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The World Bank is appreciative of the collaboration provided by the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Sudan, in the preparation of the “Assessment of Development Needs of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Eastern Sudan”.

The completion of the study would not have been possible without the support of the GOS’ federal ministries and organizations conducting activities related to, or with an impact on, IDPs and refugees in eastern Sudan. The Commission of Refugees (COR) and Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (MHA) – GOS - were of particular relevance as the main organizations responsible respectively for refugees and IDPs.

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Extensive interviews were conducted with non-governmental organizations, the private sector, academic institutions, donors and international organizations. The study received unrestricted support from these organizations. As the main practitioners on the ground, with their commitment and long experience in the implementation of activities for the development of eastern Sudan and the support to refugees and IDPs, their views and insights into the challenges faced by eastern Sudan and the appropriate responses to the same conform the main body of knowledge available on the subject.

The study team was led by Abderrahim Fraiji (Senior Operations Officer, AFTCS) and coordinated by Yousif Elfadil (Operations Officer, AFTCS) from the World Bank. Other members of the team included Sara Elhassan (Research Assistant, AFTCS) and Valerie Molina (Consultant).

The study team’s consisted of Jorge Gavidia (Lead Consultant) and Ali Hameed Karim (Consultant).

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## Acronyms

<b>AAA</b>	Analytical and Advisory Activities
<b>AFTCS</b>	Fragile States, Conflict and Social Development Unit, World Bank
<b>CA</b>	Country Assessment
<b>COR</b>	Commission of Refugees - Sudan
<b>CPA</b>	Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Southern Sudan)
<b>CPIA</b>	Country Performance and Institutional Assessment
<b>DAR</b>	Development Assistance for Refugees
<b>ESPA</b>	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
<b>ESRDF</b>	Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund
<b>FFW</b>	Food for work
<b>FFE</b>	Food for education
<b>GONU</b>	Government of Sudan
<b>GOS</b>	Government of National Unity
<b>GOSS</b>	Government of South Sudan
<b>IDPs</b>	Internally Displaced Persons
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>INGO</b>	International NGO
<b>MAH</b>	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
<b>MDG</b>	Millennium Development Goals
<b>NGO</b>	Non Governmental Organization
<b>PA</b>	Poverty Assessment
<b>ROSCA</b>	Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
<b>PRSP</b>	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
<b>SAF</b>	Sudan Armed Force
<b>SDV</b>	Social Development Department – World Bank
<b>SOLSES</b>	Sustainable Options for Livelihood Security in Eastern Sudan
<b>SPLA</b>	Sudanese People’s Liberation Army
<b>SPLM</b>	Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Fund for Population Activities
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children’s Fund
<b>UN-OCHA</b>	United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs
<b>UNRCO</b>	United Nations Resident Coordinator Office – Sudan
<b>WHH/GAA</b>	Welt Hunger Hilfe / German Agro Action
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Introduction

The specific objective of the analytical work is to assess and develop a clear understanding of the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the three states of eastern Sudan, namely, Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref, and to identify opportunities for World Bank involvement to address development needs of the target groups in partnership with UNHCR, the government and other interested partners.

The study focuses on the most vulnerable segment of the IDPs and refugees in eastern Sudan, those for whom finding durable solutions have stalled or who are marginalized as a consequence their condition. The study aims at complementing a renewed effort by UNHCR to implement a “Self –Reliance Strategy for Refugees in Eastern Sudan”, and further contribute to the global work of humanitarian and development partners on the analysis of response strategies for similar situations in other countries.

### IDPs and refugees in eastern Sudan

Eastern Sudan has a total population of approximately 4.5 million (Red Sea State 1.37, Kassala State 1.79 and Gedaref State 1.35 with growing urban centres in Gedaref and Kassala town as well as Port Sudan. The region has recently emerged from a situation of conflict. The Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Eastern Sudan Front in 2006, created a positive environment for returning to the path of development. However, the east remains one of the poorest regions among the northern States of Sudan and relatively neglected in political terms. As a “host community” to refugees and IDPs most of the population of eastern Sudan itself suffers of acute poverty and limited development prospects, not dissimilar from those experienced by the IDP and refugee population in their midst.

East Sudan has received a continuous influx of IDPs and refugees over the last forty years. Mass influxes were witnessed during years when the region experienced natural catastrophes as droughts and floods, or an escalation of tensions and conflict in neighbouring countries, mainly Eritrea and Ethiopia. Presently there is still a steady but smaller in numbers influx of refugees, mostly from Eritrea, but with an apparent change in their social composition and expectations.

The verified population of refugees in eastern Sudan stood at 79,847 by mid-November 2010. Of this, 67,040 (84%) reside in the 12 camps where they receive assistance from the international community. The rest are in closed camps and urban areas in the East. In addition, there is a continuous and growing stream of new refugee arrivals that started in 2004. There were approximately 24,000 new arrivals in 2009.

For all practical purposes the influx of IDPs in eastern Sudan has ceased. Present day internal population movements relate to more conventional forms of migration within Sudan, that is, households in search of work and economic opportunities. Still, the situation of the large number of IDPs that moved to the area over 15 years ago and are living in camps is precarious and needs urgent attention.

The latest OCHA assessment considered a number of over 66,000 IDPs in 11 camps in Kassala State (2004). Most of them arrived in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. They were displaced due to the Eritrea-Sudan war, civil war, and SAF-SPLA fighting. There are “drought” displaced IDPs, located in the western area of Port Sudan, and “war” displaced IDPs located in the eastern periphery of the city. It is estimated that 1,750 IDPs are located in Gedaref State.

### Methodology / Analytical framework

The main elements of the definition of what is a “durable solution” for IDPs could also apply to refugees, particularly in a protracted situation: one that “ is achieved when the *displaced persons* no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement”

In the absence of conditions for the attainment of durable solutions for refugees, particularly in protracted situations, UNHCR has proposed intermediate strategies to ameliorate present conditions until a durable solution becomes feasible. The ensuing *Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR)* aims to achieve improved burden sharing and quality of life and self-reliance for the refugees and host communities. Self-reliance is the guiding principle in the present UNHCR strategy for eastern Sudan.

However, self-reliance has proved an elusive term to define operationally in the field. The implementation of self-reliance strategies faces an emerging perception among refugees that it is “a strategy to discontinue support to the refugees” thus, limiting their support to it.

The analytical work postulates that there is a set of basic conditions that can contribute towards improved responses to protracted situations and ensure sustainable livelihoods. It also postulates that in the absence of options to achieve these conditions through legal and institutional changes in the short term, good “practices” presently applied to realize them in an ad hoc manner for only a segment of the refugee/IDP population could be extended to the rest of the target population in a formal manner.

These conditions are analyzed in the study and in the review of projects and programmes implemented to attend the needs of IDPs and refugees in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan

### Lessons learned and elements of a response towards durability in eastern Sudan

At the policy level:

- Presently there are not the basic conditions required to provide a durable solution to the refugees in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan. To a large extent that also applies to IDPs with long permanence in camps;
- There is not political will from the authorities, at all the levels, to work towards the achievement of durable solutions;
- The perceived short-term benefits of the present situation (access to some services, humanitarian support, etc.), exerts a great pressure on the stakeholders (national humanitarian agencies, lines ministries and institutions, and refugee and IDPs) for maintaining the status quo of mere survival;
- The concept of self-reliance is valid if inserted in a process towards durability and if it is not only a proxy for survival, subsistence, but a stepping stone for development. Without this goal in sight, and proactive work towards its achievement, it can create an environment where humanitarian support is discontinued or decreased and maintains the same situation of deprivation without end in sight;

- Presently there are not conditions to achieve self-reliance by most of the displaced population given the situation of their locations in eastern Sudan in terms of natural environment and its capacity to support sustainable agriculture and other urban and rural economic activities;
- Realistic assessments need to be made of the capacity of present locations (of local communities, IDPs and refugees) to ensure self-reliant activities at a socially and economically affordable cost. Hard policy decisions will need to be made to follow on those assessments;
- Despite enjoying full rights, most of the rural communities and low income urban areas in the east are in social and economic conditions not much better than the IDPs and refugees. They are living at the subsistence level and are vulnerable to sudden changes in natural phenomena and political events. Thus, interventions aiming at achieving self-reliance need to be defined in a wider community and geographical context and not simply aimed at a specific target group;

At the operational level:

- Refugees and IDPs in a *protracted situation* are the main group of concern for the achievement of durable solutions or sustainable livelihoods. Programmes should target this group as an integral part of the communities or areas where they are inserted;
- Self-reliance is the strategic framework being applied by UNHCR for the attention to refugees in eastern Sudan. As such, the refugee population and other stakeholders closely associate the term to UNHCR activities. Being a fundamentally humanitarian agency, and despite the application of principles of “Development Assistance for Refugees”, the main actions to implement self-reliance in eastern Sudan are determined by the competencies and operational mechanisms of UNHCR. As such, they face limitations in the introduction of truly self-reliance developmental processes in terms of sectors and implementation modalities; thus
- It is required the application of implementation mechanisms that can encompass all the sectors of activity necessary to execute comprehensive interventions to achieve self reliance. This approach would mean the introduction of effective overall programming rather than vertical lines of authority. Equally, given the convergent needs of IDPs, refugees and local communities, it would be necessary that such activities focus on the achievement of sustainable livelihoods;
- Given the complexity of the situation of refugees and IDPs in a protracted situation as well as of their relation with the authorities and local communities, it is essential that interventions for self reliance and sustainable livelihoods are community driven;
- Sustainable livelihoods can only be achieved if “practices” are introduced to enable the displaced population to securely search for income generation activities in their present locations or elsewhere, recognizing their entitlement to have access to freedom of movement, labour permits, tenure, finance and residence. The design of such “practices” would be based on existing ad-hoc cases in the east and be extended to the rest of the refugee population while a durable solutions is being worked out;
- A similar approach would be required among national organizations from the public sector, enabling state planning agencies to take the lead in the integral assessment and planning of needs for IDPs, refugees and local communities, while line agencies are responsible for operations, and national humanitarian agencies strengthen their role as policy and coordination body;

- Complementary activities are required to ensure that national organizations develop the capacity to efficiently perform these tasks;
- Each refugee and IDPs community is unique in terms of its history, ethnic mix, natural resources and environment, geographical location, urban-rural condition, relation with neighbouring IDP and/or local communities, and vocation and skills for certain type of economic activity. While recognizing the need for a broad strategy encompassing all the displaced population, each community, entity, needs to be the subject of a specific appraisal and targeted responses to attain sustainable livelihoods;
- It is essential that IDP and refugee communities have freedom in choosing the type of activities in which they would prefer to be engaged and for which they have particular vocation. It is also essential that they also have the freedom to pursue their preferred option of activity in other locations. This is particularly important since it appears that many camps/locations might not be able to support sustainable livelihoods for all their population, or the cost of achieving this might be unaffordable;
- Programmes for the achievement of sustainable livelihoods need to have a clear beginning and end. The agreement between the target communities and the support agencies for a realistic period of support to achieve sustainable livelihoods and an exit date should be clear on a case by case basis;
- Programmes should be designed to give integral – complete – attention to one or more communities for which full funding is to be secured in advance, and then move on to other communities. “Partial” or sectoral attention to all the communities of concern has not proved effective in the past;
- It is necessary to establish a funding mechanisms that allows bridging the gap between exclusive funding for humanitarian or for development purposes, and that permits planning horizons longer than the usual one or two year programming cycle applied by international cooperation partners

### Considerations for the World Bank

#### Strategic interests:

Within the overall mission of the World Bank, its strategic objective in contributing towards the durable solution of forced displacement situations is to bring the affected countries and displaced population back to the path of peace and development, enabling the application of pro-poor policies and fostering economic growth. Under these conditions, the World Bank will be in a better position to engage the affected countries through its regular operations.

This is a difficult task for the World Bank to undertake on its own. However, the World Bank is well positioned to contribute towards the achievement of this goal in collaboration with other partners.

#### Potential for World Bank involvement:

The assessment in eastern Sudan shows that, not taking into account actual field operations, the World Bank could contribute to the response in situations of forced displacement in five different ways:

- *Analytical and knowledge creation:* deepening the understanding on forced displacement in specific contexts and drawing lessons for the design of operational responses;

- *Methodological and tools:* Giving due significance and analytical consistency to the issues of forced displacement and durable solutions in the various country assessment instruments applied in relevant countries (CA, PA, PRSP, CPIA, etc);
- *Programming tools:* Systemizing the treatment of forced displaced situations and responses in World Bank programming for relevant countries. Systemizing the interrelation between forced displacement and responses with specific World Bank country operations;
- *Operational tools:* Developing project appraisal instruments as well as project operational procedures that are specific to the conditions prevailing in situations of forced displacement;
- *Operational delivery modalities:* Supporting the establishment of umbrella implementation / coordination mechanisms to deliver projects targeting the provision of durable solutions to situations of forced displacement.

Conditions for World Bank's participation in country operations – projects:

The study of refugees and IDPs in eastern Sudan shows how easy it is for an organization to get bogged down in situations that becomes protracted. The failure to achieve durable solutions, or at least sustainable livelihoods – self reliance, has a profound cost on institutional credibility. It also creates a precedent of failed expectations that burdens new initiatives with an upfront negative load.

World Bank involvement in country operations in this area, even on a partial basis, should thus be conditioned to a series of pre-requisites to secure as far as possible the achieving of the desired objectives and preserve the Bank's standing, namely:

- Self-reliance/sustainable livelihood is designed for achievement within the period of project implementation;
- The outcomes of the project include, if they do not exist, the introduction of recognized appropriate “practices” that permit the access of the refugee / IDP population to freedom of movement, employment, and tenure, pending legal and regulatory changes than would take a longer period of implementation;
- Durable solutions are achieved within the period of project implementation in case the introduction of legal and regulatory changes are part of the project;
- The project targets the displaced population and host community in an integrated manner;
- The project is community driven;
- The project considers the building of the implementation capacity of the local line authorities responsible for livelihoods and service delivery. It includes a clear strategy for the transfer of responsibilities to the authorities and the phasing out of support and management by external partners.
- There is confirmed commitment from the communities and authorities with project implementation. There is an element of community / government counterpart contribution in project implementation, even if in kind.

Follow up in eastern Sudan:

The commitment of GOS to abide by the result of the referendum for the separation of Southern Sudan in January 2011, might open the way to a new area of cooperation with the international community and its institutions. GOS will now have more freedom, and pressure, to focus its energies on attending the demands of the northern states and build peace and prosperity in the region.

The World Bank can contribute to the process of full reinsertion of Sudan in the international community and assist the country in overcoming the multiple challenges posed by poverty and the pursuing of wanting development policies. The analytical work and assessments carried out by the World Bank in collaboration with GOS in various sectors in recent years provides a stepping stone for this effort.

Since the state of poverty of refugees and IDPs in eastern Sudan is not dissimilar of the conditions experienced by the local population and given that their attention has to be conducted in an integrated manner, there is a positive argument for the World Bank to follow up on its previous analytical work with action on the ground and thus build a body of experience on positive operational responses for scaling up.

“Action on the ground” could focus on the preparation of the instruments required for due inclusion of the issues of the displaced population on country assessments and programming, as well as in developing the tools for appropriate project appraisal, design and implementation.

Further “action on the ground” could move into actual project implementation. However, it is believed that World Bank involvement in actual implementation would need to be within the framework of prerequisites or conditions as outlined above.


For this purpose, the World Bank would need to conduct consultations with GOS, the state authorities and international partners, particularly UNHCR on the feasibility of meeting such conditions and move into project design.

