Ukraine

Investment Plan for the Clean Technology Fund

January, 2010

Table of Contents

1. Country and Sector Context .................................................. 3
   Ukraine’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions ........................................ 4
   Energy Supply Overview and Emissions .................................... 6
2. Identification of Priority Sectors for GHG Reduction Interventions .......... 13
   The Baseline: Business as Usual (BAU) Scenario .......................... 14
   Low Carbon Development (LCD) Case ...................................... 15
3. Rationale for Selected Sectors for CTF Co-Financing ......................... 20
   Alternative Sources of Low Carbon Financing Options: Carbon Funds, GIS, Energy Efficiency and Environment Eastern Europe Partnership, GEF, USAID ............ 20
   Proposed interventions ....................................................... 22
   Renewable Energy (RE) ......................................................... 22
   Energy Efficiency (EE) .......................................................... 25
   Smart Grids ............................................................................ 28
   Zero Emissions Power from the Gas Network ................................ 31
4. Enabling Policy and Regulatory Environment .................................... 34
   Energy Sector Policy Agenda ................................................... 34
   Energy Sector Subsidies in Ukraine ......................................... 38
   Energy Sector Legal and Regulatory Framework ............................ 39
5. Implementation Potential, including Risk Assessment .......................... 41
   Country Risk ........................................................................... 41
   Implementation Readiness ....................................................... 42
   Private Sector Risks ............................................................... 45
6. Financing Plan and Instruments .................................................... 47
   Annex 1 ................................................................................. 48
   The Energy Sector ..................................................................... 48
   Sectoral Overview ..................................................................... 49
   Power Market Ownership and Plant Status ................................... 50
   Annex 2 ................................................................................. 51
   Program Overview ..................................................................... 51
1. Renewable Energy Program (EBRD and IFC) .................................................. 52
2. Improving Energy Efficiency (IBRD/EBRD/IFC) ............................................. 58
3. Smart Grids ........................................................................................................ 64
4. Zero Emissions Power from the Gas Network .................................................. 69
Ukraine Investment Plan for the Clean Technology Fund

1. Country and Sector Context

1. Ukraine is a lower middle income country, with GDP per capita of US$1,940 in 2006. Located strategically between the east and west, its population of 46 million is the second largest among the successor states of the former Soviet Union.

2. After a decade of steep economic decline, which halved the country’s recorded economic output and raised the poverty rate to almost a third of the population, economic growth rebounded in 2000 and GDP grew by about 7.5% per year on average until 2007. The robust economic recovery is seriously at risk. Much of this improvement in growth performance was due to the combination of financial stabilization and the introduction of economic reforms. The hardened budget constraints bolstered confidence in the Government’s macroeconomic management and in the country’s fledgling financial sector as well as created the legal and institutional basis for a market based exchange rate. The recent global financial/economic crisis has, however, hit Ukraine’s industrial sector particularly hard: GDP growth dropped to 2.1% in 2008 and is forecasted to decline by about 9% in 2009, followed by a slow recovery in 2010 with an expected GDP growth of 1%.

3. To recover its economic growth and improve competitiveness, Ukraine will need to address a combination of challenges. Improving the energy efficiency of the economy and thereby reducing its vulnerability to further import price shocks, as well as modernizing the energy sector to make it more efficient, are among those challenges. The Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period until 2030 (Energy Strategy), adopted in 2006, provides a platform for addressing these issues over the three distinct phases of development envisaged for the country: Phase I (2006-2010) – focusing on innovation and reconstruction; Phase II (2011-2020) – on accelerated development of the Ukrainian service sector; and Phase III (2021-2030) – on the start of changes in economic structure, moving to a post-industrial society. Phase I, sidelines by recent events, essentially involves technical improvements, rooted in energy efficiency, and strengthened economic reforms (see discussion in Box 1).
Box 1. From “Business-as-Usual” to “Business-as-Unusual”:
The Transition to a Low Carbon Development Trajectory
The Government Energy Strategy, outlined in a report in 2006, indicates their desire to normalize the energy supply system, continuing a move towards adopting EU standards. The strategy included only a limited focus on demand-side energy reforms, however. Three events have changed the backdrop considerably: the global increase in energy prices; the change in Gazprom’s gas pricing formula for Ukraine; and the financial/economic crisis which saw a collapse of Ukraine’s banking sector and a drop in GDP of about 10%. The two-punch energy price impact has ended the Government’s complacency towards demand-side energy efficiency; it has now become a top priority. Increased gas prices have also accorded a high priority to switching from gas use towards alternative fuels. While domestic coal has been given a high priority as a part of the fuel switching exercise, there is also an opportunity to increased use Renewable Energy resources if the incentives can be mobilized. All of the above will require not only a change in the focus of energy sector investments, but it will also require an increase in funding, both of which will be a challenge while Ukraine tries to dig itself out of the current financial/economic crisis.

Ukraine’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions

4. **Ukraine signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in June 1992, which was ratified by Parliament in October 1996.** Ukraine became a Party to the UNFCCC in August 1997. The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, was ratified by Ukrainian Parliament in February 2004 and since then became an integral part of Ukrainian legislation. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Ukraine is committed to ensure that its annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions during the period 2008-2012 do not exceed the 1990 level of 922 million tons.

5. **Reflecting the steep economic decline due to the transition, emission decreased between 1990 and 2000** at an average annual rate of 8%. With the resumption of growth, emissions increased between 2001 and 2006, but total emissions remained less than half the 1990 level (see Figure 1.1)
6. **Total GHG emissions in 2012 and 2020 are forecasted to remain well below the 1990 levels.** In addition to fulfilling its Kyoto commitments, Government of Ukraine (GoU) plans to keep GHG emissions 20% and 50% below 1990 levels by 2020 and 2050, respectively. The latter target would require maintaining the GHG emissions in 2050 to roughly today’s levels, implying a net zero growth in emissions between now and 2050 despite an expected strong economic growth.

7. In the Energy Strategy, the GoU proposed low carbon development measures that would help achieve its long term GHG emission reduction goal (the measures are discussed in detail in the next chapter). A study by IIASA\(^1\) has developed a GHG mitigation cost curve for Ukraine (see Figure 1.2) that shows the costs of mitigation options rise steeply and would require considerable external financing. Hence, in order for the GoU to achieve its long term goal of GHG emissions reduction, it needs to mobilize substantial funds.

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\(^1\) “Potentials and Costs for Greenhouse Gas Mitigation in Annex 1 Countries – Initial Results” by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, February 2009
Energy Supply Overview and Emissions

- **Energy Supply**

8. **Ukraine’s high energy intensity is 3 times higher than the EU average and is the key driver of GHG emissions in the country**\(^2\) (see Figure 1.3). For example, Ukraine’s energy use per unit of purchasing power parity adjusted GDP exceeds German figures by a factor of 4 (0.5 kg of oil equivalent in Ukraine vs. 0.125 kg in Germany\(^3\)). The energy intensity of Ukraine is higher than that of energy-rich Russia, and CO\(_2\) intensity is considerably above that of Russia due to the high share of low-efficiency coal in power generation (see Figure 1.4). The only countries with more energy intensive economies are the oil producers of the Middle East. While Ukraine’s energy efficiency has improved at a rate of 4-6 percent per year, from 1 kg of oil equivalent per unit of purchasing power parity adjusted GDP in 1999 to 0.5 kg in 2006\(^4\), it remains at a level similar to that of Poland in the early 1990s.

9. Such poor energy intensity is attributable, in part, to historically low energy prices, especially for natural gas, which biased the incentives in favor of inefficient and energy intensive technologies. However, with recent changes in the border price of natural gas from Russia, investments will now need to be evaluated using much higher

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\(^3\) WDI, 2009

\(^4\) Energy Information Administration, [http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_time_series.cfm?fips=UP#prim](http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_time_series.cfm?fips=UP#prim)
costs of energy supply. Investing in more efficient technologies could provide a triple dividend in Ukraine: decreasing energy costs, improving energy security and reducing emissions.

Figure 1.3
Energy Intensity Comparisons\(^5\)

![Energy Intensity in Ukraine and Other Countries, 2004](image)

*Source: IEA statistics.*

Figure 1.4
CO\(_2\) Intensity Comparisons

![2008 Co\(_2\) Emissions Intensity](image)

*Source: EIA International Energy Statistics*

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\(^5\) No later data available for Russia, Ukraine, Belarus
Primary energy supply in Ukraine is dominated by natural gas at 41% of the total, though its consumption has been decreasing in recent years (see Figures 1.5, 1.6). While natural gas emits relatively small amounts of GHGs compared to other fossil fuels, the efficiency with which it is used is well below the industry average. The primary problem is the aging asset base: many of the power and district heating plants are operating beyond their design life. Improving the efficiency of the existing assets will be undertaken with a three-pronged effort: (1) replacing the oldest equipment with new plants; (2) upgrading plants with reasonable continued operating life (typically more than 10 years); and (3) decreasing the energy production by investing in new plants allowing operating hours of existing plants to decrease. Coal accounts for a relatively large share of primary energy (Figures 1.4, 1.5) and its use is expected to grow in response to increasing natural gas prices and/or for reasons of security of energy supply, given that it is the largest domestic source of primary energy. However, Ukraine’s increased reliance on nuclear power (two 1,000 MW units were commissioned in 2007 and two more are under construction) could curtail use of coal and reduce GHG emissions. Renewable energy (RE), dominated by hydropower, accounts for about 4% of the country’s supply of primary energy, slightly higher than global average. RE’s share in the supply of primary energy can be increased through the development of small hydropower, wind power, solar energy and biomass.

Figure 1.5
Ukraine’s Primary Energy Sources
11. The carbon intensity of the economy decreased by about 30% in the 1990s, largely due to energy intensity decrease. The composition of GHG emissions is primarily driven by carbon dioxide which, in 2006, accounted for 76% of GHG emissions and methane for another 18%\(^6\). The energy sector was responsible for 69% of the total emissions. Industrial processes produced another 22% of GHGs (see Table 1.1).

12. **Using FPCC\(^7\) standard definitions for GHG emissions, the energy sector accounted for the bulk of the reductions in GHG emissions in absolute terms, followed by agriculture as a distant second** (Figure 1.7). Between 1990 and 2006 GHG emissions from the energy sector fell by 380 million tons of CO\(_2\) (MTCO\(_2\)) and from agriculture by 70 MTCO\(_2\). Together, they account for about 94% of the GHG emissions decrease. The recent economic/financial crisis is expected to result in further reductions in GHG emissions in 2009, possibly extending into 2010 as well, with the bulk of the reductions coming from industries.

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\(^{6}\) National GHG Inventory Report, 2008  
13. **GHG emissions from the energy sector and industrial processes are expected to grow once the economy recovers.** Achieving the Government’s 2050 GHG emissions target and the associated net zero growth in emissions will, therefore, depend critically on substantially improving the efficiency with which energy is produced and consumed. This will require broadening and deepening of the structural reforms implemented to date to foster a shift to cleaner fuels and more efficient technologies.
Table 1.1
GHG Emission Trends by Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mt CO₂</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Fuel combustion</td>
<td>685.49</td>
<td>387.79</td>
<td>271.69</td>
<td>305.11</td>
<td>-55.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy industries</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>334.04</td>
<td>218.37</td>
<td>252.32</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>56.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing industries and construction</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>98.12</td>
<td>110.8</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other sectors</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-57.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Fugitive emissions from fuels</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>53.75</td>
<td>53.32</td>
<td>52.79</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid fuels</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>30.13</td>
<td>31.38</td>
<td>28.98</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>23.62</td>
<td>21.94</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Processes</td>
<td>126.92</td>
<td>62.68</td>
<td>81.52</td>
<td>97.17</td>
<td>-23.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solvents</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>62.34</td>
<td>32.75</td>
<td>30.45</td>
<td>-69.8</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LULUCF (net absorption)</td>
<td>-66.94</td>
<td>-60.33</td>
<td>-50.91</td>
<td>-32.63</td>
<td>-51.3</td>
<td>-35.9</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>8.55</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (with LULUCF)</td>
<td>885.07</td>
<td>461.41</td>
<td>344.09</td>
<td>410.56</td>
<td>-53.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (without LULUCF)</td>
<td>922.01</td>
<td>521.73</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>443.18</td>
<td>-51.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National GHG Inventory Report, 2008

14. In 2005 and 2006, the production of electricity and heat accounted for over 90% of energy sector emissions. Of the total electricity produced, 45% came from fossil fuel power plants, 48% from nuclear and 6.7% from hydro. Thermal power plants burnt 27,458.3 and 33,422 tons of coal in 2005 and 2006 respectively.

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8 National GHG Inventory Report, 2007; National GHG Inventory Report, 2008
9 Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine, 2007
http://mpe.kmu.gov.ua/fuel/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=81973&cat_id=35086&search_param=%D0%90%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%96%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BD%D0%B0+%D0%B4%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%96%D0%B4%D0%BA%D0%B0&searchForum=1&searchDocarch=1&searchPublishing=1
10 Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine, 2008
15. Fugitive emissions, primarily caused by methane release from fossil fuel production, processing, transportation and storage, accounted for a relatively significant share of GHG emissions. Venting and flaring of methane are also included in this category. Solid fuels (coal) accounted for 55% of the fugitive emissions and oil and gas for the remaining 45%.

16. Industrial processes are responsible for 22% of GHG emissions in Ukraine. Iron and steel production, cement production, lime production as well as limestone and dolomite use are the most significant sources of CO$_2$. Iron and coke production causes the largest amount of methane emissions. N$_2$O is emitted mainly from adipic and nitric acid production, and perfluorocarbons – from aluminum production.
2. Identification of Priority Sectors for GHG Reduction Interventions

17. **Energy and industry are the priority sectors for intervention as they account for 69% and 22% of country’s GHG emissions, respectively** (see Figure 2.1). These sectors are also central to Ukraine’s Energy Strategy, which is largely driven by energy security concerns. In the past, low cost natural gas has played an important role in primary energy supply. However, gas has increasingly presented problems in Ukraine because of the increased price and the periodic interruptions in its supply. Therefore, Ukraine plans to reduce its dependence on imported natural gas by increasing use of nuclear power and indigenous coal-based capacity. Increased use of renewable energy resources, particularly hydropower, is also an integral part of the Energy Strategy, but at a much lower level than thermal options. At the same time, the rapid increases in energy prices have facilitated a new outlook on energy efficiency investment potential. The Government is now preparing legislative changes to support increased focus on energy efficiency investment in the residential sector.

![Figure 2.1: Emissions by Sector in Ukraine, 2006](image)

Note: Energy Industries, Manufacturing Industries and Construction, Transport, Other Fuel Combustion Sectors and Fugitive Emissions from Fuels are reported under Energy sector emissions

Source: National GHG Inventory Report, 2007
The Baseline: Business as Usual (BAU) Scenario

18. Considerable analysis by IPCC and others indicates a strong linkage between economic growth and GHG emissions with elasticities typically about 1.1\textsuperscript{11} assuming no change in policy drivers – the “Business as Usual” (BAU) case. A BAU scenario for Ukraine was developed on this basis using the Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period until 2030 adopted in 2006 as a baseline. Under that scenario, \textit{Ukraine’s GHG emissions are expected to decline significantly this year with the economic contraction, followed by gradual increases consistent with a 5\% per annum GDP growth after 2011.} This scenario would result in Ukraine’s total emissions in 2020 reaching 764 million tons of CO\textsubscript{2} equivalent, 83\% of its 1990 GHG emissions. \textbf{Without the crisis impact, BAU’s 2020 emissions would return to 1990 level} (see Figure 2.2).

19. The development trajectory of the BAU Scenario assumes the following:

- **Thermal generation would increase in both absolute and relative terms.** The Government’s plan calls for increasing the electricity produced by fossil-fueled power plants from 84 TWh (2005) to 125-130TWh in 2030. The share of fossil-fueled power generation is expected to increase from 45\% to about 51\%, with coal accounting for 85\% of the total in 2030, compared to 52\% in 2006.

- **Increase nuclear power generation.** The Energy Strategy includes an optimistic implementation program for installing nuclear power capacity. Nuclear power plant capacity is forecasted to increase from 13.8 GW (in 2005) to 15.8 GW in 2020. The share of nuclear power in total generation is expected to be about 44\% in 2020, a modest 4\% decrease relative to 2005.

- **Increase Ukraine’s hydropower generation capacity.** The Government’s target is to increase hydropower capacity from 4.7 GW in 2005 to 7.5 GW in 2020.

- **Increase non-hydro renewable generation capacity (mostly wind).** The government expects to install 1.6 GW of renewable resource-based generation capacity by 2020, well above the current level of less than 0.1 MW. The Government forecasts that renewable sources will generate 1.5 TWh in 2020, about 0.5\% of total generation.

- **Reduce the consumption of energy in existing industries and restructure the economy to make it less energy intensive.** As it has been mentioned above, Ukraine’s energy intensity is about 3 times that of EU countries. This is due in part to the legacy of the Soviet era and in part to the delays in implementing the reforms required to restructure the economy to reflect the higher cost of energy supply. The reforms needed include adjusting the price of energy to reflect the cost of supply and

\textsuperscript{11} According to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group III’s 2007 Report, the elasticity of GHG emissions with respect to GDP ranges between 0.5 and 1.5, depending on the policy agenda – an estimate supported by other studies. For middle income countries an elasticity of roughly 1.1 has been found to be the norm, which closely corresponds with a rough estimation of the elasticity for Ukraine of 1.16, based on data covering the period between 1990 and 2006. In a paper by Dhanda, Adrangi and Chatrath ( “Linkage between GDP and Emissions: A Global Perspective on Environmental Kuznets Curve”, Journal of Business & Economics Research, Vol. 3 #5, pp. 47-56), it is found that in the medium developed countries 1\% increase in GDP leads to 1.14\% increase in emissions.
improving access to both information and capital as they continue to be a binding constraint.

