Forced Displacement of and Potential Solutions for
IDPs and refugees in the Sahel –
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania & Niger
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Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 4
1.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 7
2.0 Current Situations, Context and Causes .................................................................................................. 10
   Table 1: Overview of displacement figures in the Sahel ................................................................. 10
   Figure 1: Key Displacement Situations in the Sahel (2013) ............................................................ 11
2.1 Context .................................................................................................................................................. 11
   Figure 2: Refugees in the Sahel .......................................................................................................... 12
2.2 Country Situations ............................................................................................................................... 13
2.3 Displacement Characteristics .............................................................................................................. 15
   Table 2: Ethnic distribution of displaced populations (Malian crisis) ............................................. 16
   Table 3: Refugee population trends by country – Mali Crisis. March 2012 – July 2013 ............. 17
3.0 Durable Solution Prospects ................................................................................................................ 18
3.1 Criteria for return ................................................................................................................................. 18
   Table 4: Protracted nature of situations ......................................................................................... 18
3.2 Development needs, challenges, and opportunities ........................................................................ 21
   Figure 3: Livelihoods before and after displacement ....................................................................... 22
4.0 Recommendations .................................................................................................................................. 27
Annex 1: Notes on legal framework for displaced population by country ........................................... 34
References ..................................................................................................................................................... 37
Executive Summary

Currently in the Sahel region, approximately 1.1 million persons are forcibly displaced as a result of conflict. Of these, the largest groups are the 353,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Mali, who fled the armed fighting in 2012, and the 280,000 refugees from Sudan, who have crossed into Chad. Renewed violence in Mali in September and October 2013 highlights the volatility of the region and the challenge for those displaced who seek to return to their place of origin.

Prospects for the displaced look bleak. Refugees and IDPs are on a pathway into deeper poverty, they have lost livestock, livelihoods and access to services. The situation looks set to be a long term challenge; approximately 70% of those displaced in the region currently have no prospects for a sustainable return. Already some of those affected have been living away from their areas of origin for more than twenty years.

Beyond the 1.1 million displaced, a much larger population is impacted by the affects of displacement. This wider group includes members of host communities where the displaced come to reside, those who are left behind in communities of origin, and ‘returnees’ who have been able to resettle in a previous residence.

Tackling displacement in the Sahel is critical for both poverty alleviation and stabilization, and only a development response will be adequate to the task. There are important incentives for Governments and international actors to build upon current humanitarian responses with a holistic, longer term development response to the challenges of forced displacement in the region. These incentives include the following:

- Given that the majority of the displaced in the region face protracted displacement, their risks of vulnerability and exclusion will increase as their displacement continues. Mitigating these risks requires a development planning timeframe that anticipates the displacement to continue for the medium and long term.

- If designed with a development lens, implementing support for displaced persons can address some of the underlying causes of conflict, instability and fragility in the region. Targeting development resources at the displaced and their host/return communities, can be an effective entry point for investing in broader conflict-mitigation work, such as strengthening governance, livelihood improvement, building resilience, and fostering social cohesion.

- Seeing displacement as a development challenge will ensure that displaced persons are integrated in strategic development initiatives. If they continue to be seen as a humanitarian target, there is a risk the displaced will not benefit from broader national and regional development investments, lose human capital and become even more marginalized in that process.

A development response to forced displacement in the Sahel requires a regional approach. Such an approach would have the benefits of being able to: (i) overcome challenges relating to cross-border movements, (ii) obtain commitments by host governments to support the prospects of displaced from neighboring countries, and (iii) facilitate common approaches, shared conceptualization and learning. A regional approach will be appropriate in the context of ECOWAS cooperation, as three of five countries suffering the heaviest displacement in the region are members of that organization, namely Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

The purpose of this scoping study on forced displacement is to contribute towards the formulation of a regional policy framework for sustainable solutions to displacement and towards the substantiation of a development response. This study, undertaken jointly by UNHCR and the Global Program on Forced
Displacement (GPFD) in the Social Development Department (SDV) of the World Bank in June 2013, indicates that the main development challenges for the displaced in the region are as follows:

- **Livelihoods.** Most displaced persons have been unable to resume farming or pastoralist livelihood practices; doing so would put further strain on limited land and water resources in the areas where they have settled. The location of temporarily displaced people varies based on their pre-displacement livelihoods: IDPs are in large majority agriculturalists; refugees are in majority pastoralists. Outside of camps, the displaced have often relied on intense mobility to mitigate the burden placed on host families and communities. This mobility further undermines conditions for the resumption of livelihood activities. In camps, livelihood opportunities are limited and are very different from the displaced pre-displacement activities, requiring new skills and assets. The ability of displaced pastoralists to retain livestock varies across the region but there have been considerable losses. The loss of livestock has affected women with the decrease in milk availability, affecting their revenue and supplemental feeding for small children.

- **Relations with host communities.** Support from communities hosting refugees and IDPs has been an important response in the crisis so far but is now stretched to breaking point. Tensions are becoming more frequent, as displaced populations compete with host communities for the same limited resources. Under these circumstances, ethnic differences between host and displaced population become the focus of resentment and tension.

- **Cohesion.** Ethnic and social tensions, which were among the drivers of conflicts in the region, remain active among the displaced communities. There is some evidence that protracted displacement and expectation of retaliation on return is leading to greater politicization of the displaced along ethnic lines. Traditional community based structures, which have long regulated relations between pastoralists and agriculturalists, appear to be increasingly weakened and ineffective in conflict resolution. These conflicts present a high risk of escalation along ethnic lines because livelihood activities traditionally reflect an ethnic division of labor (even though that division is increasingly blurred).

- **Depletion of services.** The outflow of civil servants - teachers and health workers - during displacement has forced the closure of services for those who remained. In areas of settlement, the population influx has put further pressure on already struggling educational services and corresponding decline in attendance.

- **Governance.** Across the region, there is general discontent among displaced populations towards various governments for enabling the conditions that led to displacement. These include: marginalization of the affected populations, the lack of rule of law, and the absence of adequate services for stability.

The priorities for development responses for displacement related challenges in the Sahel - addressing the needs of the displaced, their host and return communities - are:

- Securing political buy-in and Governmental support at a regional and country-specific level for a development response to forced displacement

- Improving the monitoring of population movement and knowledge on the locations, profiles and needs of the displaced, their host and return communities.

- Ensuring that the displaced and those affected by them can benefit from ongoing wider development investments in the region by designing ‘displacement-sensitive’ interventions which
include the displaced as targeted beneficiaries and adapt project activities to take their needs into account alongside other poor and vulnerable groups.

- Strengthening services in affected areas through targeted regional investment programs, which mitigate the strain on infrastructure, education, water and other resources availability posed by the influx of refugees and IDPs.

- Responding to the particular needs of the transhumant pastoralists who have been displaced. Although population movement and migration is a way of life for them, those affected by conflict now have severely constrained migration and coping choices and have suffered loss of livestock. Supporting their livelihood recovery is a key imperative for the region.

- Employment creation and livelihood generation for those displaced into urban settings, to facilitate them acquiring useful, applicable new skills, which can benefit themselves and their host communities.

- Delivering resources for the displaced in such a way that important outcomes are achieved: the resilience of affected persons is increased, host and return communities also benefit, governance and state building is strengthened and affected persons are consulted and participate in the decisions that affect them.

- Exploring the creative use of new technologies to extent information and development benefits to the displaced, who are often mobile and hard to access.
1.0 Introduction

Currently in the Sahel region, approximately 1.1 million persons are forcibly displaced as a result of conflict. This includes refugees, who crossed an international border, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled to new locations within their own country. These refugees and IDPs are on a pathway into deeper poverty, they have lost livestock, livelihoods and access to services. They have suffered from violence and loss of assets, from the destruction of ways of life. They are faced with the difficulty of adapting to new locations. The situation looks set to be a long term challenge; approximately 70% of those displaced in the region currently have no prospects for a sustainable return. Already some of those affected have been living away from their areas of origin for more than twenty years.

Beyond the 1.1 million displaced, a much larger population is impacted by the effects of displacement. This wider group includes members of host communities where the displaced come to reside, those who are left behind in communities of origin, and ‘returnees’ who have been able to settle in a previous residence. These groups are also at risk of impoverishment, especially in the context of strained services and diminishing resources in the Sahel. Competition over access to scarce resources is causing tensions amongst communities affected by displacement, these in turn exaggerate and politicize the ethnic and social differences, which contributed to the conflict in the first case and could perpetuate the instability of the region.

Tackling displacement in the Sahel is therefore critical for both poverty alleviation and stabilization, and only a development response will be adequate to the task. Humanitarian agencies - Government and Non-Governmental – are addressing the immediate shelter, protection and food security needs of the refugees and IDPs in the region. But global experience shows that short term humanitarian assistance for the displaced cannot fully mitigate the risk of vulnerability and marginalization associated with displacement. Indeed, all too often a humanitarian response for the displaced contributes to their dependency and lack of self reliance. Their eventual need for safety nets and further support can be a fiscal drain for the Government for years to come.

