Russian Federation

Russian Federation Gender Assessment

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Acknowledgments

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Overview

An egalitarian socialist legacy and relatively high and growing levels of income—particularly over the last decade—have translated into fairly equal gender outcomes in Russia along many dimensions. There are no significant differences in education levels between men and women, and in recent years more young women have completed post-secondary education than young men. Girls outperform boys in reading in standardized exams and do as well as them in math and science. At first glance, women do not seem to have difficulties in transitioning from school to work or remaining employed over the life cycle. And female labor force participation is significantly above the levels observed in other countries in Europe and Central Asia, as well as in the OECD.

As the World Bank (2012a) has shown, economic development brings institutional improvements such as education, which in turn lead to gender equality in some outcome domains. But whether these positive impacts of development on gender outcomes are strong or weak depend on how well-oiled is the engine of economic development, e.g. how well markets and service delivery institutions function, how supportive of change the cultural environment is. Thus, in reality, many gender imbalances do not disappear with economic development. The Russian Federation is no exception. While on surface high education and high levels of female participation in labor markets may suggest gender equality in labor market outcomes, high sector segregation and gender income gaps remain, with women earning on average 70 percent less than men. And, while improvements in health delivery services have had a positive impact in reducing maternal mortality levels, they have not been sufficient to reduce excess male mortality, deeply rooted in social norms about gender and a strong division of gender roles.

This new assessment of gender equality issues in Russia seeks to gauge the progress in all the domains of outcomes during the last 10 years, and to further understand the main causes behind the persisting gender gaps identified in the country. This assessment builds on the analytical framework proposed by the World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development (World Bank 2012a) to provide a general overview of gender issues in Russia, and it builds on literature at the frontier in economics to go deeper in the two selected topics: adult mortality and gender gap in pay.

This new assessment takes on board the difficult challenge of serving a wide audience, both internal and external to The World Bank Group, from policy makers to academics and experts. On the one hand, internally, it seeks to inform the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) discussions and to support World Bank teams in their efforts to improve gender attention in their projects; and thus this report provides both an up-to-date overview of comprehensive selection gender outcomes in key priority areas.¹ The analysis builds on and expands previous work on gender issues at the national, regional, and global levels (Paci 2002, World Bank 2004, 2012a and 2012b) and it complements other analytical work on jobs, economic mobility and aging in Russia. In this way, this report also aims at serving key national stakeholders involved in policy making, to both integrate gender into their activities or to introduce new specific policies needed to overcome the persistent gender imbalances. On the other hand, this report

¹ Part 1. Gender Inequality in Russia: A Panorama.
also seeks to reach academics and experts interested in gender, labor markets, and health, by providing new analytical insights about the determinants of persistent gender differences in labor market outcomes, and male mortality. Identifying these determinants allows to better target policy interventions aimed at increasing gender equality.

To serve this diverse audience, the gender assessment is composed of four different pieces organized in two groups. The first two pieces of work update the early 2000s general panorama of gender equality in the Russian Federation and provide a general overview of gender issues in the three dimensions of gender equality: endowments, economic opportunities, and voice and agency (World Bank 2012a). The first document offers a panorama of the situation across these areas based on the most recent and multiple data sources for Russia; while the second piece offers a summary of the scholarly production and existing literature by national researchers on gender issues. The second part of the assessment includes two pieces focusing on the analysis of critical gender gaps in Russia—that have persisted over the decade and beyond with little change- by exploring the causes of excess male mortality from a gender and social norms perspective and of the prevalent and persistent gender wage gap in the country. Income growth has some influence in shifting these patterns but does not eliminate the gaps in the sectors or occupations where women and men work, nor the resulting earnings gap; and has not appear to have affected the propensity of Russian men to engage in risky behavior, or change specific habits related to their early mortality patterns.

Higher gender equality can boost economic development through its positive impact on productivity growth, the quality of institutions, and the welfare of the next generation (World Bank, 2012a). Understanding the root causes of persistent gender inequalities and designing policies that tackle those can therefore have a high payoff. The World Bank can contribute to this process by adequately evaluating and addressing gender issues within its portfolio. This Gender Assessment will provide new and useful information and analysis that will help teams achieve this goal.

The main messages resulting from this analysis were presented to government representatives, civil society organizations, and the research community on December 2, 2013 and triggered a dialogue at the national-level dialogue, highlighting the need to focus on gender inequality in policy action, and which should be followed by the upcoming national and regional technical pieces and policy instruments.

**Main Messages**

A general look at the Russian Federation situation on gender equality over the last two decades seems to indicate that the country maintains high levels of gender equality in many areas. However, a more observant look reveals that some gender gaps have proven to be very resilient to change. The positive trends in education and employment already identified in the mid-2000s, when the World Bank produced a series of reports covering gender issues in Russia have continued (Baskakova et al. 2006,
World Bank 2004)\textsuperscript{2} are now stagnant; and little progress has been seen in the domains of struggle: large gender gaps in pay and high adult male mortality rate.

High male mortality is still a concern in the country, and women’s participation in economic activity is still rewarded at much lower wages than men’s. The gender disparity in life expectancy has not improved, and men’s life expectancy currently trails that of women by 12 years, only 1.2 years less than the difference observed at the beginning of the century. The pattern of early male mortality has also remained motionless: the highest rates are still observed among the working age population, and the major causes are related to cardiovascular diseases and alcoholism.\textsuperscript{3}

The story is not very different when looking at gender disparities in earnings, and in spite of the progress in education. The overall disadvantage that women face in the labor market remains unchanged with persisting gender gaps in access to economic opportunities and wage gaps. Women continue to be paid less than men—the raw gender wage gap was 26 percent in 2010, the highest among the majority of European and Central Asian countries—\textsuperscript{4} and employment segregation by gender remains high, and twice as large in comparison to other large countries like Brazil. The high investments in women’s education have not been reflected in labor market outcomes. Different factors including lack of skills among women in low paying occupations, career choices for educated women, and legal regulations still prevent women from working in specific jobs and sectors, facing a ‘glass-ceiling’ that severely limits their upward mobility and higher managerial representation, and their engagement in entrepreneurial activities.

Gaps in indicators related to women’s voice and participation in society (or agency using the language adopted post-World Development Report 2012) have sturdily remained unchanged for a country with a tradition of equality inherited from the soviet era, and that has opened to western culture. For example, female participation in the political sphere as well as in firm management and ownership continue to show extremely low levels. Only 13.6 percent of parliament members are women, representing an increase of less than 4 percentage points since 2003,\textsuperscript{5} and well below the 21 percent average across the world and OECD countries.\textsuperscript{6}

Social norms regarding care and family responsibilities have evolved at a very slow pace, and violence against women rests a problem. Women are still expected to be the main care providers for children and the elderly, and Russian society sees care as mainly a family responsibility. An astonishingly high 79 percent of people believe that care for pre-school children is mainly the family’s responsibility, and a little over half of the individuals interviewed for the Gender and Generations Survey also perceive eldercare as a responsibility of the family. Women perform the majority of care tasks including dressing


\textsuperscript{3} Main causes of death include circulatory diseases, external causes of injury related to alcohol consumption, and suicide.

\textsuperscript{4} with the exception of Azerbaijan, Estonia and Kyrgyz Republic

\textsuperscript{5} In 2003 9.8 percent of the parliament was represented by women.

\textsuperscript{6} Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in National Parliaments Database
children, putting them to bed, caring for them when ill, and helping them with the homework. Women are also twice more likely to help elders in their families with personal care.

Thus, as highlighted throughout this summary and the different parts of this assessment, higher gender equality can boost economic development through its positive impact on productivity growth, the quality of institutions and the welfare of the next generation (World Bank 2012a). Understanding the root causes of persistent gender inequalities and designing policies that tackle those can therefore have a high payoff. Clear and determined efforts to reduce gender inequalities and increase women’s access to opportunities in all areas of life are central to achieve more equal and thriving societies. Both economic and individual wellbeing depend on equal access and benefit from the opportunities available to individuals.

Part I. Gender Equality in the Russian Federation: Where does it stand?

The Russian Federation has seen many changes over the first decade of the XXI century. As noticed, some of these changes have contributed to close gender gaps and others have not had the expected impact, observing some sticky domains. While attitudes seem to suggest a very egalitarian society in its views –in particular in relation to family formation, fertility and the distribution of care tasks– in practice women remain the main care providers for children and elderly, which become worrisome for an aging society. As new challenges arise, actions need to be set in place now to prevent gender inequalities from staying in place for another ten years.

The academic community in Russia is aware of the need to discuss, analyze, and find solutions to mitigate sticky domains of gender inequality. Gender-related reports and publications released in Russia between 2004 and the first half of 2012 amounted to over 800 publications, covering an array of areas. However, the authors of the commissioned literature review of this task note that attention to gender in scholarly production has diminished as compared to the 1993-2003 period, with fewer publications being released, suggesting a shift of attention to other areas. However, the quality of the remaining research has moved from more general analysis of gender issues to more in-depth work, including more sophisticated statistical and econometric techniques. The penetration of electronic media has helped making gender studies and discussions more public, and in response, areas of analysis have centered in pervasive gender inequalities.

Academic production shows that while Russian legislation appears to be non-discriminatory and to protect women, the enforcement of the law is still on-hold. And, in a similar vein, while the education system sees more girls enrolling, their achievements have lower economic payoffs in the labor market. Surprisingly, there were fewer studies devoted to gender aspects of health and healthcare, except for the well-known problem of excess male mortality, or focused on specific groups such as rural women and migrants.

7 Kalabhakina (2013) notes that while comprehensive, the literature review may have failed to document all publications released over the last decade in Russia given the focus of the review on the following areas: legislation, education, health, political participation, violence, and employment.
When it comes to economic opportunities, research seems to be more attentive to women’s issues, including their vulnerability to economic crises, the barriers that some labor market regulations represent, and issues covered more in-depth in this volume of analysis including occupational segregation, women’s low vertical mobility and gender pay gap.

The national academic production has also noted that, in order to move forward with finding solutions to deep rooted issues such as violence against women, more knowledge and data needs to be produced. The development of gender statistics is a key element to better understand problems and track results of potential solutions.

The analysis conducted based on the most recent data on ‘Gender Equality in the Russia Federation: A Panorama’ included in the first part of this gender assessment, is very much aligned with the findings of local researchers. Reverse gender gaps – where men are at a disadvantage – can be found in the areas of education and life expectancy, with young men lagging behind girls in education enrolment and completion, and adult men dying much earlier than women.

As it has been mentioned, adult male mortality is a serious concern in Russia, and although improving over time, is still lagging. The adult mortality rate for men is more than twice that of women (1975 per 100,000 adult men vs. 870 per 100,000 adult women). The trend, however improving, it has remained largely unchanged. Adult male mortality rate has decreased from 2306 (deaths per 100,000 adult men) in 2003 to 1975 (deaths per 100,000 adult men) in 2010. Beyond the typical male adult diseases such as heart attacks, the main concern in Russia are external causes of injury – largely related to alcohol consumption, and suicide rates, both revealing the low value of life for many adult men. As it will be showed in the analysis in Part II, social and gender issues overlap with other risk factors. Young men are also lagging behind young women in educational outcomes with more women than men earning university degrees or technical tertiary education (56 percent over 39 percent), but this difference is compensated in terms of returns once they enter the labor market.

Even if the Russian Federation seems at first glance as one of the most egalitarian countries in terms of women’s economic opportunities, statistics beyond female labor force participation uncover another reality. In spite of the high female labor force participation, women work for fewer years than men due to early retirement and childbearing interruptions – in particular among those women with 3 or more children. More importantly, women earn about 30 percent less than men in their jobs, placing Russia as an outlier in terms of gender gaps in pay for its level of gender gap in employment. Finally and in contrast to other high-income countries, although women are more educated than men, they continue to work in ‘female industries and occupations’ partly as a consequence of sticky social norms but also because of outdated labor legislation that forbids them to take certain jobs.

The high level of occupational segregation – which has remained largely unchanged for the past fifteen years – can impact women even before they enter the labor market. On the one hand, women might spend more years in the education system to acquire credentials that allow them to perform as well as men in the labor market. On the other hand, they will tend to concentrate in certain fields of study that are more appropriate for ‘female’ jobs. These differences are also influenced by the existence of restrictions to women’s employment in a large group of occupations coming from the Labor Code.
Women’s employment rates are lower than men’s in two periods of their life. Early on, when women are still at school or during their child bearing years - the mean age for first births was 24.6 years of age in 2009\(^8\) and at the end of their working life (ages 55-59) when they approach retirement age and, in some cases, may be helping younger women with childcare needs. In fact Russian society places the childcare burden mostly on the family rather than on society. Almost 79 percent of people believe that care for pre-school children is mainly the family’s responsibility\(^9\). And women are the ones that take on most of household and childcare responsibilities. Only a third of mothers with a child under the age of six less than half are using child care services for the youngest child. This has a direct impact in women’s labor force engagement. A third of mothers with three or more children are out of the labor force, and almost 40 percent of them work less than eight hours a day. The second main care providers among family members are grandmothers.

Finally, changes in policies, including the expansion of childcare services, could be accelerated by increasing the presence of women in decision-making positions. Low female participation in decision-making bodies reduces the ability of women to influence policy making. The number of women in the Federation Council has declined in both absolute and relative terms: in 2005 there were 10 women (5.7%) among 175 members of the Council, while in 2010 there were only 7 women (4.3%) among 164 senators. The share of women in the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), has increased slightly, but at 14% remains low in comparison to other countries. Lack of policy action in areas such as domestic violence, including lack of reliable data in terms of victims, is likely to see a change if representation of women increases.

As the World Development Report 2012 notes, economic growth can help close some gender gaps, but it is not sufficient to guarantee positive movements towards gender equality. The Russian Federation is an example of this. While observing sustained growth between 2002 and 2012 accounting for a total 57%,\(^10\) gender equality has not evolved at the same pace, and pervasive differences remain. The second part of the analysis focuses on two areas that exemplify this situation. Excess male mortality and gender pay gaps have seen little to no change in the past decade, and progress will keep slow unless policy actions to address them are implemented.

**Part II. Focus areas: Excess Male Mortality and Gender Wage Gaps**

Persistent gender inequalities respond to a combination of multiple overlapping factors and have impacts beyond the specific area of inequality analyzed. Two of the most pervasive areas in the case of Russia are early male adult mortality and the gender wage gaps.

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8 Source: UNECE
9 Source: GGS
10 Growth is measured using yearly series of constant 2005 USD, from WDI
Male mortality
The Russian Federation will soon face the same challenge of other European countries: an aging population, declining fertility, and hence the need of actions to ensure that population trends do not have a large impact on economic growth and on long-term fiscal sustainability. An additional challenge for Russia, particularly in the case of males, is to ensure that they reach long age, and live long enough to reach retirement. Excess male mortality—particularly in middle age—remains a significant challenge. While male life expectancy has improved somewhat in recent years, it is still substantially lower than would be expected for a country of Russia’s income level. The excess mortality problem hits men in their most productive years of life, with a Russian man in the early thirties being four times more likely to die than his American counterpart, and a Russian man aged 60 or above being four times more likely to die of heart-related problems in a year than a Spaniard of the same age.

There are important social and economic consequences of the high death rate of men, especially at the employable age. First, there is the economic loss generated by a reduction in the active labor force. Secondly, it leads to high health care costs, high dependency ratios in the social insurance system, and the destabilization of the family.¹¹ The poverty impacts can also be significant (in 2003 about 78 percent of single parent families—largely headed by women—subjectively assess their condition as living in destitution compared to 56 percent of two parent families).¹²

The note on excess male mortality seeks to understand the underlying factors behind this phenomenon. While widely investigated from a risk behavior perspective—pointing at alcohol consumption as the main culprit of male deaths; the question of what drives these behaviors remains open. Some analysis has pointed to the transition from communism to open market economy generating psychological stress due to the loss of the sense of protection from government; others have argued that high unemployment levels were a main cause, though both causes are now less significant. But evidence also indicates that social norms and gender norms play an important role on people’s risk-taking decisions. The analysis focuses on these potential root causes to the excess male mortality crisis in Russia.

Social norms affect men and women differently and commonly change at a slower pace than other economic or even individuals’ ideas, particularly self-imposing beliefs, largely driven by incomplete or asymmetric information leading to distorted perceptions of the future.¹³ The causal effects of social norms on risk-taking decisions are not easy to identify, as they are confounded with other unobserved factors. Aritomi (2013) presents a framework aimed at explaining the gender differences on the association between social norms and engagement in risky behaviors among Russian men, and how they create incentives for men and “protective” barriers for women to participate in risk-taking activities.

¹² See Baskakova, Marina; Mezentseva, Elena; Zotova, Elena. 2006. Gender issues in modern Russia: based on formal statistics.
¹³ See Kuntsche et al (2009) and Mackie and LeJeune (2009)
Based on a classic role theory, the paper proposes a theoretical model that attempts to explain gender differences on the propensity to engage in risky behaviors by looking at three main arguments: loss of identity and life meaning, single vs. multiple social roles that impact individual’s time availability, and gender-specific social norms. The first argument is linked to several analysis of the transition process in the 1990s, when economic and political transformations created a sense of instability for Russians, and affected their sense of identity. Paired with changes in the political, social, and particularly the economic structure, including increased unemployment level and work instability this affected men more than women. Authors suggest that men reacted to these social and economic changes intensifying their heavy alcohol drinking and aggressive behavior patterns, as a way to reinforce their sense of masculinity (Hinote and Webber 2012, Gough 2006). While women roles and activities as caregivers, family caretaker, and even paid workers, men saw their main role of breadwinner challenged. Women’s multiple roles as well as social sanctions to their engagement in heavy drinking—considered normal and acceptable among men—seems to have protected them from engaging in risk activities as coping mechanism, both from an identity point of view, but also in terms of their availability of free and leisure time. These trends appear to have remained over time instead of disappearing as the country stabilized under its new economic and social situation.

The analysis is helpful in revealing why some programs and policies implemented in Russia appear to have had important effects on the more recent male life expectancy trend, while others have failed to do so. Dissemination programs through anti-alcohol campaigns as well as legislation changes (i.e. regulations of alcohol production, price, and distribution and tobacco bans) are likely to continue moving the life expectancy trend of Russian men upward. But it also shows that more needs to be done, particularly in the areas of psychological factors as well as changes in traditional cultural and social gender-based norms, in order to reverse these trends.

**Gender Earnings Gaps**

As mentioned earlier, gender differences in education achievement favor women, but this advantage does not translate into more favorable labor market outcomes. This means the labor market in the Russian Federation is both penalizing the acquisition of skills by a large group of the society, and not taking advantage on the best human capital available. Combined with legal disincentives to work in certain industries and occupations, and the lack of support with care-related activities, this might generate disincentives for younger women to participate in the labor market, with related impacts on their agency, household wellbeing, and the economic development of the society. The high gender gap in pay is a sign of deep-rooted underlying processes of gender inequality, which we are interested in transforming not only because we may want to live in societies that offer equal opportunities to all of the population, but also because it makes economic sense. Skilled women should be able to work in the

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15 The moral hazard model framework partially explains why some individuals are more prone to engaging in risky behaviors if they perceive that the immediate benefits are greater than the future negative effects on health or mortality (Gruber 2009).
same jobs as skilled men, and equal pay for equal job is a necessary incentive to make women apply to and maintain the same jobs as men.

Equality in labor participation does not necessarily imply equality in earnings in the Russian Federation. The gender gap in pay has hardly changed over last twenty years from 27 percent in 1995 to 31 percent in 2010. In 2010 the same gap was only 7 percent in Norway;\textsuperscript{16} and while higher gender gaps in pay are expected in countries with higher female labor force participation—as high-skilled women are more likely to work than low-skilled women other things constant—the Russian Federation is a clear outlier with a gender gap in pay higher than that observed in countries with similar levels of female labor force participation.

The gender gap in pay is driven by a strong tradition of occupational segregation, with men employed in male occupations and women in female occupations that were—and still are—underpaid compare to male occupations (Oglobin 2005). Occupational segregation has also been reinforced with a strong protection to hazardous jobs that restricted employers to hire women in certain occupations\textsuperscript{17}. But studies analyzing the gender pay gap in the Russian Federation have yet to identify clearly which factor—segregation, education and skills, discrimination—explain gender earnings gaps. Twenty years after the transition of the Russian Federation to a market economy, this volume contributes with a novel analysis by Atencio and Posadas (2013) to try to better understand the drivers of the current wage gap.

The analysis finds several relevant determinants of wage gaps. First, Russian women are in jobs with fewer options of career development, either by choice or by lack of opportunities. Women tend to be found in less productive occupations. Second, the causes for the observed gender pay gap vary along the wage distribution. While at the median of the earning distribution differences in labor market characteristics of men and women explain a good proportion of the gender gap in pay; for the lowest paid groups lack of skills seems to be the main barrier. For the higher income earners, women appear to be overqualified compared to men and are unable to access jobs that pay them as much as men given their qualifications.

These findings point to the need of differentiate policy interventions. Women at the bottom of the earnings distribution will need support to increase their labor market skills, since equalizing the characteristics to those of men at the bottom of the earnings distribution would reduce the gender gap in pay in half. In contrast, women at the top of the distribution need support to break the glass-ceiling preventing from accessing jobs remunerating their skills as much as men’s.

Occupation and industry concentration is still relevant, but it differs in its importance depending on women’s position along the wage distribution. Again, low-paid women tend to be employed in low wages industries, often in the same occupations as men. If these women were employed in the same economic sectors as men their gender wage gap would decrease in half. In contrasts, occupational

\textsuperscript{16} Figures refer to raw gender gap in pay, measured as monthly total earnings.

\textsuperscript{17} The labor code states that women should not perform "hard physical" labor, jobs "with harmful or dangerous labor conditions or work underground except for nonphysical jobs or sanitary and consumer services. The 460 occupations currently forbidden include steelworker, freight fighter, oil well worker, or train operator.
differences within sectors explain most of the gender pay differences between more skilled women and their male counterparts.

The Russian Federation should put in place policies to help women to advance in their careers according to the education they have. Helping women to achieve the top makes economic sense as the country is not taking advantage of the full potential of the investment in women’s education and skills. Examples of policies that can help Russia to break the glass ceiling vary from instating quotas for women in corporate boards, promoting more transparent process of promotion within firms, awareness raising and increasing information for women on the potential advantages of job-to-job transition, together with support mechanisms to help lowering the cost of on-the-job job searches; and actions to encourage employers to break the inertia and promote women to higher levels in the corporate ladder.

References


1. Gender Inequality in Russia: A Panorama

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The World Bank
## Contents

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................................ 1

Main Messages ....................................................................................................................................... 5


Part II. Focus areas: Excess Male Mortality and Gender Wage Gaps ......................................................... 9

  Male mortality ...................................................................................................................................... 10

2. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 16

2. Subjective wellbeing ............................................................................................................................ 16

  2.1 Measures of subjective wellbeing .................................................................................................. 17

3. Endowments ...................................................................................................................................... 20

  3.1 Health .......................................................................................................................................... 20

  3.2 Education ...................................................................................................................................... 22

4. Economic Opportunities .................................................................................................................... 24

  4.1 Employment .................................................................................................................................. 26

    4.1. Earnings ..................................................................................................................................... 32

    4.2. Entrepreneurship ....................................................................................................................... 34

5. Agency and voice ............................................................................................................................... 38

    5.1. Gender related views of society ................................................................................................ 39

    5.2. Family formation ........................................................................................................................ 41

    5.3. Legal and institutional framework ............................................................................................ 45

    5.4. Voice ......................................................................................................................................... 46

    5.5. Domestic violence ....................................................................................................................... 47

6. Conclusions ....................................................................................................................................... 49

Appendix ............................................................................................................................................... 1

  Appendix 1. Data sources ..................................................................................................................... 1

  Appendix 2. Subjective Wellbeing ......................................................................................................... 3

  Appendix 3: Fertility by cohort and ages ............................................................................................. 6
1. Introduction

Equality between men and women takes place in many dimensions, including a wide range of social, economic, and cultural dimensions—from health and education to economic opportunities, and participation in political decision-making. This panorama note aims at giving an overview of the gender gaps and differences across these areas in the Russian Federation.

The findings of the study point to gender asymmetries in different areas of life, and how they interrelate and overlap creating specific gender differences and inequalities, especially with respect to high male adult mortality and low male life expectancy, higher female education attainment yet female disadvantage in wages and lack of support for work-family conciliation; and limited female participation in decision-making and persisting violence against women. The analysis reveals that many of these gaps have remained unchanged during the past ten years.\(^\text{18}\)

The dimensions of gender inequality are presented following the World Development Report (WDR) on Gender and Development (2012). The framework provided in the WDR is a useful starting point, identifying three dimensions: human capital endowments, economic opportunities (including access to resources) and agency. These three dimensions are equally important and are interrelated aspects of wellbeing and gender equality. The WDR finds that improvements in one domain stimulate advances in others, and that, they largely are affected by issues related to the functioning of markets—credit, land, labor- public policy and institutions of the state, and social norms and culture.

Several data sources are used for the analysis of gender inequalities, including The World Value Survey (WVS), the Life in transition Survey (LiTS), the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), the Gender and Generations Survey (GGS), as well as data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.\(^\text{19}\)

The resulting gender differences are reflected also in individual’s perceptions and their evaluation of their subjective wellbeing. The analysis starts by looking at gender differences in subjective wellbeing, and moves next to reviewing gender inequalities in each of the three dimensions, starting by endowments and finalizing with agency.

2. Subjective wellbeing

Measures of subjective wellbeing are receiving a renovated attention, as researchers and policy makers do more experimentation in the collection of this type of data. Interesting results are obtained when contrasting it with traditional measures of wellbeing (OECD 2012, Ravallion 2012a, 2012b). Examining


\(^{19}\) Details and characteristics of the data are discussed in Appendix 1.
measures of subjective wellbeing for men and women is useful as they provide suggestive evidence about the existent constraints coming from social norms, markets, and formal institutions. In this section, we present evidence on subjective wellbeing measures for men and women.

2.1 Measures of subjective wellbeing

Women self-assess to be less satisfied with their life than men. Both the World Value Survey (WVS) and the Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) ask questions about subjective wellbeing. It is interesting to present the information from both sources as the questions differ in (a) the wording, (b) the leading questions, and (c) the average characteristics of respondents by gender; and all these parameters influence responses (Gamberoni and Posadas, 2012). In particular, the main difference is that the LiTS asks about the wellbeing of households while the WVS asks about the individual satisfaction. In addition, the WVS and the LiTS contain different information that allows examining different aspects that relate to gender differences. Both sources indicate that women tend to report to be less satisfied than men—either themselves or the household (Figure 1).

The usual U-shaped relationship between age and wellbeing is not observed for Russian men. Age tends to be commonly found to be an important factor explaining wellbeing, life satisfaction and happiness. Usually, subjective measures and age have an inverted U-shaped association (Graham 2011). However, in the case of Russia this pattern is not confirmed for men whose level of satisfaction does not change much with age. Figure 2 shows that Russian men experience a fall in satisfaction levels after the age of 40, showing a concave shape (vs. the usual convex pattern), and for adult men in Russia to be happier compared to other adult men in ECA. For women, the usual U-shaped relationship is observed. Although elderly men (above 75 years of age) report similar levels of satisfaction to men in other ECA countries, the conclusion should be taken with caution given the small number of observations for these sample, partly due to the high adult make mortality.

Although women are less satisfied with life than men, the difference shrinks considerable if women are employed. When running a regression of life satisfaction on basic characteristics: age, number of children, marital status, employment dummy, and education level controls we see that women are less satisfied with life than men (between 10 and 80 percent depending on the model specification). But if women are employed the difference shrinks. Employed women less satisfied with life than no-employed men but more satisfied compared to employed men (Tables A2 and A3 of the appendix). This is due to a combination of effects that are not gender neutral: employed men report to be less happy than those that are inactive while the opposite is true for women.

In Appendix we also present additional measures of wellbeing on happiness from WVS, and a five-step ladder from the LiTS. The change of the question or the scale does not seem to affect the conclusions. Table X also shows the correlations among subjective wellbeing measures.
Figure 1. Women report lower levels of satisfaction for themselves and for their households than men.

Histogram of subjective wellbeing by gender

Source: LiTS

Notes: The question states: “Please imagine a ten-step-ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest 10% of people in our country, and in the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest 10% of people in our country. On which step of the ten is your household today?

Source: EVS

Notes: The question states: “How satisfied are you with your life in scale from 1 to 10, 1 being dissatisfied and 10 being satisfied.”

Figure 2. As opposed to other development countries and the ECA region, there is no U-shape relationship for men in Russia

Wellbeing ladder by age and gender

Note: Author calculations based on LiTS.
Work and politics are the two dimensions that women believe are less important to be satisfied with life compared to men. How satisfied a person is with her life depends on what her priorities are and how satisfied the person is with the achievements in each domain. The WVS asks about the importance in their life the following six domains: work, family, friends, leisure, politics, and religion. Figure 3 reports the male-female difference coming from an ordered probit regression. Women believe jobs and politics are not very important in life while they are more concerned with family and religion. Regarding friends and leisure, the gender differences are small. However, the differences by gender in each of these domains fall considerably once we add controls such as employment status or education.

Figure 3. For women jobs and politics are not important for their life; however, employed women are neutral about jobs

Importance in life of each domain

No controls

Controlling by specific characteristics


Note: EVS data. Ordered probit regression. Controls include number of children, marital status, employment dummy, and education (except for family). All variables are interacted with female dummy. See full regression in Table A3 of Appendix.

To sum up, women on average tend to be less happy than men and this is mainly driven by a large difference in perceptions among adult men and women. After contrasting the levels of satisfaction with the averages for the ECA region, we conclude that this is not mainly driven by lower levels of life satisfaction of adult Russian women but by higher levels of life satisfaction of adult Russian men. In addition, as in other countries, women believe that family and religion are important in life while jobs and politics are not, and this obviously has implications for the path women follow in life. After controlling for family formation and employment, these differences in dimension become more muted. These gender differences in subjective wellbeing are suggestive synopses of multiple driving forces. Some of these are analyzed in the following sections.

21 For more details on the technique applied to female happiness see Stevenson and Wolfers (2009)
3. Endowments

This section looks at two main areas where gender differences appear to have reversed and the gender gap appears to be disfavoring men instead of women, these areas are education and health.

3.1. Health

Although life expectancy for men is improving in the last years in Russia, there is a still a gender gap and large regional disparities. Since the socialist era, male life expectancy in Russia has been considerably lower than female. There is also regional variation for life expectancy, with some parts of the country having male life expectancy of 56 years in the first half of the 2000’s.

Figure 4. Men’s life expectancy in Russia remains low, with clear gender disparities

Source: UNDP (2010, page 55)

Adult male mortality is a serious concern in Russia, and although improving over time, levels are far above the regional average. In Russia, the gender gap in adult mortality largely due to disparities in mortality of the working age population. The adult mortality rate for men is more than twice that of women (1975 per 100,000 adult men vs. 870 per 100,000 adult women). The trend, however improving, it has remained largely unchanged. Adult male mortality rate has decreased from 2306 (deaths per 100,000 adult men) in 2003 to 1975 (deaths per 100,000 adult men) in 2010. Beyond the typical male adult diseases such as heart attacks, the main concern in Russia are external causes of injury –largely related to alcohol consumption, and suicide rates, both revealing the low value of life for many adult men (Figure 5 and 6). Social and gender issues overlap with other risk factors –as it is shown in the note on Part II of this report on excess male mortality. The interesting thing is that these facts are not picked up by the measures of subjective wellbeing presented above (Figures 1 and 2).
Figure 5. Adult male mortality is a serious concern and one of the main preventable causes is the high suicide rate.

Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, compiled from national and international (WHO European health for all and EUROSTAT database). Notes: The (age-) standardized death rate (SDR) is a weighted average of age-specific mortality rates per 100,000 population. The weighting factor is the age distribution of a standard reference population. The standard reference population used is the European standard population as defined by the World Health Organisation (WHO). As method for standardisation, the direct method is applied. As most causes of death vary significantly with age and sex, the use of standardised death rates improves comparability over time and between countries.

Figure 6. Adult male mortality is caused by typical male diseases but also by high suicide rates

Source: UNECE Statistical Division Database, compiled from national and international (WHO European health for all and EUROSTAT database). Notes: ibid Figure 5.
Female health indicators have improved in the 2000’s. Maternal mortality was nearly halved since the beginning of the millennium, and there was a threefold decrease in the rate of maternal mortality from illegal abortions. Over 99 percent of births are attended by skilled health staff. However, regional heterogeneity persists, with rural areas registering a maternal mortality rate fifty percent higher than urban areas. Additionally, morbidity rates for a number of illnesses increased between 2000 and 2010, including breast cancer and cervical cancer. At the same time, between 2000 and 2007 morbidty rates for HIV grew six fold for women and three fold for men. Notably, obstetrics and gynecology are some of the most expensive and popular fee based services. Furthermore, access of immigrants to the healthcare system and medical services is limited, which is critical in a country whose population grew by around 7 million immigrants between the years of 1990 and 2009.

3.2. Education

Russia has gender parity in education levels, and if anything women are surpassing men in tertiary education. Indeed the country has maintained gender equality in primary and secondary education since Soviet times, and more women than men have a university degree or technical tertiary education (Figure 7), although for the case of vocational training more men than women enroll without having completed secondary education, still women surpass men in completion. (39 vs. 56 percent of men and women respectively). Boys are the largest share in professional schools that require only primary education while girls are the majority in professional schools at the tertiary level.

On average women work fewer years than men –women have a lower retirement age, and enter the labor market later (see next section on economic participation), what leads to think that Russian women might be over-investing in education. This can be due to the fact that women need to show more credentials to prove they are able to perform as well as men in the job market, as there is still a high level of occupational segregation in the labor market (Figure 12). The gender consequences of current university reforms have yet to be assessed, but researchers expect an outflow of women from Master’s programs due to potential rising costs22.

The gender asymmetry is also reflected in different fields of study for men and women. The distribution of boys and girls by field of study is uneven with women choosing traditionally female areas while men choose traditionally male subjects. Women concentrate in social sciences, education, health, culture and art, etc., representing between 73.9 to 81.5 percent of students in these areas in the 2008/2009 academic year. Men tend to focus on geology, the energy sector, metallurgy, aerospace, marine technology, etc. representing 79.1 to 93.8 percent of students of these disciplines in 2008/2009 (UNDP 2010). As shown later, occupational segregation in employment is high and originates before people enter the labor market when they choose fields of education, and might respond to different factors, including restrictions to women’s employment in a large group of occupations. These differences are reflected within the labor structure of the education system itself. Despite equal numbers of men and women among teaching staff in Russian higher education institutions, gender

22 See Kalabhakina (2013) in this assessment for details
asymmetry occurs in the distribution of positions: the higher the position, the fewer women are represented, and vice-versa; an associate professor is about the only position where men and women are represented equally.

**Figure 7. Women have surpassed men in education**

![Distribution of highest level of education by gender, 2010](image)

**Percentage of girls in primary, secondary and higher professional education, 2006-2009**

![Percentage of girls in primary, secondary and higher professional education, 2006-2009](image)

*Source: RLMS 2010. Computed for men and women between 18 and 64 years of age. Source: Russian Federal Agency for education cited in UNDP 2010*

**Women and men chose to continue education for different reasons.** While men are interested in using the knowledge to improve (or open) their businesses, women report to do it to expand their horizons. The difference is considerable large: 30 percent of men report they will use the education for their business while only 20 percent of women do so. This fact is consistent with the concern of having women overinvesting in education (Figure 8), but also with the low involvement of women in entrepreneurship (Figure X). As Atencio and Posadas (2013) in this volume show, women’s returns to education are lower than for men, and largely contribute to the wage gap women experience in the labor market and the additional education is not reflected in wages among the most educated and higher earnings groups. Local researchers have also highlighted that female graduates of secondary schools and universities are paid less, spend more time on career development and start off in lower positions (Kalabikhina 2013). However education remains a central element to increase the wages of low-skilled women. It is also interesting to note that men and women engage in adult education at different moments in life. Women are more likely to go continue education to expand horizons in their 30s and 40s, while men tend to do so when approaching the retirement age.
4. Economic Opportunities

Russia has high levels of female labor force participation; however, levels of female participation are lower than males. In spite of being one of the countries with the highest levels of female labor force participation which has even increased over the last decade, in Russia there is still a gender employment gap. Women’s labor force participation in the labor force is 10 percentage points lower than men’s (68 vs. 78 percent respectively, Figure 9). But also, male participation rate is high in absolute levels and even increasing over the last 10 years (Figure 9b). Female labor force participation has increased only slightly in the last decade. In year 2000, 66.8 percent of working age women participated in the labor market.

The high level of female labor force participation in Russia is above the mean of countries with similar levels of economic development. A fact that persists over time is the U-shaped relationship between female labor force participation and economic development measured by GDP per capita. This U-shaped relationship results from the labor division in the economy, and how it evolves as a country’s economic structure moves away from agriculture into manufacturing and services. The economic development is usually accompanied by jobs substitutions, from the home or the farm to the market (Schultz 1990, Golding 1995, Mammen and Paxon 2000). During the Soviet era Russia was an outlier in this factual relation, with higher levels of participation compared to countries of similar development. However, in Russia, as opposed to other ex-socialist countries, female labor force participation did not decline much as the country transitioned into a capitalist economy and continued growing.
Figure 9. Women in Russia have a higher labor force participation than the regional average, but still lower than men.

Source: WDI, Female labor force participation is at the same level in Estonia, Slovenia, and Lithuania.

Figure 10. Like other ex-socialist countries, Russia has been growing and FLFP has slightly gone down.

Source: WDI, the same pattern is observed in Slovak Republic.
Women are more likely to work as wage workers and less likely to be entrepreneurs in Russia. In general, beyond gender differences, few persons are entrepreneurs in Russia. Only 5 percent of employed women are entrepreneurs, compared to 8 percent of employed men. There is also some unpaid work, which—although low (only 6 percent of the female employed population)—is still high for the level of development of the country, where we could expect no unpaid work (Figure 11). Employers—including own-account workers and entrepreneurs—account for 15.25 of the total employed population in the EU with a third of them having at least one worker.

**Figure 11. Women are less likely than men to be employed and more likely to be wage workers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution of labor status by gender, 2010</th>
<th>Distribution of type of employment by gender, 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>Employed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female head</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Unpaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source: Authors calculations based on RLMS 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 4.1 Employment

There is a high level of occupational segregation in Russia. Women work in traditionally female occupations: women are nurses and other public health workers (13%), teachers and in other education jobs (15%), and in trade and consumer services (25%), as shown in Figure 12. The observed occupation segregation has its roots in the Soviet Labour code of 1922 seeking to protect women from hazardous or strenuous occupations—that require physical effort and strength, and as a consequence, women concentrated in occupations where they might not be at a physical disadvantage (Reza and Lau 1999). Measures such as the Duncan index of concentration (see Atencio and Posadas 2013 in this volume) shows that this has remained the case for 15 years.

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23 Entrepreneurs are defined as having replied yes to the following two questions: Are you personally an owner or co-owner of the enterprise where you work? and: In your opinion, are you doing entrepreneurial work at this job? This definition would probably include the self-employed. However, the reader must be aware that in other descriptions in the document the exact definition might change as the data sources change too.
One explanation for segregation is that women don’t have the skills that are demanded in some sectors. There is not enough evidence to analyze whether there is a skills mismatch in Russia, however, the existent facts do not seem to suggest there is any. Women have higher educational levels, and while they concentrate in some educational areas, they are more likely than men to report their jobs need technical or college degrees while men report that they either don’t know or they only need a professional degree. This difference in views can be consistent with the occupational segregation.

