Using M&E to Support Performance Based Planning and Budgeting in Indonesia

Mark Ahern, Victoria A. Beard, Anna I. Gueorguieva, and Retno Sri Handini

Since 2000, there has been growing interest in reforming Indonesia’s budgeting systems to promote a more performance-orientated process. Indonesia is in the initial stages of this reform. A major challenge is determining the information needs of the central coordinating ministries. To date, these ministries have taken separate paths, developing their own monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems, which are not linked to the planning and budgeting system, and creating new regulations and institutions to manage them. The result has been underused information and a high reporting burden at all levels. Furthermore, the current system places a greater emphasis on monitoring rather than evaluation. In 2011, representatives from the coordinating ministries participated in a series of high-level round table discussions to identify the steps needed to rationalize and coordinate M&E practices across institutions and to strengthen the links among data collection, evaluation, planning and budgeting. The round table process has confirmed that, while coordination is needed, establishing incentives for the demand and use of M&E information is critical to making the systems effective. This note identifies priority areas for future action building on this finding.

Context

In Indonesia, policy makers and planners are in the early stages of identifying the appropriate information at the national level so that they can better monitor and evaluate the performance of the public sector. Such information is key to moving the country from a system of planning and budgeting based historically on budgetary inputs to a new system based on programmatic outcomes and performance. The task of developing a well-functioning M&E system is daunting for any country; international experience suggests the process can take upward of 10 years (Aritzí and others 2010). This note summarizes Indonesia’s experience in this transition by providing a overview of the evolution of M&E, including the political economy of the M&E activities currently being undertaken, and concludes with a discussion of priorities for future action.

A number of factors make Indonesia’s development of a coordinated M&E system particularly challenging, including its size, geography, and administrative organization. Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, with a total population of 238 million in 2010, and roughly 700 unique languages in addition to a national language (Badan Pusat Statistik 2012). This geographical complexity is significant because government units across the country have varying capabilities to collect, manage, and transmit data. The country is organized into territorially based political-administrative units (33 provinces and 497 cities/districts), which are responsible for about 50 percent of the core public spending in 2012. In 2011, at the central government level, 86 boards/ministries/agencies/commissions were responsible for designing and overseeing the implementation of more than 420 national development programs by 29,000 spending units (Ministry of Finance 2012).
The historical and political context is important because of its continued influence on the institutional culture that shapes M&E in Indonesia today. During Suharto’s presidency (1967–98), governance was based on a hierarchical structure in which data were collected from the smallest territorial-based units (in some cases clusters of 10 households), transmitted upward to increasingly larger units, and ultimately reported to the managing ministry or office in the central government. It should be noted that similar governance structures exist throughout East and Southeast Asia. For a number of programs, this system worked effectively at relatively low cost. For example, trained local volunteers (kader) collected information on contraceptive use, basic indicators of early childhood health, and household poverty. The system, however, did have limitations, including allowing for only a one-way transmission of information from the bottom to the top that limited opportunities for those who implemented the programs to communicate performance nuances and inhibited horizontal learning. Building on the oversight perspectives of pengawasan (“watching for nonconformance”) or pemeriksan (“examination of the books”), the government of Indonesia’s (GOI’s) administrative data collection systems and practices are largely geared toward tracking compliance with rules and regulations rather than achievement of results (Huage 2004).

**M&E in the Reformasi Era**

The resignation of President Suharto in 1998 ushered in a period of dramatic political and administrative reform in Indonesia, known nationally as reformasi (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010; Crouch 2010). This period brought significant changes in the judiciary, legislature, and executive offices as well as a system of competitive elections. Another key reform that supports the consumption of M&E information is a political environment that is much more tolerant of free speech and an open news media. Civil society was severely restricted under President Suharto, but in the period since his resignation there has been significant growth in the number and diversity of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A

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**Figure 1. Timeline of Changes Affecting M&E in Indonesia**

- **2000**
  - No systematic M&E effort
  - Law 17/2003 on public finance stipulates that budget should based on performance

- **2003**
  - Government Regulation 20/2004 stipulates that line ministries should submit quarterly and annual budget performance reports