*Next steps:*

- The World Bank to review the “assessment of development needs” and take a decision on its readiness to continue with its support work in eastern Sudan and/or globally. Make a preliminary decision on the areas on which that support would be focused based on the issues outlined in chapter V, section B, of the report, or others that might be determined by the World Bank.
- If it is decided to continue the support to eastern Sudan, conduct consultations with UNHCR to harmonize views on the conclusions of the report and agreed on a joint strategy to move forward. That is, developing a programme for the attention of the displaced population and host communities in eastern Sudan through interventions to achieve sustainable livelihoods, self reliance;
- Conduct consultations with key institutions of GOS, donors, UN organizations and implementing partners on the main conclusions of the report and on the feasibility to move forward with the development of a programme for the displaced population and host communities in eastern Sudan.

- Prepare a road map for the formulation of a programme for the displaced population and host communities in eastern Sudan. Conduct preliminary consultations with key partners to reach agreement on the envisaged objectives and funding requirements of a proposed programme. Confirm support from GOS to the objectives of the programme and secure tentative pledges for donor support;
- Organize a conference to present the programme and confirm support and funding.

# SUDAN EASTERN STATES



## I. BACKGROUND

### A. Introduction

A scoping exercise was conducted by the Social Development Department (SDV) of the World Bank at the end of FY09, to explore the opportunities for a strategic partnership on the subject of forced displacement within the Bank as well as with external partners comprising selected bilateral, UN agencies and key NGOs. Building on internal and external consultations, a three-year work programme has been designed with strategic activities on forced displacement in the following areas: i) global, regional and country specific analytical work and knowledge dissemination, ii) partnership initiatives and iii) operational support to country teams at the country/regional level.

As part of the three-year work program, SDV is working with the World Bank Sudan Country Team to address the forced displacement situation in eastern Sudan with particular emphasis on the plight of IDPs and refugees in a protracted situation.

The specific objective of the analytical work is to assess and develop a clear understanding of the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the three states of eastern Sudan, namely, Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref, and to identify opportunities for World Bank involvement to address development needs of the target groups in partnership with UNHCR, the government and other interested partners.

The study focuses on the most vulnerable segment of the IDPs and refugees in eastern Sudan, those for whom finding durable solutions have stalled or who are marginalized as a consequence their condition. The study aims at complementing a renewed effort by UNHCR to implement a “Self –Reliance Strategy for Refugees in Eastern Sudan”, and further contribute to the global work of humanitarian and development partners on the analysis of response strategies for similar situations in other countries. In particular:

It is envisaged that the study will support the implementation of Government of Sudan (GOS) policies, particularly in the context of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), and the implementation of the joint COR/UNHCR “Solutions Strategy for the Protracted Refugee Situation in Sudan”.

It is expected that the recent “International Donors and Investors Conference for East Sudan” (Kuwait, 1-2 December 2010) will lead to a renewed effort by GOS and the international community to support the development of eastern Sudan and ameliorate the plight of IDPs and refugees.

The study complements on-going activities of the World Bank on the subject. In particular:

- *Bank’s interim strategy (ISN)*: focusing on pro-peace and community-driven development, and placing great emphasis on peace and development in the marginalized area of eastern Sudan, for the overall stability of Sudan. The Bank strategy on stabilizing peace entails a major role for analytical work and policy dialogue on implementing key provisions of the CPA (pro-poor growth, good governance and decentralization, empowerment).

- *World Bank Operations and commitment*: in line with the role of the Bank on analytical work, advisory service and knowledge sharing to member countries on lasting economic and social reforms. AAA are meant to provide a framework by which strategic priorities and informing decisions on projects and programs are defined.
- *Fragile States unit strategy*: providing crucial operational and strategic support to country programmes in these contexts, with a focus on supporting peace-building efforts and laying the basis for longer term institutional and economic recovery.
- *Social Development Department (SDV)*: supporting strategic activities on forced displacement in the areas of: i) global, regional and country specific analytical work and knowledge dissemination, ii) partnership initiatives and iii) operational support to country teams at the country/regional level. Working with the World Bank Sudan Country Team and AFTCS to address the forced displacement situation in Eastern Sudan.

The first part of the study provides a broad overview of the magnitude of the challenge posed by IDPs and refugees in the world and Sudan in particular. It presents the overall scope of the study and the methodology applied for its implementation.

The second chapter, the Analytical Framework, outlines a vision of the main underlying factors contributing to the setting in of a protracted situation and presents the main internationally accepted principles for achieving durable solutions. Since “self reliance” has been adopted by UNHCR as one of the main strategic approaches for the attention of refugees in eastern Sudan an attempt is made to qualify the main aspects of self-reliance in the context of local conditions.

Chapters III and IV, “Eastern Sudan” and “IDPs and Refugees in Eastern Sudan” provide an overview of social and economic conditions in the region and for the main target group of the study. The information provided is the latest available up to December 2010. An effort has been made to reconcile often contradictory data from various sources, however, it is not excluded the possibility of having to refine some of the data in the future. It is believed that the main findings and conclusions of the study will not be affected by possible minor adjustments in data. One of the main findings of the study is therefore that a major effort is needed to create a body of valid and standardized social and economic data for the region. Future work on the last national census and the recent household survey conducted with the support of the African Development Bank could go a long way in this direction.

The last three chapters focus on the main lessons learned from the implementation of humanitarian and development activities in eastern Sudan and provide some consideration for the formulation of response strategies.

## **B. Global overview of the IDPs and refugees situation**

### **• IDPs and refugees in the world**

It was estimated that some 10.5 million people were refugees outside their country of nationality in 2008, while another 27.1 million were internally displaced (IDPs) in 2009 as a result of violence and conflict (see table 1 below). These numbers have not changed in a significant manner since 2008. Additionally, millions of people are displaced every year because of natural disasters. Inadequate responses to forced displacement are likely to have longer term negative development impacts on human and social capital, economic growth, poverty reduction efforts, and environmental sustainability.

Large numbers of refugees and IDPs seriously strains weak institutions and can become a breeding ground for grievances leading to conflict, crime and instability. Finding economically and socially sustainable solutions to displacement situations therefore constitute a significant development challenge for the international community, the World Bank, and the affected countries.

**Table 1: Number of IDPs and refugees – 2008/2009<sup>1</sup>**

<b>REGION (1)</b>	<b>IDPs (millions)(2)</b>	<b>Refugees (millions)(3)</b>
Africa	11.6	2.1
Middle East	3.8	2.4
South and East Asia	4.3	3.6
Americas	5.0	0.8
Europe and Central Asia	2.4	1.6
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>27.1 (4)</b>	<b>10.5</b>

Notes:

- (1) Numbers give an order of magnitude only and might be slightly affected by differences in the definition of regional country coverage used by IDMC/NRC and UNHCR
- (2) “Internal Displacement - Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009”, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)– Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), May 2010
- (3) People in refugee and refugee-like status end 2008. “2008 Global Trends – Refugees, Asylum seekers, Returnees, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons”. 16 June 2009
- (4) 26 million in 2008

- **IDPs and refugees in Sudan**

Sudan is one of the countries with the highest number of displaced persons in the world. Many of the refugees in particular came to Sudan as far back as the late 1970’s and early 1980’. After close to 40 years, most remain registered as refugees and a new generation of Sudan-born registered refugees has emerged (over 60% of the refugees registered in camps in eastern Sudan are born in the country).

Table 2 presents an estimate of the total number of IDPs and refugees in Sudan in 2010. Precise numbers need to be verified given the constant changes in the field as well as variations between the sources of information.

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<sup>1</sup> Latest data for the years 2008 and 2009 is used for comparative purposes only

**Table 2: IDPs and refugees in Sudan – December 2010 <sup>2</sup>**

Place of origin	IDPs <sup>3</sup>	Refugees	People in refugee-like situation
Eritrea		138,700	
Chad		8,000	
DRC		21,000	
Others		17,100	
	4,270,000		45,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,270,000</b>	<b>184,800</b>	<b>45,000</b>

A sizeable number of these IDPs and refugees find themselves in a protracted situation, which can be defined as:

*“when finding durable solutions have stalled and/or they are marginalized as a consequence of violations or a lack of protection of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights”<sup>4</sup>.*

Eastern Sudan has a particularly large sector of its refugee and IDP population in a protracted situation. While the “length of time” under the above conditions is not a factor in categorizing a situation as protracted, it is evident that IDPs and refugees with over 30 years in eastern Sudan with essentially unchanged circumstances find themselves under protracted circumstances.

### **C. Scope of the study and the Inception Report**

The study was designed to cover the following aspects:

- a desk research of the displacement situation in eastern Sudan including past and current humanitarian and development activities targeting refugees and IDPs, their socio economic situation, numbers, demographic information, and geographical distribution of refugee/IDP settlements;
- a desk review of past and current self-reliance projects to identify lessons learned;

<sup>2</sup> UNHCR Global Appeal 2011 (Update), Geneva, 1 December 2010

<sup>3</sup> 4,900,000 in 2009 (same as for 2008) as per Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), of which 420,000 were reported in the eastern states (displacement starting in 1997) and 1,200,000 in Khartoum and northern states (Internal Displacement - Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2009, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre – Norwegian Refugee Council

<sup>4</sup> 2007 expert seminar on protracted IDP situations, hosted by UNHCR and the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal displacement. The basic elements of this definition are also being applied to refugees in this document

- an assessment, based on secondary information and structured field visits, of the socio-economic conditions of the refugees and IDPs, including coping strategies, income opportunities, value chains, and long-term expectations;
- an assessment, based on secondary information and structured field visits, of the socio-economic conditions of hosting communities, including their potential for involvement in future projects;
- an assessment of the challenges faced in the design and development of durable and self-reliance responses to the situation of IDPs and refugees, and formulation of recommendations for the type of future Bank involvement.

The consultants prepared an inception report with the methodology for the study and outlining the main premises for the achievement of durable solutions. The inception report also provided an overview of the social and economic conditions in eastern Sudan as well as of the IDP and refugee population in the region.

The inception report was circulated to UNHCR and relevant World Bank units to confirm the validity of the outlined premises and the proposed methodology to be applied in the study. Comments and observations received in this regard were taken into account in the completion of the study and in the preparation of the final report.

## **D. Methodology**

The study was structured in three interrelated phases:

- **Initial desk review leading to the preparation of the inception report, to:**
  - Formulate the main hypotheses for the conduction of the study, particularly on the underlying factors contributing to the setting in of protracted situations;
  - Coordinate with UNHCR and other partners the activities of the study;
  - Collect available secondary information on the situation of IDPs and refugees in eastern Sudan, projects and programmes implemented, and on the overall policy framework regulating the situation of IDPs and refugees;
  - Conduct a first round of interviews with stakeholders and institutions related to the attention of IDPs and refugees in eastern Sudan to present the objective and orientation of the study, obtain secondary information, and receive comments and advise on the conduction of the study;
  - Design the instruments for the collection of primary information on the policy context as well as on the projects/programmes implemented in eastern Sudan with a bearing on the situation of IDPs and refugees;
- **Collection of primary information through interviews and field surveys on:**
  - The policy and institutional framework conditioning the provision of durable, self reliance solutions to IDPs and refugees in a protracted situation, as well as other policies and legislative instruments that affect their circumstances albeit not targeted at them;
  - Programmes and projects implemented in eastern Sudan aimed at, or with a marked effect on, the situation of IDPs and refugees;
  - Analysis of the success and limitations of such programmes and projects in achieving durable, self reliance, solutions. The collection and analysis of information was to be conducted taking as reference the underlying factors contributing to the setting in of protracted situations;

- **Formulation of recommendations and consultation with stakeholders on the findings of the study and preparation of the final report:**
  - Formulate a set of recommendations to guide eventual World Bank involvement to address development needs of the target groups, IDPs and refugees, in partnership with UNHCR, the government and other interested partners;
  - Review the recommendations of the study by the World Bank and partners and preparation of the final report.

The study faced severe constraints in accessing secondary information on the socio-economic conditions in eastern Sudan, as well as on the circumstances of refugees and IDPs. Thus, the information presented in the study is the result of cross referencing several sources of information, partial studies and interviews.

A similar situation was experienced in obtaining documentary material on past and on-going programmes and projects for IDPs and refugees.

Guides were prepared for the collection of information on the implementation of policies and projects related to IDPs and refugees. Forms were also developed to guide structured interviews with IDP and refugee communities as well as with other stakeholders.

Structured interviews were conducted with IDP and refugee communities as well as with the resident administrative authority (COR) when available. The interviews aimed at covering a representative sample of the circumstances faced by:

- a) refugees: urban and rural, in land based and wage based camps, in active camps and in those presently not receiving assistance (closed), in different natural environments;
- b) IDPs: urban and rural, in isolated camps and in camps near local communities; in different natural environments.

Interviews with stakeholders focused on Federal and State authorities, non-governmental organizations, research and academic institutions, donors and international organizations. This enabled the gathering of a wide range on information, from policy formulation to actual project implementation

Despite the broad range of comments and information received, it is understood that the conclusions and recommendations of the report cannot be attributed to a single source and are finally the responsibility of the consultants.

## II. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

### A. Principles for durable solutions, self reliance and sustainable livelihoods

The main elements of the definition of what is a “durable solution” for IDPs could also apply to refugees, particularly in a protracted situation:

“A durable solution is achieved when the *displaced persons* no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement”<sup>5</sup>.

The UN framework for durable solutions for IDPs also provides a number of criteria to determine to what extent IDPs have achieved a durable solution, enjoying without discrimination<sup>6</sup>:

- Long-term safety, security and freedom of movement;
- adequate standard of living, including at a minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, health care and basic education;
- access to employment and livelihoods;
- access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide them with compensation.

It will also be necessary for the achievement of durable solutions in a number of contexts to ensure that the following criteria are met:

- Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation;
- voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement;
- participation in public affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population;
- effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations and information about the causes of violations.

Subject to issues of residence/citizenship and international movement differentiating refugees and IDPs, the operational attainment of durable solutions for refugees and IDPs involves essentially three main forms of response: repatriation to their *place* of origin; integration in their *present location*; or resettlement to *another location*.

In the absence of conditions for the attainment of durable solutions for refugees, particularly in protracted situations, UNHCR has proposed intermediate strategies to ameliorate present conditions until a durable solution becomes feasible<sup>7</sup>. *Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR)*<sup>8</sup> aims to achieve improved burden sharing and quality of life and self-reliance for the refugees and host communities, by:

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<sup>5</sup> “Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons”, United Nations, A/HRC/13/21/Add.4, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons. Human Rights Council, Thirteenth session, 2009

<sup>6</sup> Ditto

<sup>7</sup> “Framework for durable solutions for refugees and persons of concern – DAR: Development Assistance for Refugees - 4Rs: Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation, Reconstruction – DLI: Development through Local Integration” . Core Group on Durable Solutions, UNHCR, Geneva, May 2003

<sup>8</sup> Ditto

- burden sharing with the host country;
- compensation for the burden aspect of the host community;
- development of the host country;
- development of the host community;
- gender equality, dignity and improved quality of refugee life;
- empowerment and enhancement of productive capacities and self-reliance of refugees, particularly of women, pending durable solutions.

Self-reliance is the key element in this strategy, and is the guiding principle in the present UNHCR strategy to deal with refugees in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan.

However, self-reliance, “the capacity to rely on one’s own resources”, has proved an elusive term to define operationally in the field without jeopardizing the preservation of the internationally accepted rights of refugees. The implementation of self-reliance strategies also faces an emerging perception among refugees that it is “a strategy to discontinue support to the refugees” thus, limiting their support to it.

Thus, improving their quality of life appears as the only alternative presently available for the displaced population in eastern Sudan. There are however three main issues to consider in the definition of strategic responses to this challenge:

- the operational meaning of self-reliance – or sustainable livelihoods;
- the extent of the local integration to be promoted (economic, socio-cultural and legal); and
- the costs and benefits of attempting to achieve sustainable livelihoods in the present locations of the refugees and IDPs.