There are important incentives for Governments and international actors to build upon humanitarian responses with a holistic, longer term development response to the challenges of forced displacement in the region. These incentives include the following:

i) The majority of those displaced in the Sahel region appear likely to remain in protracted displacement. Without sustainable solutions, their risks of vulnerability and exclusion will increase, the longer their displacement continues. Mitigating these risks requires a development planning timeframe, which anticipates the displacement to continue for the medium and long term.

ii) Unlike humanitarian support, development responses focus on building the resilience and self reliance of those affected by displacement, through improved skills and assets. These resources will enable the displaced to better flourish whatever their location, whether they remain in new communities or are able to return.

iii) Equipping the displaced, their host and return communities with assets for recovery can bring development benefits for the wider society. Investing in the human, social and economic capital of those affected can reinvigorate the wider communities where they settle or return. In the case of return of refugees and IDPs, these resources can speed the recovery and bring new potential and economic dynamism to these regions.

iv) Seeing displacement as a development challenge will ensure that displaced persons are integrated in strategic development initiatives. If they continue to be seen as a humanitarian
target, there is a risk the displaced will not benefit from broader national and regional development investments, and become even more marginalized in that process, which could lead to further instability.

v) If designed with a development lens, implementing support for displaced persons can at the same time address some of the underlying causes of conflict, instability and fragility in the region. Targeting development resources at the displaced can be an effective entry point for investing in broader conflict-mitigation work, such as strengthening governance, livelihood improvement, building resilience and fostering social cohesion.

vi) Based on global experience, international humanitarian actors are increasingly stressing the need for early displacement-related interventions to be influenced by development thinking. There is recognition that early development responses can mitigate the adverse outcomes of protracted displacement. This position is growing in emphasis in global policy on displacement and good practice examples of the approach are increasing.¹

Defining a development response for forced displacement in the Sahel requires both a country-specific and regional approach. A regional approach is required to address the situation of refugees. In the Sahel, refugees account for two-thirds of the displaced population. Country specific development responses cannot fully meet the needs of refugees who have crossed international borders. Promoting development responses for the displaced will entail commitments by host governments to supporting the prospects of persons who originated in neighboring countries. Addressing displacement will also need policy and practical cooperation on cross-border development challenges, for which a regional framework will be beneficial.

A regional response is also appropriate in the context of ECOWAS cooperation. Three out of five countries suffering the heaviest displacement in the region are ECOWAS members – Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. ECOWAS provides a unique framework, which establishes freedom of movement and the right of residence and establishment for all nationals of member states. In practice, numerous challenges remain to cross border movement, the establishment of residence, or free work.² ECOWAS collaboration on displacement challenges would turn this legislation into reality. It would also set an important precedent for regional collaboration on other humanitarian, development and migration issues.

There are many regional commonalities in the development challenges for the displaced. One issue that transcends national borders is that of displaced nomadic pastoralist groups who are dependent on being transitory but are unable to repeat traditional migration patterns due to armed violence impeding their routes and livelihoods. A regional approach will allow shared conceptualization of and learning on how to address this and other common issues. There are currently strong opportunities for such mutual cooperation and shared learning in the formulation of the World Bank Regional Sahel Initiative.

Nevertheless, due to the specificity of contexts and causes of displacement, a regional response will need to be complemented by country-specific policies and programs. Many of the issues will need to be addressed in the setting of political economy incentives, which only national governments can determine.

The purpose of this study is to contribute towards the formulation of a regional policy framework for sustainable solutions to displacement and towards the substantiation of a development response. It does this by providing ECOWAS leadership, governments, World Bank country teams, UNHCR and other actors in the Sahel region (particularly Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania), with an analysis of (i) the drivers, spatial patterns, nature, and scale of forced displacement in the Sahel region (including profiles of displaced populations, their needs, and durable solutions prospects), and (ii) the development options and actions for supporting durable solutions for displaced populations.
This note first provides an overview of the extent of displacement in the region, as well as the contextual factors and historical forces leading up to the current dynamic of displacement in the Sahel. The note then discusses the profiles of the various displacement situations, needs and priorities, the likelihood of protracted displacement, the prospects for durable solutions. Finally, it lays out options for policy dialogue and development interventions. In recognition that both regional and country-specific solutions are required, the report describes situations and possible development responses at both levels.

Methodology: The study is based on a desk review of existing documentation and rapid in-country fieldwork undertaken in June 2013. Fieldwork consisted mainly of meetings with key stakeholders (Government representatives, UN agencies, bi-lateral partners and NGOs) currently involved in responses for refugees and IDPs.
2.0 Current Situations, Context and Causes

Across the region, more than 1,100,000 persons are forcibly displaced. For the purpose of this study, ten situations of forced displacement were explored in order to identify opportunities to support durable solutions through development interventions. Working figures for the numbers of displaced in the region are currently as shown in Table 1, rounded to the nearest thousand.³

In the region, refugees account for about two-thirds of the displaced population and IDPs for about one third. There are some differences between challenges faced by refugees and those faced by IDPs. There has been far less research on appropriate durable solutions for IDPs compared to refugees.⁴ Legal norms and protection is typically not as clearly defined for IDPs compared to refugees.

Table 1: Overview of displacement figures in the Sahel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi in Mauritania (refugees)</td>
<td>26,000 in refugees-like conditions</td>
<td>⁵ (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Mauritanians</td>
<td>12,000 Refugees in Mali 24,000 Returnees in Mauritania</td>
<td>⁶ (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali crisis of 2012 (refugees and IDPs)</td>
<td>353,000 IDPs (June 20, 2013) 171,000 Refugees: 50,000 Refugees in Burkina Faso 70,000 Refugees in Mauritania 50,000 Refugees in Niger, including approx. 3,000 returned nationals</td>
<td>⁷ (09/2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina/Mali/Niger borders (IDPs)</td>
<td>Cyclical conflicts</td>
<td>⁸ (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Niger</td>
<td>11,000 (2012), all returned</td>
<td>⁹ (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returning migrants from Libya</td>
<td>(Organized returns only:) Burkina Faso: 1,600 Chad: 87,000 Niger: 97,000</td>
<td>¹⁰ (03/2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram in Nigeria/Niger (returning nationals and refugees)</td>
<td>10,000 - 20,000 Refugees and returning nationals including at the minimum: 3,000 Nigerian refugees 3,000 Returning nationals</td>
<td>¹¹ (09/2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic crisis (refugees in Chad)</td>
<td>79,000</td>
<td>¹² (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadian internal displacement</td>
<td>0 (gouv.) – 120,000 IDPs (UNHCR)</td>
<td>¹³ (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur crisis (refugees)</td>
<td>281,000 refugees in Chad</td>
<td>¹⁴ (2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.1 Context

With long traditions of pastoralism in the region, population movement is not a new phenomenon in the Sahel. Population movement is a normal aspect of life for pastoralists in the Sahel who migrate according to seasonal patterns and climatic variations. Migration is also the result of rapid urbanization, economic migration, and a general southward movement due to increasingly marginal living conditions in the northern part of the Sahel. Forced displacement does not occur in isolation from these movement cycles and trends.

Recent political and environmental stressors have, however, resulted in a critical level of forced displacement. This forced movement resulting from conflict is different from other cycles of population movement. Forced displacement may prevent such cycles (e.g. transhumance) or on the contrary accelerate trends (e.g. urbanization). The impact of forced displacement on pastoralists, for example, is that they have more constrained choices and limited power over access to resources. One direct effect of forced displacement on existing migratory patterns is that economic migrants are forced to return to their country of origin as a result of conflicts.

The drivers of conflicts and subsequent forced displacement in the Sahel include environmental, economic, socio-ethnic and governance factors. An initial discussion of the drivers of conflict and subsequent forced displacement is useful as the nature and causes of conflict influence durable solution prospects. These causes include:\(^{15}\)

- Environmental characteristics (drought, floods), limiting livelihood opportunities and productivity, with recurrent humanitarian crisis;
Livelihood patterns, resulting in regular tensions between agriculturalist and pastoralist activities, especially regarding access to water and grazing areas, reinforced by changing migratory patterns due to climate change and extreme weather patterns. This is further compounded by the fact that there was a traditional ethnic division of labor, with specific ethnic groups engaging in pastoralism engaged in agricultural activities. This division is no longer maintained in all cases but remains an important feature of the socio-economic context.

Development decisions, including a historical inequality of investment in infrastructure across the region. Agricultural development did not take into account pre-existing migratory arrangements or pastoralism as a viable livelihood in general, reinforcing disputes over access to water and land, and the marginalization of northern areas of the Sahel;

Ethnic and social tensions, resulting partially from structural inequalities and competition for limited resources;

Weak institutions and capacity, and poor governance, limiting the states’ ability to provide basic services and security, especially in the northern parts of the Sahel characterized by low population density, leaving opportunities for traditional structures and/or criminal and radical groups to compete for control;

Increased dependency on trafficking and other criminal activity as a livelihood alternative because of limited opportunities;

Growing population sizes, with major bulges of youth who compete for limited socio-economic opportunities, including education and jobs, resulting in high youth unemployment;

A growing threat of extremist groups, fueled by the increased availability of weapons;

Limitations of existing early warning systems which undermine the prevention and mitigation of complex crises.

There has been a steady increase in the absolute numbers of displaced in the region. The factors outlined together with impoverishment and political marginalization, they have contributed to grievances along ethnic lines over several decades – leading, for example, to the Touareg rebellion of 1989. These factors reinforce a growing disconnect and mistrust between populations and the central government, and they have ultimately led to conflicts and mass violence in the region, compounded by recurrent food crises and chronic poverty. The numbers of people fleeing these challenges have steadily increased.

Figure 2: Refugees in the Sahel
2.2 Country Situations

Mali: the Malian crisis accounts for the large majority of the IDPs and about one third of the refugee population in the Sahel. As of September 2013, the total number of Malian displaced is approximately 524,000 individuals. This comprises 171,000 Malian refugees in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mauritania, Niger and Togo and an estimated 353,000 IDPs.

The current crisis in Northern Mali has deep roots. Traditionally, populations in this area have been dependent on nomadism, keeping of livestock and trans-Saharan trade. The artificially imposed national boundaries of the 19th century had already interrupted trade routes, while the nomads’ livelihood was undermined by the Sahelian droughts of 1973 and 1984, which led to major loss of livestock and large-scale desertification. This resulted in political marginalization and impoverishment of the population, at the root of the Touareg rebellion, which began in Niger in 1989 and quickly spread to Mali. This Touareg rebellion of 1989 caused the flight of close to 150,000 persons from Mali. After protracted negotiations and numerous setbacks, efforts resulted in political settlements that paved the way for the return of the refugees. Most eventually returned between 1995 and 1997.