Figure 12. There is high occupational segregation by industry

As an example, female researchers have been moving out of businesses and into higher education. Female researchers, that are an equal percentage of the population as male, are changing the type of jobs they take, and choosing jobs in higher education over jobs in the business sector. In 2000, 44 percent of the researchers in businesses were women and in 2010 the percentage fell to 41 (Figure 14). Instead, in higher education, the percent of researchers that are women rose from 42 to 44 percent in the same period. Although these changes are small, they are suggestive of a possible trend that we believe it is worthy to continue monitoring in the future.
Men and women report different skills needed to perform their job, which given the occupational segregation and the difference in education level could be consistent with the absence of a skills mismatch.

Source: Authors calculations based on RLMS 2010, difference in the distribution of the level of education required is statistically significant.

Women researchers have been moving out of businesses and into higher education.

Source: UNECE

Gender employment gaps by age are observed at the beginning and at the end of the working age life. Between the ages of 30 and 54 there are very small gender gaps, with women even showing higher employment rates than men for certain age categories: for example between the ages of 45 and 49, the female employment rate stands at 82 percent and the male employment rate is 78 percent. However, there is a gender employment gap for both the young and those close to retirement. Before 30 years of age, women’s employment rates are lower than men’s. Two reasons might be behind this gap: women
are having children at this age—according to UNECE the mean age for first births was 24.6 years of age in 2009; and women are studying as they achieve higher levels of education than men (as shown earlier). In addition, women also retire younger than men. A large gender employment gap is observed when approaching the retirement age—15 percentage points between the ages of 55 and 59. After retirement 49% of women 55 and above, and 35% of men 60 and older, report being employed, defined as doing any activities—small or not—in exchange of payment in the last 30 days.

**Figure 15. Young men are more likely to work than young women and probably to drop out of school, while gender employment gaps appear among less educated**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment rate by age group and gender, 2010</th>
<th>Employment rate by education level and gender, 2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>25-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Retirement age: 55 (women) 60 (men)

**Source:** authors based on RLMS 2010

**Women are less likely to be informal workers than men but more men than women who chose informality are covered by health insurance.** There are several definitions of informality that can be used. The RLMS has two questions that allow identifying two types of informal contracts. We explore whether the job is officially registered, which we interpret as the existence of a contract between the employer and the employee which is also declared (probably for tax and benefit purposes) to the government. According to this definition of informality, more men than women are informal (8 vs. 4 percent of men and women respectively are informal, Figure 16). However, if we look at the workers that are covered by health insurance but not registered, we find that more men than women receive this benefit (14 vs. 12 percent of men and women respectively receive health insurance as part of their job benefits). The reasons for choosing informality vary by gender. While more men than women chose to be informal, more women than men report to be informal because either the employer or both—the employer and themselves—wanted that. In year 2010, among informal workers, 26 percent of men report to have chosen to be informal, while 21 percent of women do so.
Figure 16. Women are more likely to be informal but the reasons behind might be different

Formality by gender, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officially</th>
<th>Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reasons for informality, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Officially</th>
<th>Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer did not want</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee did not want</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both employer and employee did not want</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RLMS 2010. Notes: The difference in formality for either definition (Officially and Health) are statistically significant at a 1% level. The distributions of reasons for informality for each gender are not statistically different according to the Pearson test.

Women work in smaller firms and have fewer managerial responsibilities. Women are more likely to work in smaller firms than men. In 2010, the average size of the firm measured by number of employees where women work is 30 percent smaller than the average size of the firm where men work. The number of employees of firm of the average employed man is 983 while the number of employees of the average employed woman is 671 (Figure 17). Compared to other countries, firms in Russia are large. According to the BEEPS data, medium and large firms are more common in the Russian Federation with the average firm having 118 full-time permanent workers. This probably is another condition that persisted through the transition and originated in socialist times.

Figure 17. Women are more likely to be employed in smaller firms and manage fewer subordinates

Managing subordinates by gender, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>N.Subordinates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: RLMS 2010. Notes: The gender difference in the probability of managing subordinates is statistically significant at a 5% level. The gender difference in the number of subordinates is statistically significant at 1% level.
Although women are only slightly less likely than men to manage subordinates, they have significantly fewer managerial responsibilities than men. Employed women are only 2 percentage points less likely than men to manage subordinates (22 vs. 20 percent of men and women respectively manage subordinates). However, there is a large difference in the managerial responsibilities that men and women have. We measure the managerial responsibilities by the number of subordinates that an employee has to supervise. On average men supervise 171 subordinates while a woman only supervises 11. This enormous difference suggests two other facts: (i) women are more likely to report to a man than to a woman, and (ii) women are less likely to be promoted than men. The two facts relate to one another. Women’s probability of promotion on occasions depends on the sex of the supervisor (Rothstein 1997, Bertrand 2010). Studies suggest that institutional barriers and the arrangement of social networks are the main obstacles for vertical female mobility in the labor market. Only 20 percent of firms have women as top managers, and vertical segregation can be seen across industries and sectors, including in the civil service (Figure 18).

Figure 18. Women are less likely to be in managerial jobs in the civil service

![Figure 18](image)


Women are less likely than men to change jobs with possible implications for promotions and gender wage gaps. Although there are no significant gender differences in movements within the job—promotions, demotions or horizontal moves—there are significant gender differences in job-to-job movements. Although the gender gap has decrease since 2000, men are still more likely than women to change place of work and profession (18 vs. 13 percent of men and women respectively, have changed place of work during 2010). As expected, this difference in job mobility means that women stay at the same job for longer periods than men. Job tenure is larger for women than for men (Figure 19). These gender differences in job-to-job transitions are important for understanding the gender wage gap, as 60
percent of the lifetime wage rise occurs during the first 10 years in the labor market, and mainly by changing jobs as a way of finding a better job match and a wage increase (Topel and Ward 1992). However, it has been found for the U.S. and some European countries that women have fewer job-to-job transitions with implications for wages (Royalty 1998, Theodossiou 2009).24

Figure 19. Women have less job mobility than men

Source: Authors calculations based on RLMS 2010. Note: the omitted category for within job change is “No promotion, demotion, or horizontal move”, and the omitted category for movements across jobs is “No change in profession or place of work”. Within job promotion distribution of responses for men and women is significant at 12% level. Across jobs, however, there are statistically significant differences in the distribution of responses for men and women, at 1% level.

4.1. Earnings

Women work fewer hours per day than men and they work more from home. Women worldwide have less leisure time than men and spend fewer hours outside the home in wage jobs as a result of the time household and child-rearing responsibilities (World Bank 2012). Although there is no up to date time use data available for Russia25, this conclusion can be inferred by two available facts: first women work about one hour less per day than men (men work on average 10 hours per day while women work 9 hours per day in 2010, Figure 20). At the same time, women are taking advantage of flexible work opportunities, and 11 percent of employed women as opposed to 6 percent of employed men report to work from home during 2010.

The raw gender wage gap in Russia is 26 percent, which is slightly higher than the average for the ECA region but worse than in developed countries used as reference; however, the comparisons should be taken with caution. The comparison of the hourly rate of pay of men and women shows there is a 26 percent gender wage gap. However, the gap could be even higher since official statistics report a raw gender wage gap of 35% (UNDP 2010). This level of gap is high compared to developed countries: in the U.S. it is about 20 percent (Kolesnikova and Liu, 2011), in Sweden it is 10 percent (World Bank 2012a);

24 This situation is analyzed in more detail in Atencio and Posadas (2013)
25 Time use data was collected as part of the RLMS but only for a four rounds and discontinued after 2006.
but also compared with the average of the ECA region which is 22 percent (World Bank 2012b). However, these comparisons of the raw gender wage gap should be taken with extreme caution since there are several factors determining the raw gender wage gap. To begin with, the gender employment gap affects the raw gender wage gap. The larger the employment gap, and assuming that more educated women are more likely to work than less educated women, the smaller the raw gender wage gap but the larger the gap would be if all women were employed (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008). Thus, it might be the gender wage gap in ECA is smaller because of a selection problem, but still the raw gender wage gap in Russia is larger than in developed countries such as the U.S. or Sweden.

**Figure 20. Women are more likely to work from home and work 1 hour less per day at work**

Source: RLMS 2010. Notes: the gender difference in hours of work per day and working from home is statistically significant at 1% level.

**Figure 21. Women earn less than men and most women receive maternity leave**

Source: Authors calculations based on RLMS 2010. Note: the omitted category. The gender differences in the variables plotted are statistically significant at 5% level.
4.2. Entrepreneurship

Women are less likely than men to become entrepreneurs and the evidence on the success rate of female entrepreneurs is mixed. Both the LiTS and the RLMS ask about attempts to become entrepreneurs. Both sources indicate that women are less likely than men to start a business, and the response rate is equivalent for the two sources. Women of working age (15-64) are 6 percentage points less likely than men to start a business. Given the levels of entrepreneurship (8 percent of the employed men and 5 percent of employed women are entrepreneurs, Figure 15) and the relatively high levels of success of entrepreneurship we believe the gender difference in business startup is not small. However, there is mixed evidence on the probability of success of for those women that start a business compared to men (Figure 23). The LiTS reports that women entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed than men entrepreneurs (53 vs. 45 of entrepreneurs succeed, respectively in 2008) while according to the RLMS, women are less likely to succeed as entrepreneurs than men (45 vs. 42 percent of men and women succeed as entrepreneurs in 2010).

One possible reason women are less likely than men to start business is that women are more risk averse than men. The LiTS ask men and women to self-assess how likely they are to take risks. Both men and women who do not attempt to start a business are less willing to take risks than those men and women who attempted to start up a business. But in addition, among women who did not attempt to start a business, women are even less willing to take risks than similar men. Also, the fact that there are no differences in the willingness to take risks among entrepreneurs might lead to men and women to pursue similar business strategies (in terms of risks at least) and thus similar success rates (Figure 24). However, women might put more effort into their business strategies than men since they are more likely than men to believe that effort and hard work are necessary for success.

Figure 23. Women are less likely than men to start business, but women entrepreneurs behave similar to men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attempted</th>
<th>Succeed</th>
<th>Attempted</th>
<th>Succeed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td><strong>Men</strong></td>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted</td>
<td>Succeed</td>
<td>Attempted</td>
<td>Succeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LiTS, 2008. The gender differences in the variables plotted are statistically significant at 5% level. Source: RLMS, 2010. The gender differences in the variables plotted are statistically significant at 5% level.

---

26 Given that the question does not make an explicit reference to the time frame, we assume that this refer to any moment since entering in adulthood.
Figure 24. Women self-select out of entrepreneurship because of lack of willingness to take risks, but might be also discouraged by the effort and hard work a business implies

**Self assessment of willingness to take risks by business attempts and gender, 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attempt</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No*</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Succeed</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reported reasons for success in Russia gender, 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effort and hard work</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and skills</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By political connections</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By breaking the law</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: LiTS 2008. Notes: Willingness to take risks is scaled from 1 to 10 where 1 means not willing to take risks at all and where 10 means very much willing to take risks. * indicates statistically significant difference.

**Women are less like to manage and to own firms than men.** Although almost forty percent of the firms surveyed by the BEEPS in 2010 were owned (fully or partially by women), women were less likely to manage firms, with only 20 percent of firms being managed by women. The difference between ownership and management is found in other countries too (Aterido and Hallward-Dremeier, 2010). In addition females are more likely to manage their own firms or to hire women to manage them: half of the firms owned by women are managed by women too. This result is not surprising, since it also should follow from the previous conclusions: women are less likely to supervise other employees (Figure 21) and women are less likely to start a business than men (Figure 25). Note that the levels of entrepreneurship reported in this section differ from those of above since the sources of the information are different. In this section we present facts coming up from the BEEPS (see Appendix 1) that is an enterprise survey, while previous facts were obtained using tow household surveys, the RLSM and the LiTS (see Appendix 1).
Women are less like to own and manage firms than men; and women are more likely to be both the managers and the owners in smaller firms. Source: BEEPS 2010. Notes: In green female managed firms among female-owned-firms.

Women are also more likely to manage small firms. This fact is also found worldwide (World Bank 2012a) and in the ECA region (World Bank 2012b). However, what is different in the case of the Russian Federation is the low percentage of women managing micro firms. Only 18 percent of micro firms are owned or managed by women, and in all cases, female-owned-firms have female managers, most likely themselves. The largest percent of female managed firms is among small firms, with 27 percent of small firms managed by women. Their representation in larger firms is smaller: 17 percent of medium and 6 percent of large firms are managed by women. Under other definitions of firm size, such as sales levels, it is also observed that women are more likely to manage small firms. Figure 26 shows that the distribution of female-managed firms is skewed towards the left for both variables.

Figure 26. Female firms are smaller independently of the indicator of size

Source: BEEPS 2010. Notes:

27 The definition of firm size has been taken from the Enterprise Surveys and Indicator Surveys sampling methodology note (2009), and is the one that is followed by the Russian Government.
As with employment, women entrepreneurs concentrate in traditionally female industries such as textiles, garments and retail. The distribution of female- and male-managed firms across industries is statistically different. While more than half of firms in Textiles, Garments or Retail are managed by women, less than 10 percent of firms in Electronics, Machinery or the Metallic industries are managed by women (Figure 27).

**Figure 27. Female ownership and management is concentrated in traditionally female industries such as textiles, garments, and retail**

![Graph showing concentration of female ownership and management](image)

Source: BEEPS 2010.

**Sector concentration and size by female entrepreneurs might be affected by a differential access to finance.** Men and women have similar rates of financial inclusion, with only slight differences in their patterns of use. Global Findex data from 2011 provides gender disaggregated data for men and women over the age of 15 in Russia on a number of financial indicators. Data reveals that similar shares of women and men have accounts at formal financial institutions (48 percent and 49 percent, respectively). However, women are more likely to use accounts to receive government payments and to receive and send remittances, while men are more likely to use accounts for business purposes and to receive wages. Similar shares of men and women have credit cards (8 percent and 11 percent) and debit cards (36 percent and 38 percent). Men are slightly more likely to have taken a loan in the past year, however women are more likely to have an outstanding loan for health or emergencies or for home construction. Similar shares of women and men had saved money in the past year (23 percent and 22 percent), though women are slightly more likely to be saving for emergencies while men are more likely to be
saving for future expenses. The low use of their financial inclusion for business purposes could be reflecting other barriers—including restrictions to credit— affecting women in moving ahead with a business idea.

5. Agency and voice

Agency refers to women’s or men’s ability to take charge and make effective choices in all areas of life, in order to achieve some outcomes. This ability in many cases is bounded by limits on individual’s legally guaranteed rights, as well as by social norms and sanctions to specific choices. The WDR 2012 defined a series of areas where guaranteeing agency could have large impacts on women and men’s wellbeing. (a) Control over resources—including the ability to earn and control income and to own, use, and dispose of material assets; (b) Decision making over family formation—including women’s and girls’ ability to decide on fertility and marriage; (c) Freedom from the risk of violence—measured by the prevalence of domestic violence and other forms of sexual, physical, or emotional violence; and (d) Ability to have a voice in society and influence policy—measured by participation and representation in formal politics and engagement in collective action and associations. What happens in these areas is likely to influence what happens with women and men’s economic opportunities and investment in endowments.

Box 1. Female heads of household

In 2009, 1 out of 5 Russian women was head of a household - proportion that is slightly larger when compared with the same figure among the working age female population (17.5%). Almost half of the Russian households headed by a woman are headed by a post-working age female. In fact, the average age of women heads of household is 10 years higher than their male counterparts, 53 and 43 years old, respectively. However, it is important to note that 93% of the post-working-age female headed households only have one member, which means that 31% of elderly women live alone. While 3 out 5 female headed households are unitary households, male headed households have on average more members and a larger number of dependents (Figure B1). 63% of women heads of household do not have any dependents.

Figure B1. Female headed households have fewer members and dependents than male headed households
Half of the total women heads of household are employed, and approximately 48% are out of the labor force; the majority of the ones out of the labor force are 55 years of age or older, so past retirement age, and all of them receive a pension. Of those women employed, 91% are wage workers, 5% are entrepreneur and only 4% of them are unpaid workers. 2 out of 3 female headed households are placed in the two lowest quintiles of the total expenditure distribution, figure that doubles the share of male headed households in the same position. Notwithstanding, 63% of the women head of household have either a technical or (post)graduate degree and less than 1% of them have not completed secondary education.

5.1. Gender related views of society

In Russia gender roles are equalitarian, probably partly as a consequence after several years under a socialist regime. The European Values Study (EVS) asks men and women on their views on several statements that reflect on their views on gender roles. In answering these questions, we observe that in Russia there are no marked gender stereotypes in views. Men and women agree to the same extent on men and women sharing responsibilities in the household: almost 100 percent of the population believes that men should take the same responsibility for home and children than women do, and that both husband and wife should contribute to the household income. However, above 80 percent of the population also believe that women need to have children to feel fulfilled and 60 percent think that a pre-school child will suffer if the mother works. In particular, women are slightly more likely to believe that fathers are less suited to look after children (80 and 90 percent of women and men, respectively, agree with the last statement).

When it comes to labor market participation of women, views are more unequal in Russia. There are significant gender differences between men’s and women’s views on the role of women in the labor market. For example, more women than men believe that a job is the best way for independence of women (80 vs. 71 percent of women and men, respectively, agree with the statement), and more men than women agree with the fact that being a housewife is as fulfilling as a paid job (63 vs. 69 percent of women and men). Note that although these two statements seem to oppose each other to a large extent, a large percentage of both men and women agree with both statements. A great gender
difference appears regarding who should work in times of crises: 43 percent of men and 28 percent of women believe that men should be given priority if jobs are scarce. (Figure 29)

While some of the views by women have progressed over time, others have retreated. More young women compared to older women disagree with the statement ‘Being a housewife is as fulfilling as having a paid job’; more young women also disagree with the statement ‘If jobs are scarce, men should have priority’. The same age difference in views and opinions can be seen in relation to two other statements: ‘Husband and wife should contribute to household income’ and ‘Preschool child suffers with working mother’, where young women tend to be in favor of more equal contributions, and disagree with the last statement. These simultaneous progressive and traditional views show that Russian society is changing and views are as well. (Figure 29)

Figure 28. Views on gender-roles in Russia are very equalitarian, although there are a few differences on certain gender equality statements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of men and women that agree with the following statements about gender roles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>It is alright to live together without getting married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term relationship is necessary to be happy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men should take the same responsibility for home and...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Fathers as well suited to look after children as mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husband+wife contribute to household income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** If jobs are scarce, men should have priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Job best way for independent women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** Being housewife as fulfilling as paid job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women really want to have children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-school child suffers with working mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Working mother warm relationship with children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women need children in order to be fulfilled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EVS 2008. Notes: ** gender difference significant at 5%, * gender difference significant at 10%. Respondents have to either (i) strongly agree, (ii) agree, (iii) disagree, or (iv) strongly disagree with each of the statements above. In computing statistics above we transform the replies into binary variables: agree/disagree, with 1 meaning agree and 0 disagree.
Regarding family formation, the Russian society is not attached to traditional values. Although men and women believe a long-term relationship is necessary to be happy, they also believe that it is alright to live together without getting married (Figure 29). However, age at first birth and marriage remains low according to the latest data available (at nearly 25 years of age for women), younger than the age at first birth and marriage in other high income countries like Germany, the United Kingdom or Japan when marriages happen after age 30, or the US (27 years of age). Between 20 to 29 years mothers in Russia have two-thirds of their total fertility in Russia.

Fertility rates in Russia have increased from the very low levels of the socialist era and at the same time abortion rate has considerably decreased, approaching the average of the Region. During the Soviet era, fertility rates in Russia were far below population replacement levels. In the year 2000, the total fertility rate was 1.2 children. By 2010, the rate has increased to 1.6, very close to the regional average (Figure 30a). A more detailed look by cohorts also suggests a transition to a higher fertility, particularly among younger women (who have not completed their fertility). At the same time, one important concern in Russia and related to fertility, was the use of abortions as a contraceptive method.

Source: EVS 2008
This has changed during the last decade with the abortion rate having more than halved (Figure 30b), and the number of women using oral contraceptives has doubled.

**Figure 30. Fertility rates have raised from the very low levels and the abortion rate has considerably decreased, approaching regional averages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Russian Federation</th>
<th>ECA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Legal Abortion Rate (per 1,000 live births)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNECE

**Fertility has partly increased due to direct policy interventions.** Starting in 2007, Russia’s federal government has been implementing a set of policies to encourage couples to have more children. The most noticeable one is the Maternity Capital program started in January 2007, whereby women that give birth to or adopt a second or consecutive child are entitled to special financial assistance. The benefit, that amounts to approximately USD$11,000, can be claimed at any time after the child reaches the age of three and can only be spent in (i) improvements of housing conditions, (ii) child’s education, or (iii) investment in the mother’s retirement fund. Local researchers have discussed the long term impact of the program, and argue that the program will have only a temporary effect and it is likely to fade out.\(^{31}\) Other policy measures such as support to mothers with small children by expanding childcare services and facilities, or like other countries such as Sweden, by ensuring that both parents have adequate support for active engagement in child-rearing and for women with children to return to work.\(^{32}\)

**Russian society places a majority of the childcare burden on the family rather than society.** According to the Generations and Gender Survey (GGS), almost 79 percent of people believe that care for preschool children is mainly the family’s responsibility. (This reflects on the agreement levels on both the

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\(^{31}\) Kurskaya (2011). A recent paper by Slonimczyk and Yurko (2012) estimates a structural dynamic programming model of fertility and labor force participation to evaluate the effective of the Maternity Capital policy; the authors also reach a preliminary conclusion that the policy in its current form is ineffective at increasing birth rates.

\(^{32}\) Reflecting on the case of Sweden, Andersson (2008) concludes that the ‘persistent focus on gender equality is a better strategy’ so that ‘women don’t see childbearing as reducing their freedom’. This is in line with the presentation of the fertility decision as a utility maximizing consumption decision as first presented by Becker (1960).
EVS and the GGS with the statement that a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works). Approximately 60 percent of respondents also consider care of schoolchildren after school hours to be mainly the responsibility of the family as well.

**Women take on larger household and child-rearing responsibilities with implications for their work life balance.** Only a third of mothers report using childcare services, and even among mothers with a child under the age of six less than half are using child care services for the youngest child (Figure 31). A third of mothers with three or more children are out of the labor force. Additionally, almost 40 percent of employed mothers with three or more children work less than eight hours a day. Overall, around a quarter of working mothers work less than eight hours a day (Figure 32).

**The use of child-care services varies across characteristics of the mothers, and child-care is most often provided by kindergartens alone.** Use of child-care services varies among women with different education levels, and mothers with university education are most likely to use child-care services for the youngest child. This may reflect heterogeneity in cultural expectations surrounding the use of child-care services. Very few mothers use non-relatives as child-care providers for their youngest child. Instead, mothers with three or more children are most likely to use only kindergarten, while mothers with one or two children are more equally distributed between using only kindergarten, only a non-household relative, and a combination of the two.

**Women are most likely to spend more time in care-related tasks.** According to GGS data, women are responsible for most tasks with children. This includes dressing kids, putting them to bed, caring for them when they’re ill, and helping with homework. Leisure activities are the one task that 49 percent of households share equally between men and women. While non-employed women do take on a slightly larger share of care responsibility than employed women do, households with employed women still place a larger burden of care on the woman. And satisfaction levels with the current division of care work in the household is higher among men than women—in fact, in households where men take on most of the child care responsibilities, women are more satisfied than men are with the arrangement.

**Grandmothers are expected to take on informal childcare responsibilities.** Three quarters of respondents to the GGS agree that grandparents should look after children if the parents are unable to do so. 77 percent of informal childcare is provided by the grandmother of the child, and great grandmothers provide another 9 percent of informal care.

**Russian society also believes families rather than society should be responsible for elder care, and this adds to women’s care burden.** Half of GGS respondents believe that caring for elder persons is mainly a task for the family. A little over a third believes this responsibility should be shared equally between society and the family. There is almost universal agreement that children should take responsibility for parental care if parents are in need, with over half agreeing that children should adjust their working lives to the needs of their parents. Women are more likely than men to care for elders and other relatives, with female GGS respondents being nearly twice more likely than men to have given regular help to an elder in their families. Care demands on women will likely impact their ability to take advantage of new economic opportunities as well as it will impact their wellbeing.
Figure 31. Childcare coverage is still insufficient affecting working mothers

![Bar chart showing type of child-care provider for the youngest child under 6, by number of children in the household](chart1)

- Orange: Only kindergarten
- Green: Only non-hh relative
- Blue: Only non relative
- Brown: Relative and kindergarten
- Light blue: Non relative and kindergarten
- Black: Relative and non-relative

Source: RLMS

Figure 32. Most mothers work full time, but this changes as the number of children increases

![Bar chart showing hours worked, % of mothers](chart2)

- Blue: Less than 8
- Orange: More than 8

Source: RLMS
5.3. Legal and institutional framework

While Russia’s legal framework contains many important components of gender equality, important gaps remain. Russia’s constitution guarantees equality for men and women before the law. Men and women have equal ownership and inheritance rights to property, and the default marital property regime is partial community of property. Additionally, the law provides for valuation of nonmonetary contributions during marriage. However, there is no legislation that specifically addresses domestic violence. Additionally, the law does not mandate equal remuneration for men and women for work of equal value, nor are there laws mandating non-discrimination based on gender in hiring. Job advertisements have been seen to indicate the preferred sex of the job seeker and offer lower salaries for women compared to men. It is also not illegal for an employer to ask about one’s family status during a job interview, and pregnant women and persons with families have been known to suffer breaches of justice.

Labor laws originally intended to protect women affect women’s ability to work in occupations of their choices and promote gender inequality. There are restrictions regarding the employment of women in 456 jobs in the areas of mining, construction, metalworking, factories, jobs requiring lifting weights above a threshold, and jobs deemed hazardous or arduous. While law-makers see these restrictions as protecting female health, experts and women’s organizations find the restrictions to be unjustified and restricting to women’s choices of professions. Women’s organizations failed in their appeal to the Supreme Court in 2009 when seeking to get these restrictions removed from the books. The existence of these restrictions is also disadvantaging men’s safety when the jobs banned for women are actually dangerous. The rate of occupational injuries is three times higher for men than for women. Rather than restricting women from working in hazardous jobs, the government should be making these jobs safer for all workers regardless of gender thus promoting both health and labor equality.

The law mandates both maternity and parental leave, and there are workplace protections for pregnant and nursing women as well as mothers with children under three. The law mandates 140 calendar days of maternity leave with full pay and 955 calendar days of parental leave with partial pay. Both are financed by the government via employer reimbursement, and there is no minimum amount of parental leave that must be taken by the father. The law guarantees pregnant and nursing women workplace protections from dismissal, placement in an equivalent position when they return from maternity leave, and rights to a flexible schedule. Additionally, according to the law, an employer has no right to cancel a labor contract with a woman with children under three years old and single mothers with children under 14 years old. The law stipulates public provision of childcare for children under the age of primary education.

Inequalities remain with regards to the pension scheme due to both remnants of prior policies and current laws. The main gender disparity is that retirement age for receiving one’s pension is 55 for women and 60 for men. An average pension today accounts for less than 30% of an average salary. The pension system is designed so that pension differences are not dependent on pay and work record differences; rather, pensions have turned into common old-age benefits, which is better for gender equality when labor market inequalities exist as they do in Russia. Yet the pensions awarded today are drastically different from those actually paid; there are some that were awarded 10-20 years ago when
salaries were significantly lower. Therefore gender differences in pensions being paid are greatest for women over 70 years old.

**Russia has signed on to international commitments on gender equality.** The USSR ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1980. Most recently in 2010, Russia reported steps that the country has taken to implement the Convention between 1999 and 2007, and the Committee provided comments based on this report. Additionally, Russia ratified the Optional Protocol, which allows the Committee to consider individual appeals against violations of the Convention by member states. Russia is also a member to conventions of the International Labor Organization, including Equal Remuneration Convention, Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, and Workers and Family Responsibilities Convention. According to the constitution, if an international treaty to which the country is a party differs from national laws, the regulations of the international treaty shall govern.

**However, it is not clear that the Russian public is aware of both national and international gender legislation.** The government does not carry out information campaigns on women’s rights and educational programs do not include pieces on gender equality. Notably, there are no federal programs to train law enforcement officers, government officials and local department staff, and other officers and judges on specific gender rights and non-discriminatory procedures.

5.4. **Voice**

As with the evolution over time of gender roles by society, women’s participation in society has moved in opposite directions depending on the public sphere. While there is less involvement of women as senior civil servants or judges, more women have become members of parliament or have been appointed in local office positions. Note that these changes might be related to the change in government (presidential elections occurred in 2000, 2004, and 2008). Such a low level of involvement of women as members of parliaments is surprising, given the parity in education levels and the egalitarian views of society among men and women. Since 2007, weighted voting has replaced majority voting, and research suggests that a weighted system is more favorable from the point of view of gender parity. Given that there are no quotas for women participation in political parties, the positive and gradual increase of women’s involvement in politics will most likely be maintained. The local municipal level is the only level where women are strongly represented.

Low female participation in decision-making bodies reduces the ability of women to influence policy making. Three women were appointed as federal ministers in the Russian Government around 2009, taking the posts of Minister of Economy, Minister of Health and Social Development, and Minister of Agriculture. The number of women in the Federal Council (the upper house of the Russian parliament) had declined in both absolute and relative terms: in 2005 there were 10 women (5.7%) among 175 members of the Council, while in 2010 there were only 7 women (4.3%) among 164 senators. The Federation Council is still chaired by a man, and the gender composition of the vice-chairpersons has not changed over the years: there is one woman among 4 vice-chairpersons. The share of women in the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), has slightly increased in the elections of 2008 compared to the previous term, from 9.8% to 14%. Leadership in the lower house is in hands of men:
the leader of the State Duma is a man (and always has been) and only 3 among 10 vice-chairpersons are women. And in the justice sector, the share of women in the Constitutional Court is rather low (17%)\(^{33}\).

**Figure 33. While there is less involvement of women as senior civil servants or judges, more women have become members of parliament or being appointed in local office positions.**

![Percentage of women in public and civil office, 2006-2011](chart)

*Source: UNECE*

### 5.5. Domestic violence

The legal framework regulating violence against women in the Russian Federation meets the guidelines of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which Russia ratified in 1981.\(^{34}\) The Russian Constitution (Chapter II, Article 21, Paragraph 2.1) guarantees the rights to life, to be free from torture or other forms of violence, and to equality before the law.\(^{35}\) Within Russian law are civil remedies for domestic violence, and the Family Code permits divorce initiated by either spouse, without requiring specific grounds.\(^{36}\) The law also prohibits rape and sexual assault, regardless of the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.\(^{37}\) The Criminal Code establishes liability for trafficking in persons and rape, in addition to protection for victims of violence during criminal proceedings.\(^{38}\)

Despite meeting the CEDAW guidelines, there are significant limitations in this legal framework’s ability to address domestic violence. For instance, there are no laws specifically prohibiting domestic

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\(^{33}\) *Source: UNDP 2010*


\(^{36}\) “CEDAW Assessment Tool,” 90-91.

\(^{37}\) “CEDAW Assessment Tool,” 91.

\(^{38}\) “Russian Federation,” *The UN Secretary-General’s Database on Violence against Women*, http://sgdatabase.unwomen.org/countryInd.action?countryId=1081#cat1 (June 21, 2012).
violence. The very term “domestic violence” is not commonly used by law enforcement. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs classifies domestic violence within crimes that occur in the family or domestic sphere. Legal practitioners note that the civil remedies for domestic violence are inadequate; Russian law does not, for example, contain a civil remedy that would allow temporary removal of a batterer from the home. Criminal procedure also limits State involvement in many cases of family violence. Moreover, statistical data on crimes of domestic violence against women is scant to non-existent.

The limited information indicates that scale of domestic violence occurrence in Russia is significant. A number of independent studies as well as statements made by representatives of government agencies help illustrate the scope of the problem. In 2008, a representative of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs noted that violence is observed in 25 percent of all families in Russia. Up to 40 percent of all serious violent crimes are committed within families. By comparison, within the United States between 1998 and 2002, only 11 percent of all victims of violence were victims of family violence. It is also important to note that many victims do not report crimes to the police. According to research, 60 to 70 percent of women suffering from domestic abuse do not seek help from law enforcement authorities.

The prevalence of domestic violence in Russia reflects regional statistics of Europe and Central Asia. Approximately 20 percent of women in Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine have been subjected to domestic abuse. Within Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro), domestic violence affects 20-30 percent of women and their children. These prevalence rates are also higher in Central Asia. The statistics from UNECE are aligned with these other sources of information (Figure 34).

Russia is no exception regarding the lack of reliable data on domestic violence. To illustrate the lack of accurate data, Figure 7 shows the number of assaults that the Independent National Commission on Women’s Rights and the Problem of Violence Against Women in Russia reported (UNDP 2010), against the rate of assault that we constructed using data from the UNECE. The two indicators clearly show different trends. While during the first years of the millennium both the number of rapes and the rate of assaults increase, later in the decade the number of rapes and attempted rapes decrease considerably. These differences can not only be due to definition problem (which are over sighted here) but also are a clear signal of the complexity of measuring the problem, starting by the fact that changes can be due to changes in reporting and not necessarily to changes in assaults.

39 “CEDAW Assessment Tool,” 89.
45 “Domestic Violence in Europe and Eurasia,” ix.
46 “Domestic Violence in Europe and Eurasia,” viii.
There is a severe lack of specialized organizations that provide assistance to women victims of violence, including domestic violence. Over 50 crisis centers were established in all the territories of Russia by non-governmental organizations, but their numbers have declined in recent years due to lack of government interest and support (UNDP 2010). By contrast, the number of government agencies providing assistance to women in difficult circumstances is gradually increasing. In 2009, there were 21 refuges for women victims of violence in Russia (UNDP 2010). This number however, seems rather small for the large population and territory of the country.

6. Conclusions

The Russian Federation has seen many changes over the first decade of the XXI century. Some of these changes have been positive to close gender inequality gaps – such as reduction of maternal mortality, and increased women’s education levels. But others remain unchanged, and new ones have appeared. Male mortality and life expectancy is still a concern, as it is women’s occupational segregation and wage gaps. And while attitudes seem to suggest a very egalitarian society in its views, in particular in relation to family formation, fertility and the distribution of care tasks, in practice women remain the main care providers of children, and this role is likely to transfer to elder care as population ages.

New areas of attention are arising and actions to address them need to be set in place. Including preventing the earnings gap from expanding, fostering women’s entrepreneurship; and removing legal barriers participation of women in all economic sectors. Increasing women’s voice in the public sphere is likely to help in implementing the needed reforms. Finally, more attention needs to be place to areas of concern that remained to be addressed such as violence against women.
References


Appendix

Appendix 1. Data sources

Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, RLMS-HSE (conducted by the High School of Economics and ZAO “Demoscope” in Moscow, and the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology RAS). The RLMS is a series of nationally representative surveys collected since 1992 in two phases (Phase I, 1992-1994) and Phase II, 1995 to the present). The survey has both a cross-sectional and a panel component, with no stipulated limit in the amount of time that a particular household can remain in the sample. This feature makes the RLMS one of the few long-term panel surveys available in the world. The survey contains information on income, consumption and a larger set of household and individual characteristics. It also includes relevant community-level data, including region-specific prices and community infrastructure data for recent years, after an expansion in the sample to allow for representativeness at the regional and oblast levels. The survey was designed to allow various modules of questions to be included from round to round, so specially-designed thematic modules have been administered from time to time. Of special interest to the team are the modules of job separations and worker displacement (2006) and on informal employment (2009).


Life in Transition Surveys, LiTS (conducted by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) is nationally representative survey. The first round of the survey was conducted in 2006 and it included a total of 29,000 households in 29 transition countries (1,000 households per country). The second round of the survey was conducted in 2010 and it included 38,000 households in 30 transition countries and 5 Western European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom). One thousand households were interviewed in each country, with the exception of Poland, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and Uzbekistan where samples were 50 percent larger. The survey includes information on household and individual characteristics, as well as a wealth of attitudinal and opinion questions on a variety of topics. Both rounds also include a series of retrospective questions covering the period 1989-2006 for the 2006 round and 2006-2010 or the 2010 round. The team has access to both rounds of data for all countries.

More information about the survey can be found at www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/transitionII.html

World Value Survey, WVS, and European Value Survey, EVS. The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research program on basic human values. It provides insights into the ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions of citizens all over Europe. It is a unique research project on how Europeans think about life, family, work, religion, politics and society. The last year the EVS collected data for the Russian Federation is 2008. The World Values Survey (WVS) network will carry out a new wave of surveys in 2010 - 2012. This will provide a 30-year time series for the analysis of social and political change. Building on the 1981 European Values Study (EVS), the EVS and WVS carried out a joint second wave in 1990; the WVS carried out a third wave in 1995; the EVS and WVS again did a joint survey in 1999-2001; and the WVS carried out its most recent wave of surveys in 2005-2007.

More information about the surveys can be found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/index_html and http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/


**Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, BEEPS** (a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank) is a means for collecting firm-level data on broad range of issues about the business environment and performance of firms, including business-government relations, firm financing, labor, infrastructure, informal payments and corruption, and other topics such as training and innovation. For the Russian Federation, the last survey was conducted in 2008 and covered just above 1000 firms.

The **Generations and Gender Program/Survey** is a longitudinal study of the dynamics of the family and family relationships, along with and socio-economic conditions of household functioning. The core questionnaire and other instruments are available at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe’s web-site http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ggp/ggs_quest.htm.

The first wave of the Generation and Gender Survey in Russia was conducted in June-August 2004 by the Independent Institute for Social Policy (IISP) in cooperation with Demoscope Independent Research Center. The Russian questionnaire consists of 14 modules covering a wide range of topics and respondents (household; children; marriage(s)/partnership(s); distribution of household tasks; parents and parental home; pregnancy, sterility and plans to have children; health and well-being; respondent’s activity and income; partner’s activity and income; household possessions, income and transfers; values and attitudes; provision of pensions and pension reform; interviewer observations; interviewer report). The peculiarity of the questionnaire is as follows: it allows obtaining information about the respondent; and also, from his/her words about his/her partner/spouse, members of the respondent’s household, children, living together with the respondent or apart; parents, living together with the respondent or apart. Thus, number of observations under the representatives of the different generations is found to be higher than the samples volume.
## Appendix 2. Subjective Wellbeing

### Table A2.1. Correlation among subjective wellbeing measures for the LiTS

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Notes: LiTS. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Notes: EVS. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Notes: EVS. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix 3: Fertility by cohort and ages

Table A.3.1. Number of children by birth year of mother

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Table A.3.2. Number of children by birth year of mother by specific age. Women 25-40 years old only.

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Part I

2. Gender Issues in Russia.
An Overview of National Publications
2004-2010

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November 2013
Disclaimer

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed here are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the government they represent.

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# Table of Content

1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 3
2. Gender Equality in Legislation and Law Enforcement Practice ................................................................. 5
   2.1. General Issues of Gender Equality in the Russian Legislation ............................................................... 5
   2.1.a. The Russian Federation Constitution ................................................................................................. 5
   2.1.b. Russia’s Execution of International Commitments on Gender Equality ............................................. 5
2.2. Equality and Non-discrimination in Certain Codes and Legislative Acts................................................... 6
   2.2.a. Laws on Elections ...................................................................................................................................... 6
   2.2.b. Labour Laws ............................................................................................................................................ 7
   2.2.c. Family Laws ........................................................................................................................................... 9
   2.2.d. Property and Inheritance rights ............................................................................................................... 11
   2.2.e. Right for Pension Benefits ..................................................................................................................... 11
2.3. Legal and Administrative Tools to Eliminate and Prevent Gender Discrimination ..................................... 12
   2.3.a. Gender Discrimination Defined by Law ................................................................................................. 12
   2.3.b. Administrative Tools to prevent Gender Discrimination ...................................................................... 12
   2.3.c. Non-Discrimination cases at Law ........................................................................................................... 13
2.4. Social Reasons for Non-Observedance of Gender Equality Laws .............................................................. 14
   2.4.a. Women and men are unaware of their rights and how to protect them .............................................. 14
   2.4.b. Gender Stereotypes .................................................................................................................................. 14
   2.4.c. Women Law-Makers are Out-numbered ............................................................................................... 14
   2.4.d. Not Enough Text Books and Research Works on Gender Equality Laws ............................................ 15
2.5. Conclusions and Recommendations on Further Legislative Improvement ............................................... 15
3. Gender Equality in Education ........................................................................................................................ 16
   3.1. Educational Structure of the Russian Society ............................................................................................ 17
   3.2. Access to Education in Russia ................................................................................................................ 18
   3.2.a. Gender Segregation in Education ......................................................................................................... 18
   3.2.b. Access to Free Education ...................................................................................................................... 20
   3.2.c. Illiterate Boys ......................................................................................................................................... 21
3.3. Gender Inequality of Education Payoff ....................................................................................................... 23
1. Introduction

Today, gender equality is undoubtedly a way to a country's successful socioeconomic development. Gender equality means both the right development goal and a sensible approach to the economic policy (133).

