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# Abbreviations

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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDRD</td>
<td>Community-Driven Recovery and Development</td>
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<td>CISS</td>
<td>Coordination of International Support to Somalis</td>
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<td>CoI</td>
<td>Country of Origin Information</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIIP</td>
<td>Improving Livelihoods through Employment Intensive Infrastructure Investment Programmes</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FGoS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<td>GPFD</td>
<td>Global Program on Forced Displacement</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>ISN</td>
<td>Interim Strategy Note</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>The International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>JPLG</td>
<td>Joint Programme on Local Decentralised Service Delivery</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRR&amp;R</td>
<td>The Ministry for Return, Rehabilitation and Repatriation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation for Islamic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDP</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Development Programme</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>The Somalia Donor Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIDP</td>
<td>Somali Institutional Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSF</td>
<td>Somalia Stability Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCDF</td>
<td>United Nations Capital Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy</td>
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Executive Summary

**Forced displacement is a key feature of the current context of Somalia.** Those affected by displacement comprise a significant vulnerable group in need of sustained support. They will need to be a special target of initiatives that aim to build security and development through overcoming social, political and economic exclusion.

The necessity of addressing displacement is partly due to the scale and duration of the phenomenon. The numbers of people affected by displacement are staggering. Today there are an estimated 1.1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Somalia. There are over one million Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. But these numbers only begin to capture the scale of displacement effects. There are vast numbers more widely affected by displacement, including returnees, those who have been displaced multiple times, members of host communities, and those left behind.

Displacement patterns have fundamentally altered the social and demographic composition of Somalia. Displacement has contributed to a rapid pace of urbanisation, the re-concentration of social groups, and it has sharpened identities in the northern autonomous territories. Understanding how displacement has shaped Somali society will be key to efforts to forge peace and sustain socio-economic improvement in the years to come.

This purpose of this study is to inform the Bank and other development actors on the scale, characteristics and political economy dimensions of IDPs in Somalia. Addressing vulnerability is one of the three cross-cutting and strategic challenges identified in the ISN. The ISN commits to knowledge work to identify and inform responses to different dimensions of vulnerability, starting with IDPs. This report explores:

1. The drivers of forced displacement in Somalia and their inter-linkages;
2. The scale of displacement;
3. The prospects for return of displaced persons;
4. The vulnerabilities and development needs of the displaced;
5. The political economy challenges concerning displacement;
6. Recommendations on engagement.

There is an increasing commitment among development partners of the need to move from a humanitarian to a more development oriented approach to IDPs in Somalia. The difficulty in distinguishing protracted IDPs from other poor and vulnerable members of society, and the overlap in their needs and challenges indicates that the IDP situation should be addressed through integrated development initiatives.

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1 As opposed to humanitarian needs and protection issues.
Therefore rather than providing specific IDP related development programmes, the analysis points to the need to undertake development and poverty-reduction oriented programmes, which then include specific activities aimed at curtailing the vulnerabilities of IDPs.

**Interventions will need to target two types of IDPs:**

1. **IDPs with the intention of remaining in urban areas.** The bulk of these have been IDPs for multiple years. The objective of a development approach towards these IDPs will be to ensure sustainable local integration and long-term livelihood opportunities in urban areas.

2. **IDPs with the intention of returning home.** The majority of these come from rural areas and are the more recent IDPs, displaced by the 2010-2011 drought, or by security incidents. They currently reside in urban areas like Mogadishu or more rural transition areas like Dolo. The objective of the development approach towards these IDPs will be to ensure a sustainable return with livelihood opportunities, which is expected to contribute to the economic development of Somalia.

**To address the IDP issue from a development perspective the report recommends areas in need of attention by the international community:**

1. ** Provision of technical assistance to the Federal government of Somalia (FGoS), and the Governments of Somaliland and of Puntland to address the IDP situation from a development perspective.** This could include assisting in developing or revising the current IDP policies.

2. **Support to increase the displacement sensitivity of the Somalia national development process.** The need to mainstream IDP issues into initiatives for development and security has only been partly addressed in the current ‘New Deal’ Somalia Compact. In order to compensate for this, there could be more concerted effort to include IDP issues in the sector strategy planning processes underpinning the Somalia Compact.

3. **Engage in land reform processes for all three administrations of Somalia.** Under the leadership of the respective Governments, the international community could assist in reform of land legislation to enable a more legitimate and recognised land restitution and registration process that will ensure security of tenure for returnees, as well as IDPs who wish to settle in new (often urban) areas.

4. **Undertake further analysis on the economic dimensions of IDP development, including potential contributions to increased agricultural production, land reform challenges and opportunities, and a more skilled work force.**

5. **Plan and implement return programmes that focus on and cater for sustainable return and employment opportunities, and that also consider any vulnerabilities that returnee women and female-headed households experience.**

6. **Support urban planning processes to include long-term IDPs as part of city structures.** There is particular need to engage in development planning and
implementation in small and medium-size towns and urban areas across South-Central Somalia to ensure access to services and markets for rural villagers and returnees.

7. Engage in development programmes that enable better service delivery for poor Somalis, as well as IDPs. This is particularly relevant in terms of improved infrastructure that will enable enhanced economic growth and mobility, as well as the growth of basic service sectors such as health and education.

8. Enhance the availability of qualified local NGOs and increase motivation to move to a development oriented approach to IDPs. A local NGO capacity assessment may identify the appropriate actors to provide services to returnees and in urban areas where IDPs have decided to settle, and where the local government capacity is insufficient to cope with service delivery.
1 Introduction

Development and humanitarian actors currently engaged in Somalia face the challenge of delivering assistance in such a way that it is supportive of peace and state building, addresses the acute vulnerability and dependence of large shares of the population while operating in a still insecure and changing environment. Defining and delivering such conflict-sensitive assistance requires full comprehension of political economy dynamics. Forces of elite capture, political, social and economic exclusion, clan identity and segmented decision making were among the root causes of violence in the first place and now pervade the context in which assistance is to be channelled. Only when these features of the conflict are recognised and mitigated will development assistance be fully conflict-sensitive.

Forced displacement is a key feature of the current political economy context of Somalia. Those affected by displacement comprise a significant vulnerable group in need of sustained support. They will need to be a special target of initiatives to overcome social, political and economic exclusion. But more than this, displacement patterns have fundamentally altered the social, gender and demographic composition of Somalia. Understanding how displacement has and continues to shape Somali society will be key to efforts to forge peace and development in the years to come.

The necessity of addressing displacement is partly due to the scale and duration of the phenomenon. Displacement has been prevalent in Somalia since the last days of the Siad Barre Regime in the 1970s. The numbers of people affected by displacement are staggering. As of December 2013 there were an estimated 1.1 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) within Somalia: 2 129,000 in Puntland, 893,000 in South-Central Somalia and 84,000 in Somaliland. 3 There are over one million Somali refugees in the Horn of Africa and Yemen. But these numbers only begin to capture the scale of displacement effects. For a start, the numbers of those directly affected over the years is likely greater. Population movements in Somalia are fluid. Consequently, there is great complexity in assessing the exact number of IDPs and refugees. 4 Second, there are vast numbers of those more widely affected by displacement, including returnees, those who have been displaced multiple times, members of host communities, urban poor and those left behind.

Displacement dynamics have fundamentally reshaped Somali culture in multiple ways. Understanding displacement is also central to the recovery of Somalia because it

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2 In addition to refugees from Somalia residing in the region (greater East Africa) and in Yemen (968,000 by December 2013)
3 UNHCR Somalia Fact Sheet: April 2014
4 UNHCR and its partners have collected population movement information since 2006 through a Population Movement Tracking (PMT) system. The system was merged (07/2013) with the Protection Monitoring Network (PMN) into the Protection and Return Monitoring Network. There are considerable caveats to be kept in mind regarding the estimation of IDP figures in Somalia: Estimates are static, while the context is fluid; distinguishing between IDPs and other categories of people can be very challenging; access to displaced populations is often constrained; the perceived connection between recorded numbers of people in need and the amount of assistance delivered affects the accuracy of data provided; the high number of assessments undertaken by agencies has created a degree of assessment fatigue; humanitarians have often collected information using different methodologies and inconsistently shared information.
has been a powerful force in forging new social and economic patterns and relationships. In particular, displacement has contributed to a rapid pace of urbanisation, in the re-concentration of social groups, redefined gender roles and it has sharpened identities in the northern autonomous territories. Recovery has to explore and build upon the new realities of population movement and settlement and the political economy implications.

The purpose of this study is to inform the Bank and other development and humanitarian actors on the scale, characteristics and political economy dimensions of displacement in Somalia. The primary focus of the report is on IDPs rather than refugees. Addressing vulnerability is one of the three cross-cutting and strategic challenges identified in the World Bank's 2013 Interim Strategy Note (ISN). The ISN commits to knowledge work to identify and inform responses to different dimensions of vulnerability, starting with IDPs. In response this report explores:

1. The scale of displacement and character;
2. The drivers of forced displacement in Somalia and their inter-linkages;
3. The prospects for return of displaced persons;
4. The vulnerabilities and development needs of the displaced;
5. The political economy challenges concerning displacement;
6. Recommendations on engagement.

Methodology

The study was undertaken between February and June 2013 by a team from the Tana Copenhagen. The conceptual framework for the study was based on one for political economy assessments. The team carried out an initial desk review, followed by fieldwork comprising interviews with IDPs in Mogadishu and Doolow in South-Central Somalia, as well as interviews in Hargeisa. Other key informants included representatives from the national government, the regional authorities, local governments, bilateral and multilateral donors, non-governmental organisation (NGOs) and resource persons in Somalia (Mogadishu and Hargeisa) and Nairobi.

Working definitions

**IDPs, refugees and returnees**

Within the Somalia context, the working definition of IDP, refugee and returnee as used in this report is as follows:

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5 The decision to focus this report primarily on IDPs rather than refugees was related to: (i) The majority of displaced Somalis have remained within Somalia, rather than move to other countries, (ii) the challenges of qualitative research in the Somalia context and the practical need to limit the scope of the study within the time available for fieldwork, (iii) specific commitments in the ISN to study the characteristics of displacement within Somalia, (iv) existence of ongoing and parallel World Bank studies on displacement throughout the Horn of Africa, where issues of Somali refugees can be taken up.

6 Interviews with IDPs were conducted using a semi-structured questionnaire, administered by a team of Somali consultants.
• **IDP**: An individual who has been displaced from his/her region/area of origin (because of conflict, human rights violations, natural or man-made disaster) and has remained within the same administrative regions of Somalia as they originated from.  

• **Refugee (in Somalia)**: An individual who has left his/her administrative region of origin (on grounds of persecution or fear thereof) and sought asylum in any of the other three administrative regions of Somalia.

• **Somali Refugee**: A Somali citizen (from any of the three administrative regions of Somalia) who has left Somalia (on grounds of persecution or fear thereof) and sought asylum in another country (mostly neighbouring countries).

• **Returnee**: An individual who fled or left Somalia, sought asylum in another country, and has returned to Somalia to settle. Many of these individuals have lived in the countries of asylum for many years. The term returnee also refers to IDPs who have returned – from within Somalia - to their area of origin. Return is either voluntary or coerced.

Essential to the definition of IDPs and refugees, is the forcefulness of the displacement, and also to some extent the impossibility to return (unless circumstances change).

**State Administration**
The term ‘state’ also has a distinct meaning in the report. Puntland is a semi-autonomous state of Somalia, while Somaliland is a self-declared autonomous state. Each of these administrations has its own government, as well as a president and a parliament. Internationally, however, Somalia is recognised as a single state.

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7 It is to be noted that the IDP definition is complicated in the Somali context. Somaliland does not recognise Somalis from either Puntland, or south and central Somalia, and residing in Somaliland as IDPs. They are referred to as refugees, the same as refugees from other countries.

8 For example, through the actions of the Kenyan Government, Somali refugees resident in Kenya, especially those not living inside refugee camps were required to leave the cities and go to these camps on security grounds. Rather than live in refugee camps, many of these refugees opted to go back to Somalia. At the same time, the conditions in the refugee camps were also deteriorating due to a reduction in donor funding, and as a result a number of Somali refugees also decided to return to Somalia.
2 History, Causes and Characteristics of Displacement in Somalia

Somalia does not fit into any of the classical categories of IDP situations as the country does not have a single displacement pattern with a simple cause and effect equation. More than 20 years of internal conflict, combined with drought and challenging livelihoods in Somalia has resulted in a mixed situation of displacement and migration ranging from voluntary to forced migration patterns. People have been displaced and migrate for multiple reasons. Some affected persons have been displaced for only short periods of time, while others have been displaced since the early 90s. Often displacement is anywhere along the continuum between forced displacement to voluntary economic migration in search of new livelihoods with a combination of factors causing people to move. This chapter seeks to illustrate the complexity of displacement in Somalia with reference to the history, causes and characteristics of displacement.

2.1 History of Displacement

Displacement has long been a part of the history of Somalia. There was soaring internal and external displacement in the early 90s followed by a relative stabilization of a protracted displaced population from the mid 90s to the mid 2000s and eventually a new displacement crisis at the end of the 2000s. Although there have been improvements to the security situation in Somalia in recent years, the overall situation

Graph 1: Summary of Displacement trends over time
remains fragile with Al-Shabaab a major obstacle to peace and security.\(^9\) Forced displacement remains an ongoing reality of citizens at the current time of writing.

**The most significant periods of forced displacement in Somalia’s history were as follows (see Annex A for more details):**

- **Late 1980s.** Hargeisa bombing by the SNM and state response with half a million internally displaced and half a million fleeing as refugees.
- **1995 – 2000.** Continued inter-clan fighting and local level displacement. In 1998 Puntland declared independence, it had emerged against the backdrop of reconcentration of those who had fled northwards.
- **2005 – 2009.** Fighting centered on Mogadishu resulted in waves of people leaving the city, including three hundred thousand persons in a two month period in 2007 and a total of one million affected by the end of 2009. In addition, disputes between Puntland and Somaliland opened a new front of displacement.
- **2009 – 2011.** Major offensives by Al Shabaab resulted in massive additional displacement and the numbers of IDPs in Somalia peaked at 1.4 million in 2010. In response to drought in 2011, people began to move back into Mogadishu seeking assistance.
- **2011 – 2014.** Ongoing displacement in response to fighting associated with Al Shabaab and flooding again saw movement into Mogadishu. In 2014, some 70,000 IDPs fled after military offensives against Al Shabaab.

### 2.2 Drivers of Displacement

Throughout these waves of displacement multiple and inter-related factors have caused people to flee. The following driving factors can be singled out as being especially influential and are discussed in more detail below:\(^{10}\)

- Conflict and violence in areas of origin (or new areas of settlement);
- Loss of access to land;
- Environmental factors and natural disasters;
- Food insecurity.

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\(^9\) Security challenges mentioned by the May 2014 UNSG report on Somalia include: the Joint AMISOM and Somali forces Operation Eagle against Al-Shabaab, (launched in March 2014), high levels of instability in the Shabelle Hoose, protracted insecurity in Mogadishu, volatile situation in Kismayu, fresh reports of Al-Shabaab sightings and infiltrations in and around Boosaaso, Garowe and Gaalkacyo (suggesting that some militants are relocating to Puntland), tense situation around Baidoa and continued tensions between Somaliland and Puntland.

\(^{10}\) For further details on the drivers of displacement of the current IDP population, please refer to the Population Movement Trends (especially the “Reasons of Movement” section) at the following link: [http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/country.php?id=197](http://data.unhcr.org/horn-of-africa/country.php?id=197).
2.2.1 **Drivers of displacement: Conflict**

The failure of the state of Somalia can be attributed to the interplay between historical, socio-economic and political factors. Historical causes go back to the arbitrary boundary divisions instituted during the colonial era in the late 19th century. Contemporary causes include the combination of authoritarian rule with the politics of patronage based on clan affiliation; a political approach promoted by Mohammed Siad Barre. Siad Barre’s regime used a system of political patronage to promote certain clans in order to strengthen his government’s grip on power, with the consequent marginalisation of other clans. This resulted in the fragmentation of clan relations. Deep inter-clan hostilities developed that led to, and continue to influence, a number of insurgencies currently witnessed in the country. Factional warfare with clan alignment broke out across Somalia in the early 1990s, entailing the subsequent secession of Somaliland in 1991, and the declaration of the semi-autonomous state of Puntland in 1993. On a regional level, the activities and interests of Somalia’s neighbours – particularly of Ethiopia – as well as of the international community more broadly have further fuelled the continuation of conflict and fostered displacement.

**Displacement as a result of security concerns brought about by this fighting has been one of the dominant factors leading to displacement in Somalia.** IDPs have fled for a number of reasons, including direct exposure to violence or the threat of violence. For others, the forcible acquisition of their land by dominant or well-armed clans resulted in a loss of their assets and means of livelihoods and prompted their departure.

**The influence of clan politics in the conflict has resulted in a distinct clan profile of displacement experiences.** The exact relationship between clan affiliation and the risk of displacement is hard to determine; clan alignment has been the source of protection as well as abuse. Nevertheless, the following patterns have been observed: (For a fuller overview of the clan dynamics in Somalia and their link to the IDP situation see Annex J)

- In the early years after Barre’s ousting, ex regime-aligned groups, such as some Darod clans, were targeted. To escape the fighting, many Darod, who had never lived outside of urban areas (Mogadishu) before, fled south; to the Juba Valley and to Kismayo.

- Minority groups have been targeted by dominant clans during conflict, and, as a result, they have frequently lost assets, including land. These minorities

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11 Tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia have existed since the 1940s over the Ogaden region that, during the colonial era, was transferred to Ethiopia by the British. In 1977, Somalia waged a war to regain the Ogaden territory and was pushed back. The claims made over the territory by both Ethiopia and Somalia remains a point of contention between the two.

12 For example, western and regional hostility to the emergence of a strong Islamist state, the US war on terror, and the efforts of some East African countries to gain regional dominance.

13 Observers have called for additional research on what they call displacement feedback effects: displacement reshapes urban cultures, triggers tensions over access to work, re-concentrates social groups, diversifies places of refuge and sharpens distinct identities in northern autonomous territories. All these areas merit further research; understanding how displacement has shaped Somali society will be key to efforts to forge peace and development in the years to come. See Lindley, A. Apr. 2013, op. Cit., p. 20.

include: the Bantu, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir, Gaboye, Bajuni, Benadiri and Bravanese (see below under economic factors, land grabbing of rich agricultural land in the Middle and Lower Jubba). Consequently, a majority of IDPs are from minority clans.

- In the second half of the 1990s, a significant number of Rahanweyn were displaced from Bay and Bakool.

### 2.2.2 Drivers of displacement: Land Acquisition

Annex C contains a map of Somalia's livelihood zones, key to illustrating the section below.

