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Devarajan, Shantayanan

Development Economics

Fields of Specialization

Public economics, Trade policy, Natural resources and the environment, General equilibrium modeling

ORCID

0000-0002-7785-1810

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Development Economics

Last updated January 31, 2023

Biography

Shanta Devarajan is the Senior Director for Development Economics (DEC) at the World Bank. Previously, he was the Chief Economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa Region. Since joining the World Bank in 1991, he has been a Principal Economist and Research Manager for Public Economics in the Development Research Group, and the Chief Economist of the Human Development Network, the South Asia Region and Africa Region. He was a director of the World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People. Before 1991, he was on the faculty of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. A member of the Overseas Development Institute’s Board of Trustees, and the author or co-author of more than 100 publications, Mr. Devarajan’s research covers public economics, trade policy, natural resources and the environment, and general equilibrium modeling of developing countries. Born in Sri Lanka, Mr. Devarajan received his B.A. in mathematics from Princeton University and his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley. Shanta's latest blog posts can be found on his blog, Future Development. Please check out the Development Economics page for more info.

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Now showing 1 - 10 of 45

Goals for Development : History, Prospects, and Costs

(World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2002-04) Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Miller, Margaret J. ; Swanson, Eric V.

The Millennium Development Goals set quantitative targets for poverty reduction and improvements in health, education, gender equality, the environment, and other aspects of human welfare. At existing rates of progress many countries will fall short of these goals. However, if developing countries take steps to improve their policies and increased financial resources are made available, significant additional progress toward the goals is possible. The suthors provide a preliminary estimate of the additional financial resources which would be required if countries would work vigorously toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Two estimates of the resource gap are developed, one by estimating the additional resources necessary to increase economic growth so as to reduce income poverty, the other by estimating the cost of meeting specific goals in health, education, and the environment. Both estimates yield a figure in the range of $40-$70 billion in additional assistance per year, which is in line with estimates from other international development agencies and which would roughly represent a doubling of official aid flows over 2000 levels. While the authors believe this is a reasonable first approximation of the costs associated with achieving the Millennium Development Goals, it should be interpreted with caution for several reasons, including the lack of empirical data in many countries to estimate the relationship between expenditures on health or education and related outcomes, or the relationship between investment and growth, the sensitivity of the results to changes in the policy environment (both at the macroeconomic and sector level, and with respect to international trade), and opportunities for increased-and more efficient-domestic resource mobilization.
The Long-Run Economic Costs of AIDS : A Model with an Application to South Africa

(Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank, 2006-04-11) Bell, Clive ; Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Gersbach, Hans

Primarily a disease of young adults, Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) imposes economic costs that could be devastatingly high in the long run by undermining the transmission of human capital the main driver of long-run economic growth across generations. AIDS makes it harder for victims' children to obtain an education and deprives them of the love, nurturing, and life skills that parents provide. These children will in turn find it difficult to educate their children, and so on. An overlapping generations model is used to show that an otherwise growing economy could decline to a low level subsistence equilibrium if hit with an AIDS type increase in premature adult mortality. Calibrating the model for South Africa, where the HIV prevalence rate is over 20 percent, simulations reveal that the economy could shrink to half its current size in about four generations in the absence of intervention. Programs to combat the disease and to support needy families could avert such a collapse, but they imply a fiscal burden of about 4 percent of Gross domestic product (GDP).
The Long-run Economic Costs of AIDS : Theory and an Application to South Africa

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003-06) Bell, Clive ; Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Gersbach, Hans

Most existing estimates of the macroeconomic costs of AIDS, as measured by the reduction in the growth rate of gross domestic product, are modest. For Africa-the continent where the epidemic has hit the hardest-they range between 0.3 and 1.5 percent annually. The reason is that these estimates are based on an underlying assumption that the main effect of increased mortality is to relieve pressure on existing land and physical capital so that output per head is little affected. The authors argue that this emphasis is misplaced and that, with a more plausible view of how the economy functions over the long run, the economic costs of AIDS are almost certain to be much higher. Not only does AIDS destroy existing human capital, but by killing mostly young adults, it also weakens the mechanism through which knowledge and abilities are transmitted from one generation to the next. The children of AIDS victims will be left without one or both parents to love, raise, and educate them. The model yields the following results. In the absence of AIDS, the counterfactual benchmark, there is modest growth, with universal and complete education attained within three generations. But if nothing is done to combat the epidemic, a complete economic collapse will occur within three generations. With optimal spending on combating the disease, and if there is pooling, growth is maintained, albeit at a somewhat slower rate than in the benchmark case in the absence of AIDS. If pooling breaks down and is replaced by nuclear families, growth will be slower still. Indeed, if school attendance subsidies are not possible, growth will be distinctly sluggish. In all three cases, the additional fiscal burden of intervention will be large, which reinforces the gravity of the findings.
Is Investment in Africa Too Low or Too High? Macro and Micro Evidence

(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2001-01) Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Easterley, William R. ; Pack, Howard