One of the World Bank reports on "Engendering Development - Through Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice" (2002) examines the empirical links to prove these points. In 2012, the World Bank published the World Development Report 2012 on "Gender Equality and Development" to single out four priority areas for the gender policy: closing the gender gap in human capital assets, overcoming gender gaps for improving access to economic opportunities, increasing women's voice and agency and limiting the reproduction of gender inequality across generations (133).

Gender inequality is an acute problem for Russia, as it still maintains certain gender inequality across all life areas (134, 135, 182, 184, 300, 511, 664, 738, 751):

- 35-40% pay gap;
- working-age women have twice as much input into the household compared to men, while leisure time is an hour shorter;
- high level of professional segregation and ‘glass ceiling’ barriers;
- around 60% of university students are women, which, nonetheless, does not help overcome gender discrimination in employment;
- twice as many men work in the conditions falling behind sanitary standards and twice as many women are employed in jobs with a greater stress level;
- only one third of fathers pay child maintenance;
- women represent 92% of elderly living alone experiencing financial hardship
- the life expectancy gap at birth is over 12 years - one of the highest figures world-wide;
- expected fertility is lower than actual fertility, and below population replace levels - women show lower figures than men (expected number of children is 1.72 and 1.9 respectively); educated women have lower reproduction expectancy, since the country offers no options to combine maternity and career;
- the use of modern contraceptives amongst men and women is still low, while abortions are high and abortion laws get more permissive;
- women make only 13% of politicians;
- domestic violence occurs in 30-40% of families;
- gender stereotypes justify inequalities across all life areas.

According to the UN report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the gender equality situation in Russia has not changed much since 2002, and gender equality is yet to be reflected in Russia's demographic and socioeconomic development (128, 185, 250).

By analysing gender equality reports in various fields of concern released over the past five years, we can evaluate topical gender problems and the attention paid to them by researchers and the public. Gender-related publications in Russia were first overviewed in 1993-2003 (133). This document updates
that review, including a survey of gender-related reports and publications released in Russia between 2004 and the first half of 2012. The analysis is particularly relevant for Russia, as the country’s gender equality practices have been stagnant over the past decade.

We have analysed 835 books and reports. Disclaimer: we may have not covered all of the publications that came out during the review period, but we have tried to give a detailed presentation of the gender-related publications released over the last decade in Russia.

This work touches upon the following issues:

- gender equality in legislation and law enforcement;
- gender equality in education;
- gender equality in the access to healthcare, health standards and life expectancy;
- gender issues in employment;
- women in politics;
- domestic violence.

The chapter dedicated to gender equality in legislation and law enforcement is concerned with the principles of equality and non-discrimination in Russia’s general legislative system and its certain areas; legislative and administrative machinery for elimination and prevention of gender discrimination and social reasons behind non-enforcement of gender laws.

The chapter on gender equality in education is concerned with the educational structure of the Russian society, accessibility of education and education payoff, and the gender content in education.

The chapter devoted to gender equality in the access to healthcare, health standards and life expectancy describes gender-based approaches to health issues, analyses excess male mortality, female health (including reproductive health) and access to healthcare services, particularly among women from rural areas and migrants, and evaluates gender aspects of HIV/AIDS in Russia.

The chapter on gender issues in employment describes female employment and unemployment trends (including those during the 2008 economic crisis), high gender segregation and low mobility in the labour market, poor working conditions and the pay gap.

The Women in Politics chapter is dedicated to the issues of women's presentation in politics and in top government positions, the role of women's NGOs in women's promotion in politics and the reasons for low numbers of women in politics and state administration.

The chapter on domestic violence describes different forms of domestic violence and the factors obstructing the elimination of the inadmissible violence situation in Russia.

Each chapter has its own conclusions and recommendations on promoting gender equality in the given field.
2. Gender Equality in Legislation and Law Enforcement Practice

This chapter describes how gender equality and non-discrimination principles are applied in Russia's legislative system and certain legislative areas, considers legislative and administrative machinery for elimination and prevention of gender discrimination and highlights social reasons behind non-enforcement of gender laws.

2.1. General Issues of Gender Equality in the Russian Legislation

The Russian Federation Constitution

The domestic women's rights protection legislation provides gender equality guarantees. The country's principal law contains a special article devoted to gender equality (766).

According to Part 2, Article 6 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, every citizen of the Russian Federation has all the rights and freedoms and equal obligations provided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Part 2, Article 19 of the RF Constitution guarantees the equality of rights and liberties of the person and of the citizen regardless of gender. Gender equality is currently established by Part 3, Article 19 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: "Men and women have equal rights and freedoms and equal empowerment opportunities." Such a constitution is optimum, and it most fully reflects the need of gender equality for the society and the state (207).

State guarantees of equal men's and women's rights along with equal empowerment opportunities mean the government's obligation to enforce this principle, particularly by creating a nation-wide machinery, rather than plain declaration of equality in legislation (495).

In accordance with Part 1, Article 19, every man is equal under the law and in a court of law. As stated in Paragraph 3, Article 37, the RF Constitution acknowledges the right to work in safe and healthy conditions and be compensated on a non-discriminating basis.

Russia's Execution of International Commitments on Gender Equality

The Russian Federation is a party to many fundamental international treaties on human rights protection. According to Part 4, Article 15 of the RF Constitution, generally acknowledged principles and norms of the international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation are part of its legal framework. If an international treaty to which the Russian Federation is a party provides regulations different from those reflected in national laws, the regulations of the international treaty shall govern (496).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) prescribe non-discrimination on the basis of sex. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights have obligated the states to provide the equal right to enjoy all economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights.

On a global scale, the focus should be laid primarily on empowerment of the rights provided by human rights protection treaties.

In 1980, the USSR ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The so-called Women's Convention became a fundamental document to segregate women's rights within the human rights system (410).

The CEDAW provides means to oversee its implementation. The member-states are obligated to submit initial and periodic reports on the accomplishment of the CEDAW goals and objectives to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.


Having studied the report, the Committee came up with conclusive comments on Russia’s execution of the Convention on 16 August 2010 (208).

In 2004, the Russian Federation signed and ratified an Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women entitling the dedicated UN Committee to consider individual appeals against violation of the Convention by its member-states (410).

In 1953, the USSR ratified the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (New York, 1952). Moreover, Russia is a member to conventions of the International Labour Organisation. Today, ILO's fundamental gender equality conventions include: Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), 1953; Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), 1960; and Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention (No. 156), 1983 (206).

2.2. Equality and Non-discrimination in Certain Codes and Legislative Acts.

Laws on Elections
The Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Law "On the Fundamentals of Civil Service in the RF", the Law "On Political Parties" and the Law "On the Election into the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation" give men and women an equal right to elect and be elected. Notwithstanding the constitutional norms of gender equality, gender asymmetry remains one of the most typical features of Russia’s political life. To begin with, women are still poorly represented in managerial positions and government agencies - legislative, executive and judicial departments as well as in major political parties, both on the federal and regional level. From this viewpoint, the Russian political sphere having the signs of gender discrimination is far from being modern, while sustaining strictly traditional features of the system (17, 18).
According to Part 4, Article 19 of Federal Law No. 95-FZ “On Political Parties” in force as of 11/07/2001 (amended on 02/04/2012), political parties shall be established by men and women - citizens of the Russian Federation of diverse nationalities, members of a political party, entitled to equal opportunities to be represented in governing bodies of the party and on lists of parliamentary candidates and other elective posts with state authorities and local self-governing bodies.

Since 2007, the majority voting system has been replaced with weighted voting leading onto the abandonment of single-member district elections. Further steps included abandonment of the minimum turnout of voters and "none of the above" choice on ballots, prohibition of electoral blocks and coalitions and introduction of a 7-percent vote threshold for party elections into the State Duma. Researchers say, weighted voting is more favourable from the point of view of gender parity. At the same time, women are poorly represented on electoral lists of political parties while mainly placed at the end (17). Today, women-deputies in the Russian State Duma make up 13.5% of the total number of deputies.

**Labour Laws**

Article 3 of the RF Labour Code prohibits occupational discrimination on the grounds of sex. In accordance with Article 64 (Guarantees at Concluding Labour Contracts), unjustified refusal to conclude a labor contract shall be prohibited. All and any direct or indirect restrictions or granting direct or indirect advantages at concluding a labour contract depending on the sex unrelated to professional qualities of employees shall not be permitted, except when otherwise stipulated by the federal law.

Despite the statutory prohibitions of gender discrimination in place, gender discrimination still does exist in the labour market. Gender discrimination occurs in employment (job advertisements indicate the preferred sex of the job seeker and offer lower salaries for women compared to men), there is a pay gap between men and women employed in similar positions (today, women are paid 30-40% less than men in similar positions), and pregnant women and persons with families often suffer a breach of justice (16, 515).

Russia still has a list of specifically male professions prohibited for women. Article 253 of the RF Labour Code prohibits female labour in heavy, dangerous and/or unhealthy trades as well as underground working except non-physical work or sanitary and domestic services.

A list of industries, professions, and jobs with unhealthy and/or dangerous working conditions with restricted female labor is established by RF Government Resolution No. 162 of 25/02/2000.

The list contains 456 professions. It is believed to be unjustified and restricting women's choice of professions by many experts and women's organisations while law makers think themselves as looking after female health. Here is the opinion of E.N. Ershova, Candidate of Science (History), President of the Consortium of Women's Non-governmental Associations: "Such an approach to female healthcare is beyond understanding - women, as potential mothers, are allowed to work on wet decks salting the fish. And that is not dangerous. But they are not allowed to learn to be a navigator or a captain - that's dangerous. They are allowed to be air hostesses but becoming a pilot/navigator/radio operator is a no-no. What a very peculiar way of taking care." (515).
In 2009, women's organisation activists tried appealing against the list with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, but had no luck. (RF Supreme Court Ruling No. KAS09-196 of 21/05/2009 "On Upholding of RF Supreme Court Decision No. GKPI09-36 of 02/03/2009).

The labour legislation specifically prohibits non-employment or dismissal of pregnant women and women with children under three, and on grounds of pregnancy or presence of a child. This is one of the few norms of the labour legislation which violation may result in criminal liability (507).

Pregnant women may count upon better guarantees in case of a labour contract cancellation. According to Article 261 of the RF Labour Code, the employer has no right to cancel a labour contract with a female with children under three years old and single mothers nursing children under 14 years old (handicapped children under 18 years old) (336).

But despite this statutory provision, the 2008 economic crisis brought on large-scale dismissals without a valid reason of pregnant women and women with young children employed in small and medium businesses.

It was obvious that women were being forced out of companies by all means possible. It was often referred to as "maternity phobia" by many journalists. Though many entrepreneurs do admit that women are often better workers than men, they still find it unprofitable to hire pregnant women. The laws governing employment relations are still based on soviet principles where the state used to be an all-in-one employer, underwriter and legal safeguard. The relations have changed considerably since then. But businesses are still obligated to insure female employees and provide pregnancy and maternity benefits. By doing so, later the Social Insurance Fund would compensate, albeit with certain deductions, the benefits already paid. In the conditions of escalating inflation, businesses find this unprofitable. Moreover, businesses must retain the position for women on maternity leaves by finding a temporary replacement. At the same time, a temporary worker will obviously have a smaller input compared to permanent employees (158).

Many of those dismissed without a valid reason sought protection in a court of law with the support of women's public organisations, and many of them won. However, childcare allowances enforced by court were hard to collect as the employers fled from prosecution. This started a series of public rallies and one-off actions in 2010-2011 in 20 major cities of Russia. Protesting women demanded female protection from careless employers and changes to the social insurance system to make maternity benefits payable directly out of the Social Insurance Fund, thus avoiding the employer, as described in dedicated literature (158).

Finally, in July 2011, the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development as instructed by the Russian President, announced the launch of pilot projects to implement the decisions in two of the Russian constituent territories - the Nizhny Novgorod Region and the Karachayevo-Circassian Republic. In July 2012, the projects will be launched in another six regions of Russia, and experts hope Russia will switch to the new benefit payout system across the country by 2014 (158).
Another acute problem is male discrimination in the field of social protection and parenthood benefits. Male discrimination is found at the legislative level in the Labour Code of the Russian Federation and the federal laws "On the Status of Military Servicemen", "On the Police" and others.

The RF Labour Code provides guarantees primarily for women with families; Article 261 of the Labour Code mainly aims to protect women's rights. Under the labour laws, women are entitled for a pregnancy leave followed by a paid childcare leave until 18 months old. The applicable legislation does not stop fathers from taking a childcare leave either, but the empowerment procedure is rather complicated and it requires considerable organizational efforts and time (507).

In accordance with Para. 7, Article 54 of the Regulation on Employment in Internal Affairs Agencies of the Russian Federation, pregnant women and mothers employed in internal affairs agencies employed therein (raising children alone after the mother's death, termination of parental rights, long-term hospital treatment and in other cases where mother care is not available) enjoy legal and social safeguards established by law.

In accordance with Para. 9, Article 10 and Para. 13, Article 11 of the Federal Law "On the Status of Servicemen", female service members and service members - single parents are entitled for social guarantees and compensations as prescribed by federal laws and other regulatory legal acts on the protection of the family, maternity and childhood; female service members further enjoy pregnancy and childcare leaves as provided by federal laws and other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation.

We are therefore dealing with gender asymmetry whereby the state as the guarantor of benefits for women only does in fact admit greater family responsibilities on the part of women and deprives men of the same rights without valid grounds (206).

The subject drew much public attention after the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of "Marking v. Russia" that recognised gender discrimination of Konstantin Markin, a military serviceman who had been refused a childcare leave. In its decision, the European Court of Human Rights gave much criticism of the Russian legislation and legal propositions of the RF Constitutional Court that refuse military servicemen their right for a childcare leave (206).

**Family Laws**

Russia's family legislation is also based on gender equality. Article 31 of the RF Family Code establishes the equality of family partners: either spouse is free to choose their occupation, profession and place of sojourn and residence. Issues related to maternity, paternity, child upbringing and education and other family matters are a joint decision based on the equality of spouses.

The spouse equality principle is further reflected in a number of other articles of the Family Code of the Russian Federation (Article Nos. 32, 33 - 39 and others). Spouses are treated equally in the division of shared property, unless otherwise provided by a prenuptial agreement.

There are exclusions, however, such as the provisions of Article 89 of the RF Family Code entitling the wife to demand separate maintenance in an action at law to be paid by the husband, if financially reliable, during pregnancy and for the following three years after birth. Men nursing children of under
three do not enjoy the same right. A literal interpretation of the norm reflected in Article Nos. 89 - 90 of the RF Family Code would suggest that a wife (an ex-wife) that has not cared for a common child for three years since birth is also entitled to demand maintenance (816).

Many experts also see spouse inequality in unilateral limiting the right of the husband in the absence of the wife's consent to divorce during pregnancy and for the next year after child birth (Art. 17 of the Family Code). This limitation is valid even when the husband is not the father of the child born in marriage. Contestation of paternity in a court of law and decisions to sustain paternity contestation actions have no effect on the existing limitations established by Art. 17 of the RF Family Code (239, 816).

In accordance with Article 61 of the Code, parents have equal rights and obligations to their children (parental rights).

The so-called "maternity capital" - a new tool of financial support provided by the state for the birth of a second child and every next child has been raising eyebrows. The concept was introduced to the Russian legislation following the adoption of Federal Law No. 256-FZ "On Additional Measures of State Support of Families with Children" dated 29/12/2006 (hereinafter, "the Family Support Law"). One of the downsides of the maternity capital, as believed by experts, is the limited use of the money (for instance, the money granted is by far not enough to use it for one of the most popular purposes – purchase of housing) (70, 91, 191, 216).

Much criticism comes from recipients of the maternity capital: since the funding is intended for a woman (and not parents or the child), maternity capital only makes the modern demographic policy more patriarchal. We have in fact made a step back since the time when many areas of the family policy covered both parents in the 1990s. Today, the government has relay the childcare obligation on the woman alone (70, 283, 292, 294).

The Family Support Law focuses on maternity (family) capital; not only women but men, too, have the right for additional state support at child birth (adoption). Specifically, men - single adoptive parents of a second, third and every next child are entitled for state support if the adoption decision came into force as of 1/1/2007 (Part 1, Article 3 of the Family Support Law).

Fathers (adoptive fathers) are entitled for additional state support in case of the mother’s death, declaration of death, deprivation of parental rights and termination of adoption. Therefore, both men and women basically have equal rights in this field.

However, Part 3, Art. 7 of the Family Support Law provides a rather peculiar norm: persons in receipt of a maternity (family) capital certificate may spend the funds in part or in full on housing improvement or the child's (children’s) education, or add them towards the funded component of pension for women as stated by Para. 1 and 2, Pt. 1, Art. 3 of the law. This suggests that the man as a single adoptive father of a second and every next child, unlike women, cannot dispose of the dedicated funds by adding them towards his retirement pension (336).
**Property and Inheritance rights**
The laws governing property and inheritance rights are gender-neutral.

Citizens, whether male or female, may own property, inherit and bequeath property, engage in entrepreneurial activities and any activities permitted by law, set up legal entities, either alone or jointly with other individuals and legal entities, carry out transactions and take on obligations permitted by law, choose the abode, hold copyright for works of science, literature and arts, inventions and other intellectual property protected by law and have other property and personal non-property rights. Nonetheless, female poverty still remains a rather acute issue (485, 515).

From the point of view of poverty, single mothers and single elderly women are a sensitive risk group. These are so-called "the new poor", i.e. people that work and live in the conditions of poverty at the same time. Unlike most of other countries, working in Russia may not provide material welfare. Female poverty is all the more acute in the presence of discrimination in the labour market, unequal remuneration for work of equal value, waiver from maintenance payments or an extremely low level of childcare maintenance (511, 516, 904).

Women have equal rights for family allowances, bank loans and any financial transfers. But in reality, women receive more family allowances and fewer bank loans, especially those for business or housing, as they require better credit worthiness, which poorly-paid women cannot always meet (485).

**Right for Pension Benefits**
According to Article 7, Federal Law No. 173-FZ "On Retirement Pension in the Russian Federation" of 17/12/2001, retirement age pension shall be paid to men at 60 and women at 55.

This norm was considered by the RF Constitutional Court. It concluded (ref. Ruling No. 276-O of 21 December 2000) that the law was based on a differentiation scheme determined by physiological and other differences between men and women thus establishing different age criteria for age retirement and the required work record for the assignment of age pension on a regular or on a preferential basis. The law is further based on the exclusive role of a woman in the society, i.e. maternity, which is harmonized with the provision of Pt. 1, Art. 38 of the RF Constitution stating that maternity is protected by the state and shall not be considered as a discriminatory restriction of constitutional rights, as the decision, by implication of Art. 19 of the RF Constitution, provides true rather than formal equality. At the same time, the Court emphasized that such a legal proposition does not stop future introduction of a pension reform whereby women would have to meet the same pension criteria as men (12).

Pension assignment is not the only gender-differentiated norm. Aforesaid law provides the right for early age retirement at 50 for mothers of children of up to 8 years of age disabled from childhood having 15 years of pensionable service. Under the law, fathers raising handicapped children had not had the same entitlements until the Constitutional Court of the RF recognised the possibility of using the same pension scheme for men too (ref. Ruling No. 231-O of 27/06/2005) (239).

In Russia, the only similarity between the rate of pay and the pension is that they are equally low; an average pension today accounts for less than 30% of an average salary. As for the number of pension payments assigned to men and women, the gender difference is less than 10%. This is determined by
two factors. One, the pension system is designed so that pension differences are not dependent on pay and work record differences; pensions have turned into common old-age benefits. Two, the pensions awarded today are drastically different from those actually paid; there are some that were awarded 10-20 years ago when salaries were significantly lower. Therefore gender differences in pensions awarded for all years make up 10-20% in total, the lowest being paid to women of 70+ (547).

2.3. Legal and Administrative Tools to Eliminate and Prevent Gender Discrimination

Gender Discrimination Defined by Law
An essential drawback of the gender component of Russia's legal framework is that it does not define "discrimination against women" despite repeated instructions by the UN Commission on the Status of Women regarding harmonizing the legislation with international standards. In particular, such definition is found in Article I of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. It reads, "...discrimination against women shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field" (187).

Women's non-governmental organisations in cooperation with the Russian State Duma Committee on Women, Family and Youth have yet had no luck in enforcing the law "On State Guarantees of Equal Rights and Freedoms of Men and Women and Equal Empowerment in the Russian Federation" that would define the term. The draft law has not gone much further that the first reading in 2003. (24).

Administrative Tools to prevent Gender Discrimination
As noted by experts, today's Russia does not have machinery to directly sustain gender equality, despite the fact that the country has taken on the respective commitment under a number of international treaties (128, 185, 546).

In its 2010 Conclusive Comments, the UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women reminded the member-state of its obligation to provide that the government would maintain gender equality and create the conditions necessary for women to exercise human rights under the Convention. By saying so the Committee relied upon the instructions contained in its General Recommendation No. 6 and the Beijing Platform for Action regarding national machinery for improvement of women's status, particularly, the creation of conditions to provide effective performance thereof. The Committee urges the member-state to take prompt steps in establishing a national machinery to improve women's status with adequate authority, human, financial and technical resources to effectively carry out strategies and measures to eliminate discrimination (208).

At the same time, Russia has general human rights mechanisms.

As stated in Article 1 of the Federal Law "On the Public Prosecution Service", the public prosecution service of the Russian Federation is a common federal central system of bodies supervising the
observance of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and laws applicable in the territory thereof on behalf of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, Article 26 of the law states that the public prosecution service oversees the observance of human rights and freedoms by federal and regional authorities and local self-governing bodies.


Moreover, Russia has a Federal Labour and Employment Service represented in all constituent territories of the RF via its local department network that oversees the observance of the labour laws. The local departments also have the authority to consider individual employee complaints and take appropriate steps: check on employers and prosecute where necessary (16).

But despite said human rights protection tools provided by the state, those are rarely used by the ordinary citizen to protect from discrimination on grounds of sex (208).

**Non-Discrimination cases at Law**

Article 136 of the Russian Criminal Code provides criminal liability for a violation of the equality of civil rights and freedoms. Discrimination, i.e. violation of civil rights, freedoms and legitimate interests on the basis of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, status and position, residence, religious affiliation, beliefs and affiliation with public associations or any social groups committed by a person abusing their official position shall be punished by the imposition of a penalty of one hundred to three hundred thousand roubles or a one- to two-year salary or another form of income of the offender, or by deprivation of the right to occupy determined posts or to engage in a determined activity for up to five years, or compulsory community service for up to four hundred and eighty hours, or corrective labour of up to two years, or compulsory labour of up to five years, or imprisonment for the same term.

According to analysts, the article does not find much practical use as its wordings are vague. There have been no judicial proceedings under this article during 2010-2011 (158).

Article 145 of the Russian Criminal Code also prohibits a refusal to employ or dismissal of a pregnant woman or a woman with children under three without a valid reason. This one is rarely applied in practice too. Those unfairly dismissed on the grounds of maternity often file their dismissal claims with regular courts. As advised by public organisations, some of them also add a discrimination clause to their claims. Despite the fact that courts would normally protect women's rights by recognizing unfair dismissal, they would always turn a blind eye to gender discrimination, even in the presence of all the legal grounds (516).
So non-discrimination cases at law are virtually non-existent. Experts believe that the main reason for this is that the society got used to human discrimination and is treating it as something common and justifiable (683, 215, 232).

2.4. Social Reasons for Non-Observance of Gender Equality Laws

*Women and men are unaware of their rights and how to protect them*

Russian public is practically unaware of women's rights and ways to protect from gender discrimination, or the existing international and national gender legislation. Large sections of the population and civil servants have little knowledge of the tools to improve women's status in Russia. The general poor knowledge of rights and rights protection methods also means little knowledge of gender rights (215, 232).

The government virtually does not carry out information campaigns on women's rights. Educational programmes are not concerned with gender equality.

Law enforcement officers, government officials and local department staff and other officers and judges are unaware of men's and women's rights and non-discrimination procedures. There are no federal programmes to train specialists in this field (485, 185).

*Gender Stereotypes*

Despite the existing legal framework, gender discrimination remains a widespread phenomenon. The practice, traditions, patriarchal attitudes and deep-seated stereotypes concerning female and male roles, duties and identity across all life areas do still exist. The government too maintains the stereotyped image of women's superiority in the upbringing of children thus creating obstacles along the way to gender equality (283, 490).

The issue may be solved only by raising awareness amongst men and women of all social groups. A key to achieving the balance between men and women is to view women as individuals and subjects placed on the same society level as men rather than as wives and mothers. The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women urges to use innovative and effective steps towards better understanding of male and female equality and to cooperate with mass media in facilitating the development of a positive, non-stereotypical and non-discriminatory image of a woman (208).

*Women Law-Makers are Out-numbered*

Women in Russia are politically active but they are significantly outnumbered in the country's political life and have little influence. Here is an expert comment on the results of the 2003-2004 electoral period (State Duma and presidential elections): "slightly more women represented in federal legislative bodies and an absolute exclusion of women from top echelons of the executive branch..." (18). Women deputies currently make up 13.5% of the State Duma deputies. In local elections, women win more seats compared to federal elections but even here they make up around 10% of local law-makers. Only a few women hold political posts in Russia. The federal level is currently represented by the only woman-
minister; as for the regional level, women are normally appointed ministers in the field of social protection.

There are many reasons for unequal female representation in political life, but the most important ones, as noted by experts, are these. While members of prominent political parties, women normally rank low on party lists, which limits their opportunities of holding political office. During individual independent campaigns, women find themselves in an unfavourable financial situation as they are outnumbered by men holding managerial positions at major companies, which is currently a decisive factor for a successful candidate in Russia. Finally, deep-seated stereotypes of a woman being unsuitable for politics as dictated by nature and the maternity role stop women from winning over and hold back the electorate in voting for women (324).

Not Enough Text Books and Research Works on Gender Equality Laws
Gender equality is not a popular subject of discussion amongst lawyers today. An analysis of the books on the subject shows that gender equality and women's rights protection were more popular between the early 1990s and the early 2000s. Since the start of the XXI century, there have been fewer publications on the subject despite the absence of any systemic legislative changes in the field. Therefore, only a handful of law books dated 2004-2012 is dedicated to the legal aspects of gender discrimination in Russia, which is another reason for low public awareness in the field.

2.5. Conclusions and Recommendations on Further Legislative Improvement
The domestic women's rights protection legislation provides gender equality guarantees. Russia has signed and ratified the majority of international gender equality treaties.

Nonetheless, certain sections of the Russian legislation still maintain gender asymmetry whereby the government provides parenthood-related benefits for mothers thus acknowledging greater family responsibilities on women's part and depriving men of the same.

The legislation does not define the term "discrimination against women", and there have been no real discrimination cases at law. Experts believe that the main reason for this is that the society has got used to human discrimination and that people are unaware of their rights.

Researchers highlight a whole range of recommendations concerning legislative developments in the field of gender equality:

1. Laws should be adopted at the federal level to maintain gender equality. Those should explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex and define discrimination as such, including both direct and indirect discrimination in the public and private sector. The laws should further establish enforceable sanctions for violations (485, 24, 185, 208).

2. A national machinery aimed at improvement of women's status should be introduced to the executive agencies at all levels vested with adequate competence and authority, particularly for the consideration of individual complaints, and human, financial and technical resources for effective performance.
Another measure is to set up a system of regular reporting to the Government and the Parliament (485, 24, 185, 208).

3. The government needs to adopt national action plans to secure gender equality at the federal and regional level, including monitoring and regular evaluation of the implementation strategies and steps (128, 208, 546).

4. Laws on elections, including the Federal Political Parties Law should have a clause obligating contending political parties to include at least 30% of female and male candidates. At the same time, electoral list positions should be distributed according to the gender representation (17, 324).

5. To overcome gender asymmetry, the labour legislation should be changed in so far as it concerns the regulation of work by persons with family duties. Article 260 of the Russian Labour Code should provide for an infant care leave available for men as well as for women. The employment contract termination ban provided by Part 4, Article 261 of the Labour Code should apply to men and not only women with children under three. The legislation governing military, civil, police service, etc. must enable men as well as women to use their right to take a childcare leave (206, 207).

6. To eliminate female discrimination in employment, the government should change the maternity benefit scheme, particularly how maternity benefits are granted and paid, and switch to direct payments to the insured by local offices of the Social Insurance Fund thus avoiding payment through the employer (158, 516).

7. Articles 89 and 90 of the Family Code should be changed to entitle fathers to raise their children up to three and demand maintenance. Federal Law No. 256-FZ dated 29/12/2006 "On Additional State Support of Families with Children" must provide equal opportunities to make use of the maternity (family) capital for men and women (239, 336, 816).

3. Gender Equality in Education

Gender equality in education is one of the most essential prerequisites for the empowerment of women's rights and socioeconomic development (281, 291, 525). The human asset increase factor in today's world has become a basis for economic prosperity and a faster rate of social development of countries (525, 705). Women's status in education (equal access to education at diverse levels) indicates the promotion of gender equality (140, 300, 580).

Russia is a country with one of the highest education levels. Gender parity in primary and secondary education has been maintained since soviet times. As for university education, the percentage of girls by the start of the period in question (2002/2003) was 57%. However, women's educational resource is not used as effectively as it should be (525), and the education system is still characterised by gender segregation. Socioeconomic transformations in the Russian society and the ongoing education reform are a new challenge for the future development of gender equality in education. However, there has not been a single significant gender examination of educational reforms.
This chapter is concerned with the educational structure of the Russian society, accessibility of education and education payoff, and the gender content in education.

### 3.1. Educational Structure of the Russian Society

According to the results of the 2010 census, in the educational pyramid, women have higher educational status, while men are placed on lower levels (Fig. 3.1).

As established during the 2010 nation-wide census, women with an academic degree are outnumbered by men. There is 44% of candidates and doctors of science amongst men (265 K people) and 33% amongst women (41 K people). However, some regions such as the Zabaykalsky Krai, show higher figures for women.

The gender distribution in education can therefore be conventionally presented as a cake where the lowest and the highest layers are taken by men, while the middle and top layers - by women.

![Figure 3.1. Distribution of the population based on the educational level and sex (for every 1,000 people aged 15+)](image)

*Note: Educational levels: 1 - university education and undergraduate education, 2 - intermediate vocational education, 3 - general secondary education, 4 - basic general education, 5 - elementary vocational education, 6 - elementary general education, 7 - no elementary education. Source: Federal State Statistics Service. (data accessed in June 2012).*
3.2. Access to Education in Russia

Gender Segregation in Education

There are more girls amongst students, while there are more men amongst postgraduates and PhD students (404).

Gender segregation in education is getting worse. The elementary and secondary vocational education system is characterised by a steady high number of girls; the number of girls in the university education system is growing (Table 3.1) (135).

Even despite draft determent for male students of universities (a great incentive for higher education for many young men today), there are more boys than girls leaving school on finishing the ninth form to enter basic vocational education institutions or the labour market (525, 275). The reason for this is that today, the pay gap between men and women and occupational segregation in the labour market make it possible for men to be paid more after leaving a secondary school or a secondary vocational school compared to women with university education. Women's high level of education does not help narrow the pay gap and overcome the "glass ceiling" (525), although human capital assets are the only factor that can help close the gap in Russia (209).

Increasing gender segregation maintains gender stereotypes, as patriarchal family relations are supported largely by young working-class males with no university education (578).

Occupational distribution of young men and women is unequal too (135). Technical universities and occupations are thought of as specifically male, while humanitarian sciences are believed to be women's prerogative. According to scientific forecasts, the number of students of technical universities traditionally considered "men's schools" will go down with the introduction of a professional army (525).

Table 3.1. Percentage of girls in the total number of students of vocational education institutions, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of vocational education</th>
<th>1995/96</th>
<th>2000/01</th>
<th>2005/06</th>
<th>2009/10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic vocational education*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and municipal secondary vocational education**</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private secondary vocational education**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and municipal professional university education**</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private professional university education**</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate education*</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral education*</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * as of the middle of the year, * as of the start of the year, Source: Federal State Statistics Service (data accessed in June 2012).
Despite a recent increase, there are fewer women amongst postgraduate and PhD students (Table C1). In the second half of the 2000s, the number of postgraduate female students went up due to an increasing number of younger (up to 26) women (Figure 3.2).

![Figure 3.2. Percentage of female postgraduate students in Russia in 2007-2009, %](image)


Lower figures for older female postgraduate students can be linked to deteriorating conditions for women to combine maternity and postgraduate studies. An implicit reason for this may be the fact that women are less certain they would defend their theses in time (59), which is normally explained by greater family duties.

Gender segregation in education does not only manifest itself in the existence of typically "female" and "male" universities and student space and uneven distribution of men and women at educational levels but in vertical and horizontal segregation of the very education officers at all levels in the labour market. Despite equal numbers of men and women among teaching staff in Russian higher education institutions, gender asymmetry occurs in the distribution of positions: the higher the position, the fewer women are represented, and vice-versa; an associate professor is about the only position where men and women are represented equally (404).

Reasons for gender segregation in education are closely connected with gender stereotypes and the role structure in society, and the entire gender relations system (363).

There are numerous consequences of gender segregation in the education system. Some of those are: 1) the promotion of specifically gender-based occupations and occupational segregation in the labour market, including the education system itself (feminisation of primary and secondary education), 2) the promotion of vertical segregation in society, including the education system itself (managerial positions at any education level are primarily held by men; there are fewer women holding top educational
positions, such as professors), 3) the promotion of gender stereotypes on the role of education in women's life and on typically "female" and "male" occupations (368, 525).

Finally, gender segregation in education affects women's opportunities of using their skills to lead the country, mastering new high-tech professions, socialization and cultural development of boys and girls (278, 280, 368) and even educational motivation (681, 712).

**Access to Free Education**
Formally, all levels of education and training for all occupations for girls and young women remain free. However, changes in the education system of the country affect men and women differently.

According to expert opinion, the number of students has been going up recently due to women's fee-based education (525).

Notably (Table C1), private secondary vocational and professional university education is characterised by a greater number of female students compared to public education. Private education is normally paid for by students themselves. This suggests that girls more often than boys find themselves paying for their education. We cannot be too sure of this as there are not so many private educational institutions, and a final conclusion as to gender distribution in fee-based education would require information on the allocation of free and fee-based student space at public education institutions.

The university reform lacks gender neutrality. But political and professional discussions on the subject of the university reform are little concerned with the gender consequences thereof, except potential negative effects of equal access to education with the introduction of uniform state examinations (USEs), registered financial obligations and Russia's joining of the Bologna Process mentioned in a handful of research works (525). Researchers were particularly expecting an outflow of women from the Master's programme due to a potential escalating cost of master's education, coupling of studies with family duties and segregation of higher professional education.

In her earlier study (M.E. Baskakova. Economic Efficiency of Investments into Higher Education: Gender Aspect. M., 2002) the author noted positive changes in the higher education system (in conditions of education commercialization, parents refrain from giving preferences to their sons when making decisions on payment for education; feminization of higher education took place) and she also mentioned negative aspects (primarily “female” specialties become paid; impact of education on equalization of female and male employment has declined; and benfits from education reduced for women during the reforms).

Essential changes to the education system are the innovations connected with inclusivity of education in Russia. Gender consequences thereof are yet to be assessed (26).

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47 For reference: between 1995 and 2010, the number of private secondary schools went up from 0.1 to 5%; the number of private universities increased from 4 to 17%.
In view of the elaboration of a new law on education and the ideas announced by current Minister of Education and Science Dmitry Livanov concerning the promotion of fee-based education (292), the Internet society is actively discussing the law itself and the potential aftermath of the increasing fee-based student space within the university education system (elitism, utility and narrowing of the resource and undergraduate base) (298).

Despite ongoing discussions, those are little concerned with examining the draft education law and the current changes from the point of view of gender equality.

**Illiterate Boys**

The low-numbered illiterate adult population of Russia (6 for every 1000) largely embraces people of over 70, mainly women and mainly rural residents. 3 men and 8 women in every 1000 people of both sex aged 15+ were illiterate in Russia in 2002. The situation with the population under 70 is more worrisome: firstly, the younger a person, the more chance of illiteracy and secondly, more illiterate young men than women are found in rural areas (275) (Fig. 3.3).

The balance is tilted. In 2002, the rate of illiteracy amongst the generation of school graduates after 1989/1990 was 2‰ of illiterate males (25,000 people) and 1‰ of illiterate females (12,000 people) in urban areas, and 7‰ of illiterate males (27,000 people) and 5‰ of illiterate females (18,000 people) in rural areas. The figures look small but they still make up some 82,000 people.

In the 1990s, young men ceded more in the accumulation of human capital than young women. For instance, if we compare the generations having graduated before the market reforms with those having graduated during the perestroika, despite the general increase in the number of people with just primary education and uneducated people, men would be showing greater numbers than women (275) (Fig. 3.4).

According to the 2010 census, 7% of boys and 6% of girls aged 6-9 do not attend pre-school or general education institutions in rural areas.
Figure 3.3. Gender-based illiteracy of the Russian population aged 15 to 69, for every 1,000 of the given sex

Source: (275).

Figure 3.4. Men/women ratio in the primary education and uneducated social groups of the soviet post-war and perestroika generations in Russia

Source: (275).
3.3. Gender Inequality of Education Payoff

Gender inequality in Russia's education system also manifests itself in low economic yield of female education, as the existing implicit discrimination in the labour market makes it hard for women to get better payoff from their education as compared to men (525). Female graduates of secondary schools and universities are paid less, spend more time on career development and start off in lower positions (185).

A microdata analysis, however, proves differently: the education payoff (measured as the rate of pay based on the number of years in education) is higher with women than with men. For women, education remains the only social "elevator" that could help close the pay gap (209).

At the same time, it takes women longer than men to achieve their education payoff based on the work record within a company. This means that a lack of university education for women cannot be as easily compensated by the work record within a company as it would be for men; the pay gap for women with different educational levels exists regardless of the work record (14).

In accordance with the estimates of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, the education payoff between 1995 and 2003 increased from 7% to 12% for women and from 4% to 7% for men. The variations were largely explained by the occupation (371).

According to the mid-2000s estimates, the education payoff was 9% for women and 7% for men. Women's figures are high and comparable to average figures for OECD members (294).

Education payoff of later years showed a slight decrease. But during 1990-2008, women's education payoff would remain 2 per cent higher than men's (294).

The education payoff is better in less attractive regions, regions with a higher unemployment rate and those with higher employment in the public sector (294).

This considerable gender variance in remuneration across regions is connected with a higher level of regional segregation in the labour market (234).

According to researchers, household cost efficiency of daughters' education is decreasing as young women find it hard to get employed in the occupation of choice due to excessive labour market supply and growing stratification of universities - only a few of those can maintain the education quality, which makes them elite and not easily accessible (525).

3.4. Gender Content of Education

When we speak of the gender content of education, we mean the content of educational programmes and texts and the specifics of the communication and teaching style.