The current crisis comes on the heels of droughts in 2005 and 2010, which impacted already vulnerable households through losses of productive assets and reductions in income, leaving many households too poor to survive without assistance. More recently, erratic rainfall, low agricultural output, and high food prices in 2011 and 2012 led to a food crisis across the Sahel that has affected close to 20 million people and put one million children at risk of starvation. Compounding the region’s problems, armed conflict broke out in Mali in January 2012 when Touareg separatists and an Islamic militant group linked to Al Qaeda took control of large areas of northern Mali, forcing thousands to flee their homes.

Following a rapidly deteriorating situation in Mali, where rebel groups consolidated their control of the north, leaving the area inaccessible to aid agencies, and a coup in the capital Bamako in March, the French military intervened on January 11, 2013. For several months, continued violence and intimidation by armed actors in northern Mali, the inability of humanitarian actors to access affected areas, and the worsening humanitarian situation, all forced more Malians to flee and closed off the possibility of return. More recently, however, IDPs and refugees have started to return to their place of origin following the signature of a ceasefire between the government of Mali and Touareg rebels in June 2013 and the rapid holding of presidential elections in July (1st round) and August (2nd round) 2013. The scale of these returns is not yet reflected in the statistics available as of September 2013, but there are accounts of tens of thousands of returns among IDPs, and thousands of returns among refugees. The situation remains nevertheless fragile as the outcome of the peace process following the ceasefire agreement between the government and Touareg rebels remains unknown. Renewed violence in September and October 2013 and fear of attacks highlight the volatility of the region and the challenge for those displaced who seek to return to their place of origin.

Chad: the second largest displacement situation in the region concerns Chad. The country is host to 281,000 Sudanese refugees from Darfur, 79,000 refugees from the Central African Republic and a population of its own IDPs.

The Darfur conflict of Sudan, originating from 2003, has several root causes, among which, two are particularly salient: (i) the scarcity of resources such as land and water. This problem has become more acute due to demographic growth and desertification, which has been taking place since the 1980s. The tribes traditionally solved conflicts around resources peacefully at so-called “conferences” but desertification has resulted in mass migration from neighbouring countries, driven by livestock keepers searching for grazing lands; (ii) the ethnic diversity of the region: the population of Darfur is predominantly Islamic (so there is no decisive religious difference with Northern Sudan) but ethnically, there is a division between “Arab” and “non-Arab” (Negroid, African) tribes. As long as political
conditions are not appropriate for their return to Darfur, refugees are likely to remain in Chad in the coming years, requiring protection and humanitarian support in accordance to Chad’s international legal commitments.

Internal tensions and trans-border impact of conflict in Darfur also displaced Chadians in eastern Chad from 2006 and onwards. After decades of sub-regional political instability, 2011 marked a turning point in the relationship between Chad and the Sudan. Change was also marked by the signature of the peace agreement of January 15, 2010, which officially ended the seven year old proxy war. Following a tripartite summit in May 2011, it was decided to deploy a joint force (Chad, Sudan and the CAR) among others, to protect common borders through enhanced security coordination and to foster a culture of peaceful co-existence amongst the tribes living along the borders and in the sub-region. According to the Chadian government, the stabilisation of the situations means there are currently no more IDPs in the country. However, this assertion is subject to debate since not all IDPs from the eastern part of the country have yet returned.

The ongoing conflict in CAR and the coup in March 2013 have resulted in an influx of refugees into the southern part of Chad. In addition, about 90,000 registered Chadian migrants have arrived from Libya since 2011. Apart from these conflicts, food insecurity, failed harvests, and inconsistent rains have affected movement patterns. Regional socio-economic challenges and political dynamics contribute to trends that have resulted in Chad being a host country not only to refugees, but also to victims of human trafficking.

**Niger:** in addition to the influx of refugees from Mali, Niger is experiencing a separate wave of displacement in Diffa due to the conflict between the government of Nigeria and Boko Haram. An estimated 3,500 Niger citizens are living in Nigeria, and 2,500 Nigerians have crossed the border between 2012 and 2013 to Niger and are considered refugees. Boko Haram, an Islamic guerilla group, has allegedly grown in numbers of fighters and gun power. The current situation has its origin in 2006, when important migrations from Niger to Nigeria occurred, possibly as a result of recruitment by Boko Haram, and likely as a result of economic opportunities (e.g. Nigeria provides subsidies for agriculture, unlike Niger). As security degraded in northern Nigeria, the population started fleeing local violence, beginning in February 2013. As insecurity became more widespread, displacement became more permanent, as opposed to a back-and-forth movement. Refugees are reluctant to identify themselves as Nigerian or as citizens from Niger due to fear of being seen as Boko Haram sympathizers.

**Mauritania:** Mauritania is associated with two groups linked to two of the most protracted refugee situations in the Sahel - the Sahrawi in northern Mauritania, and the Afro-Mauritanians in Niger. Displacement of the Sahrawi started in 1973 as Spain, the former colonial power, withdrew its presence and the Polisario Front began an armed struggle for independence. Most Sahrawi sought refuge in Morocco and Algeria, but some went to Mauritania. Refugees continue to arrive, with some coming after spending years in Algeria. These refugees are generally regarded as citizens of Mauritania and have full rights to work and move. They do not seek refugee status or assistance and are usually not in contact with UNHCR. However, many have expressed a desire to return to their place of origin if a referendum for self-determination were to be held. The referendum was one of the provisions of a ceasefire brokered by the UN in 1991 but that was never implemented.

Groups of African farmers – Afro-Mauritanians – were forcibly displaced from Mauritania on the order of the government in April 1989, in the context of ethnic and border conflict between nomadic, Arabic-speaking ethnic groups, and sedentary, African farming groups in both Senegal and Mauritania. The Mauritanian government policy dispossessed African farmers of land in the Senegal River Valley and throughout Mauritania, re-distributing land to Arab groups displaced by desertification. Meanwhile, Senegal began to forcibly evict Mauritanian Moors who were living in Senegal. In retaliation, Mauritania
denounced and expelled Afro-Mauritanians mainly from the Pulaar, Soninké and Wolof ethnic groups, which had previously dominated many positions in government.

Up to 60,000 of these Afro-Mauritanian refugees formed settlements in Senegal, in and around the Senegal river valley towns of Dagana, Podor, Matam, and Bakel. Relations with local communities were reportedly good in general. Following the normalization of relations between Senegal and Mauritania in the early 1990s, thousands of Afro-Mauritanians returned to Mauritania with the help of UNHCR or spontaneously. UNHCR facilitated the reintegration of 35,000 returnees into Mauritania through the Special Program for Rapid Integration (SPRI) from 1996 to 1998 (UNHCR). Voluntary repatriation continued until 2012, but 14,100 refugees chose to locally integrate in Senegal as of 2013.

The situation of those who chose to return to Mauritania remains unclear. Many lost land, houses, and herds when they fled or were expelled from Mauritania, and the redistribution of land and properties toward Arab groups is a source of conflict. The expropriation of the land that was formerly used by fleeing refugees, the multiplicity of traditional land use practices, the intervention of legislation, and the changing ecology from water control, irrigation and climate change have made land a complex and controversial issue (World Bank, May 2008). This, in turn, has had a direct impact on livelihood opportunities. Finally, Mauritanian authorities destroyed or confiscated birth certificates of those expelled in 1989. In 1998, the government insisted on evaluating citizenship on a case-by-case basis as part of the return process. However, in many instances this did not yield identity documents for those who had returned prior to 2002.

Over 12,000 Afro-Mauritanians, mainly Peuhls, remain refugees in Mali, mainly in the southwestern Kayes region close to the Mauritanian border. The refugees are not restricted to camps and can live where they want. They are essentially self-supporting through agricultural activity, growing maize, peanuts, and other crops. They have the same rights as nationals to obtain health services and have access to public education equivalent to nationals.

In addition to these situations, cyclical displacement occurs due to local level conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists. This is especially the case along the Burkina Faso/Niger/Chad border. There is little conflict about the driest parts of Touareg territory, and the different pastoralist groups have been moving around in the region, crossing borders when necessary, following a “principle of reciprocity.” However, access to water sources and pastures needed for cattle breeding remains a major source of conflict among pastoralists and between pastoralists and agriculturalists. Insecurity, on the other hand, hinders pastoralists’ ability to move livestock to water and pasturage points. With limited opportunities for movement and an added increased presence of refugees and their herds, the pressures on natural resources in the region are amplified, which could be a potential source of conflict between refugees and local communities. Finally, there are unresolved land conflicts involving many stretches of agricultural land located just south of the Sahara. Farmers in the Sahel region have experienced the impact of the drought cycle on their livelihoods capacities and resilience. The food crisis, as in other parts of the Sahel, is considered to have further catalyzed the rural to urban migration pattern already observed in the region. This underlying factor of vulnerability is an essential element to consider when looking at the current crisis and potential post-crisis and recovery options.

2.3 Displacement Characteristics

Ethnic diversity is an important element of displacement in the Sahel. There is ethnic and cultural variability, even within the same displacement situation. In displacement, stemming from the Mali crisis of 2012, for example, limited data from refugee camps and a survey of urban IDPs in Bamako and Segou shows that there is a strong ethnic divide between IDPs and refugees. Ethnic ties are a factor in the location of displaced populations. The influx of large numbers of individuals of the same group can tilt
pre-existing ethnic balances in the host population. This is reportedly the case in selected areas of Mali, where the influx of Songhai in minority areas has turned the ethnic group into a majority.

**The location of temporarily displaced people varies based on their pre-displacement livelihoods.** In addition to ethnic differences, there is variability in the livelihood of those displaced. IDPs are in large majority agriculturalists. Refugees are in majority pastoralists. Typically, traders and civil servants favor urban areas. In Bamako, IDPs are mainly traders, artisans, and civil servants, while in Segou and Mopti, they are often agriculturalists. However information on this issue is incomplete and there is need for better local understanding of these displacement situation profiles.