## **B. Premises**

Despite that factors such as the length of time in displacement or the number of people affected are not a primary consideration in determining whether a situation is protracted, a condition that have stretched over extensive periods of time without an end in sight compounds humanitarian and development challenges for refugees and IDPs.

Anecdotic evidence shows that protracted situations tend to remain under conditions of, among others: a weak presence of public institutions; frail informal institutions; widespread extra-legal economy; livelihoods highly vulnerable to external factors, and existence of serious poverty.

The implementation of projects in protracted crisis situations tends to show that to achieve progress towards durability, self-reliance, and to trigger development opportunities for the affected population, it is necessary to deal with some of the underlying conditions that maintain the processes stalled.

Sectoral interventions in areas such as nutrition, health, shelter, infrastructure, education and livelihoods, are at the core of programmes to provide durable or self reliance solutions. However, as experience shows time and again, they will not be properly anchored in the absence of complementary actions to deal with some of the underlying conditions that maintain a situation as protracted, or if the processes applied are not conducive to sustainability.

As a consequence, defining what to do (projects, programmes, actions) to respond to protracted situations is as important as to select the right options for how to do it (processes) and to create an enabling environment for sustainability (overcoming underlying causes).

The enabling environment can be influenced by either, positive policies and institutional frameworks that further solutions to the situation of refugees and IDPs, or by other policies and legislative instruments not specifically directed to this target group but that have a negative impact on their circumstances (e.g. immigration, labour, property, etc).

The analytical work postulates that there is a set of basic conditions in the enabling environment that can contribute towards improved responses to protracted situations. It also postulates that in the absence of options to achieve these conditions through legal and institutional changes in the short term, good “practices” presently applied to realize them in an ad hoc manner for only a segment of the refugee/IDP population could be extended to the rest of the target population in a formal manner.

These conditions are the primary focus of the study and of the review of projects and programmes implemented to attend the needs of IDPs and refugees in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan, namely:

*General:*

- In the absence of options for attaining durable solutions, agreement needs to be reached among stakeholders on the pursuing of strategies for improving quality of life and achieve sustainable livelihoods for the refugee and IDP population;
- Attaining sustainable livelihoods is understood as bringing the target IDP and refugee population to a situation equivalent to that of the host community (legal, economic and social), and that they can rely on their own resources or on those extended by regular programmes of the federal and state authorities;
- The conditions for attaining sustainable livelihoods are not different in essence from those required to achieve durable solutions, however, alternative practices would need to be found to ensure that the refugees and IDPs enjoy their human rights without discrimination, and have access to services and facilities on terms equivalent to those enjoyed by the local population;
- Each refugee and IDP community is unique and would need unique responses to attain sustainable livelihoods.

*Enabling environment:*

- Confirmed will from all stakeholders, including the displaced population, to bring the protracted IDP and refugee situation to a condition of sustainable livelihoods, and an eventual durable solution. Ensure that there is convergence between the interests of the authorities and host communities and those of the refugees and IDPs;
- Decision to embark on the provision of appropriate responses to protracted IDP and refugee situations when there is a fair assessment that the process has stalled, even if there are still on-going challenges to deal with the root causes of the original displacement;
- Capacity for the design, funding and implementation of strategies that go beyond the application of conventional humanitarian interventions or the execution of narrow sectoral recovery or development programmes;
- Decision to embark on viable alternatives in case the natural environment where IDPs and refugees are presently located does not have the capacity to carry sustainable livelihood processes for the whole population, including the host communities, without unaffordable costs or investments with negative rates of return;
- Have access to services and facilities on terms equivalent to those enjoyed by the local population;

*Process:*

- Recognition that in a situation of limited resources not all the displaced population and host communities can be provided with appropriate solutions at the same time. Provide integral, sustainable, solutions to a priority number of displaced persons and communities rather than piecemeal, incomplete, support to all the displaced persons that perpetuates their condition of deprivation and dependence (barring of course essential humanitarian support);
- Give priority to those IDPs and refugees whose primary means of livelihood is humanitarian assistance, that have restricted rights, and their options for return to their places of origin are limited, that is, generally, displaced population in a protracted situation in camps;
- Design and implement sustainable livelihood projects that:
  - incorporate an exit strategy and time lines agreed by all stakeholders, including the target population;
  - have full, secured, funding for all activities envisaged until sustainable livelihood is achieved, at the completion of the exit strategy;
  - Minimize or remove restrictions that condition funding and operational responsibility for exclusive application to either humanitarian or development purposes;
  - Enable line public sector agencies and institutions to become the regular providers of services to the target population, in the same way as to the host communities, thus;
  - Humanitarian phasing out: ensure that external support agencies (such as international organizations, NGOs, and national agencies focused on the attention to IDPs and refugees) fully devolve their responsibilities and functions to national line agencies during the implementation of the strategy. Set up effective coordination mechanisms among these agencies;
  - Respect the right of IDPs and refugees to make an informed and voluntary choice on what solution to pursue and to participate in the planning and management of the same;
  - Embarking on a programme for sustainable livelihoods in the absence of the option for a durable solution must not be regarded as a renunciation of the IDP/refugee right to the same should that choice later become feasible;

The analytical work looks into the above conditions through the experience gained in eastern Sudan and proposes some actions for their achievement or revision in light of local circumstances.

### III. EASTERN SUDAN

Eastern Sudan has a total population of approximately 4.5 million (Red Sea State 1.37, Kassala State 1.79 and Gedaref State 1.35 with growing urban centres in Gedaref and Kassala town as well as Port Sudan<sup>9</sup>.

The region has recently emerged from a situation of conflict. The signing of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Eastern Sudan Front in 2006, created a positive environment for returning to the path of development. Several mechanisms were created for this purpose, such as the Special Fund for Rehabilitation and Development of Eastern Sudan.

However, eastern Sudan remains one of the poorest regions among the northern States of Sudan (albeit better off than the present southern states), and relatively neglected in political and social investment terms. As a “host community” to refugees and IDPs most of the population of eastern Sudan itself suffers of acute poverty and limited development prospects, not dissimilar from those experienced by the IDP and refugee population in their midst.

**Table 3: Selected indicators for the states of Eastern Sudan**<sup>10</sup>

Indicator	Sudan(1)	Khartoum	Red Sea	Kassala	Gedaref
Food insecure households – poor food consumption (%) (2)	17.2	4.2	12.8	10.8	9.2
Stunting prevalence (moderate and severe) (%) (2)	32.5	25.5	31.1	42.9	38.4
Mortality rate for under 5 (per 1,000 live births) (2)	112	87	126	81	137
Maternal mortality rate at birth (per 100,000 births) (2)	1107	311	166	1414	609
Doctors per 100,000 population (3)	28 (4)	65.5	11.7	12.1	16.8
Primary school net attendance rate (% both sexes) (2)	53.7	86.3	69.5	50.7	58.1
Literacy rate of 15-24 years old (% both sexes) (5)	77.2	- (8)	- (7)	43(6)	62(7)

Notes: (1) National average for northern and southern states. The present Southern Sudan has in general lower indicators than the rest of the country bringing the national average down, thus the inclusion of Khartoum State for comparison purposes

(2) Sudan Household Health Survey, GONU/GOSS, 2006

(3) Annual Health Statistical Report 2008, National Ministry of Health, GONU

(4) Average for all Northern States only

(5) MDG monitoring, UNFPA, 2005

(6) Age 15+, and only for rural areas with secure access. Figure might show great variations with urban areas. TANGO/WFP report “A Livelihood and Nutritional Assessment of Rural Red Sea State and Kassala”, 2005 (quoted by UNDP, April 2009)

(7) Age 15+, 2008-2009, Ministry of Education, Gedaref/State Council of Strategic Planning

(8) Not available at the time of the report

Eastern Sudan has had a history of marginalization in national affairs and political representation. That started to change in 2005, due to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Southern Sudan, which raised awareness in the leadership of the east and GOS on the need to attain similar goals for the

<sup>9</sup> Sudan National Census 2008, GoS.

<sup>10</sup> Data on demography and social and economic indicators from the latest National Census (2008) and National Household Survey (2009-2010) was being processed but not available at the time of the study

east. Furthermore, the focus of the international attention on Darfur persuaded GOS to take steps to avoid a similar situation developing in the east. Also, the relatively improved economic circumstances in the country due to the oil revenues and the greater assertiveness and participation of regional leaders in national affairs have contributed to an increase, albeit modest, in the attention given to the development of eastern Sudan.

The three States of eastern Sudan, Red Sea, Kassala and Gedaref are socially, economically and politically interconnected and share complementary, environmental characteristics. Gedaref is better endowed with soil and water resources for agriculture, while animal husbandry is important in Red Sea and Kassala which have less suitable soils and water resources. The rural population of Red Sea State belongs predominantly to the Beja (a confederation of tribal groups) while rural Kassala and Gedaref are more ethnically diverse, having other groups such as the Rashaida, Arabs and Nubians.

The Beja encompass a number of clans such as Hadandawa, Beni Amir, Halanga and Bushariyin. They are mixed with ethnicities from all of the country including the north and those displaced from the west, south and the Nuba mountains. The clans exhibit different economic interests and sources of livelihood that are often determinant in the design of development programmes. For example, the Hadandawa, whose majority are found in remote rural Red Sea state lead a nomadic, pastoralist, way of life, while the Beni Amir seem more oriented towards urban settings and practicing trade.

The region is rapidly urbanizing with population concentrations in Port Sudan (50% of the State population), Kassala and Gedaref towns. It is estimated that 30% of the population in the last two states live in urban areas. There are indications that these towns and cities also host the largest amount of IDPs in the area.

There are some underlying factors that contribute to exacerbate the situation of poverty in the region. The continued deterioration of natural resources (water availability and soil) and the recurrence of natural disasters (drought and floods) have a marked negative impact on the productivity of the agricultural sector and animal husbandry, the main sources of income in the east. The weak capacity of the state institutions and limited entrepreneurial drive of the private sector constrain the ability of the region to develop alternative types of activity. Despite some competition from local groups, like the Beni Amir in the border areas, large trade and commercial activities are dominated by groups from outside the region.

In a vicious cycle of deterioration, some of the factors increasing rural poverty are also driving people to urban areas, exacerbating rural decay and creating a new form of urban poverty.

The information provided in the following sections of the report is based on a series of snap shots obtained through several surveys and studies conducted in eastern Sudan, primarily in rural areas. Although the coverage and focus of these surveys and studies do not provide a validated overview of conditions in eastern Sudan it is believed that they do permit developing a relatively accurate view of the conditions prevailing in the region.

Tradition and cultural patterns in Sudan, including the east, have hampered women's development. Their tasks are generally confined to domestic duties with negligible participation in community decision making. Women represent half of the population in the region and 35% of them report as extremely poor. The unequal situation of women is reflected, among other indicators, on the illiteracy rate that is close to 56% among them. Constraints on girls' education, limited opportunities for vocational training, early marriage and high birth mortality contribute to widen the gender gap in eastern Sudan and to waste the potential contribution of women to the economy and to the overall development of the community.

Nevertheless, some improvements have been achieved in education in recent years. Girls' enrollment in primary education has increased to 71.4% and 63% in port Sudan and Gedaref respectively, slightly less than boys. Primary school enrollment in Kassala is still low at 23.9%, and female students as a percentage of the total enrolled represent 48.3%.

Presently, women in eastern Sudan are assuming a more active role in family and community affairs through a combination of factors, such as the increasing number of women-headed households, the need to increase household income, and the support being provided by external partners like NGOs. Thus, women are becoming more involved in small trade and income generating activities, including agriculture, livestock, handcrafts, and the processing of products like oil and butter.

However, important barriers remain to full female empowerment. Tribal practices as well as the pervasiveness of traditional property and tenure systems that restrict the capacity of women to own land and livestock are among the main factors in this regard. NGOs and government institutions are developing programmes to support women and attend their needs. But, their progress is still slow and tentative, partly due to the lack coordination among different programmes and the absence of a decisive support at the policy-making level.

### **Main economic activities**

Each of the three States in eastern Sudan may be seen as having a particular sector of activity that dominates its economy. While the three states count with plans outlining their development objectives and investment/funding requirements, they fall short of providing a realistic view of their comparative advantages in developing the economy and lack a strategic view of how to achieve such goals. State plans are scant on planning issues related to their neighbouring states despite facing common development challenges and issues, as the IDP and refugee population or the possible joint development of their economies.

Mechanized rain-fed farming is the main activity in Gedaref State, generating income and demand for labour. Gedaref is one of the main agricultural areas in the country with 75% of its population working in the sector. This has led to a relatively large influx of migrant labour and ensuing tensions among ethnic groups. Rural livelihoods depend on animal husbandry and rain-fed agriculture. Large tracks of land are in the hands of few mechanized agricultural schemes, exacerbating tensions for access to land and blocking routes used by pastoralists. The state counts with updated land use plans based on the type of soils and irrigation modalities.

There are opportunities for investment on mechanized farming and processing of agricultural produce but they are not materializing at the necessary pace. An increasing area of land is being farmed under the auspices of the State Agricultural Corporation in lots of 500 to 1000 feddans<sup>11</sup>. The State Agricultural Corporation is also promoting, with mixed results, the consolidation of small holdings into cooperatives covering up to 1000 feddans each. For this purpose the state aimed at surveying all small farms by the end of 2010. However, small farmers still need to be persuaded of the benefits of the shared tenure of the land and other property issues related to the cooperative system.

Gedaref town is a transport and commercial hub in eastern Sudan which in principle could attract further commercial and industrial activities. However, there are not concrete strategies in this respect and this potential is still to be realized. Existing small scale manufacturing is limited and not competitive in

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<sup>11</sup> One feddan is approximately one acre

national terms. There are also references to untapped mineral resources in Gedaref state but the study was unable to locate detailed information on the nature and magnitude of such resources.

Kassala State is also dependant to a large extent on agriculture and it is a centre for border trade. Irrigated agriculture includes large projects as the Gash Agricultural Scheme, New Halfa Scheme and Gash Delta. It is estimated that 40% of the State land is apt for agriculture however, only 30% of this is cultivated.

Most small scale cultivation takes place in rain fed areas with yields of only 16% of those in irrigated land. The arid nature of the region and the decreasing amount of rainfall in recent years has been a factor contributing to this situation. Despite that a large part of the rural population in Kassala state is dedicated to agriculture, there are not accurate studies on the viability of pursuing this type of activity ensuring adequate rates of return on potential investments.

The bypassing of Kassala town by the recent opening of a direct road link between Khartoum and Port Sudan has had a negative impact on trade and transport activities in the town as well as in the settlements along the route previously used for this purpose. This has led to a further deterioration in the economy of the state and in the livelihoods of rural and urban families whose source of income was related to the activities and trade dependant on the old road link.

The economy of the Red Sea state is anchored in the port where close to 50% of its population is located. The Port Sudan Corporation, Bashaer Petrol Port, Sudan Duty Free Zones and Aryaab Gold Mines generate most of the income and demand for labour in the state.

Per capita income in some areas of the Red Sea state is as low as US\$ 0.25 per day, Sinkat is ranked the highest in terms of poverty in the state, followed by Halaib, Toker and Port Sudan. In addition to the arid nature of the land and unrelenting environmental degradation, poverty in the state is also exacerbated by uncontrolled urbanization and badly applied economic policies.

Recent restrictions applied to the international trade with Sudan have resulted in diminished port activity leading to layoffs and increased poverty. Rural households are mainly pastoralist and rely sometimes in the exploitation of firewood and charcoal. Agriculture is mainly limited to areas covered by seasonal rainfall and is at the subsistence level. There are fertile soils in the Toker and Baraka areas as well as pastures along the Red Sea, but cultivation in these areas is also seasonal in nature and requires further development.