Educational programmes and texts lack gender neutrality and are based on gender stereotypes (123, 368, 525). The official curriculum across all education levels, including kindergartens and schools, offers
exclusively "male" and "female" subjects (a vivid example would be handcraft classes and orientation training). An "implicit" curriculum based on a system of gender values, norms and ideas, and behavioural standards for men and women is imposed on boys and girls through the teaching content, processes and organisation (teaching books and training aids contain sexist statements; text books have many more pictures featuring boys and men engaged in active work; training aids practically do not mention female scientists and historic and contemporary public figures - basically, gender segregation is imposed as a role model).

Gender education is not covered by school education programmes. A "Family Life Ethics and Psychology" extracurricular course offered in schools is thought to carry little information on family planning. It does not help prevent gender stereotypes as the course teachers are less informed themselves (the course was given by psychologists, PE teachers, teachers of biology and geography and any other teachers ready to take on the job) (185).

Schools and kindergartens are therefore one of the first institutes in life to impose gender stereotypes (368).

The teaching and communication style in education promotes gender stereotypes. Teachers normally give more attention to boys, expect better results from them and praise them oftener than girls. Boys get more encouraged for achievement, while girls - for learning behavioural models which are far from leadership and management (368, 681, 712).

Gender stereotypes are maintained in university education too. Gender stereotypes on the role of men and women are often found in text books and training courses, and in teachers' attitudes. Gender education and gender research programmes and compulsory courses would be very hard to launch at universities. The worst ones would be economics departments of universities, as the proof of the economic benefits of gender equality is the best tool to promote it (185).

Gender studies at universities are mainly backed up by international organisations rather than government agencies or universities themselves. Gender studies at universities are mainly backed up by international organisations rather than government agencies or universities themselves. We believe that economics departments are the hardest to launch gender courses at, because gender issues are not treated seriously by the scientific community, assuming that the field of economics in Russia is the one characterised by the worst gender stagnation.

3.5. Conclusions and Recommendations on Gender Equality in Education

The Russian education system formally does not discriminate against girls and women in their access to education at all levels and practically all occupations. The problem occurs in equal male presentation in the university education system.

The economic payoff of education is higher with women, but it does not help narrow the pay gap.

Both school and university education (the contents of courses and text books and teachers' attitude) promote gender stereotypes.
At the level of education policy and management, educational institutions should take the following steps (123, 185, 368, 525, 135):

- an expert examination of the education reform at all educational levels on the part of the government;
- overcoming occupational segregation at all levels of professional education;
- introduction of compulsory gender studies at departments of humanities;
- a gender examination and correction of school books;
- promoting the prestigious status of work in the education system;
- achieving of a gender balance amongst teachers;
- introduction of gender subjects into teacher training programmes;
- learning and mastering the teaching and communication styles within the education system enabling to overcome false and unjustifiable gender stereotypes;
- elaboration of a teacher's code promoting non-admissibility of gender stereotypes in professional work.

4. **Gender and Health**

The chapter devoted to gender equality in the access to healthcare, health standards and life expectancy describes gender-based approaches to health issues, analyses supermortality among men and female health (including reproductive health) and access to healthcare services, particularly by women from rural areas and migrants, and evaluates gender aspects of HIV/AIDS in Russia.

4.1. **General Ways to Approach the Gender and Health Issue**

Every person's health is influenced by multiple factors. There are certain trends, however, that are typical for various communities, including men and women. It seems that only yesterday women's and men's health specifics were determined largely by the biological factors. But the realization of the need to change the approach to gender issues helped us understand that they should be interpreted within a larger context - the context of gender. At the scientific level this meant that social and situation conditions would have greater influence on an individual compared to their biological features.

A gender-based approach to health is recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO). Further, a gender-based approach to analysing the state of health and development of today's healthcare systems is reflected in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Russia and other states having signed and ratified the convention regularly submit national women's status reports to the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (the latest one dated 2010) part of which is devoted to the health status of women in the Russian Federation.
Over the past period, general gender health and healthcare issues have been highlighted in a number of scientifically and publicly significant works (152, 218, 219, 437).

We will touch upon two of them which best reflect today's situation both in theory and in practice. The first work is “Monitoring of Women's Rights in Russia: A Thousand Women's Stories. A collection of analytical material and monitoring data on Russia's fulfilment of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women”, Moscow, 2008 (437). The work highlights and analyses the results of studies in 15 regions of Russia focusing on: women's access to medical and healthcare services during pregnancy, childbirth and the child's first year; access to medical and healthcare services for handicapped women, women - single mothers and women from rural areas; and HIV/AIDS and prevention among women and their family members.

The second work is “Health and Healthcare. The Gender Dimension” (219). The book is an analytical work, a collected monograph embracing copyrighted materials devoted to a general characteristic of healthcare organisations in Russia and gender analysis opportunities in healthcare policy. The book particularly highlights health protection issues directly linked to the implementation of top national healthcare and demographic development projects. The research work is based on the gender indicators of health and healthcare developed under the different projects by diverse scientific and public organisations of Russia in the 1990s-2000s. The book also relies on state statistics, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS, 1996-2002), the National Survey of Public Welfare and Public Participation in Social Programmes and deliverables of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies of Population at the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Moscow Gender Research Centre (MGRC). Substantially, the book is an innovation opening up more room for further research, as it is the first large-scale study of gender health and healthcare in the country.

The monograph was recommended for publishing by the Academic Council of the Institute of Social and Economic Studies of Population at the Russian Academy of Sciences (the first methodological work entitled "Gender Approach to Healthcare" was published in 200148).

The concept of gender medicine has been arising great interest lately. In medicine, gender specificity of men and women is understood as a difference between the state of a disease in men and women. The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) declared women's pain as the key problem of 2009. The association is currently conducting an international campaign entitled Real Women, Real Pain. Why is today's woman particularly in spotlight? According to statistics there are 38 specifically female clinical conditions accompanied by pain, while 15 are known to commonly occur in men and 24 - to be typical for people of both sex. Population studies have shown that the women/men pain ratio is 1.5:1 on average for headaches, neck aches, and shoulder and knee aches; 2:1 for face and jaw aches and 2.5:1 for migraine. There have been works published in Russia that address gender differences in real health practices. One of such studies entitled "Your Health and Healthcare" was conducted in St. Petersburg in 2003. The work presents a theoretical description of real healthcare behaviours, particularly behavioural

patterns. It analyses the gender specifics and establishes determining factors. Statistically important greatest differences in smoking patterns are based on sex (77, 467).

Studying of behavioural health conservation and improvement practices is part of a general research of health inequalities. Behavioural models are elements of a particular lifestyle characterizing a person's capabilities to foresee and overcome problems. Health-determined behaviour therefore depends on general life patterns which reflect social values, psychological welfare and personal integration into the predominant culture. Along with an extremely high rate of economic and social transformations, health deterioration and environmental degradation, health values and unhealthy behaviour are one of the significant factors determining the morbidity rate and the risk of an early death in the country (77, 201, 724).

A popular science magazine Female Health was launched in 2005. The magazine regularly publishes the results of gender-based clinical tests.

4.2. Gender Gap in Life Expectancy: The Problem of Russian Men

Russia is a world leader when it comes to the difference between men's and women's life expectancy. In 2004-2010, the life expectancy gap was 12 years (Fig. 4.1). The main reason for such a huge gap is working-age men. The death rate for working-age men is higher for all reasons, particularly due to external (preventable) factors (162, 300, 679).

Figure 4.1. Men's and women's life expectancy dynamics at birth, Russia, 1963-2010


Life expectancy in Russia increased over the period between 2004 and 2010, the 2010 figure being 75 years for women and 63 years for men, but the big gap remains. Significant differences in life expectancy within and across regions, including gender-based ones, still exist (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Table 4.1. Regional differences in life expectancy of the population of Russian Federation territories with long and short lifespans as of mid-2000s (in years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Smolensk Region</th>
<th>Gender gap</th>
<th>Khanty-Mansy Autonomous District</th>
<th>Gender gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>men</td>
<td>women</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum index</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for municipalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum index</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for municipalities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap for municipalities</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Table D2, mortality in men aged under 15 and 60+ is 1.5 - 1.6 times higher than that in women; mortality in working-age men is 3.3 - 3.4 times higher. The biggest gap on average is found in medium cities with a population of over 50,000 people and in large cities (2.7 compared to 2.5 - 2.6 in other towns/cities).

Table 4.2. Age-based mortality indices (for every 100 K of the population) depending on the type and size of the urban population of the Central Federal District of Russia, 2008-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-14</th>
<th>15-29</th>
<th>30-44</th>
<th>45-59</th>
<th>60+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-type settlements</td>
<td>106.8</td>
<td>365.9</td>
<td>893.8</td>
<td>2265.8</td>
<td>7955.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns: up to 10 K</td>
<td>145.9</td>
<td>271.6</td>
<td>1001.0</td>
<td>2502.3</td>
<td>8349.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19.9 K</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>331.9</td>
<td>891.4</td>
<td>2326.0</td>
<td>8152.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium cities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49.9 K</td>
<td>104.5</td>
<td>310.5</td>
<td>896.1</td>
<td>2252.9</td>
<td>8054.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99.9 K</td>
<td>117.3</td>
<td>332.9</td>
<td>862.2</td>
<td>2241.0</td>
<td>8252.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large cities: 100 K+</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>230.0</td>
<td>776.8</td>
<td>2043.1</td>
<td>7431.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region's centres</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>243.3</td>
<td>752.1</td>
<td>1932.7</td>
<td>7169.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban-type settlements</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>102.9</td>
<td>273.5</td>
<td>690.9</td>
<td>5321.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns: up to 10 K</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>135.8</td>
<td>264.1</td>
<td>807.0</td>
<td>5625.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19.9 K</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>291.3</td>
<td>717.1</td>
<td>5471.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium cities:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49.9 K</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>272.7</td>
<td>661.2</td>
<td>5299.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-99.9 K</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>250.4</td>
<td>678.1</td>
<td>5335.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large cities: 100 K+</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>248.8</td>
<td>625.1</td>
<td>4902.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region's centres</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>224.7</td>
<td>577.3</td>
<td>4735.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shortest lifespan for men (less than 56 years in the first half of the 2000s) was characteristic of European Central and North-West parts of the country with the highest depopulation and population degradation and in the regions of South Siberia and the Far East characterised by hard labour or underdevelopment. These regions’ male mortality factors are the worst living conditions, alcoholism and poor education (124, 578).

The regions were also mentioned in the context of offering the worst longevity conditions for women (359).

Unlike developed countries, the gender gap in mortality in Russia remains big (Fig. 4.2). The main reason for the big gap is working-age men (Fig. 4.3). The death rate for working-age men is higher for all reasons, particularly due to external (preventable) factors (Table 4.2) (162, 300).

If the current situation remains the same, only 50% of boys aged 15 and 90% of girls aged 15 will live up to the pension age (162, 163, 200).

Figure 4.2. Gender gap in life expectancy at birth, Russia and developed countries, in years

Source: Russian State Statistics Service (data accessed in June 2012) and (162).
Table 4.3. Gender ratio of mortality indices for working-age persons with a breakdown into main causes of death, Russia, 1990-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All causes</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood circulation system</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External causes</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCLUDING 6-8 x AS MANY SUICIDES!

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respiratory system</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digestive system</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious diseases</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (300).
Women live longer despite worse health conditions. The gap closes up when it comes to healthy life expectancy (Table 4.4) (162).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>LE m</th>
<th>LE w</th>
<th>HLE m</th>
<th>HLE w</th>
<th>Gender gap in LE</th>
<th>Gender gap in HLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ex-soviet states</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East European countries</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing countries</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (162).

In her earlier studies, N.M. Rimashevskaya (e.g., N. Rimashevskaya. A Person and Reforms. Secrets of Survival. M, 2003) also confirms this thesis. The author believes that health condition of women is poorer, since women bear heavier biological and social burden (birth and bringing up of children, double working day, especially at the times of economic crisis). Men die at earlier age because of lower self-protection – they do not often address doctors for hospitalization and treatment, and they abuse alcohol and tobacco to greater extent. As a result, women live longer, but their health is poorer. I.B. Nazarova (447) provides detailed analysis of various existing concepts explaining gender impact on health, in particular self-protection behavior, double burden on women, gender-specific professional diseases, and different attitude of men and women towards health. She presents data of various studies carried out at the turn of the century: the same share of men and women have one chronic disease, while several diseases are diagnosed with every tenth man and every fifth woman.

One of the main factors of poor health of women is caused by reproductive disorders.

4.3. Women’s Health. Reproductive Health

The Russia of the 2000s was characterised by positive dynamics in many areas of women’s health and healthcare. Researchers particularly link this with nationwide healthcare programmes in Russia (185).

In the 2000s, the maternal mortality index dropped twofold, and the childbirth mortality index decreased 1.5 - 1.7 times for girls and boys both from urban and rural areas. There was a threefold decrease in the rate of maternal mortality from illegal abortions. Russia as a country with a traditionally high level of abortions (in the 1990s, the birth-to-abortion ratio was 100:200) showed a 1.4x decrease in the number of abortions (1.6x for women aged 20-34) (Table D5). In the first half of the 2000s, the
number of abortions amongst young women aged 15 to 19 went down too, but that amongst younger girls of under 15 increased, 88% of pregnancies being terminated in 2004 (185).

The decreasing number of abortions is primarily linked to the extensive use of modern contraceptives, especially amongst young women (Table D6). The number of women using oral contraceptives increased twofold (185, 583).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Box Inserted from Russia’s Healthcare Programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Separate sections of each of the documents set tasks to cut down on maternal and infant mortality, develop advanced perinatal techniques, protect public reproductive health, especially when it comes to adolescents and older reproductive age groups (including the prevention of cancer of women's reproductive organs), affordability of high-quality medical services for all social groups, standardization of medical services, public awareness and promotion of a healthy lifestyle. Improvements further include the launch of childbirth certificates, a large-scale campaign for the prevention and early diagnosis of cancer of the reproductive organs, building of new perinatal centres and provision of high-technology medical equipment for the existing healthcare institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maternal mortality in rural areas, however, remains almost 2 times higher than in urban areas. Child mortality for boys and for rural areas is traditionally higher. Compared to developed countries (with 10-20 abortions to every 100 children born), the number of abortions as of the late 2000s was still high - 92 abortions to 100 children born. Around a quarter of the population (23%) has an unmet need for family planning, i.e. non-use of contraception or use of traditional, less effective contraceptive methods (the index being 10% for developed countries) (563, 564, 583).

Professional medical help at labour is provided to all women across Russia (451). 97-98% of pregnant women visit GPs, 94-95% takes Wasserman's tests. The number of sick pregnant women is worrisome. The number of complicating conditions (for every 1,000 births) either remains the same (blood circulation and urogenital conditions) or it increases (diabetes mellitus, oedema, hypertension, varicose veins) (Table 4.5). Female and male reproductive system diseases occur more often, and the morbidity rate is going up, including cases when first diagnosed.

In order to sustain further decrease in perinatal, infant and maternal mortality, especially in view of the 2012 introduction of birth registration criteria recommended by the World Health Organisation, steps should be taken to renovate the existing obstetric clinics, set up intensive care wards for newborns and pathologic departments for newborns and prematurely born, and fit out child healthcare and obstetrics institutions with advanced diagnostic and therapeutic equipment.
An effective three-tier pregnancy and infant aid system can be set up only with the government support of construction and reconstruction of regional (in krais and republics) and federal perinatal centres. Over the 2006-2010 period, the number of perinatal centres in Russia went up from 40 to 53. Twenty two regional and one federal perinatal centres were launched during 2008-2011 in the framework of the implementation of a “Health” priority national project co-financed from the federal budget. These perinatal centres provide medical aid to over 90,000 obstetric patients and high-risk newborns every year (70, 120, 218, 219).

| Table 5.5. Health state of pregnant women, women in labour and new mothers |
|-----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| Number of pregnant women - total, K people | 1292.8 | 1155.9 | 1335.7 | 1675.9 | 1698.3 |
| of which:       |        |        |        |        |        |
| carried to term | 1178.0 | 1053.4 | 1238.3 | 1541.8 | 1569.0 |
| had premature labour | 50.5   | 46.9   | 44.2   | 66.0   | 62.4   |
| terminated pregnancy\(^1\) | 64.3   | 55.6   | 53.2   | 68.0   | 66.9   |
| Illnesses amongst pregnant women-new mothers: |        |        |        |        |        |
| anaemia         | 34.4   | 43.9   | 41.5   | 35.3   | 34.7   |
| blood circulation disorders | 7.7    | 10.2   | 10.6   | 10.3   | 10.4   |
| diabetes mellitus | 0.1    | 0.1    | 0.2    | 0.3    | 0.4    |
| oedema, proteinuria and hypertension | 14.9   | 21.4   | 21.6   | 17.8   | 18.1   |
| urinogenital diseases | 12.9   | 18.6   | 21.2   | 19.2   | 19.2   |
| complications on veins | 2.3    | 3.4    | 3.9    | 4.4    | 4.5    |
| Labour-complicating conditions\(^2\): |        |        |        |        |        |
| anaemia         | 209.5  | 265.8  | 259.5  | 232.2  | 230.8  |
| blood circulation disorders | 53.2   | 68.5   | 68.4   | 70.6   | 67.9   |
| diabetes mellitus | 1.0    | 1.3    | 1.6    | 3.0    | 3.7    |
| oedema, proteinuria and hypertension | 156.8  | 215.3  | 223.5  | 197.2  | 189.5  |
| urinogenital diseases | 87.0   | 93.6   | 89.5   | 81.0   | 72.4   |
| varicose veins   | 17.1   | 17.6   | 18.9   | 22.4   | 22.1   |
| bleeding at placental and lying-in stages | 27.6   | 24.3   | 15.7   | 13.3   | 12.7   |
| labour disorders | 124.7  | 132.6  | 122.2  | 119.7  | 113.0  |

Notes: 1\(^{)}\) spontaneous delivery and delivery on medical indications. 2\(^{)}\) for every 1000 deliveries. Source: Federal State Statistics Service (data accessed in June 2012).

A decreasing birth rate among adolescents and young women is positively influenced by a general "birth maturity" trend and a growing number of people engaged in family planning. Age-specific birth rates among adolescents and young women (aged 15-19 and 20-24) went down in the 2000s with the intensification of birth maturity in the RF (162, 296). There has been a positive family planning trend borrowed from West European countries, where the main birth rate input is down to women aged 25-34 with good education and a career start. The birth rate among adolescents of under 18 has been going down too (those account for less than 2% of all child births) (185).
In order to improve women's health status, the government needs to enhance information and resource support of the existing reproductive healthcare programmes and strengthen the measures connected with equal access to healthcare services, including paid ones (especially for low-income women and women in rural areas). Another step is the introduction of dedicated school programmes with a good resource base, primarily, qualified teachers and modern teaching aids. At the same time, the government needs to tread carefully when it comes to women's reproductive rights by categorically denying an abortion ban, protecting women from being pressurized about abortion and providing a free-of-charge abortion option (185).

The Concept of Socioeconomic Development of the Russian Federation Until 2020 provides for a "range of measures to prevent and cut down on abortions." We are afraid that to do so, the government may resort to gender-discriminating methods. Members of parliament, for instance, have been repeatedly raising the issue of banning abortions. For your information, there was a cut-down on social indications for artificial termination in 2003. Raising public awareness and maintaining accessibility to advanced family planning techniques for all public groups are the only effective methods to cut down on abortions and save women's reproductive rights at the same time (120, 256, 309, 437, 535, 599, 601, 645, 646, 655).

In late 2011 - early 2012, the government was discussing a number of amendments to the public healthcare law aimed at limiting women's access to abortions. The discussions were never made too public. Demographists, doctors and sociologists kept insisting that the rate of abortions could only be brought down by promoting modern contraceptives, rather than imposing bans (654, 664). Such laws have little effect on high-income population (who can always pay); those at risk are people from low-income families.

As for the general female health status, there has unfortunately been a tendency for deteriorating health indices for a number of illnesses (Table 4.6).

According to public opinion, especially that among healthcare directors at different levels, the situation is often linked to the improvement of diagnostics through a renovation of healthcare facilities in hospitals and introduction of public health examinations for large groups of employees. But not all of it is true. Increasing morbidity is found in rural areas with poor healthcare facilities.

In the late 2000s, there was a positive tendency towards a slower increase in rates of cancer morbidity in women (cancer of reproductive organs). As for sexually transmitted diseases, the death rate went down considerably - almost twofold for syphilis and gonorrhoea between 2000 and 2007. However, HIV morbidity kept going up. The prevalence is higher for men (256 cases in men against 130 in women for every 100K of the population), while the rate of extension is higher for women: female HIV morbidity grew 6-fold between 2000-2007, male HIV morbidity increased three-fold (185).
Table D 6. Women’s morbidity with a breakdown into conditions, Russia, 1995-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women registered with first diagnosis: total, K people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malignant tumours</td>
<td>206.1</td>
<td>232.3</td>
<td>250.1</td>
<td>269.9</td>
<td>278.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breast cancer</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cervical, endometrial and placental cancer</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ovarian cancer</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active tuberculosis</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alcoholism and alcoholic psychosis</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>menstrual disorders</td>
<td>239.9</td>
<td>399.8</td>
<td>531.6</td>
<td>528.8</td>
<td>555.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>infertility</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>complicated pregnancy, labour and puerperium</td>
<td>1443.9</td>
<td>2085.1</td>
<td>2470.7</td>
<td>2881.3</td>
<td>2888.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for every 100,000 women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malignant tumours</td>
<td>263.7</td>
<td>299.6</td>
<td>328.5</td>
<td>353.9</td>
<td>363.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breast cancer</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cervical, endometrial and placental cancer</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ovarian cancer</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>active tuberculosis</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>43.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alcoholism and alcoholic psychosis</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.4. Access to Healthcare Institutions

Notably, women are more sensitive when it comes to access to healthcare because one, obstetrics and gynaecology are among the five most popular fee-based services, and one of the most expensive ones at that, and two, women find it more difficult to pay for medical services than men due to higher female poverty incidence (437).

Access to healthcare is one of the acutest issues for the population of Russia. The cost of healthcare keeps going up both in urban and rural areas (Table 4.7).

Studies of the understanding of inequality in the health status of different communities which still exists and has even become worse lately are of particular interest. Relatively poorer households spend the bulk of their income on food, and the income differences between the rich and the poor may have grave consequences for the diet, thus affecting the state of health. One of the most essential characteristics connected with health status inequality is the level of income. The obvious link between health and poverty has been in focus of many researchers (170, 219, 539, 544, 548, 554).
### Table 4.7. Household expenses on fee-based healthcare and recreation services
(based on a random survey of household budgets; on average per member of household; in roubles; 1995 – K roubles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total spendings</strong></td>
<td>385.7</td>
<td>1909.1</td>
<td>11935.8</td>
<td>27950.4</td>
<td>32468.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on medical services</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>143.0</td>
<td>495.4</td>
<td>1243.3</td>
<td>1559.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on spa and health activities</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>197.7</td>
<td>681.8</td>
<td>664.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on physical education and sports</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>108.5</td>
<td>380.3</td>
<td>371.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on organisation of recreation and cultural events</td>
<td>5.4(^1)</td>
<td>104.6</td>
<td>965.9</td>
<td>2738.9</td>
<td>3046.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban households</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total spendings</td>
<td>464.2</td>
<td>2264.3</td>
<td>14477.6</td>
<td>33576.4</td>
<td>38601.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on medical services</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>180.5</td>
<td>603.0</td>
<td>1514.0</td>
<td>1888.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on spa and health activities</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>243.3</td>
<td>896.9</td>
<td>841.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on physical education and sports</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>146.7</td>
<td>511.0</td>
<td>496.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on organisation of recreation and cultural events</td>
<td>6.4(^1)</td>
<td>137.6</td>
<td>1281.0</td>
<td>3600.4</td>
<td>3983.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rural households</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total spendings</td>
<td>160.8</td>
<td>943.3</td>
<td>4991.5</td>
<td>12422.3</td>
<td>15539.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on medical services</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>201.5</td>
<td>496.4</td>
<td>653.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on spa and health activities</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>174.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on physical education and sports</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on organisation of recreation and cultural events</td>
<td>2.4(^1)</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>105.5</td>
<td>361.3</td>
<td>459.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** \(^1\) Including PE and sports services. 

Accessibility of medical aid means free access to healthcare services regardless of geographic, economic, social, cultural, organizational or language barriers. Accessibility of medical aid is determined by the following factors (174):

- balance between the required scale of medical aid for public and government opportunities and country's medical and financial resources;
- availability and qualification of medical personnel;
- availability of relevant medical technologies;
- the option of free choice of a physician and a hospital;
- transport capabilities;
- public awareness in the field of health conservation and improvement and disease prevention.

Discrimination occurs when people cannot access a service due to low income, race, sex or age. Further, there are implicit factors that limit the access to health services, such as high transport costs, inconvenient opening hours and language barriers. Considerable limitations are found in the healthcare imbalance of rural and urban areas. Discrimination also occurs when too much money is spent on high-technology medical aid for limited communities instead of a better-balanced resource distribution in public's interest.
Equal quality for everybody means that every person has the right to be treated equally depending on the needs rather than the social status. Equal quality also means that everyone is entitled for a service of an equally high standard. The problem occurs with poorer patients and is, above all, connected with difficulties in providing qualified workforce in deprived regions. An important parameter of equal quality is the accessibility of a service, i.e. whether service delivery would be arranged in such a way that it will be unavailable for certain communities for which it is theoretically intended (111, 218, 309, 437).

Many scientists therefore urge that the healthcare policy based on equality must be integrated at a national (central) level. Until social equality is reached, healthcare services must be financed primarily by the government (at the central and local levels).

One of the fundamental social objectives of the government is the provision of safe, high-quality and affordable medications along with high-quality medical aid, especially in rural areas (219, 437, 568, 830, 832). According to the Nationwide Census as of 1 January 2010, 38.2 mn people, i.e. 27% of the country's population is rural residents. 22% of those residing in the country are older than the working age (709). Pharmacological support of the rural population has its regional specifics due to a number of objective reasons which is fundamentally based on the specifics of the economic development of a region. Below are some of the most acute problems of pharmacological support of the rural population:

- remoteness and inaccessibility of populated localities;
- a lack of steady transport communication between populated localities;
- an underdeveloped public pharmacological support infrastructure;
- a lack of staff (both paramedics and midwives and nurses and chemists);
- a lack of skill in specialists;
- more low-income people unable to afford costly medications.

Scientists are certain that in healthcare modernization conditions, improving accessibility of medical aid and pharmacological support for rural residents of remote and inaccessible regions is an essential task upon all government levels (727).

4.5. HIV/AIDS and Female Health

Russia is characterised by one of the quickest rates of growth in the number of HIV positive. Since the 1990s and to the present day, more than 70 percent of all HIV positive in Russia belong to various risk groups. Risky behaviour in turn depends on a whole range of socio-psychological factors. Moreover, HIV epidemics in the country has feminized as women are twice as prone to the infection as men.

According to the Federal AIDS Centre and the Central Research Institute of Epidemiology of the Ministry of Healthcare of the Russian Federation, around 0.16% of the entire country's population or 0.3% of the adult (15-49) population was HIV/AIDS carriers in 2002. Women made up 25% of the figure (166). 24.1% in 2001 and as much as 33% in 2002 were women newly recorded as HIV positive.

According to ILO assessments (ILO Programme on HIV/AIDS and the World of Work, global analysis, influence on children and youth and response actions, 2006), HIV incidence within an age group of 15-49
was 1.1% in 2005, 49% was women. According to the Federal Statistics Service, 78,000 (of those, 22% women) was registered as HIV positive in 2000, 235,000 (of those, 36% women) - in 2005 and 333,000 (of those, 39% women) - in 2009.

The diversity of evaluation methods do not always make it possible to give a correct estimate of HIV figures. One certain conclusion, however, is that the percentage of women in all HIV positive and AIDS patients is going up. The increasing number of women amongst HIV positive is scientifically linked to an increasing risk of heterosexual transmission. Persons aged 20 to 30 are the most prone age category in Russia: 63% of men and 57% of women. An average age of HIV/AIDS patients was 25 years for men and 23 years for women as of late 2002 (166).

Problems connected with the prevention and treatment of female HIV positive, response to the epidemic, overcoming the stigma and discrimination, and assistance for HIV/AIDS patients are gender-specific too. That's not only because around 30% of all HIV positive is women but primarily because 90% of them come under the reproductive age category, which contributes to an increasing number of children born to HIV positive. In 1987 - 2005, around 15,000 children were born to HIV-positive mothers, 70% of those were born over the last three years (2003-2005). These figures explain the need for monitoring of the situation as a way to evaluate efficiency of the preventative measures under way, which does not merely imply a system of national registration of new HIV cases but which embraces epidemiological and behavioural studies amongst HIV/AIDS risk groups.

The overwhelming majority of Russian women living with HIV are of the reproductive age, which accounts for the fact that more and more pregnant women are diagnosed with HIV. In 2002, 119.2 pregnant women of every 100,000 examined were diagnosed with HIV antibodies. In 2003, every fifth HIV positive woman gave birth, while in 2000 only 3% of women committed to going ahead with the pregnancy.

According to the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development, 10,696 HIV positive women gave birth and 95.1% of those received chemical prophylaxis and antiretroviral therapy in 2010.

There are special medications enabling to bring down the risk of fetal infection. According to the Federal AIDS Centre, special treatment is given to 90% of patients and the rate of HIV transmission onto the child up until 2000 was 19.3% on average (166).

According to the Ministry of Healthcare and Social Development, more and more HIV-positive pregnant women have been embraced by HIV mother-to-child transmission prevention programmes over the recent years (95.4% in 2009, 90% in 2007 and 58% in 2006). Thanks to the programmes, there have been positive dynamics in the frequency of perinatal HIV transmission. Over the period of 7 years (2003-2009), the number of children aged 0-17 first diagnosed with HIV went down by 54.2%. Cumulatively, the number of children infected through perinatal transmission is over 3.5 thousand children or 6% of all children born to HIV-positive mothers. 96% of children are in need of antiretroviral therapy of the HIV infection.

Below are some characteristic features of the HIV/AIDS spread in Russia: high infection rate and constant growth in the number of infected; a tendency for infection within younger age groups; an
increasing risk of HIV in women and children; main transmission - through injected drugs and an increasing rate of heterosexual transmission; many HIV-positive are unaware of the condition.


Despite the developed legislative support of non-discrimination against HIV/AIDS patients, discrimination still exists. It is primarily linked to the following three issues: a negative image of people living with HIV/AIDS; a lack of knowledge of those working with such patients (medical and social workers) and a lack of competency in certain areas; the very organisation of social support in Russia is unsuitable for the support of vulnerable communities (151, 219, 437, 535).

Facts of discrimination:

- Breach of confidentiality both with regards to HIV-positive women and their children and families;
- Social exclusion of HIV-positive and their loss of social contacts.

Contradictions are found between federal and regional laws. For instance, Federal Law "On the Prevention of Propagation of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV Infection)" No. 38-FZ of 30 March 1995 and amendments thereto guarantee the observance of all the rights and freedoms under the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal and regional laws. In accordance with Article 9 thereof, pregnant women are not obliged to take a compulsory medical examination. Contradictions are found in the legislation of St. Petersburg (Resolution No. 29-r/4 dated 4 February 2002 of the Healthcare Committee and the Russian Federation Oversight Committee for Sanitation and Epidemiology Centre) that obligates pregnant women to be tested for HIV. The Resolution prescribes compulsory repeated HIV blood tests for pregnant women as they get registered and again in the 35th-36th week of pregnancy subject to compulsory pre-test counselling and for those accepted for delivery that have been tested once or not tested at all. The Regulation further obligates pregnant HIV carriers to be referred to the AIDS Centre for in-depth analyses, an updated diagnosis and relevant treatment (437).

It constitutes a breach of Paragraph 6, Article 7 of Federal Law No. 38-FZ on compulsory counselling during an HIV test. There have been cases where HIV-positive women were refused employment and HIV-positive children would not be accepted to kindergartens and other childcare centres.

4.6. Health of Rural Female Residents and Immigrants

According to the 2010 census, rural female residents made up 19.6 mn people, which is 52.2% of the entire rural population. In 2002, there was a 3% drop in the number of female rural residents and a 16% drop in the number of girls (aged 0-15), which is a negative trend. The rate of immigration of female rural residents, especially within an age group of 18-39, is still high.
The death rate among women from rural areas is considerably higher than that among urban female residents, although it has been going down. In 2009, life expectancy was 73.38 years among women from rural areas and 75.13 years among urban female residents. If in cities female mortality from external causes has been overtaken by cancer since 2009, in rural areas, external causes of death (poisoning, injuries and accidents) still come second after blood circulation disorders (and the two causes have almost an equal input, which speaks of an archaic structure of death causes) (Table 4.8).

Table 4.8. Rates of death at working age from main causes, RF, women, cities v. rural, 2009 (number of diseased per 100,000 working-age women)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Blood circulation</th>
<th>Cancer</th>
<th>External causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cities</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Maternal mortality in rural areas is higher than that in cities (30 and 19 cases of maternal mortality for every 100,000 born healthy respectively, 2009).

One of the main reasons for high female mortality is alcoholism induced by hard labour, low income, sense of insecurity of the future, a lack of cultural leisure, etc. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, the rate of death among working-age women from accidental alcohol intoxication in 2009 was 9.6 cases for every 100,000 working-age women for rural areas and 5.7 for cities.

The rate of alcoholization among women is higher than that among men (the number of registered female alcoholics has gone up by 2.3% while remaining the same among men).

Working conditions for women engaged in the farming sector are bad and only keep getting worse (219, 568, 727).

Women from rural areas often combine three duties: working for a farming enterprise, doing personal part-time farming and doing household duties. The first one is normally poorly paid, the second one rarely has publicly recognised value and the third one is not paid at all. Rural female residents face further challenges when it comes to the separation from ex-husbands (including that resulting from domestic violence) basically because it is impossible to sell up and find separate accommodation. Gender stereotypes, especially those related to domestic violence are stronger in the country side, while family planning awareness is much lower (276).

According to a public survey in the field of employment (November 2004), 60.2% of women and only 46.5% of men had vocational qualifications. At the same time, employed women made up 49.9%, which is almost 10 per cent lower than men.

Women-entrepreneurs in rural areas find it hard to come to terms with diverse social institutions. This is particularly typical for regions with underdeveloped self-employment infrastructures. This accounts for a big gap between women that would want to run their own business in the country (up to 58% according
to the survey) and those who have one already. Social problems affect women's choice of a career in self-employment. For instance, 33% of respondents have access to healthcare services in their regions, while 21% have no access at all and 45% gave a 'no answer'.

The health state and access to medical and healthcare services of women-immigrants in Russia are another topic not fully covered by contemporary gender studies. There have been a handful of works over the specified period that would more or less touch on the subject (26, 422, 832).

Immigrants' health is a significant factor to be considered while making diverse forecasts and comprehensive analyses and definitions of the influence of immigration on various areas of life and the national economy. Immigrants' integration into a new society also depends on health, both in terms of the physical capabilities of immigrants to become part of a new society and medical support of immigrants. Health monitoring of immigrants and the provision of advanced medical services directly determine the safety of resident population both in terms of the prevention of life-threatening diseases and continuous health maintenance, which is a positive factor for the economy of the host country. Therefore, the relevancy of studies in this field is determined by the global tendency for immigration and the fact that a key to solving the "health and immigrants" problem is unique for every country (832).

Since the downfall of the USSR in the early 1990s, Russia has become one of the centres for international immigration where millions of fellow nationals from ex-soviet countries would flee in search of a permanent abode. According to official data, in 1991-2009 the country's population grew by around 7 million immigrants. Working immigrants in Russia make up large numbers; experts report various illegal immigration figures. There are considerable inconsistencies between records of the Russian State Statistics Service and the Russian Federal Immigration Service (FIS figures being higher). According to the Eurasian Development Bank, for instance, the total number of illegal working immigrants from Tajikistan, Kirghizstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus alone made up 312,000 to 1,224,000 people in 2010; based on the number of cash transfers by illegal immigrants, the national budget has lost 10-40 billion roubles worth of unpaid personal income tax.

An important trend of immigration from CIS countries is the increasing number of female immigrants with minors (26, 423, 754).

Information on the health status of immigrants in Russia as well as studies of the access to healthcare and medical services are rather vague. Experts note that immigrants in Russia currently have no access to the healthcare system, for instance, to HIV prevention and treatment facilities. As an exception, emergency first aid is provided to immigrants from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan and Tajikistan. The right for emergency first aid is guaranteed by the interstate agreement on the equality in receiving first aid and emergency medical services.

In the early 2009s, amendments were introduced for consideration by the State Duma obligating non-residents to obtain all-clear certificates for socially dangerous diseases, including HIV. The condition must be met in order to obtain a compulsory medical insurance policy (CMIP). According to the text of the amendments to the Law “On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the RF”, the rules are different for visa and non-visa immigrants.
In case of a visa entry, an insurance policy must be obtained in the country of origin; in case of a non-visa entry, insurance policies are given out by Russian insurance companies. Notably, foreign citizens are not in fact covered by a CMIP as it may take up to 25 days to collect all the documents and permits required prior to entering employment, therefore, the cost of medical treatment of immigrants is paid from the budget.

There was a debate in 2006 devoted to CMI support of working immigrants and opportunities to buy voluntary medical insurance policies (VMIP) for non-working immigrants. The draft project was backed by all the departments concerned but rejected by the Ministry of Healthcare and Social development and the Federal Immigration Service on the grounds of a lack of a non-resident insurance system.

The observance of requirements of oversight agencies is monitored by various organisations and individual experts, most often in the form of investigative reporting (793).

Immigrants' access to the healthcare system and medical services in Russia is limited. Analysts note that 60% of immigrants in the Russian Federation cannot access medical services and resort to self-treatment, 30% use private clinics and 10% receive medical aid paid for by the employer (566).

The situation has got worse since 2010. Prior to 2010, every Russian employer had the obligation to issue legal working immigrants with a CMI policy. As of 1 January 2010, CMI policies may be issued only to those with temporary or permanent residence permits (the majority of working immigrants have a temporary sojourn, non-resident status). Six months after the introduction of the amendments, regional healthcare departments deprived immigrants’ children and pregnant immigrants of the right to be attached to Russian healthcare institutions free-of-charge (previously, this was allowed by local government resolutions). Today, children of immigrants or pregnant immigrants can only use the option of paid hospital visits: either by purchasing a voluntary medical insurance policy valid throughout a certain period of time or by paying for every individual visit to a doctor (often, under-the-counter, straight into a doctor's pocket). In practice this means that the number of immigrants left unexamined up until the delivery will grow even more, which may increase the risk of infection of the patients and their children at Russian hospitals. At the same time, delivery assistance is fee-of-charge (26).

Researchers point to the problem of access to medical services by pregnant immigrants in Russia (26, 437). There are no official childbirth statistics for immigrants. According to the Moscow Healthcare Department, female immigrants account for about 8% of all childbirths. Analysts give a different figure - 3% (26). Hardships do not only end in a lack of money to pay for medical examinations. Straight away, pregnant immigrants face the risk of losing their jobs and accommodation. They often get forced out of their flats as their flat mates are not prepared to put up with a little child as co-habitant. They are deprived of sick leaves and pregnancy benefits.

Notably, a system of immigrant access to healthcare and medical services would be impossible without adequate attention to a whole range of problems connected with immigrants, starting from the issue of permits, oversight measures and social support, and up to the education of the local population about the economic, demographic and strategic components of immigration.
To sum it up, today's access to healthcare and medical services by immigrants in Russia is very limited. The existing government tools in the field of immigrant residence and work legalization in Russia are not working; immigrants' health problems are solely their own concern (217).