**Forcible appropriation of land has been a driver of displacement and remains an impediment to return.**\(^{16}\) Populations – particularly agriculturalist minority groups like the Bantu\(^ {17}\) – that initially fled conflict and insecurity, have suffered further as a result of forcible appropriation of their farming lands along the banks of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers by the militarily strong clans.\(^ {18}\) During the early years of the civil war, stronger clans (particularly the Habar Gedir, of the Hawiye clan) grabbed rich plantations and real estate owned by agricultural clans and indigenous groups, often leading to their displacement or even enslavement. Minorities have particularly been affected by this trend. In the Juba\(^ {19}\) and Shabelle River valleys for instance, several clans have aggressively displaced indigenous populations to pursue new landlord-tenant relationships, and to benefit from the cultivation of a range of profitable crops, especially bananas and citrus fruits.\(^ {20}\) Other minority groups such as the Bravenese, Asharaf and Bajuni, who were traditionally fishermen, were deprived of access to their traditional means of livelihood as lands and resources were taken by these stronger clans.\(^ {21}\) Many of these populations eventually moved north (to Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland) in search of economic livelihoods, and as mentioned above, make up a significant proportion of the IDPs spread across the three administrations of Somalia.

**Under colonial management and past regimes, titles to vast tracts of arable land were expropriated.** These lands were awarded to foreign investors and cronies with no compensation for local communities that had prior claim to or that actually worked the land, and they were often obliged to provide labour for the new landlords under

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\(^{16}\) E.g. in Juba and Shabelle river banks and Kismayo

\(^{17}\) The history of farming in the riverine areas of south Somalia, is indeed intertwined with that of the more marginalized social groups. Many of the farming population identify as Jareer/Bantu or Rahanweyn agropastoralists (which have a long history of marginalization).

\(^{18}\) Mainly Hawiye armed groups.

\(^{19}\) The Juba Valley regions are endowed with a wealth of natural resources: The region benefits from one of the highest rates of rainfall in Somalia (approximately 500mm to 700mm per annum). The rains, river and rich soil support a wide range of agricultural productivity.

- Wide-ranging pasture has led to the regions' high concentrations of livestock.
- The Kismayo seaport and the proximity of the Kenyan border provide market access.
- Further, both ocean and river fishing provide subsistence bounties and trade possibilities for a variety of groups


inhumane conditions\textsuperscript{22} (incl. Italian colonial confiscation for plantation agriculture). More recently, the Somali Diaspora and local businessmen have been actively involved in land grabbing. Settling the land disputes remains a challenge among competing formal and informal authorities that have to deal with a long history of land grabbing.\textsuperscript{23} Development-induced displacement is hence likely to become a regular occurrence (again) as more focus is placed on developing rural areas.

**Forced evictions in urban centres have increased.** Increased security, an improving economy and urban migration have resulted in increased pressure over urban land, leading to more forced evictions and relocations of IDPs in cities such as Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Bossaso. IDPs have been evicted by authorities from public buildings or land, or by private landowners now able to more lucratively use their land. IDPs are often given little notice and no alternatives.\textsuperscript{24}

2.2.3 **Drivers of displacement: Environmental Factors**

Somali pastoralists have used seasonal migration as a coping mechanism for centuries, but climatic changes are challenging resilience. The turbulent political conditions, combined with adverse climatic conditions, have forced large numbers of people to move away from their places of origin. Competition over dwindling pasture and water sources has caused conflict among communities, particularly the nomadic/pastoralist groups. Frequent cycles of floods and drought have resulted in losses in crops, hunger and starvation, and forced people to move to areas where they can receive food aid. The country being made up of predominantly pastoralist groups, agriculture and livestock rearing are the mainstay of a majority of the rural population. However, erratic weather patterns affect agriculture and livestock, and disease outbreaks, such as the rift valley fever, further affect cattle and goats and cause significant losses in animal stocks, destroying the pastoralists’ means of livelihood. This forces some to move to urban areas where they settle in IDP settlements. With the destruction of household coping mechanisms (through frequent droughts, floods, loss of assets and means of livelihoods), options for rural communities are restricted.

**Factors are exacerbated in urban slums.** Increased discussion about urban environments highlights both the multiplied effect of natural disasters on urban poor and displaced populations, as well as the increase in likelihood of such disasters as the impoverishment of slum dwellers and displaced persons compels them to live in hazard-prone locations such as low-lying areas and landfill sites or in sub-standard, crowded and insanitary housing.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22} ICG, Negotiating a blueprint for peace in Somalia, March 6, 2003, p. 7
\textsuperscript{23} ICG’s comments targeted at the Reconciliation Committee for Land and Property in 2003 appear to still hold true: “Focussing exclusively on disputes since Barre’s fall would appear to reward those who had profited from the old regime, while punishing the “liberators”. Extending the remit to cover disputes since independence might appear more even-handed but would also require more cumbersome bureaucratic and legal machinery for investigating titles awarded under previous governments. (Much pre-war documentation has been lost or destroyed, and land titling was extremely politicised during previous governments). Extending the committee’s horizon further back to, say, the clan zones demarcated by the colonial powers – as some members of the Committee have suggested – would risk opening a Pandora’s box of irreconcilable claims and counter claims.”
\textsuperscript{24} UN (12 May 2014), Report of the UN Secretary General on Somalia, S/2014/330.
\textsuperscript{25} Zetter, R., Deikun, G. (February 2010), “Meeting humanitarian challenges in urban areas” in Forced Migration Review, issue 34
2.2.4 Drivers of Displacement: Food Insecurity

The consequences of conflict, of negative environmental factors, and of loss of land are the loss of livelihoods, and a rise in food insecurity. According to the FAO, drought and conflict are the leading causes of food insecurity in the Horn of Africa. The cyclic droughts that have become common in Somalia and the rest of the Horn are especially devastating, particularly for the displaced, considering that the loss of assets greatly reduces their level of resilience. Land degradation has also played significant role in increasing food insecurity, in as much it has led to heavy losses in livestock, reduced rainfall and water sources, and therefore increased displacement of both farmers and pastoralists.

Restricted humanitarian access exacerbates the issue. The situation is complicated by insecurity, as a result of which humanitarian actors are unable to reach many of the food insecure in their home areas. This means that they are only able to reach a number of urban areas, inadvertently acting as a pull factor for food insecure households to move to urban areas in order to secure such assistance.

2.3 Characteristics of Displacement

Displacement in Somalia has historical patterns and multiplicity of causes. The character of displacement is further complicated by the fluidity and ever-evolving movements patterns amongst the displaced. In addition, displacement is affected by the related but distinct trends of cyclical pastoralist movement, labor migration and urbanisation. Given these links it is often hard to distinguish where the ‘forced’ element of displacement ends and other population movement dynamics begin.

Complex patterns of movement are central to the coping strategies of the displaced. Somalis have employed a number of strategies to manage and minimise disruptions in their lives, including: displacement within or between urban centres, moving between town outskirts and rural areas, the separation of family members to maximise the benefits available at different locations, and by more significant movement to distant locations, including to neighbouring countries and further abroad. These complex social decisions also extend to the dynamics of return; sometimes males opt to return to their areas of origin and women and children are left behind with the intention to move back if and when the situation improves and they are better able to settle.

For pastoralists, nomadic mobility is at the centre of their livelihood system. More than half of the Somali population are either pure pastoralists or agro-pastoralists, deriving food and income from rearing livestock, and following cyclical nomadic patterns. This mobility may involve seasonal concentration and dispersal of herders and

26 http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x8406e/x8406e01e.htm
27 Lindley, A., Environmental Processes, Political Conflict and Migration: A Somali Case Study, 2013, p.3.
their livestock, according to the availability of forage and water in different places.\textsuperscript{29} It is normal for agro-pastoralists to split families or to switch seasonally between moving with livestock and settled crop cultivation. People might migrate seasonally to supplement food and income gained through crop production with earnings from rural and urban labour opportunities. Most nomadic pastoralists also have links to urban centres through their families. Some settle on the edge of town for part of the year, or move to urban areas on a temporary or more permanent basis to work or for schooling.

\textbf{Somalia has seen a strong pattern of urban migration for several decades by people seeking informal or formal employment in the major urban centres.} In the 1980s for instance, Somalia’s rate of urban migration was estimated at 6.5%, one of the highest in Africa.\textsuperscript{30} The civil wars caused a short-term reversal of this pattern as people fled fighting in the major southern urban centres to return to areas from which their clans came, typically small regional towns (such as Beletweyne, Galkayo, and Baidoa) and rural villages. Some moved to the safer northern urban areas (such as Bossaso and Hargeisa), which also possessed a concentration of businesses and development agencies. In more recent times, the lack of development in rural Somalia has resulted in migration to urban cities in search of livelihood opportunities.\textsuperscript{31} Development of urban centres has not been planned, and the population of urban poor without access to services is growing.

\textbf{Access to services and humanitarian aid in urban centres, such as Mogadishu, are another factor driving urban migration.} This rural-urban migration has further complicated the categorisation of displacement, as these economic migrants are not necessarily IDPs as defined in the African Union (AU) Convention on IDPs.\textsuperscript{32} However, because many of them end up settling in IDP settlements (where services are available to some extent), they are referred to as IDPs by international agencies as well as the local population.

\textsuperscript{29} The \textit{deegaan} is the area where the sub-clan has the customary right to move around, reside and graze their livestock. It does not have precise boundaries, and may host different groups.

\textsuperscript{30} NRC, \textit{UN Habitat, UNHCR, Land, Property and Housing in Somalia}, 2008, p.69.

\textsuperscript{31} Incl. pastoralists hurt by worsened pastoral livelihoods due to the livestock ban and natural phenomena, have fled their homes to seek economic opportunities in new areas.

\textsuperscript{32} According to the AU Convention on IDPs in Africa (The Kampala Convention) and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, "internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border"
3 Current IDP Situation

This chapter summarises the present IDP situation across Somalia in terms of scale, movement and residence patterns, key characteristics and policy frameworks.

3.1 South and Central Somalia

South and Central has produced the largest number of IDPs and refugees in Somalia. Many of the displaced come from the southern regions of Bay, Bakool, Shabelle and Juba Valley. Most of them have lost their livelihoods assets to armed groups; some fled to escape the fighting and are unsure of the state of their land, although most assume that it has been taken over by these armed groups. The most recent displacements have been caused by the moving in of Al-Shabaab, as well as by the drought.\(^{33}\)

The majority of those fleeing from the south-central regions have remained in South Central Somalia. Mogadishu is the single largest IDP hosting location. As of December 2013 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated\(^{34}\) that there are some 893,600 individuals displaced in this South Central Somalia, over 40% of which are assessed to be in Mogadishu. Estimates indicate that by January 2013, the number of IDP settlements in South Central Somalia stood at 1,842 of which 79% were located in Mogadishu. The IDP population in Mogadishu is concentrated in three districts: Hodan, Dharkenley and Wadajir, which are believed to host 55% of the IDP population in the city. At least 30% of those IDPs are believed to be new IDPs who arrived in 2011-2012 as a result of the drought.\(^{35}\) The remainder of IDPs from the south-central region have moved further north into Puntland and Somaliland. A number have also made their way across the borders into Kenya (majority), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Tanzania and Yemen.

In the past, the Government in the South offered little protection and development support for IDPs. During years of TFG rule (November 2004-August 2012), the Government had limited control over the country to provide protection to IDPs. Even in the areas under TFG control, its actions (such as restrictions on aid deliveries, association with local strongmen responsible for human rights violations and evictions in Mogadishu) caused additional vulnerabilities for the displaced.

Policy changes are ongoing since the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. The Federal Government, with the support of UNHCR and the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, are finalizing a national policy framework on Internal Displacement, which "provides the policy basis necessary

\(^{33}\) 2011-2012 drought in the Horn of Africa.
\(^{34}\) Based on UNHCR Somalia Total IDPs by Region (April 2014).
\(^{35}\) Mogadishu IDP Survey. June 2012. ICRC. It should be added that due to the frequent movement of IDPs, these numbers are constantly changing and their degree of accuracy is limited.
for securing a predictable, systematic, coordinated and principled approach to the situation internally displaced persons”.

Currently, a key vulnerability for IDPs in Mogadishu is risk of eviction or forced relocation. On 20 January 2013, the Ministry of Interior and National Security announced that plans were underway to relocate thousands of displaced families living in IDP settlements across Mogadishu. A six-step plan on IDP relocation was developed, and an Inter-ministerial Task Force was formed to plan for and oversee the relocation of all IDPs to locations outside the city by 20 August 2013. Other similar Government actions have been highly detrimental to the displaced. In 2012, the government embarked on an exercise to reclaim public buildings in the city and as a result, many IDPs (and urban poor) were summarily evicted. Since the ousting of Al-Shabaab, a number of refugees and Diaspora have been returning to Somalia, and also evicting IDPs from their properties. This has been a particularly visible trend in Mogadishu and in Hargeisa, because of the rising property prices, as well as a result of the renewed growth of the private sector.

3.2 Puntland

Estimates from December 2013 placed the number of IDPs in Puntland at 129,400 in the following locations:

- Galkayo 84,000 in 31 settlements;
- Bossaso 49,000 in 21 settlements;
- Garowe 10,000 in 11 settlements;
- Sool Sanaag 6,000.

IDPs are attracted by the region’s relative stability (and in Bossaso, the access to livelihood opportunities in Yemen). IDPs in Puntland are mostly from southern Somalia where they fled sporadic fighting and clan skirmishes. Others are internal migrants from the nomadic inland areas, attracted to the town by trading needs or by the possibility of jobs in the transport industries. In addition to IDPs, Puntland hosts returnees from neighbouring countries, predominantly the Ogaden region in Ethiopia.

Puntland is in the process of articulating an IDP policy and progress has been made towards durable solutions. The Puntland policy Guidelines on Displacement state that IDPs have rights equal to any Puntland citizen, and commits the government to protect people from arbitrary displacement and to search for durable solutions. Innovative work has been achieved in support of the policy. For example, UN-Habitat

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38 The ousting of al-Shabab from the city has spurred real-estate development and a rise in businesses such as restaurants, hotels and small industries.
39 These figures have yet to be revised to reflect the movements that have taken place since July 2012 as the number of IDPs in Puntland is estimated at 129,400 in January 2013, down from 149,000 in December 2012.
40 Youth economic migration to Yemen and to Saudi Arabia is a growing phenomenon in Somalia.
41 IDMC 2012
has supported the relocation of a number of IDPs and the provision of secure tenure of their new property in Bossaso. The Puntland administration has limited public land to allocate to this task, but has been able to facilitate agreements between relevant authorities dealing with land to secure the tenure for the IDPs. The certificate of ownership that each IDP receives is signed by the Minister of Interior, the clan leaders, and religious leaders to ensure recognition by relevant parties should it be contested. This is one short to medium-term strategy found to work in a region where land is a problematic issue.\(^2\)

Nevertheless, the Puntland authorities have on occasion moved to forcibly relocate IDPs from town to the outskirts. One of the reasons given for this is the heightened sense of insecurity posed by al-Shabaab militants hiding in IDP settlements.

### 3.3 Somaliland

Recent figures suggest that the number of IDPs in Somaliland has swelled from 50,000 three years ago to 90,000 today.\(^3\) Most IDP settlements in Somaliland are inhabited by a mix of people: returnees from bordering countries, displaced from within Somaliland (including from the disputed Sool and Sanaag region), IDPs from South-Central Somalia, Ethiopian refugees and urban poor.\(^4\)

Most IDPs in Somaliland are considered refugees and not IDPs by the authorities. According to Somaliland’s Constitution (2001) and its Citizenship Law (2002), to qualify as a Somaliland citizen, one’s father must be descended from a person who was lawfully resident as a citizen in the territory at independence (1960) or before. In practice, this is interpreted through affiliation to the clans and minority groups traditionally resident in the territory.\(^5\) Anyone whose father is of a ‘non-Somaliland’ clan, even if their mother is a Somalilander, is not viewed as a citizen. Somaliland considers itself bound by the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol with regard to such individuals.

The development of an IDP policy for Somaliland started back in 2007 but stalled. With support from Save the Children International, the MRR&R has taken up the task again.\(^6\) The Government, with support from agencies such as UN Habitat and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) have managed to relocate a number of IDPs from the centre of Hargeisa (from government property) to the outskirts of town (Ayaha I-IV), and provided them with basic housing.\(^7\) Interestingly, this relocation has included both IDPs and urban poor because of the recognition that it is often not easy to differentiate between the two groups, and that their needs are similar.

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\(^2\) For further details, please refer to Decorte, F., Tempra, O. (February 2010), “Improving living conditions in Bossaso, Somalia” in Forced Migration Review, issue 34.

\(^3\) Figures from The Ministry for Return, Rehabilitation and Repatriation (MRR&R). Given the classification of IDPs from South-Central and Puntland as refugees, this figure of 90,000 does not take into account displaced originating from these two locations.

\(^4\) \[http://www.internal-displacement.org/802578F004CFA06/\] (httpCountryResourcesByCountry)

\(^5\) I.e. Isaq, Gadabursi and Ise, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, as well as several minority groups

\(^6\) A consultant will be hired in March 2013 to facilitate the process.

\(^7\) Although technically, those relocated are given ownership certificates for the land and house allocated to them, the agreement for being in the scheme is that they cannot sell the property.
4 Prospects for Return

Return of Somali refugees to the country is an increasingly politicised issue and numbers are increasing due to the policies of hosting countries. Prospects for the return of IDPs, however, remain limited and further displacement continues in the light of ongoing insecurity. This chapter outlines the prospects of return of the displaced in the near term.

In Kenya, security concerns from Al-Shabaab have resulted in the authorities elevating the issue of Somalia refugee return. The authorities have decreed that Somali refugees residing in urban areas should return to Somalia.48 There has also been a more active drive to repatriate refugees residing in the refugee camps, especially those in Dadaab refugee camp. So far over 20,00049 refugees have been repatriated to Somalia. Many of these returnees are settling in and around Mogadishu. Although the Governments of Kenya and Somalia have pledged to work together in resolving the issue of Somali refugees in Kenya, there is still no coherent plan on how to implement returns or on the kind of support returnees might receive. A significant number of these refugees are second and third generation Somalis, some from minority clans, and in addition to having never lived in Somalia, many families have lost and or can no longer access their land. Those with no or limited support networks in Somalia therefore face the same challenges as the most vulnerable IDPs and UNHCR predicts that many of them will have no choice but to move into IDP settlements.

Saudi Arabia has deported Somalis since 2012. The country deported more than 12,000 people to Somalia between January 1 and mid-February 201450 and another 6,000 between mid-February and end of April 201451, without allowing any to make refugee claims. These expulsions have included hundreds of women and children. The country deported at least 12,000 Somalis to Mogadishu in 2013 and thousands of others in 2012.

The international community calls for voluntary returns and urges States to refrain from forcibly returning any person to Southern and Central Somalia. The UN Secretary General, in his latest report on Somalia52 called on countries to continue to comply with their obligations under international law and not to return Somalis forcefully to Somalia. UNCHR’s position, and that of most NGOs, is that the requisite security and living conditions are not yet in place to allow for large-scale returns53. The Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, and UNHCR54, signed a Tripartite Agreement, on voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya in November 2013. The agreement

48The eventual plan being that all Somali refugees should relocate back to Somalia, although no time-frame was given about how and by when this should happen.
49UNHCR 2013
50Numbers published by HRW on 18/02/2014 in Saudi Arabia: 12,000 Somalis Expelled.
51Numbers published by the UN Secretary General in UN (12 May 2014), Report of the UN Secretary General on Somalia, S/2014/330.
53IRIN (23 November 2013), Briefing: Repatriating Somali Refugees from Kenya.
54UNHCR has adopted a phased approach and offers comprehensive assistance to Somali refugees in Kenya who spontaneously decide to return. The first step of this assistance is offering comprehensive information about Somalia and the intended area of return so that refugees can make an informed decision. It also includes the provision, in collaboration with partners, of an initial integrated community-based support in three pilot districts: Baidoa, Kismayo and Luuq.
stresses that returns ought to be voluntary, safe, carried out in dignity, and sustainable. No (large-scale) organised returns will be set-up for the time being.