- **2004**
  - Establishment of Minimum Service Standards for subnational governments by the Ministry of Home Affairs

- **2005**
  - Ministry of Planning (BAPPENAS) starts to implement a national effort to monitor programs (PP 39/2006)

- **2006**
  - Deputy of Performance Evaluation (BAPPENAS) established

- **2007**
  - President established a special unit (UPK4) to provide short-term program output information (INPRES 1/2010)

- **2009**
  - Performance-Based Budgeting Legislation (PP 90/2010)

- **2010–11**
  - Series of ministerial-level capacity-building workshops and policy coordination roundtables

_Source: Authors’ illustration._
major legislative reform during this same period was what some have referred to as “big-bang” decentralization that transferred core public service functions and devolved political authority to cities and districts.

The changes in the post-Suharto period have created both opportunities and obstacles in terms of M&E. First, democratization coupled with increased freedom of speech and freer news media have created new expectations for transparency and accountability in the public sector. A new national dialogue about corruption has emerged, and recent emphasis has been put on using program and ministerial performance as the basis for allocating resources. The production of Minimum Service Standards at the subnational level for key sectors, such as in health and education, also emerged in 2005 (World Bank 2008, 2012). These changes support moving the M&E agenda forward. However, simultaneously, political and administrative decentralization has raised serious questions about the authority of the central government to mandate reporting from lower levels of government. It is against this complex backdrop that analysts, policy makers, and planners need to understand the evolution and consider the future of M&E in Indonesia.

The Evolution of M&E

During the post-2000 period of reform and decentralization, the development of M&E systems was driven largely by regulations and decrees issued by different central coordinating agencies. New regulations and decrees were created at a rapid pace, thus sometimes creating problems in terms of harmonization with regulations issued by other departments within the same agency or other agencies. Because the new systems were often not linked to the decision-making processes of the government, they also lacked credibility.

An important development occurred in 2003 when Law 17/2003 on state finance was promulgated. Among others, the law mandated: (i) implementing a budget classification system that included performance measures; (ii) unifying the previously separate development and routine budgets and explicitly differentiating between operational and capital expenditures to overcome the problem of duplication and overlap; and (iii) creating a forward-looking budget based on the use of medium-term economic frameworks. These recommendations provided a basis for institutionalizing M&E because of the need to assess program performance.

Almost in parallel, in 2004 the Law on National Development Planning was passed. The law, among others, mandated that the National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), a coordinating ministry responsible for national planning, implement an annual work plan (RKP, Rencana Kerja Pemerintah) to bridge the gap between the five year plan and the annual budget cycle. The law further mandated that the individual ministries create their own work plans, including basic output indicators; however, initially these work plans were not linked to budget allocations. Eventually, BAPPENAS and Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued decrees (PP 20 and 21) in an effort to link the annual work plans to resource allocation in 2004.

In 2005, the Ministry of Home Affairs established the Minimum Service Standards (MSS) for most of the key service sectors. This was a significant initiative that carried with it an implicit commitment by the GoI to monitor and evaluate the MSS indicators over time. However, the use of MSS information by decision makers is limited and there is not yet a link to the resource allocation system.

BAPPENAS first mandated the collection of budget-related M&E data in 2006, when it issued a decree (PP 39) that required each national development program to report quarterly. Almost from its inception, implementation of this regulation ran into difficulties. One issue was that the data collection was not linked to a particular budget or planning process, meaning that there was not a strong incentive for program managers or budget and planning officials to use the M&E information provided or give feedback on how it might be improved. Another issue was that the regulation requires that the reporting be conducted quarterly at the level of the 29,000 spending units, which overburdened all parties involved and resulted in much of the information reported being copied from other reports. The “one-size-fits-all” template was also difficult to apply to specific programs, and was often not fully consistent with existing performance systems such as the MSS in key sectors, so interpretation and reporting varied. In sum, an external evaluation characterized the regulation as “difficult to implement, is unlikely to generate the types of information required for strategic planning and
evaluation and has variable levels of compliance” (Funnel and Djayusman 2008).