**Box: Excerpts from an interview with pregnant immigrants from the CIS (26, 437):**

"I am not officially registered. I used to have temporary registration but it expired. My husband's registration expired six months ago. To renew my registration, I would have to leave the country to re-enter and pay 1,500 roubles at least to get my migration card. I'd have to come here, find a landlady, get registered and pay 5,000 roubles. I'd rather spend the money on childbirth and my child. They say we take jobs away from the locals. But you'd hardly find locals prepared to do the dirty jobs we do. Do you think there would be many willing to gut fish day in, day out? Why create such problems for us? We would get registered officially if it was that easy" (Aigul, 24).

"I came to Samara because that’s where I went to school, and I treat the city as my native. Samara is part of my happy years of the past. I was born here, but immigrated with parents later. And now I am a foreigner here. My only goal is to make money. I am 8 months pregnant, and I haven't seen a doctor yet. Everywhere you go, you have to pay. I just hope I will be assisted with delivery and won't be forced out" (Dilfusa, 35).

"I have no insurance policy because I am a Kirghiz. I have not seen a doctor about my pregnancy. We went to hospital but were told we’d have to pay. I have no money to pay. I paid for an ultrasound examination when I was two months pregnant. Everything was ok. Later, my legs would swell up. I am doing self-treatment right now. Just hoping that the ambulance will have me when the time comes (Faranghiz, 29).

"Many doctors are ignorant of us, immigrants, and say the Russians must be served first" (a Tadjik immigrant). Female immigrants are so worried, particularly about deportation, that a lack of money and a legal status in Russia makes them stay away from hospitals, even when it comes to childbirth.

### 4.7. Conclusions and Recommendations on Women’s and Men’s Health Improvement

There were fewer works and studies devoted to gender aspects of health and healthcare in 2004-2012. But the quantity did not affect the quality as most of the publications were fundamental and generalizing as they touched upon a whole range of problems and disputable issues in the field.

Multiple health factors must be considered in order to go ahead with medical and therapeutic programmes. One of the most important factors is gender discrimination directly or indirectly affecting the diagnostics, progress, treatment and prevention of diseases. Today’s plans to reform and upgrade the healthcare system have no regard for gender inequality.

A gender approach to health allows developing and integrating meaningful programmes to change the social factors which affect the incidence.

Gender differences in health-related behaviour are determined by general gender expectations in a society.
The gender approach has brought on the need to develop equal opportunities for men and women, which should help solve health-related problems. Strengthening of the role of a woman is an essential condition for her health. This means opening up women's access to diverse resources, education, employment and the advantages of new technologies and approaches in medicine, and protection of their rights and empowerment for them to make an individual and non-discriminatory choice. Women must not only be a subject of health programmes, but they must take an active part in elaboration thereof (218, 219).

Russia's negative reality is the biggest gender gap in life expectancy. Advanced men-oriented programmes must primarily be concerned with reconsideration of gender stereotypes - sustaining a non-violent communication culture, personal health care and childcare skills. Combating alcoholism and harmful working conditions is another line of activity to be considered by men's health programmes (283, 292, 300).

Another acute problem is the health state of rural female residents; the government needs to develop individual programmes to address the issues of health conservation and maternal mortality.

There is no organized approach to health analysis and healthcare maintenance of immigrants. Steps to be taken (163):

- to launch a medical insurance system for foreign workforce and develop bilateral agreements with source nations on establishing a compulsory medical insurance system for immigrants during their sojourn in the Russian Federation. To encourage the launch of medical examination centres in source countries;
- to issue work permits only upon presentation of all-clear certificates for the approved list of medical conditions, which would be cheaper than deporting an immigrant with a newly discovered publicly dangerous disease;
- access to healthcare services by immigrants has become more difficult since 2010. This is due to an increasing number of women and immigrants with children. Immediate action must be taken to prevent infectious diseases in immigrant maternity patients and their children as well as Russian mothers-to-be sharing wards with unexamined immigrants: female immigrants should be granted the right for free-of-charge prenatal care at prenatal clinics. The funds must be allocated from the country's budget (providing the reinstatement of the deductions payable by Russian employers into the Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund). Part of the costs may be allocated to source countries by signing interstate agreements (26).
5. Gender Issues in Employment

Gender equality in the labour market is one of the acutest female problems in Russia. Gender discrimination is one of the reasons for this state of affairs. Analysts point to an integrated nature of female discrimination in the labour market: on entering employment and on dismissal, in a limited access to certain occupations and positions, in professional promotion and career growth and in remuneration of equal labour unrelated to the differences in labour productivity (63, 136, 271, 281, 760). We can therefore conclude that gender discrimination is primarily aimed at women: 78% of women name gender as the main cause of employment problems (136). The most vivid demonstration of female discrimination is the attitude to pregnant women and women with little children. Mass layoffs of pregnant women and non-payment of childcare benefits were recorded at the end of the first - start of the second decade of the XX century (98, 158).

There were the following changes in female employment during the reform years (1990s): a decrease in labour activity of working-age women; intensification of horizontal (industry-specific and occupational) and vertical segregation; a growing pay gap and a tendency for female discrimination by employers, particularly in the private sector (133, 300). In the 2000s, key gender features of Russia's labour market remained the same: a trend towards a slight increase in economic activity and employment among men and women, high horizontal and vertical segregation and a pay gap, and intensification of discrimination against women, especially after the 2008 economic crisis (158, 295, 293).

Some experts believe that in the short-term, Russian women may face greater instability and insecurity and a severer form of paternalism coming to replace that of the soviet epoch (63). Others (115, 273, 276, 320, 332, 88) see positive changes in the elimination of explicit labour division and emergence of a new generation of women who value professional occupation and career growth.

In the next chapter we will highlight key female and male employment trends in Russia, give an insight into gender segregation in the labour market, excess of men employed in harmful working conditions and the specifics of female and male unemployment, analyses the reasons for a pay gap between men and women and bring up the issue of a family-work balance in Russia. In conclusion, we will provide expert recommendations on eliminating gender inequality in employment.

5.1. Key Employment Trends in Russia

In 2011, women made up 49% of economically active and employed population of Russia. Employment figures for women have been high for many decades.

Between 2000 and 2010, the economic activity grew from 59.5% to 62.3% for women and from 71.3% to 73.8% for men. Men’s and women’s employment rates showed a slight increase too (Fig. 5.1).

Despite the fact that women's economic activity in Russia in high, there are fewer and fewer chances of keeping the economically active status or switching from an economically inactive to an economically active status (281). Women's family status affects their working activity (576). For instance, the level of
economic activity amongst single mothers in Moscow is very high – 82.5, the level of employment - 77%; most of them work full time (170).

Figure 5.1. Men's and women's employment rates in Russia (%)


**Box: Economically Active Population and Employment/Unemployment Figures for Russia: Aftermath of the 2008 Crisis**

The women's and men's employment dynamics were affected by the 2008 economic crisis resulting in higher unemployment figures for Russia (up to 8.4% in 2009). By 2012, unemployment effects of the crisis have ceased.

Table. Economically active population and employment/unemployment figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Economically active population, K people</th>
<th>Of which:</th>
<th>Economic activity level,</th>
<th>Employment level, %</th>
<th>Unemployment level, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>employed</td>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>75757</td>
<td>70865</td>
<td>4791</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>75635</td>
<td>69285</td>
<td>6373</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>75449</td>
<td>69884</td>
<td>5638</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>75732</td>
<td>70732</td>
<td>5020</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012, Q1</td>
<td>74763</td>
<td>69865</td>
<td>4870</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russia’s employment level remains high amongst working-age men and women, but it shows a dramatic decrease with the start of retirement (294), especially for men. Age models of women’s employment are traditionally plateau-shaped (273) (Fig. 5.2).

During the 2000s, the employment figures for young men and women (up to 25) dropped by about 5%. The level of employment among young retirement-age women (55-59) gained 13%.

There is a considerable gender gap in the employment figures at a pre-retirement and early retirement age: within pre-retirement age groups in 2009, the employment rate was 80% for women and 68% for men; that for newly retired was 56% for women and 43.5% for men (254). In other equal conditions in Russia, there are more women than men continuing employment after retirement (1).

An average age of employed women and men is going up (which is linked to the ageing of the population, including that among working-age people). In 2011, working women were on average 1 year older than working men: 40.5 and 39.5 respectively.

5.2. High Gender Segregation and Low Women’s Mobility in the Labour Market

There has been steady horizontal and vertical gender segregation in Russia’s labour market. Industry-specific and occupational segregation in the 2000s remained on the same level; occupational segregation was stronger: the rate of industry-specific segregation was around 30%, occupational - around 50% (401, 706).

In 2005, industry-specific segregation was replaced with a new classification based on economic activities. Gender segregation has not changed much under the new classification. Women show low
employment figures in construction, transport and communication, energy, gas and water production and distribution, mining, agriculture, public administration, security, social insurance and the real estate sector (271, 300).

Women are largely represented in the occupations and sectors demanding traditionally female duties, while men are employed to perform traditionally men's roles (30, 107, 113, 281). Men occupy better-paid positions requiring more skill and responsibility, while women hold less important posts and often switch to flexible labour markets (546).

According to scientists, a prevailing number of women in typically "female" companies affects women's employment characteristics and welfare because these companies are mainly found in problem sectors with old HR management models and lower wages. Such companies play the role of so-called social enterprises (199). Women are more prone to the risk of being excluded from innovative economic sectors, both in the context of technology and organisation. They are more often employed in companies with ageing technologies and an outdated professional HR development system (480).

Women have to put up with second-grade positions as they have to combine breadwinning and childcare duties. Russian labour laws do not encourage men to take on parental obligations and women often find themselves bearing the parental burden, which largely affects their competitive capabilities in the labour market (283, 803). Women face discrimination on entering employment and on dismissal, pregnant women being the most vulnerable category (803).

Women and men are concentrated in different occupational categories, but men's occupational distribution is more uneven. According to expert estimates, an increasing number of men employed in the service sector is an essential factor determining future segregation (575).

Horizontal female segregation is accompanied by vertical segregation when women have jobs characterised by lower qualifications or a lower status within one and the same occupation.

Notably, vertical female segregation in Russia co-exists with a high level of women's professional education (135).

Men's and women's primary occupation distribution is asymmetrical. During the 2000s, for instance, there were no more than 40% of women among public officers and authorities, including heads of companies and enterprises (300). Men still lead in CEO positions (93.8% appointments), which creates a glass ceiling for women. Advertising agencies are characterised by the highest number of women occupying top positions (37%), while production sectors (excluding the food sector) show the lowest number of female directors (1%) (711).

Positive changes have been happening in Russian private companies hiring more female managers (up to 42% in 2009), primarily in the positions of chief accountants, and HR and marketing directors (135).

According to some experts, gender discrimination is worse in state-owned companies compared to private ones (723).
Unequal representation of men and women in different positions becomes obvious when we analyze gender distribution of federal civil servants (Fig. 5.3). Employment in regional civil service does not leave many chances for women to reach the top either. In municipal service, too, (a more feminized level of public service) no more than a half of top positions are held by women, while 90% of them are still on the lowest tiers of the pyramid.

Figure 5.3. Gender distribution of public civil servants with a breakdown into positions, 2009, %

Vertical segregation is maintained even in typically female industries and female enterprises (197). Segregation occurs and continues due to non-gender neutral recruitment and different career paths (400).

Women in science are another problem touched upon by researchers. Despite a large number of female scholars, science is still characterised by androcentrism with male dictatorship. To be successful, women have to learn to play by "men's rules" (520). Gender differences further occur in scientists' search of additional income: men would give preference to hierarchical positions and innovative work whereas women would engage in economics, especially when they have to act as breadwinners (264).

These factors account for a persistent glass ceiling phenomenon in the labour market. Reasons for the glass ceiling include difference opportunities for women from the point of view of the social structure of business and business life (579). According to studies, the main obstacle for vertical female mobility in the labour market is institutional barriers and the arrangement of social networks rather than family duties (401). This is an important discovery for overcoming gender inequality as it would be easier to set up social networks in the IT age than lowering the childbirth burden.

A number of researchers mention traditional men's and women's opinions on job characteristics. Creativity and good terms within the work team are important for women, while the performance and
remuneration are decisive factors for men (139, 758). Women often link employment motivation with family welfare gains rather than career (139).

Career and self-development are important for young ambitious women, in most cases child-free. This very sociodemographic group forms a new female behavioural pattern in the labour market (115, 139) by closing the gap between male and female employment motivations (320).

Today's employment and industrial relations are characterised by a tendency towards gradual non-dichotomization and non-polarization of male and female socioindustrial roles, activities and occupations, which speeds up the abolishment of the traditional gender-based labour division system (332). More and more women in Russia are employed as top managers and professionals. We can already speak of a female management style capable of meeting the advanced trends of the post-industrial society and having good prospects (88).

However, women are still less mobile in the labour market (both horizontally and vertically): average figures show that they stay longer employed within the same company and in the same position (254). This affects women's salaries as their professional mobility contributes to a salary increase for both women and men (398, 402).

The gap in occupational behaviour models (primarily when it comes to occupational mobility) tended to close up in the 2000s, but today men still show greater occupational mobility than women (401). In the 2000s, women would opt for the strategies connected with a possible increase in the work load and a loss of earnings, highly skilled jobs and labour and social protection: secondary employment and transfer to non-governmental economic sectors - the informal economic sector (276).

The informal economic sector expanded in the 2000s, and employment figures for the sector in the early 2000s were 2x higher for women than men. At the same time, the informal economy is a target employment sector for the poor as it provides means of subsistence (930). In the late 2000s, around a half of the informal economic sector was represented by women with primary and secondary jobs. Scientists note that the gender gap in remuneration is higher in informal employment. Primary informal employment is more attractive for women with just basic education and men-entrepreneurs with university education; secondary employment attracts women with university education employed in education, healthcare and science (696). There are fewer of those with side jobs or secondary employment in any sector among young women (217).

According to experts, regional differences in employment are also affected by gender segregation. Regional gender inequality in employment is insignificant and is even declining, but horizontal (sector- and activity-wise) and vertical (status-wise) female segregation causing a considerable imbalance in remuneration still exists (234, 466). Discrimination against women is worsened by the specifics of employment in single-industry cities characterised largely by male prevalence in the job market (760). Broadly speaking, one of essential factors of gender inequality in today's labour market is the macroeconomic policy of the government aimed at developing "male" industries (413, 900).

Gender inequality in employment is generally influenced by a whole of the following factors: the economic factor (crises and baby booms may worsen women's status), the institutional or
discriminatory factor (in the macroeconomic policy, priorities are given to "masculine" raw material and power sectors; employers, consumers and the society on the whole are stereotyped about women being of second grade as the society's expectations are linked to a woman's role as a mother); and the behavioural factor (women's low self-esteem in the labour market) (297).

Public gender stereotypes are strong as well. A third of all Russians believe the division into male and female occupations is primarily determined by nature: both men and women have their purposes dictated by nature and inclinations and capabilities determined by their anatomy and biology. A half of the population is of an opinion that gender differentiation of occupations is largely determined by the way the society is organized (93). In the mid-1990s, 14% of Russians believed that women did not need equal opportunities to move up the career ladder as women's role was the family, while men's prerogative was the work, and would prefer to keep it the way it was (94). The same stereotypes account for the pay gap.

Today's gender stereotypes have become obsolete and unrealistic, and they are not only a barrier in achieving gender equality and human asset development both for men and women but they slow down democratization and socio-economic development of the country (786).

Negative consequences determined by the gender stereotypes in the Russian society are slowing down of women's social mobility, discrimination in women's and men's remuneration, integration of female discrimination into family relations and deterioration of physical, psychic and social health of the public on the whole and every individual in particular (547). Men's life in Russia, for instance, is more stressful due to the deep-seated stereotype about men's predominant role of a breadwinner. Women in favour of this stereotype normally do not consider working themselves as a way to maintain welfare (249).

The literature on the examined period contains studies dedicated to the employment of female migrants in Russia.

According to the official statistics, the number of legally employed foreign citizens in Russia has increased after enactment of the legislation in 2006 (Table E1) and varies around the figure of 2 million people. With growth of the number of migrants who have received work permits, the share of women remains stable and constitutes 10-15%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Including</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thousand of people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>213.3</td>
<td>190.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>702.5</td>
<td>591.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1014.0</td>
<td>858.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1717.1</td>
<td>1450.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2425.9</td>
<td>2075.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2223.6</td>
<td>1901.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1640.8</td>
<td>1404.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to expert estimates, the share of women reaches 25-30%, i.e., a significant share of female migrants work in Russia illegally.

Half of women migrate independently. 60% of female migrants are married. Married female migrants more often migrate together with their spouses. 82% of those migrants who brought their children to Russia migrate with their families (422).

With average earnings of 14.6 thousand rubles per month, female migrants remit on average 254 US dollars per month (about half of their earnings) to their families who stayed in the country of origin.

5.3. Women’s and Men’s Unemployment

For the past 20 years, unemployment has had specifically male and female features. There are more officially registered unemployed women than men. On the whole, unemployment figures are slightly lower for women, however their unemployment lasts longer (63, 113, 188, 335, 437, 546, 577). An average length of female unemployment is 0.5-1.0 months longer than that of men. The number of women in search of a job for over a year is also 2-3 per cent higher (135).

Jobs offered by job centres are intended for men and rarely meet professional, educational and qualification characteristics of women. On the whole there are many more typically male jobs advertised, but there are more offers of jobs below the subsistence line for women (369, 370).

Scientists note that unemployed men rely on women who traditionally meet their expectations, while unemployed women generally rely on their own earnings or the help from relatives and friends (198).

According to official statistics, the 2008 crisis largely affected men's unemployment figures (584). Before the 2008 crisis, the difference between men's and women's unemployment figures had been 0.2-0.4 per cent, but the gap later expanded (reaching its maximum in February 2009) to 1.6 per cent (Fig. E4). During the crisis, men's unemployment gained momentum. In January 2012, the unemployment level went down to the pre-crisis level, the gender gap being 0.7 per cent.

Men's unemployment would grow faster also during the 1990s crises (247, 577, 705, 706).

Studies suggest that women are slightly more often afraid to lose their jobs during a crisis but feel more secure at steady times. Women are more pessimistic about finding a new equally good job once unemployed, especially during an economic crisis. That explains why only a fifth of working females (compared to more than a third of working men) are prepared to quit and look for a new job in deteriorating working conditions (135).

---

This very lack of self-confidence makes women become less choosy about jobs during a crisis and make concessions to save their jobs. They are less likely to turn down a job on the grounds of a low salary (135).

The gap closes when it comes to middle-aged employed women and middle-aged unemployed men. At the same time, the rate of unemployment among youngsters is much higher than that among older generations. The rate of unemployment in 2011 was 31.0% (including 28.6% of young men and 34.8% of young women) within an age group of 15-19 years old and 13.6% (including 13.6% of young men and 13.6% of young women) among those aged 20-24.

![Figure 5.4. Rate of unemployment, % of economically active population](image)

*Source: Federal State Statistics Service (data accessed in June 2012).*

The consequences of becoming unemployed have their gender specifics. Unemployment in single-parent (primarily single-mother) families, for instance, automatically means a risk of poverty. In full families, unemployment would cause poverty in 15.4% of families, while for single-parent families, the figure would be as high as 41.2% (170).

### 5.4. Men more often do hazardous jobs

The percentage of men employed in harmful working conditions across all economic sectors is traditionally higher than that of women. This is one of the main aspects of men's discrimination in the job market (133, 524, 135). As evident from the new Russian Classifier of Economic Activities (RCEA), men's hazardous job figures prevail in all economic activities (300) (Table 5.2).
There are twice as many men employed in harmful working conditions; the rate of occupational injuries is three times higher for men and the number of deaths from occupational accidents is 17x higher (135).

The worst statistics are in the mining sector: in 2011, a half of men and almost one third of women were employed in the conditions falling behind health standards; one third of men were employed in heavy labour and one fifth of men were employed in intensive work.

The situation is getting worse for both men and women across all economic sectors. But the worst conditions are found in the communication sector. The percentage of men employed in heavy labour has increased at least two-fold across all economic sectors.

Another problem to be addressed with respect to harmful working conditions is working immigrants (both men and women) who find themselves employed in unsuitable working conditions and suffer through a lack of legal and social support in the labour market of today's Russia in the conditions of a great inflow of illegal immigrants. The issue is further characterised by female discrimination as women more often resort to health services, and the access to health services for working immigrants is limited, especially now after the 2010 statutory changes. Moreover, women are more prone to fraud, sexual exploitation and forced labour (26, 263, 335, 336, 337, 292). These problems also exist for Russian women moving out to work abroad (596).

Table 5.2. Percentage of employees working in harmful and/or hazardous conditions industry-wise (as of the end of the year, % of the total number of female and male employees within the field)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Power, gas and water production and distribution</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employed in heavy work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Power, gas and water production and distribution</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employed to operate equipment falling behind safety standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Power, gas and water production and distribution</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.5. Pay Gap: One of the Steadiest Indices of Gender Inequality in Russia

The gender pay gap in Russia is one of the steadiest indices of gender inequality. The pay gap reaches 35-40% (30, 133, 185, 271, 293) of socioeconomic conditions and the political situation. Many scientists believe that the pay gap is an integrated gender equality progress index, for Russia too (140, 135).

The pay gap determines the level of human capital, professional segregation and gender discrimination. If the influence of the human capital (which, in Russia, even helps close the pay gap) and unequal women's presentation in professions/activities (accounting for more than a half of the pay gap) are eliminated, around a half of the pay gap will still be unaccounted for.

For instance, an average human capital and its payoff are higher for women than men, which would help close the pay gap by around 10-15% (14, 209, 487, 574).

Gender asymmetry in employment is the second factor which accounts for today's gender pay gap (30-40% of the gap). In 2008, for instance, 71.2% of all women and only 51% of men working by trade were employed in the economic sectors with salaries lower than the nation-wide index (135). The percentage of women employed in the council sector reaches 70%, while only 40% is employed in private, mixed and foreign enterprises. At the same time, council work in identical positions pays off half as much as it would in companies with full or partial foreign capital (333). According to expert estimates, the gender pay gap exists across all sectors, but it narrows up when it comes to typically female occupations. The smallest gap (around 11%) is in the education sector (254). A relatively small gender gap does not compensate low income in these sectors. In 2005, for instance, women earned 68% of an average salary across all sectors while doing specifically female jobs, 87% - neutral jobs and 118% - men's jobs (300).

Therefore, if we eliminate the influence of job characteristics on female and male employees, the discriminating portion of the pay gap would be around a half of the total gap, i.e. 15-18% (209).

Therefore, we have to address the problem of direct female discrimination in remuneration, which exists despite the statutory ban.

Segregation which, too, largely accounts for the pay gap, must be eliminated to enable women to access highly-paid jobs and help bring up the value of feminine jobs (271). One of ILO's latest recommendations on the elimination gender inequality in employment is aimed at overcoming the undervaluation of feminine jobs (524).
In Russia's labour market, there are more minimum wages paid to women whose employment capabilities are worse than those of men, especially when it comes to jobs with a greater physical input. The percentage of women with minimal wages has been going up since 2005 (789).

Some scientists suggested a pay rise for those employed in the public sector and an increase in the minimum wage and Grade 1 base wage rate of the unified wage rate scale (371, 540, 135).

However, in their studies of the influence of the minimum wage on the gender pay gap, scientists proved that the measure would have little effect on closing the gender gap. The gender pay gap was less sensitive (elastic) to changes in the national remuneration standards: an average 0.7% to 10% increase in the minimum wage and a 1.5% to 10% increase in Grade 1 base wage rate of the unified wage rate scale (271).

A wage increase for education and healthcare workers (a gradual increase within the framework of national "Education" and "Health" projects since 2006) has had no effect on closing the gender pay gap: the rate of pay within the sectors compared to average salaries in Russia only went up by 3-4 per cent and never made up more than 75% of the average Russian rate of pay (135).

Notably, the pay gap across Russian regions is one of the largest on a global scale (209). At the same time, gender inequality in remuneration also varies greatly across regions. The richest regions of Russia demonstrate the largest gender pay gap (234, 293). An almost two-fold increase in average regional wage increments for men largely reflect the specifics of the employment structure in Northern regions of the country with prevailing male employment. The tariff portion partially balances out the pay difference, while increments and bonuses make the gap larger. The gender gap in the pay rate is around six per cent (58).

However, the tariff portion too affects the gender gap, which only speaks in favour of revaluation of feminine jobs. A tariff scheme analysis showed that women are more often occupied in professions with small tariff ceilings and are rarer represented in professional groups with forked rates, when the width of the rate fork closes the gender pay gap. The gender pay gap is wider in the professions with high average and maximum rates of pay (271).

If in the 1990s, the gender pay gap was getting bigger, the mid-2000s are characterised by a trend towards closing (compare: approximately 40% in 2005 and 35% in 2009).

At the same time, the gender pay gap would expand due to an increasing payoff of education. Women were the ones to suffer more as their education payoff is higher. This advantage, however, was not enough to compensate for the losses for other reasons, such as women's prevalence in low-paid jobs. Intra- and inter-regional as well as intra- and inter-industrial wage differences may be the cause of the gender inequality dynamics of the past decades (371).

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51 The tariff portion of the employee’s wage consists of workers tariff rates, position salaries of office workers, fixed official salaries (guaranteed part of the salary fixed in the labor agreement).
According to experts, increasing inequality in income and wages in the 2000s was less determined by the gender pay gap, despite the fact that the latter was growing. In 1994-2003, the pay gap input was merely around 4.5% (371), which somewhat increased later. At the same time, in 2005, the gender pay gap expanded in low-income communities and somewhat went down within highly-paid ones (372).

Poor men are outnumbered by poor women, which makes it possible to speak about female poverty52. Women are more likely to become poor while men prevail among both the rich and the poorest population strata (137). Constant poverty in Russia is more typical for elderly people: women having retired by the 1990s had fewer chances for a steadily comfortable life (66).

To analyze the situation from the point of view of gender, we should rely on the expert conclusion that poverty grows due to working population (primarily unemployed) and low-income or zero-income workers (544).

Female poverty is therefore closely connected with gender inequality in employment. According to many experts, poverty issues, especially among women, cannot be solved without a policy directed at a salary increase and revaluation of feminine jobs (53, 271, 537, 540, 544, 903). Elimination of pay delays and reduction of working hours, too, help closing the gender pay gap (574).

5.6. Family-Work Imbalance in Russia

Maternity/paternity and reproductive functions are traditionally a discriminating factor for women (and men) in the labour market. Different aspects of gender inequality in employment are often linked to the women's duty of combining professional and family duties.

Total work time expenditures of women of active working age (at home and at labor market) are two times higher than those of men. Women spend on household chores three time more time than men, and practically one hundred per cent of women are engaged in them. According to the household time survey carried out in the Russian Federation (early 1990s, State Statistics Committee), with practically the same duration of the working day time expenditures on household chores constitute 15.5% of daytime for women and 5.5% for men. Free time during the working day constitutes 5% for women and 10% for men (276 53).

Unlike men, women are more likely to stay on the same rate of pay as they get older, as the quickest growth of pay rates for women normally coincides with the maximum reproductive load. This stops women from being able to start earning higher wages as they get older. The biggest pay gap is observed at the age of 30-45 (135).

52 According to official statistics, poverty feminization is reflected in slow growth of gender pay-gap. In 2009, the ratio of average wage of women to the average wage of men constituted 65%, and 64% in 2011.

The pay gap between women with and women without children is around 8.1%, and the higher the human capital, the higher the wage losses. Women with children work slightly shorter hours due to a lack of jobs with flexible working hours (31).

According to experts, the new maternity benefit evaluation scheme will mean a reduction of benefits for many women. To be more specific, the new evaluation system takes into account the vacation time, idle time and temporary incapacitation (158).

Introduction of a maximum rate of insurance benefits discriminates women with the highest income, as it discourages them to use their maternity leave, even the paid portion of it (300).

Neither the demographic/family policies nor socioeconomic development concepts want to consider the gender factor (185). A lack of measures governing the family-work balance particularly affects the progress of society and the quality of living of women, men and children (268, 283, 289, 91, 216, 268). According to experts, financial incentives for childbirth and a lack of measures to enable coupling of professional and family duties (both for mothers and fathers) will cause a collapse of today’s demographic policy in Russia (292, 294, 216).

Both men and women would benefit from such measures. The group most sensitive to a lack of the measures and unsatisfied with its family role is women and men with better education (563, 564, 91, 216, 585).

Legislation gives possibility to both men and women to take a leave to take care of children after divorce. However, in practice, men do not take any leave (because of gender stereotypes and resentment from the part of employers, friends, acquaintances, and also because of the gap between men and women payment). In spite of the reforms of the social protection system in the 1990s, which transformed maternal childcare leave into parental one, men do not practically exercise their parental rights. For example, in November 2000, only 8 thousand men exercised their right provided by the legislation and took leave to take care of the child under age of 354. In 2000, there were about 3.75 mln of children at the age of 0-2, and even if we assume that there can be two (three) little children in the family and that not all the parents took that leave or did not take the whole leave, gender gap in the care for little children still remains obvious.

In the event of divorce, children in Russia traditionally remain with mother. In particular, female judges keep children with the mother “out of habit” and men do not even think about the possibility to assume full or partial duties of bringing up children. It should be noted that the amount of alimony is low. According to 2006 RLMS data, in 45% of families that received alimony it constituted less than 10% of the family monetary income, and in 25% of families alimony constituted less than 500 rubles per month. Alimony is received by less than one third of those entitled to it (511).

Measures to balance out the family-work aspect include those aimed at developing a childcare assistance scheme, creation of a friendly work atmosphere for parents, introduction of flexible working hours and promotion of paternity (267, 292, 294, 13, 131, 885, 902, 216).

However, Russia makes efforts only to develop childcare system (primarily, traditional kindergartens, since about 2 million people are still included into the waiting lists for places in kindergartens) and to create conditions enabling women to combine motherhood and employment. However, modern component of “family-work” balance envisions creation of conditions for combining parenthood and employment, while support of fatherhood and gender redistribution of time budgets is not even part of the agenda (293,55).

So far, the Russian government has only focused on childcare assistance (traditional kindergartens) and opportunities for women to combine work and maternity. An essential family-work balance component, i.e. opportunities to combine family duties and work, support of paternity and gender allocation of time budgets, is not even on the agenda (293).

5.7. Conclusions and Recommendations on Overcoming Gender Inequality in Employment

According to scientists, women in Russia are the ones to suffer most during economic crises in the country, meaning a cut-down on feminine jobs in most companies, strengthening of gender stereotypes in the labour market, women's lower wage expectations and women's mastering of male professions as a way to survive (826). Some research works also use the term "maternity phobia" (158). Another feature of an economic crisis is greater income reductions for women employed in the public sector, a greater risk of poverty for families with children and a reduction of government expenditure on social services. Conversely, formal unemployment figures suggested a worse position for men (537). At the same time, some experts note that the government's social support is inadequate to the present and future social challenges (537, 544, 546). Regulation of gender inequality in the labour market is particularly important because of the essentiality of this life sphere for women's welfare and the fact that the labour market is characterised by stagnating gender inequality.

One of the proposed measures to eliminate the basics of gender inequality is changing the demand structure in the labour market and recruitment and promotion practices and enhancing the importance and prestigious status of women's jobs (573).

Steps to tackle these problems should include bringing of the minimum wage up to the subsistence wage level, increasing remuneration in the government social service sector, support of women employed by small businesses (437) and development of small and medium businesses (886).

Overcoming segregation by means of professional mobility is possible providing women's competitive growth in the labour market and easing up of their access to jobs in the private sector (398).

Another positive factor of overcoming female discrimination is legal gender education and measures to raise confidence in the legal system and its effectiveness, and steps to activate civic institutions (78).

---

Revaluation of feminine jobs and a gender-based review of the legislation and development programmes will, too, promote gender equality and help eliminate discrimination in the labour market.

Steps to be taken (272):

1) To work out ways of overcoming the undervaluation of female jobs:
   a) to revise current tariffs and standards, the practice of assignment of tariff rates and increments
      and to revise jobs, positions and remuneration schemes in the public sector (especially within
      gender-neutral economic sectors);
   b) to work out recommendations on adequate evaluation of feminine jobs from the point of view
      of gender parity and introduce reporting on relative gender pay ratios (and the gender parity of
      those employed in different positions) in the private sector;
   c) to improve job standardization for better understanding of job requirements; to maintain
      transparency of how the salary and all salary components are awarded;
   d) to enhance target professional development in companies;
   e) to set up tripartite commissions (active participation of trade unions and female and male
      employees' input into collective discussions) for decision-making in the field of labour laws and
      development of a labour tariff, standards and incentives system.

2) To strengthen the observance of non-discrimination laws (within the framework of the civil rather
   that criminal code).

3) To develop a scheme of voluntary pension contributions in large companies (since the average
   retirement plan payoff for women is 1.5 higher than that for men).

4) To conduct a gender review of the demographic and social policies in order to establish how certain
   political measures affect women's employment competitiveness.

5) To launch a system of measures to support workers with families both as part of an individual
   employment policy and as a demographic policy component.

6) To encourage the development of a forked childcare scheme in the labour market, including a full
   revival of day nurseries and setting up an institute of certified nannies.

7) To integrate a non-transferable paternity leave into the pronatalist policy.

8) To introduce regular budget-financed time studies to the gender statistics, as the time is one of the
    most asymmetrically distributed gender resources, and it affects women's capabilities in the labour
    market and accounts for a conflict of work and family interests.
6. Women in Politics

In one of her latest interviews, Michele Bachelet, the first woman-president of Chile and currently the executive director of UN Women said that gender equality in a country may bring huge benefits (74) and therefore, gender equality is something every state must strive for.

This chapter is dedicated to the issues of women's presentation in politics and at top government positions, the role of women's NGOs in women's promotion in politics and the reasons for low numbers of women in politics and state administration.

6.1. Women remain extremely outnumbered in politics

The Russian Constitution, the Law "On the Fundamentals of Civil Service in the Russian Federation", the Law "On Political Parties" and the Law "On the Elections into the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly" provide a legal basis for men's and women's equal opportunities to elect and be elected at all levels and non-limitation of women's rights for an equal access to civil service and public office.

However, the actual women's participation in government administration is determined by how well women are represented in decision-making positions at the federal, regional and local levels. Table 6.1 shows that the percentage of women in the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly hardly reached 14% over the entire period of 1993 to 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections in the State Duma</th>
<th>Percentage of women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First State Duma (1993-1995)</td>
<td>13.6% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second State Duma (1995-1999)</td>
<td>10.0% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third State Duma (1999-2003)</td>
<td>7.7% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth State Duma (2003-2007)</td>
<td>9.8% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth State Duma (2007-2011)</td>
<td>13.8% women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth State Duma (2011-2016)</td>
<td>13.8% women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Federal State Statistics Service (data accessed in June 2012).*

Women's representation on party lists (except the Just Russia party) corresponded to women's participation in the State Duma (Table 6.2).

All of the four parliamentary parties are headed by men. Of 32 parliamentary committees 4 are headed by women; 20 women hold the position of the deputy committee chair (13.5% of the total committee chairs). Five committees have no women at all, while 17 have just one each.
The situation did not change much after the last 2011 elections in December. There are in total 62 women represented in the RF State Duma. United Russia is a party with largest women's representation - 42 members. However, it has the largest party list too (Table 6.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Russia</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>271 (86%)</td>
<td>44 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53 (93%)</td>
<td>4 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Russia</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>27 (71%)</td>
<td>11 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36 (90%)</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: official website of the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Russia</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>194 (82.3%)</td>
<td>42 (17.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>88 (95.7%)</td>
<td>4 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Russia</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>54 (84%)</td>
<td>10 (16.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party of Russia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>52 (91.1%)</td>
<td>5 (8.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: official website of the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly.*

Therefore the number of women in the present State Duma has remained the same, while generally being very low both at the federal and regional government levels (18, 54, 115, 159, 392).

All scientists agree about women's poor representation in politics and the fact of it being a key characteristic of gender equality in the country (184, 578). Experts speak of a catch 22 where decision-making remains men's prerogative in the country with 11 million more women than men and in the conditions of women's better education and women accounting for a half of all employees. Whether the planned women's presentation in politics can be reached in the framework of the Millennium Development Goals is much doubted. None of the government branches has seen any changes in women's representation (184). An increase in women's numbers in politics has been recorded in municipalities and local self-governing bodies only.

Of the 29 State Duma committees only 4 are chaired by women: I.V. Yarovaya - Chair, State Duma Committee On Security and Anti-Corruption Enforcement; E.B. Mizulina - Chair, State Duma Committee on Family, Women and Children; G.P. Khovanskaya - Chair, State Duma Committee On Housing Politics and Public Utility Sector and N.V. Burykina - Chair, State Duma Financial Market Committee. All 6 of the State Duma commissions are headed by men. Within the public service sector, women primarily occupy
non-decision-making positions. It is partially explained by the introduction of a new law on deputies elections that has abolished single-member district elections into the State Duma (proportional voting has come to replace the majority election system). It has affected women's opportunities to be elected; women's success now depends solely on party leaders who are in no rush to promote women to top posts (18, 341, 392, 495, 692).

Women candidates are typically last on the list. Therefore, there are more women in a party which has the majority of seats in the State Duma.

An analysis of the gender composition of the RF State Duma shows that in its current composition, most of the women elected represent the so-called "nomenklatura" and are already experienced in working in the State Duma and federal and regional authorities. Public organisations have very few female members; those primarily come from sports and youth organisations.

According to the Interparliamentary Union, with its women's representation in national parliaments as of late May 2008, Russia ranked 81 of 188 parliamentary countries.

During the run-up to the 2003 parliamentary elections, Russia's women's organisations put forward an initiative on the introduction of amendments to the election legislation aimed at expanding women's opportunities to be elected and their full integration into the decision-making process. They appealed to the fact that Russia did not fulfill the recommendations of the Beijing Conference (1995), i.e. equal representation of men and women in governmental bodies, state administrative establishments and courts (by the assignment of quotas if necessary) signed by the Russian Federation as it's member state. In 2003, the State Duma passed the Federal Law "On State Guarantees of Equal Rights and Freedoms of Men and Women and Equal Empowerment Opportunities" in the first reading. The law was backed by 366 deputies, i.e. the required constitutional majority. There has not been a second reading yet.

According to the proposals, women would be guaranteed at least 30% seats on party lists. The amendments were considered during the autumn 2002 and spring 2003 sessions of the State Duma on the adoption of the laws "On the Elections into the State Duma of the RF Federal Assembly". The same amendments were being discussed at the regional level. The political community, however, was unprepared to accept the idea of institutional support of women's and men's equality by having declined the amendments. Just before the last elections of February 2007, the RF Public Chamber along with a number of women's organisations and associations made open letters and public appeals on Russia's political parties for more adequate women's representation on candidates’ lists but their attempts were never heard.

Of the total number of public servants within RF state authorities, women make up 70.6% (29.4% of men respectively). However, when it comes to the top office, the balance is tilted in favour of men making up 76.7% v. 23.3% of women.

Gender representation of the position of a public prosecutor and an investigator: 37% of women v. 63% of men.
Today's government is represented by two women: Olga Yurievna Golodets - Deputy Prime Minister as of 21 May 2012 and Veronika Igorevna Skvortsova - Minister of Healthcare of the Russian Federation.

As of 21 September 2011, the Federation Council was headed by Valentina Ivanovna Matvienko, the ex-governor and chair of the government of St. Petersburg (2003-2011). For the first time in Russia's history a woman came to hold such a top position, the woman being an iconic figure in Russia's politics. She had already been the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia during 1998-2003.

There are currently only two women-governors: the Governor of the Murmansk Oblast Marina Vasilievna Kovtun (April 2012) and Governor of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug–Yugra Natalia Vladimirovna Komarova (March 2010).

According to the Public Opinion Foundation, 50% of women and 32% of men believe that men in Russia have many more empowerment opportunities.