**Within Somalia, the return of IDPs is still limited.** A small number of IDPs has started to return to their areas of origin. In 2012, UNHCR established the Return Consortium to unite efforts in support of displaced Somalis living in Mogadishu and other areas of South-Central Somalia, Somaliland and Puntland, who are intending to return home. The Consortium supported a number of these returnees and is monitoring trends. As of December 2013, the number of returnees recorded by UNHCR stood at 10,000. UNHCR plan to assist the return of a further 40,000 in 2014. The Return and Reintegration Framework currently being piloted) furthermore states that “no distinction should be made between the needs of refugee-returnees, IDP-returnees, IDPs living in the pilot areas and those of receiving communities”.

**IDPs themselves appear to be uncertain and unconvinced about their prospects for return.** When interviewed, IDPs expressed a desire to return but reflected that there remain major disincentives such as: lack of security, lack of access to services, lack of the capital required to cover a return, and lack of livelihood opportunities (see figure 1 for responses from IDPs questioned in South Central Somalia). Security concerns still rank high because of the threat from Al-Shabaab elements still operating in many parts of rural South-Central Somalia. Secure land rights and tenure also remain issues of key concern to IDPs. The lack of clear guidelines on land ownership, restitution mechanisms, laws, and presiding authorities hampers the ability of IDPs and returnees to return to their areas of origin, to settle and adequately integrate. And since IDPs and refugees experience relatively better access to basic services and income generating opportunities in urban areas compared to the rural areas, they more readily choose to remain in the place of migration or displacement.

**Figure 1:** Top three factors motivating return (by number of times mentioned)

![Bar chart showing top three factors motivating return](http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483ad6.html)

*Source: Semi-structured interviews (n=40)*

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Due to the volatile situation and complexity of the context, households (IDPs and refugees) adopt a number of strategies vis-à-vis return, further compounding assistance in this area. As illustrated by the Reintegration framework (referring to refugees but applicable to IDPs): returnees “will frequently opt to spread risk and to cushion the impact of return by having some family members remaining outside (the country), or move elsewhere – either within the country or abroad - to pursue migration strategies. Experience shows that frequently returnee families split to differentiate their livelihoods with some members settling in rural areas while others settle in town”56. Such factors compound the work of actors engaged in return issues however the Reintegration framework stresses: “This should be facilitated and not viewed as a failure of the reintegration process”57. Finally, it should also be added that evidence58 tends to suggest that the longer IDPs remain in urban areas, the less likely they are to return permanently to their home areas.

Some good practice examples exist of development responses for the returnees. Sustainable return processes to rural areas have been made more effective when building upon local mechanisms for land restitution. Such initiatives are designed with the support of community network of elders, extended families, and religious leaders, who are able to assure ownership of land by claimants. In Somaliland, a cadastre survey, originally funded by Danida and implemented through UNDP in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture, was taken up again in 2011 and has surveyed over 13,000 plots of agricultural land, and allocated 6,000 title deeds in this way. UN-Habitat has also undertaken a similar exercise in Hargeisa. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, land-related conflicts dropped drastically in those areas where they managed to allocate title deeds.

Experience shows that inclusion of returnees in local community governance structures also plays a large role in the sustainability of returns. Community governance structures are, in most parts of Somalia, a combination of formal and informal governance structures. These jointly prioritise development and ensure security. Evidence59 shows how community-based governance development such as the Community-Driven Recovery and Development (CDRD) approach can play a part in developing such structures as a stop-gap measure while the government is building its local governance structures and capacity. There is much to learn from these current initiatives, which could be scaled up in the event of larger waves of return.

Table 2 below presents an overview of actors and factors contributing to IDP decisions to return or to permanently settle in their current living areas.

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57 UNHCR (7 April 2014), op. Cit.
### Table 2. Actors and factors contributing to decisions on settling and returning

**RETURN OR SETTLE?**  
Actors' and factors' influence on the choices and options for IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTORS</th>
<th>FACTORS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Actors contributing to return</strong></td>
<td><strong>Actors promoting settlement in urban areas</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government efforts aimed at moving IDPs to transition camps or trucking to place of origin</td>
<td>Humanitarian organisations providing assistance to IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land owners expelling IDPs from their lands</td>
<td>Gatekeepers (through incentives and forcefully) and local leadership benefitting from the gatekeeper business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian and development organisations providing return programmes</td>
<td>Private sector contractors providing services to IDPs</td>
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See Annex B for further information on the interviews with the IDPs, their perceptions about prospects for return, access to services, and involvement of the local authorities in IDP issues.
5 Vulnerabilities and Development Needs of the Displaced

IDPs in Somalia have shown remarkable resilience. Many have managed to survive and adapt to new locations. There are strong coping mechanisms within Somali society, as well as a tradition of clan support to the destitute. Nevertheless, the humanitarian, protection and development needs of IDPs are acute. This chapter describes particular vulnerabilities in regards to: (i) urban settlements, (ii) livelihoods, (iii) security and human rights abuses, (iv) rule of law, and (v) women and female headed households.

5.1 Urban Vulnerabilities

The high number of IDPs in urban settings brings with it distinct development challenges. It is likely that urban IDP settlements will eventually lead to the rise of more permanent slums, with limited access to basic services such as clean water, education or health, as well as inadequate access to food. This situation will arise in the context of an overall increase in the number of urban poor, including destitute pastoralists, economic migrants and people who are unable to make ends meet because of lack of livelihood opportunities. As a result, an immense strain on urban services and economic opportunities is to be expected. An increased vulnerability of those slum residents, including to natural phenomena and violence, is also likely to be expected.

Newly arrived IDPs in urban settings are considered to be more vulnerable than protracted IDPs. New arrivals (such as those recently displaced by the drought of 2011-2012) do not have the protection of their clans or the networks to cope successfully in an urban setting. In interviews undertaken for this study, the perception of vulnerability was very strong among IDPs interviewed in South-Central Somalia. Several IDPs explicitly added that lack of support networks was a factor further compounding their vulnerable situation. Female-headed IDP households experience increased vulnerability for the same reasons: loss of clan protection and community networks. This is especially so for those belonging to minority clans.

The urban livelihood options available to IDPs are limited because they possess few transferable skills that can be used within the urban settings where most of them settle. In some cases IDPs have become an integral part of the economy. Urban IDPs are, in many cases, a part of the local workforce usually as day-labourers especially those long-term IDPs who have, over the years, established local networks that offer opportunities for access to employment. But for the majority, IDPs have found it hard to enter the urban labour market

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60 And provision of remittances from diaspora.  
61 Ibid
especially when coming from rural areas given the skills and the education gap.\textsuperscript{62} Again, the most vulnerable in this respect are newly arrived IDPs, because they have not been in urban centres long enough to adapt to their surroundings and have not been able to secure multiple income sources (an important coping strategy, see below).

**In many respects IDP face the same development challenges as the general urban poor but their challenges are heightened because of their history of displacement related vulnerabilities.**\textsuperscript{63} IDPs and the urban poor share similar demographic characteristics and together face poor service delivery and infrastructure, limited employment prospects and poor quality housing. They often live alongside each other. For urban IDPs, however, their strains are heightened because of the experience of shock and loss of assets, which mean they arrive impoverished and often traumatised. They end up in labor markets for which they do not have the skills or social connections to enter. They tend to live in camps and settlements, which are concentrated pockets of vulnerability. They face a higher degree of control of their movement and ability to be economically active through gatekeepers, government policies and restrictions (see further discussion below). They are more subject to the threat of eviction and insecurity of housing and are more likely to be the victims of looting, intimidation and extortion by militia and criminal groups in the urban area.

**5.2 Livelihood Vulnerabilities**

In an attempt to fulfil needs, IDPs employ a number of coping mechanisms. As noted above, IDPs are seeking income and employment in cities. But their livelihood options are often insecure menial and casual jobs or begging. Others rely on remittances from family members who have migrated or are refugees in countries in the region, the Gulf States, or further away.\textsuperscript{64} Figure 3.1 presents the answers given by interviewees in South Central Somalia when asked about the source of their family's income. Most families, especially if they have been in displacement for a longer period of time, cumulate various strategies with e.g. males undertaking casual daily labour, child labour and the women selling vegetables.

\textsuperscript{62}Lessons learned in other similar context confirm this. A recent study by the WB and UNHCR in Afghanistan for instance (The World Bank, UNHCR (May 2011). Research Study on IDPs in urban settings - Afghanistan, Kabul) shows that economic and social integration of IDP households in an urban context is difficult due to their skills’ disadvantage as well as the strong educational disadvantage.

\textsuperscript{63}For global reflections on this issue see the WB/UNHCR study in Afghanistan and most importantly a Tufts/IDMC study in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire), Khartoum (Sudan) and Santa Marta (Colombia): See A. Davies, K. Jacobsen (February 2010), “Profiling urban IDPs “ in Forced Migration Review, issue 34. As well as K. Jacobsen (2011), “Profiling Urban IDPs: How IDPs Differ From Their Non-IDP Neighbours in Three Cities” in K. Koser, S. Martin (ed), The migration-displacement nexus: patterns, processes, and policies, p. 79-95.

\textsuperscript{64}Somalia has also become a source country for people being trafficked across the Red Sea, some of which end up in forced labour, commercial sexual exploitation or taken hostage for ransom claims.
Minorities, women, and youth are particularly vulnerable when it comes to livelihoods. IDPs belonging to minority groups are often without extended family support and remittance income from the diaspora. Lacking connections, they may be blocked from access to trading and other employment opportunities. They often face exclusion, exploitation and abuse, such as the denial of payment for work they have done. GBV and labour exploitation affect women disproportionately as more of them work in unprotected informal sectors such as domestic work. As indicated in the answers gathered above, child labour is also one of the coping strategies. UN agencies in the field mention that children mainly engage in activities such as farming, cattle herding, shoe shining and selling water using donkey carts. Children are also selling (and using) drugs.

Somali youth have limited opportunities to earn a decent wage. This is compounded by their limited access to education and limited skills. Internally displaced youth (and young returning refugees) are considered among the most marginalised.

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65 UNHCR Baidoa field report.
66 Since most organisations do not collect statistics on a ‘youth’ age group, there is a lack of accurate data on the numbers of displaced young people. However, it is important to mention that Somalia has one of the largest youth population in the world with 73% of its population aged under 30 (According to UNDP (2012), Somalia Human Development Report 2012: Empowering Youth for Peace and Development, p.4).
68 UNDP (2012), op. cit., p.88.
and at-risk youth groups\textsuperscript{69}. Most of them do casual labour such as collecting garbage and washing clothes for the host community. Frustration is high among young IDPs and may encourage some towards irregular migration, radicalisation, or to join criminal and other armed groups. In some reports, IDP sites are described as “breeding grounds for extremism. (...) It is from here street gangs, child soldiers, drug dealers and armed militias are recruited” \textsuperscript{70}.

5.3 Security, Human Rights Abuses and Lack of Rule of Law

IDPs are subject to security incidents and human rights abuses. IDPs in Mogadishu interviewed for this study mentioned a wide array of security incidents including: incidents with the local host community (accusing IDPs of theft and of IDPs having to bribe the police and judges), security forces arresting young men in the site during security operations, threats by gatekeepers (see discussion below), IDPs targeted by militia, forced labour, theft and forced eviction, beating and arrests in IDPs sites. Figure 3 below presents the answers of IDPs interviewed, when asked about the occurrence of protection incidents (security, abuse, misuse). While the sample of interviewees is not intended to be representative of Mogadishu or Doolow, they provide a good indication of difference between urban (Darwish and Siliga) and peri-urban/rural (Qansaley and Kabasa) locations, with significantly higher number of positive answers as to general violence and violence against women in the former.

**Figure 3:** Occurrence of protection incidents (% of positive answers)

Access to justice and redress mechanisms for IDPs in cases of abuse, harassment and other violations is limited. In reality, such protection is mostly offered through

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\textsuperscript{69} Youth at risk, generally defined as those between the ages of 12 and 24 who face conditions hindering their personal development and successful social integration, have a greater propensity than their peers to engage in behaviours such as school absenteeism, dangerous sexual behaviour, delinquency, violence, and substance use and abuse.

\textsuperscript{70} An IDP quoted in IDMC (1 October 2013), \textit{op. cit Blog Post}.
clan affiliation and because of this IDPs become vulnerable in two ways: (i) minority clans may lack strong recourse to justice against violations from majority clans, (ii) through displacement IDPs may lose their clan connections and mechanisms for protection. To cope, some minority clan elders have managed to make agreements with major clans in urban areas, but these are tenuous and alter the regular structure of clan relations. Organisations such as the Somaliland Human Rights Commission, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Access to Justice and Rule of Law Programme, and other civil society initiatives aimed at providing legal assistance to vulnerable populations and IDPs are active in Somalia, but these are few, and demand far outstrips supply.

5.4 Gender Related Vulnerabilities

Displacement is a gendered process. Women and children make up an estimated 70 to 80% of IDPs. 48% of IDPs are female, and women head 47% of displaced families. Among IDPs in southern Somalia, 50 to 60% of households are headed by women. The number rises as high as 70-80% in Galkayo in Puntland. This high number of female-headed households is attributed, amongst others, to the fact that many women have lost their male family members to the long-running conflict or that men have not been able to flee certain areas. Many women are confronted with violence both inside and outside of conflict zones. Moreover, as a result of forcible displacement, the learned and historically developed roles and functions of community members cannot be applied in the traditional manner because of the new living situation, and changing livelihood conditions. Displacement can hence (positively or negatively) impact on persons and defined gender roles.

Gender based violence (GBV) remains one of the most prominent protection risks faced mostly by IDP girls, adolescents and women. Women and girls in host communities are not immune from GBV but among IDPs (en route to and within IDP settlements) the practice is more prevalent. This is a consequence of the more limited clan protection, the frequent absence of male relatives in the home and, more generally, the lack of secure conditions in settlement camps. Sexual violence, particularly rape, and domestic violence are among the most commonly experienced forms of GBV in Somalia and several agencies report that female IDPs account for the majority of reported cases of sexual violence in Somalia. Other experiences include harassment and forced prostitution. In Mogadishu and surrounding areas alone, during the last quarter of 2012, more than 1,100 rape cases were reported. Almost half of the recorded

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73 UNICEF (2011)
74 IDMC (1 October 2013) Solutions for IDPs revealed as key for future peace and stability in Somalia, p. 5.
76 Such protection is the main reason why clans or communities from the same area of origin tend to congregate in the same settlements. It is important to note however, that even when such mechanisms of clan protection are present, women and girls are still vulnerable to forms of GBV but not at a similar scale.
incidents were against minors, including a few cases of sexual violence against boys. In parts of Puntland and South-Central Somalia, the vulnerability to GBV of the women in female headed houses is compounded by the fact that women no longer have access to formal or traditional protection from GBV due to the disintegration of clan structures.

**The impact of GBV on women’s livelihoods and opportunities to pursue durable solutions is hard to ascertain.** In Somalia, the impacts of sexual violence and other forms of gender-based violence are pronounced. As in other countries, rape carries a strong cultural stigma and can lead to rejection of victims by their families or communities. Consequently, survivors of violence may be reluctant to report or seek services due to fear of stigmatization or rejection or due to a lack of awareness of available options for care. While male clan members are bound by principles of duty to protect the honor and status of the women in their clan, denial or social pressure for reconciliation to secure compensation or maintain the opportunity for bride wealth often gives way to alternate social negotiations. A survivor’s family may attempt to negotiate bride prices down in order to secure marriage (with the perpetrator) and to minimize social stigma. The cost of GBV survivors is further enhanced by reduced household income or resilience as the survivor often has fewer productive resources (because of medical demarches for instance) and lower productivity. This is in addition to intangible costs linked to the survivors' trauma and fear.78

### 5.5 Other Vulnerabilities

**Internally displaced children are particularly vulnerable to all forms of violence, abuse and exploitation.** Children as young as nine are still frequently recruited to serve as combatants. Family separation during displacement leaves many children having to fend for themselves in child-headed households. Unaccompanied children as well as child-headed households are especially at risk of exploitation, human rights violations and becoming street children79.

Displacement has an emotional impact on people with psycho-social consequences. Trauma and depression are generally high amongst the displaced due to discrimination and abuses or because they have had to abandon their way of life, assets, customs and culture. At an individual level, it is manifested as sadness, fear, and despair, which in turn impact their resilience. The sense of limbo and uncertainty inherent to displacement particularly impacts on youth. Protracted displacement presents obstacles for young people in 'being able to map out a future' or 'develop a life plan or strategy for themselves.' This is qualitatively different from being an older person, who has already achieved adult status80.

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79 IDMC (1 October 2013), op. cit.
80 UNHCR (March 2013), UNHCR's Engagement with Displaced Youth.
6 Political Economy Challenges

The Somali context holds some particularly challenging political economy dynamics. These affect the status of the displaced and complicate the challenges of defining or delivering development assistance to address their needs and achieve durable solutions. This section describes political economy challenges related to: (i) gatekeepers, (ii) access to land, (iii) clan profile, (iv) the response of authorities, and (v) the approach of aid agencies. The main actors in these political economy dynamics and their position is summarised in table 3 below.

6.1 Gatekeepers

A system of ‘gatekeepers’ has resulted in the exploitation of IDPs. IDPs settle on public or private land as provided to them by settlement managers (known as gatekeepers) appointed by the local leadership (clan or district commissioners). This system is fully developed in Mogadishu where the gatekeepers provide land and security, and negotiate the delivery of services to IDPs in the settlements. The gatekeepers then tax the IDPs or the NGOs providing the services. For most gatekeepers, the taxation of IDPs is their only source of income, and in many cases, the taxation substantially outweighs the expenses incurred by the gatekeepers for servicing the IDPs, thus making gatekeeping an attractive business. The gatekeeper situation is exacerbated by the fact that, currently, no international and national assistance to IDPs can be distributed without the support and assistance of the gatekeepers.

While security forms part of the gatekeeper service, there is substantive evidence of rights violations committed by gatekeepers towards IDPs. A recent Human Rights Watch (HRW) report states that displaced communities in Mogadishu face serious human rights abuses, including rape, beatings, ethnic discrimination, restricted access to food and shelter, restrictions on movement, and reprisals when they dared to protest their mistreatment. The most serious abuses were committed by various militias and security forces, often affiliated with the government, operating within or near camps and settlements of the displaced. Frequently, these militias were linked or controlled by the gatekeepers of the IDP camp.

Services of gatekeepers become a factor in the IDPs’ decision on where to settle. The gatekeeping business has particularly evolved since 2007, when the international community re-engaged in Mogadishu. Estimates place the number of IDP settlements in Mogadishu at between 500 and 1500, and IDPs often move between the different

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81 This section is based on interviews with national and international organisations and bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as interviews with IDPs in South Central Somalia. Due to the sensitivity of the issues discussed, the team will refrain from attributing specific statements to specific interviewees or organisations.