The development plans of the state government identify fisheries, cement, wheat, cotton, gold mining, natural gas, oil, salt and tourism, as key areas for the promotion of the economy in Red Sea. However, there are few concrete actions being taken to attract investments to these sectors. It is hoped that the recently held conference for the promotion of investments in eastern Sudan could assist in this regard<sup>12</sup>.

### **Livelihood**

The population in eastern Sudan is mainly rural (close to 75% with exception of Red Sea with 50%) deriving their livelihood primarily from subsistence agriculture, animal husbandry and menial wage employment. The majority of the population in urban areas is engaged in small trade and services and wage employment, also at the subsistence level. Only few count with more stable employment in the public sector and with larger private businesses.

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<sup>12</sup> The International Donors and Investors Conference for East Sudan, Kuwait, 1- 2 December 2010

While the figures provided below relate to rural Kassala, they also give an idea of the conditions found in the rural areas of the other eastern states:

- The main economic activities reported in selected rural communities in Kassala are farming - 42%; wage employment - 34%; livestock rearing - 10%, and trading - 8%. Many households practice several activities, farm and off-farm, simultaneously to boost income. Wage employment and trading are often related to subsistence, informal, activities<sup>13</sup>;
- Another survey in rural Kassala (North and North East) reported that 24% of the population is dedicated to farming and 18% to livestock rearing, while 33% are engaged in casual labour (similar as above) and 7% in trading<sup>14</sup>. The information from the two surveys is quite consistent and the variation in the proportion between the percentage of the population dedicated to farming and livestock can be attributed to the different traditional occupations in the areas covered by the surveys;
- A sample of rural households in Kassala state showed that 76% of the surveyed households experienced a food gap in the summer of 2009<sup>15</sup>. This was predominantly experienced in the 4 to 6 summer months. Other surveys have reported up to 94% of the rural population experiencing seasonal food shortages in similar areas and period<sup>17</sup>;
- Some of the conclusions of the Welt Hunger Hilfe / German Agro Action survey in Kassala give a perspective of the main challenges faced in achieving sustainable livelihoods in the rural areas of eastern Sudan<sup>18</sup>: relentless environmental degradation that put stress on scarce natural resources; vulnerability to natural disasters – floods and droughts – reducing coping capacity; uncontrolled competition for resources that exacerbates conflict; limited possibilities for the expansion of agricultural land; steady reduction in the area of grazing land; scarce water resources; lack of security; and limited external support for the region, especially the north-east.

### **Allocation of resources**

While the actual transfer of Federal resources to the northern states has increased in recent years (19% of Government of National Unity expenditures in 2006), they have mostly benefitted, on a per capita basis, the Northern, Blue Nile and River Nile states. Despite that transfers to the eastern states are still higher than to other areas, as Darfur, they remain well below their needs or of what it would proportionally correspond to them based on their share of the population<sup>19</sup>.

Average state-level allocations to expected pro-poor activities were mostly for general public services, reflecting support for wages and salaries: 30% for general public expenditures; 5% for agriculture, 20% State infrastructure (roads, bridges, electricity, and water), and the rest for health and education. Significantly, most of these resources cover recurrent costs and very little is left for development

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<sup>13</sup> A Baseline Survey Report – Improving Food Security and livelihoods in Kassala Rural Areas, January 2010, EC / Practical Action, Ahmed Mahmoud Ahmed Elamin

<sup>14</sup> Baseline Survey – Hamesh Koreib, Telkuk and Rural Kassala – Food Security and Flood Prevention Project / European Commission. 2009-2010. Welt Hunger Hilfe (German Agro Action)

<sup>15</sup> Ditto as footnote 14

<sup>16</sup> 7% of the sample were IDP households

<sup>17</sup> Ditto as footnote 15

<sup>18</sup> Ditto

<sup>19</sup> Sudan Public Expenditure Review, The World Bank, December 2007

investment, thus, perpetuating a situation of poor services and low capacity to trigger development processes<sup>20</sup>.

According to the United Nations, the requirement of international assistance (humanitarian and early recovery) for the three States combined represented 5% of the total requested for the country as a whole in 2010. This is also well below the actual needs of the region and a reflection of the marginal importance given to its development<sup>21</sup>.

Despite that agriculture and animal husbandry constitute the main source of livelihood for most of the population in the three states, agricultural productivity and pastures are suffering a steady deterioration that is reflected on increasing rural poverty. This process is driven to a large extent by the irrational use of natural resources and the chronic lack of investments in the sector.

### **Land tenure and distribution**

Land tenure in Sudan was guided by customary law. The first modern land regulation was introduced by the British colonial administration in 1899, which recognized as private property the continuously cultivated lands in northern and central Sudan valleys, and classified government owned land as land subject to no right and land subject to customary usufruct rights. Since customary usufruct rights were not legally registered, subsequent legislation extended government right to withdraw customary usufruct rights.

The Unregistered Lands Act of 1970, declares as government property all unregistered land before the introduction of the Act, thus, presently most of the land in Sudan is owned by the state. Land registration is administered by the Land Registry, however, there seems to exist a fundamental legal ambiguity about the power to allocate land. This has led to situations where conflict arises over claims by traditional holders to land allocated for investment<sup>22</sup>

The application of the Act has effectively weakened the rights of small farmers and pastoralists and allowed the expansion of rain-fed and irrigated schemes concentrated on few owners, generally from outside the region and with no previous occupation as farmers. The impact of mechanized farming and the lack of transparency on land tenure have marginalized small farmers and is a contributing factor to the exacerbation of rural poverty and social conflict. The situation is particularly critical in areas such as in Kassala, where 70% of the rural households has claimed ownership of their land for long periods of time<sup>23</sup>.

Various approaches are being suggested to regularize the land allocation and tenure situation in the east. It is recommended in the first place to adopt local systems of land registration in partnership with the Federal Land Registry, and that the states consider passing legislation to register agricultural land granted by the state governments following the model of the Agricultural Land Registration Act of Khartoum<sup>24</sup>. It is also suggested that state governments develop a proactive approach to conflict resolution on land tenure, and to promote joint partnerships between existing occupiers and potential investors.

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<sup>20</sup> Ditto

<sup>21</sup> Work Plan for Sudan, UN and Partners 2010

<sup>22</sup> Mini Diagnostic – State Level Barriers to Investment in Gedaref State, Gezira State, North Kordofan State and Red Sea State, May 2009, The Law and Development Partnership, United Kingdom

<sup>23</sup> A Baseline Survey Report – Improving Food Security and livelihoods in Kassala Rural Areas, January 2010, EC / Practical Action, Ahmed Mahmoud Ahmed Elamin

<sup>24</sup> Ditto as footnote 23

### **Access to finance / credit**

The majority of the people in eastern Sudan do not have access to formal credit due to their economic status. However, there are some semi-formal financial mechanisms in operation, including revolving funds, mainly promoted by national and international NGOs. There are also informal credit mechanisms operating through family and lenders. The Sheil (Salum) system is run by informal lenders that provide credit in advance to the next crop.

The nature of the loans and size of the projects involving some form of revolving fund normally restrict the capacity of the projects to scale up and to establish self-sustained financial instruments. Since most of these credit operations do not fully function at market conditions (interest rates and cost recovery), they require a continuous injection of resources to keep them capitalized. Thus, they tend to phase out once external support is discontinued.

Improvements in the micro finance system as well as in the business skills of the communities would enable the micro finance sector, which is at the core of the country strategies to alleviate poverty, to develop its full potential. The World Bank is already assisting the Bank of Sudan with the establishment of a micro finance department, and UNDP is proposing the establishment of a Centre for Inclusive Finance in Eastern Sudan (CIFES) to support micro finance initiatives.

As part of the strategy being promoted by the Central Bank of Sudan for the development of micro-finance, all commercial banks would be required to allocate 12% of their outstanding portfolio to micro-finance. Under this scheme, micro-finance products would be made available to economically active clients in amounts up to SDG 10,000. The introduction of the scheme is running into delays and is not operating at present.

There are other semi-formal schemes being introduced by non-governmental organizations to promote the establishment of credit systems. The Al Gandoul Organization was established as a legal entity to implement a rural development project in Kassala (Practical Action). It is planning to have 12 branches in the project area with, among other attributes, bank accounts. They will have the capacity to offer an opportunity for representation of communities in financial transactions.

### **Productivity - Value chain**

Despite the absence of detailed analyses on the subject, the study could verify in the field that the great majority of urban and rural activities for production or trade are at the subsistence level, small scale and with low levels of productivity. There is in general very limited value added through the application of technical knowledge or inputs that improve the output.

Most of the information available on productivity relates to agriculture and animal husbandry. It is obvious that there is large gap in the knowledge on the nature of informal, small, urban activities, their potential for development and how a supporting environment for increased productivity can be created.

Studies in rural Kassala show that about 36% of the households were unable to cultivate all the area they held in 2009, with 40% of the households owing less than 5 feddans and 49% between 5 and 10 feddans<sup>25</sup>. This situation was reportedly due to lack of finance (52%) and low rainfall (27%). A similar survey in other areas of rural Kassala reported that the main reasons for unused land were lack of tools (26%), seeds

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<sup>25</sup> A Baseline Survey Report – Improving Food Security and livelihoods in Kassala Rural Areas, January 2010, EC / Practical Action, Ahmed Mahmoud Ahmed Elamin

(23%), and pesticides (20%), as well as climate conditions (22%). There is no information on the possible effect of lack of finance on productivity.<sup>26</sup>

The same studies show that 87% of the holdings rely on rainfall for irrigation and 84% use traditional implements for farming. Similar figures are reported for land farmed by refugees in Kassala (82.7%) thus contributing to the persistence of low agricultural yields. The reported support received from the state is negligible, except on vaccination for which they cover 42% of the services provided. Other support is provided by NGOs, mainly through production inputs and tools. A similar situation is found in animal husbandry.

Available information for Kassala does not allow confirming a linear relation between agricultural productivity and factors such as type of irrigation, perceived land “ownership”, rented land, or the nature of land available. It seems that productivity, and its decline, is mostly related to the application of inadequate agricultural practices and inputs.

It is reported that close to 79% of the owners of livestock in rural Kassala experienced an animal fodder/pasture gap during the last seasons, with 26% of them also suffering water shortages. Sheep and goats represent together over 70% of the livestock reared in the region.

The growth of animal herds in Kassala and Red Sea raises questions on the capacity of the area to support additional livestock. Despite that 60% of the state land in Kassala is classified as grazing area and that state officials indicate that there is further room for increase in the number of livestock, the main complaint by pastoralist in the region is the lack of fodder and limited grazing land. There are reports that certain areas of rural Kassala experienced overgrazing of rangeland and pastures in the last years due to water scarcity and degradation of pastures.

In addition to the need for rationalizing the use of pastures and water for livestock there seems to be further scope for improving livestock breeds to maximize meat production.

There are conflicting views on the need to improve the commercialization of agricultural produce and livestock. While some sectors claim that the present system of wholesale traders is working, others report that they take an inordinate share of the marketing benefits and there is a need for promoting producers-led marketing facilities.

The region has mixed experiences on the promotion of associations of producers to achieve economies of scale and increased productivity. It has been difficult to identify associative forms of production running for long periods of time on a sustainable basis. Many of the existing experiences count with external support for their operation. On the other hand, local communities do not seem to perceive cooperative forms of association as an alternative that would guarantee their expectations in terms of private ownership of land.

### **Institutional delivery capacity**

The transfer of competencies to the states for the delivery of public services has in most cases overwhelmed their capacity for planning and executing development activities. As indicated before, a large part of the resources available are dedicated to cover current expenditures, primarily salaries, leaving few resources free for investment in essential social services and infrastructure. In this context,

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<sup>26</sup> Baseline Survey – Hamesh Koreib, Telkuk and Rural Kassala – Food Security and Flood Prevention Project / European Commission, 2009-2010. Welt Hunger Hilfe (German Agro Action)

State authorities are overstretched and with limited operational capacity. Planning and budgeting functions need substantial improvement.

An important number of development projects in the region are funded by the international assistance. These projects are normally executed by implementing partners including national and international NGOs. Over the years, some of the international organizations and NGOs working in eastern Sudan have gained a wealth of experience on the region and formed cadres of knowledgeable and experienced staff. However, the paucity of funding often limits the capacity of these institutions to scale up their activities and forces them to release experienced staff which is difficult to replace.

The region counts with a relatively noteworthy pool of small and medium-size contractors for the execution of construction works. However, the quality of work, costs, and capacity to adhere to contract conditions and delivery times is not always up to acceptable standards. Thus, it is necessary to apply more rigorous processes for the prequalification of contractors and the supervision of works. State authorities have a limited capacity to perform these tasks and external support might be necessary for the development of institutional capacity in this area.

Traditional forms of social, community, organization in the region are not always conducive to the efficient generation and implementation of development projects. Additional work needs to be done in this area until formal delivery systems are strengthened and are able to fully assume their responsibilities.

## **IV. IDPs AND REFUGEES IN EASTERN SUDAN**

### **A. Evolution of the situation – a brief narrative**


East Sudan has received a continuous influx of IDPs and refugees over the last forty years, with some of them, the fewer, moving on to other areas in Sudan and abroad. Mass influxes were witnessed during years when the region experienced natural catastrophes as droughts and floods, or an escalation of tensions and conflict in neighbouring countries, mainly Eritrea and Ethiopia. Presently there is still a steady but smaller in numbers influx of refugees, mostly from Eritrea, but with an apparent change in their social composition. The majority of the recent refugees are educated youth in search of economic opportunities or fleeing the military service, with urban backgrounds and not ready to stay in camps or practice traditional forms of farming and animal husbandry to earn their living. They rather consider their refugee status as a transitional measure to move elsewhere in search of work or further education.

It can be considered for all practical purposes that the influx of IDPs in east Sudan has ceased. Present day internal population movements relate to more conventional forms of migration within Sudan, that is, households in search of work and economic opportunities. Still, the situation of the large number of IDPs that moved to the area over 15 years ago and are living in camps is precarious and needs urgent attention.

The old caseload of refugees has received protection and humanitarian support from UNHCR and COR throughout. While the majority of these refugees are in a protracted situation and their future uncertain, some of them have managed to enjoy certain degree of mobility and possibilities to work. These gains by a very small number of refugees are ad hoc and informal. While they show some degree of flexibility by those responsible for the attention of refugees in the field, they do not represent an explicit policy of the government in this regard. Their example can however constitute a good practice to be applied to the rest of the refugees in a protracted situation while more complex legal issues are resolved.

With the improvement of the situation in Eritrea UNHCR and COR declared a cessation clause in the mid 2000s, and encouraged the voluntary repatriation of refugees. A new policy was introduced to close camps and consolidate the 26 initial camps into the current 12 open camps. However, the still critical situation in the open camps, diminishing resources and new arrivals contribute to maintain a situation of deprivation for most refugees. To face this challenge, UNHCR, COR and their partners developed a strategy to increase the effectiveness in the use of the available resources and to enable refugees to become self-reliant for their livelihoods. Other agencies are also introducing more developmental approaches to increase self reliance such as those being applied by WFP on food for work and food for education.

The concept of self reliance in Sudan is not new since it was already implicit when establishing “wage” and “land” based camps for the refugees arriving close to 40 years ago. However, the self reliance strategies applied in Sudan, past and present, are still to bear fruits.