20. Under BAU scenario, it is forecast that GHG emissions in 2020 would be 764 million tons of CO₂ equivalent, or 83% of the 1990 level.

21. However, implementing a “Business as Usual” program of this size would be challenging for the Government. In light of the recent financial/economic crisis, the GoU finds itself following not a “Business as Usual”, but rather “Business as Unusual” scenario, and measures outlined in Energy Strategy to improve energy efficiency and security require extensive financial and implementation resources. The nuclear program is capital intensive and may stretch the implementation capacity. The renewable energy program is also capital intensive, with limited options for financing it, at least over the short to medium term. Finally, there are questions about the financial and implementation capacity of the Government to address all issues in parallel.

Low Carbon Development (LCD) Case

22. As it has been mentioned in previous chapter, the GoU has outlined, in broad terms, the measures it plans to implement to reduce GHG emissions in the Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period until 2030 (Energy Strategy, 2006; CH 7) as well as in the Report on “Demonstrable Progress under the Kyoto Protocol” (2006). Most of the measures proposed by the Government as part of the Low Carbon Development Case target the energy and industrial sectors and, to a lesser extent, housing and communal services and agriculture. The implementation of the proposed measures would reduce annual CO₂ emissions by 136 million tons. If both BAU and LCD programs are implemented as planned in Energy Strategy, then the level of GHG emissions will be 18% below the BAU case by 2020 (see Figure 2.2). Moreover, the additional importance of implementing LCD scenario is that it would put Ukraine on track to achieving its ambitious goal of reducing GHG emissions by 50% by 2050.

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12 Depends on when/how many combined cycle power plants are assumed to be commissioned.
23. In the energy sector, the LCD measures proposed by the Government give priority to rehabilitation of fossil fuel power plants and accelerating the construction of new nuclear power plants. In addition, the Government proposes to develop renewable energy resources, reduce energy consumption through energy efficiency measures and reduce emissions during production, transportation and in the processing of oil and gas. The forecasted installed capacity and electricity production by source relative to the BAU case is shown in Table 2.1. Under LCD scenario, increased use of new capacity would result in a decrease in the operating hours of the older technology, thus decreasing GHG emissions.
Table 2.1  
Electric Power Industry Development:  
Business as Usual Vs. Low Carbon Development Case

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>BAU</th>
<th>LCD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thermal Power Plants (TPP)</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>125.1-135</td>
<td>129.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Power Plants (NPP)</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>110.5</td>
<td>158.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydro Power Plants (HPP)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Hydro Pumped Storage Power Plants (HPSP)</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy Sources</td>
<td>0 (up to 70 MW)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>185.2</td>
<td>250.1-260</td>
<td>306.9*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Energy Strategy, 2006

Notes:
* Increased electricity production under LCD case is due to decreased load shedding and increased electricity exports.

24. In particular:

(i) Low carbon power generation. In 2005, 45% of the total electricity was produced by fossil fuel fired power plants. According to the low carbon scenario outlined in the Energy Strategy, the share of fossil fuel electricity production would drop to 42% by 2020 (compared to an increase to 51% in BAU). The GoU is considering the following options that would help to reduce the share of fossil electricity production: (1) accelerating the construction of new nuclear plants; (2) accelerating renewable power development; and (3) switching to high efficiency combined cycle/combined heat power plants.

- **Combined cycle/combined heat and power (CCGT) plants development** would improve efficiency of electricity generation from roughly 30% in older, existing plants to more than 50%. Substituting a 500 MW CCGT power plant for a similarly sized existing low efficiency subcritical coal burning plant is estimated to reduce CO₂ emissions by 2.9 million tons/year. **Assuming that by 2020 Ukraine builds five 500 MW CCGT plants, total CO₂ emissions would be reduced by over 14 million tons per year compared to BAU scenario.**

- **Renewable power generation.** According to the Energy Strategy of Ukraine, electricity production from hydro power plants is expected to increase from

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13 In 2005, nuclear power plants generated 48% (88.8TWh) of total electricity production; thermal power plants were responsible for 45% of total generation (84.1TWh); hydrogenation contributed 7% (12.3TWh) of total electricity production (Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period until 2030, 2006)

14 We assume that a low (30%) efficiency subcritical coal burning plant emits 1085g of CO₂ per kWh.
12TWh to 17TWh. These actions would reduce CO$_2$ emissions by 5 million tons.

It is important to note that in its Energy Strategy, the GoU plans to install 1.6GW of renewable energy in both BAU and LCD cases. Also, the GoU is planning to increase renewable energy capacity to as much as 5GW should the initial experience succeed. However, the success of this program is jeopardized by the recent financial crisis and will require nurturing to address the remaining barriers.

- **Nuclear power generation.** By 2020, Ukraine’s installed capacity is forecasted to increase by 8 GW$^{15}$ in LCD scenario. This would increase nuclear electricity generation from 89TWh in 2005 to 159 TWh in 2020, 48 TWh more than under the BAU case (see Table 2.1, BAU Case). This would reduce CO$_2$ emissions by 53 million tons a year, assuming the nuclear plant displaces existing coal-fired generation.

(ii) **Rehabilitation of fossil fuel-fired power plants.** By 2020, the GoU plans to increase the installed TPP capacity by a modest 4.1 GW, from 33.5 GW to 37.6 GW$^{16}$. The GoU also plans to rehabilitate of the existing subcritical coal-fired power plants. A 6 percentage point improvement in efficiency, from 30% to 36%$^{17}$, would reduce CO$_2$ emissions by 18 million tons per year.

(iii) **Renovation of the gas transmission network.** Most of the gas transmission network in Ukraine is old and in need of renovation or replacement. More than 60% of gas pipelines have been in use for over 10 years (over 30 in some cases). Compressor units are of low efficiency and outdated$^{18}$. As a first step in the renovation of the network, the GoU plans to install high efficiency gas compressor units. Existing compressor units consume about 8 billion m$^3$ (bcm) of natural gas annually. Replacing these with new high efficiency gas compressor units throughout the system would reduce the consumption of gas by 2.5 bcm annually. Assuming that by 2020 all of the compressors are replaced, CO$_2$ emissions would be reduced by about 5 million ton per year.

25. The GoU also plans to improve the efficiency of the industrial sector through large-scale energy-saving measures. It is planned to introduce a sectoral energy savings system that would:

- introduce new energy saving processes and technology;
- improve existing processes and technologies; and
- reduce energy losses.

26. Sectors targeted for the energy savings are metallurgy, gas, construction, communal services and agriculture. According to the Energy Strategy, implementation of

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$^{15}$ 2 GW out of 8 GW are a part of BAU case.

$^{16}$ Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the Period until 2030, 2006

$^{17}$ In this case, CO$_2$ emissions will be reduced from 1085g of CO$_2$ per kWh to about 930 g/kWh.

large-scale energy-saving measures would lead to saving of 29TWh of electricity by 2020, which corresponds to 32 million tons of CO₂ emissions reduction.

27. In housing and communal services, the GoU has given priority to improving the efficiency with which heat is supplied and consumed, involving the use of energy saving materials, technologies and equipment. The estimated energy savings potential in communal heat supply, with a relatively short pay-back period, is 10-15% (such as replacement of burners, introduction of heat recovery, air heaters, and upgraded furnaces). According to Energy Strategy, just replacing and upgrading low-capacity and low-efficiency (about 70%) boilers (NIISTU-5) currently operated in the municipal thermal energy sector with modern 95% efficiency boilers would reduce natural gas consumption by over 200 million cubic meters annually. This would correspond to 0.37 million tons in CO₂ emission savings. Additional savings could be achieved by refurbishing heat distribution networks and increasing thermal building insulation. According to IFC estimates, 4 bcm of natural gas reduction can be achieved from residential heating energy efficiency improvements. This would translate into the annual CO₂ emissions reduction of about 8.7 million tons. However, achieving these additional savings would face significant barriers compared to the industrial sector.

28. Hence, successful implementation of the measures outlined above would lead to a reduction in CO₂ emissions of 136 million tons relative to BAU case, 32% below the 1990 level.

29. In addition to the LCD case interventions, the following options are also being considered:

- **End-Use Energy Efficiency.** With Ukraine’s energy intensity among the highest in the region, there is considerable potential for reducing energy consumption by changing technologies and consumer habits.
- **Supply-Side Energy Efficiency.** The capital stock in the power sector and in district heat supply is old and inefficient. Much of the existing stock is operating beyond its design life and needs to be replaced while other assets should be upgraded.
- **Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).** CCS options are unlikely to be implemented before 2020 in Ukraine as the technology is still being piloted elsewhere and potential CCS storage sites have not been identified.
- **Use of Coal Bed Methane and Coal Mine Methane.** Coal Bed and Coal Mine Methane projects could support considerable power plant capacity. However, the resource base is reported to be geologically difficult, necessitating piloting before it can be scaled-up.
- **Landfill Gas and Waste as a Fuel.** These resources have not received significant attention as of yet as they are expected to have a minor impact.

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19 We assume 1,860.5 tons of CO₂ savings per million m³.
20 In this case, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change emission factor of 56.1 tons CO₂/TJ for natural gas combustion was used.
3. Rationale for Selected Sectors for CTF Co-Financing

30. Energy Security is a priority for the Government of Ukraine. As seen in the previous chapter, energy efficiency and renewable energy are among the measures proposed by the GoU to achieve its energy security objective and are fully consistent with the LCD scenario for GHG emissions reduction.

31. The GoU is seeking CTF support in implementation of its Energy Strategy to both accelerate the low carbon options in the BAU scenario and to facilitate a move from the Business as Usual (BAU) Scenario to the Low Carbon Development (LCD) Scenario (with GHG emissions levels 18% below BAU) through a combination of energy efficiency and renewable energy interventions.

32. The interventions with the highest potential for reducing GHG emissions in Ukraine are: (1) energy efficiency; (2) increased use of nuclear power; (3) implementation of high efficiency combustion technologies and carbon capture and storage (CCS) for new coal-fired plants\(^\text{21}\); and (4) renewable energy. Nuclear power is not an option for CTF financing; and at this time, no greenfield coal plants would meet the CTF's CCS-readiness requirements. Hence, energy efficiency and renewable energy are left as key candidates for CTF interventions.

33. The suggested projects would be implemented by the public and private sectors and would leverage the limited resources available through private sector participation. Public sector interventions would cover areas where the enabling environment needs to be established or reinforced and without which the potential gains are unlikely to be fully realized. Furthermore, some sectors have limited private sector interest due to the current financial/economic crisis.

Alternative Sources of Low Carbon Financing Options: Carbon Funds, GIS, Energy Efficiency and Environment Eastern Europe Partnership, GEF, USAID

34. JI - Presently, there are 31 Joint Implementation (JI) projects in the (advanced) project pipeline which, together, are expected to mitigate 12 million tons CO\(_2\) equivalent/year. However, as we approach 2012, the application of JI becomes increasingly limited due to implementation constraints.

35. AAU Trading - Based on 2006 emissions data, Ukraine has a surplus of emission rights\(^\text{22}\) amounting to 2.22 billion AAUs over the Kyoto Protocol commitment period. It

\(^{21}\) It is assumed that adding CCS to existing coal-fired plants would not make economic sense as the assets are old and have limited operating lives left. They are inefficient and efficiencies would be further penalized by CCS.

\(^{22}\) Emission Rights or AAUs (assigned amount units) are units in which the Kyoto Protocol is measured. Each Annex I country has received emission rights equal to the base year (depending on country and type of GHGs), adjusted by a country-specific factor. In the case of Ukraine, because of the economic collapse that followed the political changes of 1990, the volume of these rights is considerable.
is expected that its actual surplus will amount to 1.86 billion AAUs, of which 1 billion would potentially be for sale. The latter figure is, however, unrealistic considering the overall imbalance between supply and demand: e.g., total cumulative demand from Parties that are seriously committed to reaching their Kyoto Protocol target might only be 1.5 billion. To date, Ukraine has agreed to sell 30 million AAUs to Japan with further deals in the pipeline. It has also been reported that the GoU plans to sell 100 million AAUs to Dighton Carbon CA (Switzerland), 50 million AAUs to Tawhaki International (New Zealand) and 100-300 million to London branch of Nomura Bank (Japan). If fully realized these deals could amount to US$1.4 – US$6 billion, depending on the price of the AAUs.

36. Assuming that low carbon potential could be realized through trading AAUs, up to 150 million credits (i.e., both ERUs\textsuperscript{23} and AAUs through GIS) could actually be traded on a yearly basis. Assuming a price of €10/credit (which is rather high given current market circumstances), and a leverage factor as high as 10 (Carbon Trust, March 2009), annual investments could reach €15 billion as an upper bound. However, based on figures released earlier by Ukraine’s National Environmental Investment Agency, a leverage factor of 4 appears more realistic, which is also more in line with international experience. Even with this low leverage factor, overall annual investments could reach €6 billion. These investments are likely to cover the most cost-effective (in terms of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions) and low-risk investments in industrial and buildings energy supply efficiency, but would most likely not be available to co-finance more technologically advanced or higher-risk measures. All of the AAUs brought to the table so far are allocated. However, AAUs resources are experiencing problems with project design due to institutional capacity. That can best be addressed by the MDB’s presence in EE with CTF resources supplementing AAUs to enable market transformation.

37. **Energy Efficiency and Environment in Eastern Europe (E5) Partnership.** The partnership was initially known as the Swedish/EU initiative, and was launched on April 28, 2009, in Stockholm; it was proposed by Sweden in the context of its Presidency of the European Union commencing July 1, 2009. On 26 November 2009 over €90m were pledged to E5, and it will become operational during 2010. The purpose of E5 is to bring together in common framework finance from Participating Financial Institutions (PFIs) to make a significant contribution to the financing and implementation of concrete projects to improve energy efficiency across all sectors in Ukraine and potentially other Eastern Partnership countries. The list of PFIs includes EBRD, EIB, NIB, NEFCO\textsuperscript{24} and the World Bank Group. All beneficiary countries will also be donors. The E5 fund will be managed by EBRD and governed by a steering committee comprised of participating PFIs and donors. The fund will co-invest with PFIs in selected projects under different proportion of donor/PFI funding depending on a project.

38. The E5 will initially focus on district heating and then expand the sector focus to other municipal projects (water, solid waste, and transport), renewable energy projects,

\textsuperscript{23} Emission Reduction Units
\textsuperscript{24} European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; European Investment Bank; Nordic Investment Bank; Nordic Environment Finance Corporation
industrial projects and residential energy efficiency. It will also cover technical assistance in terms of country coverage; it will start with Ukraine and then expand to other countries in the region. As of June 15th, 2009, the total project pipeline amounted to some €1.2 billion of PFI loans. The funding is largely expected to support project preparation.

39. A dedicated investment officer will be installed in EBRD’s Kyiv office with the brief to not only progress implementation of the initiative, but also to ensure appropriate co-ordination between E5 and other initiatives, such as the CTF and the USAID program (see below). The Ukrainian government has proposed a permanent dialogue to ensure such co-ordination within the framework of the government’s energy efficiency program.

40. USAID Ukraine Energy Program funds capacity building and the early development of ESCOs in Ukraine. The MDBs are seeking to closely co-ordinate their activities in municipal heating with USAID to ensure full complementarity. This could happen within the framework of the E5.

41. Global Environment Facility provides funds for capacity building in Ukraine’s energy sector. A project proposal to support elements of the CTF renewable program is currently pending with the GEF.

Proposed interventions

Renewable Energy (RE)

42. The GoU has recently demonstrated its commitment to implementing RE projects by passing a new law introducing green (feed-in) tariffs for renewable energy, which was supported by technical assistance from the EBRD. The green tariff is differentiated by RE source and is expected to provide a sufficient incentive for low cost RE options. However, experience in other countries has shown that the feed-in tariffs by themselves do not mean an RE program will succeed – it is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Moreover, despite recent progress in the adoption of a modern regulatory framework, Ukraine’s renewable energy industry requires support to establish the practical business case and infrastructure for project support. The development of RE projects is stalling due to lack of conventional long-term financing from commercial banks. For example with wind, there are several projects in pre-development by local companies but not a single one has been able to secure commercial debt funding or attract a Western strategic sponsor yet.

43. In addition to facing the implementation risk of being the first to market with an untested framework, these projects are also threatened by the global financial crisis which has led to the unavailability of bank loans. Table 3.1 below outlines the investment requirements to achieve the wind power capacities foreseen in the currently proposed revision of the 2006 strategy.
Table 3.1

| Table: Newly proposed amendments to the Strategy for wind power development |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Year                            | 2006  | 2010  | 2015  | 2020  | 2030  |
| Installed capacity of WPP, MW    | 85    | 285,8 | 2172,8| 5172,8| 16002,8|
| Commissioned during the period, MW| 200,8 | 1887  | 3000  | 10830 |
| Power generation, GWh/year       | 201*  | 686   | 6340  | 15327 | 47773 |
| Investment during the period, million € | 255   | 2399  | 3813  | 13766 |

* Power generated since the beginning of wind power operations up to year 2006


44. The availability of CTF resources at this critical time would play a vital role by delivering a substantial part of the funds required for the kick-starting of the sector in Ukraine in the period 2009 to 2011 as well as setting the process of RE projects development onto a rapid and scalable development path. Experience in other markets has demonstrated that ignition of a critical mass of privately-financed renewable energy projects has only occurred in markets that rapidly reach a critical threshold in terms of cumulative installed capacity (for wind it is roughly 500 MW). Reaching such a level sends a positive signal to the global industry including project developers, investors and lenders, and also sets in motion a virtuous feedback loop where more ancillary economic development activity associated with the specific renewable energy industry (e.g., turbine assembly, component fabrication, service organizations, etc.) begins to also scale.