**Table 2: Ethnic distribution of displaced populations (Malian crisis)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ethnic groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malian Crisis</td>
<td>Bamako (IDPs)</td>
<td>Songhai (82%), Bambara (5%), Bella (4%), Bozo (3%), Dogon (2%)²⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Segou (IDPs)</td>
<td>Songhai (45%), Touareg (15%), Peuhl (10%), Bella (10%), Bambara (7%)²⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mbera (Refugees, Mauritania) camp</td>
<td>Touareg (35%), Arabs (55%), the remainder of the population being subdivided between Songhai, Bella, Soninké and other minorities.²⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Malian refugees</td>
<td>Touareg (54%), Arab (27%), Songhai (4%), Peuhl (2%), Other (3%)³⁰</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For transhumant or nomadic pastoralists, forced displacement is characterized by their inability to follow their traditional patterns of migration or inability to return to pasture land; this has devastating impact for their livelihoods and ways of life. It is important however to differentiate the difference between transhumant pastoralists – who follow cyclical movements on a yearly basis - and nomad pastoralists – who follow a seasonal migratory pattern that can vary from year to year. Arguably, transhumant pastoralists are more likely to be negatively affected by forced displacement since they have regular encampments, which they would lose access to. But more analysis of migratory patterns is required to substantiate this hypothesis. The relationship between migratory pastoralists and forced displacement is further complicated by reports that some may be voluntarily identifying as IDPs or refugees in order to receive assistance.

Solidarity and community-based hosting of the displaced has been an important feature of displacement across the region. There is a strong sense of solidarity, which means that displaced populations typically receive support from host populations, including shelter. Overall, the political trend in Mali and Niger is to avoid setting up camps for displaced populations; the Nigerien government is not creating camps in relation to the Boko Haram crisis, there are no camps for IDPs in Mali, and a mix of camps and reception zones in Niger for the Mali crisis. This community-based hosting of displaced populations has numerous advantages in terms of strengthening the resilience and agency of displaced individuals and increases the potential economic, civic, and social contribution of these individuals to the host communities. At the same time, it complicates the delivery of services specific to those displaced and makes it harder to quantify the numbers of displaced. For example, in Niger, in the villages adjacent to the camps for Malian IDPs, a large number of Malians are unregistered displaced individuals who prefer to remain out of the camps. Community hosting presents the advantages of better local integration and
access to livelihood opportunities but has disadvantages; in a context of extreme poverty and chronic insecurity, the burden on host communities is considerable, and sometimes results in tensions.

**Displacement in the region is a dynamic process.** During the Mali crisis and to this day, displacement of refugees, for example, occurred in several waves, representing different ethnic groups. The displaced are divided along ethnic lines, with the first wave of migrants being mainly composed of agriculturalists groups and pro-government Touaregs, and the later waves increasingly composed of pastoralists. At first, agriculturalist populations fled the Islamic extremists allied with pro-independence Touaregs. Populations, including an increasing number of pastoralists, then fled the now divided Islamic extremists and pro-independence Touaregs, and finally the population fled during operation Serval – the French led military operation in Mali aimed at ousting Islamic militants. These different waves of displacement have caused different experiences, needs and expectations for return (see durable solutions prospect).

**Table 3: Refugee population trends by country – Mali Crisis. March 2012 – July 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Refugee population trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other notable characteristics of displacement in the Sahel include the frequent separation of households. For example, in Bamako, a survey conducted among IDPs suggests that 30% of the households had at least one household member stay behind – typically the head of household, likely to attend and maintain assets (land, livestock, dwelling) although no further disaggregated data exists on the subject. In Mali, the IDP population is very mobile and families are scattered because after being hosted by friends and families, as the burden on hosting families has been too great. IDPs have had to leave, ultimately having to pay rent and/or keep moving from place to place. Families are frequently separated to reduce the burden on any given host family. One study shows that nearly half the displaced households in Bamako (45%) had to separate from members living in various places to reduce the cost of housing or burden on host families.
3.0 Durable Solution Prospects

3.1 Criteria for return

Across the region, the displacement experience is predominantly a protracted one, i.e. those affected have been displaced for more than five years. This situation is likely to continue as prospects for return for the majority of the displaced remain limited. Approximately 70% of those displaced in the region currently have no prospects for a sustainable return.

Table 4: Protracted nature of situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Protracted?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi in Mauritania (refugees)</td>
<td>Protracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afro-Mauritanians</td>
<td>Protracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali crisis of 2012 (refugees and IDPs)</td>
<td>Return of IDPs, may be protracted for refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina/Mali/Niger borders (IDPs)</td>
<td>Cyclical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Niger</td>
<td>Short-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnee migrant workers from Libya, Mali, and Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Short/Medium-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram in Nigeria /Niger (returning nationals and refugees)</td>
<td>Protracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic Crisis (refugees)</td>
<td>Protracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chadian internal displacement</td>
<td>Protracted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darfur crisis (refugees)</td>
<td>Protracted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The choice of and ability to return is influenced by a range of political economy, security, livelihood, service delivery and governance issues. It is typically assumed that displaced populations will return home once security is achieved in the place of origin. However, experience shows that the decision to return home is influenced by wider contextual factors, and is influenced by analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of various options. Decision-making among displaced populations (including the decision to return home, remain in the current location, or resettle in an alternate location) depends on a number of factors:

- **Political economy.** Given that forced displacement stems from political conflicts and territorial disputes, displacement is always a highly charged political issue. Political will and associated government policy can often prove to be the single greatest determinant of whether displaced persons return, integrate or end up settling on the margins of society. The influence of the political economy context will include elements such as:
• Presence of a state viewed as legitimate – in Mali, holding the elections were a necessary step for IDPs and refugees to consider returning to their place of origin;
• Political progress toward peace and negotiated settlement of conflicts, and inclusion of displacement as an issue to be addressed in those resolutions;
• Level of commitment and resource allocation by a Government to sustainable solutions for those affected by displacement;
• Degree of political ideology in relation to the displaced, for example their political affiliation may lead to responses that position them either as victims or scapegoats, which can affect the type and support extended to them;
• Availability of aid and access to development resources in places of settlement or return.

• Security (generally defined by the absence of violence and the presence of legitimate security actors, including UN forces) and level of violence and traumatization experienced. Fear of reprisal is also a major factor, especially in areas with mixed ethnic composition that include both pastoralists and agriculturalists;

• Livelihood opportunities, such as access to land and agricultural season for farmers, recovery of livestock for pastoralists, or credit for basic inventory among traders, the loss of productive assets, and prospects for restitution;

• Access to basic needs, especially shelter and food;

• Access to services, health, education, social services and utilities;

• Family ties/solidarity, especially the presence of groups with similar ethnic background and/or Diaspora communities;

• Distance and accessibility from their respective area of origin.

• Degree of impoverishment, and whether those affected have the necessary capital and assets to return or rebuild a life in a new location.

• Social compositions, family losses sustained in conflict – such as loss of an adult male and creation of a female headed household, or the loss of children and carers.

Analysis of these factors in the Sahel can help to assess whether ongoing displacement situations will become or remain protracted or will be resolved rapidly. The following assessment of prospects for return is based on initial analysis of these factors in country-specific situations. However, fuller conclusions on whether the displaced will return can only be based on: (i) stronger understanding of the specific political economy, context and individual characteristics in each location, even within a given crisis or situation, (ii) in-depth assessment work of the opinions and circumstances of the displaced themselves, which explores their experience of the incentives and disincentives for return.

3.2 Country Specific Prospects for Return

Return is most likely in Mali, where IDPs express the intention to return home and small numbers of families have begun to reclaim their places of origin, although large-scale returns have yet to begin. According to the Commission des Movements de Population, there are major population movements to and from the north; movements toward the north approximately equated the movement from the north between January and May 2013, and the return trend – although not massive - was confirmed in subsequent months. The government has been supporting the return of IDPs to their place of origin, with, for example, local officials paying transport.
The reasons why few people expect a protracted displacement crisis are multiple and include the fact that the situation in northern Mali is rapidly stabilizing with a relative return to security and service delivery, while IDPs still have little access to livelihood opportunities or assistance. As a result, most have had to spend whatever they have, sell assets, or rely on support from family and friends. Community-based support mechanisms (solidarity) are limited as host families and IDPs have exhausted their resources to pay for rent and other basic needs. A March 2013 IOM survey in selected areas of internal displacement in Mali (Bamako and Koulikoro) suggests strong intentions to return, with 93% of the displaced households planning to return, mainly to their former dwelling (92%). The decision, according to the survey, is mainly based on security conditions (62%), the school calendar (37%), and the agricultural seasonal calendar (5%). In Burkina Faso and Niger, refugee representatives questioned for the purposes of this study, all expressed a wish to return to their place of origin as soon as possible. However, they also stressed that improved security would be a primary precondition for return. It is also important to recognise that the displacement consequences of the conflict will continue long after stability has returned.36

The assessment is different among Malian refugees in Niger, where there is more uncertainty about return intentions. Specifically, there is thought to be a divide between pro-MNLA and pro-government refugees (mainly pastoralists), which conditions their willingness to return. While security is also seen as a necessary condition for the return of refugees, the presence of the state and security forces are polarizing aspects. With regard to security forces, pastoralists fear reprisal or being targeted because of perceived links to the MNLA or even Islamic extremist groups. The 2013 elections were an important criterion, as a lack of legitimacy of the elected government would have hindered returns. However, the elections are hardly sufficient, especially among refugees, for whom political settlement of the conflict remains an important issue (i.e. need for a peace process following the ceasefire). With regard to socio-economic factors, according to UN workers, the high level of services available to refugees in Niger may be discouraging them from leaving, and may have been a driver of displacement among the latest waves of refugees. On the other hand, grazing areas are reputedly better in Mali, which could drive the return of pastoralists.

It is anticipated that the displacement from the crisis in Diffa related to the presence of Boko Haram in Nigeria and on-going military operations against the group by the Nigerian army will be protracted. Little information is available about the unfolding crisis in Diffa. As mentioned earlier, the displacement profile is notable by the absence of camps, with returning nationals and Nigerian refugees living together with host communities. It is also notable because over half those forcibly displaced are returning migrants (approximately. 3,500 out of 6,000, based on May 2013 estimates – current numbers are unknown, but the total displaced populations, refugees and returning nationals, is estimated at 10 to 20,000). It is anticipated that the crisis will be protracted for several reasons:

- There appears to be no rapid solution to the conflict as Boko Haram is a diffused and resilient network, making a military victory unlikely;
- Even if Boko Haram were to be defeated, most refugees would be unlikely to return in areas under control by the army for fear of reprisal. The Nigerian army has been singled out for its targeting of civilians, and many displaced fear being associated with Boko Haram.