83 For more details, refer to the March 2013 HRW report on gatekeepers in Mogadishu: Hostages of the Gatekeepers, to be found under the following link: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/03/28/hostages-gatekeepers
settlements as a consequence of forced eviction, or in search of better services, security or a leaner ‘taxation system’. However, with IDPs being an important source of income, some gatekeepers have tended to force people to remain in their settlement either through the use of their own militia, by forcing people to leave their belongings behind if they choose to leave the site, or by simply collecting and withholding their IDP identification cards.

The presence of IDPs across Somalia has resulted in the development of an industry of service delivery to IDPs. Although gatekeeping has also been reported in Puntland, the system is less pronounced outside of Mogadishu. At the national and local levels, limited access to different regions and sections of urban areas has meant that IDP service delivery has either had to rely on the private sector (facilitated by the gatekeeper who provides services not offered by NGOs and is paid by IDPs) or by local level NGOs funded by international aid agencies. These organisations have gained economically from the presence of IDPs, and have an interest in the status quo.

6.2 Clan Profile

Clan dynamics are central to the displacement profile of Somalia. The influence of clan politics and its importance as a social organisation mechanism has affected displacement in a number of ways. First, as described above, the clan-based fissures of the conflict have led to some clans being disproportionately affected by displacement. This dynamic is ongoing: for political or economic purposes, some leaders continue to play on clan identities to manipulate members to engage in conflict with other clans. Second, in the absence of a functioning state, the clan system continues to provide services, and IDPs may be particularly dependant on clan affiliation to secure protection and services. Third, for minorities, the clan structure poses special difficulties as they lie outside the major clan system and therefore cannot call upon the protection of warlords or clan militias.

The interplay of clan affiliation, conflict and displacement has been so significant as to alter the socio-political map of the Somali territories. Several well-armed clan groups have expanded on lands not originally theirs and displaced others mainly in the urban and arable areas, such as Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, Mogadishu, Galkayo or Kismayo. Such demographic impacts of displacement have served to both concentrate groups previously more mingled, as well as socially diversify the urban centres where people settle.

The question of durable solutions for IDPs is therefore closely related to clan dynamics. Clan affiliation can affect the extent to which IDPs are included or excluded from development opportunities. In Puntland, for example, Southerners of Darod/Harti clans tend to be better placed to find local kin and clan protection while other displaced southerners, for example the Rahanweyn and minority groups who have migrated northwards throughout the period since 1991, and the Hawiye who arrived in larger numbers since 2007, find themselves at a disadvantage.84

84 Interview with Ken Menkhaus in July 2013.
6.3 Access to Land

There is widespread lack of clarity of land ownership. In South-Central Somalia in particular, there are conflicting formal and informal authorities responsible for land certification, ranging from local authorities to clan leadership. In Mogadishu, the complexities have increased with the removal of the cadastre registration database from the city to Djibouti, where entrepreneurial individuals provide non-authorised land registration for citizens of Mogadishu, based on the stolen cadastre. In Somaliland, and the urban areas of Puntland, the land issue and registration system is more formalised through the local government system, though still challenged by the multiplicity of other authorities (formal and informal) involved in the process.85 As revealed in research undertaken for this report, IDPs themselves are often very unclear on who owns the land on which they settle and many varied opinions may exist in the same settlement.

The ambiguity in the current process of ascertaining who owns a plot of land exacerbates the potential of land issues to perpetuate conflict and undermine development. For the displaced, the uncertainty of land ownership and challenges of land tenure has at least three negative and interlinked implications:

- Land disputes occasionally result in the forced eviction of IDPs when land changes ownership.86
- The uncertainty about land ownership in the place of origin serves as a demotivating factor for return.
- The lack of ownership of the IDPs of the land they occupy (and the threat of eviction), limits the motivation to engage in using the land for more long-term livelihood opportunities.

Upon return, land issues can become a source of conflict. In South-Central, the issue of land occupation is particularly prevalent;87 long-term IDPs returning to South-Central often find their land occupied by others. While land issues are often settled by the clan leadership in the area of return, they are not always resolved amicably and, in some cases, IDPs refrain from returning, knowing that their land may be occupied or that return might lead to conflict.

The lack of proper land registration and security of land tenure remains a major constraint for delivering economic opportunities and long-term development assistance for IDPs. IDPs are less likely to take economic risks towards sustainable livelihoods when their claim on land is insecure. This prevents IDPs from taking on activities, which require greater investments, such as agricultural production, shopkeeping etc.

Female-headed IDP households are particularly vulnerable to land access challenges. Although Somalia’s civil law does not prohibit women from owning

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85 The land issue is further compounded by the existence of ‘religious land’, which overlaps with commercial and/or public land and needs the involvement of religious authorities for their allocation.

86 This is becoming more evident in Mogadishu where returning diaspora are reclaiming their right to land.

87 Unlike in Puntland and Somaliland (with a few exceptions in Sool and Sanaag).
property and land, in practice this is primarily governed by traditional and Sharia laws. As a consequence, unless there is a male relative present in the household, those IDP women that return to their area of origin experience difficulties in terms of regaining and maintaining control of their land. This further limits their interest in return and their ability to engage in sustainable livelihood activities that, in rural areas, are closely tied to access to land.

6.4 Central, regional and local authorities

Central and local governments across the three administrations of Somalia have improved their planning and response to displacement but they apply competing incentives for doing so. Somali authorities are increasingly taking an active role in managing and coordinating service delivery and humanitarian assistance for the displaced but their motivation to do so is also driven by security or land access concerns, affecting the nature of their response. In the past, authorities in Puntland have moved (by force and volunterily) IDPs from settlements in Bossaso and Garowe to new settlements with mixed success. The authorities in Somaliland have done the same in Hargeisa. In Mogadishu, there is a current plan to relocate all IDPs to sites immediately outside of the city. This plan is a consequence of what the authorities have defined as the need to: (i) free public land for development; (ii) ensure that IDPs are relieved from their current poor livelihood situation; and (ii) boost security. But the relocation is being planned as a temporary response to IDP settlement, not taking into account the likelihood that the IDPs will remain in the medium to long term. Uncertainty about ownership of the new sites also limits opportunities for longer term planning such as expanding the sites to become part of Mogadishu and the sustained provision of housing, more permanent services, and livelihood opportunities. This increases the risk of IDP settlements creating new and unplanned slum areas.

At a macro level, the planning process for returns and local integration are challenged by the de facto ‘three-state’ system of Somalia. While the Government of Somalia officially plans for all three administrations of Somalia, this authority is not recognised in Somaliland, and decisions are rarely implemented in the semi-autonomous administration of Puntland where the authority of the central Government in Mogadishu is still disputed. As already mentioned, in Somaliland, IDPs from South-Central and Puntland are registered as refugees, limiting their opportunity to settle more permanently in Somaliland. The lack of joint planning, coordination, and communication across the three administrations therefore complicates the facilitation of sustainable return processes.

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88 Please refer to annex E for an overview of relevant authorities.
89 With the plan the City of Mogadishu however risks relocating a substantive number of urban poor (including IDPs) who see themselves as residents of Mogadishu. The relocation will thus need to take into consideration their interest in continued settlement in Mogadishu and an appropriate development response to this, which is likely to include livelihood activities and service delivery, as well as the possible allocation of land.
6.5 The political economy of international aid

Irrespective of the protracted nature of the displacement crisis in Somalia, the response of the international community has, to date, focused on immediate humanitarian assistance. The focus on the provision of food and non-food items and immediate protection concerns is partly a consequence of the one-year funding cycle for IDP related support from the international donor community. As a result, planning frameworks, needs assessments, and implementation have been humanitarian-oriented. There is widespread recognition in the international community that applying a solely humanitarian lens misses identifying the longer term development implications and possibilities for IDP support.

Humanitarian assistance has favoured some areas over others. IDPs are either supported in major urban centres or rural areas with limited attention to small and medium-sized towns. This is in part a consequence of the limited access to medium size towns and peri-urban areas in major parts of South-Central Somalia in the past, which, as a result, have received limited attention from the international community and in many cases, from the Somali administrations as well. Consequently, the choice for most IDPs is to remain in the major cities where they have access to relatively more income generating opportunities than in the rural areas.

The development community has yet to engage on displacement issues. Since displacement is seen as a humanitarian issue, development actors have shied away from engaging with IDPs, irrespective of the developmental nature of their needs. IDPs are therefore not being taken into account in planning for longer term sustainable outcomes for Somalia.

Different actors have varying degrees of political and economic interest in the movements and assistance to IDPs as described in table 4 below.

Table 4: Different actors’ interests and actions vis-à-vis IDPs in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTOR</th>
<th>POLITICAL AND/OR ECONOMIC INTEREST VIS-À-VIS IDPS IN SOMALIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government of Somalia</td>
<td>See displacement as an issue of security and poor living conditions. The Government is concerned with the illegal occupation of Government land and would like greater control with IDPs as well as access to Government land by relocating IDPs. The Government prioritises return rather than local integration in urban areas. So far there has been limited discussion on possible benefits of IDPs and their contribution to the economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Puntland</td>
<td>Is concerned with IDPs from a security perspective. Has in the past practiced forceful evictions from Bossaso and Garowe. However, now open to experimenting with semi-permanent solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Somaliland</td>
<td>Clearly distinguishes between Somaliland IDPs and IDPs from other parts of Somalia whom they classify as refugees. Has practiced forceful relocations in the past but open to more sustainable relocation options for urban IDPs. Would prefer South-Central refugees (de facto IDPs) to return to place of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTOR</td>
<td>POLITICAL AND/OR ECONOMIC INTEREST VIS-À-VIS IDPS IN SOMALIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian donors / implementers</td>
<td>Have in the past underscored the humanitarian needs of IDPs, even for those who lived in a more protracted situation and have more de facto development oriented needs. There is an increasing understanding among some humanitarian agencies of the need to work on more long-term solutions and development oriented assistance vis-à-vis protracted IDPs. Few agencies have initiated this process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development donors / implementers</td>
<td>Most development agencies (and donors) relate the IDP label to humanitarian needs and with few exceptions, none engage in IDP related issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities (municipalities and district commissioners)</td>
<td>The view on IDPs from a local authority perspective differs between locations. Some local authorities benefit indirectly from the rent and services provided to IDPs, while others see them as a security threat and a nuisance for the community. There is little recognition of the de facto contribution to the local economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clans</td>
<td>Majority clans are interested in keeping or gaining a majority in their primary areas of habitat. Thus, the migration and displacement patterns are often motivated by clan presence. Migrants and displaced persons move to areas where their clan is dominating or they may risk facing protection issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeepers</td>
<td>Gatekeepers benefit from IDPs through taxation arrangements and often motivate IDPs to settle in their area or prevent them from relocation through direct and indirect force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Militia</td>
<td>Militias are often working with or for gatekeepers and may benefit from IDP presence through financial gains. However, in this process they also provide security solutions for informal settlements (as well as human rights violations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7 Development for IDPs - Recommendations

This report is a first step towards detailing the complexity of displacement in Somalia. As such, it will provide initial broad recommendations. Achieving these recommendations will require detailed action plans agreed, supported and implemented by a range of partners. It is beyond the scope of this report to substantiate that process, instead it gives general suggestion on, (i) the need for a development response and development opportunities including targeting priorities among the IDP caseload, (ii) policy areas for attention, (iii) areas in need of further research and analysis.

7.1 A development response

For many displaced, their situation of insecurity, uncertainty and flux means that a humanitarian response remains most apposite. In some cases, however there is potential to move to a development-oriented approach to IDPs in Somalia. The importance of the urban dimension of displacement, the difficulty in distinguishing protracted IDPs from the poor and vulnerable members of society, and the overlap in their needs and challenges indicate that the IDP situation should be addressed through interventions that aim for longer-term sustainable outcomes. It implies cooperation between humanitarian and development actors towards the adoption of a new paradigm.90

Development interventions could be focused on three main areas:

1) Targeting IDPs with the intention of remaining in urban areas.

The bulk of these have been IDPs for multiple years. The objective of the development approach towards these IDPs will be to ensure sustainable local integration and long-term livelihood opportunities in urban areas. Development responses would need to support urban planning processes that include long-term IDPs as part of city structures, through which the needs of IDPs are mainstreamed, including their potential contribution to city development as well as their service and security needs. This approach should be extended beyond Mogadishu and to small and medium-size towns and urban areas across South-Central Somalia to ensure access to services and markets for rural villagers and returnees.

2) Supporting IDPs with the intention of returning home.

The bulk of these come from rural areas and are the more recent IDPs, displaced by the 2010-2011 drought, or by more recent security incidents. They currently reside in urban areas like Mogadishu or more rural transition areas like Dolo. The objective of the

90 Other analysts have come to similar conclusions. The Tufts-IDMC study mentioned above suggests that, "given the subtle differences between IDPs and the urban poor amongst whom they live, programmes should not only target IDPs but also encompass poverty alleviation of the poorest and most vulnerable societies in which they live. (...) it is important to design IDP programmes with a great deal of care, so that they help IDPs but do not antagonize the host community, which ultimately provides their most direct assistance and support. On the other hand, specially targeted initiatives can be designed to address their unique protection issues. Programmes can therefore be divided into a) activities that address the urban poor in general, of whom IDPs constitute a major but diffused group, and b) those that target the particular concerns of IDPs (e.g. support to return)."
development approach towards these IDPs will be to ensure a sustainable voluntary return with livelihood opportunities, which is expected to contribute to the economic development of Somalia. Sustainable return will be dependent on multiple factors, of which the most important are livelihood opportunities in the areas of return, access to services, and security. Such programs would need to consider any vulnerabilities that returnee women and female-headed households experience. These developments should apply to the full area of return and not targeted to returnees only. Return will require engagement of, and planning with, the local authorities in the area of return.

3) **Integrated development and poverty-reduction oriented programmes.**

These would include specific activities aimed at curtailing the vulnerabilities of IDPs alongside and inclusive of poor Somalis. This is particularly relevant in terms of improved infrastructure that will enable enhanced economic growth and mobility, as well as the growth of basic service sectors such as health and education.

All such development programmes will need to be adapted to the diversity of IDP experience, vulnerabilities and capacities. Table 5 below is a first attempt at providing a typology of IDPs. It attempts to summarize the situation on a continuum of the individual IDP’s/household’s resilience, as elements contributing to the strength of the IDP/household, or on the contrary affecting it negatively. The singling out of characteristics at the individual level is to highlight that certain individuals are particularly vulnerable, and that a household which has vulnerable individuals, will be more vulnerable than one without. A household with many children, or a household caring for a sick or an elderly person, will be less resilient/more vulnerable, than other households. Obviously a lot of these factors are inter-related and can have multiplying effects yet also change the scope presented below: a majority clan fleeing to an area where his/her clan is not majority will be less resilient. Youth, while being a vulnerable group, can strengthen a family’s resilience as they can be productive and contribute to the family’s income (especially if this does not affect the youth’s access to education). The individual factors will have an even stronger effect on the household if they affect the head of household (both positively and negatively): a household will be more resilient if its head is educated, it will be less resilient if the head is disabled etc.

**Table 5: Tentative IDP typology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>LESS VULNERABLE</th>
<th>MORE VULNERABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area of origin</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for displacement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudden onset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance from commercial</td>
<td>Close</td>
<td>Distant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>centre/market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time since arrival</td>
<td>Longer</td>
<td>Recent arrivals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of previous</td>
<td>Few</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>displacements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

91 This is, for example in the areas of roads, energy, agriculture (irrigation schemes and rehabilitation of dilapidated irrigation canals), etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>LESS VULNERABLE</th>
<th>MORE VULNERABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size of HH displaced</td>
<td>Smaller, not single</td>
<td>Larger Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
<td>Both Parents</td>
<td>Single Parent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex of head of HH</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of head of HH</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Child or youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of settlement (incl. land ownership)</td>
<td>Camp (organised setting not represented in Somalia) / with family member</td>
<td>Informal settlement In host community (after some time)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>Minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community</td>
<td>Same clan</td>
<td>Different clan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government policies and actions</td>
<td>Engaged and capable authorities with resources</td>
<td>No capacity of authorities Abusive authorities (e.g. security forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to services during displacement</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal (IDP) Governance</td>
<td>Inclusive and representative (e.g. small settlements /villages/same clan)</td>
<td>Not representative / abusive/ exploitative e.g. some gatekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family support</td>
<td>Remittances from abroad or urban centres, family members with relatives elsewhere</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Individual level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTOR</th>
<th>LESS VULNERABLE</th>
<th>MORE VULNERABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Married</td>
<td>Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Adult</td>
<td>Child or youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>Elderly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>No major health issue</td>
<td>Serious medical condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability</td>
<td>No disability</td>
<td>Disability (physical or mental)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skills</td>
<td>Has skills (Relevant to the environment)</td>
<td>No (relevant) skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special needs</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>E.g. Pregnant or lactating woman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other factors to include are the possibility of return (e.g. is the area of origin still experiencing conflict, is land occupied), which may on the one hand influence a
households attempts to integrate locally, however also place a greater psychological burden on the HH which is deprived of its own agency. This is closely linked to a thorough understanding of the area of origin and the reason for displacement, which may give indication about the likelihood of return.

7.2 Key recommendations at the policy level

Changing the scope of the support to IDPs will also have to be addressed at the policy level. Key opportunities include:

- Provision of technical assistance to the Federal government of Somalia (FGoS), and the Governments of Somaliland and of Puntland to address the IDP situation from a development perspective.

- Support to the Somalia national development process. The need to mainstream IDP issues has only been partly addressed in the current ‘New Deal’ Somalia Compact. In order to compensate for this, IDP issues should be included in the sector strategy planning processes underpinning the Somalia Compact.

- Engagement in land reform processes for all three administrations of Somalia.\(^9^2\) Under the leadership of the respective Governments, the international community could assist in reform of land legislation to enable a more legitimate and recognised land restitution and registration process that will ensure security of tenure for returnees, as well as IDPs who wish to settle in new (often urban) areas.

- Assist in developing or revising the IDP policies of the three administrations, taking into consideration the development needs and potential of IDPs. The policy(ies) should recognise the different categories of IDPs and aim at enabling them to become less dependent on humanitarian assistance, and to contribute to and benefit from the development of Somalia. The policy(ies) should link with the lessons learned from the return activities, the IDP experiences from urban areas (including the role of gatekeepers), and the vulnerabilities of IDPs, particularly female IDPs and female-headed households.

- Enhance the availability of qualified local NGOs and increase motivation to move to a development oriented approach to IDPs. A local NGO capacity assessment may identify the appropriate actors to provide services to returnees and in urban areas where IDPs have decided to settle, and where the local government capacity is insufficient to cope with service delivery.