45. Moreover, Ukraine is facing a critical, breakthrough moment for the RE sector: while the regulatory framework has been set up, it remains completely untested as not a single commercial size project has been completed. So there is no precedent to judge whether the framework will succeed. The proposed CTF funding is needed to support the first time private sector players that would take on the implementation risks, discovering the barriers as they go along and addressing them as an example for others.

46. Hence, the CTF funds would support the new RE framework, accelerate wind, biomass, and small-scale hydro, and demonstrate the potential for other renewable technologies. Large-scale applications are limited to hydro and large investors. Other barriers that would be addressed by the CTF supported program include high transaction costs, insufficient FRRs\(^{25}\) for the proposed projects, access to the grid and lack of financing.

47. CTF can be used to justify the difference between short-term quick fixes and the long-term effective solutions for the companies considering RE investments in Ukraine.

\(^{25}\) Financial Rate of Return
Through robust evaluations, it can encourage investors to support the highest impact opportunities rather than temporary solutions.

48. CTF support of US$75 million is expected to trigger the deployment of about 100MW of clean energy capacity with direct annual savings of around 0.7 million tons of CO₂ per year.

- **Emission savings of the proposed interventions**
  49. As has been mentioned above, it is expected that the suggested intervention would facilitate savings of 0.7 million tons of CO₂ per year. By 2020, total savings through transformation could reach 16 million tons of CO₂ per year.

- **Demonstration potential**
  50. Access to financial resources is a key constraint to scaling-up the implementation and replication of RE projects, both large and small. Private investors and financial institutions are reluctant to invest in the RE sector, which is perceived to have a higher risk profile than traditional supply options. The perception stems from lenders and borrowers not having the requisite technical capacity: the former to evaluate such projects and latter to prepare bankable projects. CTF will serve as catalyst in attracting financial institutions to this new field and developing a competitive market for these new projects.

- **Development impact**
  51. Co-benefits of the intervention include business and employment generation, reduces SOₓ, NOₓ and particulate emissions and energy security. The proposed project would address policy, finance, business, and information barriers to renewable energy market developments in Ukraine. The GOU has established strong support for rationalization of energy use, largely driven by the problems associated with gas imports from Russia. In addition to their energy efficiency program, Ukraine plans to substitute gas use with other fuels, including nuclear power, coal and renewable energy. The renewable energy program, to date, has been weak suffering from low prices for fossil fuels. The Government has announced that they plan to address this through a rationalization of input prices which would favor increased use of renewable energy. However, local coal remains a low-cost option that necessitates low cost financial support for low carbon options to enable them to be implemented and, later on, scaled-up. The Government has demonstrated its support for implementation of renewable energy through the establishment of feed-in tariffs for RE.

- **Results indicators**
  52. The primary indicator of success would be the operation of new renewable energy supply into the grid. The enabling environment is in place while the next steps will test the regulatory regime for practical implementation of RE. It is proposed that the program established targets for renewable energy projects that would be monitored by the Government to ensure that the legal and regulatory framework is effective and the incentives are adequate. An additional $75 million of CTF financing is expected to jump-start the RE program by supporting 100 MW of new RE capacity. These resources are also expected to help identify and resolve the remaining barriers to entry to increased
private sector participation in RE. The expected output would reduce CO₂ emissions by about 0.7 million tons per year (see Table 3.2 at the end of the Chapter for the summary of the indicators and estimated results).

**Energy Efficiency (EE)**

53. Ukraine has enormous potential for increasing energy efficiency, and good progress has already been made in addressing some sectors of the economy. Drawing on lessons learned in other countries in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, progress would require access to concessional financing to address the many barriers to energy efficiency investments. GEF’s energy efficiency program has demonstrated in many countries that EE investments require relatively modest support to succeed. The proposed CTF EE program would build on these lessons learned and enable the scaling-up required to become transformational.

54. Ukraine’s Energy Strategy calls for more than 50% reduction in energy intensity by 2030, corresponding to energy savings of 223 million ton of oil equivalent (MTOE). About 38% of these savings (85 MTOE) would come from structural changes, as the economy shifts away from heavy industry to more service-oriented sectors, and the rest would come from technical improvements. To achieve this target it is estimated that about US$20 billion needs to be invested in energy efficiency.

55. Experience with energy efficiency investments in other countries shows that many projects, though financially viable, are not implemented because of the combination of the following six barriers:

(a) **Inadequate awareness of the benefits of energy efficiency projects and their perceived high technical and financial risks.** Industry, particularly medium and large industries, may in cases perceive energy efficiency projects to be technically risky and not about commensurate financial returns, particularly when compared to the kind of financial returns expected from other investment options. Lack of familiarity with the range of energy efficiency technologies and processes, energy conservation investment best practices as well as the under-appreciation of financial benefits from energy conservation investments are primarily responsible for the high risk perception among industrial enterprises;

(b) **Insufficient capacity for evaluating renewable energy and energy efficiency projects among banks, and their perception of high financial risks of such projects.** There is a lack of adequate debt financing for such projects, primarily because banks are not familiar with such projects in Ukraine. The internal capacity for identification of such projects, their evaluation and further processing is also low as a result. In Ukraine, this is further exacerbated by the absence of financing of suitable tenor and cost – financing available in the Ukrainian market is short-term and high-cost. For industries, banks prefer new investments, or investments that raise productivity or capacity, rather than investments aimed at reducing costs or improving efficiency;
(c) **Insufficient institutional capacity for managing the regulatory framework for energy efficiency.** The capability of the regulatory arrangements to effectively implement the Government’s energy efficiency policies and programs needs to be scaled up to meet the new challenges posed by the EE Law and the secondary regulations. This is a significant challenge, as witnessed in other countries that have embarked on the path to scaling up energy efficiency, and need significant capacity building support in initial years;

(d) **High transaction costs in developing renewable energy and energy efficiency investments.** The transaction cost of developing renewable energy (other than large hydro and wind) and energy efficiency investments faced by industry as well as by banks is usually high. Such costs can arise from energy audits, feasibility studies, sometimes the need to shut down processes in order to rehabilitate or replace parts. These costs are further enhanced by the lack of adequate familiarity and experience with identifying and preparing such projects both within industry as well as in banks;

(e) Another of the key limitations for wider project implementation of renewable energy and EE financing is the **lack of financial resources and proper lending facilities**, particularly for small-scale projects and SMEs. Financial institutions view renewable energy and the EE sector as higher risks, due to lack of technical capacity on the part of lenders to evaluate such projects and potential borrowers being unable to establish bankability of their projects. CTF will be instrumental in attracting the attention of the financial institutions to this new field, providing necessary know-how to help develop institutional capacity and developing a competitive market for these products;

(f) The **landlord-tenant problem** which e.g. occurs when the landlord is including the price for heat and power in the rent, thereby removing the incentive on the tenant to use these utilities in an efficient manner, and also the ability of the tenant to control usage through awareness of the meter readings. The reverse would be when the landlord provides energy-using appliances (such as a refrigerator or lighting systems), but the tenant pays the electricity bill. In this situation, there is little incentive for the landlord to choose the most energy-efficient appliance; and

(g) **Additional costs and risk premiums in the sector for buildings** include (i) project preparation/ audits; (ii) monitoring and inspection of results; (iii) knowledge sharing; and (iv) the guarantees needed by banks to enter this market.

56. CTF investment in energy efficiency is expected to focus on two sectors, the industrial sector and residential sector – both for production and end-use measures. CTF resources would be used to address the need to buy-down the cost of energy efficiency projects to address the barriers identified above.

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26 The needs of the other sectors are modest and thus do not require additional CTF support.
• **Emissions savings potential of the proposed interventions**

57. In industrial sector, the proposed EE program would help achieving saving of 2 million tons of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions annually. Through transformation of the sector, 20 million tons of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions would be saved by 2030. Due to intervention in residential sector, the proposed program is expected to facilitate the saving of 1.2 million tons of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions annually which will translate into 10 million tons by 2030.

• **Demonstration potential**

58. The energy efficiency needs in Ukraine are estimated to exceed $1 billion per year. The Government has agreed to establish a broad-based EE Action Plan, under which the International Financial Institutions (IFI) support would fall. The Action Plan is expected to show scalability of the EE program. The IFI program would be instrumental in deepening EE interventions in the industrial sector, district heating, power and water utilities. It is also proposed that the EE program broaden its effectiveness in sectors where there is little or no support at this time: public and private buildings. The program would be designed to be replicable, particularly in the new markets and sustainable by working through commercial banks.

• **Development impact**

59. Co-benefits of the proposed interventions include enhanced energy security, reduced cost of gas supply to the country as well as business and employment generation, clean air and improved competitiveness. Moreover, the project would allow extension of industrial activity with low CO\textsubscript{2} emissions as well as would facilitate growth of key sectors in a region currently suffering from supply shortages.

60. As mentioned above under the RE program, the GoU has accorded a high priority to energy efficiency to help address the problems associated with imported gas. EE has been identified as the highest priority intervention because Ukraine’s energy intensity is among the highest in the world. As energy prices are adjusted over the next year, the impact would be felt on all aspects of the economy, requiring fundamental restructuring away from energy use with increased use of labor and capital in its place. Furthermore, the socio-political impact of rising energy prices need to be mitigated with energy efficiency interventions to soften the impact. Improved metering and controls in buildings would facilitate EE investments.

• **Results indicators**

61. The Government, in its Energy Strategy, set a target of reducing its energy intensity by 50% by 2030. The Government has agreed to complement this target with medium-term targets, possibly 25% improvement by 2020 and a 20% improvement by 2014, so that a targeted Action Plan could be developed to ground-truth these targets. The Government has agreed, as a part of this Action Plan, to establish clear accountability and responsibility for implementation, identification of legal and regulatory impediments as well as provide a program for their mitigation and the capacity-building needs to fulfill the objectives. A broad-based financing program would be developed for support from the donor community and IFIs. The implementation of this program is designed to help the Government achieve its 20% improvement in its
energy intensity by 2014. The energy efficiency program is expected to decrease GHG emissions by about 3.2 million tons of CO$_2$ per year.

**Smart Grids**

62. GoU has expressed interest in supporting the implementation of Smart Grids to support both their Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency programs. A Smart Grid is a power grid that uses sensing, embedded processing, two-way digital communications, and software to manage network-derived information, thus making itself:

- **Observable**: measure the states of all grid elements;
- **Controllable**: affect the state of any grid element;
- **Automated**: adapt and self-heal; and
- **Integrated**: connected to utility processes and systems.

63. These capabilities support the three major business functions of the T&D utility: power delivery, asset management, and consumer experience enablement$^{27}$.

64. Ukraine has recently committed to an aggressive schedule to enable them to join the Energy Community in Europe. An important component of this commitment entails meeting EU standards for system access and reliability. Given the current state of the sector – the age of the assets, pricing and financing concerns and energy efficiency levels – power system modernization will need considerable support if the transition to EU standards will succeed. The average technical losses in the electricity transmission and distribution system currently amount to about 15% (8% in 1990) compared to 6% in the OECD, indicating the need for refurbishment and modernization. Experience in other countries has shown that decreasing technical losses takes place gradually as considerable investments need to take place to enable losses to be reduced.

65. Smart Grids would foster system loss reduction by improving the load factor in the system through demand management measures fostered by two-way communications between the dispatch center and loads. The major departure that Smart Grids enables is improved integration between power supply and demand, enabling equipment like air conditioners and heat pumps to be cycled in a manner to improve system load factors. In addition, two-way communications would enable customers to make equipment use price sensitive, enabling some equipment to be operated at off-peak periods to reduce costs and system losses. By decreasing peak power flows, network losses will be reduced, thus decreasing primary energy use and, hence, GHG emissions. Customers, too, would benefit from Smart Grids by time-shifting the use of equipment and appliances to reduce their electricity costs.

66. At the same time, the Government’s strategy calls for rapidly increasing the role of Renewable Energy – this capacity would offset the need for new coal fired power plants. This scale of RE development – from practically no installed capacity to more than 1,000 MW within the next decade and potentially 5,000 MW by 2030 – would create challenges to the power system, in terms of required grid connections, transmission

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$^{27}$ Accenture, 2009
system reinforcement and grid management of large-scale intermittent generation (due to the inevitable variations in wind power generation). One of the biggest technical problems with RE projects is the uncertainty of supply: the relative unpredictability of wind and solar regimes can create system stability issues. Smart Grids can mitigate these problems through better communications and enhanced control systems. Improved coordination between supply and demand by cycling interruptible loads would decrease the need for redundant supply and decrease the effective total cost of RE. This component would consist of investments into improved communications and controls, possible integration of the power grid and the internet and upgraded “smart” meters.

67. In order for wind energy to be implemented and utilized, effort needs to be placed in parallel, in developing and implementing a smart-grid solution in Ukraine. The renewable energy sector in Ukraine is in its early stages of development, which makes it an opportune time to introduce Smart Grid technologies, thus ensuring that the transmission system is supportive of renewable energy and its scale-up is cost-effective. Experience in many countries has demonstrated that market penetration of renewable energy could be constrained by an outmoded grid. The Smart Grid project would complement the RE and EE programs proposed and would facilitate further scaling-up. As part of the programmatic approach reflected in this Investment Plan, the Smart Grid and RE investments will be appropriately sequenced, so that the transmission components are supportive of the RE program. Since this is a very innovative and complex concept, which is only now being tried in Europe and the USA, it would be beneficial to utilize CTF financing for this effort, given the concessional nature of CTF. Use of CTF resources in this endeavor would yield very significant results in terms of reduction of GHG emissions.

68. In addition to GHG reduction benefits, the implementation of the Smart Grid and the development of wind energy have significant national-level benefits. It would help offset increased imports of natural gas, which would save the government important foreign currency, thus freeing up resources for social welfare and economic activities. Wind energy development also entails significant employment benefits, as indigenization levels increase and domestic industry develops to provide supplies and construction support.

- Emission savings of the proposed interventions

69. The emission savings from Smart Grids are indirect as they provide an environment that supports RE and EE. Many renewable energy options suffer from being non-dispatchable since they depend on unpredictable inputs from the sun and wind. In a system that is designed to respond to changes in milliseconds, the addition of greater uncertainty comes at a cost, either from energy storage options and/or increased use of spinning reserve to ensure system stability. Smart Grids are designed to mitigate these problems by improving the flexibility of generation and load dispatch. Better market signals of the time dependent nature of electricity use, coupled with improved dispatching of loads that can be easily cycled (such as air conditioners and heat pumps), allow increased use and flexibility in deploying RE and, thus, decrease their cost. As electric cars evolve, they are expected to become an important component of improving
the flexibility of grid systems when coupled with Smart Grids. Improved time-of-use pricing and better cycling of equipment will also help support energy efficiency programs by making loads more responsive to price signals.

- **Demonstration potential**

  70. In Europe and the USA, the challenges posed by wind generation are sought to be addressed through similar “intelligent” grids, which can respond to the challenges placed by growing intermittent wind generation, increasing demand, and tailoring reliability to customer reliability needs. These systems are currently under development by the European Technology Platform (SmartGrid) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the USA\(^{28}\) (the IntelliGrid Program). As experience is gained in countries implementing state-of-the-art technology, it is expected that Smart Grids will later be applied in other middle-income and, eventually, lower income countries.

- **Development impact**

  71. The proposed implementation of “Smart Grids” is designed as a component of a broader-based energy efficiency strategy which would enable better incorporation of demand-side options into bridging future supply-demand gaps. The IFI community, as well as bilateral donors, are working closely with the Government to implement this broad-based energy efficiency strategy, starting with an Energy Efficiency Action Plan (EEAP) due to be finalized in 2010. The EEAP will be implementation-focused, designed to reduce the energy intensity of Ukraine by 20% by 2014 as part of a longer-term goal to cut its intensity in half by 2030\(^{29}\). There is considerable potential to meet the short-term goals by improving the incentives, installing better metering and controls and providing low cost financing to be addressed under the energy efficiency component of the program.

  72. However, to make the energy efficiency program transformational requires that the demand-side investment options are better integrated into system design. Smart grids would enable this transformation by providing real-time pricing information to customers to enable price sensitive controls that would support load curtailment during peak pricing periods. Unlike current demand-side management systems that employ one-way communications, smart grids provide two-way communications thus integrating supply and demand-side options through improved metering and communications systems. Co-benefits of the proposed interventions include downstream energy efficiency benefits that are expected to accrue as a result of improved pricing communications to consumers which, in turn, is expected to enhance benefits of cycling loads when the system stability is operating at high load and supply costs are high. Decreased emissions and improved energy reliability would also be among secondary benefits. The use of Smart Grids in

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\(^{28}\) The European Technology Platform Smart Grids brings together European utilities, technology providers/manufacturers, regulators and government agencies. EPRI’s IntelliGrid Program brings together a large number of US and two European electric utilities, technology providers, and agencies including the US Department of Energy.

\(^{29}\) The target is to reduce energy intensity from 0.5 kgoe/GDP\(_{hl}\) to 0.24 kgoe/GDP\(_{hl}\) by 2030 where GDP is measured in Purchasing Power Parity in Hrivna.
Ukraine CTF

Ukraine complements the renewable energy and energy efficiency programs outlined above.

73. **The Smart Grid investment would support scale-up of RE capacity from 1.5 GW to 5 GW.** CTF resources are proposed to be blended with the next IBRD transmission loan which will support transmission expansion and strengthening, among other things, support for wind energy integration into the grid. CTF resources blended with IBRD are proposed to be utilized for assisting in design and implementation of the next generation of modern grid management and control systems which can enable large-scale integration of wind energy resources and to improve integration of demand-side measures. IBRD resources would focus on expansion of “conventional” transmission grid and system control reinforcements and interconnections.

- **Results indicators**

74. Given that Smart Grids are designed to facilitate renewable energy and energy efficiency, the ultimate test of success is in RE and EE programs. However, given that full deployment of Smart Grids is expected to take years to achieve, intermediate targets may also be used. Given the important role of dispatchability of loads to both RE and EE, a key measure of Smart Grids would be the deployment of smart meters. The impact of Smart Grids is expected to have a longer-term impact, fostering the scaling-up of RE after the 250 MW target is achieved in the CTF RE program. It is also expected to facilitate the achievement of the Government’s energy efficiency targets (see para 61).