From the 2003 elections onwards, the parties and associations have had no women's associations as such (in 1993-2002 they would participate on an individual basis). May 2012 became a milestone date with the registration of the Public ‘For Women’ Party.

6.2. The Role of Women’s NGOs in Maintaining Gender Equality in Politics

According to an RF Public Chamber report, there are over 1,500 women's non-governmental organisations. The statistics are kept by women's organisations themselves. A most complete reference guide "Women's Non-governmental Organisations in Russia and the CIS" was published in 1998. It has not been reissued since. Key areas of activity of Russian women's NGOs include: human rights, education, information, charity and family support, women's entrepreneurship, women with handicapped children and research work.

According to expert opinion, women's NGOs in Russia have not had any considerable input into gender equality in politics unlike in the majority of developed countries.

A Presidential Council for Civic Institutions and Human Rights was launched in 2009. It initiated reconsideration and analysis of the entire NGO legislation. In June 2009, RF President Dmitry Medvedev introduced a draft law to soften the norms of the 2006 federal law on NGOs and introduce simplified registration and financial reporting for small NGOs (with revenues of below 3 mn roubles a year).

In 2012, statutory amendments to the reporting scheme for NGOs depending on the source of funding (the so-called "foreign agents") need to be further analysed to determine the influence of the amendments on women's NGOs.

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56 Official website of the RF Government
6.3. Reasons for Women’s Low Numbers in Politics

A gender gap in the composition of political and public authorities is a consequence of gender disproportions in the economy, which stop women from gaining economic independence and protecting their interests (578).

Political system (proportional) and political process arrangement in today's Russia, too, have negative impact on women's representation in politics. A masculine political life model stops women from overcoming multiple barriers linked to a lack of party support, social networks and communications, and social capital (133).

During elections, women's organisations do not get adequate administrative backing of authorities at any level. Authorities tend to consider women's organisations as social rather than political players.

Russia has no national machinery or procedures to provide real, not only legal guarantees of gender equality as prescribed by the constitution.

The new law "On the Elections into the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation" (in force as of 2005, including subsequent amendments of 2007 and 2009) has brought in a number of significant amendments to the laws on elections. The amendments, particularly, a ban of electoral blocks and coalitions and the abolition of "none of the above" voting option have lowered the chances of women's organisations and associations in taking an active part in election campaigns.

Russia maintains great tolerance to the violation of women's and men's equal rights. This is another reason for women's unequal representation in politics and in top civil service positions, violation of their labour rights, sexual harassment at work and wide-spread domestic violence.

These issues and the issues of women's low numbers in politics are not publicly discussed.

Women themselves are captivated by the stereotype of politics being a men's prerogative.

6.4. Conclusions and Recommendations on Women's Promotion in Politics

There are no direct limitations of women's rights for an equal access to civil service and civil service positions but women are still outnumbered when it comes to decision-making by elective bodies practically across all of the country.

The country has no policy to promote women in politics at any decision-making levels.

Women have improved their representation in regional and council establishments, which, however, have a dramatic lack of resources. And the more resources, the less accessible government departments are for women.

Scientists propose the following steps to improve women's representation in politics (578):

- To shape the legal framework of the state gender equality politics, including the law "On State Guarantees of Equal Rights and Freedoms and Equal Opportunities of Women and Men in the Russian Federation";
• To amend and supplement the election legislation with a view to promoting women's representation on electoral lists of political parties;
• To set up a nation gender equality strategy;
• To amend the public service legislation with an aim of promoting women to top tiers of public authorities;
• To set up an HR pool for women to hold top public office with the help of dedicated on-going education programmes.

7. Domestic Violence in Russia

The reason for the demographic disaster Russia is facing today is not only low birth rates but a critical level of domestic violence (Professor M. Satterthwaite, demographist, Oxford University, 17 April 2006). This chapter describes different forms of domestic violence and the factors obstructing the elimination of the inadmissible violence situation in Russia.

7.1. High Level of Domestic Violence

A whole range of multiple factors, particularly, uncertainties about a number of legal and institutional issues, account for a persistently high level of domestic violence in Russia. According to the current data of the Russian Interior Ministry, on average 250,000 of crimes of violence against women, including minors are committed in Russia every year. 12 to 14 cases of domestic violence per year end in death; 75% of all homicide is committed on family/domestic grounds. On police records are over 3.5 million of persons with anti-social behaviour, including over 296,000 classed as family debauchers, 421,000 as chronic alcoholics - regular offenders and 415,000 as socially dangerous drug addicts - a menace for co-habitants (486).

Unfortunately there have been no comprehensive studies of economic losses from domestic violence in Russia, unlike other countries. However, researchers (303) believe the country is suffering huge economic losses due to violence, all the more so that for the past fifteen years Russia has been leading in the absolute number of victims of domestic violence among women and children. Even on a comparative basis, the figure is 45-70 times higher than that in France and the UK, 16 times higher than in the US and 7 times higher than in Pakistan, even according to the most overestimated figures and considering the half-legal status of uxoricide in the country (680).

Crisis centres, public organisations, the scientific community and social institutions help raise public awareness of domestic violence. A number of text books on domestic violence have been published over the past 10 years aimed at the target audience of university students (186, 187, 194, 459, 488, 781), social workers (204, 459), healthcare workers (347), teachers and psychologists (458), judges (200) and police officers (187).
Domestic Violence in Women as the Most Widespread Form of Domestic Violence

At least 20 theses on domestic violence and violence in women were defended in sociology (108, 265, 346, 382, 491, 562, 597, 718, 726, 764), jurisprudence (144, 318, 329, 763), psychology (23, 155), philosophy (32, 801) and medicine (597) in Russia over the period of 2004 to 2012.

Researchers (108) and classic scholars of gender sociology (315) draw a link between violence against women and the existing gender inequality. Despite the fact that today's emancipated women won't follow obsolete patriarchal behavioural standards in families and more often support egalitarian values, men are more inclined to favour patriarchal stereotypes and explain their violence (315) by women's attempts to possess something justly belonging to men. Empirical studies in Russia, too, prove that domestic violence against women depends on how much respondents are inclined to support patriarchal standards in gender relations and public tolerance for violence (187, 265, 465).

Despite today's emancipation in Russia, economic and psychological factors and sexual assault make women choose an adaptive behaviour and save the family by all means (108).

Such women's behaviour is determined by the existing social situation when gender violence is widely treated, also by law-enforcement officers, as a commonality unrejected and uncondemned (108, 142, 187, 454, 465, 486). Furthermore, domestic violence is generally treated on the basis of victims'/offenders' individual characteristics and the family microenvironment (561, 562).

On the other hand, scholars and practicians insist that the existing government social support system needs new ways of prevention of violence against women and children and rehabilitation of victims of domestic violence, since the police and courts of law designed to counteract family cruelty support the stigma of dependence, sacrifice and insufficiency (142, 265, 454, 486) and cannot always provide adequate help for victims of violence. In some cases, offenders cannot be stopped until a homicide is already committed.

Factors determining an increasing risk of violence against a woman: 1) the family is child-free for more than 5 years, 2) alcohol or drug abuse, or psychic disorders, 3) the husband or any family member is an ex-prisoner, 4) the woman does not know of or visit a local crisis centre (303).

Forced sex, another form of violence against women in families, is very often neglected in literature as it is believed that sexual assault cannot occur in wedlock. This form of violence is described in a handful of scientific publications only (318).

Violence in Older Women – Chiefly A Women’s Problem

There have been only a few publications recently devoted to gerontological violence (518, 519, 749). Since 2004, the problem has been focused on in just one thesis in Russia, and even that one exemplified cases in Kyrgyzstan (749).

Gerontological violence, i.e. abuse of elderly people by inflicting psychological, physical and economic damage and verbal assault by close relations is quite commonplace in many families (518, 519, 749). According to scholars, this form of violence occurs within all social groups regardless of the level of
income, education and social status. Most of the victims of gerontological violence are women over 70, both living in families or alone, with illnesses and in need of medical help, care and support with routine household chores. This is another form of latent violence as victims rarely report abuse by their close relatives to the police (518, 519, 749).

Scientists note that the most frequent victims of violence in older people are the closest relatives and neighbours, mainly alcohol (27.2%) and drug (4.5%) addicts. In many cases, offenders are financially dependent on their victims (12%), have no job (19.8%) or do not want to work (2.1%) (518, 519).

Elderly people are most exposed to 1) physical assault, 2) emotional and psychological abuse, 3) fraud - illegal use or misappropriation of property and money, and pressure to change the will, 4) negligence in elderly care, 5) sexual assault in elderly women, 6) medical violence - abuse of medications, misuse of medications, either premeditated or accidental, a lack of medicating or prescription of medications in the doses harmful for an elderly person (518, 519, 749).

Scientists urge to pay more attention to gerontological violence naming social dehumanization and moral decadence spread across all classes as the main reasons (518, 519, 749).

Close Links between violence against children and women
At least nine theses related to violence in children have been defended since 2004 (777, 11, 65, 97, 155, 168, 365, 701, 819).

Violence against women and violence against children are interrelated. Multiple studies have established circularity of violence and close correlation between childhood violence and violence in later years (142). According to statistics, 13.4% of women abused by their husbands did not suffer childhood abuse while 47.6% was exposed to some form of family violence.

Moreover, children having witnessed father’s violence experience so-called "secondary victimization". They also tend to exhibit aggressive behavior as a child and later as a teenager. Unfortunately, children - witnesses of violence rarely get psychological help. Children react to violence differently depending on their age, gender and social support. But if children witness and suffer violence they are very likely to later develop severe behavioural and emotional disorders such as anxiety, depression, low performance at school, low self-esteem, nightmares and physical ailments. Studies show that very often violence as a behavioural model is adopted by children in the course of their socialization, and it often becomes a real epidemic spreading across generations (142, 835).

According to literary sources, Russia's system for the prevention and eradication of violence against children is starting to work. Today's preventive activities on the part of social services makes it possible to break the closed cycle of violence and bring family relationships back to normal (835).
Intimate Partner Violence

Although many literary sources indicate that in 90% of cases domestic violence is directed against women and children, men, too, find themselves exposed to family abuse. Unfortunately, there are scarce works that address the problem as it is never made too public. Most of domestic violence reports mention women, children and elderly family members as victims. Cases of violence against men are kept secret since the society generally tends to conceal cases of men being victimized. It is largely due to the existing stereotypes of a "strong man" and a "weak woman". (72, 385).

The subject of intimate partner violence in men has been poorly studied for the following reasons: 1) a lack of current statistics on the frequency and nature of marital violence, 2) severer consequences of marital violence for women compared to men, 3) interpretation of women's violence as self-defence rather than targeted causing of bodily injuries, 4) men are less likely to take the matter to the police or social services being afraid of public mockery. In the present situation, i.e. in the conditions of traditional public beliefs, men's seeking of help is thought of as a less adequate strategy.

General forms of women's violence include psychological and physical assault, sexual abuse and fraud; specific forms would be social status violence - deprivation of paternal rights and child exclusion, persuasion to drop family contacts, etc. (72, 385).

7.2. Social and Legal Barriers of Eradicating Domestic Violence

Many experts address the issue of Russia's lack of a legal framework dedicated to family violence. The existing laws and regulations provide only partial protection for victims of violence. According to experts working in the field of violence, domestic violence is hard to prove under the current laws. The problem lies in the fact that the Russian judicial system tends to consider public violence as a greater hazard than violent actions directed at family members. According to this theory, domestic violence is treated as a personal family matter rather than a social offence. (187, 409, 465, 486).

Another legal issue is classing of domestic offence as a case of private prosecution. Legally, whether or not to go ahead with prosecution depends on how much a woman is morally prepared to oppose the offender and initiate criminal proceedings. Women-victims as plaintiffs must present evidence and word the charges in search of conviction. That is why many cases of private prosecution end without having started either due to victims' failure to correct their statements as prescribed by court (often due to women's lack of legal competence) or due to conciliation. According to judicial statistics, 9 of 10 cases end in conciliation (187, 409, 465, 486).

Another problem noted by experts is the fact that the only article of the Russian Criminal Code (No. 117 "Torture") that covers crimes related to domestic violence has little effect in Russia. According to the comments to the article, torture shall be understood as "infliction of physical or psychic damage to the victim, including systematic battery, torture, threats and insults." These can be definitely classed as domestic violence, which is known to have cyclic nature. In reality, however, the law is rather hard to rely on. The reason is the Resolution of the Plenum of the RF Supreme Court (#14 of 21/12/1993)
according to which, repeated infliction of light bodily harm or battery cannot be classed as torture in the following cases (187, 409, 465, 486):

- if one or several episodes of prosecution which allow to qualify the actions as reoccurring must be dismissed as time-barred
- if the offender has already been penalized under the administrative law and respective rulings have not been cancelled

Article 78 of the RF Criminal Code states that a person shall be relieved of criminal liability if so much time has passed since the commission:

- two years for misdemeanor
- six years for crimes of medium gravity
- ten years for grave crimes
- fifteen years for gravest crimes

Therefore, the limitation on conviction for family violence is two years since the commission. Furthermore, according to the RF Supreme Court resolution, battering with no signs of torture happening between two arguing persons on grounds of personal hostile relations cannot be considered a torture (187, 409, 465, 486).

There is a lot of controversy in the definition of domestic violence as a crime, and each law relies on its own specific crime interpretation. It calls for elaboration of a separate law on violence against family members (187, 409, 465, 486).

Another relevant problem raised by scholars and experts is a lack of protection to prevent subsequent acts of violence. There is a tested-out system of methods aimed at preventing reoccurring violence in families used in western countries - the practice of restraining orders, which are a legal document committed to protect victims of domestic violence and providing them with adequate forms of legal support. Restraining orders are normally given out by judges following proceedings initiated by victims of abuse or their lawyers or representatives, and they offer a wide range of legal support for the victims: 1) they order the offender to stop victimization, threats and physical assault, 2) they prohibit the respondent to come into any contact with the plaintiff, whether by telephone or correspondence or through gifts or personal visits, 3) they prohibit the offender from close physical contact with the victim, 4) they sometimes prescribe rehabilitation for offenders abusing alcohol or drugs or psychological counselling aimed at eradication of assault. The chief goal of a restraining order is to separate the conflicting parties in order to stop further escalation of violence (409, 410, 454, 465, 486).

There have been many cases where the police would refuse to accept statements from women - victims of violence, and where they would demonstrate inaction or prejudice against victims of domestic violence. According to expert opinion, the reaction of public officers depends on their individual attitudes and stereotypes rather than on the law (142, 187, 409, 454, 465).

Another worrying aspect is a lack of reliable statistics on domestic violence in Russia and the fact that general police records do not differentiate violence on the basis of sex. The offender-victim relations
should be considered in statistics in order to enable more realistic records on domestic violence (465, 486).

But a more important barrier in eradicating domestic violence, as believed by many researchers and experts, is a lack of political determination. Today's Russia has no federal policy to define domestic violence as a serious barrier for the empowerment of women's rights as human rights. 2005 was the end of a unified government institution dealing directly with violence against women - the Interdepartmental Commission on Domestic Violence, Sexual Abuse and Human Trafficking. Today, gender issues are largely addressed by the State Duma Committee for Family, Women and Children and the Ministry of Social Development and Healthcare, which do not particularly prioritize the issues of domestic violence (187, 409, 454, 465).

Government's negligence of the problems accounts for a lack of half-way houses and shelters that can temporarily accommodate women and children - victims of violence. According to some experts, there are merely around 200 such institutions across the country (409).

7.3. Conclusions and Recommendations on Eradication of Domestic Violence

General conclusion: the level of domestic violence in Russia is intolerably high.

Women's crisis centres and NGOs experienced in handling victims of violence and offenders have worked out recommendations on changing today's domestic violence situation in the country (409, 410, 454, 465, 486).

Experts of crisis centres, mainly lawyers and psychologists, speak of a pressing need of legal regulation of domestic violence to fill in gaps in the Russian regulatory framework and protect victims of violence. To do this, a federal law "On Social and Legal Protection against Domestic Violence" should be passed as soon as possible. Some of its recommended goals (409, 410, 454, 465, 486):

1. To recognize the term "domestic violence" within the context of the law.
2. To provide special means of social and legal protection for vulnerable family members such as temporary and permanent restraining court orders. ... 1) a mechanism for the implementation of a restraining order, 2) oversight of offender's execution of a restraining order, 3) introduction of liability for violation.
3. To recognize "commission of a crime against a family member and an intimate partner" as an aggravating circumstance and introduce this provision to Article 63 of the Russian Criminal Code.
4. To change the private status of family crime prosecution to public and make respective amendments to the Criminal Code.
5. To launch within the Interior Ministry a uniform victims record system with a classification into gender and victim-offender relations.
6. To launch compulsory psychological intervention programmes for persons practicing family violence. Compulsory correctional education shall be partly funded by offenders by deducting 5 to 20% of their income, as determined by court, in favour of the institutions holding the dedicated courses.
7. To set up a primary and secondary family violence prevention system (parties, their functions and interaction).
8. To open an adequate number of temporary shelters for vulnerable family members.
9. To put a simple ban on mediation during criminal proceedings and introduce the system of restraining orders.

Crisis centres (as posted on the website of the St. Petersburg Crisis Centre) urge the Russian government to take prompt steps to sign and ratify the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, CETS No. 210 adopted on 11 May 2011. Once ratified, the convention will make it possible to protect women from all forms of violence and obligate the government to prevent, prosecute and eradicate violence against women and domestic violence on the whole and work out an integrated framework, policy and procedures for the protection and assistance of all victims of domestic violence (409, 410, 454, 465, 486).

A great step forward in the field of gender equality and domestic violence would be the adoption of a federal gender equality law "On State Guarantees of Equal Rights for Women and Men". Whether the law will be passed is rather doubtful, though, in view of today's strong conservative attitudes in the society.

Another important step towards the prevention of social violence is changing public opinion on domestic violence, i.e. eradicating tolerance for domestic violence. To bring down the level of domestic violence in the country, public should be made aware about human rights and the general educational and cultural level should be improved. Alcohol abuse prevention, launching of a chain of dedicated anti-violence and public awareness centres (303) and further integration of educational programmes on domestic violence for dedicated professionals - the police, judges (including JPs), forensic experts, social workers, public prosecutors, medical staff and teachers can bring positive results too.

A common factor accounting for ineffectual prevention of violence noted by many experts is a lack of a systemic approach. The problem can be resolved on an integrated basis only, when all of the professionals, institutions and the civil society - the mass media, the police, courts, social workers, sociologists, psychologists, counselors and medical professionals unite in combating violence (409, 410, 454, 465, 486, 835).
8. Summary

Gender research has changed in Russia. If we are to summarize the changes in the number and format of gender publications released over the last decade (2004-2012) as compared to the previous period (1993-2003)57.

First and foremost, we must note that there have been fewer gender publications released58. We believe there are two main reasons for this.

One, gender issues having first appeared on the agenda in the 1990s raised great interest in scientific circles and amongst public. Gender problems are hard to resolve and need much more time than mere 10 years. This is explained by the fact that multiple gender issues are based on deep-seated gender stereotypes. By the 2000s, some researchers dropped out while others, really interested in an in-depth analysis of cause-effect relations between gender equality and socioeconomic development, continued the studies having realized the social significance of gender research. The number of publications released therefore did not affect the quality of the works published. Just the other way round: the scientific world has seen fundamental, generalizing works and works on gender research resorting to advanced statistical and econometric techniques.

Two, the number of publications has done down for political reasons: the gender subject is unfortunately not a relevant political topic (unlike it was in the 1990s) and today's Russia is characterized by stagnation in this field.

The presentation format has changed too. Most of the works come in electronic format (for reader's convenience, we have provided links to the electronic versions of the publications, where possible). Internet technologies have enabled to make gender problems and discussions more public. Of particular interest are forum discussions of gender problems, gender works and gender equality legislation. A vivid example would be a network campaign held in March 2012 in a form of electronic voting for the promotion of the gender equality law.

Some general conclusions of the literature review reveal that:

On the legal side, the domestic women's rights protection legislation provides gender equality guarantees. Russia has signed and ratified the majority of international gender equality treaties. Nonetheless, certain sections of the Russian legislation still maintain gender asymmetry whereby the government provides parenthood-related benefits for mothers only thus acknowledging greater family responsibilities on women's part and depriving men of the same. The legislation does not define "discrimination against women" and there have been no real discrimination cases at law. Experts believe

58 On average, during the early period (during 11 years from 1993 to 2003) 113 publications per year were identified, while during the later period (8.5 years from 2004 to July, 2012) there were 98 publications per year.
that the main reason for this is that the society got used to human discrimination and that people are unaware of their rights.

On education, the Russian education system formally does not discriminate against girls and women in their access to education at all levels and practically all occupations. The problem occurs in equal male presentation in the university education system. The economic payoff of education is higher with women, but it does not help narrow the pay gap. Both school and university education (the contents of courses and text books and teachers' attitude) promote gender stereotypes.

There were fewer works and studies devoted to gender aspects of health and healthcare in 2004-2012. But the quantity did not affect the quality as most of the publications were fundamental and generalizing and touched upon a whole range of problems and disputable issues in the field. One of the most important health factors is gender discrimination directly or indirectly affecting the diagnostics, progress, treatment and prevention of diseases. However, today's plans to reform and upgrade the healthcare system have no regard for gender inequality.

A gender approach to health allows developing and integrating meaningful programmes to change the social factors which affect the incidence. Gender differences in health-related behaviour are determined by general gender expectations in a society. The gender approach has brought on the need to develop equal opportunities for men and women, which should help solve health-related problems. Strengthening of the role of a woman is an essential condition for her health. This means opening up women's access to diverse resources, education, employment and the advantages of new technologies and approaches in medicine, and protection of their rights and empowerment for them to make an individual and non-discriminatory choice. Women must not only be a subject of health programmes, but they must take an active part in elaboration thereof.

Russia currently has the biggest gender gap in life expectancy. Advanced men-oriented programmes must primarily be concerned with a reconsideration of gender stereotypes - sustaining a non-violent communication culture, personal health care and childcare skills. Combating alcoholism and harmful working conditions is another line of activity to be considered by men's health programmes.

Another acute problem is the health state of rural female residents; the government needs to develop individual programmes to address the issues of health conservation and maternal mortality. There is no organized approach to health analysis and healthcare issues related to immigrants. Access to healthcare services by immigrants has become more difficult since 2010. This is due to an increasing number of women and immigrants with children.

In terms of economics, according to scientists, women are more prone to the consequences of economic crises, and Government's social support at the time is not always adequate to present and future social challenges. Regulation of gender inequality in the labour market is particularly important because of the essentiality of this life sphere for women's welfare and the fact that the labour market is characterised by stagnating gender inequality: occupational segregation, women's low vertical mobility and a steady gender pay gap.
There are no direct limitations of women's rights for an equal access to civil service and civil service positions but women are still outnumbered when it comes to decision-making by elective bodies practically across all of the country. The country has no policy to promote women in politics at any decision-making levels. Women have only improved their representation in regional and council establishments with a dramatic lack of resources. And the more resources, the less accessible government departments are for women.

The level of domestic violence in Russia is intolerably high, and the country has no integrated approach to eradicating it.

Table 8.1 demonstrates schematic tendencies of major changes in various aspects of gender equality in 1993-2003. The main conclusion is that, unfortunately, no significant changes have taken place. The situation with political institutions of gender equality has deteriorated, while demographic situation has improved (expected lifespan of women and men, maternal mortality and artificial abortions level).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender equality areas</th>
<th>Schematic notation of the main changes in 2004-2012 compared to 1993-2003.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislation and law enforcement</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Access to education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Education content</td>
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<td>Health Care</td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Life expectancy gap</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reduction of the number of abortions and maternal mortality</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Female health</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Health of certain social groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment and living standards</td>
<td>Segregation and discrimination</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unfavorable working conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gap in work payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female poverty</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Detailed scientific studies of the gender issues in legislation, education, access to healthcare, employment, women's representation in politics and domestic violence and targeted recommendations proposed by scholars in the context of promotion of gender equality can be summarized as follows:

- To launch a national machinery for securing gender equality, part of which will be establishing of dedicated departments at diverse governmental levels committed to promotion of gender equality and entrusted with all relevant resources and powers.
- To adopt the gender equality law "On State Guarantees of Equal Rights and Freedoms for Men and Women and Equal Empowerment Opportunities in the RF."
- To adopt a law "On Social and Legal Protection against Domestic Violence" to counteract violence against women.
- To integrate the gender component of the development into all existing development concepts, including the Demographic Concept in order to balance out work and parental duties for women and men.
- To launch educational programmes on overcoming gender stereotypes.
- To conduct a state expert review of the education reform at all of its stages and the contents of text books, and introduce a teacher's code putting a ban on gender stereotypes within professional activity.
- To launch an effective machinery to prevent violence against women.
- To develop gender statistics, especially continuous time budget accounting and work out a gender classification of income and expenditure across budgets of all levels.
- To elaborate a programme on the encouragement of self-protective behaviour in men and mitigation of unfavourable social impacts on health and life expectancy in men and women. To pay special attention to women residing in rural areas and female immigrants. To eliminate discrimination in the labour market.
- To mitigate segregation in education and employment.
- To revaluate feminine jobs.
- To set up an HR pool to promote women to top state administration positions.
- To introduce quotes or standards for representation of men and women at top decision-making levels.
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Part II

Excess Male Mortality in Russia: A Gender-Based Theoretical Look of the Social Norm and Risk-Taking Decision Framework

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January 09, 2014
1. Introduction

Over the past decades, except for some countries in Africa and in Eastern Europe, worldwide improvements in life expectancy have been observed. Simultaneously, improvements in education, treatment of preventable diseases, as well as some macroeconomic and social stability have been achieved. Despite these worldwide improvements, high mortality, particularly among men, continues to be a significant problem in Russia. Several hypotheses have been explored, including the psychological and economic issues linked to the transition from communism to open market, macroeconomic crises, education levels, traditional cultural and social norms regarding alcohol and tobacco consumption, eating habits, among others.

Initially, significant emphasis was given to the psychological stress directly associated with the loss of sense of protection from government and massive privatization with high unemployment levels. However, after over 20 years from the transition from communism to open market economy, we could expect these factors’ influence to be lesser. Nevertheless, mortality rates among Russian adult men, although slowly improving, continue to significantly lag behind those observed for Russian adult women and their counterparts in most former Soviet Union countries and other parts of the world. Evidently, more research is needed to fully understand the significant associations among other factors and the decision to engage in risky behaviors that clearly affect Russian men’s survival chances.

Studies suggest that social norms play an important role on people’s risk-taking decisions. Evidence suggests that social norms affect men and women differently, commonly playing a protective role among women, but also creating incentives to initiate risk-taking activities among men. This is particularly obvious in societies with more traditional gender-based social norms (Kuntsche et al. 2009). Indeed, more traditional social norms originated from self-imposing beliefs and incomplete or asymmetric information are likely to distort perceptions of the future as well as the decisions to engage in certain risky activities (Mackie and LeJeune 2009). These radical beliefs not only place divergent behavioral expectations on men and women, but also they tend to be more radical and more difficult to change.

Nevertheless, although social norms commonly are more challenging to change and they normally do it at a slower pace than macroeconomic development or even education improvements, evidence indicates that their speed of change can improve if the correct policies or programs are implemented (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, WHO 2007). Unfortunately, there is no consensus regarding the specific factors or the causal associations between gender-based social norms and specific risk-taking decisions. Exploring these associations using a more structured theoretical framework appears to have a significant importance to understand the role of social norms on the observed life-expectancy gender gap and excess male mortality crisis in Russia.

This background paper’s main goal is to contribute to the theoretical discussion presenting a framework for explaining gender differences on the association between social norms and risky behavior
engagement. The main focus of this framework is to identify social norm factors that create “incentives” for men and “protective” barriers for women that explain the observed gender differences on risk-taking activity engagement. The case of Russia is explored using empirical evidence from previous studies providing some support to this framework, with the main goal of explaining how gender-based social norms have affected the observed excess male mortality crisis in Russia.

2. Descriptive background on mortality, life expectancy, and main causes of death: Trends in Russia

Despite the observed overall improvements in life expectancy over the past years, high mortality rates among Russian men continue to represent a significant challenge for the Russian government (Shkolnikov et al 2013). Indeed, male mortality in Russia continues to be high, both compared to their female counterparts and to other former Soviet Union nations (Figure 1). Life expectancy for Russian women increased from 72 years to 75 years, between 1995 and 2010. Russian men were expected to live at birth 58 years in 1995 and 63 in 2010 (UNECE 2013).

Figure 1: Life Expectancy at Birth (Average Years of Life) in Belarus, Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, by gender and years.

![Life Expectancy Chart](image)

Source: UNECE Statistical Database, 2013. Notes: Life expectancy at birth, as defined by UNECE, is the average number of years a newborn is expected to live if the prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of his/her birth stay the same throughout his/her life. Missing information for some countries is due to lack of data for those specific years.
Similarly, life expectancy at birth for men in 2010 in the Czech Republic was around 75 years, whereas in Russia, men were expected to live to 63 years old (UNECE 2013). This represents a 12-year gap between these countries. This is a slight improvement compared to the estimated differences observed in 2005 between these two countries (14 years, 73 years and 59 years for men) (UNECE 2013). Although smaller, differences in female mortality also prevailed in 2010 (7 years, 79 years and 72 years, respectively). These estimates show the diverging trends that stated early 1990’s. Indeed, differences were significantly smaller in 1990 between these two countries both for men (4 years, 68 and 64 years) and women (2 years, 76 years and 74 years).

An issue of significant concern is the fact that these sizeable gaps are largely driven by the high mortality rates of working-age Russian men (Shkolnikov et al 2013). This premature and excess male mortality crisis represents a serious economic, social, and cultural problem for Russia. Marquez et al (2007) discuss a list of consequences including population reductions, labor force shortages, and national security risks\(^\text{60}\). Also, issues associated with poor health include work absenteeism, reduction in work productivity, jobs loss and unstable work, and issues with household economic and mental health well-being have a negative effect on the Russian population (Marquez et al 2007).

This mortality crisis has been the center of many studies and debates, exploring several factors from education and socio-economic conditions and the post-Soviet Union cultural and socio-political transition, to psychological and social norm factors (Lundberg and Shapira 2014). Although there is no consensus regarding the precise causal association between these factors and the gender-gap in mortality, it is clear that these factors play a critical role (more than frequently through multiple interaction effects) on the observed high male mortality trend in Russia. Particularly, the role of social norms appears to have a critical role explaining the diversion between the male and female trends. Using a simple theoretical framework and empirical evidence from previous studies, this study show how social norms have contributed to the upward and gender-gap mortality trend and, more recently, to the downward trend in male mortality.

**Main Causes Of Death: Trends in Russia**

The main observed causes of death for men in Russia have been persistent over the past years. Cardiovascular diseases (i.e. ischemic heart diseases; cerebral-vascular and other circulatory diseases) and external causes associated with alcohol-related conditions (i.e. homicides and violence, liver cirrhosis, intentional self-harm/suicide, transportation accidents, and alcohol poisoning) have been at the top of the list (See figure 2). Other causes have included cancer, tuberculosis, and diabetes.

\(^{60}\) This is, through a lack of healthy adults who might be able to participate in military service as well as a rise of military budget directed to pay for medical, nutritional, and substance abuse program services
Studies indicate that cardiovascular diseases account approximately for 57 percent of deaths in Russia (Petrukhin and Lunina 2012). The main issues behind this percentage are non-communicable diseases linked to psychosocial factors such as depression, engagement in culturally accepted risky behaviors such as heavy alcohol and tobacco consumptions, as well as poor eating habits and low physical activity (Petrukhin and Lunina 2012). As stated earlier, this is particularly alarming because of the large prevalence among working-age Russian men.

The second major cause of death is external causes associated with alcohol-related conditions. Estimates using data from the Institut National d’Etudes Démographiques (INED) and the Centre for Demography and Human Ecology list homicides and violence, liver cirrhosis, intentional self-harm/suicide, transportation accidents, and alcohol poisoning as external causes of death linked to alcohol-consumption conditions. Alcohol consumption among Russian men has been one of the most explored risk factors linked to the excess male mortality in Russia (Shkolnikov et al 2013, Leon et al 2009). Indeed, in addition to the direct health effects of heavy alcohol consumption, studies suggest significant associations between alcohol consumption and suicides (Pridemore 2013) as well as engagement in acts of violence (Stickley and Pridemore 2010). These external causes of death are also particularly prevalent among men (Brainerd and Cutler 2004).

Since 2005, mortality rates have shown a downward trend across all adult age groups, for both men and women, consistent with the observed improvements in life expectancy (Shkolnikov et al 2013, Neufeld and Rehm 2013). Estimates indicate that the improvement in life expectancy has been largely driven by reductions in circulatory diseases and particularly external causes of mortality. Additionally, recent estimates indicate positive changes in drinking patterns that hint at the start of a downward trend in risky alcohol consumption. Using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, estimates indicate that, with respect to the total consumption of pure ethanol, the share of beer has increased and the share of vodka (spirits) has reduced (Neufeld and Rehm 2013). These changes in the patterns of
alcohol consumption are regarded as important factors that have affected the reductions in male mortality rates over the past years.

Despite these improvements, the gender gap in life expectancy continues to be significantly large. Several studies have presented different hypotheses attempting to explain these changes. Research indicates that gender-based social roles and social norms play an important role on the significant gender differences on the likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors (Kuntsche et al 2009, Bobrova et al 2010, Hawkes and Buse 2013, Cockerham et al 2006). The following section presents a theoretical discussion exploring the role of gender-based social roles and norms on the engagement in risky activities that lead to the observed excess male mortality in Russia.

3. Theoretical framework: Gender differences on the determinants of risk-taking behavior

General model

Although empirically challenging, several studies have tried to model the factors that determine individuals’ engagement in risky behaviors (Grossman 1972, Becker and Murphy 1988, Orphanides and Zervos 1995, Cawley and Ruhm 2011). The main challenges include the role of unobserved factors and multiple interaction effects that lead to inaccurately measuring the impact and unclear causal associations.

In general, studies suggest that the decision to engage in health risky activities is the result of a trade-off between the individual’s “stock of health capital” and short-run increases in welfare. For example, if the individual perceives that the benefit of smoking is greater than the risk of suffering a heart attack or lung cancer in the future, then he or she will be more likely to engage in this risk health activity. As a result, the engagement in risky behaviors depends on the weight that the individual gives to the discounted value of his/her life expectancy or future well-being (Grossman 1972, Cawley and Ruhm 2011). Lundberg and Shapira (2014) present a summary and theoretical framework discussion on the main determinants of risk-taking behaviors.

Figure 3 presents a general theoretical framework listing a group of risk factors shaping the decision to engage in risky activities, by gender group, based on the Lundberg and Shapira’s (2014) theoretical framework. Overall, factors have similar effects on the likelihood of risk-taking engagement across men and women. The effect of social determinants of risk-taking factors on risk-taking outcomes, however, are likely to have different effects on men and women, particularly in places where social norms are more rigid. Similarly, biological factors such as testosterone and monoamine oxidase levels also determine men and women’s proneness to risk-taking behaviors. These gender-differentiated effects

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61 Particularly, the focus has been drawn to risky behaviors, such as alcohol consumption, smoking, engagement in violent activities (Shkolnikov et al 2013), as well as poor eating habits and low physical activity (Petrukhin and Lunina 2012).
are likely to explain the gender-gap in mortality observed in Russia. The following section focuses on the role of gender social norms and their potential contribution to the male mortality crisis in Russia.

Figure 3: Theoretical Framework of Risk Factors and Risk Taking Outcomes by Gender.

Source: Lundberg and Shapira (2014) and author contributions. Notes: The green arrows indicate a positive association between risk factors and the risk-taking decisions. The red arrows indicate a negative association between risk factors and the risk-taking decision. Risk factors in orange boxes represent those with different in effects by gender.
### Figure 4: Social Norms and Classic Gender Role Theory: Differentiated Gender Effects on Risk-Taking Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Argument</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Differentiated Gender Effects</th>
<th>Risk-Taking Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sense of Identity</td>
<td>Individuals who lack a sense of identity and life meaning are more likely to engage in risky behaviors.</td>
<td>Women are commonly responsible for care-taking and household work activities</td>
<td>Reduces likelihood of risk-taking outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Men are usually considered the main breadwinners in the household, and commonly they are excluded from other domestic-related activities.</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of risk-taking outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Roles</td>
<td>Individual who face multiple social roles and greater time constraints are less likely to allocate time to risky activities.</td>
<td>Women are consistently more likely to be responsible for multiple social roles. Men are responsible only for one social role of income provider.</td>
<td>Reduces likelihood of risk-taking outcomes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Women commonly face social and self-imposed pressures to restrict their engagement in risky activities, considered non-feminine. Men are usually pressured to act as “real men” engaging in risky activities to prove their hegemonic masculinity or gender dominance.</td>
<td>Increases likelihood of risk-taking outcomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author contribution.*
Social Norms and classic Gender Role Theory Model

Based on a Classic Role Theory (Hibbard and Pope, 1991; Hong and Seltzer 1995; Eagly et al 2000), Kuntsche et al (2009) propose a theoretical model that attempts to explain gender differences on the propensity to engage in risky behaviors. Figure 4 describes a theoretical framework explaining the effect of social norms and the classic gender role theories on the decision to engage in risky behaviors. Three main arguments are used to explain these decisions, (1) the identity and life meaning argument, (2) the multiple social roles and time constraint argument, and (3) the gender social norm argument.

Argument 1: Sense of Identity

The main hypothesis behind the classic role theory specifies that individuals who are responsible for a greater number of social roles (e.g. breadwinner, family caretaker, and partner) are less likely to engage in risky behaviors (such as heavy alcohol consumption or smoking). In other words, individuals who hold multiple social roles are able to position themselves more confidently in their social system, gaining a sense of identity and life meaning (Kuntsche et al 2009). This, in turn, reduces their need or urgency to engage themselves in risky activities, and hence their probability of premature death.

Argument 2: Multiple Roles

Closely related to this theory, a second argument that potentially explains the association between multiple social roles and engagement in risky activities is the time constrain hypothesis (Bobrova et al 2010). This is, the number of multiple roles or responsibilities significantly reduces the person’s time potentially allocated to risky activities such as drinking, smoking or engagement in violent situations decreases.

Argument 3: Social Norms and Hegemonic Masculinity

A third argument attempts to explain the gender difference in risky behavior engagement using the role of social norms line of reasoning. Social norms are actions that people commonly consider as appropriate behaviors (Paluck and Ball 2010), commonly perceived as expected or mandatory rules of behavior within a social group (Mackie et al 2012). In some cases, these social norms regulate or prevent certain groups from engaging in risky activities, as they are inappropriate. For example, traditional social norms of behavior prevent women from doing certain activities perceived as bad or inappropriate for women (Cockerham et al 2006). Such activities include heavy alcohol consumption or smoking.

In other cases, these social norms could not only encourage but also pressure certain people to engage in risky activities. For example, risky behaviors among men are commonly expected and even

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62 This study presents two conflicting theoretical models that aim at explaining the observed changes in engagement in risky behaviors among Russian men. The first is the “Classic Role Theory” that argues that people with a greater number of social roles are less likely to engage in risky behaviors, as their lives are more structured. On the other hand, the “Multiple Burden Theory” claims that people who have multiple social roles experience greater stress levels, and hence are more likely to engage in risky behaviors (Kuntsche et al 2009).
encouraged, even to the point of disregarding health threat warnings (Hawkes and Buse 2013, Greene et al 2013). This idea is consistent with the concept of hegemonic masculinity (see Box 1). The hegemonic masculinity framework argues that men commonly feel the pressure to behave as “real men” (e.g. taking more risks, tolerating more pain, being independent main providers, having multiple sex partners) to assert their real manhood (Pollack 1995, WHO 2007).

