Person:
Hoekman, Bernard

International Trade, Poverty Reduction & Economic Management, World Bank

Fields of Specialization

International Trade

Departments

International Trade, Poverty Reduction & Economic Management, World Bank

Last updated February 1, 2023

Biography

Bernard Hoekman is the director of the World Bank’s international trade department. Prior positions at the World Bank include Research Manager of the trade and international integration team in the Development Research Group; manager of the trade capacity building program of the World Bank Institute; and trade economist in the Middle East/North Africa and Europe and Central Asia departments. He was an economist in the GATT Secretariat in Geneva during 1988-93, supporting the Uruguay Round negotiations. He has published widely on the world trading system, trade and development, trade agreements, international trade and investment in services, trade preferences and regional integration. He is a graduate of the Erasmus University Rotterdam, holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan and is a Research Fellow of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research and a Senior Affiliate of the Economic Research Forum for the Arab countries, Iran and Turkey.

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Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 71

Canada-Wheat : Discrimination, Non-Commercial Considerations, and State Trading Enterprises

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-08) Hoekman, Bernard ; Trachtman, Joel

Statutory marketing boards that have exclusive authority to purchase domestic production, sell for export, and set purchase and sales prices of commodities are a type of state trading enterprise that is subject to World Trade Organization disciplines. This paper assesses a recent dispute brought by the United States against Canada, alleging that WTO rules require state trading enterprises to operate solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that the Canadian government did not require the Canadian Wheat Board to do so. The panel and Appellate Body found that the primary discipline of the WTO regarding state trading enterprises was nondiscrimination, and that operating on the basis of "commercial considerations" was not an independent obligation. Instead, WTO disciplines regarding the pricing behavior of state trading enterprises use a "commercial considerations" test as a possible indicator of discrimination. Although a significant degree of price discrimination is observed in the case of Canadian wheat exports, there are economic arguments why this might also be pursued by a private, profit maximizing firm.
European Community—Sugar : Cross-Subsidization and the World Trade Organization

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-08) Hoekman, Bernard ; Howse, Robert

An important recent World Trade Organization dispute settlement case for many developing countries concerned European Union exports of sugar. Brazil, Thailand, and Australia alleged that the exports have substantially exceeded permitted levels as established by European Union commitments in the WTO. This case had major implications for both European Union sugar producers and developing countries that benefited from preferential access to the European Union market. It was also noteworthy in the use of economic arguments by the WTO dispute settlement panel, which held that the excess sugar exports were in part a reflection of illegal de facto cross-subsidization-rents from production that benefited from high support prices being used to cover losses associated with exports of sugar to the world market. Although in principle the economic arguments of the panel could apply to many other policy areas, in practice WTO provisions greatly limit the scope to bring similar arguments for trade in products that are not subject to explicit export subsidy reduction commitments of the type that were made for sugar and other agricultural commodities.
Regulatory Cooperation, Aid for Trade and the General Agreement on Trade in Services

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007-12) Hoekman, Bernard ; Mattoo, Aaditya

This paper discusses what could be done to expand services trade and investment through a multilateral agreement in the World Trade Organization. A distinction is made between market access liberalization and the regulatory preconditions for benefiting from market opening. The authors argue that prospects for multilateral services liberalization would be enhanced by making national treatment the objective of World Trade Organization services negotiations, thereby clarifying the scope of World Trade Organization commitments for regulators. Moreover, liberalization by smaller and poorer members of the World Trade Organization would be facilitated by complementary actions to strengthen regulatory capacity. If pursued as part of the operationalization of the World Trade Organization's 2006 Aid for Trade taskforce report, the World Trade Organization could become more relevant in promoting not just services liberalization but, more importantly, domestic reforms of services policies.
Strengthening the Global Trade Architecture for Development

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2002-01) Hoekman, Bernard

Despite recurring rounds of trade liberalization, under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT). Complemented by unilateral reforms, many developing countries have not been able to integrate into the world economy. The author argues that from the perspective of the poorest countries, a multi-pronged strategy is required to strengthen the global trading system. Moreover, much of the agenda must be addressed outside the WTO. The most important contribution the WTO can make to development, is to improve market access conditions - for goods and services - and ensure that trade rules are useful to developing countries. Enhancing trade capacity requires concerted action outside the WTO ("aid for trade") as well as unilateral actions by both industrial, and developing countries to reduce anti-trade biases.
Trading Market Access for Competition Policy Enforcement

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-01) Hoekman, Bernard ; Saggi, Kamal

Motivated by discussions at the World Trade Organization (WTO) on multilateral disciplines with respect to competition law, the authors develop a two-country model that explores the incentives of a developing country to offer increased market access (by way of a tariff reduction) in exchange for a ban on foreign export cartels by its developed country trading partner. They show that such a bargain is feasible and can generate a globally welfare-maximizing outcome. The authors also explore the incentives for bilateral cooperation when the developing country uses transfers to "pay" for competition enforcement by the developed country. A comparison of the two cases shows that there exist circumstances in which the stick (the tariff) is more effective in sustaining bilateral cooperation than the carrot (the transfer). Furthermore, the scope for cooperation is maximized when both instruments are used. An implication of the analysis is that developing countries have incentives to support an explicit WTO prohibition of export cartels.
Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and Multilateral Policy Options