**Areas where main camps are located:**

-  **Refugees**
-  **IDPS**

The presence of IDPs in east Sudan can be traced back to the 1980s as result of the drought and floods affecting other areas of Sudan and the escalation of the civil war in the south. The first IDPs were mostly from western Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. They settled for the most part in Gedaref state, which is a fertile area for agricultural production and offers better employment opportunities. These IDPs are now to a great extent socially and economically integrated in the state. Later movements of IDPs to Kassala and Red Sea states have not fared that well, having to settle mostly in arid lands with limited possibilities of making a living through agriculture or animal husbandry alone. The situation of these IDPs in most cases lags behind that of neighbouring refugee camps and local communities.

## **B. Social and economic conditions**

### **Refugees:**

It is difficult to define the precise number of refugees in eastern Sudan. UNHCR has completed a first phase of verification in 12 open/active refugee camps and is now in the process of verification in “closed” camps. A third phase of verification will focus on urban refugees in Khartoum state

According to the latest information from UNHCR, the verified population of refugees in eastern Sudan stood at 79,847 by mid-November 2010. Of this, 67,040 (84%) reside in the 12 camps where they receive assistance from the international community. The rest are in closed camps and urban areas in the East.<sup>27</sup>

Table 4 below presents a breakdown of the estimated refugee population in eastern Sudan at the completion of Phase I of the UNHCR/COR verification process in mid-2009. The total figures in table 4 are slightly different from the above for early 2010. However, they provide an overview of the overall total refugee population presently in eastern Sudan under various categories and give a close indication of the order of magnitude of the refugee population in each location. It is understood that these figures will be adjusted as the verification process proceeds.

It is assumed that most of the “not verified refugees” (estimated at 55,000) are integrated in urban areas of eastern Sudan, and some in rural settlements (e.g those in closed camps/settlements). These refugees are in principle “self-reliant” since they do not receive any humanitarian support and have to live by their own means. Despite their assumed integration and self-reliance, this refugee population continues being of concern since their legal status is not yet regularized.

The estimated 15,000 refugees living in “closed camps” are effectively under the same legal environment than those still in open/active camps, though they do not receive humanitarian assistance and are in principle “self-reliant”.

In addition, it is reported that there is a continuous and growing stream of new refugee arrivals that started in 2004. There were approximately 24,000 new arrivals in 2009. They are for the most part Christian Eritreans from the highlands, young and educated, in transit to other destinations, and often with relatives and links of tribal affinity with people in the camps. The large discrepancy between those that complete registration and those verified (10,400 and 400 respectively in 2009) tends to confirm a trend of secondary movement among the new arrivals.

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<sup>27</sup> Multi-year Self-reliance Project for Long-staying Refugees in East Sudan, December 2010, Kassala, Sudan

**Table 4: Estimated number of refugees in the three States of eastern Sudan**

## Observations:

- The figures given below for the 12 active camps correspond to the completion of Phase I of the UNHCR/COR verification exercise and UNHCR estimations as on May 2010. As such, they differ slightly from the figures emanating from the ongoing Phase II verification. It has been decided to keep in the present table the figures from Phase I on the understanding that they will be changing as the verification process proceeds.
- The term “closed camps” used in the table below applies to those camps that do not receive refugee humanitarian assistance any more. However, the refugee population continues living in them, supposedly under conditions of self-reliance, but in general still preserving their “status” as refugees.

Description	State	Population	Date established - arrival	Category
1. Abuda Camp (1)	Kassala	2,753	1981	Land based
2. Girba Camp (1)	Kassala	5,363	1979	Wage based
3. Kilo 26 Camp (1)	Kassala	7,343	1979	Wage based
4. Shagareb I Camp (1)	Kassala	10,755	1985	Wage based
5. Shagareb II Camp (1)	Kassala	5,814	1985	Wage based
6. Shagareb III Camp (1)	Kassala	4,938	1985	Wage based
7. Wad Sharifey Camp (1)	Kassala	15,015	1982	Wage based
8. Um Gargour (1)	Gedaref	8,507	1987	Land based
Other camps & Red Sea (2)	El Gezira, Sennar, Red Sea	5,059	1987 – others	Wage based
Closed camps		15,000 (3)	1979-1987	Mainly land based
In urban and rural areas		40,000 (3)(4)	-	Wage
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>120,547(5)</b>		
<b>Total in active camps</b>		<b>65,547</b>		

## Notes:

- (1) Registered/Verified as of mid-2009, UNHCR, September 2009. Other sources, including COR/GoS, consider substantially larger figures, however, they could not be verified by the analytical study
- (2) Fau 5; Awad El Seed, Fath El Rahman, Kilo 7, and other registered refugees in Red Sea (mid-2009)
- (3) UNHCR estimation
- (4) To be revised based on the results of the on-going second phase of the UNHCR/COR verification exercise
- (5) There are other estimates of the total number of refugees in the Eastern states, including some by government agencies, that more than double this figure, however, they have not been considered due to the present inability to verify them

The refugee population in camps is mostly of Eritrean origin (close to 95%), Muslim, and with social/cultural affinity to the people of eastern Sudan, Beni Amir in particular. There are also Ethiopians (5%) and few Somalis. Most of them arrived in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is estimated that 60% of the present refugee population was born in Sudan.

Current programmes and projects of humanitarian assistance and self-reliance can only be targeted at the clearly identified, “verified”, refugee population, that is, the refugees living in camps. Some projects have been targeted at urban-integrated refugees, however, not as part of a broad strategy to improve the livelihood or regularize the situation of this sector of the refugee population.

Approximately 11,000 of the refugees in camps are located in so called “land-based camps”. The rest are in “wage-based camps”. Land based refugees are allocated a plot of land by COR, about 5 feddans per household, for rain fed cultivation. COR has in turn received legal tenure of the land from the State

Authorities. Thus, the refugees do not have any expectation of accessing to a longer-term, more secure, tenure of the land. The Sudanese Asylum Act of 1974, dictates that no refugee shall own land or immovable property in Sudan.

“Wage-based” camps are located next to mechanized farming schemes and local settlements providing easily accessible work opportunities and allowing refugees to supplement their income.

In both the above cases, refugee households attempt to supplement the received humanitarian aid and income from the work in the land, with ad-hoc activities such as handicrafts, petty trade and casual labour in urban areas. Some refugees manage to rent land for agriculture. Rental agreements often involve the provision of labour in kind or the sharing of the produce. Anecdotic evidence shows that productivity in “rented” land often tends to be higher than in land provided by COR.

A recent survey of refugee camps in Kassala state provides an insight into the coping strategies of refugee families<sup>28</sup>. The survey shows that refugees in camps rely for their livelihood primarily on a mix of activities, typically: off-farm income generating activities (32%); agricultural and livestock rearing (31%) and humanitarian (24%). Women-headed households represent 28% of the total, which is relatively high for the area, and are in general more dependent on humanitarian aid (up to 43%). There is evidence that no single source of income is enough to cover the needs of a household, thus several are pursued at the same time.

There are indications that in certain cases the overall means of livelihood for a refugee family (humanitarian support plus own income) might place them in a better situation than some sectors of the host communities, but still at a subsistence level. The study confirmed that services provided to refugees by humanitarian programmes (water supply, schools, health facilities, etc) are in many instances also used by the local communities.

Income for working refugees is less than SDG 450 per month for most groups of age. The main item of expenditure is food, followed by transport. Refugees in camps face lower costs in drinking water and health services since these are to an extent subsidized. Refugee income generating activities are limited at the subsistence level. Approximately 72% of women’s small businesses are home based and 21% in the case of men

Contextual evidence indicates that often refugees in camps have relatively better access to health services than their host communities, which puts pressure on the already precarious health services available to refugees to also give attention to the neighbouring communities. A similar situation has been observed with the educational facilities in certain refugee camps.

With an estimated enrolment of 51% in primary schools, refugees seem to have similar or slightly lower rates of enrollment than those in the host communities in Eastern Sudan.

The survey of refugee camps in Kassala shows that 19.7% of the respondents reported access to land through rent or partnership, while 8.3% reported ownership (Since present legislation does not allow land ownership by refugees, the reported “perception” of ownership needs to be verified). It is reported that 90% of the refugees cultivate less than 10 feddans (5 feddans or lower in average) and all cultivate less than 15 feddans.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Refugee Livelihoods Survey, Draft, April 2010, ACORD Kassala - UNHCR

<sup>29</sup> Ditto as 28

Some villages reported that there is not customary law restricting the allocation of land to refugees. However, land ownership/tenure is a crucial issue in eastern Sudan, embedded in local customary processes and traditions. Its sale or allocation to third parties is in general difficult and a source of conflict. Land rental agreements are normally for only one season, precluding a long term commitment to introduce appropriate agricultural practices and investment, and therefore with a negative impact on productivity.

As in the case of the local communities, there are some semi-formal financial mechanisms being promoted among refugees, including revolving funds, mainly introduced by national and international NGOs. Most loans are in the range of SDG 500 to 1000. Refugees in Kassala consider that a loan of SDG 1000 to SDG 1500 or higher would be more adequate.

The survey of refugee camps in Kassala reported that 14.7% of the respondent refugees have some form of access to credit. There are also informal mechanisms operating through family and lenders. A number of national NGOs, like ACORD, are promoting the creation of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) in refugee camps. They tend to apply variations of the Grameen Bank model in the design of such programmes.

Community guarantees and to a lesser extent group guarantees are also being applied in semi-formal credit systems for refugees focused on the promotion of rural enterprises.

There are not detailed evaluations on the performance of these initiatives. However, the reported presence of an element of subsidy in most of the applied interest rates and operational costs tends to raise the issue of their sustainability in the absence of external support.

According to the same survey by ACORD, the working capital of over 82% of the refugees engaged in businesses and small trade is under SDG 500. It is reported that the main challenges facing small businesses are their small scale and low value in size; difficulties for expansion; low levels of technology and poor business skills; saturated markets; risk aversion, and limited access to information.

51% of the refugee farmers sell part of their crops largely inside the camps to supplement their income. Almost one third of the refugee households sell livestock also inside the camps. Only 16% of the refugee farmers belong to an agricultural organization of which 14% belong to farmers' associations.

Refugees in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan face limitations in the access to the labour market despite that the Asylum Act does not explicitly forbid it. Other legal instruments, such as the Employment of Non Sudanese Act, 2000, offer some room for flexibility in this regard, however, administrative interpretation is generally negative and refugees are unable to obtain a work permit.

Their condition as refugees does not give them the right of normal residence in the country, owing land, and to have freedom of movement, thus, limiting their options for fully developing livelihood opportunities. There is evidence that few refugees overcome some of these restrictions through ad hoc practices or kinship ties, although they do not guarantee to them long-term security or protection based on their present legal status.

While recognizing that most refugees in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan have limited options for repatriation or relocation, and despite statements otherwise (Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement, 2006, and a Solutions Strategy for the Protracted Refugee Situation in Sudan, 2007), there seems to be no political will from the authorities to embark on an effective process of ensuring self-reliance and a modicum of integration. Lack of "political will" is often difficult to attach to specific levels of government or institutions, being more like a network of legal and operational restrictions whose responsibility for

management is diffuse and no individual institution seems willing or with the capacity to assume responsibility for, or the take the initiative to, overcoming them.

The study was able to verify in situ that many refugees are indeed able to move with relative freedom in eastern Sudan, find employment – albeit not in the public sector, and in certain cases have even some form of residential recognition. However, all the reported cases were ad-hoc, based on the particular circumstances of the refugee and the will and decision of the responsible government representative on the ground, rather than part of an legally and institutional sanctioned process. It is clear that no durable solution or self-reliance can be built on this basis.

### **Internally Displace Persons (IDPs)**

The precise number of IDPs in eastern Sudan is also difficult to define. The latest OCHA assessment considered a number of over 66,000 IDPs in 11 camps in Kassala State (2004). Most IDPs in camps in Kassala State arrived in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. They were displaced due to the Eritrea-Sudan war, civil war, and SAF-SPLA fighting. In general, all of them depend for their livelihood on casual labour, charcoal making and handicrafts. There are about 79,292 IDPs in the Red Sea state. Some are “drought” displaced IDPs, located in the western area of Port Sudan, and others are “war” displaced IDPs located in the eastern periphery of the city. Despite the absence of reliable studies it is estimated that 1,750 IDPs are located in Gedaref State. See table 5 below.

IDPs camps have mostly low population density and few means of livelihoods within them. Field observations show that camps have limited activities in their markets and offer few work opportunities. IDPs rely to a large extent on nearby towns to purchase household supplies. Men from IDP camps in Kassala state tend to move to towns in search of work opportunities. Casual labour and charcoal making seem to be the main livelihood options for IDPs. This must be seriously considered in the design of self reliance projects, as IDPs will encounter difficulties in purchasing inputs and selling their produce in the camps.

Despite several references to a larger presence of IDPs in eastern Sudan, up to 420,000 by some accounts, there is not verifiable information in this regard. This is the situation for Gedaref state in particular, where it is not possible to verify the often mentioned large presence of IDPs. The most probable is that the influx of population experienced in Gedaref and the urban areas of Red Sea and Kassala in the last decades were a mix of economic migrants and rural-urban population movements driven by the crisis in the rural economy.

It is not expected that the result of the referendum in early 2011, on the possible separation of Southern Sudan will have an impact of the situation on the IDPs in the east since most of them have been displaced from locations in eastern Sudan itself or Kordofan and to a large extent by economic reasons. For example, 50% of the IDPs in Red Sea declared having been displaced for economic reasons [drought, poverty, searching for job] while 34% declared war and security as the main reason for displacement. Also, despite that 50% of the IDPs in Port Sudan expressed in 2003, their readiness to return to their places of origin, only a negligible number of families had returned by 2010<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>30</sup> National Population Council (NPC), Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs, Red Sea State, *Rationalization of Population Mobilization Project*, Port Sudan, 2003.

**Table 5: Estimated number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the three States of eastern Sudan**

State	Description	Population	Date established - arrival	Observations
KASSALA (1)	Fedayeb	11,022	1998	War Eritrea/Sudan
	Fatu	5,866	1998	War Eritrea/Sudan
	Hadalia	6,912	1998	War Eritrea/Sudan
	Matataib	2,717	-	-
	Toglay	3,093	2002	Fighting SAF/SPLA
	ODI	5,276	>1995	Civil war
	Tahjer	2,500	2001	War Eritrea/Sudan
	Dabalawiet (4 places)	10,694	>1995	Civil war
	Gulsa	8,982	>1998	War
	Amarah	6,252	>1995	Civil war
	Aderman	3,223	>1995	Civil war
	Others	Not available		
	<b>Total Kassala</b> (with information available)		<b>66,537</b>	
RED SEA (2)(3)	Port Sudan, Toker, Singat, Halayp	79,292		From the south, Nuba Mountains and Beni Amer
	<b>Total Red Sea</b> (with information available)		<b>79,292</b>	
GEDAREF(4)	<b>Total Gedaref</b> (with information available)		<b>1,750</b>	
	<b>TOTAL (with information available)</b>		<b>147,579</b>	

Notes:

(1) OCHA/UNDP, December 2009. Recent but undated information from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs puts the total population in IDP camps in Kassala at 72,210

(2) National Population Council (NPC), Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs, Red Sea State, *Rationalization of Population Mobilization Project*, Port Sudan, 2003. This figure was confirmed as still valid by NPC – Red Sea in November 2010.

(3) Another source provided the figure of 128,976 also quoting the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC), 2006, however the study was unable to identify the original source

(4) In two settlements (J. Marko and Salamat Elbiaa), Village Development Committees and Sudanese Red Crescent (Provided by NGO - Practical Action), 2010

Interviews conducted by the study with IDPs in Red Sea state made evident that they do not return to the places of origin because they find conditions in their present locations better, notwithstanding the hardships currently being experienced. They also reported having a positive view of their integration in their present locations.