**Zero Emissions Power from the Gas Network**

75. CTF co-financing is proposed to demonstrate, at scale, zero emissions power generation from waste heat recovered from compressors in Ukraine’s gas network. The IFI’s gas network rehabilitation initiative for Ukraine provides a unique opportunity for the transfer, deployment and diffusion of Heat Recovery Steam Generators (HRSGs), Organic Rankine Cycle Engines (ORCEs) and/or Turboexpanders throughout Ukraine’s gas transit system. The project proposes to add equipment which would capture hot exhaust gas generated during compression to produce electricity – a **zero carbon power generation technology, akin to renewable energy.** The impact of such technologies would be to reduce coal-fired power plant emissions from the power sector.

- **Emission savings of the proposed interventions**

76. Ukraine’s gas transit system (GTS) transports about 120 bcm and about 56 bcm domestically. With that volume, the addition of HRSGs to the 5,600 MW of compressor capacity could potentially generate 11,000 GWh of zero emission electricity per year. At the margin, this electricity production would displace coal-fired power plants. The cumulative GHG emissions savings would be about 11 million tons of CO$_2$-equivalent per year. The proposed project would be used to demonstrate the potential by adding roughly 350 MW of HRSGs, ORCEs or Turboexpanders to one of the primary transmission lines, which would displace an estimated 1.8 million tons per year of CO$_2$. 

31
• **Demonstration potential**

77. In addition to the replication potential in Ukraine outlined above, the potential for replication is also particularly significant in Russia where gas compressor usage is much higher than that of Ukraine. In addition, these investments could also be considered in countries downstream from Ukraine, as well in other energy producing and transiting countries, e.g. China, Bolivia, Algeria, Egypt and India. To-date, these technologies have been deployed only in OECD countries. The proposed CTF intervention would provide the first commercial scale demonstration in an MDB client country.

• **Development impact**

78. The project would introduce a new technology of electricity generation using waste hot gases produced during compression. This would allow Ukraine to decrease share of electricity produced from fossil fuels, including gas, and hence improve Ukraine’s energy security and decrease the cost of its energy supply. The project would substitute zero carbon emission power, but includes cost and risk characteristics that necessitate a buy-down using CTF resources to make these technologies attractive. Because the unit sizes are relatively small, compared to similar technologies used in the power sector, diseconomies in scale more than double the capital cost. Furthermore, these technologies, like renewable energy, are “must-run” options that cannot be dispatched by the system operator to follow the fluctuations of electricity demand, thus decreasing the value of such supply options. Furthermore, since global experience in using such technologies is limited to a few pilots, there is also a technology risk that the operator would assume, which also needs a buy-down to support its implementation. However, should the technology meet its expectations, it would provide electricity to Ukraine with no incremental fuel needs, reducing GHG as well as SO\(_x\), NO\(_x\) and particulate emissions as well as diversify the portfolio of electricity supply options. The details of these risks will be addressed in the proposed feasibility study.

• **Results indicators**

79. The addition of HRSGs/ORCEs/Turboexpanders to gas compressor substations would produce electricity using waste heat and would thus decrease the need for electricity produced from coal-fired power plants. If fully implemented, about 350 MW of HRSGs/ORCEs/Turboexpanders would be built, producing about 1.8 TWh per year of electricity. As the existing coal-fired plants emit more than 1,000 g/kWh, the proposed project would reduce CO\(_2\) emissions by about 1.8 million tons per year.
Table 3.2
Summary of Proposed Projects’ Indicators and Estimated Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Primary indicator</th>
<th>Projected CO₂ emissions reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy (RE)</td>
<td>Renewable energy supply in the grid</td>
<td>0.7 million tons/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency (EE)</td>
<td>20% improvement in energy intensity by 2014</td>
<td>3.2 million tons/year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart Grids</td>
<td>Long term impact: fostering the scale-up of RE after 250MW target is achieved</td>
<td>Indirect; will provide enabling environment for RE and EE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Emissions Power from Gas Network</td>
<td>Installation of waste heat recovery generation capacity of 350 MW</td>
<td>1.8 million tons/year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Enabling Policy and Regulatory Environment

Energy Sector Policy Agenda

80. Ukraine’s policy agenda focuses on addressing issues of energy security, cost of supply, supply demand imbalance, alignment with EU directives and environmental management. This policy agenda has been supported by a series of laws and regulations introduced since 2000 to establish the enabling environment for these goals.

81. The Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MFE) is responsible for energy sector strategy and policy formulation. The Ministry is supported by the main national regulatory institution for the energy sector - the National Energy Regulatory Commission (NERC). NERC participates in forming a comprehensive state policy on development and functioning of Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM) as well as markets for oil, gas and oil products; it also oversees the state policy implementation. NERC also sets heat and electricity tariffs.

82. By the Presidential Decree\textsuperscript{30}, the Government’s policy on energy efficiency has been delegated to a specialized agency, National Agency of Ukraine for the Effective Use of Energy Resources (NAER). NAER is responsible for increasing the share of renewable energy in energy balance of Ukraine, improving legislative framework to promote energy efficiency, creating a system of national energy efficiency standards as well as implementing a system to monitor efficient use of fuel resources in the country. The Agency was established in 2005; in 2009 alone it developed 11 EE standards for different industries.

83. The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and the National Environmental Investment Agency (NEIA) of Ukraine are the lead authorities on climate change policy. NEIA was created in 2007 and is responsible for implementation of Kyoto protocol flexible mechanisms. The agency is also in charge of establishing a green investment scheme.

84. The policy reform agenda in the energy sector is guided by the above Government Ministries and agencies, drawing on support from advisors. Ongoing advisory support is an important component of capacity building within MFE, complemented by training programs. However, the recent fiscal shortfalls have made it difficult for the Government to adequately address the capacity-building needs in these institutions; support from bilateral donors and IFIs have been helping address this issue.

85. **In March 2006, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the Energy Strategy to 2030, building on work undertaken over the previous decade.** Ukraine first developed its energy strategy in the mid-1990s – the National Energy Program of Ukraine to 2010 – which the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) adopted in 1996. Ukraine also adopted several comprehensive state programs that outlined the government medium-term policies in various sub-sectors: Creation of a Nuclear Fuel Cycle (1994); Development of Hydrocarbon Resources in the Ukrainian Sector of the Black and Azov Seas (1996); Energy Conservation (1997); Construction of Wind Power Stations (1997); Oil and Gas of Ukraine until 2010 (2001) and Thermal Power Plant Reconstruction (2002). The Energy Strategy of Ukraine to 2030 outlines the strategic objectives for energy sub-sectors with broad objectives that:

- create favorable conditions for meeting energy demand in a sustainable way;
- determine mechanisms for the safe, reliable and stable functioning of the energy system, and for its efficient development; create favorable conditions for implementing these mechanisms;
- increase energy security;
- reduce the impact of the energy sector on the environment;
- reduce the cost per unit of energy production and use via the following measures: assuring efficient energy use, introducing energy-saving technologies, rationalizing the structure of industry and reducing the share of energy-intensive technologies;
- integrate Ukraine’s energy system into the European energy system, with gradual growth of electricity exports; and
- strengthen Ukraine’s position as an oil and gas transit nation.

**Box 2. Gas Sector Reform Agenda**

Ukraine enjoys outstanding natural endowments and a key strategic location on the East-West gas transportation corridor. However, it has failed to take full advantage of the opportunity to exploit these assets in order to maximize their contribution to the economic development of the country. Within the context of the current financial and economic crises, the gas sector faces significant financial problems that represent a major threat to the country’s economic future. External stakeholders in the sector, together with a number of international financial institutions (IFIs) have expressed a willingness to assist, but only if Ukraine is willing to introduce reforms that will address the key challenges facing the sector. The key reforms required may be summarized as follows:

- Tariffs need to be brought up to levels that will provide for full cost recovery and a particular emphasis will be required on maintaining high collection rates, possibly including a change to the collection system.
- Naftogaz should be restructured so as to ensure clear and consistent accountability. In addition, Ukraine should commit to full and timely reporting of Naftogaz’ financial performance – introducing reporting mechanisms consistent with those that apply under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
- Gas purchases and gas transit arrangements should be established on a long term basis with financial terms dictated by an equitable formula approach consistent with good international practice. It is expected that this would significantly improve the financial terms of both gas import and transit arrangements for Ukraine.
- Incentives are urgently required to encourage increased investment in the upstream sector. These include (i) elimination of the two tier tariff structure whereby Naftogaz’ domestic production is compensated at a level designed to cover costs rather than at its economic value (import parity); (ii) conduct of open, transparent, competitive exploration and production licensing rounds to attract investors to the sector both as partners of Naftogaz and as independent investors; and (iii) changes to the production sharing agreement (PSA) regime so that it conforms to good international practice attractive to international investors.
86. **The Energy Strategy to 2030 calls for a 50% reduction in energy intensity by 2030** which is estimated to correspond to energy savings of 223 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE). The Government anticipates that 84 MTOE, or 38%, of these savings would come from structural changes, as the economy shifts away from heavy industry to a more service-oriented GDP (see Figure 4.1). Within industry, the government projects a particularly large decrease in some of the most energy-intensive sectors, such as ferrous metallurgy, energy, and chemicals. The proposed plan satisfactorily identifies the conceptual framework from which a targeted Action Plan would be developed to lay the groundwork for achieving the desired results. Investments in energy efficiency in these priority sectors are now cost-effective without subsidies, and likely to become more so with increasing prices in the future.

![Figure 4.1](image_url)

**Structure of Energy-Efficiency Potential**

87. **The Energy Strategy confirms the following steps and targets for the development of its electricity market.** In 2006, MFE prepared the Comprehensive Strategy for Harmonization of the Ukraine Energy Sector with the EU Internal Energy Market and, based on this strategy, proposed an Action Plan for Energy Sector Reform and Development which was adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers on June 13, 2007. During the same period, NERC prepared a detailed program for the implementation of the Wholesale Electricity Market (WEM) concept and drafted the power grid code and market rules.

88. **The transition from the current pool trading arrangement to the future bilateral contract and balancing market (BCBM) will represent a major change for the Ukrainian WEM.** A gradual transition over 5 year period is planned through 4 major steps in market and system operations. The first step envisages initial learning and
a small number of bilateral contracts – up to 20% of the market. The second step envisages the start of a balancing mechanism. At the third stage, self scheduling would be started through the Power Exchange (PX). At the last stage there is a full market opening and there is an end of the mandatory trading market. Market design would change fundamentally. The current administrative Single Buyer/Pool market would be replaced gradually with a more modern and competitive BCBM. This provides additional opportunities as well as risks (such as Balancing and Settlement System problems, ancillary system issues and high transaction costs) for renewable energy sources (RES) generation. The current market with its implicit instrument of priority dispatch would not be very suitable to support large volumes of RES. Once RES start to provide medium to large portions of the energy generated (like large wind farms), it would be scheduled as has been done in Spain and Austria. However, it is clear from the past operation of the Pool/Single Buyer that any investments in generation (not only RES, but all generation sources) have been restrictive. It is anticipated that the move to the bilateral contract/balancing market will provide improved investment incentives.

89. The 1996 National Energy Strategy and the 1997 Cabinet of Ministers’ Program for State Support of Non-Traditional and Renewable Energy Sources set a target to meet 10% of domestic energy demand with non-traditional and renewable energy by 2010. A number of sectoral programs have set targets for specific renewable energy technologies but results are falling short of the target. For example, the Comprehensive Program to Build Windmills to 2010, approved by the government in 1997, has a goal of installing 190 MW of wind capacity by 2010 – only 84 MW have been installed to date. The Energy Strategy estimates that Ukraine would nearly quadruple its use of renewable energy, waste and non-conventional energy sources, from 10.9 MTOE in 2005 to 40.4 MTOE in 2030 requiring investing some UAH60 billion (US$ 12.6 billion) in the sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1</th>
<th>Projected Use of Renewable and Non-Conventional Energy Sources, Optimistic Scenario (MTOE/year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bioenergy</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solar Energy</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Hydropower</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geothermal Energy</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wind Energy</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Potential Heat</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Renewable Energy</td>
<td>1.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-</td>
<td>9.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Energy Sector Subsidies in Ukraine

90. **Historically, coal prices for energy production have been subsidized.** The coal underpricing represents a core problem of the industry with coal prices reflecting neither the cost of production nor the cost of alternative energy sources. While the coal prices have been growing since 2003 they are still below production costs for the steam coal used for power production. In the first 8 months on 2009 the average price of coal produced by the state-owned mines was UAH444 (about US$55) per ton while the production cost averaged UAH707 (about US$88) per ton. The price of coking coal used in the steel industry reached the cost recovery level in 2005 and its production is deemed profitable.

91. **As a result of steam coal underpricing, the cost of electricity production from coal-fired power plants (about 40% of total electricity produced) is relatively cheap:** 2 cents/kWh vs. 4 cent/kWh if enterprises had to pay full cost of coal. **However, despite subsidized coal price, electricity tariffs for industrial consumers cover full energy production cost** (about 7 c/kWh); households pay about 3 c/kWh.

92. **Gas prices are not subsidized for industrial consumers:** they pay about US$260 per thousand cubic meters (thcm) (price for Russian gas in III quarter of 2009 was US$198 per thcm). **Households, on the other hand, receive gas for about US$80 per thcm. District heating companies receive gas at subsidized price as well; they pay about twice as much as households.** However, the gas market is structured in a way that households and district heating companies receive mostly indigenous gas (about 20bcm produced annually), which production cost is about US$50 per thcm.

93. **Household heat tariff does not cover heat production cost of district heating companies.** The recent attempt of National Electricity Regulation Commission (NERC) to raise natural gas retail prices for households by 20% and the ceiling prices of natural gas for the municipal heating companies failed. As a result of inefficient energy pricing, district heating companies are virtually bankrupt and pay about 55% of their gas bill to Naftogaz. **As a result, Naftogaz provides a cross-subsidy to district heating companies.**

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31 The unusually difficult geological conditions (thin, steeply inclined coal seams at great depth) in the central Donbas make the mining of coal costly and labor intensive.

32 It could be argued that after incorporating transport and distribution, the cost of domestic gas would be as high as US$300 per thcm. However, transport costs would add about US$5 to the total cost of gas; as for distribution, the system is rather old and almost no investment has been made in proper maintenance, so it would increase the total cost only my marginal cost of distribution, which is rather low.
94. As it is seen from the discussion above, **industrial energy is not subsidized**; most of the subsidies go to heat supply sector and households. **These issues are being addressed through IMF program and the Bank’s DPL series**. In particular, adjusting price for domestic gas in accordance with international prices as well as reforming heat tariffs formula are on the agenda of DPL 4. Progress on energy projects will be contingent on implementation of the reforms under these programs.

**Energy Sector Legal and Regulatory Framework**

95. **In December 2005, the President signed a Decree on Establishing the National Agency of Ukraine for the Effective Use of Energy Resources (NAER) whose mandate is to guide Government policy on energy efficiency.** This Agency reports to the Cabinet of Ministers. As a Government body with special status, the Agency is charged with:

- carrying out state policy in the area of energy consumption and energy conservation;
- securing an increase in the share of non-traditional and renewable energy production;
- establishing a state system to monitor energy production, consumption, exports, and imports; improving the system of registering and controlling energy consumption; and
- ensuring the functionality of the system of industrial energy consumption norms.

96. **To date, NAER has actively developed and implemented a range of EE policies.** The Agency also has broader powers; for example, it can participate in designing government tariff policies. Several other government bodies are also particularly important in implementing energy-efficiency policy. The Government created the State Inspection for Energy Conservation in 1999, reporting to NAER, to oversee compliance with energy-efficiency regulations and standards. The Inspection establishes standards for energy use in industry according to product type, and then monitors manufacturers’ compliance with these standards. It also conducts technical analyses and monitors compliance with building energy codes. The Ministry of Regional Development and Ministry of Housing and Communal Services are also very active on energy-efficiency issues in district heating and buildings. Many regional governments also have energy-efficiency departments that have been quite active in promoting energy efficiency.

97. **Under an initiative by the State Committee for Energy Conservation, each regional administration established a department for energy saving.** These departments typically focus on:

- managing energy-efficiency activities at the regional and municipal levels by establishing and coordinating the corresponding departments in municipal administrations;
- monitoring energy consumption within the region;
- identifying the top priority energy efficiency measures;
• comparing actual energy consumption with the established norms;
• ensuring realization of energy-saving programs at the regional and municipal levels;
• providing information support for energy efficiency activities; and
• organizing training for local staff who deal with energy efficiency.

98. The Law on Alternative Energy Sources, adopted in 2003, defines the legislative, economic, ecological and organizational framework for the use of renewable and non-traditional energy. The earlier drafts of this law proposed mechanisms to provide financial, economic and regulatory support for renewable energy sources. However, following two presidential vetoes, all financial stimuli and support measures were excluded from the final text. Ukraine is in the process of establishing the required procedures and standards for development, permitting, licensing and connection of renewable energy capacity to the Ukrainian electricity grid, which it recognizes should be streamlined. Furthermore, insufficient access to adequate amounts of longer-term funding for renewable energy projects resulting from real and perceived risks is also a constraint to developing RE projects: tenors beyond the banks’ current horizons are necessary for financing these types of projects.