In an effort to further strengthen institutional support for M&E, the Deputy of Development Performance Evaluation (DPE) was established in BAPPENAS in 2007. However, DPE has faced challenges in navigating the preexisting M&E arrangements and defining its role among other coordinating bodies. The external evaluation urged DPE to develop a framework to improve the availability, quality, and use of relevant M&E information. Their study recommended that DPE establish its profile and credibility as a change agent across the government. The evaluation identified the need to build capacity and share information, particularly with the MOF. It also identified the potential risks involved in bringing forward the M&E agenda if the process is not managed properly. Such risks include low commitment and understanding of what is expected, token compliance, distortion of information in the absence of quality assurance, and the misdirected use of incentives and sanctions resulting in or reinforcing poor practices.

M&E during this first phase lacked the incentives and institutional arrangements to ensure the use of the monitoring data for program assessments. Although approximately 40 percent of line ministries regularly report on the indicators under PP 39, these data are not analyzed, nor are they used for decision making in planning or budgeting. The lack of analysis can be explained by the huge burden of the monitoring effort. The performance indicators, based on a logical framework methodology, total over 6,000, with a limited focus on outcomes and overall low relevance for evaluation (World Bank [2011b] provides a discussion of social assistance indicators). Table 1 compares the large number of M&E indicators in Indonesia to the number of indicators collected in other countries.

Part of the recent impetus to improve M&E systems in Indonesia has come with the strengthening of performance-based budgeting (PBB; Castro 2007). To support this reform, the MOF established an internal M&E unit to enhance the systems for budget monitoring. The unit has developed a new regulation that collects information on budget implementation and assesses the outcome of program interventions. The system is in its infancy, however, and faces a number of challenges, including the need to resolve how the information will be used in the annual budget cycle to inform allocation decisions; how to rationalize the information demands made on line ministries; and to clarify the role of the MOF with respect to that of other institutions monitoring the budgeting and planning process.

On the evaluation side, the capacity to design, implement, and analyze impact evaluations should continue to be expanded because there is no systematic program coordinated at the central level. This is an area where the GOI could build on the support by external development partners. For example, the World Bank has supported several major impact evaluations of key development programs since 2005 and has an active program of evaluations and an analytic agenda linked to its engagements.3 As a result of good collaboration, associated recommendations are often incorporated (though not without critical review) into both policy coordinators’ and implementers’ planning and budgeting. This is clearly visible in, for example, the link between results from the impact evaluation of Indonesia’s largest national community-based poverty alleviation program (PNPM) and the policy and planning stances that their respective implementing and coordinating agencies have taken. However, such impact evaluations, while useful, are expensive and technically difficult and therefore require careful planning and should be used selectively.

Table 1. Comparison of M&E Indicators by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (year)</th>
<th>Number of M&amp;E Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada (2003)</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2005)</td>
<td>1,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia (2010)</td>
<td>6,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep. of (2007)</td>
<td>2,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2002)</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (1998)</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand (2010)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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</table>

Source: World Bank’s Public Sector Performance Global Expert Team (2011a), and authors’ compilation.
The M&E Terrain and Its Challenges

One of the most significant challenges in reforming the M&E systems in Indonesia is to create a strong incentive for M&E to be conducted, and for the findings to be used to inform the budget as well as program managers’ decisions. M&E information has value only if it is reliable and if it is used—and these attributes are reinforcing. Without strong incentives, it is challenging to sustain the intensive effort needed to build and operate an M&E system. While in many other countries an incentive has been provided by a fiscal crisis, this has not been the case in Indonesia over the past decade. High commodity prices and growing domestic consumption coupled with prudent macroeconomic management have allowed Indonesia to weather the global economic crisis without a significant fiscal deterioration. At a microlevel, the M&E systems have often been an end in themselves rather than a tool to support a critical need of the government. Nonetheless, there appears to be a strong demand emerging from policy makers and other stakeholders to improve the quality of public services in areas such as health, education, social protection, and infrastructure.