The authors investigate the relationship between weak growth performance and low investment rates in Africa. The cross-country evidence suggests no direct relationship. The positive and significant coefficient on private investment appears to be driven by Botswana's presence in the sample. Allowing for the endogeneity of private investment, controlling for policy, and positing a nonlinear relationship make no difference to the conclusion. Higher investment in Africa would not by itself produce faster GDP growth. Africa's low investment and growth rates seem to be symptoms of underlying factors. To investigate those factors and to correct for some of the problems with cross-country analysis, the authors undertook a case study of manufacturing investment in Tanzania. They tried to identify why output per worker declined while capital per worker increased. Some of the usual suspects--such as shifts from high- to low-productivity subsectors, the presence of state-owned enterprises, or poor polices--did not play a significant role in this decline. Instead, low capacity utilization (possibly the by-product of poor policies) and constraints on absorptive capacity for skill acquisition seem to be critical factors. If Tanzania is not atypical, the low productivity of investment in Africa was the result of a combination of factors that occurred simultaneously, not any single factor. What does this tell us? First, we should be more careful about calling for an investment boom so that Africa can resume growth. Unless some or all of the underlying problems are addressed, the results may be disappointing. We should also be more circumspect about Africa's low savings rate; it may be low because returns to investment were so low. The relatively high level of capital flight from Africa may have been a level rational response to the lack of investment oportunities at home. Second, there is probably no single key to unlocking investment and GDP growth in Africa. All of the factors contributing to low productivity should be addressed simultaneously.
Budget Rules and Resource Booms : A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Analysis

(World Bank Group, Washington, DC, 2014-07) Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Dissou, Yazid ; Go, Delfin S. ; Robinson, Sherman

This paper develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to analyze and derive simple budget rules in the face of volatile public revenue from natural resources in a low-income country like Niger. The simulation results suggest three policy lessons or rules of thumb. When a resource price change is positive and temporary, the best strategy is to save the revenue windfall in a sovereign fund, and use the interest income from the fund to raise citizens' consumption over time. This strategy is preferred to investing in public capital domestically, even when private investment benefits from an enhanced public capital stock. Domestic investment raises the prices of domestic goods, leaving less money for government to transfer to households; public investment is not 100 percent effective in raising output. In the presence of a negative temporary resource price change, however, the best strategy is to cut public investment. This strategy dominates other methods, such as trimming government transfers to households, which reduces consumption directly, or borrowing, which incurs an interest premium as debt rises. In the presence of persistent (positive and negative) shocks, the best strategy is a mix of public investment and saving abroad in a balanced regime that provides a natural insurance against both types of price shocks. The combination of interest income from the sovereign fund, transfers to households, and output growth brought about by public investment provides the best protective mechanism to smooth consumption over time in response to changing resource prices.
MENA Quarterly Economic Brief, July 2014 : Predictions, Perceptions and Economic Reality

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014-07) Devarajan, Shanta ; Mottaghi, Lili

This issue of the MENA quarterly brief assesses the macroeconomic performance of seven of the MENA countries: Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Libya. All of these countries experienced rapid economic growth during 2000-10, and suffered a sharp economic slowdown in the aftermath of 2011. The brief focuses on the challenges facing these countries with a closer look at the actual growth performance in comparison with their forecasts and highlights the limitations of forecasting in the wake of the 2011 uprisings; and at the consequences of the growth slowdown, including unemployment, where perceptions may diverge from reality. The story is told in fourteen charts.
Middle East and North Africa Regional Economic Update, April 2014 : Harnessing the Global Recovery - A Tough Road Ahead

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014-04) Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Mottaghi, Lili

Compared with the previous three years, 2014 seems hopeful and 2015 could be a turning point for the countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Many countries in MENA will start to benefit from stronger external demand in the high-income economies, as the global economy is set for a rebound in 2014. In the MENA region, higher global demand is expected to boost exports of energy and manufactured products in those countries that have trade linkages with high- income countries. Growth in MENA is expected to reach 3.3 percent in 2014 and further accelerate to 4.6 percent in 2015. Nevertheless, the prospects for growth in MENA could be threatened if long awaited structural problems remain unresolved.
Middle East and North Africa Quarterly Economic Brief, January 2014 : Growth Slowdown Heightens the Need for Reforms

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014-01) Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Mottaghi, Lili

Ongoing regional tensions, together with a challenging (albeit slightly improving) external environment, have hit the economies of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region hard. Economic growth is slowing, fiscal buffers are depleting, unemployment is rising, and inflation is mounting in seven of the region’s most vulnerable economies-- Egypt, Tunisia, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen and Libya. Short-term policy actions such as increasing public sector wages and subsidies—aimed at reducing social tensions--exacerbate the situation, which is driven by long-standing structural weaknesses, including labor market rigidities, complicated and opaque regulations, infrastructure deficiencies, regressive and inefficient subsidies, and inadequate social safety nets. While these countries face an unstable political and macroeconomic environment, the growth slowdown after the Arab Spring creates a unique opportunity to address these structural problems to both create fiscal space and restructure the economy towards job creation and inclusive growth.
Middle East and North Africa Quarterly Economic Brief, July 2013 : Growth Slowdown Extends into 2013

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013-07) Devarajan, Shantayanan ; Mottaghi, Lili

While the focus has been on the recent change in government in Egypt, five countries in the Middle East and North Africa Region, including Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and Iran are facing a growth slowdown, rising fiscal deficits and debt, and high unemployment and inflation. Continued political turmoil in Egypt and spillovers from the civil war in Syria to Jordan and Lebanon threaten to make their economic situation worse. While easing political tensions in Tunisia and post-election improvements in Iran’s international relations may help these countries, the overall macroeconomic outlook in all five countries for the rest of 2013 is grim.
Middle East and North Africa Data Book, September 2014

(Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2014-09) Devarajan, Shanta ; Mottaghi, Lili

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) data book serves as a quick reference and a reliable dataset for monitoring economic and social developments in the region. The data are drawn from the 2014 World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) and International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) direction of trade statistics. It contains macroeconomic, sectoral, and social indicators for 19 countries in the MENA region and aggregates for other developing regions. The data book presents following topics: basic indicators; national and fiscal accounts; trade; infrastructure; and human development.