99. The Government has now established a “Green Tariff” to support the implementation of Renewable Energy. At the beginning of 2006, the Verkhovna Rada approved, in the first reading, the draft law on green tariffs: a premium for power based on renewable energy resources. On 25 September, 2008, the Law “On Amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On Electricity” and ”On Alternative Sources of Energy” was approved by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, removing a major obstacle to the growth of RES in Ukraine. This law is also called “On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Introduction of a Green Tariff” (the “Green Tariff Law”). Additional amendments to the Green Tariff Law were adopted in April 2009. The green tariff now is differentiated by RE source and each one has its coefficient which is used to multiply the retail tariff, thereby establishing the green premium. The green tariff for 2009 is approximately €65-133/MWh for wind power, €427-465/MWh for solar power, €124/MWh for biomass and €77.5/MWh for small hydropower plants.

33 The wide range of the green tariff is due to different costs associated with each option and capacity for each proposed installation.
5. Implementation Potential, including Risk Assessment

Country Risk

100. Ukraine’s credit risk is high. Sovereign obligations in foreign currency are rated at B2 by Moody’s and thus are considered speculative and are subject to high credit risk. Macroeconomic risk is rooted in the following: (i) inappropriate implementation of fiscal and monetary responses in the context of upcoming presidential elections; (ii) worse than expected external economic environment and terms of trade deterioration; (iii) further depreciation of the exchange rate with knock-on effects for corporate and banks; and (iv) lower than expected roll-over of private sector external debt. The main mitigant to macroeconomic risk is the framework provided by the IMF program.

101. Political risks are high, due to a recent track record of instability and the presidential elections, which may delay or derail implementation of the program. However, Ukraine has proven in the past, and yet again with the recent approval of amendments on bank resolution, that it can generate consensus at critical times. While political risks to program implementation are substantial, this operation takes the view that such risks are best managed through continued active engagement and the design of a policy operation, which can serve as a focal point for critical reform steps.

Details on Macro Risks

102. Moving forward, the most important economic risks lie in: (i) inappropriate fiscal and monetary policy responses through the adjustment process, for example, through incomplete implementation of the IMF-supported government program (and in the context to the run up to the presidential elections); (ii) the size, and duration, of current external shocks (terms of trade and external debt roll-over difficulties); and (iii) further deteriorations in corporate and banking sector balance sheets due to the impact of the economic contraction and a disorderly adjustment process. Moreover, the macro-financial risks are inter-linked. For example, there is a tangible risk that an additional (significant) fiscal deficit (in 2009 and 2010) driven by pre-electoral policy/legislation – without equivalent corrective measures — could compromise fiscal sustainability and further weaken investors and creditors confidence, leading to a disorderly adjustment with exchange rate and roll-over rates implications in the short term as well as longer term borrowing cost effects. Further, disorderly adjustment of the exchange rate would have serious effects on sectoral balance sheet and their various feedback loops.

103. The main risk mitigation would come from appropriate macroeconomic and structural policies and, to a large extent, from a higher level of unification and backing for those policies among government authorities (i.e., President, Prime Minister, speaker of the Parliament, and fiscal and monetary authorities) and political parties. While implementation of adequate policies has been so far uneven,
moving forward, consistent signals will need to be sent to markets. The fact that the stakes are high may reduce the risks of inappropriate policies, as key stakeholders among Ukrainian businesses and political fractions in the Government have much to lose from disorderly adjustment. Nonetheless, implementation risks remain high even after mitigation, and policy uncertainty is significant, particularly in the context of pre-election politics.

104. In addition, the policy framework agreed with the support of the IFIs may serve as an anchor to maintain an appropriate macro-economic framework during the time of adjustment. The IMF SBA is based on implementing exchange rate flexibility, reining in the fiscal deficit, and, together with the Bank financed PFRDPL-I, establishing the basis for financial sector stability. The IMF-supported government program would further help to rebalance the economy if implemented thoroughly by the authorities. The EBRD and IFC have supported banks in their recapitalization effort and bilateral donors have been providing technical support to the authorities. The Bank is also preparing the DPL IV focused on structural reforms to facilitate business entry and exports, to generate fiscal space for needed investments and well-targeted programs, and to help ensure sustainability in the gas sector. These structural reforms are critical to underpin a difficult process of recovery.

Implementation Readiness

105. Overall implementation risk is assessed to be Moderate34 (see Table 5.1)

106. Ukraine has a proven implementation record of the World Bank and EBRD financed projects in the energy sector – as well as other sectors. The World Bank financed Hydropower Rehabilitation and System Control project which was implemented by Dniprohydroenergo, closed in June, 2002, with a satisfactory rating and is now under implementation by State Hydropower operator UkrHydroEnergo. The second Hydropower Rehabilitation Project has a highly satisfactory rating. The EBRD UKEEP energy efficiency credit line has run since 2006 and disbursed more than €150 million. In the industrial and district heating sectors, several projects have been undertaken successfully.

107. Ukraine ranks 145 of 181 economies on the ease of doing business index (IFC Doing Business 2009) and 27 of 28 countries in ECA; scores on “paying taxes”, “dealing with construction permits”, “closing a business” and “protecting investors” lower the ranking. The key risks relating to the proposals under this investment plan are identified in the risk matrix below.

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34 Rating of 4: High (H), Substantial (S), Moderate (M), Low (L)
### Table 5.1
Risks and Mitigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Risks</th>
<th>Rating after Mitigation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic framework</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Risks are substantial due to vulnerability to international liquidity problems. The high financing needs as well as current account and budget deficits will have an impact on the economic performance. Overall, Ukraine’s economic outlook for 2008-09 is thus highly affected by global credit conditions. One of the main mitigation measures on the fiscal side is to link spending to revenues in view of the downside risk to growth and revenue projections. Ukraine is expected to return to a high-growth path in the medium to long term. Energy demand, particularly electricity and gas demand, has grown since 2000 and is expected to continue to grow rapidly once the economic crisis has passed. The prospects for CTF projects to be successful are excellent in renewable electricity generation, and energy conservation, particularly electricity and gas conservation and energy efficiency because of their positive impacts on the twin deficits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country engagement with WB</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The current Country Partnership Strategy approved in 2007 for next 3-4 years proposes a two-pillar framework of support. The first pillar will aim to improve Ukraine’s competitiveness through investments in public sector infrastructure (in particular transport and energy efficiency), advisory services and advocacy work to improve the business climate, technical assistance and access to credit lines to strengthen the financial sector, and global knowledge sharing to promote innovation and technology adoption. The program is designed to also help Ukraine benefit from the framework for international carbon trading and makes a contribution to emission reductions. The second pillar will seek to improve public services by targeting greater efficiency in spending, and using improvements in public sector financial management as an entry point into public sector reforms more generally. With this CPS Bank will maintain a strong dialog on policy and program issues in Energy Sector through Energy Sector Reform &amp; Development Program, Infrastructure Program and Carbon Finance agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country engagement</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>The country is very closely engaged with the EBRD on energy policy and projects, and has entered a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Risks</th>
<th>Rating after Mitigation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>with EBRD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding on a joint Sustainable Energy Action Plan, which outlines actions to be taken by the Government to improve the framework for clean energy investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country governance</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Political risks include: domestic political differences, upcoming presidential elections, and tensions with Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic corruption</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>Corruption levels are higher than EU member countries but the situation is improving. Noticeable efforts to reduce corruption include legislation on public procurement which is under review at the moment, civil service ethics, and freedom of information which improved substantially through the past several years, as well as the ratification of a number of conventions related to the fight of corruption. Improving business standards, including transparent commercial practices will be addressed as part of project processing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector policies and institutions</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>The 2009 gas crisis has reinforced the need for energy supply diversification and increased energy efficiency in Ukraine and has already led to action by the Government, including the recent Joint EU-Ukraine International Investment Conference on the Rehabilitation of Ukraine's Gas Transit System. Ukraine has made efforts to become increasingly integrated into the EU and South-Eastern European energy markets. Pricing and regulatory issues will be addressed as part of the DPL policy agenda by the World Bank.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing agencies</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Local capacity to build and operate hydro and wind power facilities, and implement industrial projects including building retrofits and construction has been demonstrated. The skills of the domestic financial sector to assess and supervise RE projects through financial assessment of EE activities are emerging. The decentralized nature and smaller size of RE and EE interventions mitigate impacts on power sector performance due to possible delays or failures of individual projects. Technical assistance and external expertise will be sourced to support assessment of EE and RE opportunities, as well as Smart Grid development. Donor interest for this has been established (Chapter 6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technology</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>CTF will utilize commercially available wind, biomass, and EE technologies that have already been proven in country. CTF will also utilize technologies with a proven track record outside Ukraine, e.g. Smart Grids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Risks</td>
<td>Rating after Mitigation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguards</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>WB/IFC/EBRD safeguards policies will apply to all interventions. UkrEnergo, Ukrhydroenergo, UkrEximBank and commercial banks working under the UKEEP project are already applying these for ongoing projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Private Sector Risks

108. **Financing wind energy is an important component of IFC and EBRD’s commitment to addressing climate change through development finance.** Over the past years, both institutions have accumulated global experience in the direct financing of the wind sector. Wind projects currently in the IFC portfolio and pipeline are based in countries such as India, Mexico, Chile, Turkey, Estonia, Bulgaria and Ukraine. EBRD has financed such projects in Poland, Latvia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Turkey. In late 2008, both IFC and EBRD financed a 156 MW greenfield AES Kavarna windfarm in Bulgaria, and in early 2009 followed this with a joint investment in a 135 MW windfarm in Turkey. The Bulgarian project, the largest in the country, will almost quadruple Bulgaria’s share of electricity produced from windpower, propelling it towards the EU commitment of generating 11% of electricity from renewables by 2010. It will also influence the country’s ability to attract foreign investment to its nascent renewables sector and position it as an alternative emerging market destination for private sector wind power investments. This and the Turkey investment would be used as a model for financing wind projects in Ukraine.

109. **IFC and EBRD will draw in their experience in financing hydro and biomass projects to mitigate risks of private sector projects in Ukraine.** IFC has undertaken hydro projects in Chile, Columbia, Nepal, Brazil, Albania, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Currently, IFC is working with a Brazilian company to finance a portfolio of small hydro plants, wind farms and biomass-fired plants; and with a bank in Sri Lanka to structure a risk sharing facility to assist the local financial sector in increasing exposure to RE projects in the region. EBRD has undertaken biomass and hydro projects in Bulgaria, Russia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Macedonia.

110. **The use of financial intermediaries to finance smaller-scale projects which would not be sufficiently large to warrant direct involvement by the institutions is a successful business model applied by both EBRD and IFC in various regions.** EBRD applies such scheme in some new EU Member States, implementing it most recently in the Western Balkans. IFC has applied successful programs in the ECA region (Hungary, Bosnia, Czech, Baltics, Slovakia, Russia, and regional schemes). The most recent examples include the Russia Sustainable Energy Finance Program to create sustainable capacity in the Russian financial sector to finance EE projects, including RE; and the
Eastern Europe Renewable Energy Mezzanine Facility, aimed to catalyze financing, via local banks, for small scale hydro, wind and solar projects. The principal objective in all cases is to create a sustainable commercial lending market which will continue in the absence of IFC/EBRD credit lines. This approach can be used as a model for Ukrainian financial institutions. Electricity and heat produced using small-scale RE sources will be mostly for own consumption by SMEs; export of excess electricity to the grid will be pursued. In addition, the proposed element of a Direct Lending Facility operating with delegated authority and managed from the local offices, would target private investors interested in financing medium-scale RE sources for sale to the grid.
6. Financing Plan and Instruments

111. The primary financial instruments that would be used to support the CTF Investment program for Ukraine would be loans and grants.

112. **Grant funding** would be used to advance project preparatory work for the projects and help identify and resolve potential implementation issues. The funding level that is expected amounts to US$2.5 million (see Table 6.1). US$1 million would support energy efficiency and US$500,000 would support Smart Grids; funding requirements for preparation of the renewable energy project is estimated at US$1 million, for the preparation of EIAs, feasibility studies, and other associated preparatory work. These funds would be supplemented by funding from ESMAP and PPIAF.

113. **The proposed loan program** would support four projects: Ukraine Renewable Energy Financing Facility, Energy Efficiency, Smart Grids and Zero Emissions Power from Gas Network. Ukraine seeks US$350 million of CTF financing, representing about 13% of the US$2,605 million in overall financing needs (Table 6.1). This will leverage US$1,575 million in multilateral support and US$450 million from the Government of Ukraine, and US$230 from the private sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Pennsylvania Counterpart (million US$)</th>
<th>MDBs</th>
<th>Private Sector (million US$)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>CTF Grant Funds</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>IFC</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy Efficiency</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Smart Grids</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero Emissions Power from the Gas Network</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Stage 1</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

114. In addition, carbon financing options may be pursued for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency projects should such financing be needed to overcome financing hurdles.
Annex 1

The Energy Sector

Ukraine is a net importer of energy resources with imports representing 62% of primary energy needs (2004). In 2005, the shares of domestically produced fuels among supplied fuels were as follows:

- 26.8% of natural gas supply;
- 22.6% of oil supply; and
- 88.1% of coal supply.

Coal industry. Total coal reserves of Ukraine are estimated at 117 billion tons, including confirmed reserves of 56.7 billion tons, of which 39.3 billion tons are steam coal reserves. In 2005 the coal industry in Ukraine operated 167 underground and 3 open-cast mines. Difficult geological mining conditions as well as reduced demand resulted in a reduction of coal production from 136 million tons in 1991 to 71 million tons in 1996. Since then Ukraine managed to first stabilize and then slightly increase coal production at about 80 million tons per year. Stabilization of coal production at this level was achieved due to structural reforms in the coal industry, technical retrofits increasing competitiveness of mines, and re-emerging demand due to economic growth, in particular in the steel industry.

The Oil and Gas industry is of considerable economic importance in Ukraine. The state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz accounts for almost 13% of GDP, employing 1% of the country's workforce. Ukraine produces 20 billion m$^3$ of natural gas per year, while annual consumption of natural gas is 76 billion m$^3$. Oil production is 4 billion tons per year. Ukraine has important oil and gas transport systems, which not only supply Ukrainian needs but also play a critical role in carrying oil and gas to Central and Eastern Europe. Gas and oil transit to Europe in the recent years has been 110-120 billion m$^3$ and 32-33 million tons per annum, respectively, thus becoming an important source of revenue.

Ukraine's natural gas transportation system is the second largest in Europe. It includes almost 38,000 km of pipelines, 13 underground natural gas storage facilities, and a well-developed system of distribution stations. The system’s annual input capacity totals 290 billion m$^3$, while the output capacity stands at 175 billion m$^3$ annually including 140 billion m$^3$ into central and eastern European countries.

Renewable Energy supply, other than large hydro, is relatively small in Ukraine, despite a good resource base. The primary problems in increasing the use of renewables relates to a weak support framework as well as relatively high costs compared to thermal power options. Recent changes to the legal framework have made it likely that the supply will now increase from its current low levels.
Sectoral Overview

The Power Sector of Ukraine comprises of 14 large thermal power plants (TPPs), 8 large hydropower plants (HPPs) and 4 nuclear power plants (NPPs). As of 2005, total installed capacity was 52 GW of which:

- 57.8% TPPs;
- 26.6% NPPs;
- 9.1% HPPs and pumped storage; and
- 6.5% isolated generating plants (IGPs), combined heat and power plants (CHPs) and other sources.

In terms of generating output, in 2005 the power plants of Ukraine delivered 185 TWh, comprising:

- 40.8% TPPs and CHPs – 75.5 TWh;
- 6.6% HPPs and pumped storage – 12.3 TWh;
- 47.9% NPPs – 88.8 TWh;
- 4.6% IGPs and communal CHPs – 8.6 TWh.

Figure A1.1

Source: Statistics of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Ukraine
Power Market Ownership and Plant Status

The thermal power generation industry consists of 5 generation companies, 4 of which are publicly owned, while one is private. TPPs include a total of 102 power units with a capacity ranging 150-800 MW. Much of the TPP equipment is operating well beyond its normal life-time and urgently requires rehabilitation or replacement. Financing in this area is inadequate, resulting in low reliability and high fuel consumption.

**The Heat Supply System** in Ukraine is largely based on district heating-utilizing heat-only boilers, with some larger CHP supplying both industrial and residential systems. Currently there are about 250 CHPs under operation. As is the case for power plants, most of the CHPs are outdated, do not meet environmental standards, and thus require urgent retrofitting and modernization. The fuel used in CHP units is as follows:

- 76-80% natural gas;
- 15-18% oil; and
- 5-6% coal.

In addition to CHPs, the heat supply system includes about 100,000 boilers of different specification. The vast majority of these boilers are small industrial or autonomous boilers. Fuel consumption of these boiler houses is:

- 52 – 58% natural gas;
- 12-15% oil;
- 27-36% coal.

Biomass is now emerging as a new source for heating plants, and the first projects are currently reaching financial closure.
Annex 2

Program Overview

Energy Production

1. EBRD/IFC Ukraine Renewable Energy Finance Facility including:
   - Small Hydropower and Wind projects through credit line or delegated lending facilities
   - Biomass projects financing mechanism through credit line or delegated lending facilities
   - 100 MW Wind Power Project in Crimea

Energy Efficiency

2. IBRD/EBRD/IFC Energy Efficiency Program Focusing on Buildings and District Heating

Support for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency

3. IBRD Smart Grids

Gas Network

4. IBRD/EBRD Zero Emissions Power from the Gas Network Rehabilitation
1. Renewable Energy Program (EBRD and IFC)

Problem Statement
Although Ukraine has significant potential renewable energy resources, ranging from wind and small hydro sectors to geothermal and biomass, the market for renewable energy and related products and services remains small. Ukraine lacks a clear, long-term, transparent mechanism to develop renewable energy resources, combined with the required procedures and standards for development, permitting, licensing and connection of renewable energy capacity to the Ukrainian electricity grid.

Ukraine has significant RE potential, especially in wind, small hydro and biomass. However, most of this potential remains untapped. The country’s RE today is concentrated in large hydro power (75% of total) and biomass-fired heating boilers and stoves. There are also several wind power plants and geothermal heating systems. As of 2008, RE supplies account for only 2.8% of total primary energy supply. The development of renewable energy in the country is not only a priority due to the greenhouse gas reductions which could be realized but also to improve security of supply which has become an increasing concern in Ukraine following the gas crises of January 2006 and 2008.