\(^9^2\) This requirement is most evident around Mogadishu, but remains a contended issue in other towns in South-Central, and in urban areas in Somaliland and Puntland as well
7.3 Further Research

There remain many knowledge gaps in the understanding and definition of the full needs of IDPs in Somalia. Further work is needed in the many areas with the following being a priority (see Annex L for further detail):

- Land Reform. This analysis could explore the feasibility of such mechanisms as setting up a land commission (with the needed legitimacy among the different groupings in Somalia); development of legal aid programmes that also make use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that still play an important part in Somali culture; the legislation of land and how to integrate the sometimes conflicting land laws and practices as adjudicated by Islam, tradition, and contemporary regulations.

- Sustainable Return. Returns to areas of origin are becoming more of a reality. There will have to be detailed assessment of the development priorities in these areas, in order to outline development investments which would facilitate people to return and to stay. Particular attention should be given to the vulnerabilities of female headed households.

- Labor Market Opportunities. To guide the design of activities aimed at economic development, market studies/analysis should be carried out to determine how best to undertake such initiatives. This could then progress towards the development of an appropriate and comprehensive approach towards programming and investment strategies to stimulate the local economy with the involvement of IDPs.
Annex A – Displacement (and Migration) Trends

According to the Refugees Studies Centre (RSC), Somali dynamics of displacement can be summarized as follows: soaring internal and external displacement in the early 90s followed by a relative stabilization of a protracted displaced population from the mid 90s to the mid 2000s and eventually a new displacement crisis at the end of the 2000s.

It is difficult to identify a single displacement pattern in Somalia. People have been displaced for several reasons and for varying time frames. Fighting, compounded by natural disaster has led to massive displacement in Somalia and to neighbouring countries since the 1970s. A. Lindley adds that even where displacement has been labelled “due to natural disaster”, this disaster was more often than none linked to political/man made causes.

The majority of displaced Somalis have remained within Somalia, rather than move to other countries. Some have been displaced for only short periods of time, while others have been displaced since the early 90s. Many observers highlighted the fluidity of population movements in Somalia and consequently the complexity of assessing exact numbers of displaced persons. Different initiatives have tried to register IDPs and movements, including local NGOs. Efforts to me mentioned include:

- UNHCR’s Somali Displacement Crisis Portal and the Protection Cluster’s “Population Movement Tracking”
- The ICRC’s Mogadishu survey in 2012
The above observations hold true for Mogadishu as well. The capital has been the place people were displaced from (e.g. early 2000s, 2007-2008), to (e.g. 1992, 2010-2011) and within (e.g. 2006, 2012-2013). Despite the intense fighting the city witnessed and the related high level of insecurity, the availability of aid and of economic opportunities constituted a determining factor in the population movements.
Table 6: An overview of shocks (man made, natural other) inducing displacements in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>MAN MADE</th>
<th>NATURAL</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975 - 1988</td>
<td>Widespread drought, massive resettlement, resource sharing policy and muscle drain to the Gulf States</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988-1995: State collapse, civil war and famine</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Hargeisa bombing</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>Collapse of the state into factional violence</td>
<td>Widespread drought</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>Severe political violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-2000: Further dissolution of the Somali state</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-1999</td>
<td>Occupation of Bay and Bakool</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td>El Nino</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Tensions over Sool-Sanaag</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Struggle for Kismayo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000- 2005: Establishment of the TNG and prolonged drought</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>Widespread drought</td>
<td></td>
<td>Somaliland Decree</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Tsunami</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>Clashes over Sool - Sanaag</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2005 – 2009: The ICU, it’s impact on Mogadishu and Afgoye</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Flooding</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006-2008</td>
<td>ICU</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Clashes over Sool - Sanaag</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Clashes over Sool - Sanaag</td>
<td>Flooding</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Widespread drought</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evictions from public lan in Puntland</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Capture of Afgoye by AMISOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>Evictions from public land in Mogadishu</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td></td>
<td>Flooding</td>
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Please see below an attempt at highlighting the different waves of displacement presented above that Somalia has experienced since the mid-1970s.

**Mid-1970s: Widespread drought, massive resettlement, resource sharing policy and muscle drain to the Gulf States**

1974 marked one of the worst droughts in Somali history. In the 1974 drought, a quarter of a million nomads lost most of their livestock and had to be supported in relief camps. The government seized the opportunity of promoting its long-term aim of curtailing nomadism and attempting to inculcate the new revolutionary ideals.\(^93\)

IDPs were grouped in agricultural and fishing settlements, mainly in southern Somalia. The largest agricultural settlements, with populations of approx. 20-30,000, were in the Lower Shebelle and Middle Juba regions.

Some of these nomads (especially from the agricultural settlements) also joined the muscle-drain which has been occurring in direction of the Gulf States since the 1950s\(^94\).

In 1975, with the Resources Sharing Policy of Hawliyo Hantiwadaag, all land was nationalized along with nearly all major industries and the financial sector. This facilitated government's ability to expropriate citizens' property for state projects, like massive state-operated farms, and for politicos' personal use. Unpopular minority groups, such as the Gosha (Bantu), were particularly easy prey. In the 1970s and 1980s Barre expropriated Gosha occupied land to create state-owned irrigation schemes that benefited his allies (mostly from the Marehan and Dhulbahante clans). In other cases his minions expropriated land for their private use, making Gosha serfs on their own property. A lot of land in Juba Valley was acquired this way.

**1988-1995: State collapse, civil war and famine**

After the Ethiopia-Somalia peace agreement in May 1988, the SNM, fearing the collapse of its long insurgency, attacked the major northern towns of Hargeisa and Burao. The regime responded with the aerial bombing and strafing of northern towns and villages mainly focusing on Hargeisa (approx. 70% of which were destroyed). Over 5,000 civilians were killed, nearly half a million Somalis fled to Ethiopia, and at least another half million were internally displaced, streaming to other regions of Somalia.\(^95\)

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\(^{93}\) Lewis, I. Understanding Somalia and Somaliland, 2011, p. 42.

\(^{94}\) According to Naaja Kleist, Researcher at the University of Copenhagen in 2004: "Somali citizens have worked in the oil-industry in Saudi Arabia since the 1950s, and from the 1960s, when the oil boom took off, in the Middle East and the Arab peninsula as well. No reliable statistics exist of the number of Somali oil workers; the estimates of their number in the beginning of the 1980s are as diverse as 12,200 (Owen, 1985) up to 200,000 – 300,000 (Lewis, 1994, 122). The variation in estimates is at least partly due to the fact that a large number of oil workers were and remain undocumented. It appears that this migration for the large part has been undertaken by Somalis from the north-western part of the country, the former British Somaliland, and has been largely a male phenomenon.

\(^{95}\) The Centre for Justice and Accountability, Somalia Background, 2012, p.3.
The most intense period of conflict followed the state collapse in 1991 and was characterized by inter-clan and intra-clan for control of land and resources in the south of the country. There was intense fighting around the control of major centers such as Mogadishu. At the height of fighting in 1992, up to two million people were internally displaced. Many sought refuge in one of the 200 camps and squatter settlements in Mogadishu.

Clan affiliation was used by warlords to mobilise support. Broadly speaking, in the southern areas, divisions hardened between the long sidelined but populous Hawiye clans, the previously regime-aligned Darod clans, and the Rahanweyn agropastoralists.

Certain groups were particularly targeted:

- **Majority clans:**
  - The Marehan, kinsmen to Barre, which resulted in the quasi devastation of the inter-riverine areas.
  - The Darod: indiscriminate revenge killings of people of the Darod clan, especially those of the Dubbahante clan associated with the National Security Services, by the Hawiye groups was reported in the aftermath of Siyad’s escape from Mogadishu.

- **Minority clans:**
  - the Bantus were displaced from the Gosha area and nearly exterminated by Darod/Majerteen and Hawiye/Habargedir clans between 1991 and 1993.
  - The ‘Rer Hamar’ community was subject to targeted violence due to their influence and positions in the past Somali government and because they lost any protection given to them with the collapse of the institutions of rule of law in 1990.
  - The Galgala people in Mogadishu and Gedihir in Jowhar suffered brutal reprisals from the Abgal clan with whom they lived at the beginning of the 1991 war.

In Somaliland, especially Hargeisa, people were displaced due to Siad Barre’s attack on the Isak clan: in 1988 numbers of up to 1.5 million displaced are mentioned. However, the formation in 1991 of independent Somaliland created an island of stability and relative peace, which became a pull factor attracting many displaced from south central Somalia.

In 1992 drought and famine in the inter-riverine areas, and the disruption of farming and livestock production as a result of conflict, caused thousands of deaths, prompting large-scale

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96 Inter-clan fighting between Darod and Hawiye.
97 Intra-clan violence between Hawiye sub-clans: After Siyad fled, a Hawiye - Abgal group (USC) set up an interim government in Mogadishu, while Aideed (Hawiye - Habr Gidir) was engaged in chaising Siyad. The Habr Gidir grew suspicious of the Abgal intentions and fighting erupted between the two.
98 During the last days of his rule, Siyad Barre misused the Galgala community by arming them against the Abgal. Following his defeat, the Abgal killed many Galgala and forced many others to abandon their houses.
99 Note that the Gabuye, Tumal and Yibir got caught in between as 1. Having similar physical characteristics as the Isak and it was difficult for Siyad Barre’s army to differentiate between the Isak and other clans and 2. when Siyad Barre was defeated, the Isak meted harsh punishments on the Gabuye, Tumal and Yibir because they were perceived to be Siyad Barre supporters.
movement of rural displaced people towards the coastal cities to aid camps. Baidoa was hit particularly hard and thousands fled what was called the epicentre of the famine. In September 1992 an estimated 556,000 and 636,000 ‘visible’ displaced people where displaced, living in static camps. 50% of were living in Mogadishu. The severe political violence disrupted production, trade, and aid delivery, and restricted movement, turning drought into a total disaster, killing some 212,000–248,000 people in the main emergency period of 1992–1993.

Events in the early 90s also went with waves of dispossession and eviction targeting regime-aligned Darod clans and minority groups, as well as the relatively weak Rahanweyn and minority Bantu farmers occupying the fertile agricultural belt.

1995-2000: Further dissolution of the Somali state

Displacements occurred on a smaller scale at the local or regional level mostly in Gedo, Juba regions and Shabelle regions. A main event being the powershift in Kismayo in June 1999 when the militia commanded by General Said Hersi ‘Morgan’ was evicted by the Juba Valley Alliance comprising of Marehan and Habr Gedir. This led to displacement of Majerteen and Harti communities. The minority Bajuni clan was also displaced from Kismayo and many fled to Bosasso. Targeting of minority groups in rich agricultural land also continued over this period. Minorities were also targeted in Somaliland and fled to South Central Somalia.

General Farah Aided’s (Hebargedir) occupation of Bay and Bakool regions between 1996 – 1999 displaced a great number of people from the Rahanweyn clan. The main part ending up in Luuq in the Gedo region.

In 1998, Puntland declared independence and tensions erupted over Sool and Sanaag with Somaliland. It should be mentioned that Puntland itself emerged against the background of displacement and social re-concentration as members of the Darod clans, historically one of the

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100 Anna Lindley: Environmental Processes, Political Conflict and Migration: A Somali Case Study
103 Juba Valley Alliances (comprising mainly of Marehan and Habargeder - Eyr) supported by the TNG and Majerten led by General Morgan
104 With the fall of Kismayo in June 1999 to allied Somali National Alliance and Somali National Front forces, a Bajuni “alliance” with the Somali Patriotic Movement was destroyed and Bajuni property on the islands was looted by militias, forcing many Bajuni to flee. Some Bajuni made their way to Bossaso in Puntland. In 2002, it was reported that recent Marehan settlers still control the islands: “Bajuni can work for the Marehan as paid labourers, which is at least an improvement over the period when General Morgan’s forces controlled Kismayo and the islands, when the Bajuni were treated by the occupying Somali clans as little more than slave labour.”
105 In January 2001 for instance, heavily armed militia from the Wersengeli (Abgal clan) carried out a well organised attack on the Bantu (Shidle) farmers in Bananey and Barey villages in Jowhar, following a dispute over grazing land for cattle.
106 The Bantu (Makane) in Beletweyne suffered mistreatment and violation from the Hawadle, Galjele, Badi Adde and Jijele clans. Most of them were displaced from Beletweyne town to rural areas in Hiran region.
107 Puntland claims Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) based on kinship ties with the regions’ dominant Darod clans (Warsangeli, Dhulbahante and Majerteen subclans). Somaliland claims the territory as part of the original bounds of the former British Somaliland protectorate, which the enclave’s separatist government regards itself as the successor to.
most widely scattered clan families, were driven out of southern and central areas by Hawiye and allied militia in the early 1990s, many fleeing northwards.

Autonomy claims of the region around Kismayo (and the regions of Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba) are also to be reported.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{2000- 2005: Establishment of the TNG and prolonged drought}

The opposition to the legitimacy of the established Transitional National Government in 2000 and a third year of consecutive drought in 2002 constituted the main events driving displacement in this period. From the end of the 90s and until the beginning of 2006 the patterns of displacement were mainly from south to north – with a large-scale displacement caused by conflict clashes between the Habr Gedir militia of Hussein Aideed and the RRA (Rahanwein Resistance Army) and the intra-Rahanweyn conflicts in the Bay region. IDPs from south central Somalia often fled to Somaliland and Puntland (especially Bossaso). A majority belonging to the Digil, Mirifle and Bantu clans. The destruction of the livelihoods of opposing clan factions was a major instrument of the conflicts. The areas most affected were in the south: Gedo, Bay, Bakool, the Lower and Middle Juba, and the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo.\textsuperscript{109}

In the beginning of 2001 OCHA estimated that there were 309,000 IDPs in Somalia mainly in south central and primarily from the minority clans the Bantu, Bajuni, and the Rahanweyn. 150,000 resided in Mogadishu and 90,000 IDPs were primarily concentrated in the Juba Valley Regions including Kismayo of which most were from the Darod clan as they fled the clan violence in Mogadishu. Others were displaced due to fighting over access to natural resources between the majority clans in Hiran, Middle and Lower Shabelle.

In 2002 in Somaliland and Puntland a total of 19 camps were accommodating approximately 71,000 IDPs and returnees.\textsuperscript{110} IDPs were mainly agriculturalists belonging to sub clans from the south including Rahanweyn, Ajuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf and the minority group, Bantu mainly residing Haregeisa. Some 8000\textsuperscript{111} returnees form Ethiopia (to Somaliland) settled mostly in the Awdal region.

A decree issued by the Somaliland authorities in 2003\textsuperscript{112}, made a substantial numbers of IDPs, which had originally fled from South Central to Somaliland, move to Puntland. By 2006, 28,000 IDPs were residing in and around Bosasso. The unresolved conflict over the regions of Sool and Sanaag also resulted in displacements during 2004/2005 in Northern Somalia\textsuperscript{113}.

\textsuperscript{108}One of the main reasons for conflict over control of Lower Juba, particularly Kismayo is the economic strength of this region. This is evidenced by the transit routes to the ports of Mogadishu and Kismaayo; easy access to rich and fertile agricultural lands; close proximity of the fishing industry, agriculture, and livestock, as well as the high population density.

\textsuperscript{109}David Griffiths: FMO Country Guide: Somalia

\textsuperscript{110}OCHA, 2002: combined report on displacement

\textsuperscript{111}The returnees mostly some from the Haber Awal sub-clan and Garhajix community during the 1994-1996 civil conflict

\textsuperscript{112}In 2003 the Somaliland authorities issued a decree making all internally displaced Persons refugees

\textsuperscript{113}OCHA, Puntland humanitarian update 2006.
Fighting over land also continued over this period. Between October 2003 and April 2004 for instance, about 7,000 people were displaced by inter-clan fighting over the control of grazing lands and water in the Galgadud region. Most of the displaced belong to the Dir sub-clan and fled to their clan area in search of protection.

2005 – 2009: The ICU, its impact on Mogadishu and the Afgoye corridor becoming an IDP city

While the previous period was characterised by displacement patterns from south central to the northern parts this period can be described by internal displacements in South Central Somalia due to fighting in Mogadishu and flooding in the riverine areas creating a new settlement trend in Afgoye. A new driver of displacement became the fighting between Puntland and Somaliland due to claims over the disputed areas in Sool and Sanaag regions.

At the end of 2005, the UN estimated the number of IDPs in Somalia to be 400,000 or approximately 6% of the population. In Mogadishu the estimate was 250,000 or 25% of the population. In Puntland the number of IDPs was 60,000, 45,000 affected by the Tsunami in December 2004.

During the first half of 2006, the ICU fight for Mogadishu led to an important displacement of people, first within the city, then out of the city, including to the Afgoye corridor. Displacement calmed down in the second half of 2006, yet resumed with events in late 2006 – 2008 (fighting, mostly in south and central Somalia, especially in and around Mogadishu, between Ethiopian forces supporting the TFG and the insurgency groups that sprang up to challenge them) when people left the capital en masse. Over 320,000 people fled Mogadishu between 1 February and 20 April 2007. The main fighting and displacement has been from the southern part of the city, which is populated primarily by the Hawiye - Habr Gadir sub-clan. The vast majority of Mogadishu IDPs fled to the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions. At the end of 2007-early 2008, up to 60 per cent of Mogadishu\'s population had been displaced as a result of the fighting. The majority of people displaced from Mogadishu concentrated around the town of Afgoye. Others went to Galgadud, Mudug and Middle Shabelle regions.

In total, one million people were displaced from Mogadishu between early 2007 and 2009 of which 524,000 settled along the 30-kilometre stretch of road between Mogadishu and Afgoye. In October 2009 OCHA estimated this to be the largest concentration of IDPs in the world.

The number of IDPs in Somaliland was estimated to be 40,000 with new IDPs arriving in the beginning of 2007. They mainly reside in Hargeisha (35,000).

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114 Lindley: Flooding displaced some 455,000 people in the southern riverine areas in 2006
115 OCHA, October 2009: IDPs in Somalia – Fact Sheet
Displacement linked to Sool and Sanaag also continued over this period. In October 2007 Somaliland took control of the regional capital of Sool (Las Anod) by force – displacing between 30,000 to 50,000 people. Many fled to Puntland and settlements in Bosasso. In July 2010, several thousand people were displaced by clashes between Somaliland troops and a new rebel group, the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC).

**2009-2011: Al-Shabaab and the widespread drought**

Major offensives by Al Shabab between 2009 and 2011 seeking control of territories in Mogadishu and Kismayo resulted in massive displacement. In 2010, the IASC estimated that the vast majority, or 88%, of displacements were due to insecurity. Many people displaced from Mogadishu continued to move to the already overcrowded settlements of the Afgoye corridor - over 300,000 in 2010 alone with surges in March and August.

In July 2010 UNHCR estimated the number of IDPs in Somalia to be 1.41 million. The number of IDPs in the Afgoye corridor reduced to 366,000. 70,000 IDPs were residing in Puntland in settlements mainly in Bari district (49,000), Garowe (6,000) and Galkayo. Much of the 2010 displacement was temporary and IDPs returned home when the situation allowed after a few weeks.

As a result of the worst drought in ten years (according to UNHCR), further compounded by continued conflict (e.g. fighting between TFG allied forces and Al Shabaab in Lower Shabelle, Banadir, Gedo and Middle Juba region), a famine was declared in 2011 making people move back to Mogadishu. An estimated 100,000 drought-affected IDPs fled southern Somalia and in July only (highest reported number in a month since March 2010) 63,000 were displaced, 27,000 of which fled to Mogadishu. Population movements within Somalia decreased again in August to 42,000 displacements, as humanitarian aid was scaled up. In August 2011 the influx to Mogadishu slowed down from nearly 5,000 people a month in average vs. 1,000/day.