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-06) Hoekman, Bernard M. ; Maskus, Keith E. ; Saggi, Kamal

The authors analyze national and international policy options to encourage the international transfer of technology, distinguishing between four major channels of such transfer: trade in products, trade in knowledge, foreign direct investment, and intra-national and international movement of people. They develop a typology of country types and appropriate policy rules of thumb as a guide to both national policymakers and rule making in the World Trade Organization, as policies should differentiate between countries. The authors also develop some rules of thumb for policy intervention. These include: 1) Liberal trade policies for all types of countries; 2) Temporary encouragement of foreign direct investment inflows for low-income countries; 3) Licensing for technical transformation and adaptive investments by local firms to apply technologies; 4) Policy options for source economies to encourage international transfer of technology to poor countries, including fiscal incentives, improvement of flows of public-domain technologies with appropriate subsidies, and price differentiation for exports of intellectual property products.
Economic Development and the World Trade Organization After Doha

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2002-06) Hoekman, Bernard M.

The author analyzes what actions could be taken in the context of the World Trade Organization's Doha negotiations to assist countries in reaping benefits from deeper trade integration. He discusses the policy agenda that confronts many developing countries and identifies a number of focal points that could be used both as targets and as benchmarks to increase the likelihood that WTO negotiations will support development. To achieve these targets, the author proposes a number of negotiating modalities for both goods and services-related market access issues, as well as rule-making in regulatory areas. Throughout the analysis, the author refers to the work of J. Michael Finger, whose numerous writings in this area have not only greatly influenced the thinking of policymakers and researchers on the interaction between trade policy, economic development, and the GATT/WTO trading system, but also provides a model for how to pursue effective policy research.
Policies Facilitating Firm Adjustment to Globalization

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004-11) Hoekman, Bernard ; Javorcik, Beata Smarzynska

The authors focus on policies facilitating firm adjustment to globalization. They briefly review the effects of trade and investment liberalization on firms, focusing on within-industry effects. They postulate that governments' role in supporting the process is to (1) ensure that firms face "right" incentives to adjust, and (2) intervene in areas where market failures are present. Their main message is that while many policies could be adopted to address market failures, they need to be carefully designed and implemented in a stable macroeconomic environment. An institutional infrastructure that supports the functioning of modern markets is most important. Proactive support policies of whatever stripe should be subject to cost-benefit analysis, based on the existence of an identified market failure, and monitored for performance and cost effectiveness. Transparency and accountability are critical in ensuring that interventions accomplish their intended objectives rather than being vehicles for rent seeking.
Government Procurement : Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2004-01) Evenett, Simon J. ; Hoekman, Bernard M.

The authors examine the effects on national welfare and market access of two public procurement practices-discrimination against foreign suppliers of goods and services and nontransparency of the procedures used to allocate government contracts to firms. Both types of policies have become prominent in international trade negotiations, including the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) trade talks. Traditionally, the focus of international trade agreements has been on market access. However, many developing countries have opposed the launch of negotiations to extend the principle of nondiscrimination to procurement. As a result, the current focus in the Doha Round is on an effort to launch discussions on agreeing to principles of transparency in procurement. While transparency will not constrain the ability of governments to discriminate in favor of domestic firms, it could nonetheless improve market access by reducing corruption. The authors assess and compare the impact of eliminating discrimination and fostering greater domestic competition in procurement markets and enhancing transparency in state contracting. Their analysis concludes that greater domestic competition on procurement markets and greater transparency will improve economic welfare. But there is no clear-cut effect on market access of ending discrimination or improving transparency. This mismatch between market access and welfare effects may account for the slower progress in negotiating procurement disciplines in trade agreements than for traditional border measures such as tariffs, given that market access is the driving force behind trade agreements.
Agricultural Tariffs or Subsidies : Which Are More Important for Developing Economies?

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004-05) Hoekman, Bernard ; Ng, Francis ; Olarreaga, Olarreaga

This article assesses the impact of the world price-depressing effect of agricultural subsidies and border protection in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries on developing economies' exports, imports, and welfare. Developing economy exporters are likely to benefit from reductions in such subsidies and trade barriers, whereas net importers may lose as world prices rise. A simple partial equilibrium model of global trade in commodities that benefit from domestic support or export subsidies is developed to estimate the relevant elasticities. Simulation results suggest that a 50 percent reduction in border protection will have a much larger positive impact on developing economies' exports and welfare than a 50 percent reduction in agricultural subsidies. Although there is significant heterogeneity across developing economies, the results suggest that efforts in the Doha round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations should be directed at substantially reducing border protection.