A further complication is the large number of actors involved in program planning, implementation, and M&E. The coordination of the planning and budgeting process is split between two central finance ministries: BAPPENAS and the MOF, while other central agencies have active roles. These actors have developed their own M&E processes to fulfill their need for performance information. The processes have overlapping regulations for collecting M&E information from ministries and smaller offices. These regulations have raised concerns about the quality of information reported, the reporting burden, redundant information requests, information gaps, access to information, and overall M&E policy coordination. Moreover, where the processes operate at different points of a single planning and budgeting cycle, they can work in different directions. As of yet, there is insufficient communication, coordination, and data sharing among the different coordinating ministries, agencies, and offices. Table 2 describes these M&E practices at the national level.

There are concerns about the sustainability of some of these practices. For example, the Presidential Working Unit for Development Monitoring and Control (UKP4) and National Team for Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) have made an extensive investment in technical capacity. It is unclear, however, what the long-term outlook is for these offices, since they are a product of the current political administration and could be vulnerable under a new administration. As a result, transmitting and institutionalizing the M&E capacity of these offices should be a high priority.

Monitoring Burden at the Ministerial Level

The over-reporting burden is particularly evident when we look at the reporting requirements of some of the largest ministries (for example, health, education, agriculture, and public works). These ministries are legally required to provide at least six regular monitoring reports to coordinating ministries or government offices (SMERU 2011, 6). In addition to fulfilling these requirements, the individual ministries have internal monitoring systems to collect information related to budget spending and program implementation. Each ministry has unique reporting formats based on a specific program’s internal monitoring system. The cost of the reporting burden is clear: the more resources spent on routine monitoring, the fewer resources there are available for analyzing data and for managing the change they might imply.

Using Existing Data Sets for Evaluating Program Outcomes

Indonesia is unusual in having a number of robust data sets that can be used to evaluate development outcomes. While some coordinating ministries and government offices already make use of the data, in order for the data to become widely used across the government, a transparent system of data-sharing protocols needs to be established as well as the technical capacity developed in the ministries.4

The large number of data sets has the potential to improve the quality of M&E information. For instance, one of the most well-known data sets is the National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS) collected by the National Bureau of Statistics, which provides socioeconomic indicators representative at the district level. Beginning in 1963, and fielded every year or every other year.
since, SUSENAS uses a nationally representative sample composed of 200,000 households (RAND 2012). Each survey contains a core questionnaire with a household roster yielding the sex, age, marital status, and educational attainment of all household members. This core is supplemented with modules covering about 60,000 households that are rotated over time and collect additional information on topics such as health care and nutrition, household income and expenditure, and labor force experience (RAND 2012). A village or subdistrict level survey, the Village Potential Statistics (PODES) survey, gathers information on local infrastructure and services, population, and the local economy. A National Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS) collects national labor market characteristics based on working-age individuals within sampled households. The Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) is an ongoing panel survey whose data are available in the public domain. The IFLS collects data at the individual, household, and community level on a multitude of topics, including household structure, health, education, employment, and the local environment. Table 3 provides a quick comparison of these data sets.