The IDPs moving to Mogadishu and the Afgoye corridor included pastoralists (from SC) in search of fodder for animals, food aid and casual work. According to Lindley, the pull factor of Mogadishu can be attributed to its proximity to famine-affected areas, availability of international humanitarian assistance, and the fact that Al Shabaab withdrew in August 2011 seceding the military activities. Lindley assessed the Rahanweyn (agropastoralist) and Bantu (farming communities) to be the worst affected by the crisis in this period. Many of which appear to have moved to urban IDP settlements or to live with host families.

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116 [IRIN, SOMALIA: Somaliland clashes displace thousands, 23 July 2010.](#)
117 [UNHCR, July 2010: Map of estimated Total IDPs in Somalia](#)
118 In July 2011, famine was declared in i. the agropastoral livelihood zone of southern Bakool region, ii. Lower Shabelle region, iii. the Bakad and Cadale districts of Middle Shabelle region, iv. the Afgoye corridor internally displaced persons (IDP) settlement, and v. the Mogadishu IDP community. In September 2011, famine was declared in Bay region.
In the north, tensions persisted in Sool and Sanaag regions over disputed areas, leading to some displacement.

In Puntland in 2010 the government announced an official policy of ‘deporting’ young men arriving from south central Somalia resulting in evictions of entire IDP settlements in Bosaso and Galkayo. This continued in 2011 where landowners without prior notification evicted 15,000 IDPs living in 5 of Bosaso’s major IDP settlements. Most of the families evicted were female-headed households. The IDPs were forced to leave settlements within 24 hours that had been home to some families for over 16 years. It is worth noting that the treatment of displaced people in Puntland largely depends on local social relations: Southerners of Darod/Harti clans tend to be better placed to find local kin and clan protection. By contrast, other displaced southerners, for example the Rahanweyn and minority groups, and the Hawiye, find themselves at a disadvantage.\textsuperscript{120}

2012-2013: The New Federal Government,

Displacement due to man made and natural reasons continued in 2013 as Somalia witnessed flooding and continued Al Shabab activity (even if at lower level). The IDP levels in Somalia remain approximately 1.1 million. The displaced are located mainly within the South Central region with 369,000 residing in Mogadishu according to UNHCR numbers of July 2013.

The announcement of imminent military activities in the Afgoye corridor in February 2012, made more people flee, anticipating an escalation of violence. The majority headed to Mogadishu. As a result of military activity in May (when the AU captured Afgoye), large numbers of those remaining in the corridor also moved towards Mogadishu.

While, as of early 2013, the Federal government and aligned forces had re-taken all major urban centres in South Central Somalia, Al Shabaab relocated its headquarters to the town of Jilib in Middle Juba, and retained control over largely rural areas. Observers stress that "while Al Shabaab has been undoubtedly weakened by the intensified campaign against it, it remains organisationally viable and is adapting its reduced capacity to new theatres of violence. In both direct and indirect ways, it continues to pose a threat to the stability of the federal government and undermine the new regime’s ability to establish and maintain lasting security and peace."\textsuperscript{121} Many civilians were affected by this new version of Al Shabab.

In recent months, IDPs have moved mainly to Shabelle Dhexe, Banadir, Shabelle Hoose, Juba Hoose and Bay regions. An estimated 22,000 people were displaced in the first 4 months of 2013 alone, of which some 15,000 individuals displaced in April because of Al Shabab\textsuperscript{122} and


\textsuperscript{121} ACLED, Country report Somalia, April 2013, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{122} Early April 2013, the withdrawal of Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) from Xudur, the regional capital of Bakool created a security vacuum in the districts. An estimated 2,500 individuals were displaced after the insurgent group Al Shabaab quickly took control of the town.
floods in the South and the Centre of the Country (especially in Galgaduud, Bay, Middle and Lower Shabelle regions).

IDP returns are also reported (supported): 3,315 IDPs have spontaneously returned to their places of origin in Lower Shabelle, Bay and Middle Shabelle regions between January and May 2013.\textsuperscript{123}

Forced displacement, mixed migration and urban poor

Finally, it should be mentioned that since the 1990s, people have increasingly moved to the main towns of Somalia, such as Mogadishu, in search of work, food, water and medical assistance. While this trend is intimately linked to forced displacement as many IDPs displaced multiple times also fled to Mogadishu despite fierce fighting there, expecting to find opportunities as it is a traditional destination for migrant workers it further compounds the categorization of IDPs as a distinct group. IDPs in Mogadishu indeed mix with large population of urban poor resulting from years of conflict, the absence of economic opportunities and a functioning state.
Annex B – Clan Representation in Somalia

Annex C – Somalia’s Livelihood Zones
Annex D - IDPs’ Perceptions: Summary of Findings from Interviews with IDPs in South Central Somalia

IDPs and Land
Access to land is a central topic in IDPs’ responses, in particular with regards to 1) Their choice about where to settle, 2) the possibility to remain where they are and, 3) the possibility to return to their area of origin.

The scenarios in the two regions under consideration are quite different in the sense that in Gedo, IDPs have settled on private land, while in Mogadishu, some have settled on private land and others on public land (Siliga). As indicated above, respondents confirm the presence of gatekeepers in Mogadishu.

As shown by the graph below, availability of land is the third reason why IDPs have decided to settle where they currently are, particularly for Mogadishu respondents. The latter add that while they are, in principle, free to move and settle wherever they want, the options are very limited, mostly related to the availability of land to settle on. Mogadishu respondents add a concern about official plans of relocating IDPs from Mogadishu to the outskirts, hence restricting their access to land in town.

Figure A.1: Why IDPs chose to settle where they are (number of times mentioned)

When it comes to their outlook for return, access to land, including for farming and pasture for livestock is mentioned as an important factor. Conversely, no land to return to is a factor in motivating IDPs to stay where they are.
**IDPs and livelihoods**

Most respondents are very clear about their limited livelihood opportunities, in particular when it comes to opportunities in the settlements. Opportunities in the settlements are mostly limited to petty trade, and many respondents add that these are diminishing and becoming less lucrative. Consequently, respondents indicate that important livelihood opportunities in the camp are remittances and humanitarian assistance.

Most livelihood opportunities are be found outside the settlements, with the main activity being working as casual daily labour (unskilled). Both women and men are engaged in these activities: men work on construction sites, as porters, for example, while women work as domestic maids, washing clothes, general cleaning, etc. Children are also involved in providing livelihoods for the family, mostly by working as shoe shiners. Some skilled opportunities mentioned include working as car mechanics, tailors or carpenters. Begging and seeking support from relatives are also mentioned as livelihood opportunities.

Many respondents go on to add that while IDPs have some livelihood opportunities (mostly with the local community), they are discriminated against, receiving a lower wage or sometimes not being remunerated for the services provided. Women are particularly discriminated. They add that the lack of friends and network support limits their opportunities further.

The need for improved access to livelihoods, both in their current location and in the area of origin (should they decide to/be able to return) is a central theme in respondents’ answers. Related to this, many indicated that in order to increase IDPs’ ability to address their own needs, the following would be of great assistance: provide IDPs with skills to qualify for jobs (skills training), provide IDPs with start-up capital and assets to start income generating activities (including loans). Furthermore, many indicated that businesspersons have the potential to improve IDPs’ conditions, by providing them with employment, loans etc.

**IDPs and access to services**

After access to improved livelihoods, the availability of aid is the second reason IDPs indicate as motivating their choice for their current location (see Figure 4 above). It is also an important argument in IDPs’ reflection about whether to settle or return to their area of origin. In addition, access to health and education also rank highly in IDPs priorities.

Overall, IDPs are dissatisfied with their involvement in identifying their needs and hence the response thereto. They link this, both to their lack of involvement in camp management committees and discussions with NGOs and authorities, and to their own lack of organisation and capacity to speak with one voice. Consequently, IDPs see an opportunity in being further involved and in receiving training in areas such as their rights, and about how to engage in advocacy, etc.
With regard to access to services, the graph below shows the responses given by respondents in Gedo and Mogadishu.

**Figure A.2: Access to basic services**

While voicing dissatisfaction about the quality of the services, all respondents from Gedo indicated having access to sanitation and most to health and water. Those services are provided free of charge by NGOs. Local authorities are involved to some extent, but lack financial resources. However, they are mostly involved in the task by assisting NGOs. With regard to security, it is provided free of charge by the police. In Kabasa, IDPs have some role in ensuring security as well through volunteers.

As in Gedo, while expressing dissatisfaction about the quality of the services, all respondents in Mogadishu indicated having access to sanitation and most to health. When it comes to water, while the service is provided by NGOs, most indicated having accessing it through private business people and hence having to pay for the service.\(^{124}\) With regard to education, some indicated having access to education. It appears that they were referring to Koranic schools, which parents have to pay for. In security, replies differed quite significantly between Darwish and Siliga.\(^{125}\) In the latter, local authorities were said to be completely absent as security providers, while they were said to played a role in the Darwish. Siliga, moreover, is the only location where respondents indicated having to pay for security (about 0.5$/month/family).

\(^{124}\) Prices indicated range from SoSh 1500 to 5000 per 20L jerry can.

\(^{125}\) The district is not controlled by the government but rather by a clan-based militia
IDPs and central and local authorities

IDPs expressed a rather low impression of the local authorities’ involvement in service delivery (except security). Reasons advanced for this included their lack of interest in IDP issues, their lack of means (financial, human) and their corruption (taking bribes, taking part of the assistance etc.).

It is interesting to note that (illustrated by the graphs below) when asked about different authorities’ role with regard to IDPs, district level officials are overwhelmingly considered by the IDPs themselves as being in a position to improve IDPs’ conditions while xafaad level officials have a mixed review: they are mostly seen as having no role in Gedo, or not having the ability to improve the situation in Siliga (because they are not appointed by the District Commissioner (DC), are not seen as legitimate, etc.). It is only in Darwish that they are seen as having a potential to improve the situation, thanks to their relation to the district level official, while being close to the community. Waah level officials, on the other hand, are generally y seen as having the potential to play a positive role. This is linked to the role they can play as intermediaries between the IDPs and the local community, and their role in conflict resolution.

Figure A.3: IDPs' views about different local authorities' role in improving their condition
Other general information about interviews and the IDP settlements

The field teams interviewed 39 individuals in 5 different sites. The sites are located in two Regions: Dolo, at the border with Ethiopia and Benadir, i.e. Mogadishu.

The majority of the respondents were women (61%). All were persons displaced during the 2010/2011 famine and related conflict, and reasons for displacement refer both to natural causes and man made causes. The average duration in displacement is relatively short (1.5 years on average, without any significant differences between regions). Only 32% have resided at another IDP location before the one we interviewed them in.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITE</th>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>OF WHICH</th>
<th>DISABLED</th>
<th>ELDERLY (60+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qansaley</td>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabasa</td>
<td>Gedo</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darwish</td>
<td>Howlwadag</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siliga</td>
<td>Wadajir</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kabasa and Qansaley

Kabasa and Qansaley (or Kabasa2) are two parts of one larger IDP site at the border with Ethiopia, called Kabasa. It is considered a transit camp to Ethiopia (incl. Dolo Ado). There are about 2500 HH in Kabasa camp.

New IDPs reside in Qansaly and older IDPs are mainly concentrated in Kabasa (1).

The police has set up a post on site to provide security and several NGOs provide services.

There are separate camp management committees for the two parts of the site:

- Qansaley: has a committee of about 27 members of which 5 women. No members of the minority are part of the committee. While different answers are provided as to the selection of the committee, most respondents indicate that they were selected by elders and the local authorities.

- Kabasa: has a committee of about 15 members, both men and women (3). Most are from the Rahanwein clan. There are some minority representatives among them as well. They have self-nominated themselves as they were the first ones to settle on the site.

Darwish

Darwish settlement is located in Howlwadag district of Mogadishu. Some 6000 HH live in the settlement.
UN agencies and INGOs operate in the settlement through partnership with LNGOs.

Darwish IDPs settlement is an umbrella of 41 IDP sites. It is governed by a management committee of some 14 members: gatekeeper (man), his assistant (woman) and 12 committee members (8 Men and 4 women). 3 of the committee members are from minority clans.

The sub-sites have smaller management committees of 3 individuals (one woman).

While respondents are unclear about how the committee(s) was selected, those who gave a specific answer believed they were selected by IDPs.

**Siliga**

Siliga IDP settlement is located in Wadajir district of Mogadishu. It is important to note that the district is not controlled by the government but rather by a clan-based militia.

Some 1500HH live here.

UN agencies and NGOs provide services.

Respondents are unclear about the camp management structure, but as in the case of Darwish, there appears to be an umbrella committee of 29 members (5 women) and site-specific committees. Respondents, while being unclear about the way the committee was selected indicated there were between 7 and 9 members, with 2 members from minority clans.
## Annex E – Actors Mapping

### Authorities Mapping

Established by TFG  
Failed to carry out its mandate due to lack of financial resources and the prevailing security situation |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disaster Management Agency (2011) – Prime Ministers Office</td>
<td>Mandate: overseeing IDP matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Interior and national security</td>
<td>Incl. development of legal framework for refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), also main counterpart for refugee issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Social Development</td>
<td>Incl. women’s issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benadir Regional Administration (BRA) – Relief Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commission for Refugees, Returnees and IDPs</td>
<td>Newly created. Incl. responsibility for returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Disaster Management Agency (2013/2014)</td>
<td>Main body in charge of coordinating response to disasters (replacing DMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNTLAND</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management Agency (HADMA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior, Local Government and Rural Development incl. department for refugee protection.</td>
<td>Responsibility for refugee matters and IDPs as well as local development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMALILAND</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior, incl. department for refugee protection.</td>
<td>Responsibility for refugee matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs</td>
<td>Incl. GBV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Disaster Council (NRC), under the Office of the President</td>
<td>Provides overall leadership in the event of a humanitarian emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Environmental Research and Disaster Preparedness Agency (NERAD).</td>
<td>Focal agency for coordination of emergency response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Reconstruction (MRRR)</td>
<td>Responsibility for IDPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other ministries in charge of land, service provision etc. should also be mentioned.

Somalia has signed but not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is not a party to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The TFG had already indicated its willingness to ratify the latter Convention and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, but this has not happened yet.

**Donor and Agency Mapping**

Donor involvement in development assistance in Somalia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **UNDUP**                                   | Access to Justice                            | • Strengthening legal institutions – improving the functioning of the judiciary, fostering judicial reform.  
• Technical assistance, legal education as well as training to government and community actors. |
| Community Security project                  |                                              | • Support Somali authorities in the development and implementation of related policies.  
• Connecting local and national government, the police and justice system with civil society to improve safety and security in communities.  
• Set up Women’s Civilian Protection Units. |
| Somali Institutional Development Project (SIDP) |                                              | • Supports institutional development, to build a well-managed, inclusive and effective civil service.  
• Public sector reform through staff training and support to civil service reform |
| Civilian Police project                     |                                              | • Training and appointment of police officers  
• Promote human rights training and gender equality in all three Somali police forces and help foster public trust and confidence |
| Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralized Service Delivery (JPLG) |                                              | • Supporting policy and legislative reforms for functional, fiscal and administrative decentralization  
• Improving local government capacity for equitable service delivery  
• Improving and expanding the delivery of sustainable services |
| Parliamentary Development Project           |                                              | • Supporting the creation of basic government institutions Parliament, Presidency,  
• Coordinating between the Parliament and international partners to ensure that national priorities are taken into account,  
• Providing Parliamentary staff with skills, expertise and infrastructure |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection cluster lead</td>
<td>The Somalia Protection Cluster aims to provide a coherent, coordinated, accountable, and comprehensive response to the protection needs of civilians. The Protection Cluster is comprised of roughly 130 protection and human rights focused organisations. UNHCR Somalia chairs and DRC co-chairs the Protection Cluster. The cluster carries out protection assessments and IDP profiling exercises. 2014 priorities include: 1) improving minimum standards through adhering to Mental Health and Psychosocial Support (MHPSS) standards and levels of care, as well as Clinical Management of Rape; 2) Inclusion of people with disabilities and the elderly in protection programming where possible; 3) Increased focus on Housing Land &amp; Property issues (coordination and programmatic response); 4) Greater focus on IDP relocations, evictions, and returns throughout the country; and 5) Attention to migrants who are returning to, or are stranded in Somalia. The cluster includes a Gender-Based Violence Working Group and a Child Protection Working Group. The protection cluster will, in concert with the Shelter cluster, increase work on Housing Land and Property (HLP) issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter cluster lead</td>
<td>Provide Emergency, Transitional and Durable Solutions (NFI and shelter). Also: capacity building/coordination. Focus on displaced and also returnees.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to refugee and IDP returnees and local integration</td>
<td>• Community-based projects benefiting both returnees and host communities and Shelter, livelihood opportunities in coordination with cluster leads in the areas of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), health, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) prevention and response, as well as education • Return Consortium: UNHCR-led, established in 2012, with the aim to develop and provide standardized, coordinated and coherent assistance to internally displaced returning to their area of origin in Somalia. Composed of DRC, FAO, INTERSOS, Islamic Relief, IOM, Mercy Corps, NRC, UNHCR and WFP. • Task-force on returns: Established by UNHCR, including with the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and NGO partners in Mogadishu.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durable Solutions Framework</td>
<td>• High Commissioner’s Global Initiative for Somali Refugees: collaboration with host states, the Somali diaspora, donors and experts on the Somali situation, incl. initiatives on education for Somalis in countries of asylum in the region, work on livelihoods and other initiatives designed to support self-reliance and a move away from dependency. • Work within the New Deal Compact</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGENCY</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Technical support to Government and national authorities | • Development of a national policy framework for people of concern, including in the area of SGBV, and  
• Advocate for equal access to justice and the adoption of international conventions such as CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child  
• Support the Somaliland authorities’ development of asylum capacity |

