.65 No Ingles 3 3 7 3.25 477 165.08 No El Bufalo 1 2 4 6 3.25 Y 229 17 172.23 No Melgar Castro 2 2 6 3 3.25 Y 1498 17 195.01 No San José 2 2 6 3 3.25 22 141.06 No Sierra Pina 3 5 2 3 3.25 708 17 189.91 Yes Bella Vista 1 2 5 4 3 719 185.89 No Dantillo 4 2 6 3 190 170.02 Yes La Libertad 0 1 6 5 3 242 138.89 No Sinai/Altos de Sinai 2 4 6 3 51 238.38 No Mejía 4 5 1 2.5 1033 242.83 No Armenia Bonita 0 3 2 4 2.25 Y 386 20 141.72 Yes Nueva Era 1 1 4 3 2.25 No Yessenia Castillo 1 0 2 6 2.25 184 241.92 Yes El Danto 1 3 4 2 186.83 Yes El Naranjal 4 0 1 3 2 410 683.39 No Gracias a Dios 2 2 0 4 2 342 143.09 Yes Herrera 1 1 2 4 2 200.40 No Palmira 0 4 1 3 2 158 262.98 Yes Ponce I etapa 1 2 5 2 463 291.03 No Villas Neem 3 1 1 3 2 31 189.63 No El Toronjal 2 5 0 1.75 756 453.20 No Los Maestros 2 1 4 1.75 561 258.89 Yes Lempira 6 1.5 269 176.07 No Miramar 1 1 1 3 1.5 726 207.37 Yes SUTRASFCO 6 1.5 536 278.12 Villa Nueva 0 0 2 4 1.5 247.73 No Independencia 2 2 1 1.25 414 219.54 Yes Pradera 0 1 4 1.25 199 231.96 No Los Laureles 1 0 4 1.25 219 125.94 Yes Miramontes 1 0 0 4 1.25 380 223.16 No Raul Pineda 1 0 4 1.25 220 198.83 No La Barra 0 5 0 1.25 Y 199 11 223.59 No Bautista 4 1 218 142.63 No Carmen Elena 0 0 4 1 232 287.05 Yes El Siete 4 1 139.20 No Lomas de Palmira 0 0 1 3 1 71 123.72 Yes Nueva Esperanza 0 0 1 3 1 No Sam Creek 4 1 828 Yes Buenos Aires 0 2 1 0 0.75 253 201.45 Yes El Sauce 0 0 0 3 0.75 833 448.14 Yes La Esperanza 0 0 0 3 0.75 146 163.85 No Casa Blanca 2 0 0 0 0.5 63 214.13 Yes El Iman 0 351 264.20 Yes ANNEX: NEIGHBORHOOD SELECTION METHODOLOGY AND DATA 59 60 Prioritized Income Level No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of Avg. No. of by Mu- Community (Monthly Presence Households EL PROGRESO Homicides Homicides Homicides Homicides Homicides nicipality Organization Energy Con- of Primary (municipal 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009-2012 for Crime Score sumption in School cadastre) Prevention Kw, 2009) El Centro 8 14 5 14 10.25 121 7 184 Yes Palermo 6 9 5 6 6.5 Y 1043 23 169.62 Yes Mang y 4 0 6 9 4.75 680 27 160 Yes Bendeck 3 5 9 2 4.75 884 22 182.1 Yes Suazo Córdova 0 0 8 9 4.25 Y 615 24 140.6 Yes San Miguel 5 3 2 6 4 Y 325 20 131.6 Yes Los Angeles 6 5 0 4 3.75 431 195.6 No San Francisco 2 5 4 2 3.25 519 13 178.77 Yes Corocol 1 3 5 2 2.75 331 145.53 No Rodolfo Cárcamo 3 3 4 0 2.5 163 19 144.99 No Primavera 1 5 1 2 2.25 Y 646 18 154.1 Yes Los Castaños 5 0 1 2 2 246 16 137.9 Yes Sinaí 2 3 1 2 2 30 7 130.81 No CRIME, VIOLENCE, AND COMMUNITY-BASED PREVENTION IN HONDURAS 12 de Junio 3 2 3 0 2 317 122.98 No Canaan 2 4 1 0 1.75 No Suyapa 5 1 1 0 1.75 306 16 124.2 Yes Kennedy 1 0 2 3 1.5 170 161.98 No Los Pinos/El Pino 1 1 1 3 1.5 72 281.22 Yes Rodas Alvarado 0 1 2 3 1.5 235 123.41 Yes Alex er López 0 2 4 0 1.5 No Berlín 0 1 5 0 1.5 417 149.2 Yes Buenos Aires 0 4 2 0 1.5 137 158.08 Yes Las Acacias 0 1 2 3 1.5 156 380.51 No Subirana 0 2 0 3 1.25 No 19 de Julio No.1 0 2 1 2 1.25 177 122.24 Yes San José 0 3 0 2 1.25 193 216.17 Yes 27 de Octubre 1 2 2 0 1.25 129 104.96 Yes Las Mercedes 1 0 4 0 1.25 229 157.13 No Las Palmas 2 3 0 0 1.25 65 123.96 Yes Penjamo 2 3 0 0 1.25 141 133.23 Yes San Antonio 3 1 1 0 1.25 Los Laureles 2 0 0 2 1 Y 204 27 127.53 Yes 2 de Marzo 1 1 2 0 1 Y 472 24 159.58 Yes Altos de El Progreso 3 1 0 0 1 Y 86 9 106.72 No Brisas del Sur 3 1 0 0 1 66 84.45 No Carlos Roberto Reina 0 1 3 0 1 104 117.25 Yes Centro América/ 1 0 3 0 1 112 122.3 No Centro Americana Fraternidad de la Paz 3 0 1 0 1 179 186.47 No Nueva Jerusalén 0 1 3 0 1 78 120.92 No Juan Ramón Morales 2 1 1 0 1 Y 97 20 103.4 Yes La Libertad 2 2 0 0 1 90 142.25 Yes Las Delicias 0 0 4 0 1.0 116 189.9 No Nuñez 0 3 1 0 1.0 Yes Policarpo Paz García 2 2 0 0 1.0 Y 192 13 141.9 Yes Quebrada Seca 1 0 3 0 1.0 383 155.9 Yes Aurora 0 0 0 3 0.8 76 172.8 No Paredes 0 1 0 2 0.8 120 136.7 No Cabañas 0 0 3 0 0.8 146 212.6 No Monte Fresco 0 1 2 0 0.8 No Montevideo 0 2 1 0 0.8 145 194.4 No Nueva Jerusalen 0 0 3 0 0.8 78 120.9 No Ramirez Reina 0 1 2 0 0.8 182 166.9 No San Jorge 2 0 1 0 0.8 Y 436 115.4 Yes Castillo 0 0 0 2 0.5 39 176.3 No 3 de abril 1 0 1 0 0.5 Y 224 108.1 Yes Fátima 0 1 1 0 0.5 Y 87 102.8 Yes 7 de abril 0 0 1 0 0.3 Y Yes San Martin 0 0 1 0 0.3 Y 67 124.0 No Canadá 0 0 0 0 0 150 147.0 Yes Esperanza de Jesús 0 0 0 0 0 288 166.4 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 188 145.4 No ANNEX: NEIGHBORHOOD SELECTION METHODOLOGY AND DATA 19 de Junio 61 References Agostini, Giulia, Francesca Chianese, William French, and Amita Sandu. 2007. “Understanding the Processes of Urban Violence: an Analytical Framework.” Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, London. 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