**Box 1: Hegemonic Masculinity**

In most parts of the world, men and women face rigid social pressures guiding the proper ways to socially behave or even to feel. These social norms commonly demand men to tolerate greater pain, to engage in violent activities, to assume the main breadwinner role, to be more risk-takers, or to have multiple sex partners (WHO 2007). In general, these social pressures force men to constantly assert and to prove their “real masculinity” or hegemonic masculinity, frequently engaging on exaggerated risk-taking behaviors (Pollack 1995).

The hegemonic masculinity framework states that “real men” build their “male” gender identity establishing a social position of dominance or power over women or other gender identities. Under this framework, men are commonly pressured to position their dominance via a set of socially and culturally accepted (and expected) practices, frequently even regardless of their individual preferences. These “gender-based appropriate” practices determine their dominant relationships with other men as well as with women or children. These gender-based social norms commonly vary by culture, socio-economic status, or racial/ethnic characteristic and they are dynamic processes that can be malleable to change over time (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Evidence indicates that these changes are observed, particularly where gender-transformative interventions (i.e. those seeking to transform gender roles, promoting gender-equitable relationships) are being implementing, observing more gender equality in power relationships (WHO 2007).


Social norms are, nevertheless, not static and they evolve over time particularly if the correct policies are implemented (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, WHO 2007, Mackie and LeJeune 2009, Muñoz et al 2012). For example, recent reductions in alcohol consumption hint at changes in perceptions and social behaviors (Shkolnikov et al 2013). Evidence indicate that implemented policies and programs aimed at controlling alcohol (e.g. 2006 suite of alcohol policies) and tobacco consumption (e.g. 2013 tobacco bans), as well as informing individuals of the risks of alcohol consumption (e.g. anti-alcohol campaigns that supplement safe road programs) are playing an important role boosting this downward trend (Neufeld and Rehm 2013, Marquez 2013).

Alcohol consumption among Russian men has historically been widely accepted as a social activity, even in the workplace (Hinote and Webber 2012; Saburova et al 2011). However, recent studies indicate that it is not the consumption of alcohol per se that is associated with the decrease in life expectancy. Mortality rates, particularly among working-age men, have experienced important fluctuations largely explained by changes in harmful patterns of alcohol consumption (Shkolnikov et al. 2004; Shkolnikov et al. 2013).

These harmful patterns include increases in low-quality alcohol and surrogate or non-beverage alcohol consumption, such as colognes, cleaning products, or medicines (Pridemore et al. 2013, Bobrova 2012). They also include hazardous drinking, in the form of binge drinking and “zapoi” (i.e. extended episodes of heavy drinking, drunkenness, and unconsciousness or withdrawal from reality, commonly lasting two or more days). This type of hazardous drinking has dangerously increased over the past decades (Pridemore 2006, Saburova et al 2011).63

Similarly, tobacco use represents a serious cause for ill health and mortality among Russian men, particularly among those who engaged in binge drinking at least once a month (Bobak et al 2003). Indeed, smoking plays a comparable role to alcohol consumption, damaging Russian adults’ overall health (Denisova 2010).64 Gender differences are also significant. Estimates show that 60 percent of adult males and 22 percent of adult females were current tobacco smokers (Global Adult Tobacco Survey 2009).

In particular, upward trends of alcohol consumption and risky behavior engagement have been observed during the transition from communist Soviet Union to open market economy system (Brainerd and Cutler 2005; Traisman 2010; Petrukhin and Lunina 2012). Russians experience increasing stress directly linked to the overall sense of cultural and social protection loss after the political and economic transformation from the transition from communism to market economy.

In addition to these political, cultural, and social transformations, Russians also experienced a massive wave of privatization. This privatization led to critical changes in the demand for certain labor skills, high unemployment, and high job instability, as well as greater economic inequality, and changes in family structures and violence. These changes contributed with the increase in the stress factors that played a significant role on the rise of mortality rates (Popov 2009). The uncertainty generated by changes in their socio-economic status and overall lifestyle affected both men and women simultaneously.

63 Prior to these changes, the spread of spirits consumption (mainly vodka) also had a significant impact on the drinking problem, as early as the 16th century (Bobrova 2012).

64 The 2008-2010 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) estimates around 44 million smokers in Russia and close to 330,000- 400,000 deaths per year due to smoking. Estimates from the RLMS indicate that the proportion of smokers has increased over the past years from 57 percent in 1992 to 61 percent in 2004 (Marquez 2013). Even more alarming, estimates from the 2009 Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) Russian Federation indicate that although 91 percent of adults recognize that smoking lead to serious health issues, 39 percent of the population reports being current smokers.
However, the effects on risky behavior taking and mortality rates were disproportionately larger among Russian men, compare to their female counterparts. Indeed, Perlman and Bobak (2009) find a strong association between experiencing unemployment or job insecurity and mortality rates, particularly among lower educated men, using longitudinal data covering the transition to communism (1994-2003 period). More research is certainly needed to better understand the core determinants of these gender-based differences.

5. Empirical evidence: Social norms and classic gender role model.

Social norms, particularly those that determine self-enforcing belief and partially distort reality and perceptions of the future, are difficult to change. Social norms, in particular rigid gender norms, are regarded as playing an important role on the gender-based differences on the decisions to engage in risky behaviors (Bobrova et al 2010). Nevertheless, social norms are not static and they could change at a faster pace if the correct policies are implemented (Muñoz et al. 2012, Mackie and LeJeune 2009). Changes in social norms are likely to have a significant impact reducing risk-taking decisions/behaviors and hence, mortality rates.

As social norms affect men and women differently, understanding how social norms influence risk-taking decisions is critical to explain the observed gender-base differences on risk-taking engagement and the excess male mortality in Russia. The following section presents empirical evidence exploring the three main arguments behind the proposed theoretical framework presented above.

Argument 1: Sense of Identity

Prior to 1989, the Russian government provided an overall sense of economic security and stable standard of living for the Russian population. Macro-economic instability was not directly translated into high unemployment or issues with pensions or social protection during the communist era. The economic and political transformation of the 1990’s forced, for the first time, Russian citizens to face a highly unpredictable future (Brainerd and Cutler 2005). Although positive changes were also observed, such as chronic issues of consumer good shortages no longer being a problem, political system changes as well as socioeconomic transformations (including rising unemployment or the fall all social safety nets) led to increasing stress for the average Russian (Aarva et al 2000). As a result, Russians experienced major instability in their perceived lifestyle and their sense of identity,

Using a multi-country comparative study, Kuntsche et al. (2009) find support for the identity crisis hypothesis of the classic role theory that partially explained the increase in heavy alcohol consumption among Russian men during the transition to open market. The authors argue that change in the political, social, and particularly the economic structure (i.e. large waves of privatization) moved the unemployment level and work stability to high levels, previously not openly observed during the Soviet Union era.
Although women were more affected by these economic changes—holding low-paid jobs and being the first group to be laid off—, they continue to see themselves as caregivers or family caretakers (see Cockerham 2012 for a small review). Despite having lost their roles as paid workers, as Russian women held a greater number of social roles (i.e. caregiver, family caretaker, and partner), their overall identities as caregivers and family keepers remain intact. This protected them from using risky activities, such as heavy alcohol drinking and smoking, as coping mechanism. Indeed, despite evidence showing that women face greater levels of stress (Cockerham 2012), they do not necessarily cope with stress increasing their alcohol consumption or smoking (Cockerham et al 2006, Hinote et al 2009).

Men, on the other hand, lost their main identity as breadwinners, as unemployment levels and job insecurity dramatically rose. This led to an identity or masculinity crisis, particularly for working-age Russian men whose main social role was the family breadwinner. The idea of “domokhozyain” emphasized the double exclusion in the workforce and the domestic marginalization that Russian men experienced, particularly during the transition (Ashwin and Lytkina 2004). This identity or masculinity crisis was translated in an increase in heavy alcohol consumption and other risky activities among Russian men (Saburova et al 2011). This gender differences in coping strategies motivated by different perceptions of their identity status, partially explain the significant gender gap in risky behavior engagement, and thus in mortality.

**Argument 2: Multiple Roles**
During the communist Soviet Union era, Russian women were encouraged and expected to be as involved in labor market activities as men. Following the equal-to-men labor market involvement philosophy, women had to face a double burden of fully participating in the labor force, in addition to their traditional caregiving and housework responsibilities. Men, on the other hand, have traditionally been regarded solely as breadwinners, with no participation in the domestic work life (Bobrova et al 2010; Kiblitskaya 2000; Motiejunaite and Kravchenko 2008; Paci 2002, Glinskaya and Mroz 2000).

In order to support women’s participation in the workforce, the communist government provided child care services as a way to create greater incentives. After the transition to open market, government-financed child-care services significantly decreased, but not the high expectations of female workforce participation (Lokshin 2000). This increased women’s already numerous responsibilities as well as their time constraints (van de Lippe 2010). Although evidence indicated that families in other former Soviet Union countries (such as Poland and Slovenia) responded re-distributing their household responsibilities more equally, it was not the case in Russia (van der Lippe 2010).

As a result, women have little to no time for leisure activities whereas men have a considerable amount of time to be allocated to other activities, commonly drinking and other hazardous activities. Results from a small qualitative study support this hypothesis (Bobrova et al 2010). The authors find that one of the main reasons given by women regarding the gender differences in drinking patterns is the time

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65 The qualitative component of this study used a small sample of 44 individuals (20 men and 24 women) who previously participated in the Health, alcohol, and Psychosocial factors in Eastern Europe cohort survey (HAPIEE). Qualitative semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted to collect detailed information regarding their perceptions on their drinking patterns.
constraint. Participants indicate that women have little spare time and only drink during special occasions, as they are expected to fulfill traditional roles of mother, family keeper, as well as worker.

Men, on the other hand, have more free time that could be allocated to these activities, as they are “immune from responsibilities at home” (Bobrova et al 2010). An interesting finding indicates that even among men who engage in excessive alcohol consumption (allocating more time to this activity), do not reduce their time allocated to work. Rather, it is the time originally intended for child-care activities the one that is considerably reduced (Giannelli et al 2013).

Argument 3: Social Norms and Hegemonic Masculinity

Traditionally, regular social practices and interactions between Russian men have been developed in taverns and beer halls (Hinote and Webber 2012, Herlihy 2002; White 1996, Transchel 2006). These setting were predominantly more common among working class men, as a way to prove their “masculinity” and social status within the traditional Russian gender-based cultural structure (Hinote and Webber 2012). These social practices and norms have supported the alcohol consumption as a constantly practice among Russian men.

On the other hand, social norms have commonly prevented or “protected” women from engaging in risky activities, as these behaviors were perceived as not proper for women (Bobrova et al 2010). Qualitative data indicate that Russian women perceived drunkenness as not feminine, even identifying alcoholic women as “much uglier”, “disgusting” or “abnormal” (Bobrova et al 2010). These social norm restrictions reduce Russian women’s likelihood to participate in risky activities.

Using a hegemonic masculinity multidimensional framework, Hinote and Webber (2012) discuss the increase in men’s mortality caused by alcohol consumption. They authors state that this increase is directly associated with the historical idea of achieving social norms of “male behaviors” within the traditional Russian gender-based cultural structure and achievement of social status. Under a context of rapid social and economic change, men faced barriers to fulfill their traditional roles of family breadwinners, with increasing feelings of marginalization (e.g. because of not being able to quickly adapt to new social, political, and economic context).

The authors conclude that men reacted to these social and economic changes intensifying their heavy alcohol drinking patterns, as a way to reinforce their sense of masculinity (Hinote and Webber 2012). Other studies also indicate that men commonly respond adjusting their behaviors showing unnecessary competitive and aggressive behaviors (Gough 2006). Because the tavern has historically been almost reserved for men and drinking has traditionally been a masculine activity, heavy drinking was perceived as a way to restore their sense of masculine dominance or hegemony (Phillips 2000). In addition, alcohol consumption has historically been accepted in the workplace, as a way to build a sense of “cohesive community” among working class men (Hinote and Webber 2012, Phillips 2000; Transchel 2006, Saburova et al 2011).

These findings are more likely to be observed in societies with more rigid traditional social norms, such as Russia. Studies indicate that countries with more egalitarian gender-based social norms have smaller gender gaps in heavy drinking and smoking (Bloomfield et al 2006). As social norms and perceptions
among younger generations of Russian change towards more egalitarian gender-based social norms, we could expect the gender gap in hazardous activities to be smaller. As stated earlier, recent evidence suggest that alcohol consumption and mortality rates are showing downward trends (Shkolnikov et al. 2013). In addition, recent policy implementations are likely to play an important role boosting the pace of these observed changes.

6. The role of policy and program implementations

As stated earlier, the economic and political transformation of the 1990s produced a sense of unpredictable future among Russian citizens (Brainerd and Cutler 2004). A study developed in the Vologda region in 1999 indicated that 75 percent of residents were not adapted to the political, social, and cultural changes. In addition, the study found that 20 percent of the sample reported facing stressful experiences. Even more alarming, estimates indicated that 12 percent reported struggling with severe anxiety symptoms and 10 percent suffered from depression (Aarva et al. 2000).

In addition to these psychological and stress factors, social exclusion and isolation also appeared to have played a role in the high proportion of premature mortality (Gavrilova et al. 2008). A study in the Kirov and Smolensk regions of Russia found that around 89 to 100 percent of deaths caused by ill-defined conditions, were cases where human working-age bodies were found in a state of decomposition (Gavrilova et al. 2008). Consistent with this result, Pridemore et al. (2010) find that greater social inclusion associated with marital status and education could play a protective role mediating premature mortality among working age Russian men, particularly from deaths due to alcohol-related causes.

Currently, almost 20 years after the transition to open market economy, male mortality is still high and men’s life expectancy is closer to poor countries in Africa than to their middle income and European counterparts. Nevertheless, life expectancy of Russian men appears to have been moving upward over the past years (Shkolnikov et al., 2013). In addition to changes in social norms, several policy implementations appear to have played an important role in this change and potential future changes in Russian male mortality. These policies include the implementation of the 2006 suite of alcohol policies (dealing with quality control, access, and price of alcohol) and the Federal Targeted Program for Ensuring Road Traffic Safety 2006-2012, that included anti-alcohol campaigns and enforcement of drunk driving fines and alcohol content limits (Marquez and Bliss 2010).

Alcohol and Tobacco Control

The implementation of the 2006 alcohol policy suite, largely dealing with control of production and distribution of low quality alcohol, has been regarded as having a positive impact on the reduction of deaths due to alcohol-related causes (Leon et al. 2009, Pridemore et al. 2013). Studies suggest that the consumption of non-beverage or surrogate alcohol increases even further the likelihood of suicide and alcohol poisoning. Pridemore (2013) estimates that working-age men who drink non-beverage alcohol once or twice a week were four times more likely to commit suicide than those who rarely or never
consumed it. Estimates suggest that the 2006 suite of alcohol policies prevented a 35 percent increase in male mortality due to alcohol poisoning (Pridemore et al. 2013).

In addition, price reductions of alcohol beverages appear to also be associated with greater alcohol consumption. Treisman (2010) suggest that fluctuations in the price of alcohol are associated with changes in heavy drinking patterns. This study’s results indicate that the relative reduction in alcohol prices between 1990 and 1994 (58 percent) was consistent with a substantial increment of 25 to 30 percent in the amount of alcohol consumed during the 1992 to 1994 period. Price increases of alcohol beverages have been associated, however, with increases in consumption of surrogates or non-alcohol beverages, commonly significantly cheaper than vodka or other type of spirit (Leon et al. 2009).

Indirect taxes commonly applied to goods regarded as “harmful” such as tobacco, alcohol, or foods with high fat content have been the topic of discussion across many countries (Caraherl and Carr-Hill 2007, Caraher and Cowburn 2005). Known as “Sin Taxes”, these indirect taxes are commonly used to influence health behaviors by discouraging the consumption of these unhealthy goods and poor health consumer choices or even the production of certain products (such as tobacco, shifting production away to alternative cash crops). The Thailand excise tax implementation represents a successful example of such implementations (see Box 2).

**Box 2: Taxation and Smoking Behavior in Thailand**

Excise taxes on cigarettes, made cigarette prices in Thailand one of the highest in South East Asian region. Although the original purpose of the tax was to generate additional income for the government, this tax had an important effect both on smoking reductions and reduction on household income allocate to unhealthy goods. Between 1992 and 2006, taxes increased from 55 percent to 85 percent, representing a 67 to 70 percent of the retail price to consumers (Kengganpanich et al. 2009). Evidence indicates that this increase led to a reduction on cigarette consumption. Kengganpanich et al. (2009) estimate that around 10 percent of daily smokers quitted smoking and 8 percent reduced either the number of smoking days or the number of cigarettes per day. This effect has been regarded as positive because of the increase in government revenues, as well as the reductions in smoking behavior and overall health.

*Source: Kengganpanich et al 2009*

Nevertheless, there are very few studies that explore this issue of price elasticity of tobacco demand in Russia. The few studies available indicate that Russian men show low level of price responsiveness to smoking participation and intensity, believed to be related to high levels of additions (Ross et al. 2008). Changes in consumption are mainly related to changes in quality of cigarettes purchased (Ross et al 2008). In 2007 changes to tobacco tax system and quality control were re-implemented. Estimates from the 2009 Russian Federation Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS) indicate that 44 percent of adults were in favor to increasing taxes on tobacco products. Differences were significant between smokers (18 percent) and non-smokers (61 percent) (GATS 2009). Tobacco tax levels in Russia are currently below
the World Bank recommended tax level, which is five times greater than the current level, as estimated to cover the costs linked to smoking-related premature deaths (WB 1999, Ross et al. 2008).

The recent passing of the smoking national law bans smoking in public places and it restricts the distribution and sells of tobacco, bringing some light to this significant problem of premature excess male mortality in Russia. Active since June 1, 2013, smoking has been banned on municipal transportation, bus stations, administrative buildings, health facilities and schools. It is expected that by 2014, this ban will be expanded to more public settings. Tobacco product sales and advertising will also be controlled (Marquez 2013). This policy is likely to have an important effect, not only on smokers, but mainly on second-hand smokers. Estimates indicate that 51 percent of all adults in Russia report having been exposed to secondhand smoke in the last 30 days (Global Adult Tobacco Survey 2009).

Improvement in the Health System
Estimates indicate that between 1995 and 2000, Russians experienced a large reduction in per capital general government expenditure on health (10 percent reduction, see Figure 5). Per capital general government expenditure on health has been gradually increasing since 2000 (Figure 5). Between 2000 and 2011 there was an increase of 90 percent in the per capita general government expenditure on health, moving from 136 to 241 US$ (in constant 2005 US$). Despite these improvements, Russia is still lagging behind other countries in the CIS region. Estimates indicate, for example, that during 2008 the Republic of Moldova and Georgia allocated 10.7 and 8.7 percent of the GDP on total health expenditure, respectively, compared to 5.2 percent in Russia (Popovich et al. 2011).

Although calculating the precise contribution of health system improvements on life expectancy and the overall population health is difficult, evidence suggests positive health outcomes associated with improvements in the Russian Federation’s health system (Marquez 2008a). Recent calculations indicate that if deaths due to preventable diseases (those potentially treated by the health care system) were eliminated, life expectancy among Russian men could increase by 2.9 years (Andreev et al. 2003). Studies have identified significant improvements on maternal and infant mortality rates, as well as TB mortality over the past years (Golikova 2010, Marquez et al. 2010).

Recent health reforms in Russia have mainly focused on service provision, access to health centers, and implementation of single-channel health financing systems. These changes have increased the flexibility in the allocation of funds and they have reduced administrative/management costs. Studies suggest positive effects both of the changes on more flexible public resource allocation on health and improvements on effective and more equitable resource use and access to health care services (Hauner 2007, Popovich et al. 2011). Pilot implementations targeting the modernization of the health system in the regions of Chuvash Republic and Voronezh Oblast have been regarded as national models to restructure the Russian national health system (Marquez and Lebedeva 2010; Popovich et al. 2011; WB 2013). More recently, the Kirov region also started the process of modernization of its health system, focusing on preventive and primary health care services (WB 2013).
A particularly important component is also the potential improvements on the provision of preventive care to reduce death associated with poor eating habits (Petrukhin and Lunina 2012). Russians’ diet has traditionally been rich in animal fat and low in fruits and vegetables. Indeed, estimates from the 2004 RLMS indicate that the consumption of animal fat in Russia is significantly greater than the recommended WHO level (Petrukhin and Lunina 2012). Information collected from five large cities in Russia (Moscow, St. Petersburg, Tver, Arkhangelsk, and Murmansk) during 2001-2002, revealed that two thirds of the interviewees did not consume enough fruits and vegetables (Potemkina et al 2005, Popovich et al 2002). Consistent with these findings, estimates indicate that between 48 to 54 percent of the 25 to 64 year old men who participated in the survey were overweight. The range for women was between 40 to 54 percent (Potemkina et al 2005, Popovich et al 2002, Petrukhin and Lunina 2012).

The Role of Information Campaigns
In addition to the overall goal of implementing more strict limits for blood and breath alcohol content as well as strengthening the enforcement for offenders of drunk driving, the Russian safe roads program has also included anti-alcohol information campaigns. These campaigns aim at increasing the information on the dangers of alcohol consumption and presenting alternative ways to cope with challenging life circumstances, particularly targeting the male population. This policy implementation has the potential to effectively change gender-based social cultural norms that increase the risk-taking behaviors, such as alcohol and tobacco usage.

Although information campaigns are likely to change individuals’ behaviors, their effectiveness changing social norms will depend on the critical mass they could reach (White et al 2003). The use of social mass media has been recognized as an effective way to shape social behaviors and attitudes, being able to
reach a larger proportion of the target population. More specifically, socially oriented television or radio shows have been regarded as playing a major role as educational entertainment or “edutainment” channel. Known as the “Sabido Method”, the use of television programs such as telenovelas or soap operas has shown to be a way to effectively persuade changes on social attitudes and behaviors. A common response from viewers is to try to emulate the lifestyle or behaviors of leading characters, as they are perceived it as desirable (Jensen and Oster 2009). This represents a powerful tool, particularly if the messages are convincing and viewers can identify themselves with the situations.

Some examples with some evidence of positive outcomes on observed social norms changes include the Soul City program in South Africa, the Program H in Brazil, and the Punto de Encuentro program in Nicaragua (see White et al. 2003 and Fleming et al. 2013 for more information on these programs). These programs used combinations of radio and television broadcasting, magazine or brochure campaigns, as well as workshops. Other examples include exposure to cable television on rural Indian women’s autonomy, girls’ education, fertility, domestic violence, and even son preferences among women (Jensen and Oster 2009). Also, studies reveal that major reductions in fertility rate, increased women independence, and lower rates of homicide occurred after the major expansion of the Rede Globo network in Brazil, the largest producer of telenovelas (La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea, 2012; Chong and La Ferrara, 2010; Chong, Rios, and Yanez-Pagans, 2013).

More specific on smoking, alcohol use, or eating habits, successful cases include the use of mass media campaigns to bring awareness of the negative consequences of smoking in Australia (Wakfield et al 2008). Also, the case of the province of Karelia in Finland is an excellent example of the use of mass media to change the diet and lifestyle of Finnish people, reducing the burden of non-communicable diseases (Pekka et al 2001). These mass information programs have successfully been used to improve health conditions with proven highly effective results.

7. Conclusions

Social norms are dynamic as they can be transformed and relaxed, evolve, and change over time (Muñoz et al. 2012, Mackie and LeJeune 2009). Evidence indicates that, albeit slowly, gender-based norms in the world are changing, moving towards more equal normative frameworks. This transformation has occurred through exposure to counter-stereotypical role models (creating conflicting social norms that could transform perceptions of expected behaviors) commonly via mass media exposure (Chong et al. 2008, Jensen and Oster 2009). Additionally, changes in normative or legal frameworks aimed at modifying or breaking traditional cultural or social norms, such as equal inheritance or property rights have also contributed to more gender-equal social norms (Muñoz et al. 2012, WB 2012).

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66 The reverse effect is, however, also valid. Studies indicate that exposure to television programs, soap operas, movies, and commercials involving substance abuse, alcohol consumption, might increase social acceptance of these behaviors, norm settings, and habit formation through imitation of “ideal” prototypes (see Engels et al 2009 for an extensive discussion).
Indeed, a set of programs and policies implemented in Russia appear to have had important effects on the more recent male life expectancy trend. Dissemination programs through anti-alcohol campaigns or use of mass media broadcasting as well as legislation changes (i.e. regulations of alcohol production, price, and distribution and tobacco bans) are likely to transform rigid social norms that increase the propensity of engaging in risky behaviors. Using mass media to present more gender equitable role models could help transform the rigid social norms around masculinity, shifting men’s behaviors and attitudes (Fleming et al. 2013).

In particular, social norms largely shaping self-enforcing beliefs and distorted perceptions of the future (due to asymmetric information) can represent a greater challenge. Self-enforcing beliefs are determined by the idea that certain activities or behaviors are universal. As a consequence, any efforts to challenge these practices could seem irrelevant, even despite the evident health risks associated (Mackie and LeJeune 2009). Frequently, these initial changing efforts even lead to social disapproval, ostracism, or even violence (Mackie and LeJeune 2009, Lundberg and Shapira 2014).

Similarly, incomplete or asymmetric information could lead to unrealistic perception of people’s future and a greater likelihood of risk-taking. Particularly among younger individuals living in unstable or uncertain economic or cultural contexts, the feeling of despair or uncertainty would affect their perceptions of the future. As presented by Lundberg and Shapira (2014) “If individuals assign a low likelihood to being healthy or alive in the future, the cost of engaging in a risky behavior might seem limited or even negligible”.

Understanding the causes behind this excess male mortality crisis is critical. Not only because of the value that the life of Russian men has per se, but also because of the serious economic and social consequences that a small working-age male population could entail for the economic development of a nation. Single working mother and widow pensioner are the groups who are likely to face the greatest challenges. This is, in addition to labor force supply issues, excess male mortality has a direct effect on the family structure. This is true, particularly in a context where access to social protection services such as childcare or elder care, social assistance programs, and health services are limited. These issues represent an urgent problem that the Russian government needs to tackle, not only because of the immediate effects on poverty, but also because of their effects on inter-generational poverty.

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67 The moral hazard model framework partially explains why some individuals are more prone to engaging in risky behaviors if they perceive that the immediate benefits are greater than the future negative effects on health or mortality (Gruber 2009).
References


Part II

Gender gap in pay in the Russian Federation: Twenty years later still a concern

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The World Bank

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## 1. Motivation

Adult Russian women work for pay. The gender employment gap is of four percentage points or less for those between 30 and 55 years of age. The Russian female labor force participation rate has been among the highest in the world, with only a small decline after the transition into a democracy.\(^6^9\) Thus, the high female labor force participation can be thought mostly as a legacy of the socialist regime, as the revolution was set to eliminate all type of class inequalities, including giving men and women an equal position in society.

However, equality in labor participation does not necessarily imply equality in earnings. The gender gap in pay in the Russian Federation is still considerably high when compared to other high-income countries. For example the raw gender gap in pay, measured as monthly total earnings, in the Russian Federation was of 31 percent in 2010, while it was 19 percent in the US,\(^7^0\) and only 7 percent in Norway in the same year (Figure 1). Moreover, the gender gap in pay in the Russian Federation has hardly changed over last twenty years. The hourly rate of pay was 27 percent lower for women than for men in 1995 and in 2010. The raw gender gap in pay has fluctuated during this period with a peak in 2002 of 40 percent and a minimum in 2009 of 18 percent (Figure 2).

Eliminating the gender gap in pay is not only fair as we may want to live in societies that offer equal opportunities to all of the population, but also because it makes economic sense. Skilled women should be able to work in the same jobs as skilled men, and equal pay for equal job is a necessary incentive to make women apply to and maintain the same jobs as men.

Several factors explain the observed facts in the Russian Federation. On the one hand, higher gender gaps in pay are expected in countries with higher female labor force participation since they are less subject to the problem of non-random selection of women into the labor force (Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008). Countries such as Italy or Spain that have low female labor force participation have also a lower gender gap in pay because only high skilled—and thus well paid—women work in the labor market. This positive association between female labor force participation and the gender gap in pay is plotted in Figure 3;\(^7^1\) however, the Russian Federation is a clear outlier with a gender gap in pay higher than that observed in countries with similar levels of female labor force participation.

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\(^{69}\) To a different extent, most former soviet countries experienced some decline in the female labor force participation rate with the transition to a market economy (see Sattar 2012 for a general discussion for the ECA region, or Gamberoni and Posadas (2012) for Macedonia FYR).


\(^{71}\) Along the same lines Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) plot gender gap in pay against gender gap in employment for a group of European countries, obtaining a negative relationship.
**Figure 1. Gender pay gap in monthly earning in OECD countries**

Source: OECD Employment Database 2012; for Russia, RLMS (2011). Notes: Full-time employees. The gender wage gap is unadjusted and defined as the difference between male and female median wages divided by the male median wages. Latest year available reported.

**Figure 2. Gender gap in pay 1994-2011**

Source: RLMS and WDI. Notes: GDP per capita growth (annual %). Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita is based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars.
The gender gap in pay is driven by a strong tradition of occupation segregation, with roots going back to the Soviet Labour code of 1922 stating ‘equal pay for equal work’. Equal pay for equal work was interpreted equal pay for equal productivity. At the beginning of the century, men had a comparative advantage with respect to women in performing tasks that required physical strength, which were the most common form of employment in the post-industrial revolution. In consequence, women were found in occupations where they might not be at a physical disadvantage (Reza and Lau 1999). However, and contrary to what happened in other economies, men continued to be employed in male occupations and women in female occupations that were—and still are—underpaid compared to male’s (Oglobin 2005). The Duncan index of concentration can be used as a measure of occupational segregation. Figure 4 shows the Duncan index—for both occupation and industry—has not changed over the 15 years analyzed.

Figure 3: Female labor force participation and gender wage gap in OECD countries and Russia

Source: OECD Employment Database 2012. For China, India and Indonesia, ILO (2012). Notes: Female labor force participation is for women 15 years old or more. The gender pay gap is expressed as a percentage of male monthly wages. The linear fit excludes the outliers: Russian Federation, Japan and Korea. The linear trend is FLFP=51.793+0.2424GWG (R2=0.0303)

The occupational segregation was reinforced with a strong protection to hazardous jobs that disincentivized employers to hire women in certain occupations, and in some cases it was even prohibited (Oglobin 2005, World Bank-IFC 2014). The labor code also states that women should not perform "hard physical" labor, jobs "with harmful or dangerous labor conditions or work underground except for nonphysical jobs or sanitary and consumer services. The 460 occupations currently forbidden
include steelworker, freight fighter, oil well worker, or train operator. Moreover, during soviet era workers were also rewarded for political involvement translated into higher wages or higher paying jobs (jobs in particular institutions such as certain ministries and state enterprises or simply the party apparatus, or certain cities), and women’s lower participation in political elites contributed to their occupational segregation (Gregory and Kohlase 1988 cited in Reza and Lau 1999).

**Figure 4: Duncan concentration index for occupation and industry**

![Duncan concentration index for occupation and industry](image)

*Source: authors calculations based on RLMS. Notes: Occupations were coded according to the four-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) and hence defined as a group of jobs which have the same set of main tasks and duties and these are performed with similar skill level and similar skill specialization. Industry is a two-digit variable that classifies a job into one of the seventeen possible categories.*

The existent studies analyzing the gender pay gap in the Russian Federation, and in particular the effect of occupational segregation, are outdated, and in some cases they provide nuanced messages. The most common methodology to tackle the problem is to estimate earnings decompositions by gender. As reviewed in the next section, all the existent studies—to our knowledge—used Oaxaca and Blinder decompositions. Newell and Reilly (1996) finds that occupational segregation was not an important determinant in gender wage differentials in Russia, but that discrimination played a much larger role in explaining wage differentials. The estimated decompositions showed that around 90% of the raw gender wage gap was unexplained by labor market skills.

Two main arguments were used circa 2000 to justify the large unexplained gender pay gap. First, as countries move from a socialist (closed) economy to a market economy, there are shifts in demand of


73 Authors also used the RLMS.
skills that translate into changes in returns that might play against women since they work in low pay activities. Second, the practice of wage arrears spread quickly affecting disproportionately workers in the public sector and women.\footnote{There are a good number of serious studies on the matter of wage arrears and their effect on the gender wage gap. For example Gerber (2006) studies the general impact of wage arrears in Russia, and its effect on earnings inequality, including the gender effect. Specific to the relation of wage arrears and the gender wage gap, Gerry et al. (2004) find that wage arrears and payments in-kind attenuated the gender wage discrimination but only among low skilled workers. Consistently, Oglobin (2005) finds that wage arrears compressed earnings and reduced the gender pay gap.} However, both arguments should fade away, as the country settled in a path of prosperity.

Twenty years after the transition of the Russian Federation to a market economy, we wonder whether things have changed for women in the paid work in Russia. Is the gender gap in pay still that high? Is occupational segregation a main feature of the labor market and a key factor behind it? Is the largest part of the gender gap still unexplained by differences in characteristics between men and women?

What is more, the methodologies to carry out gender wage decomposition have evolved substantially allowing answering other unexplored questions in the context of the Russian Federation. For example, are women at different points of the earnings distribution facing different degrees of gender discrimination? What is the contribution of each of the covariates determining work productivity to the explained and unexplained gender gap in pay? How do these contributions vary along the earnings distribution? All these questions can be now analyzed using modern decomposition techniques (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) present the state of the art in terms of decomposition methodologies).

Lastly, modern methodologies can be applied to several years after the transition of the Russian Federation into a market economy to have a better understanding of the dynamics behind the gender gap in pay. We can study how the different components of the gender wage gap changed over time.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The rest of this section briefly discusses the main findings regarding gender wage gaps for the Russian Federation and explains why it makes sense to circumscribe the analysis to the adult working population within a life cycle approach. Section 2 summarizes the data used for this study and section 3 explains the Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) decomposition methodology employed in this study and the gains it brings relative to other methodologies. Section 4 discusses the main results coming out from the decomposition, including the decomposition results for three years (1996, 2002, and 2010) and discusses how the components of the gender gap in pay have changed over time. Section 5 concludes linking the results to the policy recommendations.

1.1. Previous relevant studies for the Russian Federation

There is a considerable literature on gender wage decompositions in the Russian Federation, though it is now outdated, both in terms of data and decomposition methodology. In addition, many of the papers analyzing the early consequences of the transition into a market economy show mixed results. Newell and Reilly (1996) find that the transition did not affect the relative position of women with respect to
men in the earnings distribution. Instead, Brainerd (1996) finds that the gender wage gap increased in the early years after the transition.

While Brainerd (1996) attributes to the increase in the earnings inequality the expansion of the gender gap in pay between 1991 and 1994, Reilly (1999) suggests that the increase in the wage dispersion played a modest effect. Reilly, using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, finds that the acquisition of observable skills by women was almost completely wiped out by the increase in unexplained part of the differential. Previous work also presents conflicting messages regarding the role of occupation segregation. While Newell and Reilly (1996) concluded that most of the gender gap in pay is ‘unexplained’ (i.e. cannot be attributed to observable skills), and that the unexplained part of the gap arises within occupations. In contrast, Oglobin (1999) argues that women’s crowding out in the occupations that pay less is due to their own preferences rather than to employers’ discrimination. The two most salient studies that look at the effect of wage arrears in the gender gap in pay also give opposite results. Gerry et al. (2004) finds that wage arrears and payment in-kind served to attenuate the discrimination. The authors argue that women at the bottom of the distribution who might have been largely affected by gender discrimination are relatively less likely not to be paid in full. However, in a later study Kazakova (2007), taking advantage of the longitudinal nature of the RLMS, finds that the increase in the gender wage gap in 2000 is due to low-wage women entering the full-wage sample. Kazakova finds that when working with continuously full-time full-wage workers, the gender gap in pay remained constant.

It is not the objective of this note to address directly the problem of wage arrears. The years to carry out the decomposition are chosen in order to avoid the peak of the use of arrears. Moreover, the decomposition technique we apply here analyzes the gender gap in pay for each percentile, allowing understanding if there are different factors along the earnings distribution.

**1.2. Why focusing on adult women within the life-cycle approach**

Women work as much as men in the Russian Federation. Female labor force participation is very close to men’s for almost every working age. The exception is women between 25 and 33 years of age for whom there is between 5 and 10 percentage points participation gap (Figure 5). Also gender gaps in employment appear when women are approaching the retirement age. This gap at older age is partly a consequence of the regulation for the age of retirement that establishes that women can retire at the age of 55 while men can do so at the age of 60. Next, we explore superficially three possible factors affecting the employment gap for young women, and we redirect the interested reader to the forthcoming report on aging for a deeper analysis of gender differences in transitions from labor markets to retirement (World Bank forthcoming 2014).

Firstly, some academics suggest that there has been a process of ‘re-traditionalization’ of the country as a result of the transition from the soviet system into the market economy, which might even continue today. Figure 6 shows labor force participation by age and birth cohorts for women born between 1945 and 1979. Although the RLMS is a longitudinal survey, figure 6 shows synthetic cohorts instead of
longitudinal averages given the attrition problems discussed in the data section. The figure indicates the labor force participation gap for young women appeared with the transition. For women 30 to 35 years of age in 1995 (cohort 1965-1969), labor force participation gender gap was much smaller than for women who were born 10 years later (cohort 1975-1979). Unfortunately, the RLMS doesn’t allow comparing these two cohorts of women when they were between 20 and 25. For the latter age group, the RLMS allows comparing those born in 1975-1979 and those born 1985-1989. For these two cohorts, instead, the difference in labor force participations arises for men, with lower participation rates.

**Figure 5: Labor force participation and wages over the life cycle**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor force participation</th>
<th>Wages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Graph" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: RLMS 2011. Notes: The sample is restricted to those individuals between 18 and 60 years old. Labor force participation is defined as the percentage of the sample that has a job or is unemployed (BLS definition). Wages are measured as the logarithm of the hourly rate of pay of the wage workers with non-missing data in education, occupation, industry, firm characteristics and, job mobility. Each graph reports the average by age and gender.*

**Figure 6: Female labor force participation, by birth cohorts**

![Graph](image3.png)

*Source: RLMS 1994-2011. Notes: Labor force participation is defined as the percentage of the sample that has a job or is unemployed (BLS definition). The figure reports the average by age, cohort, and gender.*
Secondly, women might interrupt their engagement in employment because of child rearing competing demands. Female labor force participation decreases for women between 25 and 30 years old only if they have two or more children. Given that about 20 percent of women of this age have two or more children, motherhood can clearly be a factor explaining the gender gap in participation (table 1). The labor market interruption is particular more acute among those with three or more children or those who are very young (less than 27 years of age) and with two children. Even if only a small percentage of young women have 3 or more children, this factor can explain the difference in labor force participation since it is also small.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>86.2</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of women 25-30</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS 2011.

Thirdly, young women might participate to a lesser extent in the labor market because they are continuing education while men jump sooner into work. The small gender difference in education explains a large part of the gender employment gap of this age group. Women have surpassed men in education attainments, e.g. 28 percent of women and only 21 percent of men have completed university. On average, women between the ages of 18 and 25 have completed one more year of education than men. These figures also indicate that the additional year of education can explain the gender gap in participation.

Analyzing the transition from school into the first job contributes to shed more light in the gender wage gap among young workers. For this analysis, we restrict the sample to women and men that are transitioning from school to the first job. To be considered “in school” youth only need to be enrolled in any level of education. The first job is that at which they work full-time for at least year after having been out-of the labor force and enrolled in school. Women start their careers about six month later than men. The slightly later transition of young women into the labor force is explained by a longer time spent in education, and though small is statistically significant. As figure 7 indicates, women have on average between 6 months and a year more of education than men when starting their first full-time job

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75 See also Part I: Gender Inequality in Russia: A Panorama, for a description that includes associations to child care providers.