**UNPOS**  
Political Affairs Unit  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal cohesion of the Somali Federal Institutions</td>
<td>Establish mechanisms/structures that will enhance coordination and leadership among the federal institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of Local Governance Structures</td>
<td>Support the formation of local administration in line with Government policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary Agenda</td>
<td>Engage all stakeholders and the Parliament in the review of the constitution and provide assistance towards the establishment of the six constitutional commissions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNPOS**  
Civil Affairs Unit  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace building and reconciliation</td>
<td>In collaboration with the new FGoS, the unit is supporting plans to bring together representatives of Religious Leaders, Traditional elders, the Diaspora, Youths, Women Organisations, CSOs, the Academia and the Local Administrations, representing the five major clans in 31 districts of Southern Somalia, for brainstorming in order to articulate their vision for peace building and reconciliation, as well as agree on modalities for setting up local government structures in the recovered areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advancing women’s political representation and engagement in peacebuilding</td>
<td>Support to enhance the coherent and systematic integration of gender perspectives into peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia. Implemented through gender mainstreaming, advisory services, technical guidance and capacity building and advocacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring, capacity-building and mainstreaming human rights within Somalia</td>
<td>The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights implements its Somalia programme through the Human Rights Unit of UNPOS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**UNOSOM**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy advice</td>
<td>Policy advice to the Federal Government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on peacebuilding and state-building in the areas of: governance, security sector reform and rule of law (including the disengagement of combatants), development of a federal system (including preparations for elections in 2016), and coordination of international donor support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENCY</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build Capacity</td>
<td>Build the Federal Government’s capacity to promote respect for human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rights and women’s empowerment, promote child protection, prevent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, and strengthen justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>Monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>violations of human rights or of international humanitarian law committed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in Somalia, or any abuses committed against children or women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>Strengthening local governments and decentralised service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improving livelihoods through Employment Intensive Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Investment programmes (EIP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to financial services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promoting Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Migration and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transition initiatives for stabilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods, Return and Reintegration Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENCY</td>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building in Migration Management</td>
<td>Support the government and authorities to, promote safe and orderly migration, help secure borders and build the capacity of immigration officials to manage borders and thus mitigate security threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Trafficking</td>
<td>Combating human trafficking in Puntland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration Health</td>
<td>Improve the health conditions of migrants and mobile populations (MMPs) and their affected host communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Habitat</td>
<td>Urban governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project implementation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| UNICEF | Social services (Health, Nutrition, WASH, Education) | • Health: strengthening childcare services, promoting safe motherhood and child immunization.  
• Nutrition: controlling micronutrient deficiency disorders; improving feeding practices and selective feeding.  
• Education: primary formal education and the other for primary alternative education. |
<p>| UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) | JPLG | Strengthens public financial management to improve infrastructure investment and delivery of basic services by local governments |
| National and International NGOs | All sectors | Over 104 national and international NGOs in South Central Somalia, 85 NGOs in Puntland and scores of NGOs, including over 20 international NGOs in Somaliland. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Agriculture and food security</td>
<td>Train farmers and local agribusinesses in crop production and quality control. Technical advice to livestock owners and institutions to improve the quality of their animals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy, human rights and governance</td>
<td></td>
<td>Assistance to authorities and civil society at all levels to strengthen democratic institutions, improve stability and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth and trade</td>
<td></td>
<td>Improving the investment climate, creating jobs in livestock, farming and agribusiness, energy production, and other sectors, business skills training to youth and the private sector, provide investment capital to private enterprises to address a lack of capital in the market place, support to local farmers and veterinary institutions to increase agriculture production and protect the health of livestock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>Build and rehabilitate classrooms. Vocational education and training for young people—and providing funding for selected start-ups run by youth.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| DFID | Governance and peace building | • Core State Function Programme  
• Sustainable Employment and Economic Development in Somalia  
• Somalia Monitoring Programme  
• Somalia Stability Programme  
• Support to Community Based Stabilisation Efforts in Mogadishu  
• Stabilisation Support to Sub-Saharan Africa  
• Provision of Teaching and Learning Materials for Upper Primary Schools in Somalia  
• Somaliland Development Fund aligned to the priorities of National Development Plan  
• Support Somaliland Development Corporation to stimulate private investment and job creation |
| Support to parliamentary processes for new FGos parliamentarians | | |
| EU | Governance and security | Support to over 23 projects:  
• UNDP’s Rule of Law Programme  
• UN-Joint Programme on Local Governance and Decentralised Service Delivery (JPLG)  
• Pillars of Peace Project  
• Strengthening the participation of Non-state actors in decision-making |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>SUPPORT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Support to the legislative Sector</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Empowering the Somali Women’s Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Agriculture Rehabilitation and Diversification of High Potential Irrigation Schemes in Southern Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Enhancing Popular Participation in Governance and Sustainable Development in Somalia and Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>- Accelerated Primary Education Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>- Vocational Education &amp; Training for Accelerated Promotion of employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>- The Somali Animal Health Services Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td>- Integrated Support to Rural Livelihoods Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURKEY</td>
<td>Institutional Support</td>
<td>- Infrastructure reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Education (school rehabilitation, construction and education sponsorship for primary and higher level students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Water and sewerage (rehabilitation of water infrastructure)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Energy (in partnership with private sector providers)</td>
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<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Agriculture and fisheries (Supporting the an Agricultural training school for extension workers, and a fisheries school)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Water</td>
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<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Health</td>
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<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Education (Teacher training and school rehabilitation)</td>
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<td>Social services</td>
<td>- Agriculture (irrigation infrastructure in South Central)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Annex F – List of Persons Met

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANISATION</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 UN OCHA</td>
<td>Pierre Bry</td>
<td>Head of Funding Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Danish Refugee Council</td>
<td>Peter Klansoe</td>
<td>Regional Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Food Security Cluster</td>
<td>Francesco Baldo Mark Gordon</td>
<td>Health Program Manager, Country Manager a.i.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 UN Habitat</td>
<td>Dorothee von Brentano</td>
<td>Senior Human Settlements Officer - ROAAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Human Rights Watch</td>
<td>Laetitia Bader</td>
<td>Researcher - Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Royal Norwegian Embassy</td>
<td>Geir Arne Schei</td>
<td>First Secretary (UN/Humanitarian Affairs/Gender)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 DFID</td>
<td>Camilla Sugden</td>
<td>Advisor – Peace Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 UNCEF Somalia</td>
<td>Nancy Balfour</td>
<td>Chief, WASH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Protection Cluster</td>
<td>Bediako Buahene</td>
<td>Protection Cluster Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Return Consortium</td>
<td>Marco Procaccini</td>
<td>Return Consortium Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 EC Somalia</td>
<td>Anna Schmidt</td>
<td>Advisor, Governance &amp; Security sector Somalia unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Royal Danish Embassy</td>
<td>Kira Smith Sindbjerg</td>
<td>Counsellor, Head of Somalia Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Royal Netherland Embassy</td>
<td>Rogier Nouwen</td>
<td>Senior Policy Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Swedish Embassy</td>
<td>Lilian Kilwake</td>
<td>Programme Manager – Humanitarian Assistance - Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Aid Effectiveness Secretariat for Somalia</td>
<td>Philippe Gourdin</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Ministry of Interior and National Security - Somalia</td>
<td>Mahdi Mohamud Ali</td>
<td>State Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Ministry of Interior and National Security - Somalia</td>
<td>Abukar Dahir Osman</td>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANISATION</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>FUNCTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Benadir Regional Administration</td>
<td>Mohammed Nur</td>
<td>Mayor Mogadishu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Disaster Management Agency</td>
<td>Jumaal Said Osman</td>
<td>Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Organisation of Islamic Countries</td>
<td>Ahmed Mohammed Adan</td>
<td>Head of Somalia Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Organisation of Islamic Countries</td>
<td>Mohammed Idle</td>
<td>Deputy Director Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Danish Refugee Council</td>
<td>Mogadishu-based senior staff</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Embassy of Turkey - Somalia</td>
<td>Dr Cemalettin Kani Torun</td>
<td>Turkish Ambassador to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Ministry of Interior - Somaliland</td>
<td>Abdisamad Omer Mal</td>
<td>Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Ministry of Interior - Somaliland</td>
<td>Ato Kochin</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and</td>
<td>Ahmed Egeh Tigse</td>
<td>Consultant for the Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction - Somaliland</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and</td>
<td>Abdirahman</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Integration for</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reconstruction - Somaliland</td>
<td></td>
<td>IDPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and</td>
<td>Osman</td>
<td>Director - Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction - Somaliland</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 Hargeisa Municipality</td>
<td>Maxamed Haybe</td>
<td>Vice Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Academy for Peace and Development</td>
<td>Hassan Hallas</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 UN Habitat</td>
<td>Caasha Maxamed</td>
<td>Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Farah Elmi</td>
<td>Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Somaliland Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>Fatiya Hodan Ayan</td>
<td>Chairperson and Commissioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANISATION</td>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>FUNCTION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 General meeting</td>
<td>IOM, NRC, DRC, The Heritage Institute</td>
<td>Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 Davidson College</td>
<td>Ken Menkhaus</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 SOAS</td>
<td>Anna Lindlay</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 DHA Foundation</td>
<td>Hawa Abdi</td>
<td>Head of</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Annex H – Development Assistance and Framework Related to IDPs in Somalia

There is considerable attention given to IDPs in the humanitarian coordination setup in Somalia, and less so in the development assistance framework. In this section we present the key coordination and alignment framework in development to identify options for enhanced dialogue related to IDPs.126

Development assistance to Somalia

Development assistance to Somalia is primarily provided through UN agencies as well as through a number of international and local NGOs. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which came to an end in December 2012, has been the main programming framework used by the international community. Somaliland has subsequently developed a National Development Plan. Puntland is in the process of developing one, and a similar process has started in South-Central Somalia (for all of Somalia).

A number of donors also give their development support through the European Union (EU); for example, the EU and Norway's Joint Strategy Paper for Somalia 2008-2013 presents the strategic framework for the co-operation between the EU (then EC) (and signatory countries) and Somalia under the 10th European Development Fund (EDF). The main assistance under this framework has been governance, education, economic development, and food security.

For the UN, development assistance is guided by the United Nations Somalia Assistance Strategy (UNSAS) 2011-2015, which recognises the need to move towards long-term programming for Somalia. Assistance under the UNSAS is organised under the same pillars articulated in the RDP: social services; poverty reduction and livelihoods, good governance and human security.

With regard to explicit focus on IDPs, it should be noted that assistance to IDPs and other vulnerable groups is one of the concepts underpinning the EU's Joint Strategy Paper. This was aligned with the focus of the just concluded RDP. Within the UNSAS, provision for development assistance to IDPs is made in all the sectors, especially in terms of their increased vulnerability in urban areas.

A table indicating how donors are involved in development assistance in Somalia is included in Annex C.

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126 The report does not present the humanitarian coordination mechanisms, but that coordination is ensured by the cluster set up (eight clusters are active in Somalia: Food Security, Education, Health, Protection, Logistics, Nutrition, Shelter, and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) with coordination of humanitarian action in south-central Somalia largely managed by the cluster structure based in Nairobi (though there is increased presence in the field). The cluster approach is applied by the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Humanitarian Country Team.
Coordination of assistance to Somalia

Coordination of external aid to Somalia is managed through a Nairobi-based body for the Coordination of International Support to Somalis (CISS) constituted in 2006. The CISS is governed by an Executive Committee co-chaired by the UN Resident Coordinator and the World Bank (WB). It has in the past been assisted by a permanent Somali Support Secretariat, that is currently called the Aid Effectiveness Secretariat for Somalia. The CISS is designed to provide a more coordinated and coherent international approach to the management of external aid to Somalia. Membership of the Executive Committee is limited to representatives duly delegated by each of the three main constituencies: the Somalia Donor Group, the UN Country Team and the NGO Consortium. IDPs are currently debated in this setup, but interaction with the Secretariat has shown that there are opportunities for engaging on this issue under the Somali Compact process. (Further discussed in section 4.3 below).

The Somalia Donor Group (SDG) meets monthly and is the forum for internal donor coordination and harmonisation and for agreement on a constituency position for the CISS Executive Committee. Currently the SDG is co-chaired by UK and USAID.

Under the CISS, the following sector committees have been established: the Health Sector Committee; the Education Sector Committee; the Governance Sector Committee; the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene ('WASH') Sector Committee; and the Livelihoods and Food Security Sector Committee. Discussions within these committees formally focus on development-oriented actions. Coordination on humanitarian/emergency interventions takes place within a forum organised and supported by OCHA. However, stakeholders agree on the importance of synergies and coordination across the humanitarian-development spectrum.

‘Non-traditional’ actors such as Turkey and Arab countries have set up a coordination mechanism – the Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which set up an office in Somalia in March 2011. Support is organised across sectors, with each having a sector lead. The OIC coordinates the work of Muslim NGOs (over 40 members) operating in Somalia. In addition to the humanitarian support it has been giving to IDPs, the OIC is also supporting efforts for the voluntary return of urban IDPs to their areas of origin.

Future thinking on assistance to Somalia

With the installation of the new Federal Government of Somalia (FGoS), there is renewed hope for a more stable Somalia, and the international community has indicated its support for the new government. Consequently, there are ongoing discussions between the FGoS and the international community on a new country-owned and country-led Somalia Country Compact under the ‘New Deal’ arrangement that will culminate in the development of a National Development Plan.
In preparation, and in line with the principles set out in the 'New Deal', donors will support the setting up of a 'New Deal' desk housed within the Ministry of Finance. The New Somali President has reached out to the regional administrations of Puntland and Somaliland to involve them in the articulation of future programming for Somalia as a whole, based on the 'New Deal' principles. In addition, the international community is making arrangements for setting up different pooled funding mechanisms, including the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF). The SSF is an interim funding mechanism to allow for coordinated support to agreed development initiatives, while the government is developing and strengthening its public financial management capacity and structures. A similar initiative is the Somali Financing Facility led by Norway. In Somaliland, donors will set up the Somaliland Development Fund, which will focus specifically on development priorities of the Government of Somaliland, and align with the Somaliland National Development Plan 2012-2016.

There is great interest in support to institution building, governance and development initiatives in South-Central Somalia. But interviewees raised concerns that support to other regions of Somalia might suffer as a consequence. As an example, the relative stability and democratic progress attained in Somaliland has seen the region attract and enjoy support and funding for its development initiatives; but that this attention has now swung markedly towards South-Central Somalia.

Discussions with a number of donors indicate a growing realisation that aside from humanitarian responses, much more support is needed in development and governance programming in Somalia. In addition (with specific reference to IDPs), and as has been mentioned above, the protracted nature and the motivations for migration into urban areas need to be considered in the light of broader development strategies, as opposed to solely humanitarian ones.

For humanitarian agencies, the new CAP 2013-2015 for Somalia already indicates a slight shift towards longer-term and more development-oriented support to Somalia. The development of the CAP called for a closer inspection of how donors have provided assistance to Somalia: until recently, there has been a reluctance to commit to multi-year funding mechanisms, which has led to an excessive focus on short-term funding. The CAP, furthermore, states as one of its underlying operational objectives, to improve alignment with development mechanisms and structures.

On the other hand, on the part of IDPs themselves, and for humanitarian agencies, there will need to be a shift in thinking: for IDPs (and some returnees), a shift from dependency on assistance to self-reliance, and for humanitarian agencies – both local and international – concerted efforts in linking relief to rehabilitation and development.

127 ‘The New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States’: At the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan, a number of countries and international organisations endorsed an agreement on a new global direction for engagement with fragile states.
Programming by humanitarian and development actors has, understandably, tended to be conducted in isolation of each other. Increased dialogue and joint programming between the two is needed and will ease the transition from a humanitarian to a development-oriented approach.
Annex I – Clan Dynamics and IDPs in Somalia

According to Ioan Lewis\textsuperscript{128}, the major clans in Somalia can be divided as follows:

1. Hawiye
2. Dir
3. Isaq
4. Darod
5. Digil
6. Rahanweyn/Digil Mirifle

The division between nomadic pastoralists and cultivators coincides roughly with these divisions, with the Digil falling into the latter category (or at least agro-pastoralists) and the other four in the former category.

In addition to these main divisions, “minority” groups also exist. They do not strictly belong genealogically to the main populations, but live in association with them. These include: the Jareer (Somalised Bantu incl. Gobawey, Wa Gosha, Boni, Eyle), occupational specialists (Yibir, Midgans, Tumals). In the 1960s, it was estimated that there were about 15.000 such low-status groups. The Midgans, belong to some of the larger minority groups.

Clans are headed by traditional leaders (the Sultan), and supported by clan elders.\textsuperscript{129} However, these traditional structures are facing numerous challenges, especially in urban areas. Key among them is that in the past, their territorial range of influence was much clearer, but this is not the case in urban areas or even in IDP settlements, where a host of different clans live in close proximity.

The situation is further complicated as people (IDPs too) frequently move or migrate around the city or in the rural areas. Therefore, the identification of truly representative elders, and the effective enforcement of any decision taken by them becomes increasingly difficult.\textsuperscript{130} The unfortunate effect of this is that clan-related conflicts can escalate, and have done so in urban areas, to the degree to which clan elders can influence the situation.

Another challenge is the gradual undermining of elders’ authority by different armed youth who make their living as militia soldiers, and who are causing the insecurity and the ensuing displacements.

\textsuperscript{128} Lewis, I. *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 2011.
\textsuperscript{129} The Sultan’s position is hereditary. That of lower level clan elders and traditional leaders are appointed by local low-level councils. Clan elders can therefore be replaced more easily and their positions fluctuate more than the Sultans. Warlords and Peace Strategies: The Case for Somalia. Hansen, S. 2003.
\textsuperscript{130} Civilian Harm in Somalia: Creating an Appropriate Response. CIVIC 2011.
Although many Somalis identify themselves based on clan, they, however, also blame ‘clannish’ behaviour as the main cause of the destruction of Somali stability.

Following the fall of Siad Barre, clan allegiances were central in conflict dynamics and membership of a particular clan was a ground for persecution on multiple occasions\textsuperscript{131}, even with the ICU or Al Shabab\textsuperscript{132}. Explaining the clan dynamics of the conflict since the late 80s/early 90s is not an easy exercise. Clan affiliation was used by warlords to mobilise support, and rigidified by the ensuing conflicts. Broadly speaking, in the southern areas, divisions initially hardened between the long side-lined but populous Hawiye clans, the previously regime-aligned Darod clans, and the Rahanweyn agro-pastoralists.\textsuperscript{133} According to Menkhaus though, “by late 1991, they (Darod and Hawiye respectively) were fighting amongst themselves. There was fragmentation of clan alliances and disputes at lower levels. So already by 1992, if you explained the Somali conflict as a Hawiye/Darod dispute, people would say it is wrong. However, now this division is back because of: 1. The question of who controls Mogadishu, Puntland, Jubaland and 2. The question of who has the right to be a Somali. It is a very dangerous full circle that we have come.”\textsuperscript{134}

While, as indicated above, some clans are pastoralists and have hence a different relation to territoriality\textsuperscript{135}, and furthermore clans and sub-clans are often geographically interwoven, specific clans or sub-clans do exert significant power in specific regions (see map in annex). For example, Mogadishu is sub-divided among Hawiye sub-clans, while the Rahanweyne control the Bay and Bakool regions.\textsuperscript{136} The Isaaq clan dominates Somaliland, and various Darod sub-clans control Puntland. Jareer groups are to be found particularly in the inter-riverine area along the Shebell and the Juba river basin. These geographical divisions often correspond to the conflict dynamics as clans vie for influence and resources.\textsuperscript{137}

\begin{itemize}
\item 1991: Siyad exhorted all the Darod in Mogadishu to kill the Hawiye citizens whether they were Abgal or Habar Hidir;
\item 1991: indiscriminate revenge killings of people of the Darod clan, especially those of the Dulehante clan associated with the NSS, by the Hawiye groups in the Aftermath of Siyad’s escape from Mogadishu;
\item 91-93: Bantu minorities were displaced from the Gosha area and nearly exterminated by Majerteen and Habargedir militias
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{131} Predominantly a Hawiye/Habr-Gidir/Ayr movement (although with important leaders from other clan groups) according to Abbink.


\textsuperscript{133} Interview with Ken Menkhaus in July 2013.