In Chad, though refugees in the East and South would like to return, the perspectives are unclear. Sudanese refugees from Darfur have been in the eastern part of Chad for ten years and with the recent outbreak of the conflict in the Tissi region, it seems unlikely that refugees will return in the near future. This fact, combined with budget constrains for UNHCR in Chad in general and in the eastern part in particular, invite reflection on the future of this refugee population as well as on what is needed in order to strengthen their resilience.
With regard to returning migrants from Libya, the crisis appears to be resolved. Many have benefited from assistance, but the main driver for a durable solution was the decision of the displaced to move again in search of other economic opportunities (e.g. in Ghana). No figures are available on the numbers who remained in their place of origins and those who migrated again.

Regardless of whether they are IDPs or refugees, a number of displaced households will decide not to return to their place of origin. Across displacement situations, anecdotal evidences suggest that intentions to resettled elsewhere are higher among those who have higher socio-economic status and/or have already found alternative livelihood opportunities, and are located in urban areas. The trend may reinforce on-going rapid urbanization trends in the Sahel.

3.2 Development needs, challenges, and opportunities

Given the varied prospects for return in the region, a regional development response to displacement in the Sahel will need to encompass responding to situations of return, protracted displacement and relocation. Without fuller assessment of the specific political economy context and return possibilities and intentions of those affected, it is beyond the scope of this paper to make determinations on either the likely and best case scenarios for the displaced to return or remain. Towards formulation of a regional policy framework for sustainable solutions to displacement and towards the substantiation of a development response this review does, however, identify the following common development challenges for the displaced in the region.

Livelihoods: Most displaced persons have been unable to resume farming or pastoralist livelihood practices as affected families temporarily have commonly settled in areas that are chronically insecure. The livelihoods activities pursued by the host populations in these temporary settlement sites are often similar to those pursued by the displaced populations in their place of origin (farming, pastoralism), but due to competition with hosts over access to limited resources (land, water) most displaced households are unable to resume activities. Despite the existence of the freedom of movement provisions for the ECOWAS countries (including Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso), which might have helped refugees with local integration while retaining their nationality, access to livelihood remains very limited and freedom of movement is in practice limited, including access to employment.37

Access to land is especially critical, both for agriculture and for livestock related activities, and varies by situation. In Chad, for example, no land is available to refugees, while in Niger, land access is managed through traditional means and access can be granted. About half the Malian refugees are located in hosting sites which provide the advantage of having land for their livestock. Access to land and water remain important source of tension in relation to displacement. In Mauritania, for example, the return of Afro-Mauritanian refugees resulted in clashes over access to land.38

With a loss of access to land and agriculture and livestock related activities, the displaced face considerable upheaval and change in their livelihood strategies. The following figure is adapted from multiple sources and illustrates the changes in livelihoods among three groups of displaced persons due to the Mali crisis: refugees in Mbera camp (Mauritania), and IDPs in Segou and Bamako (Mali).
The results show that livestock and agriculture no longer play a major role as a source of livelihood among displaced populations in any of the locations of temporary settlement, but that small trade and other activities (such as transportation, hairdresser, etc.) provide alternatives. The results also show that the livelihood at the place of origin differs from that in temporary settlement, notably with salaried work being more common for IDPs in Bamako than elsewhere. This reflects the tendency of salaried personnel and civil servants to move to urban areas. Among urban IDPs, discussion with representatives of the IDPs themselves and NGOs suggest that the IDPs are likely to be unemployed, to work in the informal sector, and to see their opportunity to become employed depreciate over time, confirming findings from other contexts. More generally, in Mali, IDPs appear to have small and unstable incomes because of the lack of a functioning labor market. Only civil servants and traders have reported stable incomes – civil servants because salaries continued to be paid, and traders because they were able to resume some activities.

Across situations, the ability of pastoralists to retain livestock varies, but is overall difficult to assess. During previous displacement (e.g. 1989 Touareg revolution), refugees did not move with their livestock and as a result lost all of it. This time around, many refugees took measures to protect their livestock, but the extent of losses of livestock is unknown. In Niger, some refugees were directed to hosting zones which offer areas for grazing for their livestock. Others are in camps and little information is available about their livestock, which may be in the care of others (e.g. Bella) – either in Mali or Niger. In Burkina Faso and Mauritania, refugees brought in livestock, outnumbering the pre-crisis livestock population and putting further pressure on the environment. In Chad, refugees from Darfur have lost the majority of their livestock.

The loss of livestock has particularly affected women. Women (especially those who are pregnant or lactating) and children (in particular children under the age of five) are affected by the loss of livestock in the following ways: (i) total household revenue is reduced, as meat and milk production decline; (ii) children’s health is affected due to decreased milk production; (iii) women’s revenue is disproportionately affected due to decreased milk production, as women are responsible for selling and processing milk. Rural farmers, particularly those who are vulnerable, have attempted to sustain their families by selling livestock.
The displaced often rely on mobility to mitigate the burden placed on host families and communities. This mobility further undermines conditions for the resumption of livelihood activities. Mobility makes it difficult for IDPs to invest time and resources in livelihood assets and opportunities (i.e. most of their resources are spent on covering basic needs for shelter and food). This also results in a rapid depletion of whatever assets displaced populations are able to bring with them.

**Tensions are becoming more frequent, as displaced populations compete with host communities for the same limited livelihood resources.** Displaced populations are tolerated by the host population. Sometimes, however, there are moments of tension, for example when the livestock of newcomers wander into the fields of the host population. Displaced are often seen as having rights but no duties and being much better off (or served) than the local population. The environmental burden is also heavy for host communities. For example, in Burkina Faso, Malian refugees brought three times more animals than the number possessed by the hosting population, which may exceed the carrying capacity of the local resources. For agriculturalists, the prospect of a good harvest in 2013-14 could mitigate possible risks of tensions with displaced populations by increasing food supplies and reducing the risk of competition for limited resources. Rainfall patterns are highly unpredictable, however, and food insecurity is chronic, which means that most of the time, displaced populations compete with host communities for the same diminishing resources. Furthermore, the repetition of crisis in the region (climate and conflicts) has afforded the population little opportunity to recover from shocks. For example, deteriorating vegetation, caused by over-exploitation and climate shocks, are now further pressured by displaced populations. This leads to livestock-feeding difficulties during the dry season, with many animals suffering from under-nutrition. As a result, the weakened state of livestock over many months has led to reduced levels of milk and meat production and an increase in the animals’ susceptibility to various diseases, creating higher mortality rates.

**Short term conditional (e.g., cash for work) and unconditional cash transfers and vouchers have been a major component of livelihood programming for IDPs and refugees.** WFP, for example has used cash vouchers in Bobo Dioulasso, Burkina Faso, to enable refugees to buy food in the market instead of receiving food rations in kind. This program may be expanded to the North of Burkina Faso (Mentao and Goudougou) depending on the outcome of this first project. In Mali, cash transfers have been used by multiple NGOs to provide assistance with housing rental fees, and in Niger they were used in one camp to support local food purchases. These approaches, however, may be inappropriate in some settings. For example, in northern Mali, there is no structure to cash transfers using mobile technology, and the commerce and markets, at least at the time of this analysis, remain dysfunctional.

**As yet, there are few resources to launch self-sustaining livelihood activities.** In Chad, income generating activities have been launched by UNCHR and its implementing partners - although at a small and experimental scale. The main funding is oriented towards micro-credit activities. This support targets refugees as well as host populations. In addition to this, in some of the areas in the south (five centres in total), vocational training is offered to refugees and host populations. The type of training offered has been determined according to the interests expressed by the interviewed target group and to a lesser extent based on socio-economic or market analyses. But overall these livelihood support programs are small-scale in nature.

**Some displaced persons have, however, managed to restore livelihoods through resumed trade.** Refugees in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania have good access to markets, enabling them to get news on the situation in their place of origin. In Niger despite the various crises and the unsecure situation, some commercial exchange is taking place across borders because some refugees are closely linked to their region of origin.

**Depletion of services; across the region, health and education service provision has been adversely affected by displacement.** The outflow of civil servants - teachers and health workers - during
displacement has forced the closure of services for those who remained. In northern Mali there are reports of schools being destroyed by fighting. In areas of settlement, the population influx has put further pressure on already struggling educational services and corresponding decline in attendance.

In Mali, the government is starting to address the situation and re-assigning civil servants throughout the north, including teachers and health workers. There is reluctance to return, especially among those who were not originally from the north. Furthermore, there are different incentives for return depending on the ministries, depending on external assistance since it is not in the budget of the state (e.g., WHO provides up to $500 to returning civil servants). Returning staff are currently benefiting from psycho-social training to deal with the aftermath of the violence among children. At the same time, infrastructure has been looted and destroyed, which means that the personnel often return to non-functional facilities. There are concerns that youth, especially those who did not finish school, may be easily recruited by armed groups. According to key informants, the state budget has no provision for the reconstruction of the destroyed infrastructure.