Observations conducted by the study in Kassala state show that the living conditions of IDPs are similar or lower than those of neighbouring communities and refugee camps. One explanation for this might be that they have practically no access to humanitarian aid (except some food aid) and do not count with the wider network of support provided by family and kinship relations available to the local communities.

IDPs in the Red Sea State as per a 2003 survey showed that close to 58% of them were engaged in their own, small businesses and near 22% in wage labour in the private and public sectors<sup>31</sup>. Similarly as with the local communities, most IDP households face seasonal food shortages and difficulties in accessing public services.

Of the 66,500 IDPs in camps 28,000 were receiving food aid, mainly women headed households, up to 2010. However, WFP is planning to discontinue food distribution in 2011 and replace it by a limited support to food for work and other special programmes such as food for education.

Except for the few projects being implemented to support livelihoods in eastern Sudan, including IDPs, it is assumed that the rest of the IDPs are primarily subsisting by their own means. A proper assessment of the number and circumstances of IDPs in eastern Sudan is a task still pending if appropriate strategies are to be designed to assist those in a protracted situation

## **C. Overview of initiatives for IDPs and refugees in Eastern Sudan**

### **1. Policies and strategies**

#### **Government and state development policies and strategies:**

The overall policy framework for the promotion of recovery and development in eastern Sudan is in principle provided by the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) and the programme “Sustainable Options for Livelihood Security in Eastern Sudan” (SOLSES). The establishment of the Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF) as the main institution responsible for the planning and allocation of development resources to the region provided an operational capacity to ESPA.

Available information and observations by the study indicate that the provisions of ESPA are not fully implemented yet and that SOLSES, for all effective purposes, is not working. The extent to which ESRDF is discharging its planning functions is still to be assessed. ESRDF has established offices in the eastern States and started the development of project initiatives. However, there are indications that ESRDF has not received all the resources pledged in ESPA, and that only a part of these have been disbursed. A series of funding proposals were submitted by ESRDF and the state governments to the International Donors and Investors Conference for East Sudan, Kuwait, 1-2 December 2010, and the outcome is still to be confirmed.

The planning and finance offices in the three states have ongoing plans for the development of their states. Despite that they outline some development and investment objectives they tend to fall short on implementation details that can truly guide the development of the full potential of the region based on its comparative advantages.

In addition, the achievement of the goals set out in the plans is conditioned to a large extent by the availability of resources, always uncertain given the heavy dependence of the states on transfers from the federal government. UNDP is presently cooperating with the authorities in eastern Sudan to improve public sector planning and management.

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<sup>31</sup> National Population Council (NPC), Ministry of Social and Cultural Affairs, Red Sea State, *Rationalization of Population Mobilization Project*, Port Sudan, 2003.

UNDP in collaboration with the authorities has conducted situation analyses in each of the three states. They provide an analytical framework to assist development planning. The framework addresses four main areas of outcomes: peace building; governance and rule of law; livelihoods and the productive sector; and basic service provision. The analyses are useful tools in providing an updated overview of the situation in the states and the mapping of the activities being conducted by various stakeholders. As with the case of the state strategic plans, the analyses also need to address more in depth issues of resources and local capacity to realistically achieve the proposed objectives.

- Red Sea

The current strategic plan for Red Sea includes three main goals to be achieved throughout the state: economic and social cohesion; balanced development of the Red Sea state territory; and conservation and management of natural resources and the cultural heritage.

The strategic plan identifies three key areas of intervention for the achievement of the goals: business development and employment; science, technology and higher education; and tourism<sup>32, 33</sup>. The plan envisions transforming Red Sea into an economically growing, development oriented business and investor friendly State. The plan gives particular emphasis to the promotion of inclusiveness and empowerment as a means to improve household economy as well as to give voice to the weak and the vulnerable groups. The plan does not outline special measures in relation to IDPs or refugees.

The strategy considers the application of geographically targeted resources to reduce poverty rather than universal (untargeted) programmes. It envisages that a greater efficiency in the use of resources will be achieved by targeting in an integrated manner smaller geographic units, such as secondary centres and rural communities and villages.

The priority given to agriculture, especially to improve the productivity of peasant farmers, is a key element of the state's poverty reduction strategy. It is postulated that the continued investment on developing water resources will not only provide a basic service to the people but also irrigation for increased agricultural productivity. The promotion of industry is expected to provide a boost to employment, particularly to the urban labour force.

The state government and stakeholders still need to take action to remove some of the obstacles to achieve the goals proposed in the plan: overcome current deficiencies in the legal and institutional framework regulating property and investments; remove budgetary constraints; mobilize resources for the rapid provision of infrastructure; build institutional capacity and skills; and design of social programmes that truly reach the poorer sectors of the population.

- Gedaref

Gedaref development strategy aims at achieving the integrated and balanced geographical and sectoral development of the state and to improve social and economic conditions in line with the MDGs, with particular emphasis on the development of human resources<sup>34, 35</sup>. The strategy does not contain special provisions regarding the attention to IDPs or refugees.

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<sup>32</sup> The Red Sea State Economic Development Plan, 2010

<sup>33</sup> Red Sea State – Situation Analysis, April 2009, UNDP- Red Sea State Government

<sup>34</sup> Third Economic Report, Ministry of Economic Planning, Gedaref State, 2008

<sup>35</sup> Gedaref State – Situation Analysis, December 2009, UNDP - Gedaref State Government

The strategy identifies five main areas of intervention: provision of clean drinking water; improvement of health services in rural areas; increase primary education enrollment; improve access to markets; and the establishment of social and cultural centers.

The state gives particular attention to the establishment of cooperatives for the improvement of livelihoods in the rural / agricultural sector, including those of the IDPs in the border areas. The establishment of cooperatives aims at achieving economies of scale in the performance of the agricultural sector by consolidating settlements and production units, and by providing financing and services in a more efficient way.

Despite that Gedaref has a better resource base and institutional capacity than the other states in eastern Sudan it still needs to increase its implementation capacity if the above goals are to be achieved. The state will also need to overcome a deeply rooted negative perception among citizens on the adequacy of the cooperative system to improve rural productivity while safeguarding their aspirations for individual property rights.

- Kassala

Kassala State Strategic Plan 2007-2011 overall vision is to create “a state where Kassala’s people and in particular the war-affected, vulnerable and poor groups enjoy security, access to basic social services and decent means of livelihoods within a just, inclusive and equitable governance”<sup>36, 37</sup>. The plan focuses on a number of core issues, such as basic social services, livelihoods, governance, the environment and the attainment of the targets set by the MDGs. Despite that the plan recognizes the challenges presented by the large number of IDPs and refugees in the state, no particular measures are proposed in this respect.

As with the other states, few details are given on how the proposed goals will be achieved, both in terms of specific targets and resources required.

### **Policies on IDPs and refugees**

The joint COR/UNHCR “Solutions Strategy for the Protracted Refugee Situation in Sudan” provides policy approaches to guide action in this area. Since the successful implementation of some of the recommendations in the “Solutions Strategy” depend on policy agreement by the government (COR and relevant Federal and State ministries) their progress is not proceeding as originally expected.

The study was unable to identify specific institutions or stakeholders responsible for the stalling in the implementation of the provision of SOLSES, although there seems to be entrenched perceptions among several stakeholders that their short-term interests would be better served by maintaining the existing situation:

- national humanitarian agencies would not need to undergo changes in their present competencies, activities and allocation of resources;
- line ministries would not need to assume additional responsibilities taxing their already overstretched capacity;
- refugees would not risk the loss of humanitarian support however meager.

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<sup>36</sup> Kassala State Development Plan, 2010

<sup>37</sup> Kassala State Situation Analysis, April 2009, UNDP - Kassala State Government

Complementary actions and operational strategies to cope with the refugee situation in eastern Sudan have been outlined in recent initiatives, such as: the Self-Reliance Strategy for Refugees in Eastern Sudan (UNHCR, February 2009) and the Joint Assessment Mission 2009 – Eastern Sudan (COR-WFP-UNHCR, April 2009). In fact, the “self reliance strategy” for refugees has become the main framework guiding UNHCR interventions in eastern Sudan.

The self-reliance strategy is making progress in certain components while others still need to show progress, particularly those that require policy changes and political will from the side of the government. Lack of adequate funding and limitations in applying a comprehensive approach to the promotion of self-reliance in refugee communities are also limiting the impact of the strategy. Rapid action might need to be taken to bridge these gaps since a partial application of the strategy can create a negative perception about it among the refugee communities and stakeholders and lead to its eventual dismissal.

Observations made in some refugee camps show that the application of the self-reliance strategy is often limited to the promotion of one form of livelihood and capacity building. In all the cases appraised by the study, that single livelihood activity was insufficient to cover all the needs of the household. Also, the design of the activities appeared as too reliant on external support and it was not possible to visualize a point when these would be discontinued leaving the community fully self-reliant.

The National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons contains provisions regarding the government approach to the issue<sup>38</sup>. According to the policy “the rights of IDPs include, freedom of movement, belonging to a family, access to food, water and sanitation, shelter, health, education, access to documentation, right of possession of property, civil rights, participation in political affairs and practicing religious practices, economic and employment opportunities, access to justice and all the rights of citizenship stipulated in the constitution not mentioned in this policy”.

The policy defines the obligations of the “State” in relation to IDPs, among others: preventing the causes of displacement; ensuring upholding of IDPs rights; ensuring adequate allocation of resources for IDPs; ensure that accurate data on IDPs is collected; and supporting sustainable solutions to causes of displacement. Some of these obligations have been only partly met in the case of eastern Sudan.

The federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs (MHA) has indicated that they are in the process of conducting a renewed assessment of the number and location of IDPs in Sudan, including the east, as a basis to update their policies and programmes for the attention to their needs. Understandably, MHA has to divide its attention and resources among several sensitive IDP situations in the country, including Darfur and the South. This fact contributes to limit the attention and resources they can allocate to the east

The study was able to corroborate the general lack of resources of MAH and the state ministries of humanitarian affairs for the implementation of activities in support of IDPs. It is hoped that the present efforts by the federal Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs will receive adequate support and could eventually lead to the application of a renewed strategy for IDPs in Sudan.

## **2. Programmes and projects**

UNHCR and its implementing partners have been engaged in a protracted refugee situation in eastern Sudan for more than three decades. That period has witnessed an evolution in strategies and programmes to deal with the situation, from purely humanitarian approaches to self-reliance projects and programmes.

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<sup>38</sup> National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), PDF file created on 29 May 2009 (ref, national IDP policy for 2002 and workshop on IDPs 2002), Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Republic of Sudan

The experience on projects dealing with IDPs and local development in general spans over a period of 15 years and more. These projects cover a variety of sectors (health, education, water, agriculture, livelihoods, etc); type of interventions (provision of services and infrastructure, training, capacity development, technical assistance, credit, etc); and modalities of execution (implementing partners, community participation, contracting, etc).

Table 6 below provides an overview of selected programmes and projects under implementation in eastern Sudan. Most of the projects are being implemented in Kassala and Red Sea states reflecting the more self-reliant nature of Gedaref. Kassala also concentrates most of offices and facilities of NGOs and international support agencies working in eastern Sudan.

**Table 6: Selected programmes and projects under implementation in eastern Sudan**

IMPLEMENTING ORGANIZATION	MAIN ACTIVITIES	LOCATION		
		PORT SUDAN	KASSALA	GEDAREF
ACORD	Food security and community capacity development	✓	✓	
Practical Action	Livelihoods		✓	
Plan Sudan	Education, health, water, community training		✓	
Muslim Aid	Health, hygiene and social support		✓	
Samaritan PGurse	Education, hygiene, nutrition		✓	
Mines Action Group	Demining and awareness	✓	✓	
Goal	Education, water, hygiene, nutrition, training		✓	
German Agro Action	Terrace building, water harvest, schools, Livelihoods		✓	
Qatar Charity	Orphans, social support		✓	
Islamic Charity Corporation for Social Welfare	Orphans, social support		✓	
UNICEF	Health, education, water	✓	✓	
WHO	Health		✓	
WFP	Food distribution, livelihoods	✓	✓	
UNDP	Rule of law, governance, Livelihoods, DDR	✓	✓	✓
UNFPA	Reproductive health		✓	
FAO	Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery	✓		
European Commission	Eastern Sudan rehabilitation and development program	✓	✓	✓
UNHCR	Self reliance strategy for refugees Solution strategy		✓	

There are indications that former efforts have had limited impact in achieving sustainable livelihoods for most of the target population due to, among other reasons, changing socio-political dynamics, drought, lack of management capacity, absence of competent partners, lack of engagement with line ministries and irregular funding.

It was not possible to access detailed documentation related to such projects/programmes, including those identified in the “self-reliance” strategy prepared by UNHCR, thus precluding an outright in-depth analysis of their main objectives and achievements and the constraints faced during implementation. Fortunately, many of the national implementing partners, NGOs, involved in the execution of these projects are still available and preserve an institutional memory on them. The study was thus able to obtain qualitative information on some of the projects as well as an appreciation from the implementing partners on the positive and negative elements of the same:

It is necessary to stress the commitment of the national and international organizations working to improve the conditions of IDPs and refugees as well as for the overall development of eastern Sudan. Without their work the present situation would have been more precarious. Thus, the observations provide below cannot be attributed to the performance of any organization in particular but to the context in which they have to operate. Equally, the observations below aim at providing an overview of the main issues identified in the implementation of projects in eastern Sudan rather than an assessment project by project.

- Target:

Most of the developmental projects in eastern Sudan have been targeted at local communities and in certain cases covering IDP households within them. Relatively few initiatives, mainly focused on shelter provision and services, have been specifically aimed at IDPs. Humanitarian programmes, including the most recent self reliance activities, have focused on the refugee population sometimes making accessible to the local communities some of the services provided to the refugees. Ad hoc humanitarian activities have also been targeted at the population as a whole in the event of natural disasters, as the floods affecting Kassala from time to time.

Except for the humanitarian programmes, most of the above activities have been targeted at a relative small or disperse group. Development programmes are by and large focused on rural areas with proportionally fewer initiatives in urban centres (Towns in Kassala and Gedaref host 25% of the states’ population and 50% in the case of Red Sea). Many programmes also target a particular group within the community, as women, children, orphans and specific vulnerable groups, although recognizing this as entry point for overall community development.

With very few exceptions, development programmes and projects have not covered the integral development needs of a distinct community or area containing households from diverse composition and origin: local community – IDPs – refugees. Thus, it is difficult to identify a distinct group of the population that has undergone a remarkable improvement in their living conditions and sustainability as a result of a particular project.

- Sector and components

The emphasis of the programmes and projects has moved over time from the provision of basic services and infrastructure (schools, health centres, access roads, etc) towards livelihoods and capacity development. This might respond to a situation of better access to basic services (which is not fully the case) or to the conclusion that scarcer resources might be better focused on livelihood initiatives that aim at self-reliance.

Livelihood-denominated initiatives normally encompass in themselves a whole range of components, from actual hard infrastructure (e.g. water catchment and distribution); to production inputs (e.g. seeds, tools/equipment; access to land; vaccines, pesticides, fertilizers, boats, etc); or business support (e.g. business skills, technical support, training on specific technical skills, credit, etc).

There are few cases in which a project or programme has been able to cover the whole chain of factors related to livelihood promotion. It has not been possible to identify cases in which a programme or project has successfully covered both basic services and livelihood promotion components.

Several programmes have focused on vocational training and skills development. Some of them, like the Vocational Training centre in Kassala, supported by GTZ and now JICA, or specific courses on agricultural practices and animal husbandry, are responding to actual demands by the market and proving successful. However, many others seem to lack a proper appraisal of the demand for the skills being developed and show little impact on improved livelihoods.