\textsuperscript{134} The situation is further compounded by the different sense of belonging of different groups also called \textit{u dhashay, ku Dhashay and ku Dhaqmay}:
- \textit{U Dhashay}: Being born into a family, clan or nation, belonging by blood. See pastoralist populations.
- \textit{Ku Dhashay}: Being born in a place, belonging to the land. See farming populations.
- \textit{Ku Dhaqmay}: habituating oneself - people living neither with their clan nor where they were born. See urban centres.

\textsuperscript{135} However, it is important to realise that the traditional structures of the Rahanweyn, the minorities, and the people of Bantu and Arabic descent are often very different from the nomadic groups. Without any in-depth studies that describe the agro-pastoralist, sedentary and coastal cultures, there is a risk of reproducing the mistake of extrapolating the nomadic traditional structures upon these cultures. \textit{Clans in Somalia. Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna. December 2009}

In the absence of a functioning state, the clan continues to provide services such as social protection, justice and physical protection. It is an important social organisation mechanism in the Somali social structure, and has effects across political, economic and social status. For minorities, the clan structure poses special difficulties as they lie outside the major clan system and therefore cannot call upon the protection of warlords or clan militias (minority clans are usually not armed). They therefore have minimal political power, and are especially exposed during conflict. Without militia protection, they are vulnerable to attack and to having their properties seized. Thus, in a country where all residents face some degree of threat, minorities\textsuperscript{138} are at special risk\textsuperscript{139}

In 2000, the Transitional Federal Government established the so-called ‘4.5 formula’\textsuperscript{140}, which was meant to ensure that each of the four main clans (Hawiye, Darood, Dir, and Rahanweyn) were equally represented in government. The remaining 0.5 was meant to accommodate all groups that are not part of the main clans (called the Others but now referred to as the fifth clan). However, this formula was highly disputed, primarily because, as far as the actual size of clans is concerned, some clans are politically suppressed and not well represented in Somali figures, which favour the nomadic clans. So, for example, the area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in Southern Somalia is characterised by considerably greater population density than the areas inhabited by nomadic groups. Therefore, the Rahanweyn groups may constitute at least 25 to 30 per cent of the full population, and hence be larger than they are commonly said to be. The Bantus, who are often referred to as small groups of perhaps 6%, may in fact constitute 20% of the population\textsuperscript{141}

The newly elected Somali Government has kept to this formula in the selection of the cabinet and parliamentary representatives. However, in recognition that that the strong clan delineations have been part of the obstacle to finding lasting stability for the country, the Government is making an effort to try an move discussions away from the 4.5 dynamic to a more Somali-wide representation.

In terms of displacement patterns and how it affects clans differently, general trends are difficult to highlight. One needs to make a difference between why people were displaced (natural disaster is likely to be less discriminating than targeted conflict) and where they were displaced from. Many reports highlight that IDPs are from minority groups. Ken Menhkhaus specifies: “A significant amount of IDPs have been minority, but those fleeing Mogadishu for instance (in the second half of the 2000s), were very mixed”. Below, some examples of displacement of specific groups:

\textsuperscript{138} According to the Minority Rights Group International, minority groups in Somalia include: ‘Bantu’ (Gosha, Shabelle, Shidle, Boni) 1 million (15%), Gaboye (‘Midgan’) caste groups (Tumal, Yibir, Madhigan, other) 1.5 million (22.5%), Oromo 41,600 (0.4%), and Benadiri Swahili-speakers (including Rer Hamar Amarani, Bajuni) 1.5 million (0.4%) \textsuperscript{139} http://www.minorityrights.org/4515/somalia \textsuperscript{140} The 4.5 clan-based power distribution formula has its origins in the 2000 reconciliation conference for Somalia sponsored by the government of Djibouti in the city of Arta. \textsuperscript{141} ibid
• In the early years after Barre’s ousting, ex regime-aligned groups, such as some Darod clans, were targeted.
• Minority Groups have tended to be targeted by dominant clans during conflict, and have frequently lost assets such as land as a result. These minorities include the Bantu, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir, Gaboye, Bajuni, Benadiri and Bravanese. (see below under economic factors land grabbing of rich agricultural land in the Middle and Lower Jubba)
• In the second half of the 90s, a significant number of Rahanweyn were displaced from Bay and Bakool.
• According to observers142, in 2011, the groups worst hit by the drought are Rahanweyn agropastoralist and Bantu farming communities.

It should also be added that displacement (and the conflict) have to some extent reconfigured the socio-political map of the Somali territories, often concentrating groups previously more mingled, but also often socially diversifying the urban centres where people settle. Several well-armed clan groups expanded on lands not originally theirs and displacing others mainly in the urban and arable areas such as Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, Mogadishu, Galkayo or Kismayo:

• **Puntland** emerged against the background of displacement and social re-concentration as members of the Darod clans were driven out of southern and central areas by Hawiye and allied militia in the early 1990s.
• **Somaliland**: the Isaaq are the most powerful clans
• **Sool, Sanag**: Puntland claims Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) based on kinship ties with the regions’ dominant Darod clans (Warsangeli, Dhubahante and Majerteen subclans). Somaliland claims the territory as part of the original bounds of the former British Somaliland protectorate, which the enclave’s separatist government regards itself as the successor to.
• **Jubaland** (Kismayo, Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo): the Majerten-led Harti (both Darod), the Marehan (Darod) in alliance with the Habargidir (Hawiye) clans, all sought to dominate the affairs of the region. Ogaden (Darod) clan groups are also strategically placed to exert leverage in this region143. In the early 90s, the region was dominated by the Majerteen/Harti. In June 1999 Kismayo and the area came under the controle of the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), a coalition between the Marehan (Darod) clan and the Habargidir (Hawiye). Al-Shabaab insurgents held Kismayo from 2006 to September 2012, when they were ousted by Kenyan troops and forces of the Ras Kamboni militia (Ogaden sub clan). Since its liberation, the struggle over the control of Kismayo and its surrounding areas continues and questions of achieving governance representative of all the clans of the region are at

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142 A. Lindley and I. Lewis for instance.
143 Due to its natural resources and location, Jubaland has the potential to be one of Somalia’s richest regions.
the heart. Efforts to form a regional, secular administration began in 2010 and intensified in 2013.

- **Galmudug State** (Galguduud and Mudug Regions): In 2006 Galmudug declares independence with South Galkayo its capital. The main clan is Habr Gidir (Hawiye).

- **Mogadishu**: according I. Lewis, “some Hawiye have assumed control of Benadir areas in the course of the Civil War in Southern Somalia”.

- **Rich agricultural areas**, as illustrated below in the section on economic factors, have undergone substantial changes due to heavy infusions of non-resident clans supported by their militias

Ken Menkhaus warns that the loss of the **cosmopolitan** understanding of Mogadishu and Kismayo are serious impediments to a longterm solution and should be pursued as a matter of priority: “Mogadishu can't continue to be considered a Hawiye dominated city nor Kismayo a Darod dominated one”.

Some groups have also moved away from their minority status and gained power, such as the **Rer Hamar**\(^{144}\) or the **Rahanweyn**\(^{145}\).

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- Minority Groups have tended to be targeted by dominant clans during conflict, and have frequently lost assets such as land as a result. These minorities include the Bantu, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir, Gaboye, Bajuni, Benadir, and Bravanese. (see below under economic factors land grabbing of rich agricultural land in the Middle and Lower Jubba)

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\(^{144}\) ACCORD, Clans in Somalia: Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009, pp.17-19: They gained power because 1) The Rer Hamar who succeeded in achieving asylum abroad were successful in raising their case internationally, which also contributed to an awareness about them as a community within Somalia itself, and among members of the transitional governments who were seeking international support; 2) An effect of the latter is that Rer Hamar in Mogadishu acquired political positions within the transitional government, as well a number of key positions within the regional administration of Benadir and local government of Mogadishu; 3) The combination of increased advocacy, increased political influence and establishment of relations with strong ‘noble’ clans (especially Hawiye Abgal and Habr Gedir), through marriage, mean that they are no longer targeted with impunity as for instance the ‘Jareer’ groups.

\(^{145}\) The Rahanweyne were traditionally considered minorities but witnessed a progressive change in status and have achieved political representation (and access to arms).
In the second half of the 90s, a significant number of Rahanweyn were displaced from Bay and Bakool.

According to observers\textsuperscript{146}, in 2011, the groups worst hit by the drought are Rahanweyn agropastoralist and Bantu farming communities.

It should also be added that displacement (and the conflict) have to some extent reconfigured the socio-political map of the Somali territories, often concentrating groups previously more mingled, but also often socially diversifying the urban centres where people settle. Several well-armed clan groups expanded on lands not originally theirs and displacing others mainly in the urban and arable areas such as Lower Shabelle, Juba Valley, Mogadishu, Galkayo or Kismayo:

- **Puntland** emerged against the background of displacement and social re-concentration as members of the Darod clans were driven out of southern and central areas by Hawiye and allied militia in the early 1990s.
- **Somaliland**: the Isaq are the most powerful clans
- **Sool, Sanag**: Puntland claims Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) based on kinship ties with the regions’ dominant Darod clans (Warsangeli, Dhuulbahante and Majerteen subclans). Somaliland claims the territory as part of the original bounds of the former British Somaliland protectorate, which the enclave's separatist government regards itself as the successor to.
- **Jubaland** (Kismayo, Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo): the Majerten-led Harti (both Darod), the Marehan (Darod) in alliance with the Habargidir (Hawiye) clans, all sought to dominate the affairs of the region. Ogaden (Darod) clan groups are also strategically placed to exert leverage in this region\textsuperscript{147}. In the early 90s, the region was dominated by the Majerteen/Harti. In June 1999 Kismayo and the area came under the controle of the Juba Valley Alliance (JVA), a coalition between the Marehan (Darod) clan and the Habargidir (Hawiye). Al-Shabaab insurgents held Kismayo from 2006 to September 2012, when they were ousted by Kenyan troops and forces of the Ras Kamboni militia (Ogaden sub clan). Since its liberation, the struggle over the control of Kismayo and its surrounding areas continues and questions of achieving governance representative of all the clans of the region are at the heart. Efforts to form a regional, secular administration began in 2010 and intensified in 2013.
- **Galmudug State** (Galguduud and Mudug Regions): In 2006 Galmudug declares independence with South Galkayo its capital. The main clan is Habr Gidir (Hawiye).
- **Mogadishu**: according I. Lewis, "some Hawiye have assumed control of Benadir areas in the course of the Civil War in Southern Somalia".

\textsuperscript{146} A. Lindley and I. Lewis for instance.
\textsuperscript{147} Due to its natural resources and location, Jubaland has the potential to be one of Somalia’s richest regions.
• **Rich agricultural areas**, as illustrated below in the section on economic factors, have undergone substantial changes due to heavy infusions of non-resident clans supported by their militias.

Ken Menkhaus warns that the loss of the *cosmopolitan* understanding of Mogadishu and Kismayo are serious impediments to a longterm solution and should be pursued as a matter of priority: "Mogadishu can't continue to be considered a Hawiye dominated city nor Kismayo a Darod dominated one".

Some groups have also moved away from their minority status and gained power, such as the **Rer Hamar**\(^\text{148}\) or the **Rahanweyn**\(^\text{149}\).

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\(^{148}\)**ACCORD, Clans in Somalia: Report on a Lecture by Joakim Gundel, COI Workshop Vienna, 15 May 2009, pp.17-19:** They gained power because 1) The Rer Hamar who succeeded in achieving asylum abroad were successful in raising their case internationally, which also contributed to an awareness about them as a community within Somalia itself, and among members of the transitional governments who were seeking international support; 2) An effect of the latter is that Rer Hamar in Mogadishu acquired political positions within the transitional government, as well a number of key positions within the regional administration of Benadir and local government of Mogadishu; 3) The combination of increased advocacy, increased political influence and establishment of relations with strong 'noble' clans (especially Hawiye Abgal and Habr Gedir), through marriage, mean that they are no longer targeted with impunity as for instance the 'Jareer' groups.

\(^{149}\)**The Rahanweyne were traditionally considered minorities but witnessed a progressive change in status and have achieved political representation (and access to arms).**
Annex J – Assessment Matrix Used in the Field

The assignment used an assessment matrix to cover the IDP site data collection: a socio-economic and political matrix aimed at assessing the situation, needs and strategies of the IDPs; the power influencing of different actors on the situation of IDPs; and stakeholder perceptions of the options for humanitarian actors and other aid agencies to reach out to the IDPs in light of the political-economic context.

The format of the matrices is presented below.

**Matrix – general outline**

- Date of assessment:
- Assessor:
- Name of region and district:
- Name of IDP site:
- Signify whether new or old site (give indication of approximate date when it started)
- Respondent gender:
- Age:
- Occupation (if any)
  (And function, in case he/she is a member of an IDP camp committee):

**SECTION 2: IDP MOVEMENT, LAND, AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q2.1</th>
<th>How did you decide on where to settle?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q2.2</td>
<td>How long have you stayed at this site? And have you stayed at other sites before? What made you change sites?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2.3</td>
<td>Can IDPs freely move from one site to the other? Explain the answer and give examples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2.4</td>
<td>Where do you expect to stay one year from now? And three years from now?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2.5</td>
<td>What are the key factors that will determine your interest/possibility for moving (name three and prioritise)?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SECTION 2: IDP MOVEMENT, LAND, AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS**

Q2.6 – What are the key factors that will determine your interest in settling for good in this area (name three and prioritise)?

Q2.7 - Who owns the land you have settled on?

Q2.8 – Who decides on who can settle on the land?

Q2.9 – Do you pay a rent to stay here (amount, regularity, and to whom)?

Q2.10 – Does this IDP site have a camp management committee?  
If yes, how are they selected?  
What is its makeup (no. of men, women, minority clans)?

Q2.11 – How does the camp management committee relate to the overall site management?

Q2.12 – Are the local authorities involved in managing the IDP site? If so, How?

**SECTION 3: IDPS NEEDS AND HOW THEY ARE ADDRESSED**

Q3.1 – How does your family make an income?

Q3.2 – What are the livelihood opportunities
   - In the camp
   - Outside the camp

Q3.3 – Are there options for improving your livelihood situation in the next year?

Q3.4 – Do you have access to:
   - Water?
   - Sanitation?
   - Education?
   - Health facilities?
SECTION 3: IDPS NEEDS AND HOW THEY ARE ADDRESSED

Q3.5 – If yes to any of the questions in 3.4, then: Who provides these services? And is there any cost involved?

Q3.6 – Who provides the security for you and your family? And do you pay for this service?

Q3.7 – Is the local government involved in service delivery on your site?

Q3.8 – Are there any NGOs providing services on your site? Which?

Q3.8 – Is there violence or misuse of IDPs in the IDP sites? What are the incidents? Who is involved?

Q3.9 – Are women exposed to abuse?

Q3.10 – Are the opportunities for men and women equal in terms of sustaining livelihoods in the IDP camps?

Q3.11 – Are IDPs involved in addressing their own needs?

Q3.12 – How can IDPs’ play roles in addressing their own needs be improved?

Q3.13 – Who do IDPs turn to if they face challenges?

SECTION 4 - WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ABOUT THE FOLLOWING ACTORS:

1. Do they have a role to play in IDP sites? If yes, what kind? Give concrete examples.

2. Can they play a role in improving or not improving the situation for IDPs? If yes, how? Give concrete examples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Role they play in IDP sites or for IDPs in general</th>
<th>Positive aspects</th>
<th>Negative aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District level officials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xaafad Level Official</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waah Level Official /traditional leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<th>Role they play in IDP sites or for IDPs in general</th>
<th>Positive aspects</th>
<th>Negative aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan leaders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Business persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp (management) committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs/Relief workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatekeepers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex K - Recommendations for Further Analysis

Three areas in need of additional studies have been identified to inform future development oriented assistance involving IDPs. These relate to land, sustainable return for women and female-headed households, and economic development.

Land

Even though there is recognition from all those interviewed on the importance of dealing with the issue of land registration and ownership, few organisations have made a point to address it. This is understandable given that the issue of land reclamation, restitution and rights is usually extremely sensitive and can be especially difficult in the conflict and post-conflict context of Somalia. However, in order to sustainably engage in development-oriented activities such as urban planning, sustainable development and investment, it cannot be ignored.

Further analysis would provide the Somali administrations with reliable information that would assist in the development of medium and long-term solutions. Experiences from other post-conflict countries that have managed to find workable solutions could play a significant role. This analysis could explore the feasibility of such mechanisms as setting up a land commission (with the needed legitimacy among the different groupings in Somalia); development of legal aid programmes (working closely with programmes aimed at strengthening of the rule of law\textsuperscript{156}) that also make use of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms that still play an important part in Somali culture; the legislation of land and how to integrate the sometimes conflicting land laws and practices as adjudicated by Islam, tradition, and contemporary regulations.

As mentioned earlier, of particular relevance are the ongoing talks related to the development of a Somali Country Compact and eventually, through a referendum, the articulation of a National Development Plan. Because the process seeks to engage all three administrations, this could provide an opportunity to not only agree on how to approach the land issue, but also on how to deal with all the other related mechanisms that will support land reform: the judiciary, and relevant institutions.

Sustainable IDP returns with a specific focus on female-headed households

Returns to areas of origin are becoming more of a reality, especially with the increased refugee returns from Kenya, and returns to rural areas by urban IDPs, particularly from the Benadir regions of South Somalia, as a result of adverse positions taken by the FGoS, and so on. As seen above, there are a significant number of households that are headed by women as a result of the conflict. Returns are encouraged, but so far, no significant analysis has been conducted on

\textsuperscript{156} An example in Somalia is the Governance and Rule of Law Programme implemented by UNDP with funding from a number of donors.
the vulnerabilities that these female-headed households encounter on their return. Considering that property and women’s human rights are still areas that need to be addressed in Somalia, return programmes would be in a better position of understanding how to mitigate the negative impacts that female-headed households might encounter.

**Economic development**

It is agreed by most of those interviewed that economic development is a pre-requisite to the overall development of Somalia. To guide the design of activities aimed at economic development, market studies/analysis should be carried out to determine how best to undertake such initiatives. This could then progress towards the development of an appropriate and comprehensive approach towards programming and investment strategies to stimulate the local economy with the involvement of IDPs.

A market analysis for skills development would form part of this analysis, and ideally, this would involve the private sector. The bulk of skills development activities in Somalia have centred around such areas as low level mechanics, carpentry and masonry; home industries for women (tailoring, soap-making, tie & dye) and subsistence farming. While these skills have been useful in supporting day-to-day income generation for households, in order to truly support sustainable economic development, greater emphasis should also be paid to higher level skills development such as engineering and service-oriented training in areas such as health, education, management and so on. The thriving telecommunication industry gives an indication of the possible economic dividends of such skills.

The conflict has resulted in a significant number of female-headed households who have had to adapt in order to support their families. The above market analysis could also explore ways in which women can be supported to participate more fully in the labour market, and not only as petty traders. Aside from the traditional roles of nurse, teacher, secretary, and so on, they could also be supported in other non-traditional trades such as information technology and management.

Furthermore, the analysis should relate to the benefits of access to markets and services provided by small and medium-size towns across Somalia for economic growth, and the potential of IDPs settling in these areas.