Education is singled out as an important criterion for return in relation to the Mali crisis among both IDPs and refugees. Children of school age can be broadly categorized in three groups with different needs:

(i) Those who remained in insecure areas but managed to stay in school despite the official closure, thanks to volunteers and teachers who did not evacuate. The remuneration of these teachers poses a challenge, since they cannot be paid for work conducted when schools were officially closed;

(ii) Those who evacuated and attended school at the location of displacement (camp, community, etc.) Among refugees, assistance for education is typically provided. For IDPs, most children were apparently able to attend public and/or private schools for free. However, this is unlikely to be an appropriate long term solution, and it is expected that education fees will become a significant burden for IDPs just as they have used all of their resources to support housing. During the Mali crisis, an Norwegian Refugee Council survey in Bamako (March 2013) found that 24% of the boys and 26% of the girls were no longer attending primary school. At the secondary school level, the proportion of children no longer attending was 17% among both boys and girls. In Segou, another town hosting Malian IDPs, the proportion of children no longer attending primary school was 15% among boys and 17% among girls. The reasons given for no longer attending school were primarily related to the cost of education. In Burkina Faso, only 32% of refugee children are attending primary school. As a response to this, parents are being mobilised and sensitized in order to understand the importance of sending their children to school. Many refugee children have not been used to going to school on a regular basis in Mali. As a result, their first year of school (CP1) was crowded because children up to even 12 years had to catch up to be able to continue in the school system. Another challenge has been the fact that refugee children generally have attended the Franco-Arab Schools (‘medersa’) in Mali and thus have had difficulties to adapt to French as a teaching language. The Burkinabe school system is already overloaded and does not have adequate infrastructure or enough teachers. Local schools are also situated far from refugee camps.

UNHCR and its partners have started to construct schools, though many are of more intermediate character (tents, etc.). Though efforts are made to meet the need for sufficient primary school infrastructures, secondary schools and vocational training opportunities are still insufficient. Even for the host population, access to secondary education is limited. In Chad, refugee children from Darfur are Arabic speaking and used to the Sudanese curriculum. It has thus been difficult to integrate refugee children with the host population and have them benefit from existing schools. However, after almost ten years of crisis, it has been decided to integrate Sudanese refugee children into the
Chadian education system. During an intermediary period, students will be offered accelerated language courses in refugee camps.

(iii) Children who evacuated or remained in insecure areas but who did not attend school or missed significant portions of the school year, experience delays of their education. Remedial and/or condensed coursework may be needed for these children. For example, in refugee camps for Malians in Niger, primary school enrolment ranged from 49% to 63% among girls, and 44% to 61% among boys. Pre-crisis primary school enrollment was 66%.45

Security: Security is essential for displaced populations to resume activities and/or decide to return home. Across the Sahel, the effective presence of security forces is generally lacking and, if present, security forces are often accused of committing human rights violations, especially against pastoralists. Across the region, there is a need for security sector reform and accountability of regular armed forces. Training is required so that the army, police and other security actors transform themselves in human rights protectors rather than violators.

Cohesion: Ethnic and social tensions, which were drivers of the conflict, remain active among the displaced communities. Protracted displacement, related to security or expectations of retaliation upon return, can also lead to politicization, as associations are formed along ethnic or political lines and new grievances emerge.46 Traditional community based structures, which have long regulated relations between pastoralists and agriculturalists, appear to be increasingly weakened and ineffective in conflict resolution. In Mali, tensions remain between groups, especially in the towns of Kidal and Gao, where Touaregs fear reprisal, while at the same time non-Touaregs report being targeted for violence by Touareg residents.47 At the same time, both Touaregs and the army are responsible of human rights violations along ethnic lines.48 This highlights the need for work on social cohesion. Finally, throughout the Sahel, and especially in areas that have experienced chronic conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists (e.g. Mali/Niger/Burkina Faso border) and in areas of return after protracted displacement (e.g. Afro-Mauritanians), there is a need to strengthen community structures including conflict and risk management institutions.

Relations with host communities: Support from communities hosting the displaced has been an important response in the crisis so far but is now stretched to breaking point. Tensions are becoming more frequent under these circumstances, as ethnic differences between host and displaced population become the focus of resentment and tension. New waves of displacement can further change the dynamic and the perception among host communities, which have tolerated the displaced based on the perception that they are victims. In Niger and Burkina, refugees have often been accepted on a temporary basis, while this has been much less common in Chad and Mauritania. The way that displacement is perceived can also impact the reinsertion of different groups as they return. This may be reinforced by positive discrimination in providing assistance to returnees, rather than those who stayed in their place of origin, but often were similarly affected by the conflict. According to NGO workers interviewed for this study, returnees in Mali are increasingly getting involved in local disputes with populations that never left. The IDPs are seen as having benefited from the crisis through assistance from NGOs. Programming needs to be sensitive to this dynamic.

Governance: One of the key challenges for the governments across Sahel is the general unhappiness of displaced populations toward the various governments. Resentment of the population towards government is centered on first, the fact that governments seemingly created or at least tolerated the conditions that led to displacement, including marginalization of the affected populations; and second, on the fact that governments have failed to provide adequate services. Rebuilding the trust in, and legitimacy of, governments is therefore an important priority.
The lack of identification amongst the displaced hinders access to benefits and participation in local governance structure. According to one survey conducted by the Danish Refugee Council in May 2013, 55% of IDPS in Mopti, Mali, have no documentation (ID, birth certificate). This presents a clear barrier to return, because it provides opportunities for authorities to exact illegal payments. Returning to Gao, Mali, for example, IDPs without documentation must spend between 500 and 1000 Franc at each checkpoint, for a total of 3,500 to 7,000 francs in total.49

Governance challenges also prevail in the administration of displaced populations. Refugee communities linked to the Malian crisis are organized according to the governance structure in their place of origin, and according to their ethnic group, with two separate systems: one reflecting the state governance structure (for agriculturalists), and another reflecting traditional governance systems (for pastoralists). Most situations also include a framework for consultation and representation of refugees and displaced communities. Among refugees, both the Touareg and Arab refugees are subdivided into clans and factions. This has posed various challenges to the organization in the distribution of food and non food items (NFI), as well as in camp management. For instance, initially, food was distributed to the head of factions, who then distributed the food to the people under them. However, many heads of factions quickly understood the power that this system afforded them, and therefore they either sub-divided the existing factions to create additional heads of factions or inflated the number of people in their group. Their actions generated a false impression of the refugee population, which was believed to be much larger than it actually was.50

Another issue that has sparked debate and controversy is the so-called Bella ethnic sub-group. The Bellas are a sub-group of the Touareg. In everyday life in the camps, a certain culture of subservience can be observed among certain groups, which is reflected in a “servant” to “master” relationship between different groups. For instance, Bellas normally fetch water, cook, prepare tea and look after the Touaregs’ children, and no payment is provided when these activities are performed. In some cases, concerns have been raised in food and shelter distribution, where the Touareg “master” would claim a larger share than the Bella “servant”. UNHCR considers that this subject needs further study and assessment.51
4.0 Recommendations

4.1 Towards a Regional Framework

A regional development-orientated response is considered to be the most appropriate framework for achieving solutions to displacement in the Sahel. Only a development response will be able to fully and sustainably mitigate the risk of impoverishment and marginalization of the displaced, their host and return communities. A regional framework will provide a tool for addressing the cross-national movements of refugees, the displacement development challenges that span borders of the affected countries, and will facilitate common approaches to common problems.

A regional development-orientated response will require political will and commitment. The influence of the political economy on achieving sustainable and suitable investments for the displaced cannot be underestimated. The first step in moving the findings of this report into a usable framework will therefore be to secure buy-in from the relevant governments. A process of engagement will be required to find the suitable regional and country political and government structures who can lead and coordinate this framework. ECOWAS cooperation provides a strong opportunity for this engagement, as does the current World Bank Sahel Regional Initiative.

Country-specific responses will also require government leadership and political backing. Government policies are a key part of the ability of displaced persons to return to their places of origin or build resilient lives in the new destinations they settle in. Clear frameworks outlining key development goals for the displaced and those affected by displacement will be needed, including clarification of where responsibility and accountability for addressing displacement.

The development of a regional framework will require stronger data and information on the circumstances of the displaced and their host/return communities. The absence and incompatibility of data, and incomplete geographic coverage has been a serious constraint to this study. The collection of improved data on population movements and needs of those affected is imperative. Solutions for addressing the current gap include the following possibilities, which could be sequenced as resources and capacity becomes available:

(i) Establishment of an improved regional monitoring system to track current and anticipated flows of forcibly displaced persons. Beyond tracking numbers the monitoring could contribute towards stronger profiling of the location, ethnicity, socio-economic status, return or integration prospects of the displaced;

(ii) Elaboration of this regional monitoring system to monitor circumstantial changes in the factors which are known to drive displacement. This would allow early identification of regions and occasions where forced displacement, return or resettlement is likely to occur. This could facilitate early intervention to prevent displacement or support return.

(iii) Incorporation of displacement issues into existing household poverty assessments such as LSMS. Simple measures such as disaggregating household survey data between IDPs, refugees, returnees, host communities, over sampling displaced households and the inclusion of additional modules on displacement issues, can produce a wealth of relevant data.

(iv) More in-depth household level surveys of the displaced, including the following dimensions:
   - Development dimensions, including access to services, land and property concerns and integration into local governance structures would be covered;
   - Livelihood coping strategies, decision-making on choice of solution and livelihoods as well as constraints to be overcome;
• Factors influencing attitudes and behaviors among IDPs and refugees in the Sahel, with critical distinctions between groups with different ethnic background and/or livelihood patterns;
• Exploration of the social and ethnic dimensions of displacement, including identifying risks of social exclusion, loss of power and influence by the displaced, and cohesion dimensions between the displaced and their host communities.

4.2 Defining Development Responses

Once commitment has been secured to a regional and developmental framework, responses to the displaced can be substantiated. There are important principles, which underlie the proposed development recommendations for those affected by displacement in the Sahel and should be a key part of any development response. These are: prevention of displacement, the promotion of resilience, ensuring equity with the non-displaced, integration of displacement concerns into wider development initiatives, and contribution to state building.

There needs to be increased attention given to the prevention of displacement. Prevention could be achieved through improved monitoring of changes against the factors which are known to drive displacement. This will allow governments to better identify where preventative responses should be focused. Targeted investment to address and mitigate the environmental, security, economic and social drivers of instability and displacement, may limit forced and harmful population movement. Prevention can also be achieved by including displacement concerns into disaster risk management initiatives. This involves recognizing that conflict and displacement is both cause and consequence of environmental degradation, and building the capacity of communities to take mitigating action.