- Implementation modality

Most of the humanitarian and development programmes implemented in eastern Sudan are executed by national and international implementing partners, which set up their own implementation units for this purpose.

All the programmes and projects are implemented in coordination with public sector organizations but the latter do not have in general any management responsibility within the project.

Most of the projects consider the participation of the community in their design and implementation. However, the nature and intensity of such participation varies greatly from project to project. In certain cases use is made of traditional community organizations and representation, while in others formal mechanisms of representation established by the authorities or specially established by a project are employed. There are mixed results in the use of any of these arrangements, however, it is clear that often the goal of strengthening community structures is at odds with more immediate goals of participatory project implementation.

- Participation of the public sector and phasing out strategies

In most of the cases there is minimal participation of state and local authorities in direct project management and implementation. Projects are for the most part executed by national and international implementing partners. The main justification for this situation is the argued lack of capacity of the public sector organizations as well as the lack of transparency / accountability in their contracting practices.

The majority of the developmental projects do not include specific activities to build the implementation capacity of local authorities or to facilitate the progressive transfer of responsibilities to them. There are a few projects aiming at developing the capacity of state organizations albeit mainly for planning and fiscal management. However, in most cases these activities are disassociated from actual activities on the ground, thus preventing the formation of a virtuous circle of learning and doing.

As such, the experience and capacity available to implementing partners is generally lost after project completion and little remains as an asset at the local level and with the local authorities. Admittedly, some experience and capacity remains with the staff that stays in the region, but this capacity is normally not directly absorbed by the project delivery structures in the region.

- The legal and regulatory environment

Projects in general do not include specific objectives and activities related to improving the capacity of refugees to enjoy the right to work, to property, or to movement. These issues are dealt at the political level by the GOS and UNHCR.

In the absence of these elements, most projects, particular those dealing with livelihoods are unable to develop truly sustainable mechanism for income generation and community development. The creation of proxy mechanisms to overcome this limitation (like many revolving funds or guarantee systems) is generally project specific and not sustainable.

- Replication, scaling up and sustainability

The large majority of the development projects in eastern Sudan have not been able to set in motion processes that allow their scaling up and sustainability. Most of the gains achieved are project specific and restricted to the period of project implementation.

- Funding

Funding for humanitarian activities conducted by UNHCR is allocated on an annual basis. Despite that over the years activities covered by this funding might have acquired some characteristics of a programme, it does not allow making commitments beyond one year and there is no certainty regarding on its volume.

Other funding for humanitarian and development activities is mostly allocated on a project basis with durations in average of 2 to 3 years. This type of funding normally does not carry an expectation of continuity or scaling up, despite that in a few cases it has occurred.

An element of donor fatigue has developed through the years, partly as a consequence of a protracted situation that drags on with no perspective of a solution and partly due to the perception of the limited impact of such initiatives. Present funding per project is thus small in relative terms and directed at activities that are expected to have a greater impact on livelihoods. The results of this strategy are still to be assessed.

Due to the paucity and amount of funding available the continuity of activities in eastern Sudan is kept through the dedicated action of UN humanitarian agencies, such as UNHCR and WFP, and some local NGOs that have maintained a continued presence in the region and are the source of a steady stream of funding request to the donor community.

Since donors often fund separately humanitarian and development activities under different type of procedures and conditions, it is difficult to bridge in the field the gap between these two types of activities. Organizations aiming at bridging the gap undertake creative forms of project design to overcome these restrictions, but the results are often partial and not serving the intended purpose.

## **V. LESSONS LEARNED**

### **A. The case of eastern Sudan**

The situation of refugees and IDPs in eastern Sudan is quite complex and difficult to summarize in just a few concepts. There is a long and heterogeneous history in the implementation of projects and in the action of different partners. It is not possible to capture in a study of this nature the role played by individuals in the government, implementing partners and refugee/IDP communities, that have often had a determinant influence on how activities develop and on their outcomes.

The issues outlined below are an attempt to present some of these elements in a brief and structured manner on the understanding that the actual issues are more nuanced and complex. It is expected however that the presentation of the main issues in such a manner will elicit a clear response to them - positive or contrary, call for further analysis and understanding of some of the issues, and catalyze commitment for action.

#### **At the policy level:**

- Presently there are not the minimum conditions required to provide a durable solution to the refugees in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan. To a large extent that condition also applies to IDPs with long permanence in camps;
- There is not political will from the authorities, at all the levels, to work towards the achievement of durable solutions;
- The perceived short-term benefits of the present situation, particularly for refugees (access to some services, humanitarian support, etc.), exerts a great pressure on the stakeholders (national humanitarian agencies, lines ministries and institutions, and refugee and IDP communities) for maintaining the status quo of mere survival;
- The concept of self-reliance is valid if inserted in a process towards durability and if self-reliance is not only a proxy for survival, subsistence, but a stepping stone for development. Without this goal in sight, and proactive work towards its achievement, it can create an environment where humanitarian support is discontinued or decreased and maintains the same situation of deprivation without end in sight;
- Presently there are not conditions to achieve self-reliance by most of the displaced population given the situation of their locations in eastern Sudan in terms of natural environment and its capacity to support sustainable agriculture and other urban and rural economic activities;
- Realistic assessments need to be made of the capacity of present locations (of local communities, IDPs and refugees) to ensure self-reliant activities at a socially and economically affordable cost. Hard policy decisions will need to be made to follow on those assessments;

- Field visits and surveys show that despite enjoying full rights, most of the rural communities and low income urban areas in the east are in social and economic conditions not much better than the IDPs and refugees. These communities are living at the subsistence level and are vulnerable to sudden changes in natural phenomena and political events. Thus, interventions aiming at achieving self-reliance need to be defined in a wider community and geographical context and not simply aimed at a specific target group;

### **At the operational level**

- Refugees and IDPs in a “**protracted situation**” are the main group of concern for the achievement of durable solutions or sustainable livelihoods. Programmes should target this group as an integral part of the communities or areas where they are inserted;
- Self-reliance is the strategic framework being applied by UNHCR for the attention to refugees in eastern Sudan. As such, the refugee population and other stakeholders closely associate the term to UNHCR activities. Being a fundamentally humanitarian agency, and despite the application of principles of “Development Assistance for Refugees”, the main actions to implement self-reliance in eastern Sudan are determined by the competencies and operational mechanisms of UNHCR. As such, they face limitations in the introduction of truly self-reliance developmental processes in terms of sectors and implementation modalities; thus
- It is required the application of implementation mechanisms that can encompass all the sectors of activity necessary to execute comprehensive interventions to achieve self reliance. This approach would mean the introduction of effective overall programming rather than vertical lines of authority. Equally, given the convergent needs of IDPs, refugees and local communities, it would be necessary that such activities focus on the achievement of sustainable livelihoods;
- Given the complexity of the situation of refugees and IDPs in a protracted situation as well as of their relation with the authorities and local communities, it is essential that interventions for self reliance and sustainable livelihoods are community driven;
- Sustainable livelihoods in eastern Sudan can only be achieved if “practices” are introduced to enable the displaced population to securely search for income generation activities in their present locations or elsewhere, recognizing their entitlement to have access to freedom of movement, labour permits, tenure, finance and residence. The design of such “practices” would be based on existing ad-hoc examples in eastern Sudan and be extended to the rest of the refugee population in a protracted situation while a durable solutions is being worked out;
- A similar approach would be required among national organizations from the public sector, enabling state planning agencies to take the lead in the integral assessment and planning of needs for IDPs, refugees and local communities, while line agencies are responsible for operations, and national humanitarian agencies strengthen their role as policy and coordination body;
- Complementary activities are required to ensure that national organizations develop the capacity to efficiently perform these tasks;
- Each refugee and IDPs community is unique in terms of its history, ethnic mix, natural resources and environment, geographical location, urban-rural condition, relation with neighbouring IDP and/or local communities, and vocation and skills for certain type of economic activity.

Additional distinctions are present in refugee communities based on their original set up as land-based or wage-based camps. Thus, while recognizing the need for a broad strategy encompassing all the displaced population, each community, entity, needs to be the subject of a specific appraisal and targeted design of interventions to attain sustainable livelihoods;

- It is essential that IDP and refugee communities have freedom in choosing the type of activities in which they would prefer to be engaged and for which they have particular vocation. It is also essential that targeted IPDs and refugees have the freedom to pursue their preferred option of activity in other locations. This is particularly important since it appears that many camps/locations might not be able to support sustainable livelihoods for all their population, or the cost of achieving this might be unaffordable;
- Programmes for the achievement of sustainable livelihoods in IDP and refugee communities need to have a clear beginning and end. The agreement between the target communities and the support agencies for a realistic period of support to achieve sustainable livelihoods and an exit date should be clear on a case by case basis;
- Programmes should be designed to give integral – complete – attention to one or more communities for which full funding is to be secured in advance, and then move on to other communities. “Partial” attention to all the communities of concern has not proved effective in the past;
- It is necessary to establish a funding mechanisms that allows bridging the gap between exclusive funding for humanitarian or for development purposes, and that permits planning horizons longer than the usual one or two year programming cycle applied by international cooperation partners

## **B. Considerations for the World Bank**

### Strategic interests:

Providing responses to situations of forced displacement is a complex task, especially if it is aimed at ensuring the attainment of a durable solution for those displaced, refugees or IDPs, and promoting peace and stability in the involved countries.

This is a difficult task for the World Bank to undertake on its own. However, the World Bank is well positioned to contribute towards the achievement of this goal in collaboration with other partners.

Within the overall mission of the World Bank, its strategic objective in contributing towards the durable solution of forced displacement situations is to bring the affected countries and displaced population back to the path of peace and development, enabling the application of pro-poor policies and fostering economic growth. Under these conditions, the World Bank will be in a better position to engage the affected countries through its regular operations.

### Potential for World Bank involvement:

The assessment of the situation in eastern Sudan shows that, not taking into account actual field operations, the World Bank could contribute to the response in situations of forced displacement in five different ways:

- *Analytical and knowledge creation*: deepening the understanding on forced displacement in specific contexts and drawing lessons for the design of operational responses;
- *Methodological and tools*: Giving due significance and analytical consistency to the issues of forced displacement and durable solutions in the various country assessment instruments applied in relevant countries (CA, PA, PRSP, CPIA, etc);
- *Programming tools*: Systemizing the treatment of forced displaced situations and responses in World Bank programming for relevant countries. Systemizing the interrelation between forced displacement and responses with specific World Bank country operations;
- *Operational tools*: Developing project appraisal instruments as well as project operational procedures that are specific to the conditions prevailing in situations of forced displacement;
- *Operational delivery modalities*: Supporting the establishment of umbrella implementation / coordination mechanisms to deliver projects targeting the provision of durable solutions to situations of forced displacement.

#### Conditions for World Bank's participation in country operations - projects

The study of refugees and IDPs in eastern Sudan shows how easy it is for an organization to get bogged down in situations that becomes protracted. The failure to achieve durable solutions, or at least sustainable livelihoods – self reliance, has a profound cost on institutional credibility. But most importantly, it creates a precedent of failed expectations that burdens new initiatives with a negative load, even before implementation starts.

World Bank involvement in country operations in this area, even on a partial basis, should thus be conditioned to a series of pre-requisites to secure as far as possible the achieving of the desired objectives and preserve the Bank's standing, namely:

- Self-reliance/sustainable livelihood is designed for achievement within the period of project implementation;
- The outcomes of the project include, if they do not exist, the introduction of recognized appropriate “practices” that permit the access of the refugee / IDP population to freedom of movement, employment, and tenure, pending legal and regulatory changes than would take a longer period of implementation;
- Durable solutions are achieved within the period of project implementation in case the introduction of legal and regulatory changes are part of the project;
- The project targets the displaced population and host community in an integrated manner;
- The project is community driven;

- The project considers the building of the implementation capacity of the local line authorities responsible for livelihoods and service delivery. The project includes a clear strategy for the transfer of responsibilities to line authorities and the phasing out of project support and management by external partners.
- There is confirmed commitment from the communities and authorities with project implementation. There is an element of community / government counterpart contribution in project implementation, even if in kind.

### The case for eastern Sudan

The commitment of GOS to abide by the result of the referendum for the separation of Southern Sudan in January 2011, might open the way to a new area of cooperation with the international community and its institutions. While many issues would still need to be resolved to complete the eventual separation from the South, it is clear that GOS will now have more freedom, and pressure, to focus its energies on attending the demands of the northern states and build peace and prosperity in the region.

If this is the case, the World Bank can contribute to the process of full reinsertion of Sudan in the international community and assist the country in overcoming the multiple challenges posed by poverty and the pursuing of wanting development policies. The analytical work and assessments carried out by the World Bank in collaboration with GOS in various sectors in recent years provides a stepping stone for this effort.

Since the state of deprivation of refugees and IDPs in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan is not dissimilar of the conditions experienced by the local population and given that their attention has to be conducted in an integrated manner, there is a positive argument for the World Bank to follow up on its previous analytical work with action on the ground and thus build a body of experience on positive operational responses for scaling up.

“Action on the ground” could focus on the preparation of the instruments required for due inclusion of the issues of the displaced population on country assessments and programming, as well as in developing the tools for appropriate project appraisal, design and implementation.

Further “action on the ground” could move into actual project implementation. However, it is believed that World Bank involvement in actual implementation would need to be within the framework of prerequisites or conditions as outlined above.

For this purpose, the World Bank would need to conduct consultations with GOS, the state authorities and international partners, particularly UNHCR on the feasibility of meeting such conditions and move into project design.

## **VI. ELEMENTS OF A RESPONSE TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS OF IDPs AND REFUGEES IN EASTERN SUDAN**

The sections below aim at providing an overview of the possible elements to be considered in a potential project or programme for the provision of sustainable livelihoods, self-reliance, to refugees and IDPs in a protracted situation in eastern Sudan. They do not provide a template for project or programme design but rather some of the key goals to be achieved in those projects and the main attributes they should have, thus, appropriate outcomes and activities can follow once a decision is taken on the former.

The outlined elements are not exhaustive but, on the other hand, not all of them would need to be part of a given project, since these will be determined by the actual conditions present in the selected location.

### **A. Goals**

- Create the basis for the achievement of durable solutions for the refugee and IDP population and setting up the appropriate legal, regulatory and institutional processes required for this purpose, When this is not possible in the short term:
- Establishment of appropriate “practices” to ensure access to freedom of movement, tenure and employment in a recognized manner pending the introduction of comprehensive legal, regulatory and institutional instruments;
- Achievement of sustainable livelihoods, self reliance, for the displaced population and host community, through interventions that maximize the relation between costs and benefits of the proposed project;
- Create the conditions for the scaling up of project activities through,
  - Developing the capacity of local government organizations, implementing partners and communities for project execution, and
  - Developing project appraisal and operational instruments for the design and implementation of projects under the conditions existing in situations of displacement and weak local execution capacity.

### **B. Attributes of the interventions**

- Each intervention in a community of local population, IDPs and refugees should respond to the unique characteristics of such community, its location, and environmental conditions. This would demand that such intervention is based on a solid appraisal of local conditions and an analysis of the feasibility, costs and benefits, of the same.

While it is not proposed that interventions are subject to thorough feasibilities analysis as in conventional investments projects, a simplified but equally reliable analysis would need to be conducted to avoid waste of resources;

- The interventions would need to respond to the needs for sustainable livelihoods, self reliance, in a comprehensive manner. That means, they would need to cover all aspects, sectors, of livelihoods and provision of services that would ensure and integral satisfaction of needs in a balanced manner (e.g, complete livelihood packages; support to agricultural or animal husbandry, water resources; health; education; urban and rural basic services).