To date, the full potential of these data sets has not been realized for either M&E or consequently for performance-based planning and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry/agency/office</th>
<th>Description of M&amp;E practices</th>
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<tr>
<td>National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS)</td>
<td>Quarterly reporting of national programs aggregated through individual ministries (PP 39). In addition, the current five-year plan includes a matrix where each program and its activities have corresponding output and outcome indicators. It is unclear how this information will be collected, analyzed, and used to support national planning and budgeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Working Unit for Development Monitoring and Control (UKP4)</td>
<td>UKP4 gathers basic information about short-term progress related to the president’s highest national development priorities. The focus is on tangible program milestones, with an emphasis on easily quantifiable indicators. Strengths of this system are the simplicity of the measures and the ease of reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Finance (MOF)</td>
<td>Collects information annually regarding program rationale, budget implementation, and outcomes from the line ministries. It is unclear how this information will be used in the annual budget cycle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of State Apparatus and Reform (MENPAN)</td>
<td>The focus is on performance and accountability of government institutions in terms of planning, performance measurement, performance reporting, performance evaluation, and performance achievement. Each aspect is weighted and the total score is used to rank institutions. The ministry uses a combination of interviews, direct observation, and secondary data. The results are reported annually to the president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA)</td>
<td>The ministry conducts three types of assessments that focus on the subnational level: (i) performance of local policy makers and executors, (ii) local capacity to achieve the goals of decentralization, and (iii) performance of geographic areas that recently received autonomy. These assessments are collaborations between a national team and local technical teams. The results are reported at different intervals to the president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Team for Poverty Reduction (TNP2K)</td>
<td>This office is a policy think tank headed by the vice president. The agency monitors and assesses the implementation of the country’s major poverty alleviation programs. It also aims to ensure that sufficient M&amp;E capacity exists within relevant agencies. The office’s strengths include that M&amp;E findings directly inform policy, minimal bureaucratic obstacles, and strong leadership by the vice president.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation.
Table 3. Examples of Indonesian Data Sets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data set</th>
<th>Substantive focus</th>
<th>Sample size and coverage</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Socioeconomic Survey (SUSENAS)</td>
<td>Multipurpose household survey (basic household characteristics and rotating module)</td>
<td>200,000 households with a rotating module at 60,000 households</td>
<td>Implemented every year or two since 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village Potential Statistics (PODES)</td>
<td>Village/subdistrict characteristics</td>
<td>All Indonesian villages/subdistricts, with a sample of +/- 65,000</td>
<td>Periodic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS)</td>
<td>National labor market characteristics of working-age individuals</td>
<td>Approximately 50,000 households, depending on the year</td>
<td>Yearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS)</td>
<td>Multipurpose household and community survey (for example, demographic, health, and education)</td>
<td>Approximately 30,000 individuals representing about 83% of the population</td>
<td>Approximately every three to five years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ compilation.

budgeting. The timing and availability of these data do not make them an appropriate substitute for routine program monitoring; however, these data could potentially provide information about longer-term program outcomes relevant to planning. Future cooperation among the National Bureau of Statistics and the ministries as well as local think tanks, universities, and NGOs to analyze program outcomes should be further explored and supported. However, for this to occur, a number of limitations, including data access and adequate statistical and analytical capacity in the ministries, will need to be resolved.

Recent Efforts

A series of roundtable meetings began in early 2011 in an effort to chart a future course for M&E in Indonesia. Participants included representatives from BAPPENAS, the MOF, UKP4, and the World Bank. A major issue discussed in these meetings was the need to streamline the various M&E mandates, regulations, and reporting requirements. There was consensus both on the need to share data and on the need to reduce the number of indicators and thus the reporting burden for agencies at all levels of the government. A national M&E roadmap, a manual for selecting indicators, and a technical M&E working group were developed.

While the roundtable process was effective at raising awareness of the burden created by overlapping systems and the need for coordination, it subsequently lost momentum. One reason is that the different agencies involved did not see how the effort to create a comprehensive system was addressing their immediate needs. As a result, they have continued to develop new M&E regulations and activities independently. The World Bank has more recently focused on supporting better integration of the efforts of the different agencies—specifically the work of BAPPENAS and MOF linked to the annual budget cycle. The demand from these agencies for better performance information is an important incentive to make the system effective; however, the lesson of the past is that the initiatives will only be successful if the efforts of the two agencies can be coordinated.

Other development partners are also continuing to support the GOI’s efforts to strengthen M&E capacity. Policy dialogue with external technical assistance is being provided by different institutions, including AusAID, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and the European Commission (EC). For example, in terms of building M&E capacity, the World Bank has piloted a series of capacity-building workshops for staff from the ministries of health, education, public works, agriculture, planning, and finance. These workshops featured international and domestic M&E experts and included hands-on activities for participants.
Future Actions

The development of M&E systems has been underway for some time, but in many respects is still just in its beginning phase. An important consideration guiding current efforts is the need for strong incentives to develop and sustain effective systems. While the fiscal position continues to be relatively benign, government recognizes the need for better M&E systems to support higher quality government spending, strengthen accountability, and increase the ability of the budget to respond to potential future fiscal challenges. As mentioned above, this has led to separate demand from BAPPENAS and MOF for M&E information that supports the annual planning, budget, and reporting cycle. The short-term focus is on harnessing and supporting these demands for M&E information by developing more integrated processes that meet the needs of policy makers in the two agencies.