Unlike humanitarian responses to displacement, which focus on addressing immediate survival needs, development responses stress concepts such as resilience and self-reliance for the displaced and their host communities. The intent of a developmental approach is to build sustainable skills and assets of those affected by displacement. The advantage of such development investments focused on resilience and self reliance is that they can proceed even if the political economy and intent around return or remaining in displacement is unclear. The skills and assets gained will stand those affected in good stead if they either remain displaced or are able to return and rebuild their lives in their places of origin.

A key risk in targeting development investments at the displaced is that it further exaggerates divisions between host and displaced communities. In a context of increasing social tensions, the targeting of specific groups, either based on their ethnicity, livelihood, or even displacement experience may be source of conflict causing resentment over development attention. This risk will need to be mitigated in three ways: (i) use of transparent targeting strategies using criteria that can ensure displacement needs are addressed but other vulnerable groups have opportunities to benefit from project benefits, (ii) using the entry-point of addressing displacement impacts to bring in new resources to poor communities, which can revitalize and progress the wider population beyond the displaced, (iii) using community mobilization and consultation process, which draw in a wider set of beneficiaries and encourage consensus on development needs.

A number of regional and country-specific development proposals, which are already underway in the Sahel have strong potential for building the resilience of communities affected by displacement. An effective approach to address the needs of those affected by displacement is to integrate them as a target group into wider development initiatives. For this, government clients and donors will need to agree as to whether IDPs, refugees, returnees and host communities can be incorporated as an especially vulnerable group in need of attention under these investments. Targeting may need to be modified to include geographic areas affected by displacement and return, and other design changes made of which the following are illustrative examples:
Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Program. A regional pastoral livelihoods program is already seen as a key development intervention proposed for the regional Sahel initiative. States are progressively realizing that pastoralism is a potential solution to natural constraints that are present throughout large parts of the Sahel. This program should support a mix of mutually reinforcing activities: asset management at the household level; relevant national and regional economic development to support pastoralism through improved infrastructure, watering and grazing availability, protection of movement, market access and improved technology for communication and market information; achieving a guaranteed solution to access to land for pastoralists is guaranteed to avoid conflicts with agriculturalists.

To become displacement-sensitive this program will need to:

(i) Undertake additional analysis of the asset loss, challenges of land access, economic marginalization, loss of skills and fragmented social capital, which displaced pastoralists endure and will need to be overcome. The study could also look at how the experience of displacement has bought livelihood benefits to pastoralists (exposure to new markets, livelihood opportunities, skills and social networks), which can be built upon to reinvigorate local economies and livestock trade.

(ii) Consider the replacement of lost livestock assets for the displaced

(iii) A particular development opportunity concerns those pastoralists who have fled to pasture areas they were already habituating in their seasonal migration patterns. With a precedent of seasonal settlement to these locations, these would be optimal regions for targeted improvement in livelihoods, living conditions and access to land and other assets.

Education Programs. Strong political will and backing will be required to integrate IDPs or refugee children in education systems that may be different from the place of origin. With government support secured, practical steps would involve:

(i) Rapid restarting of education services in areas of return, through the reconstruction of school buildings and incentives for teachers to take up previous jobs

(ii) Additional resources to be made available to schools hosting displaced children to ensure that services have the capacity to meet the expanded demand (including additional class room construction and teacher recruitment)

(iii) Outreach and support programs to encourage trained teachers amongst displaced populations to re-train and be amalgamated into the teaching system in the country or region of settlement

(iv) Training and capacity building for teachers on how to respond to the particular needs of displaced children including amending curriculum and learning expectations for those adapting to a second language

(v) Policy discussion and agreement as to whether displaced children may be taught in their native language and original curriculum

Infrastructure Investments. Both displacement source locations and destinations need to be included in comprehensive regional development programs that focus on strengthening infrastructure and the presence of the state. This can be done through:

(i) Use of displacement-sensitive targeting criteria (i.e. the identification of displacement affected communities through proxy indicators such as population movement and strain on services) to guarantee inclusion of displacement affected communities in wider regional development programs

(ii) Application of community-driven development approaches, with the formation of local community based management structures that allow beneficiaries to be consulted in the development decisions, which affect them. The displaced should be included in these local
level institutions alongside the non-displaced, building cohesion through joint decision making and community mobilization.

**Resource Investments.** Forest, water, energy and land management operations have strong potential to address the impacts of displacement through improving the availability of resources and enhancing the community based mechanisms which mediate conflict and stress over access to those resources. Such projects would benefit from:

(i) Analysis of the community based mechanisms for resource sharing, management and conflict resolution, and how they can be bolstered to mediate disputes between the displaced and non-displaced over access to resources

(ii) Ensuring that refugees and IDPs are represented as valid stakeholders for access to resources in the locations they settle in

(iii) Exploration of possibilities for alternative technologies to improve the level of resources (e.g. energy and water) in areas where there is high refugee and IDP influx

(iv) Extension of irrigation services to locations where returnees and refugees have access to land, but are unable to pursue agricultural production because of a lack of irrigation

**Urban Improvement.** Many of the displaced have settled in urban locations, where they are in danger of becoming economically marginalized and financially destitute and dependent. Their presence puts huge strain on inadequate urban utilities and services. Building the resilience of the displaced and their host communities in these urban contexts involves:

(i) Improved analysis of the additional pressures placed on urban settings by the arrival of refugees and IDPs

(ii) Ensuring that informal settlements of displaced and their host communities are included in urban upgrading plans

(iii) Making areas of cities with large displaced populations, a priority for utility, services and infrastructure investment

(iv) Undertaking thorough socio-economic analysis and market studies to better identify the urban activities and professions for which there is demand in the local communities, and designing urban livelihood support programs so that the displaced can take up these opportunities. This may involve livelihood activities such as vocational training, micro-enterprise support and micro-credit availability.

**Safety Nets.** Cash and in-kind safety-net transfers under humanitarian programs are an important coping resource for the displaced (for example, safety nets are now being used by UNHCR in the Mali and Boko Haram displacement situations). Lessons learned from these programs indicate that safety net programs need to be delivered before households have to resort to negative coping mechanisms (such as selling assets). At the same time, many governments in the region are starting to strengthen and roll out national safety net programs for the extremely vulnerable. This provides an opportunity for:

(i) Incorporation of lessons learned and good practice developed under humanitarian safety net programs into these national strategies

(ii) Amalgamation of the displaced into wider safety net programs through use of beneficiary targeting methods, which are adapted to facilitate identification of qualifying IDPs and refugees

Much can be gained by integrating communities affected by displacement as a target group within wider development schemes, but some stand-alone initiatives may also be required. Due to the scale of the problem, the issue of loss of livelihoods for the displaced and increasing competition over
livelihood assets between displaced and host communities is a topic that demands additional attention in both urban and rural settings.

**Support for displaced persons in the region should be delivered in such a way that it contributes to strengthening the role and presence of the state and to good governance.** On a macro level, more work is needed to support the relevant government bodies and to strengthen their capacities and resilience in dealing with displacement issues.

At the local level, there is an important opportunity for responses to forced displacement to strengthen local authorities. For example, in Diffa, UNHCR will operate its relief operations through local structures rather than establishing parallel ones as it is often happening in traditional camp settings. Strengthening the various decentralization processes in the Sahel is an essential component to stabilization. The decentralization process involves both decentralization (the transfer in whole or in part, of competences from the central level to the local level) and ‘deconcentration’ (a division of powers and administrative and financial responsibilities between different levels of central administration, with a subordinate relation between local representatives and a central ministry). The lack of clear demarcations between competencies of decentralized and deconcentrated services results in tensions at the local level. Durable solutions for the displaced must be mindful of these tensions when adopting local consultation and ownership as part of their approaches. There is a tendency to focus on decentralized services, but working with deconcentrated services is equally necessary to build the legitimacy of and support for the central government.

At the community level, development approaches which apply consultation and participation will allow those affected by displacement to have voice and influence in the decisions affecting them and in choices over the deployment of development resources. Investing in forum for community-based governance can encourage consensus across different stakeholders (for example the displaced and host communities) addressing social tensions and contributing to cohesion.

**Given the mobile and dispersed nature of displaced persons, innovative use of technologies for data gathering should be piloted.** New technologies offer unprecedented abilities to monitor trends in population movements and individual needs and improve the delivery of development investments in the following ways:

(i) Human mobility analysis using cell phone tower data, or anonymized Call Detail Records (CDR). This will require a public-private partnership with cellphone network providers for which there are existing examples.

(ii) The use of mapping and geospatial technologies to increase monitoring of migration trends and conflict regionally and serve as an overall data mapping service.

(iii) The use of mobile data collection platforms to engage with a network of trusted interviewers that can provide real-time data, in effect setting up a rapid polling system that is responsive to policy or programmatic questions

(iv) Improving resilience of affected persons through information services using new applications of ICT. This may include SMS and mobile based information services around weather forecasts, water availability, pasture, and market prices to enable better decision making.

(v) Establishing m-governance (or e-governance) as a means to better deliver services and public administration to populations in low density areas
Finally, there needs to be a strong commitment to monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness and impact of support for the displaced. Globally there remains all too little evidence of how far development investments for the displaced and their host communities reach goals of improving incomes, livelihoods, cohesion and resilience. A common set of indicators used to measure such outcomes, used across all displacement-focused programs in the Sahel would allow mutual learning and the adjustment of project design for greater impact.