Under the proposed project, CTF would make funds available to reduce risk and overall cost of investing in renewable energy technologies, which are not currently commercially viable in Ukraine. In particular, IFC and EBRD will seek to provide direct financing to large-scale private sector RE development projects (e.g. windfarms). With respect to smaller-scale projects, especially in the small hydro and biomass sectors, IFC and EBRD will work on mainstreaming funding through financial intermediaries. IFC and EBRD will also seek to provide direct financing to medium-sized project under the newly promoted scheme of a Direct Lending Facility.

Proposed Transformation
The Ukrainian government projects significant growth of RE market: Ukraine’s “Energy Strategy up to 2030”, adopted in 2006, estimates the annual technical potential of renewable and non-conventional energy sources (RES) at about 79 million tons of coal equivalent (MTCE), which translates into RES consumption of 18.3 MTCE by 2030 (6% of total energy consumption). Other estimates put the share of RES at 16.5% of total energy consumption, or 39.2 MTCE, by 2030. The Renewable Energy Agency estimates that annual RE use can grow to about 100 TWh by 2030 and over 200 TWh by 2050, allowing Ukraine to substitute 22 MTCE/year of fossil and nuclear energy in 2030 (7.3% of total energy supply) and up to 42 MTCE/year by 2050.

The main focus of the proposition is to provide funding for both large/mid-scale and small-scale RE projects in order to deliver measurable economic, environmental and social benefits. By doing so, a number of barriers to the development of renewable energy could be addressed by providing CTF financing to this emerging sector. These include:
Business skills and information

- There is uncertainty and lack of information about available options, best practice and related financial reward. A portfolio of projects demonstrating technologies and best practice could address this.
- Renewable energy investments are varied in scope and sector, and are difficult to appraise and finance. The establishment of a credit line through local banks could create an effective financing mechanism with good technical support. Technical assistance is required to ensure the pursuit of good lending opportunities that are well assessed.
- Trade and investment promotion has been fragmented in the past by the type of technology being offered (e.g., PV cells or wind turbines). Potential purchasers lack the opportunity to gain an overview of all renewable energy options available. Establishing successful projects would overcome this information gap.
- Few energy-intensive companies consider renewable energy resources as a tool for reducing energy consumption from fossil fuels, even in areas where wind or solar potential is favorable.
- There is also potential, as a follow-on, to explore related schemes to monetize greenhouse gas emission reductions to replace CTF concessional financing, but local capacity to develop such projects is low.

Finance

- As a result of lack of experience and uncertainties, renewable energy projects incur additional costs in appraisal, due diligence, and monitoring, making them less attractive to banks. CTF concessional financing can address this.
- There is insufficient access to adequate amounts of longer-term funding for renewable energy projects resulting from real and perceived risks: borrowers’ tenors beyond the banks’ current horizons are necessary for financing these types of projects. CTF concessional financing in a subordinated role can address this.
- There is no specific marketing for financing renewable projects in the banking sector. The establishment of the facilities will build up this expertise.
- Local banks have limited access to technical expertise for appraisal. There is limited information about various renewable energy resources, and misconceptions exist about their technical risks and financial benefits. Co-financing of the CTF facility could provide this expertise.

Financing wind energy is an important component of IFC and EBRD’s commitment to addressing climate change. Over the past years, both institutions have accumulated global experience in direct financing of the wind sector. Wind projects currently in IFC’s and EBRD’s portfolio and pipeline include India, Latvia, Czech Republic, Chile, Mexico, Turkey, Poland, Estonia and Bulgaria. Most recently, in late 2008, both IFC and EBRD financed a 156 MW greenfield AES Kavarna windfarm in Bulgaria. This project, the largest in the country, will almost quadruple Bulgaria’s share of electricity produced from windpower, propelling it towards the EU commitment of generating 11% of electricity from renewables by 2010. It will also influence the country’s ability to attract foreign investment to its renewables sector and position it as an alternative emerging market
destination for private sector wind power investments. This investment can be used as a model for financing wind projects in Ukraine.

**Implementation Readiness**

EBRD is already active in addressing this through a technical assistance program to assist the GoU in preparing legislation to support renewable energy. Following extensive stakeholder consultations, the first phase was completed in September 2008 with a set of recommendations for the basic structure of legislative framework and required implementation steps. Since September 2008, Rada has passed new primary legislation setting the basis for a regulatory support framework for renewables. Following further enhancements introduced in April 2009, the basic framework now provides for a supportive feed-in tariff up to 2030 based on multiples of the retail electricity price (with different multiples for different renewable technologies). Work is now focused on preparing the enabling legislation of the necessary orders and procedures covering issues such as grid connection and tariff setting. While there is strong support for establishing a comprehensive support framework for renewable energy in Ukraine, this will inevitably take some time and concrete results will probably take at least another 12 to 18 months to be realized. The EBRD is supporting this process through the second phase of its technical assistance program which provides for advisory services to the National Electricity Regulatory Commission in order to develop and implement the secondary legislation for renewables. This assignment commented in April 2009 and will last until the end of the year.

Use of financial intermediaries is a successful business model applied by both EBRD and IFC in various regions. EBRD applies such scheme in some new EU Member States, implementing it most recently in the Western Balkans. IFC has applied successful programs in the ECA region (Hungary, Bosnia, Czech Republic, Baltics, Slovakia, Russia, and regional schemes). Most recent examples include Russia Sustainable Energy Finance Program to create sustainable capacity in the Russian financial sector to finance EE projects, including RE; and Eastern Europe Renewable Energy Mezzanine Facility, to catalyze financing, via local banks, for small scale hydro, wind and solar projects. The principal objective in all cases is to create a sustainable commercial lending market which will continue in the absence of IFC/EBRD credit lines. This approach can be used as a model for Ukrainian financial institutions. Electricity and heat produced using small-scale RE sources will be mostly for own consumption by SMEs and export of excess electricity to the grid. In addition, the Direct Lending Facility would target private investors interested in financing medium-scale RE sources for sale to the grid.

This project will also build on work focusing on “Implementation of the Concept of the Wholesale Electricity Market of Ukraine” supported by the World Bank. This provides for development during 2007-2008 of the comprehensive legal framework of the new model of the electricity market of Ukraine in accordance to the Concept of Operation and Development of the Wholesale Electricity Market of Ukraine approved by the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 1789 of 16.11.2002. That includes the

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35 Loan Agreement between Ukraine and the World Bank under the hydro power rehabilitation project No. 4795–UA
preparation of the Balancing and Settlement Code, Grid Code, Distribution Network Code, and Procurement Rules for Ancillary Services. These documents will reflect the provisions related to particular characteristics of operation of electricity generators using renewable and alternative energy sources.

Rationale for CTF Financing
One of the key limitations for wider project implementation of RE financing is the lack of financial resources, both direct funding for larger projects and lending facilities for small-scale projects. Private investors and financial institutions view the RE sector as higher risk, due to lack of technical capacity on the part of lenders to evaluate such projects and potential borrowers being unable to establish bankability of their projects. CTF will be instrumental in attracting the attention of the financial institutions to this new field and developing a competitive market for these products.

CTF can be used as a tool to justify the difference between a short-term quick fix and the long-term effective solution for the companies considering the RE investments in Ukraine. CTF can have an impact on their evaluation and encourage them to go for the highest impact opportunities rather than temporary solutions.

While there have been isolated initiatives to promote renewable energy in Ukraine over the past 15 years, energy policy discussion in Ukraine has been dominated largely by the issues of energy efficiency, transit pipelines, and nuclear safety. Renewable energy resources have traditionally meant large hydroelectric facilities, which generate approximately 10% of power but have no potential for expansion. Recently, discussions of pricing reform and steps towards integrating the Ukrainian grid into the European grid have set the stage for more sustained and comprehensive attention to renewable energy resources.

The proposed project will address policy, finance, business, and information barriers to renewable energy market developments in Ukraine resulting in approximately 16 million tons of CO₂ equivalent avoided from ca. 80 MW generated from medium-sized renewable sources and 100 MW of large-scale wind power capacity over the life-time of the projects, and significant post-project emission reductions resulting from the adoption and enforcement of supportive policy and regulatory frameworks developed as a component of the project. Because Ukraine is such a large power producer (upwards of 192 TWh annually, with exports of more than 10 TWh), increasing the share of energy from renewable resources could have a significant impact on offsetting greenhouse gas emissions.

Sub-Facility Description

a. Credit Line for Small-Scale Renewables
The proposed CTF project is designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Ukraine by supporting the introduction of renewable technologies in the framework of the established UKEEP intermediated finance facility.
UKEEP is a credit facility developed by EBRD and targeting Ukrainian private companies in all sectors looking to invest in energy efficiency or renewable energy projects. EBRD has already dedicated US$150 million to the UKEEP facility for various energy efficiency and renewable energy projects. There are no exact limits on project size, although a typical loan size will range somewhere between US$2-5 million. For larger investments, companies can complement this facility with other forms of financing, e.g. own funds and other commercial credits. Smaller investments may also be eligible.

b. *Delegated Lending Facility for Medium-size RE projects*

The focus of the facility will be on kick-starting the medium-size renewables market through establishment of a dedicated Renewable Energy Fund, capitalized by the EBRD, IFC, CTF, and other sources. The fund will be a source of loans to project developers, and will be supported by technical assistance throughout the supply chain to develop a flow of bankable projects. A possible schematic of the operation of the Ukraine Renewable Energy Fund is shown below. It is planned that up to US$75 million of CTF funding will go towards loans, depending on the market assessment and needs. Other funding – for example from the EU – will be secured to support both loan and TA components:

The EBRD has already initiated a technical assistance program to support development work, which will minimize implementation risks and will aim to provide a regulatory and legal framework for grid-connect renewables.

c. *Large-scale wind energy*

The Project comprises two sites in east and west Crimea. The western site will ultimately have total installed capacity of approximately 214 MW from 102 turbines and will require the construction of a 330kV transmission line to the main grid via the existing interconnection station, which will be partially rehabilitated as part of the Project. The
eastern site will ultimately have total installed capacity of 105 MW from 50 turbines and will be connected to the main grid by a 7 km 220kV transmission line via the existing interconnection station which will be partially rehabilitated as part of the Project. The CTF financing would support the establishment of the first phase of the project, with up to 100 MW installed in total.

**Financing Plan for Ukraine Renewable Energy Financing Facility**

It is expected that major share of financing will become available from the EBRD credit line, IFC direct loans, and CTF concessional financing. Other funding sources will be explored before project submission to the CTF, such as carbon financing. Additionally, technical assistance and project preparation grants from other donors will also be separately identified by the time of submission to the CTF committee.

The table below shows tentative financial arrangement for financing renewable energy program.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EBRD</th>
<th>IFC</th>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th>CTF</th>
<th>Total RE financing package</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
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</table>
2. Improving Energy Efficiency (IBRD/EBRD/IFC)

Problem Statement
Improving energy efficiency (EE) has been a long-standing problem for Ukraine – a legacy from the period of the former Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian domestic production dropped substantially, causing a decline in energy consumption. However, production output fell at a slower rate in the export-oriented and energy-intensive sectors. As a result, in 1991-95, Ukrainian energy intensity grew by 30%. Energy intensity stabilized from 1996-99, as the economic decline slowed and energy consumption continued to decrease. From 1990-97, electricity and fuel prices rose 40-85% faster than inflation, which tripled the share of energy in total production cost and provided stronger incentives for the private sector to consume energy more efficiently. Not surprisingly, manufacturers began to introduce new technologies. At the same time, the service sector expanded. Since 2000, Ukraine has experienced substantial economic growth while energy consumption has remained relatively stable. From 2000 to 2007 energy and CO$_2$ intensities in Ukraine decreased by ~35%, an average rate of an annual average improvement of 6% per year. However, despite these recent improvements, Ukraine remains one of the most energy-intensive countries in Europe. For example, energy use per unit of purchasing power parity adjusted GDP exceeds German figures by a factor of about fourfold. The only countries with more energy intensive economies are the oil producers of the Middle East. Therefore, the challenge is to further accelerate the trend of declining energy intensity, deepening the reach of existing, successful approaches, and broadening the sectoral coverage to access currently untapped potential.

The industrial sector is critical for energy efficiency improvements in Ukraine because of its dominance in energy consumption (44 per cent of total final energy) and energy saving potential (estimated by IEA to be 57% of the total energy efficiency potential). Ukraine’s industries are among the least energy efficient in the world. As of 2005, about 40% of Ukraine’s steel production came from open hearth furnaces, a highly wasteful steel-making technology phased out long ago by all major steel producing countries, except Ukraine and Russia. Tight supply of liquidity in the domestic financial sector means that many urgent industrial energy efficiency needs will not be met in the short to medium term.

As the cost of electricity and gas rises, customers in Ukraine face steadily increasing energy bills for heating and lighting in public facilities and residences. The problem is exacerbated because most buildings, Government-owned as well as municipal and mixed ownership, are very inefficient, as much as five times less efficient as the norm in Western Europe. The buildings lack control systems to regulate heat, boilers are old and inefficient, and the building envelopes are poorly insulated. As well as costing a great deal to heat, these buildings provide an uncomfortable environment and may be impossible to keep at a reasonable temperature in the winter. Heat losses from inefficient design are exacerbated by the long heating season. Severe funding shortages over a

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prolonged period of time have created a housing stock that is energy inefficient and
deteriorating at an alarming pace. If adequate action is not taken soon, a significant part
of this housing may deteriorate beyond repair and create unacceptable housing
conditions. This is a particular problem for vulnerable groups such as the elderly, sick or
very young, all of which rely on public institutions to care for them. Unlike electricity,
heating costs of the poor are higher than for the wealthy as they are not in a position to
upgrade their building envelope. Hence, subsidies for this target group are needed.

District heating (DH) networks in the former Soviet Union were designed for a
substantially different market than is the case today. Much of the demand collapsed
during the 1990s with only limited recovery post-2000. The collapse in demand was
further exacerbated by low prices that enabled only limited replacement and upgrading to
the DH networks. As a result, DH networks are over-sized and inefficient with losses
well above the norms in the west. In addition, many of the Combined Heat and Power
(CHP) plants are old, using outdated technologies. Outdated technologies as well as poor
EE negatively affect the levels of GHG emissions in Ukraine.

Proposed Transformation
The Program is designed to improve energy efficiency in Ukraine by financing a broad-
based EE program that implements the Government’s ambitious target to reduce energy
intensity of the economy by 50% by 2030. It would include the following components:
(1) the reconstruction and refurbishment of municipal & mixed ownership housing stock
in order to improve their energy efficiency; (2) upgrading Government-owned buildings
such as schools, kindergartens and hospitals; (3) decreasing losses in district heating
supply; and (4) support for energy efficiency in industry. In industrial sector, the
proposed EE program would help achieving saving of 2 million tons of CO_2 emissions
annually. Through transformation of the sector, 20 million tons of CO_2 emissions
would be saved by 2030. Due to intervention in residential sector, the proposed program
is expected to facilitate the saving of 1.2 million tons of CO_2 emissions annually which
will translate into 10 million tons by 2030.

Based on current operating conditions and the proposed performance of the buildings in
the project, the refurbishment of the housing stock within the context of the project would
generate an emission reduction of around 30% relative to the situation at the start of the
project. Expanding credit support of international financial institutions to industrial
energy efficiency investments could help Ukraine reap substantially larger energy-
savings benefits in much shorter time than what currently available capital could achieve.
However, the EE program would be designed to use CTF resources to expand into
markets where commercial financing needs to buy down the costs. The proposed program
would be transformational because it would approach the market for public and
municipal residential housing at a point where the entire market can develop a lower
“carbon trajectory” than it would otherwise, avoiding substantial emissions for a long
period in the future. In particular, the program would support the reforms needed, piloting
examples and providing institutional capacity building support for commercial banks and
ESCOs.
Based on experience of investments from other similar projects in industries and building upgrades, an investment of US$150 million may be expected to generate energy savings of 10,500 GWh per year with emission reductions of up to 3.2 million tons of CO₂ annually. Detailed estimations of cost effectiveness (and emission reductions per $ spent) will be determined during project preparation.

The project would focus on selected regions and municipalities, and professional organizations to disseminate policies and practices that result in improved buildings efficiency. The regions would be selected based on existing activities projects under development in Ukraine, along with the need/potential for energy saving and replication. By working in conjunction with the EBRD loan that supports the development of a municipal housing authority, the project would strengthen the ability of the participating cities and additional subsequent partners to address both social and environmental issues related to housing.

**Implementation Readiness**

The first steps toward implementation readiness have started to take place as a part of the dialogue with the IMF and World Bank reform program. Gas prices are expected to be adjusted to reflect cost of supply, as well as the impacts on district heating and electricity prices. These reforms alone will create a considerable incentive for changes in attitude to energy efficiency, some of which are already visible. The Government has drafted an Energy Efficiency Law that will help establish the legal framework. Secondary legislation and related regulations are also being drafted with support from donors. Among these regulations will be standards that will apply to appliances and equipment addressing energy efficiency requirements, as well as legal improvements to the housing association framework.

An “Association of Energy Efficient Cities” has been established in Ukraine to share lessons learned, drawing largely from EU Directives and practices on energy efficiency. Lviv has taken the lead in implementing this program, having implemented the EU Directive on building energy efficiency through the Certificate Program. Building energy use in Lviv has been estimated and certificates placed on buildings so that people are aware of this characteristic. The program is now being implemented in two more cities and will follow in the remaining seven in the near-term. This program has elicited the public response hoped for as people are now seeking energy efficiency investments as they realize that many buildings are about five times less efficient than buildings in Western Europe. The CTF program would help in implementing the next steps towards improving the existing building stock, both housing and public buildings.