Despite the need to be comprehensive, it is understood that the achievement of sustainable livelihoods is the component underpinning the sustainability of all the others;

- Interventions should provide an integral response to each of the sectors of activity included in the same. Focusing on a single type of activity, e.g, constructing a facility; or training; or marketing, or credit; or providing tools; might not produce the desired results if the others are not well covered. The intervention has to cover the full cycle of activities to ensure that livelihoods are sustainable and services can operate without further support after the completion of the project;
- Interventions need to be driven by the communities. This is essential in this type of intervention since external support would be, for all practical purposes, discontinued after completion of the project;
- Interventions would need to maximize the use of local expertise and capacity in project execution for the double objective of being cost effective and developing local capacities.

If necessary, the intervention would include activities to develop the capacity of local partners for their effective participation in the project.

### **C. Implementation modalities**

The breadth of activities necessary to ensure sustainable solutions, self reliance, durability, makes it difficult for all of them to fall under the specialized capacity or competency of a single organization. Without doubt, this capacity and competencies can be built in a given organization. However, experience in past projects shows that it might be more efficient and cost effective to set up ad hoc mechanisms, to deal with ad hoc situations, that bring together the capacities and inputs from several specialized agencies.

Of course, this type of approach has also been tried in the past, also with mixed results. The main challenges in this regard have been related to inter institutional competition as well as the difficulties to bring organizational cultures together.

The experience with multi-donor funds can offer a way forward despite that they have also faced problems in the past. These problems have often been the result of management issues as well as of the application of operational procedures that are not responsive to the requirements for project execution present in refugee and situations under an environment of weak governance.

For that reason, unique situations might also call for unique structures in the implementation modality, or institutional arrangements, to be applied on a project or programme. Below are proposed some issues to consider in the selection of such modalities:

- A compact of support agencies and donors: that allows funding from different sources and characteristics to be pooled together for the implementation of project activities;

- An implementation and management umbrella: that ensures consistency in the application of the project strategy and is able to effectively coordinate the inputs of various implementing partners. A set of operational procedures that are responsive to project implementation needs and meet donor and implementing partner requirements;
- An effective process of community engagement in project activities and in their follow up. Up front confirmation from the community on its contribution to project implementation by providing counterpart inputs with the ultimate goal of achieving community driven sustainable development. Mechanisms to engage the community should focus on actual project goals, while at the same time strengthening community structures and cohesion;
- Implementation mechanisms including the engagement of local authorities in project activities, enabling a progressive handing over of implementation and follow up to the same;
- Direct project execution through local implementing partners. If necessary the project / programme shall include special activities to build the capacity of local partners for the effective participation in its activities.

## **VII. NEXT STEPS**

- The World Bank to review the “assessment of development needs” and take a decision on its readiness to continue with its support work in eastern Sudan and/or globally. Make a preliminary decision on the areas on which that support would be focused based on the issues outlined in chapter V, section B, of the report, or others that might be determined by the World Bank.
- If it is decided to continue the support to eastern Sudan, conduct consultations with UNHCR to harmonize views on the conclusions of the report and agreed on a joint strategy to move forward. That is, developing a programme for the attention of the displaced population and host communities in eastern Sudan through interventions to achieve sustainable livelihoods, self reliance;
- Conduct consultations with key institutions of GOS, donors, UN organizations and implementing partners on the main conclusions of the report and on the feasibility to move forward with the development of a programme for the displaced population and host communities in eastern Sudan.
- Prepare a road map for the formulation of a programme for the displaced population and host communities in eastern Sudan. Conduct preliminary consultations with key partners to reach agreement on the envisaged objectives and funding requirements of a proposed programme. Confirm support from GOS to the objectives of the programme and secure tentative pledges for donor support;
- Organize a conference to present the programme and confirm support and funding.

## **ANNEXES**

- Annex I: Implementation of strategies and recommendations for refugees self-reliance in Eastern Sudan
- Annex II: Implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA)
- Annex III: Project / Programme implementation review form

## Annex I: Implementation of strategies and recommendations for refugees self-reliance in Eastern Sudan

Solutions Strategy for the Protracted Refugee Situation in Sudan (2007) [COR-UNHCR]	Self-reliance strategy (February 2009) (Phase I only)	Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) Eastern Sudan – April 2009 [COR-UNHCR-WFP] (recommendations/conclusions)	PROGRESS	GAPS
<p><u>Registration and profiling</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Verification/Registration of Eritrean refugees in the progress data base, updated since 2006, and <i>in situ verification</i> (E. Sudan &amp; Khartoum), for:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Verification numbers and data</li> <li>○ Legal status confirmation</li> <li>○ Documentation issue</li> <li>○ Specific protection/assistance needs</li> <li>○ Assistance improvement</li> <li>○ Durable solutions strategies/programmes</li> </ul> </li> </ul> <p><u>Asylum System Development</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity building to COR for refugee status determination (RSD) of asylum seekers (E. Sudan &amp; Khartoum)</li> <li>• Review status of 4000 Ethiopians in Sudan before 1991, and potential granting residence permits</li> <li>• Easy restrictions on freedom of movement (Sudan reservation to UN Convention (1951) and protocol (1967))</li> </ul>		<p><u>Coordination, registration and self-reliance</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Follow up with those missing Phase I verification (2008)</li> </ul>		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Amendments to Asylum Act (1967) and legislation (M. Of Justice and attorney gen.) complying with interim constitution: registration / documentation procedures; access to work permits, property and citizenship</li> </ul> <p><u>Improvement of Services and Service delivery</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased resources for services</li> <li>• New partners to be engaged</li> <li>• COR phase out from direct delivery assistance/services and hand over to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ National / international NGOs</li> <li>○ State authorities</li> <li>○ WFP (warehouses and food distribution)</li> <li>○ Sub-contractors (logistics, transport, construct. etc.)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Strengthen capacity NGOs</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage refugees in sanitation works</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Food security</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Overhaul food and NFI distribution</li> <li>○ Support family gardens</li> <li>○ Conduct food security analysis</li> <li>○ Conduct full market survey</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <u>Logistics</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Improve warehouse conditions &amp; management, including women involvement</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <u>Health and nutrition</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Improve general health service</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		
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<p><u>Durable solutions</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Voluntary repatriation:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Continue on-going programmes</li> <li>○ No envisaged as key solution for Eritrean refugees</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <i>Self-reliance and local integration:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Assessment of present modalities of self-sufficiency (through verification exercise), to review, redesign, existing livelihood projects</li> <li>○ Continued support to beneficiary organizations: cooperatives, collective businesses, revolving funds, to manage livelihood initiatives</li> <li>○ Coordinate with broader recovery, development projects targeted at rural/urban poor</li> <li>○ Establish steering committee for SOLSES (sustainable options of livelihood security in</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deploy UNHCR surge team, management &amp; implementation structure and annual fund</li> <li>• Strategic partnership with local consultant (support surge team: site plans, master plan, baseline, 3 year M&amp;E, training, documentation, etc)</li> <li>• Develop joint framework for cooperation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Site-specific 3 years plans</li> <li>○ Master plan East-3 years</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Strategic partnership UNDP: support to local host population</li> </ul>	<p>delivery, nutrition and hygiene</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Environment, water&amp; sanitation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Improve WatSan and garbage management</li> <li>○ Information campaign on sustainable environmental practices</li> <li>○ Reforestation camps and surrounding communities</li> <li>○ Additional Tukuls/housing for new arrivals</li> <li>○ More energy saving stoves and alternative energy sources</li> </ul> </li> <li>• <u>Education</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Recruit e more teachers and procure additional supplies</li> <li>○ Improve/extend schools</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Formulate multi-year work plan for self-reliance based on self-reliance strategy</li> <li>• Establish partnerships with development agencies to advocate</li> </ul>		
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<p>Eastern Sudan)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Involve line Ministries in self-reliance activities and strengthen their capacity</li> <li>○ Seek increase refugee access to land</li> <li>○ Grant improved access to services, including secondary &amp; tertiary education</li> <li>○ Refugee ID to supersede requirement for work permits and get equal treatment as Sudanese citizens for employment</li> <li>○ Review possibility of granting citizenship</li> </ul> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Resettlement:</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Complement present resettlement activities with a <i>Multi-year resettlement Programme:</i> camp based refugees with no integration prospects</li> <li>○ Preparation of dossiers for submission to countries (10,000 to 20,000 camp based refugees)(2009-2011)</li> <li>○ Mass information campaign among refugees</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>refugee impacted areas</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Partnership with CDF (World Bank)</li> <li>• Agreement State Authorities: access to land and extension by support State development plans. Develop MOUs</li> <li>• Information campaign refugees: self-reliance, rights, obligations, etc</li> <li>• Establish/support self-reliance groups</li> <li>• Labour/market surveys</li> <li>• Review and expand programmes on: agriculture, livestock, forest &amp; vocational training</li> <li>• Promote micro-finance</li> <li>• Resource mobilization / political negotiation strategy</li> </ul>	<p>government change perception of reintegration as durable solution</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage Federal/State government for reintegration ad durable solution. Consider <i>de facto</i> integration</li> <li>• Engage State authorities for provision additional land: agriculture &amp; livestock</li> <li>• Improve delivery of services including self-reliance opportunities</li> </ul>		
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**Annex II: Implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA)**

<p align="center"><b>Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement</b></p> <p align="center"><b>Article - section:</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (ESRDF)</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>PROGRESS</b></p>	<p align="center"><b>GAPS</b></p>
<p><u>General and fundamental principles for resolving political issues</u></p> <p>1.3 Citizenship shall be the basis for political rights and obligations</p> <p><u>Levels of government and their competencies</u></p> <p>3.9.b State level of Government shall exercise authority and render public services</p> <p>3.9.b Local level of government bring power to grassroots, ensures effective participation, and makes management of public affairs cost effective</p> <p><u>Human rights and fundamental freedoms</u></p> <p>6.13 Parties commitment to respect human rights</p> <p><u>General principles for resolving economic, social and cultural issues</u></p> <p>19.50 Right to clean and diverse environment</p> <p>19.51 Right to free and compulsory primary education</p> <p>19.52 Guarantee equal access and free primary health care</p> <p>19.53 Right to acquire own property</p> <p>19.54 Undertake measures of affirmative action and pursue policies of sustained economic and social development</p> <p>19.55 Creation of Eastern Sudan Fund</p> <p><u>Development of land and natural resources</u></p> <p>21.66 All levels of government to progressively develop and amend relevant laws to incorporate customary law and international practices</p> <p>21.68 Citizens affected by land development are consulted and compensated as necessary</p> <p><u>Economic, social and cultural policies for reconstruction and development of eastern Sudan</u></p> <p><u>Strategic objectives</u></p> <p>22.75.a Rehabilitation of war affected areas</p> <p>22.75.b Rehabilitation social services including:</p>	<p><u>Project funding</u></p> <p>Health, education, water</p>		<p align="center">62</p>

health, education, water			
22.75.c Rehabilitation & development infrastructure	Infrastructure		
22.75.d Human-institutional capacity building	Capacity development		
22.75.e Eradication of poverty	Poverty eradication		
22.75.f Rehabilitation & development of agriculture, industry, tourism, fisheries, others	Agriculture, industry, tourism, fisheries, others		
22.75.g Encourage investment & job creation			
22.75.h Protect & enhance environment	Environment		
22.75.i Protect & promote historical-cultural heritage			
22.75.j Ensuring return and rehabilitation of refugees and IDPs	Support to IDP-refugees programmes		
22.75.k Ensures programmes address needs of women			
<u>Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and development fund</u>			
23.79 Serve as principal organ in planning, monitoring and follow up of reconstruction and development programme	Preparation of plans		
23.80 Allocate amounts of:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2007: US\$ 100 million</li> <li>• 2008-2011: US\$125 annually</li> </ul>	Expenditures:		
	2007		
	2008		
	2009		
	2010		
<u>Comprehensive ceasefire agreement</u>			
25.93 Create conducive atmosphere to enable IDPs & refugees to return voluntarily to their areas of origin			

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### Annex III: Project / Programme implementation review form

**Notes:**

- The following form is meant as a guide to obtain information on some “emblematic” projects and programmes in eastern Sudan which have, or have had, a marked effect on the situation of refugees and IDPs (even if they were not the direct target group), particularly in the promotion of durable solutions and self-reliance. As such, the issues/information listed is not exhaustive and will need to be revised on a case by case basis for each project/programme being reviewed;
- Since the aim of the study is to learn lessons from past or on-going projects/programmes, the sample of projects/programmes to be reviewed does not need to be necessarily of “successful “ activities only, but also include experiences that did not succeed since they can also contribute to gain an understanding of the challenges faced and the suitability of the responses;
- For “programme” it is understood a series of actions or interventions that fall under the same objective and implementation framework. Thus a programme can have several projects and components implemented simultaneously and/or in sequence;
- For the specific purposes of this study, the concept of “programme” is also applied to a series of projects which are not necessarily part of the same implementation structure, but which have a convergent set of objectives and show continuity of intervention over time. For example, this might apply to activities executed by an implementing partner in a community, starting with a project in a given sector and then continued by other follow up or complementary projects in the same or other sectors as additional funding becomes available and priorities evolve;
- When a “programme” is reviewed, an effort should be made to include the basic information of its distinct projects and/or components.

<b>Project/Programme name(s):</b>			
<b>Starting date:</b>		<b>Completion date:</b>	
<b>Location(s):</b>			

<b>Funding source(s)/ organization(s):</b>	
<b>Implementing partner(s):</b>	
<b>Government counterpart(s)</b> (State / National as applicable)	
<b>Total final budget / expenditure</b>	
<b>Number of “direct” beneficiaries</b> (Refugees / IDPs / Host population, as applicable)	

**Objective(s):**

- .
- .
- .
- .

**Outcomes / products:**

<b>Designed / programmed</b>	<b>Actual at completion of project / programme</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> <li>• .</li> </ul>

**Brief description of the overall process of project/programme implementation**

(History, partners, community, implementation arrangements and coordination, etc)

### **Assessment of factors that affected the achievement of outcomes / products:**

- .
- .
- .
- .
- .

### **Review of durability / self-reliance**

- Level of political, institutional and stakeholder will to support the project/programme and to achieve durability and self-reliance
- Elements considered in project/programme implementation to strengthen the competencies of implementing partners (public and non-governmental), develop implementation capacity, provide start up support, and strengthen social and economic networks
- To what extent the project/programme provided comprehensive, integral, durable, solutions to a priority number of displaced persons rather than partial solutions to a larger target group.
- To what extent there was an appropriate context for project/programme implementation, providing conditions to attain durable development and integration, particularly in relation to the legal and regulatory environment (residence, mobility, tenure/property, etc.)
- To what extent State/National line institutions participated in project implementation and assumed a leading role in the execution and follow up service provision. What incentives were considered by the project/programme to achieve this objective
- To what extent the project/programme and implementing partners envisaged and achieved a phasing out of humanitarian assistance, devolving their responsibilities and functions to national line agencies and progressing into regular recovery and development activities
- Assessment on the level of funding secured for the project/programme and whether this was sufficient for implementing all activities envisaged and/or necessary to achieve durability and self-reliance at the completion of the project/programme and its exit strategy;
- To what extent the conditions attached to the use of funds were appropriate for project/programme implementation, minimizing or removing restrictions for integrated humanitarian-development funding

- To what extent the project/programme has the potential for scaling up its operations with existing or modified design to cover a larger target group
- What is the potential for replicating in eastern Sudan the strategies, processes and funding mechanisms, applied in project/programme implementation. Indicate improvements that would need to be introduced for this purpose

**What could have been done better to achieve the objectives of the project/programme and achieve durable solutions and self-reliance**

- .
- .
- .
- .
- .
- .