4.3 Partners

One of the challenges for partnerships in the Sahel is the relative inexperience of dealing with a large influx of forcibly displaced populations, resulting from conflicts as opposed to chronic displacement due to weather patterns, food insecurity, or livelihood patterns. At the regional level, many agencies are only recently operational, or have had a traditional focus on food security and humanitarian assistance related to food crises. At the national level, structures exist throughout the Sahel to deal with humanitarian crises, but these typically have a focus on humanitarian and food crises as well. For example, in Niger, the Prime Minister’s office includes social safety nets cells, as well as the National Mechanism for the Prevention and Management of Food Crises (Dispositif National de Prévention et de Gestion des Crises Alimentaires) and its early warning system, response cells, and humanitarian coordination. The granting of refugee status is handled by the National Commission on Eligibility (Commission Nationale d'Eligibilité) which was created in 1998. In Mali, several ministries are involved in response to large displacement. The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Land Management (Ministère de l’Administration Territoriale, de la Décentralisation et de l’Aménagement du Territoire) handles issues relating to land and the rehabilitation of key infrastructures. The overall response is coordinated by the Ministry of Humanitarian Action and Elderly People (Ministère de l'Action Humanitaire de la Solidarité et des Personnes Agées), especially its National Direction for Social Protection and Economy, and its direction for humanitarian affairs. In Burkina Faso, UNHCR has been coordinating the response and the provision of assistance jointly with CONAREF (Commission Nationale Pour les Réfugiés) along with operational and implementing partners (including national and international NGOs). Civil society is active but has limited capacities, and a more detailed mapping is needed to identify existing resources. Among international actors, the response also remains focused on humanitarian interventions and/or food security.

Implementing the development responses outlined in this report will need a new configuration of actors and a commitment to capacity building of relevant institutions. It will require coordination across relative mandates and institutional strengths. The following division of responsibility of tasks is merely illustrative and should be the subject for further dialogue and agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Responsible</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Starting dialogue towards a regional development framework for displacement responses, coordinating, substantiating and monitoring and the framework</td>
<td>ECOWAS, World Bank (under the Sahel initiative)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Improved data collection on population movement, changes in the drivers of displacement and profile of the displaced</td>
<td>UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP, ILO), World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. In-depth analytic work on coping strategies, decision-making on solutions and livelihoods of the displaced, factors shaping their decision making vis-à-vis return, resettlement and integration.</td>
<td>UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP, ILO, OCHA) NGOs (NRC, DRC, ICRC), World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Country-specific policies and actions plans on</td>
<td>Relevant government ministries and agencies,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Development Support for the Displaced</td>
<td>World Bank, UN agencies, Bi-lateral donors</td>
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<td>5. Adaption of project design to integrate those affected by displacement into existing development investments</td>
<td>Relevant government ministries and agencies, World Bank (Task Team Leaders of specific projects), UN agencies (UNDP), Bi-lateral donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Design of development programs specifically focused on those affected by displacement</td>
<td>Relevant government ministries and agencies, World Bank, UN agencies (UNDP), Bi-lateral donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Innovative ICT tools to address displacement data needs and deliver development responses</td>
<td>UNHCR, World Bank, Private sector</td>
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Annex 1: Notes on legal framework for displaced population by country

**Burkina Faso**

*International*

- Refugee Convention 1951 - June 18, 1980;
- Declaration under section B of article 1 of the Convention upon signature: (b) "Events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951";

*Regional*


*Domestic*

- Decree N°1994-055/PRES/REX of 10 February 1994 on Refugee Status;
- Commission nationale pour les réfugiés (CONAREF). The 1994 Decree (94-055/PRES/REX) provides that CONAREF can, at any moment and where reasonable, decide to withdraw refugee status from an individual (Article 13). This legislation provides no details as to what motivations would be considered ‘reasonable’. However, an earlier article in the same Decree guarantees that refugees in Burkina Faso benefit from the same rights, and are subject to the same obligations, as provided in the relevant international conventions; this would indicate that ‘reasonable’ motivations would be in line with the situations envisaged by Article 1(C) of the 1951 Convention.

**Chad**

*International*

- Refugee Convention 1951 - August 19, 1981;

*Regional*


*Domestic*

- Décret n 211/PG.-INT. du 6 novembre 1963 portant application du code de la nationalité tchadienne;
- Ordonnance 33/PG.-INT. du 14 août 1962 code de la nationalité tchadienne.
Mali

International

- Refugee Convention 1951 - February 2, 1973;

Regional


Domestic

- Décret n° 98-354/P-RM du 28 octobre 1998, portant création de la Commission nationale chargées des réfugiés (CNCR);
- Law No. 1997-016 of 7 March 1997 on amnesty;

Mauritania

International

- Refugee Convention 1951 - April 5, 1987;

Regional


Domestic

- Décret no. 2005-022 Fixant les Modalités d'Application en République Islamique de Mauritanie des Convention Internationales Relatives aux Réfugiés - sets forth the procedures for implementation of International Refugee Conventions, adopts the principles set forth in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 African Union Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problem in Africa. The country's laws provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government has established a system for providing protection to refugees. The National Consultative Commission for Refugees (CNCR) is the national body for the determination of refugee status. UNHCR carries out refugee status determination under its mandate and presents cases to the CNCR for recognition. The government granted refugee status and accepted refugees recognized by UNHCR. In practice, the government provided protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedoms would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Niger

International


Regional


Domestic

- Ordinance No. 99-17 of 4 June 1999 Amending Ordinance No. 84-33 of 23 August 1984 Nationality Code Nigerien;
- Decree No. 98-382/PRN/MI/AT on Implementation of the Law on Status of Refugees, 1998;
- Law No. 97-016 on Status of Refugees, 1997. This law addresses the protection of refugees and establishes the National Commission of Refugees and welcomes the states parties policy with regard to refugee children but is concerned at the fact that all births are not registered;
- Ordinance No. 84-33 of 23 August 1984 Promulgating the Code of Nigerien Nationality. This code was the introduction of inequality in the transmission of nationality by men and women. For example, article 11 stated that a child born abroad of a mother with nationality of the Niger must prove that his or her father had nationality of the Niger. Furthermore, under article 22, a child born of a mother with nationality of the Niger and of a foreign father could opt for Niger nationality, whereas a child born of a father with nationality of the Niger automatically had Niger nationality;
- Law No. 1961-26 of 12 July 1961 Determining Nigerian Nationality (modified in 1973) Jus sanguinis by paternal descent. Nigerien mothers transmit their nationality only when the father is unknown or stateless. Jus soli: double, without any discrimination: nationality of origin for the child born in Niger to parent who was also born there. The foreign woman getting married to a Nigerien man acquires nationality, unless she renounces said nationality. The foreign man married to a national woman does not get any easier access to nationality. Possible naturalization after ten years in the country. There is no right to stand for election for ten years, and no access to the civil service for five years after naturalization. Dual citizenship is allowed.
- Ordinance of 2012 according prima facie status to refugees from Mali
References

1 See for example the 5 year action plan of the UN special Rapporteur for IDPs, and development of the UN Transitional Solutions Initiative, which has guided coordination between humanitarian and development actors in Colombia and South Sudan. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give good practice details of examples of combined humanitarian and development approaches but such information can be made available.

2 Florianne Charrière and Marion Frésia (undated) West Africa as a Migration and Protection area, UNHCR

3 It should be noted that estimates of displaced populations have a high margin of error, especially in a context where the displaced primarily reside with host communities.


6 Ibid.


8 Source to be completed


10 IOM – March 2013 Policy in Brief - Available at http://publications.iom.int/bookstore/free/Policy_in_Brief_Libya2013_5Mar2013_FINAL.pdf

11 UNHCR – June 2013 - NE Nigeria insecurity sees refugee outflows spreading to Cameroon - http://www.unhcr.org/51c05dd76.html

12 UNHCR Chad – available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c226&submit=GO

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


16 UNHCR: Mali situation Update no. 18, May 1, 2013

17 As of June 2013, according to the Commission of Population Movements


19 UNHCR, Refugees Magazine, 1 December 1996

20 Source to be completed

BBC: The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) began attacking government targets in early 2003, accusing Khartoum of oppressing black Africans in favour of Arabs. Darfur, which means land of the Fur, has faced many years of tension over land and grazing rights between the mostly nomadic Arabs, and farmers from the Fur, Massaleet and Zaghawa communities.


Allowing cattle-herders from one locality/country facing scarcity in pasturage and water to stay in localities with access to sufficient feeding opportunities for the animals.


"Staying a little longer" The refugee crisis in Mauritania, May 2013 – WFP and UNHCR

Mali Operation – Regional Overview as of May 10, 2013 - UNHCR


IOM: The Mali migration crisis at a glance, March 2013

UNOCHA - Mali: urgence complexe Rapport de situation no 36 (05 juillet 2013)

IOM: The Mali Migration at a glance, march 2013


Adapted from Rapport Bamako - Enquête sur les Conditions de vie et la Situation Abri des Personnes Déplacées Internes au Mali - NRC - 3/25/2013 ; Rapport Ségou - Enquête sur les Conditions de vie et la Situation Abri des Personnes Déplacées Internes au Mali - NRC - 4/18/2013 ; “Staying a little longer” The refugee crisis in Mauritania, May 2013 – WFP and UNHCR. The documents use slightly different livelihood groups, which were edited for simplicity


According to OCHA, May 2013, the number of refugee animals is 203,000 whereas the one of the hosting population is 65,000
In the past, Africare also organised micro-credit schemes however, the mission was told that recovery costs were never collected.


UNHCR Briefing note, p. 13: For secondary school and –primary school the % are even lower, 7 % and 15% respectively.


IOM, March 2013: Mali Crisis at a Glance


UNHCR Briefing note, May 2013, p. 14-15

In the Sahel region, pastoralism has been seen as part of a problem rather than a solution by the involved governments. The constant movement of nomad groups and the perceived datedness of the related economic activities have been mistrusted by governments. However, apart from commerce, pastoralism is one of the only legal livelihood sources in the Sahel (trafficking being widespread). The unpredictable availability of natural resources necessitates the mobility of populations with their cattle. Nomad groups also migrate in response to markets and social relations with other groups. A transhumance, not static lifestyle, is thus key to the survival of nomad populations. This lifestyle has long time been seen by the post-colonial states as an anarchic and outdated phenomenon that was in need to be replaced by sedentary farming and a maximization of the productivity of meadows. States are today progressively realizing that pastoralism is a potential solution to natural constraints in large parts of the Sahel. For Humanitarian Dialogue: Observation of the Dynamics of Cross-border movements by cattle herders and creation of network of leaders from the nomad populations, June 2013.