IFC recently finalized a feasibility study on residential energy efficiency in Ukraine that focused on common area renovations for those multi-unit apartment buildings that are managed by condominium associations (CA). Many of them need to renovate the common areas but cannot do this as CAs are unable to borrow from banks, banks do not know much about CAs, and other related barriers. IFC and EBRD (which has significant experience in addressing this market in the Slovak Republic) are interested in this
particular segment of residential EE sector and have already begun to develop, based on the feasibility study and on a request from the GoU, a technical assistance program to address the legislative/regulatory framework first, which will be funded by the E5. They will focus on deepening market penetration in the residential sector.

**Rationale for CTF Financing**
Investments in energy efficiency can be financed entirely on the basis of the saved energy, and capital costs can be typically recovered in 5-10 years. Lessons learned from EE lending elsewhere has shown that, despite attractive returns, market penetration has been limited due to barriers. Experience has shown that subsidies are required to overcome these barriers. Furthermore, EE investments are income skewed: high income households adopt these investments while lower income households do not.

Furthermore, the recent economic crisis made investments in improving energy efficiency in industries difficult because of the financial sector constraints. Energy efficiency is not of the highest priority for industries that were looking at rapidly evolving markets. Despite the urgent need for substantial levels of rehabilitation in the residential and public buildings sector, very little progress has been made because central and local governments lack the funds to support a significant renovation program. Local authorities, residents themselves and local banks lack the capacity to finance these measures entirely from their own resources. Furthermore, in the residential sector legislative reform is required to enable Bank lending. This is currently in progress.

It is expected that the primary modality for energy efficiency support in the non-buildings sector would be through commercial banks, drawing on lessons learned from successes in other countries. Using commercial banks has helped ensure that projects are developed on a commercial basis and that the program is sustainable. EBRD and the World Bank have experience working with the banking sector in Ukraine that can be built upon. However, it is expected that CTF resources will also be needed to help banks transition into energy efficiency markets that they are reluctant to enter for a variety of reasons. The possibility of using CTF resources as a guarantee mechanism to facilitate entry into these markets – in particular for public and private buildings -- will also be explored. In the buildings sector, commercial banks will also be a channel, but this will be augmented by the use of city-level ESCOs to address public buildings, and, in larger cities, potentially direct financing of projects. IFI guidelines mandate that the CTF not be used in a manner that would distort the financial markets. This will be addressed by focusing the global public good component of the costs and by engaging all qualified financial institutions that are interested in its application.

Technical assistance to support this transformation has already been endorsed by the E5, at a level of €1m for residential buildings legislative reform support, which is critical to unlock the market for the proposed project, and €2m for the development of financing mechanisms for public buildings in two cities, to demonstrate the potential of innovative financing approaches. Both of these will be managed by the EBRD. This very recent development, together with the availability of the E5 has enabled the shifting of significant additional resources into this part of the investment plan.
Financing Plan
It is expected that major share of financing will become available from the World Bank, EBRD, IFC and CTF concessional financing. Other funding sources will be explored before project submission to the CTF, such as carbon financing. The significant volume of energy efficiency within the financing plan is grounded in (i) the potential of energy efficiency in the Ukrainian economy, and (ii) the importance of utilizing significant volumes in order to achieve a sustainable market transformation in the buildings sector.

Additional to the investment element, technical assistance and project preparation grants from other donors will also be separately identified by the time of submission to the CTF committee. In particular, US$2 million of CTF grant funds is expected to finance the project preparatory work.

The CTF parallel technical assistance funding would provide support to analyze and disseminate techniques of integrated municipal energy planning, housing planning, and approaches to integrated housing reconstruction programs in Ukraine, and provide the basis for legal frameworks to be applied within the context of the proposed Facility. It would provide capacity building based on practical experience on how municipalities can handle large-scale reconstruction of housing stock – including engagement of private sector developers – in a transparent and efficient manner. The project would provide training in best practices in code enforcement and innovations in building codes such as performance incentives for high-efficiency buildings and build capacity among ESCOs.

The table below shows tentative financial arrangement for financing energy efficiency program.

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<tr>
<th>IBRD EE Credit Line</th>
<th>EBRD/IFC Ukraine Buildings EE Financing Facility</th>
<th>CTF</th>
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<td>21%</td>
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Project Preparation Timetable

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<td>ROC on CTF Investment Plan</td>
<td>September 2009</td>
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<td>Concept Note</td>
<td>September 2009</td>
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<td>Stage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Preparation</td>
<td>October 2009 – March 2010</td>
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<td>Appraisal and Negotiations</td>
<td>February – May 2010</td>
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<td>Board Approval</td>
<td>June/July 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation</td>
<td>September 2011 – September 2014</td>
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3. Smart Grids (IBRD)

Problem Statement
Ukraine has recently committed to an aggressive schedule to enable them to join the Energy Community in Europe. An important component of this commitment entails meeting EU standards for system access and reliability. Given the current state of the sector – the age of the assets, losses in the transmission and distribution networks, pricing and financing concerns and energy efficiency levels – power system modernization will need considerable support if the transition to EU standards will succeed. The technical losses in the power network are estimated to be about 16%, well above levels experienced in OECD countries of well below 10%. Part of this problem is due to the aging assets and partly due to an evolving structure of power demands.

The problems associated with a modernization program could be compounded by a turnaround in electricity demand in Ukraine once the financial crisis has passed. The generation assets are old and based on out-of-date technologies. The transmission and distribution system is witnessing increased strain because of the aging of the assets and the demands put on it to meet the needs of a changing economic structure. Meeting the European Network of Transmission System Operations for Electricity (ENTSO-E) standards will be a challenge under these circumstances.

Ukraine’s commitments necessitate that its electricity system evolves to one which is more market based. The design of the supply-side of the market is consistent with the approach undertaken in many EU countries. However, the demand-side of the market has not yet been not fully incorporated into the market design. IEA’s estimates indicate that investments in demand-side actions could reduce total system costs considerably, if integrated into a broad-based development plan. Drawing on new technologies, the demand-side can be better integrated into the market design and set the basis for low-cost system development rewards lasting for decades, given the life of the assets in the power sector.

At the same time, the Government’s strategy calls for rapidly increasing the role of Renewable Energy – this capacity would offset the need for new coal fired power plants. This scale of RE development – increasing from practically zero to more than 1,000 MW within a decade and as much as 5,000 MW by 2030 -- would create challenges to the power system, in terms of required grid connections, transmission system reinforcement and grid management of large-scale intermittent generation (due to the inevitable variations in wind power generation).

Furthermore, as the economy restructures toward one which is more service-based, electricity reliability becomes an increasingly important issue. Today’s technology also requires high quality electricity supply to avoid customers supplementing power system controls with their own equipment designed to stabilize supply.
Proposed Transformation
The proposed Smart Grid can be considered an agent that would enable financial, informational and electrical transactions among consumers, power supply assets, and other authorized users. The proposed Smart Grid interventions are defined by the following seven principal characteristics:

- **First, it would enable active participation by consumers.** The Smart Grid would give consumers information, control, and options that enable them to engage in new, evolving electricity markets. Grid operators would treat willing consumers as dispatchable resources in the day-to-day operation of the grid. Well-informed consumers would modify consumption based on the balancing of their demands and resources with the electric system’s capability and cost of meeting those demands.

- **Second, it would accommodate all generation and storage options.** It would facilitate seamless integration of a variety of types and sizes of electrical generation, including renewable and small distributed energy options, and energy storage systems using simplified interconnection processes and universal interoperability standards to support a “plug-and-play” level of convenience. Large central power plants, including environmentally friendly sources such as wind and solar farms would continue to play a major role even as large numbers of smaller distributed resources, including Plug-in Electric Vehicles, are deployed. When Plug-in Electric Vehicles reach the market, they can be used as energy storage devices, utilizing low-cost, off-peak power to recharge batteries.

- **Third, it would enable new products, services, and markets.** The Smart Grid would link buyers and sellers together – from the consumer to the Regional Transmission Organization. It would support the creation of new electricity markets from the customer energy management system at the consumer’s premise to technologies that allow consumers and third parties to bid their energy resources into the electricity market. The Smart Grid would support consistent market operation across regions.

- **Fourth, it would provide power quality for the digital economy.** It would monitor, diagnose, and respond to power quality deficiencies resulting in a dramatic reduction in the business losses currently experienced by consumers due to insufficient, unreliable or low quality power quality.

- **Fifth, it would optimize asset utilization and operate efficiently.** Operationally, the Smart Grid would improve load factors, lower system losses, and dramatically improve outage management performance. The availability of additional grid intelligence would give planners and engineers the knowledge to build what is needed when it is needed, to extend the life of assets, to repair equipment before it fails unexpectedly, and to more effectively manage the work force.

- **Sixth, it would anticipate and respond to system disturbances (self-heal).** Over the longer-term Smart Grids are expected to heal itself by performing continuous self-assessments to detect and analyze issues, take corrective action to mitigate them and, if needed, rapidly restore grid components or network sections.
And finally, the Smart Grid would operate resiliently against attack and natural disaster. The Smart Grid would incorporate a system-wide solution that reduces physical and cyber vulnerabilities and enables a rapid recovery from disruptions. Its resilience would be less vulnerable to natural disasters.

The “Smart Grid” is a component of a broader-based strategy which would enable better incorporation of demand-side options into bridging future supply-demand gaps. The IFI community, as well as bilateral donors, are working closely with the Government to implement this broad-based energy efficiency strategy, starting with an Energy Efficiency Action Plan (EEAP) due to be finalized in 2010. The EEAP will be implementation-focused, designed to reduce the energy intensity of Ukraine by 20% by 2014 as part of a longer-term goal to cut its intensity in half by 2030\(^37\). There is considerable potential to meet the short-term goals by improving the incentives, installing better metering and controls and providing low cost financing to be addressed under the energy efficiency component of the program. However, to make the energy efficiency program transformational requires that the demand-side investment options are better integrated into system design. Smart grids would enable this transformation by providing real-time pricing information to customers to enable price sensitive controls that would support load curtailment during peak pricing periods. Unlike current demand-side management systems that employ one-way communications, smart grids provide two-way communications thus integrating supply and demand-side options through improved metering and communications systems.

The Smart Grid investment would also support scale-up of RE capacity from 1.5 GW to 5 GW. CTF resources are proposed to be blended with the next IBRD transmission loan which will support transmission expansion and strengthening for, among other reasons, support for wind energy integration into the grid. CTF resources blended with IBRD are proposed to be utilized for assisting in design and implementation of the next generation of modern grid management and control systems which can enable large-scale integration of wind energy resources and to improve integration of demand-side measures. IBRD resources would focus on expansion of “conventional” transmission grid and system control reinforcements and interconnections.

In Europe and the USA, the challenges posed by wind generation are sought to be addressed through similar “intelligent” grids, which can respond to the challenges placed by growing intermittent wind generation, increasing demand, and tailoring reliability to customer reliability needs. These systems are currently under development by the European Technology Platform (SmartGrid) and Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) in the USA\(^38\) (the IntelliGrid Program). Experience in many countries shows that

\(^37\) The target is to reduce energy intensity from 0.5 kgoe/GDP\(_{Hr}\) to 0.24 kgoe/GDP\(_{Hr}\) by 2030 where GDP is measured in Purchasing Power Parity in Hrivna.

\(^38\) The European Technology Platform Smart Grids brings together European utilities, technology providers/manufacturers, regulators and government agencies. EPRI’s IntelliGrid Program brings together a large number of US and two European electric utilities, technology providers, and agencies including the US Department of Energy.
the transmission system can become a significant bottleneck in scaling up renewable energy. Therefore, it is more cost-effective to develop the grid enhancements in parallel with renewable energy investments, so that the enabling infrastructure is in place for investors and developers.

**Implementation Readiness**

Smart Grids would be developed over time as the technology evolves with milestones identified below representing the building blocks of the Smart Grid. Completion of each requires the deployment and integration of various technologies and applications that will evolve. Many applications are ready today – particularly the metering component – that can establish a platform for the remaining components to be built later. The sequence for implementing these milestones and the degree of implementation will depend on the specific circumstances of Ukraine which will be addressed in the proposed feasibility study. However, it is expected that smart metering and energy efficiency would be the highest priority options for Ukraine.

- **Consumer Enablement (CE)** empowers customers by giving them the information they need to effectively utilize the new options provided by the Smart Grid. CE includes solutions such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), networks within the customers’ premises including information displays, distributed energy resources (DER) to enable cycling or load curtailment, and demand response programs. These systems would be complemented by feedback loops to the supply system to better integrate supply and demand. Information technology architecture and applications would be developed to support “plug-and-play” integration with future Smart Grid technologies. It is anticipated that this first step would be the focus of the proposed CTF project.

- **Advanced Distribution Operations (ADO)** improves reliability and enables “self-healing.” ADO includes solutions such as smart sensors and control devices, advanced outage management, distribution management, and distribution automation systems, geographical information, and other technologies to support two-way power flow and microgrid operation. The basis to support these technologies would be implemented in the first phase, with full implementation expected to be completed later.

- **Advanced Transmission Operations (ATO)** integrates the distribution system with RTO operational and market applications to enable improved overall grid operations and reduced transmission congestion. ATO includes substation automation, integrated wide area measurement applications, power electronics, advanced system monitoring, and protection schemes and modeling, simulation, and visualization tools to increase situational awareness and provide a better understanding of real-time and future operating risks. These systems would help improve reliability and help Ukraine reduce network losses.

- **Advanced Asset Management (AAM)** integrates the grid intelligence acquired as part of achieving the above milestones with new and existing asset management applications. This integration enables utilities to reduce operations and maintenance and capital costs and better utilize assets during day-to-day operations. Additionally, it significantly improves the performance of capacity
planning, maintenance, engineering and facility design, customer service processes, and work and resource management.

The IBRD transmission project is in the Country Partnership Strategy of Ukraine-IBRD for FY2012. The various investments proposed under this project have been included in the investment plan and have also been approved by the Government. Over the next few months, discussions will continue over provision of budget allocations for these investments, spread over 2011-2015.

Ukraine has capacity in implementing complex transmission projects, including in the areas of load dispatch, system operation and control, and market management. Ukraine also has significant experience with IBRD policies, having implemented several projects (in addition to the two that are currently ongoing) with IBRD financing.

**Rationale for CTF Financing**

In order for wind energy to be implemented and utilized, effort needs to be placed in parallel, in developing and implementing a smart-grid solution in Ukraine. The Smart Grid project would complement the RE and EE programs proposed and would facilitate further scaling-up. Since this is a very innovative and complex concept, which is only now being tried in Europe and the USA, it would be beneficial to utilize CTF financing to buy down the costs and risks associated with Smart Grid technologies. It is anticipated that the feasibility study would show that CTF resources in this endeavor would yield very significant results in terms of reduction of GHG emissions from energy efficiency improvements. Should the full 5 GW of RE be realized, expected GHG reductions could be as high as 9 million tons of CO$_2$ per year.

In addition to GHG reduction benefits, the implementation of the Smart Grid and the development of wind energy have significant national-level benefits. It would help offset increased imports of natural gas, which would save the government important foreign currency, thus freeing up resources for social welfare and economic activities. Wind energy development also entails significant employment benefits, as indigenization levels increase and domestic industry develops to provide supplies and construction support.

**Financing Plan**

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**Project Preparation Timetable**

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4. Zero Emissions Power from the Gas Network (IBRD/EBRD)

Problem Statement
Ukraine’s gas transit system (GTS), built between 1950 and 1980 — transports around 110-120 BCM or 80% of Russia’s gas annually to Europe. It is managed by Ukrtransgaz, a subsidiary of a state energy company, Naftogaz. In addition, the Gas Transmission System (GTS) meets a demand of about 56 bcm of gas domestically. Due to under-investing, the GTS is in urgent need of upgrading and rehabilitation. By 2004, 22% of the Ukrainian pipelines exceeded their originally planned life span of 33 years, and 66% of the assets were between 10 and 33 years old. As a result, major investments are expected to take place in Ukraine’s gas network in the next decade. At the same time, for energy security reasons, Ukraine plans significant expansion in its coal-fired power capacity; under a business as usual scenario fossil fuel power is expected to increase from 45% to 51%, with coal accounting for 85% of the total in 2030, compared to 52% in 2006. These two factors present an important opportunity to design and operate the gas network in a manner which would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by adding zero GHG emission technologies to the system.

Transformation Potential
It is proposed that the CTF resources be deployed to support the capture of hot waste exhaust gas generated during compression in the gas network to produce electricity — zero carbon power generation technology, akin to renewable energy. Three potential technology options would be considered: Heat Recovery Steam Generators (HRSGs), Organic Rankine Cycle Engines (ORCEs), depending on the size of the application and Turboexpanders (see below for details on these technologies).

Ukraine, as well as its neighboring countries, has not implemented these technologies. The reason for the limited global implementation is because the cost of HRSGs and ORCEs are high relatively to single-purpose electricity technologies, largely due to economy of scale considerations. Furthermore, market access considerations increase the transaction costs for entities that are not primarily focused on the production of electricity: access to the grid network by independent generators is not widespread and direct bilateral contracting also suffers from additional transaction costs associated with market access.