76 For example, 83.1 percent of women between the ages of 20 and 25 are enrolled in the university or some other type of education; and for women between 25 and 29 the numbers are 57.7 if we exclude those already working the percentages are 13.4 y 2.4, respectively.
(panel a), and consequently are slightly older than men (about 4 months) when they do so (panel b). The results are robust to changing the definition of school-to-job transition to include part-time jobs.

**Figure 7 – Transition from school to work**

Education at the first job, by age and gender

Gender age gap when starting the first job

Percentage with a part time job by age and gender

Percentage with a full time job by age and gender

Source: Authors’ calculations based on RLMS 2002-2011. Note: these statistics refer only to a reduced sample that include all young men and women who are doing their first transition from school to their first job. When looking at the entire sample of young men and women, the education difference becomes larger.

Finally, as seen in many other countries, the gender wage gap exists for first entrants to the labor market. Even young women 18 to 24 already earn more than 20 percent less than young men (panel b of figure 5). This phenomenon is not unique to the Russian Federation; in the United States, a similar fact is observed (Posadas 2009). The reasons for this gap in pay at a young age vary including women not negotiating their wages as well as men when they take up a job, women changing jobs less often than men to reach better matching of skills resulting in higher wages, and simply employers
discriminating against them. Employers might discriminate based on statistical differences between men and women related to productivity—for example it has been argued that women put less effort on the job because they know they will interrupt or quit their jobs to form a family—but more likely based on beliefs and social norms which might not necessarily have any association with job productivity. Some of these aspects are suggested by the perceptions about gender roles (see Part 1 – Gender Inequality in Russia: A Panorama).

2. Data

The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) is a unique source of information that is ideal for understanding labor market outcomes given the richness of the questionnaire. Jointly conducted by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Demoscope team at the Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Russia, it provides a longitudinal series of nationally representative household and individual data since 1994. The RLMS interviewed 3,975 households (8,893 adults) in 1994 and 8,159 households (18,302 adults) in 2011. The RLMS includes questions on household income and expenditures, housing and land property rights, employment and education variables, health and other marital and fertility history information. The main limitation of the RLMS is not to be representative at the regional level. Control variables about the place of residence are available for the analysis, but they only distinguish the population density and are not valid for inference.

This study partially exploits the longitudinal nature of the data. To examine the evolution over time of the gender gap in pay, key descriptive statistics are presented for every year between 1996 and 2011, and in depth analysis for 1996, 2002 and 2011. Finally, we use all the rounds between 1996 and 2011 to complement the previous analysis by constructing cohorts to describe over the life-cycle patterns and compare workers who initiated their work career during the Soviet era and those who did it after the transition into a market economy; and to compute a few key variables using yearly information such as actual experience. Taking advantage of the full potential of longitudinal data was limited by changes on the surveyed population in years 2001 and 2006. Although the RLMS is a longitudinal survey of individuals, only 2,235 persons (out of 8,340) were yearly interviewed between 1996 and 2011. The attrition introduces biases in the sample: estimates coming from a Mincer earnings equation for 2011 using the full sample and estimates using the sample of those who survived the panel attrition are

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77 There are four additional early rounds of the survey (phase I between 1992 and 1993) in charge of the HSE. These rounds are not used in this study given that their format is very different. However, the year 1992 was analyzed in Newel and Reily (1996).
78 To conduct a regional analysis the only suitable data is the Household Income Survey. However, we shy away of working with this data since it is considerably poorer in terms of employment information, preventing us of conducting the analysis done here.
79 The last year of available data is 2012. This study uses data until 2011 since 2012 data was released close to the completion of the activities.
80 Years 2003 and 2004 are the midpoint of the interval; however the analysis works with 2002 as the midpoint reference to compare with other studies that use the RLMS (Kazakova, 2007).
statistically different. Wald and likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that the two samples represent the same underlying population.

A wider though less detailed description of labor market features using complementary data sources is presented in Part I. Gender Inequality in Russia: A Panorama. In this note, the analysis is restricted to the sample of wage workers defined as those individuals who reported: (i) to be currently working or on leave, (ii) not to be an owner or co-owner of the enterprise where he/she works, (iii) not to do entrepreneurial work, and (iv) have received some amount of money for the job performed in the last 30 days. Self-employed workers are not considered for the analysis since the information on their wages, which are in general less reliable. In addition, self-employed workers constitute a small percentage of the labor force in Russia: only 8 percent of employed men and 5 percent of employed women work as self-employed or entrepreneurs. The analysis is restricted to workers between 18 and 60 years of age. Retirement is 60 for men and 55 for women. However, many more women continue working after retirement. On average, women between 60 and 64 have worked 6 years after retirement—two more than men.

Decomposition analysis is usually carried on for an augmented version of Mincer’s earnings equation. The most conservative specification includes measures of experience and schooling, with controls for place of residence. Augmented models also include a set of dummies for occupation and industry, and in some cases union affiliation. An additional contribution of this study to the literature on decomposition of the gender gap in pay, is the use of additional variables that determine productivity and thus wages. The richness of the RLMS allow exploring the effect additional firm characteristics such as type of ownership (public, foreign) or size of the firm, degree of responsibility approximated by the number of subordinates, quality of employer-employee match, and occupational changes. Table A.1 of the appendix summarizes all the definitions of the variables used for the Mincer earnings equation and Table A.2 shows their descriptive statistics. The descriptive statistics showed in Table A.2 are consistent with the statements above related to young women surpassing men in education attainments and occupational segregation. Women have been concentrated in professional and technician occupations and in 2011 in the education and public health sectors.

Regarding job mobility, since 1998 the RLMS asks whether the respondent has changed profession (but not place of work), place of work (but not profession) or both in the last year. The question is incorporated into the analysis using three binary variables that takes a value of one if the individual has changed profession, place of work, or both, and zero otherwise. For 1996, only is possible to know whether the individual changed profession or place of work. Women did not change of workplace and/or profession as much as men: on average, 75 percent of women reported have changed of

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81 There are studies also include a set of controls for family characteristics such as marital status and number of children. Unless the objective of the study is to analyze the motherhood penalty (Anderson et al. 2002, Walfogel 1997) these variables should not be included in the regression analysis since they might be endogenous to the wage determination. See Blau and Kahn (1998) for a discussion and further references.

82 The sample of each year is restricted to wage workers between 18-60 years of age with information in all the covariates needed to perform the regression analysis.

83 Information about industry is only available since 2004.
workplace and/or profession while 81 percent of men did so. The same gender differences are observed when looking at specific job transitions.

The RLMS includes a few firm characteristics such as whether the firm type of ownership and firm size. These variables are also related with the individual's productivity (Cardoso et al. 2005). Men are more likely than women to be employed in large firms (more than 500 employees). However, it has to be noticed that the participation in large firms has fallen dramatically for both men and women: in 1996, about 34 (50) percent of women (men) worked in large firms, while in 2011 shares fell to 10 (20) percent for women (men). This large decrease (approximately 75%) is probably related to the privatization process of the Russian Federation. The proportion of men and women working in a public or semi-public firm has also fallen. In 2011, women were more likely than men to work in a public (semi-public) firm (17 percentage points difference).

As it is usually the case in this literature, earnings are defined as log of hourly wages, to take into account differences in intensive margin and to avoid measurement issues of benefits such as bonuses, health insurance, maternity leave and so on. The difference in the intensive margin, though significant is smaller compared to other countries: women work on average 8 hours per day, i.e. most of them are full-time workers, while men work on average 9 hours per day. Though this additional hour might not be significant in terms of daily productivity, it might be associated to a career path of more responsibility.

3. The decomposition methodology

Decomposition methodologies have been applied to gender wage differentials since the seminal work of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). The Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition (OB hereafter) is one of the most used methods not only in labor economics but also in several microeconomics applications. Since then, however, much progress has been made with decomposition methods. Mainly, new methodologies allow decomposing the gaps for other statistics different than the mean, to handle nonlinear functions, and tackle possible bias coming out from having individuals without a suitable treatment or comparable groups (i.e. the problem of no overlapping support). In this paper we use apply the recentered influence function (RIF hereafter) decomposition, recently introduced by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) (FFL hereafter). In addition, Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) provide a technical survey of the main decomposition methods available so far.

For easiness of the exposition, we first explain the OB decomposition and later we introduced the RIF regression, the FFL decomposition, and its advantage relative to other methodologies. In a nutshell, decomposition methods aim at disentangling how much of the gender gap in pay is explained by differences in observable characteristics of men and women and how much remains unexplained. The unexplained component captures differences in the returns to labor market skills and other factors usually pooled as gender discrimination.

The seminal papers by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) are based on the Mincer earnings equation. Mincer earnings equation (Mincer 1958, 1974, Becker 1964) assume that—under no labor market
imperfections—wages represent productivity, and thus they can be explained by labor market skills such as schooling and experience. Men’s and women’s wages can then be represented as:

The OB decomposition uses the linear earnings equations for men and women

\[ Y_G = X_G \beta_G + \varepsilon \quad G = M, W \]  

and it compares the differences of earnings for men and women at the mean of the earnings distribution

\[ \bar{Y}_G = \bar{X}_G \beta_G \quad G = M, W \]  

where \( \bar{Y}_G \) is the mean earnings of gender G (men, women), \( X_G \) is a vector of characteristics that influence labor market productivity (and thus earnings) such as education and experience, as well as additional controls such as area of residence, \( \beta_G \) are the estimates of a linear regression. By adding and subtracting the term \( \bar{X}_M \bar{\beta}_W \), and re-arranging terms we obtain

\[ \bar{Y}_M - \bar{Y}_W = [(\bar{X}_M - \bar{X}_W) \bar{\beta}_W] + [\bar{X}_W (\bar{\beta}_M - \bar{\beta}_W)] \]  

The first term is called the ‘composition’ effect (also known as ‘endowment’ or ‘explained’ component) and it captures the part of the gender gap in pay that is explained by differences in labor market skills between men and women. The second ‘wage structure’ effect (also known as ‘unexplained’ component) captures both differences in returns to labor markets skills between men and women as well as pure unexplained differences associated with discrimination.\(^{84}\)

In this paper we apply the FFL methodology that uses the recentered influenced function regressions. This methodology builds on estimation techniques of the program evaluation literature, constructing a non-parametric counterfactual distribution. It offers several advantages with respect to its predecessors, allowing the analyst to go deeper than any previous work for the Russian Federation or even in the literature of gender pay in gap. First, the FFL allows going beyond the mean and can be used to calculate other statistics. In particular, we are interested in the quantiles along the wage distribution. Second, it allows inspecting the contribution of each covariate to the ‘wage structure’ and the ‘composition’ effects. Previous quantile decomposition methods could only disentangle the two main effects without identifying the contribution of the covariates (Machado and Mata, 2005), or working only with dichotomous variables (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux 1996). Moreover, the FFL methodology is not path dependent as other methodologies that also build on instruments coming from the program evaluation literature (Nopo 2008), although some of the assumptions are stricter.

Against these advantages, the FFL methodology imposes two additional assumptions in order to have identification. Firstly, FFL assumes ignorability, implying that the unobservables are equality distributed in the two groups used for the decomposition. In the case of the gender gap in pay, ignorability means there is no random selection of women into the labor force. The Russian Federation satisfies the

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\(^{84}\) For a more detailed but still simplified exposition of the Oaxaca and Blinder decomposition see ADePT Gender manual (World Bank forthcoming 2014), and for a more technical exposition Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2011).
ignorability assumption since there are no selection bias (Table A5 of the appendix, Oglobin 2005). Secondly, FFL assumes common support over the observables (and unobservables) variables implying that there are no combinations of individual characteristics for which it is impossible to find a counterfactual.\textsuperscript{85}

The FFL decomposition uses unconditional quantile regressions based on the Recentered Influence Function (RIF). RIF regressions consists of running a regression of a transformation of the outcome variable (its RIF) on the explanatory variables allowing to evaluate the marginal impact of changes in the distribution of the explanatory variables on the quantiles of the marginal distribution of the dependent variable. This means that the estimated RIF coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of increasing the mean value of $X$ on the unconditional quintile $Q_j$. The problem is that with conditional quantile regressions the law of iterated expectations does not apply, and thus the interpretation can be misleading. Firpo et al. (2007) define the RIF as

$$RIF(y_i, v) = IF(y_i, v) + v$$

where $IF(y_i, v)$ is the Influence Function that represents the influence of an individual observation on a distributional statistic, $v$, of the distribution of the variable of interest, $y$. For quantiles, the RIF can be expressed as,

$$RIF(Y_i, q_j) = q_j + \left( t - \frac{I(Y_i \leq q_j)}{f_Y(q_j)} \right)$$

where $I(.)$ is an indicator function, $f_Y(.)$ is the density of the marginal distribution of $Y$, and $q_j = Q_j(Y)$ is the population $j$-quantile of the unconditional distribution of $Y$.

Let $Q(Y_G)$ be a quantile of the earnings distribution of men or women, $Y_G$. To decompose the difference in earnings between men and women for a certain quantile, $Q(Y_M) - Q(Y_W)$, into the a ‘composition’ and a ‘wage structure’ components, we need to produce a counterfactual distribution of earnings that represents what women could have earned had they received the same return to their labor market skills as men, $Y_{\tilde{W}}$. Once the counterfactual distribution is estimated, the rest of the steps are similar to the OB,

$$Q(Y_M) - Q(Y_W) = [Q(Y_M) - Q(Y_{\tilde{W}})] + [Q(Y_{\tilde{W}}) - Q(Y_W)]$$

where $Q(Y_M) - Q(Y_{\tilde{W}})$ is the ‘composition effect’ and $Q(Y_{\tilde{W}}) - Q(Y_W)$ is the ‘wage structure effect’. The counterfactual distribution $Y_{\tilde{W}}$ can be obtained by reweighting to take into account the different distribution of characteristics of male and female workers in the population. The contribution of the RIF function resides on using semi-parametric methods to estimate the counterfactual distribution $Y_{\tilde{W}}$. Using a semiparametric method means moving from conditional to unconditional estimates of the moments of $Y_G$. Replacing $Q(Y_G)$, where $G = M, W, \tilde{W}$, with their estimates we see with more clarity the results that can be obtained once we apply the RIF

\textsuperscript{85} This is exactly the point made by Ňopo (2008).
\[ \hat{q}_j(Y_M) - \hat{q}_j(Y_W) = \left[ X_f (\hat{\beta}_M - \hat{\beta}_W) + R_j^{WS} \right] + \left[ (X_M \hat{\beta}_M - X_W \hat{\beta}_W) + R_j^C \right] \]

where \( \hat{q}_j(Y_M) - \hat{q}_j(Y_W) \) is the raw gender earnings gap at the quantile \( j \), \( \bar{X}_G \) is the vector of mean covariates, \( \hat{\beta}_W \) is the vector of estimates coming from the counterfactual distribution that gives the male returns labor market skills for women in the labor market, \( X_f (\hat{\beta}_M - \hat{\beta}_W) + R_j^{WS} \) is the ‘wage structure’ effect and \( (X_M \hat{\beta}_M - X_W \hat{\beta}_W) + R_j^C \) is the estimate of the ‘composition effect’. \( R_j^C \) and \( R_j^{WS} \) are the approximation errors corresponding to the ‘composition’ and ‘wage structure’ effects respectively.

4. Results

The gender gap in pay in the Russian Federation is one of the highest among high-income countries. In spite of some mixed results, previous studies have found that the gender gap in the Russian Federation has remained fairly constant, and that a large part of it remains unexplained when applying decompositions. In this section we discuss the results coming out from applying the FFL decomposition to the RLMS data. Using this methodology allows understanding the role of skills and returns at different points of the distribution, as the female earnings distribution is shift towards the left compared to the distribution of men (figure 8).

Following earlier literature, we work with an augmented human capital model. It includes variables that directly affect productivity as experience and schooling. We begin by working with potential experience that is computed as (current) age minus 6 minus the years of schooling. A better measure of experience, in particular for countries where women have several work interruptions, is what is called actual experience, consisting of the cumulative measure of all the years (or full-years) of work of a person. Although the RLMS is a panel, because there is severe attrition we could not construct actual experience measures – at least not without making further assumptions and imputations. To compensate, we exploit the richnes of the data, and we add a small set of variables that capture firm characteristics and previous individual work history.\(^{86}\)

\(^{86}\) Unfortunately, the data on field of study is computed using a classification of fields that does not allow extracting any relevant analysis. Thus, we could not examine whether the inertia of occupational segregation starts early in life, before transitioning into the labor market, for example as Flabbi (2012) does.
changing returns along the wage distribution: RIF-regressions results

Before showing the decomposition results it is worthwhile to scrutinize the regressions results to get insights about returns to labor market skills for men and women along the wage distribution. Table 2 shows the estimates of the RIF regression for three quantiles: the 10th, the 50th, and the 90th for year 2011 (Round 20 of the RLMS) and figure 9 shows the estimates for each percentile and each covariate. The returns to labor market skills across the different quantiles are highly non-monotonic and different for men and women. For both, men and women, the returns to labor market experience are positive but decrease in the middle of the earnings distribution. In addition, the effect of experience on earnings is larger for men than for women, but not statistically different, when we compare men and women in the same quantile—though the gender difference is significant when comparing across quantile. Experience also reduces the within-gender earnings inequality. More experienced workers earn more, but the returns are larger among those at the bottom of the wage distribution than at the top.

Schooling also shows non-monotonic effects along the earnings distribution, with very different impacts on men and women. As expected, the impact of schooling on wages is larger the higher the education level. Thus, for both men and women completing the university is associated with larger wages than completing technical certificates. Moreover, the effect of education is larger at the bottom of the earnings distribution than at the top for both men and women, but the impact of education at each quantile is larger for men than for women. For example, having completed secondary education increases male earnings in the 10th quintile but not female earnings. The impact of having a technical certificate is two times larger for men than for women in the bottom of the distribution. At the top of the distribution, having completed the university has no effect on women’s earnings but increases men’s earnings in about 30 percent with respect to their male counterparts with less than secondary or vocational university.
These results indicate that although men and women work equally in Russia, the jobs they do are very different—and they are rewarded very differently too. Women are in flat career path compared to men. This is usually referred in the literature of gender wage gaps as women having jobs not careers (Goldin 2006, Bertrand 2011). The two main labor market skills—education and experience—show larger payoffs for men than for women, especially at the bottom of the earnings distribution. This can be corroborated when we look at the age-wage profiles for men and women in figure 5.

To shed more light into the possible reasons contributing to women’s flat earnings, we have estimated an augmented human capital model that includes occupation, industry and other covariates related to job productivity. By looking at the RIF estimates of the dummy variables for the occupations it can be conclude that professional women at the top of the earnings distributions have lower returns than men. Conversely, women at the median of the earnings distribution have higher returns than men in service jobs. All the results so far suggest that women—either by their own choice or by lack of access—occupy jobs that have lower returns to labor skills.

Moreover, productivity (and so wages) can also depend on firm characteristics such as type of ownership or firm size. Ideally, firm effects are quantified using employer-employee data (Cardoso et al. 2005). Fortunately, the richness of the RLMS allows exploring these effects by adding covariates to describe firm characteristics. There is evidence that public owned firms are less productive than private firms since they face less market competition. For women, and to a lesser extent for men, working for a public or semi-public firm has a negative impact on earnings, and the size of the impact is larger at the top of the earnings distribution. In particular, at the 90th percentile women working for a public firm earn 34% less than women working for a private firm. Larger firms many times are also thought to have higher productivity since they make higher investments in capital. The effect of firm size is highly non-monotonic along the earnings distribution for women while it shows very little variation for men. For women the impact of working in a large firm is always positive and it increases along the earnings distribution.

Finally, the RLMS allows exploring the importance of promotion and job-to-job transitions in earnings with a reduced form approach. There are two strings of the labor economics field that further explain wage determination, and in each of them there were found gender differences. First, job-matching theory predicts that job changes result in wage increases. Employed workers spend time searching for a better match if the chances of finding a better match are larger than the cost of on-the-job search. Empirical evidence supports this theory and found that for the US two thirds of the long-run wage (or the wage at the end of the work career) occurred during the first 10 years of employment, and that a third of the wage increase is explained by job-to-job transitions (Topel and Ward 1992). Similarly, it has been found for the US that women are less likely to switch jobs, i.e. experience job-to-job transitions, and that this explains about 8 percent of the gender wage gap in the United States (Royalty 1998, Posadas 2009). The other main theory comes from personnel economics. Employers might provide less training and fewer promotions to women, in particular during the early years of their careers, if they are expected to quit the firm because of maternity interruptions (Lazear and Rosen 1990). Empirical evidence also supports this stream of research (Bertrand 2011).
Table 2: RIF regression coefficients, 2011

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th></th>
<th>Female</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Experience</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>0.010***</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
<td>0.006*</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Experience Squared</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000***</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000**</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>0.396***</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.067</td>
<td>-0.104*</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational education</td>
<td>0.323**</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.180**</td>
<td>-0.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.134)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical education</td>
<td>0.449***</td>
<td>0.174*</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.221**</td>
<td>-0.147</td>
<td>-0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.280***</td>
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<td>0.286**</td>
<td>0.220**</td>
<td>0.166</td>
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<td>(0.156)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.171)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, Senior managers, officials</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.613***</td>
<td>0.233*</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
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<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.777***</td>
<td>0.336***</td>
<td>0.181***</td>
<td>0.417***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and Associate Professionals</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.129*</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and market workers</td>
<td>0.107</td>
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<td>0.096</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>-0.276***</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
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<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
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<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
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<td>(0.451)</td>
<td>(0.433)</td>
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<td>(0.655)</td>
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<td>Craft and related trades</td>
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<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.230**</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.106)</td>
<td>(0.176)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators</td>
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<td>-0.168</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.161)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unskilled occupations</td>
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<td>-0.552***</td>
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<td>-0.300***</td>
<td>-0.229***</td>
<td>0.157</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
<td>(0.108)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.071)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public or semi-public firm</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.116***</td>
<td>-0.020</td>
<td>-0.154***</td>
<td>-0.185***</td>
<td>-0.343***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.064)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign firms owned or co-owned</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.198**</td>
<td>0.582***</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.334***</td>
<td>0.957***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm size</td>
<td>0.145**</td>
<td>0.151***</td>
<td>0.136*</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.110***</td>
<td>0.252***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.072)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.046)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates</td>
<td>0.208***</td>
<td>0.094*</td>
<td>0.213***</td>
<td>0.113*</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>0.228**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed place of work</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.128*</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed occupation but not place of work</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.194*</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.508**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.123)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed occupation and place</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.125**</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.091)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>2,071</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>2,466</td>
<td>2,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: RLMS 2011. RIF regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p-value smaller than 0.01, ** denotes p-value smaller than 0.05, * denotes p-value smaller than 0.1. The RIF regressions also include industry dummies and the coefficients estimates are reported in table A2 of the appendix. The omitted categories are: no experience, less than secondary education, clerks, and, have not changed jobs.
Figure 9a: Unconditional quantile regressions coefficients by gender, 2011

Potential experience

Secondary

Vocational

Technical

Universitary

Subordinates

Firm size

Public or semi-public firm

Foreign or semi-foreign firm

Changed place of work

Changed occupation in the same place

Changed occupation and place
Figure 9b: Unconditional quantile regressions coefficients by gender, 2011

- Skilled agricultural
- Legislators, SeniorManagers, officials
- Professionals
- Technicians
- Service and market workers
- Craft and related trades
- Plant and machine operators
- Unskilled occupations
- Food, light industry
Figure 9c: Unconditional quantile regressions coefficients by gender, 2011

Military complex

Heavy

Transport and communication

Energy

Housing and communal services

Government and Public administration
To test these hypotheses we add a few covariates that might be capturing these effects, at least partially. The RLMS asks the adult respondents whether they have changed occupation, place of work, or both within the last 12 months. It can be thought that changes in place of work are associated to the on-the-job search theory, and they should result in wage increases. This effect is only present for women in the median percentile. For this group, having changed place of work (but not occupations!) increases earnings in almost 13 percent. Interestingly, the effect for men is smaller and not significant. Unfortunately there is no direct question on promotion opportunities; the survey only asks whether there has been a change in occupation within the same place of work. This latter variable, however, could be indicating either a promotion within the same firm or horizontal movement (even a demotion).
As with most of the previous covariates the estimates are highly non-monotonic along the wage distribution, and very different for men and women. The RIF coefficient shows to be positive and significant at the 50th percentile; and while it decreases along the wage distribution for women, it is negative and significant at the top 90th percentile.

Overall, the results coming out from the estimates from the RIF regression seem to indicate that the impacts of the covariates are highly non-monotonic for both men and women and that impacts are different for men and women, and these gender differences are statistically significant in some cases. The results are consistent with the situation where women are in jobs with fewer options of career development, either by choice or by lack of opportunities. Women tend to be found in less productive occupations.

4.2. Decomposition results

The results of the decomposition are presented in Figure 10 to 12 and in table 3. The base group used are those with no experience (i.e, new entrants), less than secondary education, have not changed jobs. The top part of table/figure shows the gender gap in earnings at each percentile (Table A4 in the appendix shows the decomposition results). As expected, the FFL shows a very different story than the one coming out from previous studies.

First, the decomposition results of the gender gap in pay into the composition and wage structure effect vary along the earnings distribution. Most of the existent studies for the Russian Federation find that differences in labor market characteristics of men and women explain about 30 percent of the gender gap in pay. Our results evaluated at the median of the earnings distribution corroborate those findings. However, the importance of characteristics (composition effect) decreases along the earnings distribution. At the 10th percentile the composition effect explains almost half of the gender gap in pay while at the top of the 90th percentile the composition effect is negative. Having a negative composition effect and a wage structure effect (and thus a wage structure effect that is larger than the gender gap in pay) indicates that women are overqualified compared to men at the same percentile.

Thus, the fact that the composition effect decreases along the wage distribution indicates that women are more subject to ‘discrimination’ or cannot access jobs that pay women as good as they pay men given their qualifications. The policy recommendation of this finding would be to help women at the bottom of the earnings distribution to increase their labor market skills, since equalizing the characteristics to those of men at the bottom of the earnings distribution would reduce the gender gap in pay in half. Instead, for women at the top of the distribution policies should be designed to help them to access jobs remunerating their skills as much as men’s.
### Table 3: Decomposition Results (RIF) 2011 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>10</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gap</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Composition effect</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-21</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-17</td>
<td>-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Mobility</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
<td><strong>4</strong></td>
<td><strong>-35</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Wage structure

<table>
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<th>90</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>-116</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>-118</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Mobility</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
<td><strong>124</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes**: RLMS 2011. The sample is restricted to wage workers between 18 and 60 years old with non-missing data in the covariates included in the regression analysis. The second and third panel presents the percentage of the GWG attributable to the respective category. For details on the variables included in each category see table A1.

Second, the results inside the composition effect also show a very non-monotonic pattern along the wage distribution. All women, and in particular for those at the bottom, are more educated than men in similar jobs and position in the earnings distribution. The most striking result is that the importance of occupation and industry decreases along the wage distribution. For women at the bottom of the distribution (10th percentile) the problem is that they are employed in low wages industries, though doing the same occupations as men. If women were employed in the same economic sectors as men their gender wage gap would decrease in half. Instead, for women at the top of the distribution (90th percentile) the problem is the type of occupation they do and not the economic sector.
Third, inside the wage structure effect, the contributions of each covariate are also highly non-monotonic along the earnings distribution. Returns to education are smaller for women relatively to men, contributing to increase the gender gap in pay at any point of the earnings distribution. If women salaries reflected their schooling degrees as much as men salaries do—other things constant—the gender gap would disappear (or even reversed for women at the top of the earnings distribution). As
with the composition effect, occupation and industry have a different role depending on the position in the earnings distribution. At the bottom of the earnings distribution, women are employed in occupations that pay relatively more and industries that pay less, but at the top of the distribution, we see that the returns for being employed in certain industries would increase the gender gap in pay. Finally, the two terms that capture the error coming from the local linearization are small: 9 percent for the composition effect and 11 percent for the wage structure effect.

Figure 10: Decomposition of composition effects

Notes: Each category includes: Experience: Potential experience, potencial experience 2. Education: Secondary, Technical, Vocational, University. Firm: Public or semi-public firm, foreign firm owned or co-owned. Job Mobility: Changed occupation but not place of work, changed occupation and place, changed place of work.
Notes: Each category includes: Experience: Potential experience, potential experience 2. Education: Secondary, Technical, Vocational, University. Firm: Public or semi-public firm, foreign firm owned or co-owned. Job Mobility: Changed occupation but not place of work, changed occupation and place, changed place of work.
4.3. Changes over time

The comparison of the RIF decomposition for 1996, 2002 and 2011 shows the important variations in the wage structure occurred in the Russian Federation since the transition into a market economy in 1992. Notable and foremost, the model specification used to analyze the changes over time is different to that described above since not all the covariates were available for all the years in the panel. The changes in the estimates due to the different specification can be noted by comparing the last three columns of table 4 with the results in table 3. The most important loss is the set of dummies that indicate the industry of the place of work. Removing industry—and to a lesser extent firm type, number of subordinates, and job mobility—covariates results in a large change of the composition effect from positive to negative at the bottom of the wage distribution (46 percent in the augmented model in table 3 vs. -20 percent in the full model used for the three year comparison). The effect goes in the same direction at other points of the wage distribution, and as argued in several points in this note, the impact is non-monotonic along the wage distribution.

Aware of the caveats of the model specification changes, some conclusions remain the same across the three years while others change. Table 4 shows the estimates for the constrained model for the three years. As explained above, the largest gap is always observed in the middle of the wage distribution. However, over time, there have been changes in the importance of the wage structure and the composition effect as well as of the covariates along the wage distribution. For example, the importance of the composition effect in the median percentile is always negative but much larger in absolute magnitude in 2002 than in the two other years. And the importance of the experience covariate always decreases along the earnings distribution, but the slope of the changes has increased between 1996 and 2011.

A key point to highlight is that the contribution of the composition effect changed from being increasing to being decreasing along the wage distribution. This change is results from changes both at the bottom and at the top of the distribution. If we focus only on the top percentile, it indicates that the gender gap in pay would be even higher if women wouldn’t ‘compensate’ part of the pay differential by being overqualified. In particular, having more education than men and being employed in certain occupations is helping women at the top. Instead, for women at the bottom, the occupational segregation has become more pervasive, and women are now less able to compensate via higher education levels or occupations for the existent discrimination.

The changes over time in the composition effect have differed in the first half of the period relative to the second half. While initially the composition effects simply became even more negative, indicating that women were swimming upstream, the changes in the composition effect were going in the same direction along the wage distribution. However, in the second period analyzed, there is a reversal resulting in monotonically decreasing composition effects along the wage distribution. The change in the monotonicity is fully driven by a drastic change in the contribution of occupation covariates. These results, however, should be taken with caution since FFL methodology is subject to a constrained

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87 Or swimming upstream as Blau and Kahn (1997) would explain.
interpretation since all binary variables show results relative to the omitted category (solved for the linear model by Oaxaca and Ransom 1994).

Going into the contributions of each of the covariates, the general conclusion is that all the contributions have become smaller over time, indicating that women are swimming upstream. The effects are even more negative in 2002 than in 2011, especially for education and occupation and at the bottom of the distribution.

Moving into the wage structure effect, the differences in returns to labor market skills explain a larger part of the gender gap in pay. As in all the other cases, the effects are non-monotonic over time and over along the wage distribution. Over time, the effect changed from being more important at the bottom of the earnings distribution to being more worrisome at the top. As in the case of the composition effect, the year 2002 shows a considerable deterioration of women's position at the bottom, and most of the action is coming from the returns to education and occupation covariates.
<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1996</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0974)</td>
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<td>(0.0827)</td>
<td>(0.0671)</td>
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<td>(0.0355)</td>
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<td><strong>Composition Effects (%)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>-9.9</td>
<td>-69.4</td>
<td>-18.2</td>
<td>-11.8</td>
<td>-22.9</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
<td>-21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>-79.7</td>
<td>-32.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-45.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>-13.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>-147.8</td>
<td>-49.8</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
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5. Policy implications

The transition from a soviet economy to a market economy was not neutral to the labor market structure. As documented early on in the process, the transition generated a dramatic increase in the dispersion of the wage distribution, positioning Russia among the countries with highest earnings inequality in a couple of years (Brainerd 1996). For some academics, this effect caused the observed increased in the gender gap in pay (Brainerd 1996); for others, the increase is mostly due to an increase in discrimination — i.e. the unexplained component in Oaxaca Blinder wage decomposition — (Newell and Reilly 1999), or the high occupational segregation — either by choice (Oglobin 1999) or by constraint (Arabsheibani and Lau 1999).

Twenty years later after the transition, the labor market structure in the Russian Federation looks very different in some of the key aspects that were used to explain the gender wage gap: the wage distribution has compressed and the steady growth of the last 15 years has eliminated the use of wage arrears typical of the nineties. However, the gender gap in pay has remained relatively constant throughout the period (leaving aside the jump around the 1998 crisis as explained by Kasakova 2007).

The fact that the gender wage gap has not responded to the wage compression is worrisome as more women than men are found at the bottom of the wage distribution, implying that the wage compression should have played in favor of a reduction of the gender wage gap. To better understand the links between the wage structure, skills distributions, and the gender wage gap, this note uses the Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) decomposition along the earnings distribution.

The main messages coming out from the analysis confirm the prior that looking at the effects of skills and wage structure along the earnings distribution is of extreme importance. Skills explain a considerable part of the gender wage gap at the bottom of the distribution (10th percentile) while at the top all the wage differential (and more) is explained by differences in returns to skills, suggesting that multiple policies — targeting different problems of the working population — are needed.

For low-skilled women, the focus needs to be in helping them to acquire skills similar to those that men at the bottom of the distribution have. The acquisition of skills for women at the bottom might be through formal education, and on-the-job. Although, on average women are more educated than men, among those with low levels of educational achievement, there is a larger percentage of women than of men. Then, policies directed to increase education at the bottom will also contribute to reduce the gender gap. In addition, for those women who are not likely to come back to school (i.e. adults already in the labor market) but with very low levels of education, on-the-job training programs will contribute to close the gender wage gap. However, before designing on-the-job skills programs, a better diagnostic should be conducted to understand if the barriers to on-the-job training are due to for example (i) lack of existent on-the-job training opportunities to of women maybe to lack of promotion opportunities or discriminatory behavior of employers, (ii) lack of interest of interest of women in taking advantage of

88 The only other period of contraction is the global financial crisis of 2008/2009.
existent opportunities, or (iii) informational problems that do not allow women to understand the returns the advantages of acquiring more education.

Jointly with education, policies should also promote women’s access to typically male’s occupations. Again, this might be of particular benefit among low-skilled women. More equal distribution of occupations between men and women can be achieved in different ways. One option, and related to the previous point, is to incentivize equality among fields of studies, even at young ages. More importantly, a revision of the labor code is needed with the elimination of prohibitions for women of being employed in certain occupations, which are (maybe no longer) differently hazardous for women than for men.

Once these women acquire more skills, measures need to be in place to secure they are rewarded for those skills as much as men are. Skilled women in the Russian Federation are in flat wage-age profiles, because their skills are valued at a lower price than men's, and so is their accumulated work experience. This result is an indication of the presence of a glass-ceiling that prevents women from reaching jobs at the top of the ladder, even if they have the skills to do so. Other argument used to support this fact — although of a smaller magnitude — comes from existent complementarities associated to promotion and wage increases. It is found that the number of subordinates and the ability of women to change jobs also contribute to the gender gap in pay.

The Russian Federation should put in place policies to help women to advance in their careers according to the education they have. Helping women to achieve the top makes economic sense as the country is not taking advantage of the full potential of the investment in women’s education and skills. Examples of policies that can help Russia to break the glass ceiling vary from instating quotas for women in corporate boards, promoting more transparent process of promotion within firms, awareness raising and increasing information for women on the potential advantages of job-to-job transition, together with support mechanisms to help lowering the cost of on-the-job job searches; and actions to encourage employers to break the inertia and promote women to higher levels in the corporate ladder.

References


Firpo, Sergio, Nicole Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. 2011. “Occupational Tasks and changes in the Wage structure” IZA Discussion Paper No.5542


Kazakova, Elena. 2007. “Wages in a growing Russia: Wen is a 10 percent rise in the gender wage gap good news?” Economics of Transition. Vol.15


Appendix

Table A1: Variable Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variables in RLMS used</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage</td>
<td>i#wagelm</td>
<td>How much money did you receive in the last 30 days from your primary job after taxes? If you received all or part of the money in foreign currency, please convert that into rubles and report the total.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hrp</td>
<td>i#wagelm</td>
<td>Hourly rate of pay (hrp) = wage/hours worked in the last 30 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln_hrp</td>
<td>i#hourlm h#bmth h#bdhay h#byr h#imonth h#iday h#iyear i#highsc i#profco i#ptufzu i#ptusec i#tecmed i#insuni i#gradre</td>
<td>ln_hrp=log(hrp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>h#bmth h#bday h#byr h#imonth h#iday h#iyear i#highsc i#profco i#ptufzu i#ptusec i#tecmed i#insuni i#gradre</td>
<td>Individual's age in years. It is the result of subtracting the date of birth to the date of interview.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>i#highsc i#profco i#ptufzu i#ptusec i#tecmed i#insuni i#gradre</td>
<td>Categorical variable that indicates the level of education of the individual: secondary incomplete, secondary, vocational, technical, universitary/postgraduate. For the regression analysis, each of the categories is represented by a dummy variable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>i#ilopjb</td>
<td>Categorical variable that indicates the occupation in which is classified the job performed by the individual. Occupations are originally coded according to the four-digit International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) but were collapsed into an one-digit code for the regression analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>i#priind</td>
<td>Categorical variable that indicates the industry to which the individual's job belongs. It has seventeen categories, each of which are represented by a dummy variable for the regression analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>i#grdlev i#prfyr i#ptfyr</td>
<td>Potential experience=age-6-years of schooling  Potential experience squared=(Potential experience)*(Potential experience). The age of entry to the russian primary general school is six years old.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm</td>
<td>i#entgov i#entfor</td>
<td>Dummy variable that takes the value one if the government is owner or co-owner of the enterprise or organization where the individual works.</td>
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</table>
Table A1: Variable Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Variables in RLMS used</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>owned or co-owned</td>
<td></td>
<td>foreign individuals owned or co-owned the enterprise or organization where the individual works. Dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual works in a big firm (500 people or more work in the enterprise).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Firm size</td>
<td>i#pjemsps</td>
<td>Dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual has subordinates in his/her job.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates</td>
<td>i#prisub</td>
<td>Dummy variable that takes the value one if in the last year the individual have changed place of work but not profession.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Job Mobility</td>
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<td>Dummy variable that takes the value one if in the last year the individual have changed profession but not place of work.</td>
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<td>Changed place of work</td>
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Notes: # is the round indicator. The second column shows the name in the RLMS questionnaires of the variables used to construct the variables listed in the first column.
### Table A2: Mean of key variables

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<td>Table A2: Mean of key variables</td>
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**Composition effect**

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**Wage structure**

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Table A5: Heckman selection model, 2011

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<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational education</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical education</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universitary education</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>0.449***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.189)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators, Senior managers, officials</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.254)</td>
<td>(0.085)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.218***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and Associate Professionals</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and market workers</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.209***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled agricultural and fishery workers</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
<td>0.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
<td>(0.309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craft and related trades</td>
<td>0.154</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.213)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled occupations</td>
<td>-0.222</td>
<td>-0.227***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public or semi-public firm</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.216***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign firms owned or co-owned</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.481***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinates</td>
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<td>0.184***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.088)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm size</td>
<td>0.210**</td>
<td>0.160***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed place of work</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.103*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changed occupation but not place of work</td>
<td>-0.064</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Changed occupation and place</td>
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<td>-0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambda</td>
<td>1.610</td>
<td>-0.556</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.405)</td>
<td>(0.567)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Industry Dummies</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,302</td>
<td>2,808</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1