The initial work by BAPPENAS and MOF is part of a broader focus on how M&E information is used for budgeting, planning, policy making, management, and accountability. The annual planning and budgeting cycle is a key process to effect policy reform and therefore has a need for good M&E information. However, thought needs to be given to what M&E information would be most useful. In particular, it is likely that monitoring information and in-depth evaluations would play quite separate roles. With the former, it is possible for BAPPENAS and MOF to manage a review process with wide coverage of government spending as part of the regular budget preparation process. Because Indonesia has introduced a Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), it would be suitable to link this monitoring information to the update of institutions “baselines” at the start of the budget preparation cycle. However, in-depth evaluations are much more resource intensive and a number of questions would need to be considered. In particular: which programs should be prioritized for in-depth evaluations? What is the technical capacity within the government to conduct, analyze, and use the information from evaluations for decision making? When in the budget cycle should the evaluations be conducted?

The proposed approach envisages building on areas where there are specific demands as a mechanism to move toward a comprehensive M&E framework. However, with this “bottom-up” strategy there remains a need to better harmonize existing and proposed M&E processes. Stakeholders have legal mandates to collect M&E information, some mandates require collecting the same or similar information. Certain types of information are needed by multiple users; for example, budget disbursement, activity outputs, and program outcomes in the short, medium, and long term. Mindful of the lessons of the early years of M&E reform, a number of actions are proposed to monitor the coherence of the overall system, improve coordination, and reduce the costs of M&E processes:

• **Maintain a forum to discuss and coordinate changes to existing M&E arrangements:** Because of the relative newness of many of the M&E regulations and the performance-based planning and budgeting systems, additional M&E regulations are being considered to help improve the process. Stakeholders should meet to discuss and coordinate proposed changes—possibly under the auspices of the roundtable group.

• **Develop M&E information-sharing protocols:** One of the most significant challenges in developing a more coordinated M&E system is establishing protocols for information sharing—based on information users agreeing on the specific forms for information collection. The resulting capacity to share information will reduce the reporting burden across all sectors and at all levels of government.

• **Make use of the pending implementation of a new governmentwide financial management information system:** While the principle focus of the FMIS will be on financial transactions, there is capacity to collect and report both financial and nonfinancial information. Agreeing on the nature and frequency of information to be collected and shared could be a catalyst to better coordinate M&E systems.

• **Develop communities of practice to review and promote improvements in the quality of performance information.** As in other countries, there are many stakeholders with an interest in the performance information used in the budget, within government this includes the central agencies mentioned above, line ministries, the statistics and audit offices, and others. Ensuring that they have an input and stake in the process of improving
and refining the M&E framework could help to enhance its quality, relevance, and use.

**Conclusion**

When considering the Indonesian experience with M&E reform, two important issues dominate. The first is the need to foster strong demand for the information, to encourage the provision of relevant (and interesting), timely, and good quality information so that the intensive effort needed to build and operate an M&E system is sustained. M&E information that is not linked to the decision-making processes of the government tends to lose relevance and reliability. The second is the need for ongoing policy coordination among the central agencies to avoid duplicating and conflicting requests for information that overload line ministries. For the M&E system to be effective, both issues need to be addressed, and various approaches have been attempted. The most recent efforts have focused on encouraging individual champions who want to use M&E information in particular parts of the budget cycle to work collaboratively with the other central agencies.

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**Notes**

2. Excluding subsidies and debt repayment, the central government and subnational governments’ expenditures are at the about the same level.
3. Since 2006, the World Bank has also published Public Expenditure Reviews for certain sectors (agriculture, health, social assistance, infrastructure and education).
4. For example, the National Team for Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) uses SUSENAS for targeting and analyzing the beneficiaries of social assistance; SAKERNAS to examine the informal sector and minimum wage issues; and PODES to analyze the availability and quality of village infrastructure.

**References**


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