In addition, the application of turboexpanders, a technology that would also produce electricity with no fuel cost, would also be considered as part of the feasibility study. Turboexpanders are also used in two different applications that are zero carbon power technology applications: (i) they are used as part of a closed loop system that extracts waste heat from gas compressors to produce electricity; and (ii) they can be used at pressure reducing stations to extract the energy lost from the pressure reduction
The details of the project would be determined from the results of a feasibility study, but the broad parameters are as follow, drawing on the example of the Soyuz pipeline:

- The total estimated cost of upgrading the gas pipeline system over the next three years is roughly $2 billion.
- The estimated cost of modernizing the pipeline over the next three years is about $730 million, of which $640 million is for compressor replacements, excluding the proposed zero carbon generation options: HRSGs, ORCs and Turboexpanders.
- If heat recovery steam generators (HRSGs) are added to the Soyuz pipeline three year modernization program, the additional costs are estimated to be $700 million.
- The addition of HRSGs to the project would not go forward without a buy-down in the costs because: (a) like Renewable Energy options the output varies with the load on the pipeline and hence is not dispatchable; (b) the size of the units are small, by power sector standards, and don’t achieve the same economies of scale as single-purpose power generation options; (c) implementing these options would require Naftogaz to enter the power market – a new market for them. A subsidy is necessary to initiate this activity so that the costs and risks (including access to the grid or to bilateral contracts with customers) can be addressed.

**Waste heat Recovery on Gas Pipelines**

Waste heat recovery either in the form of pressure drop in pipelines or hot exhaust gases in gas compressor station turbines can be converted to useful energy in a variety of ways. The sections below discuss three technologies currently being used to capture these energy losses in the gas and power business namely, standalone Turbo-Expanders, Conventional HRSG (Heat Recovery and Steam Generation) and Organic Ranking Cycle (ORC) power systems. These options are outlined below.

**Turbo-expanders**

A turbo expander is a centrifugal or axial flow turbine through which a high pressure gas is expanded to produce energy that is often used to drive a compressor. They have become popular in gas processing refrigeration units, especially in LNG/GTL plants to extract ethane and NGLs such as propane and butane, because of their relatively low cost and simplicity. Because energy is extracted from the expanding high pressure gas – which reduces its pressure, the expansion is an isentropic process; the low pressure exhaust gas from the turbine is at a very low temperature, sometimes as low as −90 °C or less.

Turbo expanders can either be used on their own as in pressure reducing facilities or as a component in gas processing plants e.g. LNG plants or as an ORC (see later for discussion on ORC’s). They can be used to drive compressors or for generating electricity for use at the gas plant or for export to the power grid.

In pressure reducing applications, such as the merging of two transmission pipelines at different pressures, or at the city gate of a gas distribution system, turbo expander-generators can safely reduce the pressure of large volume gas streams while at the same time providing useful energy.

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39 The Soyuz pipeline is the oldest of three pipelines that transit Russian gas through Ukraine to Western Europe, the other two being the Urenguoy-Uzhgorod pipeline and the Progress pipeline.
time recovering energy in the form of electric power. An expander can therefore be a replacement for other pressure regulating equipment such as control valves and regulators.

In these applications, an axial flow turbine is placed in line between the high pressure and low pressure pipes. As the gas flows from the high pressure pipe into the turbo expander, the gas spins the turbine, which can in turn spin a generator producing electricity. Simultaneously, the turbo expander is reducing the pressure of the gas to the appropriate pressure for the local gas network.

Turbo-expanders also cool the gas, but modern turbo expander installations utilize efficient methods for coping with the temperature loss. Newer Turbo-expander designs are often coupled with a second power generator such as a fuel cell or conventional fuel combusting generator. This integration between the turbo expander and secondary generator increases the net efficiency of the entire system.

**Turbo-Expander Examples.** Turbo-expanders have been around for over a century, but the application of turbo-expanders to natural gas pressure reducing facilities only began in the early 1980’s. In 1983, San Diego Gas and Electric was among the first to install a turbo expander. Subsequent installations were made in the mid 1980’s in Memphis, Tennessee, Stockbridge, Georgia and Hamilton, New Jersey. A TransAlta Energy Systems 750 KW prototype, eventually paired with a Perkins 4 cylinder natural gas engine, was installed at British Gas’s regional HQ in the late 1980’s. This ran as a technology demonstrator.

There are recent turbo expander projects that incorporate a secondary power generation source thereby increasing both overall output and efficiency. Examples of these installations are listed below

- In October of 2008, Enbridge and FuelCell Energy Inc. opened a combination turbo-expander and fuel cell facility in Toronto, Canada. The facility produces 2.2 megawatts and runs at an efficiency of around 60%.
- In January of 2009, a project was announced to install turbo expanders throughout London’s natural gas distribution system. This project combines turbo-expanders with biofuel burning generators. The project is projected to produce 20 megawatts but could be expanded to the rest of the transmission system to produce 1GW.

**Hurdles of Turbo-expander Installation in Gas Pressure Reducing Facilities.** Several hurdles face turbo expander projects. The capital costs of engineering and installing a turbo expander can be high and each turbo expander must be custom engineered for a specific application. However, the capital costs of turbo-expanders do not increase proportionally with expected output. Turbo-expanders with large output capabilities cost substantially less on a per-kilowatt basis than for smaller turbo-expanders. But the efficiency of the design depends on many factors including inlet pressure, outlet pressure, inlet temperature, outlet temperature the volume of the flow and the gas specification.
The greatest problem with developing this market in Europe in the 1980’s/1990’s was that the “city gates” were relatively far from the cities and miles from the major electricity grids. The necessary investment was not just in the capital cost of the turbo expander and generator and associated hardware but also in making a connection, sometimes over 10km or more to a power line. In those days of relatively low energy costs – (low gas and electricity prices from the “Dash for Gas”), the turbo expander/generator was not seen as a viable option. Note that although a limited number of US pressure letdown turbo-expanders were installed in the 1980s as demonstration systems it appears all these were subsequently shut down essentially because of the economics.

Recent innovations coupling turbo-expanders with other forms of power generation substantially increase efficiency and bolster the feasibility of further turbo expander development. While turbo-expanders may only capture a few megawatts at a time, the widespread deployment of turbo-expanders could serve an important function in the greater agenda of a more efficient and greener energy system, especially as energy prices rise.

**Heat Recovery Steam Generators (HRSG)**

HRSG’s are popular today because of the efficiency gains that are accomplished with the re-use of waste heat from turbines. Fundamentally HRSG’s are large heat exchangers and follow the thermodynamic laws that govern heat transfer.

The amount of heat that is available to produce steam is essentially driven by the difference of the exhaust turbine temperature with ambient, the exhaust gas mass flow-rate and the specification of the gas. High exhaust temperatures are usually required – ie like those from aero derivative engines or gas turbines. Standard HRSG designs have been used in the power industry for many years. Essentially the energy from the hot exhaust stack of the gas turbine is captured converted to steam which is then either used for district heating or to drive a steam turbine to produce more electricity – the so called CCGT. The combined efficiency of using a steam turbine with a gas turbine is 50 -55% depending on design and conditions, whereas the turbine on its own would be around 36% efficient.

The same concept can be applied to gas pipeline compressors, which are driven by gas turbines or even diesel. The exhaust gases can be captured by a heat exchanger used to raise steam to drive a steam turbine which is used to generate electricity and exported to the grid. Alternatively the steam engine could be used to turn the shaft of another compressor or used to drive an electric compressor.

**Examples of HRSG systems (Steam) on Compressor Stations.** There are few examples of conventional HRSG being used on compressor stations. This is especially so in the US, where steam driven turbines require 24 hour supervision under state laws. This increases operating costs and is impractical in remote locations where the stations are unmanned normally. Known compressor stations with HRSG solutions are outlined in the table below.
Table A2.1. Known Compressor Stations with HRSG Solutions

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<th>Name</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wingas Mallnow Gas compression project near Frankfurt/Oder</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>20 MW</td>
<td>HRSG</td>
<td>2007/2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russwii Compressor station</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>25MW</td>
<td>HRSG</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaghodia Gail</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>HRSG</td>
<td>Planned – out for tender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcanada Nipigon</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>40 MW</td>
<td>OTSG</td>
<td>1992/1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcanada NorthBay</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>40 MW</td>
<td>OTSG</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcanada Kapuskasing</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>40 MW</td>
<td>OTSG</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMV Project Weitendorf</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>16 MW</td>
<td>HRSG</td>
<td>Planned 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organic Ranking Cycle Engine**

Rather than passing the heat through a heat exchanger to generate steam to drive a steam turbine it is possible to generate electricity in a similar but slightly different way: through an Organic ranking engine using a turbo expander. It is called organic because it makes use of a hydrocarbon based fluid rather than steam. It is like a refrigerator in that the hydrocarbon liquid is expanded/cooled and heated. The expansion of the gas is used to drive a turbo expander which then drives a generator to produce electricity. The outlet of the turbo expander is at a much reduced temperature so the gas cools to form a liquid and is reintroduced to the exhaust gas to heat it up and so on. Another advantage of organic compounds is the fact that they do not need to be superheated, as with steam, as they do not forms liquid droplets upon expansion in the turbine. This prevents erosion of the turbine blades and provides design flexibility on the heat exchangers. On the operational side, the ORC requires little maintenance, its operation can be automated and unmanned, its part-load performance is good and start-stop procedures are simple. Availability is generally good as well. Although the ORC unit is a closed loop system and no loss of inventory is to be expected, a leak-detection system is recommended as some organic compounds are flammable. ORCs can also be applied for low temperature waste heat recovery (e.g. flue gas), efficiency improvement in power stations, and recovery of geothermal and solar heat. Small scale ORC’s have been used commercially or as pilot plants in the last two decades. It is estimated that already about 30 commercial ORC plants were been built before 1984 with an output of around 100 kW each.
Examples of ORC Compressor Installations. A number of companies have been actively pursuing compressor heat recovery projects in North America over the past several years. Recycled Energy Development in Westmont, Illinois designs, builds and operates heat recovery power projects, but to date has no systems installed on pipeline compressors. Ormat Technologies in Reno, Nevada has supplied ORCs to geothermal applications for close to twenty years and currently has six compressor recovery systems and one natural gas processing plant system in operation in the U.S. and Canada (see table below). In addition, there are at least ten additional systems in the construction or planning stages. Other companies including Ridgewood Renewable Power, TAS, and WOW Technologies are actively pursuing this market with ORC technologies but have no existing compressor installations.

Table A2.2 Ormat ORC Systems Applied to Gas Turbine Drives – Existing Systems US and Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Gas Turbine</th>
<th>Turbine Horsepower</th>
<th>Recovered Power</th>
<th>Power Purchaser</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TransCanada Pipeline, Gold Creek Station, Alberta, Canada</td>
<td>Rolls Royce, RB211</td>
<td>38,000 hp</td>
<td>6.5 MW</td>
<td>Alberta Power Pool</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neptune Gas Processing, Centerville, Louisiana</td>
<td>Solar Mars 100 (2)</td>
<td>12,000 hp (each)</td>
<td>4.6 MW</td>
<td>Internal Use</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Border Pipeline, St. Anthony, North Dakota</td>
<td>Rolls Royce, RB211</td>
<td>38,000 hp</td>
<td>5.5 MW</td>
<td>Basin Electric Cooperative</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Border Pipeline, Wetonka, South Dakota</td>
<td>Rolls Royce, RB211</td>
<td>38,000 hp</td>
<td>5.5 MW</td>
<td>Basin Electric Cooperative</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Border Pipeline, Clark, South Dakota</td>
<td>Rolls Royce, RB211</td>
<td>38,000 hp</td>
<td>5.5 MW</td>
<td>Basin Electric Cooperative</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Border Pipeline, Estelline, South Dakota</td>
<td>Rolls Royce, RB211</td>
<td>38,000 hp</td>
<td>5.5 MW</td>
<td>Basin Electric Cooperative</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Pipeline, Kerrobert Station, Saskatchewan, Canada</td>
<td>GE LM2500</td>
<td>33,000 hp</td>
<td>5.5 MW</td>
<td>SaskPower</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectra Energy British Columbia Canada Savona</td>
<td>GE LM2000</td>
<td>28,000 hp</td>
<td>5.0 MW</td>
<td>BC Hydro</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectra Energy British Columbia Canada Kamloops</td>
<td>GE LM2500</td>
<td>28,000 hp</td>
<td>5.0 MW</td>
<td>BC Hydro</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ORC systems have also been installed in Europe, Japan and in China mainly for industrial waste heat recovery. In 2009 Enagas installed an 5.1 MW ORC at a compressor station in Almendralejo Spain.
Compressor size Threshold – the Economics of HSRG

The economics of HRSG is driven by gas/electricity prices and the size of the compressors. Studies in the US indicate that steam based HRSG in the absence of carbon credits really only makes sense for compressor stations producing around 15,000 hp (ie 11 MW). This size will typically be associated with large trunk-line compressors. Furthermore this US study indicated that only about 7-8% of all the pipeline compression in the US meets these criteria. In capacity terms it represents about 25% of the total installed capacity. Another 50% of the installed capacity is associated with compressor units less than 5000 hp. What this implies is that there is a large waste heat market in smaller compressor units assuming that financial incentives can be brought to bear.

Replicability

The table below sets out an estimate of the major trunkline compression. Essentially the 25% of the total installed capacity discussed above.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th># of Mainline Gas Compressor Stations</th>
<th>Power MW from HSRG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>2835-4410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>211 - 326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>62-97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>432-672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>184-286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trans Alaskan Pipeline</td>
<td>17 – 24</td>
<td>129-202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Future Demand

Chinese and Indian gas demand is expected to grow by some 170 bcm/yr by 2030 (EIA 2009 forecasts with around 120 Bcm/yr of this associated with China).
Much of this is expected to be met with LNG rather than pipelines requiring the need for more regional infrastructure rather than long line pipelines. Unfortunately these pipelines will operate at lower pressures requiring lower power output compressors (HP). Line lengths will be shorter as terminals can be sited nearer to consumption centers negating the need for multiple compressors. However there will still be a need for some long distance pipelines. Including gas into to India (possibly one 30 Bcm long distance line) and gas from Russia to China (one to two 30 Bcm lines); a third and fourth line from the Chinese gas fields in the west is already planned; a trans-Saharan pipeline may also be built and India may go ahead with its east coastal network. Estimates of the additional power output for this HRSG installed compression is some 1.2-1.5 GW of power about 30% more than what is assumed for existing gas assets. Global replication potential is in the order of about 8 GW, reducing GHG emissions by roughly 70 million tons per year.

**Implementation Readiness**

The client has identified priority objects for GTS modernization and has completed the pre-feasibility studies for the Soyuz and Urengoy-Pomary-Uzhgorod pipeline segments. However, a full-scale feasibility study would be required to meet the requirements of IFI lending and to shift the proposed investments to decrease GHG emissions as outlined above. It is important to note that the client is technically capable of implementing this project, drawing on decades of experience in the gas sector. Energy sector reforms are actively addressed by the World Bank’s DPL projects and EBRD technical Assistance support. The recent commitment of the Government of Ukraine to adopt EU energy Directives would lay the framework for opening access to the power grid, facilitating a market for the proposed options.

**Rationale for CTF financing**

The primary focus of Naftogaz investment program is the reliability of transmission of Russian gas to domestic and export markets. Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions will be reduced under the Business-as-Usual scenario through the replacement of out-of-date gas compressors operating at 24% efficiency with new equipment that is expected to be 50% more efficient. However, these investments represent only a part of the GHG reduction potential. As these gas compressors are replaced, they could be designed to accommodate the recovery of exhaust heat to produce electricity using either HRSGs or
The implementation of HRSGs/ORCEs would produce electricity with no fuel incremental fuel requirements – thus a source of electricity with no incremental GHG emissions.

The estimated cost of electricity from HRSGs, ORCs and Turboexpanders is roughly 3.5-4 US¢/kWh which would appear to compare favorably with current prices in the Ukraine wholesale market of 4-5 US¢/kWh. However, the output from these investments is similar to that of renewable energy options – they are not dispatchable because their output is a function of the load on the gas pipeline. As a result, the output is valued much lower than dispatchable technologies – the capacity of these technologies is valued at nearly zero as backup capacity is needed for periods when they are not operational. Hence, the value of the output of these investments is equivalent to the marginal operating cost of power plant options; typically less than 3 US¢/kWh. A buy-down of the capital cost of this equipment would address the financial viability issues. In addition, a buy-down of the transaction costs associated with being an early-adopter of a new technology and implementing in a system whose access is evolving, also requires low-cost financing support.

Table A2.4 HRSG vs. Wind Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HRSG</th>
<th>Wind Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carbon Emission</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost $/kW</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant Factor</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost per unit energy</td>
<td>0.5 $/kW/hour</td>
<td>0.9 $/kW/hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispatchable</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over the longer-term, these technologies are expected to become financially viable in the Ukraine energy market, depending on oil/gas prices as low fuel prices challenge the economically viability of all low carbon technologies. Current electricity prices reflect the marginal cost of supply which is largely operating costs since the assets are old and fully or nearly fully depreciated. As the capital stock in Ukraine is replaced, the cost of supply and, hence, energy prices, will increase to reflect these additional costs. To some extent, these capital charges will be mitigated by lower operating costs of newer, more efficient technologies, but the longer-term trend will require increased prices. As these prices evolve and as the low carbon technology costs decrease due to economies of scale in production costs, HRSGs, ORCE and Turboexpanders are expected to become financially viable and, hence a sustainable low carbon option.

The application of these technologies is not restricted to Ukraine: they are attractive options in any country that has a gas transmission network, with HRSGs likely applied for larger gas markets, ORCE for smaller markets and Turboexpanders applicable in markets where high pressure gas pipelines need to be reduced to lower pressures.

**Financing Plan**

The total expected project cost for pipeline and compressor replacement is about US$2
billion. The HRSG/ORC/Turboexpander component of this project is estimated to be about $700 million. Assuming US$100 million CTF support, the client expects to provide around 15% equity and requests the MDBs to consider providing up around US$500 million for the zero emissions component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDBs</th>
<th>Ukrainian Counterpart</th>
<th>CTF</th>
<th>Total Financing Package</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Package</th>
<th>USD 500 M</th>
<th>USD 100 M</th>
<th>USD 100 M</th>
<th>USD 700 M</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>USD 50 M</td>
<td>USD 50 M</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Project Preparation Timetable**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PCN Review</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board Approval</td>
<td>FY2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>